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“CANADIAN FORCES DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: ARE WE READY TO MAKE CANADA FIRST?”

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MASTERS OF DEFENCE STUDIES RESEARCH PROJECT

“Canadian Forces Domestic Operations: Are We Ready to Make Canada First?”

By Major D.S. MacGregor
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ABSTRACT

Compared to the excitement of conducting expeditionary operations in countries such as Afghanistan and Libya recently, domestic operations (Dom Ops) are not usually embraced by Canadian Forces (CF) members with the similar amount of vigour and anticipation. However, Dom Ops should not be prioritized as secondary. The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) clearly articulates six core missions for the CF of which the first four directly relate to missions in a Dom Ops context. In addition, the CFDS provides direction on three roles for the CF, the primary role being defending Canada and delivering excellence at home, amplifying the importance and primacy of Dom Ops for the CF. Internal messaging from Commander Canada Command (CanadaCOM) since the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games has been that Dom Ops are “No Fail” missions. Considering this information and the context of our post 9-11 operating environment, it is paramount that preparedness and due diligence are adhered to when planning, preparing or executing CF operations in a domestic context and that there is no question to CF Readiness.

This paper examines CF Readiness to execute the domestic missions it has been assigned by the government of Canada through the CFDS. The examination deduced that the CF is ready to execute Dom Ops in accordance with CFDS however it was noted that Dom Ops will always fight a losing battle with expeditionary ops.

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INTRODUCTION

Once Canada leaves Afghanistan, the Forces will go back to their default duties as outlined in the “Canada First Defence Strategy”. This includes being able to respond to domestic emergencies, terrorist attacks and natural disasters...and being ready to contribute 2000 or more troops to an overseas mission.¹

Brigadier General D.W. Thompson.

Introduction to the CF Dom Ops Readiness Question

Considering that the primary role of the Canadian Forces (CF) is the defence of Canada as assigned by the government of Canada (GoC) in the *Canada First Defence Strategy* (CFDS),² CF operations conducted inside the borders of the nation for the same purposes have a degree of primacy assigned to them by the Department of National Defence (DND).³ The defence of Canada is not only CF commitments to military organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), it includes a significant role within the context of Domestic Operations (Dom Ops).⁴ Despite this primary role, one of three for the CF in the CFDS, the CF has a current primary focus on wartime operations, such

¹ Brigadier General Thompson. “Interview with Jeff Davis of The Hill Times Online; <http://www.hilltimes.com>, 4 December 2010 as Chief of Staff for Land Operations.

² Department of National Defence. “*Canada First Defence Strategy*”, Part III, Roles of the Canadian Forces; Defending Canada-Delivering Excellence at Home. 7.

³ Canada, Department of National Defence. *Commander Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations*, page 1-1/18.

⁴ Department of National Defence. CFJP 3.0, Chapter 6 Domestic Operations. Page 7-1. Definition Domestic Operations: Domestic operations are conducted within the confines of Canadian territory and exclusive economic zones and take many different shapes and forms: assistance during civil emergencies; support to national development goals; support to the maintenance of public order and security, and/or their restoration; and conduct of surveillance-and-control operations.

as Afghanistan, which often competes for valued government resources.⁵ The GoC, specifically the CF, is continually faced with the struggle of balancing the requirements and demands of both in order to ensure *Excellence at Home* and *International Peace and Security* as articulated in the CFDS. When the CF performs Dom Ops such as consequence management for floods, fires and earthquakes, assistance to other government departments such as assistance to law enforcement agencies (ALEA), aid to civil power (ACP) and Canadian special security events (CSSE), they directly compete for the precious manpower and resources which are currently in a CF managed readiness cycle for expeditionary operations⁶ such as Afghanistan, Libya or Haiti.⁷

Dom Ops have proven to be of extreme importance to the Canadian public as they are close in physical proximity and citizens desire a sense of security and confidence in their government response.⁸ Importance of Dom Ops in a CF context are amplified by the fact that they are contained in the top four of six core missions as set out in the 2008 CFDS by the GoC. These core domestic missions include; 1) Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD, 2) Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics, 3) Respond to a major terrorist attack, and 4) Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster. Dom Ops also represent the primary task of the CF as directed by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in CF doctrine.⁹ Considering these demands, the CF must

⁵ Sheena Bolton. *Logistics*. Legion Magazine 21 July 2011. Accessed by internet 5 March 2012. <http://www.legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2011/07/logistics/>

⁶ Ibid, page 7-13. Definition Expeditionary Operations: Operations conducted by forces of two or more nations acting together (outside sovereign soil), are increasingly the norm for expeditionary operations.

⁷ Current Army Managed Readiness Model – Dated November 2011.

⁸ Gutterman, Pearl S. “Psychological Preparedness for Disaster”. Department of Psychology, York University, Toronto, ON 2005. Page 3.

⁹ Department of National Defence. CFJP 3.0, Chapter 6 and CFJP 3-2, *Domestic Operations*.

ensure that it maintains capability including response, preparedness¹⁰ and overall Readiness¹¹ in order to execute the tasks, roles and responsibilities assigned to it internally within DND and externally by the GoC. This paper will show that the CF possesses the Readiness necessary to achieve the demands required for assigned domestic core missions as stated in the CFDS.

The methodology used to prove this thesis statement will be a *Conditions Check*¹² format, similar to CF military conditions checks utilized during operations.¹³ Criteria in which Readiness of the core domestic missions will be measured against will be *a) CF Disposition, b) CF and Whole of Government Approach, c) Application of Lessons Learned and d) Interconnectedness with the United States*. These criteria are based upon the *Four Pillars* that are identified in the CFDS but are less simplified and examine CF capability, preparedness and overall Readiness at a more micro-level.¹⁴ An illustration of how CF Dom Ops Readiness will be measured in this *Conditions Check*, including legend, can be found at Table 1.1.

¹⁰ Department of Public Safety. *Federal Emergency Response Plan*. Appendix A, Definition of Preparedness: A phase of emergency management consisting in making decisions and taking measures before an emergency, in order to be ready to effectively respond and recover (ECCV).

¹¹ CF *Readiness* for the purposes of this paper is its collective preparedness, capability and ability to response.

¹² Conditions Check for the purposes of this paper is the overall “systems” evaluation of the CF components which enable the execution of CF Domestic Operations.

¹³ Department of Defence. “Op ATTENTION Conditions Based Process.” Accessed by internet 23 April 2012. <http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/attention/index-eng.asp>

¹⁴ Government of Canada. *Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS)*. CFDS Part V, Rebuilding the Canadian Forces. The 4 pillars are generalized at a macro government level and would not provide the detail required of this paper to assess true CF *Readiness*

<i>Criteria</i> <i>Core Domestic Missions</i>	1) Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD	2) Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics	3) Respond to a major terrorist attack	4) Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.	Legend	
a) CF Disposition, and						Ready
b) CF and Whole of Government Approach,						Partially Ready
c) Application of Lessons Learned						Not Ready
d) Interconnectedness with the United States.						

Table 1.1: CF Dom Ops Readiness Conditions Check (Criteria, Core Missions and Legend)

The outline of this paper will follow the structure of the conditions check methodology using the criteria and assessed factors as identified in Table 1.1. There are four chapters, the first investigates CF Dom Ops Readiness with regard to CF disposition. Legal authority, CF assets with capability and CF C2 structure will be highlighted. After examining internally to the CF for Readiness, Chapter Two will investigate the Whole of Government Approach. Focus will be placed on CF integration with other government departments (OGDs), utility of a unified chain of command and availability federal funding. This paper will then transition to an investigation of Canadian and CF interconnectedness with the United States in Chapter Three. The Canadian Defence Plan (CDP) and Civil Assistance Plan (CAP) will be discussed in conjunction with current information sharing relationships between CanadaCOM, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and NORAD. Chapter Four will investigate if Dom Ops lessons have actually been learned in a *Routine*¹⁵, *Contingency*¹⁶ and *Rapid Reaction*¹⁷

¹⁵ Department of National Defence. CFJP 3-2, *Domestic Operations*. Chapter 4. Routine operations are force-employment activities that are normally recurring in nature, can usually be planned for, and are programmed on an annual basis.

¹⁶ Ibid. Contingency operations are planned in advance of known events or events that could reasonably be expected, thereby permitting a formal planning process.

¹⁷ Ibid. Rapid-response operations are those force-employment activities that require an immediate CF action to save lives, reduce human suffering, or mitigate property damage. In the interest of

Dom Op context over the past 10 years. The final chapter will conclude with an overall Readiness declaration for the CF in its assessed capability to perform the core domestic missions as directed by the CFDS. Throughout this paper, CF Dom Ops Readiness will be researched in the post 9-11 era in order ensure that the assessment can be applied to modern Dom Ops and the current threat.

Context of Existing and Future Domestic Threats to Canada

Before this chapter concludes, context needs to be provided on the domestic threat environment both forecasted and unforecasted prior to the analysis of criteria in chapters two through six. In the context of defining the domestic threat, description will be provided initially on natural disasters then man-made disasters and finally the domestic security threat of terrorism. The domestic threats will be examined within the CF Domestic Operations Area of responsibility (AOR)¹⁸ and Area of Interest (AOI)¹⁹.

The forest fires in British Columbia in the summer of 2003 were estimated to be the second most destructive in Canadian History²⁰ and the river floods in Manitoba in the spring and summer of 2011 were the most costly and second in magnitude to the 1997 flood.²¹ Natural disasters such as floods, fires, tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes and various other storms have increased significantly in Canada and they can be directly

achieving timely effects, planning will be reduced to its essential components; thus higher risk is accepted in planning, preparing, and coordinating the operation.

¹⁸ Department of National Defence. *Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO)* 12 February, 2012. 1. Canada COM's AOR includes Canada, the continental United States (specifically the 48 contiguous states and Alaska), Mexico and the approaches to the same.

¹⁹ Department of National Defence. *Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO)* 12 February, 2012. The CF Domestic AOI can be defined any part of the globe that affects Canadian domestic security.

²⁰ Government of Canada. *Parliamentary Review Bulletin (PRB) 03-54E*; Natural Disasters: Insurance Availability and Affordability. <http://www.parl.gc.ca>.

²¹ Steven Ashton. Manitoba Emergency measures Minister interview with CBC, 13 June 2011 accessed by internet on 15 December 2011. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2011/06/13/mb-flood-fight-emotion-manitoba.html>

contributed to global climate change according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.²² This environmental trend compounded with increased densely populated areas near traditional disaster prone zones can magnify the impacts of disasters as seen in Kelowna during the 2003 BC fires and Portage la Prairie during the 2011 Manitoba Floods.²³ Similar parallels can be made of other natural domestic threats such as SARS, Avian Flu and other pandemics which are forecasted to increase due to an increasingly mobile and growing population.²⁴ This has placed a heightened urgency for the government of Canada (GoC) to be able to effectively and efficiently respond to these domestic emergencies ensuring citizen safety and confidence. The corresponding urgency for the CF in the execution of a Dom Ops response is equally as important. They can take form as Routine, Contingency or Rapid Reaction operations to address natural disasters which will be discussed more in detail in Chapter Two. A snapshot of CF Dom Ops responses for a Natural Disaster threat is identified in Table 1.2.

Operation Name	Description
CF Domestic Response for Natural Disasters in Canada (post 9-11)	
Op PLUME	2002 Forest Fires, Gibbons AB
Op PEREGRINE	2003 Forest Fires, Kelowna BC
Op SPLINTER	2003 Hurricane Juan, Halifax NS
Op PONTOON	2007 Flooding, Fraser Valley BC
Op CANTON	2010 Snow Storm, Sarnia ON
Op LAMA	2010 Hurricane Igor, Newfoundland Coast
Op LOTUS	2011 Floods, Lake Champlaine and Richilieu River PQ
Op LUSTRE	2011 Floods, Assiniboine River, MB
Op FORGE	2011 Forest Fires, Northern Ontario
Op LYRE	2011 Floods, Souris River, MB
Op LENTUS	CF Support to OGD for Disaster Relief Operations
CF Domestic Response for Natural Disasters outside Canada (post 9-11)	
Op STRUCTURE	2004 DART response to Sri Lanka Tsunami
Op UNISON	2005 CF support to Hurricane Katrina
Op PLATEAU	2005 DART response to Pakistan earthquake
Op HESTIA	2010 CF support to Haiti earthquake
Op JAGUAR	2011 CF SAR support to Jamaica

²² United Nations. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Fourth Assessment Report 2007, Working Group I The Physical Science Basis; 3.2 Changes in Surface Climate: Temperature.*

²³ Health Canada. Health Policy Research Bulletin, April, Issue 13; *Disasters: A Snapshot of trends and Issues, page 10-12.*

²⁴ Ibid, 13.

Table 1.2: CF Domestic Operations in Response to Natural Disasters (Post 9-11)²⁵

The domestic threat environment as it pertains to man-made disasters, excluding terrorism, is also on the rise. Considering growing populations, greater volumes of tourism involving aircraft, trains and cruise ships which can access further remote areas as well as increased transportation of dangerous goods on roads, railways and waterways, the threat of man-made disasters is significant. One only has to turn on the television to acknowledge this as images of the Costa Concordia cruise ship sinking off the coast of Italy, the air crash in Nunavut and the CN rail crash in Toronto permeate all networks. Critical infrastructure supporting the energy needs of a growing and demanding population include nuclear facilities, refineries and hydro-electric dams all of which hold great potential for man-made disasters such as the BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, and the nuclear emergency in Fukushima, Japan. The GoC, specifically the CF, must be capable of responding to these man-made threats as well as many others. Special CF assets and technical skills as well as planned and rehearsed contingency Dom Ops will be required to counter this threat and will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two. An illustration table of CF response to man-made disasters is represented at Table 1.3.

Operation Name	Description
CF Domestic Response for Man-Made Disasters in Canada (post 9-11)	
Contingency	CF Response to MAJAID (Major Air Disaster)
Contingency	CF Response to MAJMAR (Maj Maritime Disaster)
Contingency	Major Loss to Life, Damage to Critical Infrastructure and Man Made Disasters that are beyond the capacity of OGDs

Table 1.3: CF Response to Man-Made Disasters in Canada (Post-911).²⁶

²⁵ Canada Command website: <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca>

²⁶ Ibid.

Lastly, the final domestic threat of concern that will complete the definition of the domestic threat environment are those in the security of Canada and Canadians domain and generally require assistance to OGDs. These include CF responses required in the event of domestic terrorism, domestic cyber-threats, threats from space to Canada, support to security of major events in Canada and general assistance to OGDs that may be overwhelmed anywhere in the domestic AOR. Asset allocation will be further investigated in Chapter Two with regard to specific response and capability. Operations that the CF has responded to concerning issues of security and support to OGDs are identified in Table 1.4.

Operation Name	Description
CF Domestic Response in Support of OGDs in Canada (post 9-11)	
Op GRIZZLY	2002 G8 Summit, Kananaskis BC (RCMP lead)
Op PODIUM	2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics (RCMP lead)
Op CADENCE	2010 G8/G20 Summits Toronto/Muskoka
Op SUPPORT	2001 Human Assistance in 9-11 aftermath
Op POSEIDON	2009 Illegal Migrants off Pacific Coast
Op NEPTUNE STRIKE	Contingency: Sp to OGD for Maritime Terrorism Threat
Op LENTUS	Contingency: Sp to OGD for Disaster Relief Operations
CF Domestic Response in Support of OGDs outside Canada (post 9-11)	
Op NOBLE EAGLE	CF support to NORAD in securing NA airspace

Table 1.4: CF Response for Security Events in Canada and in Support of OGDs.²⁷

The named Dom Ops in Tables 1.2, 1.3 or 1.4 are be in CF Routine or Contingency Operations but it is not an exhaustive list. There are others but unfortunately due to their classified nature, they are not discussed in this paper. Some of these include support to Public Safety Canada and the RCMP in counter-drug operations, fish patrols with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) as well as standing

²⁷ Ibid.

Search and Rescue (SAR) responses.²⁸ This paper will commence the investigation of Readiness in the next section, *Chapter One - Current CF Disposition for Domestic Operations*.

²⁸ Department of National Defence. "Canadian Mission Partners". Canada Comamnd website accessed 23 April 2012. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/site/partners-can-eng.asp>

CHAPTER 1 - CURRENT CF DISPOSITION FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

*“Job No.1 is keeping citizens (Canadians) safe at home...Canada Command has the equipment it requires, and more, to successfully fulfil its critical, busy mandate. The unit (CanadaCOM) is well prepared to juggle a multitude of tasks from fighting forest fires to terrorist attacks to responding to disasters and search & rescue needsThere are no equipment shortages. We actually have more than we need”.*²⁹

Lieutenant General W. Semianiw, Commander Canada Command, 2011

Introduction to Disposition

The GoC has not officially assigned a leading role for the CF, or DND, in the execution of Dom Ops and for very good reasons which will be explored within this chapter. However, history has proven that the CF has played a significant role in domestic responses of all natures as identified in tables 1.2 and 1.4. Commander Canada Com and the CDS have stated that Defence of Canada is the main priority of the CF but in the conduct of domestic operations it is to play a supporting role.³⁰ Considering direction from the CDS and Commander CanadaCOM as well as the GoC via the first 4 core missions assigned by the CFDS to the CF, it is essential that the CF is capable, prepared and has an overall Readiness for the execution of Dom Ops. Dom Ops are of great importance to the CF but it first must ensure that it has the required disposition not only in assets but also legislation, legal authority and doctrine to do so. In the next section, CF Readiness in Dom Ops will be determined within the CF Disposition context.

²⁹ Walter Semianiw Lieutenant General. Address to Members of Parliament on the Defence Committee, 29 November, 2011. <http://www.ipolitics.ca>.

³⁰ Department of National Defence. *Commander Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations Version 1, 2006 (CCDDO v1)*. Page 1-2/8.

Legal Authority for CF involvement in Dom Ops: Is it Sufficient?

There is no legislation or federal plan that places direct responsibility on the CF to lead any type of domestic response other than SAR³¹ except in extreme circumstances under the *Emergencies Act*³² 1988 (EA), supported by the *National Defence Act* (NDA)³³ and the *Constitution Act 1867* (BNA)³⁴. This enables the CF to play a supporting role to the departments and agencies that are specifically designed for domestic responses such as the RCMP, CCG and emergency management offices at the provincial and municipal level. The relatively new EA also provides flexibility to restrictions in the dated BNA, specifically the restriction in BNA section 92 which gives the provinces exclusive jurisdiction over justice and matters of private nature in the province³⁵. This enables the CF to support a provincial body such as BC Ministry of Forests or MB Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport which occurred in Op PEREGRINE and Op LUSTRE respectively.³⁶ The EA now allows the GoC to intervene in situations of *national emergencies*³⁷ by invoking special powers over the provinces to deal with specific emergencies, which the CF must be aware of. Rare situations where the CF may be involved with a domestic response, or even lead, under the legislation of the EA are limited to *public-welfare emergencies, public-order emergencies, international*

³¹ Government of Canada. *Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP)*. Annex A, page 9.

³² Department of National Defence. *CFJP 3-2 Domestic Operations*. Annex A. The *Emergencies Act* details the four types of national emergencies, public welfare, public order, international and war.

³³ *Ibid.* The *National Defence Act* Part VI deals with aid of the civil power. Section 156 outlines the powers of the military police. Section 273.6(1) provides for CF support as a “public service”. Section 273.6(2) provides for CF ALEA support.

³⁴ *Ibid.* The BNA of 1867 defines much of the operation of the GoC including its federal structure, the House of Commons, the Senate, the justice system and the taxation system.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Department of National Defence. “Op PEREGRINE and Op LUSTRE Backgrounders”. Canada Command website accessed 23 April 2012. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca>

³⁷ *Ibid.* Glossary. Definition of national emergency is an emergency that arises from threats to the security of Canada and is of a serious nature. Definition is similar within the *Emergencies Act*.

emergencies and *war emergencies*.³⁸ The strict conditions which must be met in order to authorize CF employment under the EA are; a national emergency is declared, the event exceeds the capacity of the provinces and federal OGDs, the event cannot be addressed by any law in Canada, the crisis is of limited duration and there is provincial and parliamentary consent to do so with authorization by the Minister of National Defence (MND).³⁹ It can be seen that the use of the CF is heavily scrutinized prior to its employment to ensure that it is absolutely necessary. This legislation only protects the CF and enables it to support other OGD lead agencies either federal or provincial.

In 1988, the EA replaced the dated *War Measures Act 1914* (WMA)⁴⁰ outright. The EA differs from the WMA in that the cabinet cannot act unilaterally, it needs review by parliament. The EA also demands that any action taken in a *national emergency* or new laws made under the EA are subject to the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982*, specifically citizen civil rights⁴¹, which only further protects the CF from any liability in the performance of duty. The EA ensures legal protection and consideration for responsible and accountable CF employment for Dom Ops, specifically during *national emergencies*. It demands the necessary checks and balances of the GoC forcing it to consider second and third order effects such as citizen civil right infringement. The EA is a key contributor to CF Readiness in from a legal perspective.

³⁸ Department of Defence. CFJP 3.0 *Operations*. Chapter 6, page 6-3.

³⁹ Ibid. Page 6-3.

⁴⁰ Department of National Defence. CFJP 3-2 *Domestic Operations*. Annex A. The *War Measures Act* of 1914 was a document concentrating on threat stemming from the First World War. Its dated nature pertaining to modern day domestic threats to Canada demanded the newer legislation of the *Emergencies Act* in 1988.

⁴¹ Department of National Defence. *Commander Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations Version 1, 2006 (CCDDO v1)*. Page 1-3/8.

Additional legislation facilitating CF employment and Readiness for Dom Ops are the *Emergency Preparedness Act 1988*⁴² (EPA) and the *Emergency Management Act 2007*⁴³ (EMA). Although the EMA is more recent, the EPA is the keystone Domestic response legislation for the GoC. Most importantly, the EMA provides legal authorization for *Public Safety Canada*⁴⁴ (PS) to be the overall coordinator of a GoC national response to national security and the defence of Canadians, including domestic emergencies, since 2003⁴⁵. This direct assignment of mission provides the CF clarity to whom is overall responsible. The EPA contents are keystone and establish emergency preparedness as a required activity for all federal departments, including DND, to include the requirement of all department ministers, including the MND, to identify areas of potential emergencies and to develop plans in response with applicable testing exercises.⁴⁶ Even though the CF is extremely limited legally in leading a domestic response, it plays a significant assisting role in the GoC overall response which is articulated in the *Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP)*.⁴⁷ The DND/CF is identified as an assisting department in all GoC responses to domestic crisis except those tasks dealing with human and social services and GoC policy. The reason why the CF does not lead or assist with regard to human and social services are due to a restriction identified in the Queen's Regulations and Orders (QR&O).⁴⁸ Generally, civilian health

⁴² Department of National Defence. CFJP 3-2 *Domestic Operations*. Annex A. *The Emergency Preparedness Act* of 1988, specifically the amendment in 2007, established the newly formed Department of Public Safety and outlined the duties and functions of the Minister of Public Safety.

⁴³ Ibid. The *Emergency Management Act* of 2007 established the leadership responsibilities of the Minister of Public Safety in dealing with emergencies and coordinating the responses of government institutions.

⁴⁴ The 2007 amendment to the EPA created Public Safety Canada and replaced PSEPC.

⁴⁵ Extracted from Public Safety Canada website on 5 March 2012: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca>

⁴⁶ *Emergency Preparedness Act 1988/2007*.

⁴⁷ Government of Canada. *Federal Emergency Response Plan*. Annex A-Emergency Support Functions.

care is provided by the province but the CF can provide in case of suffering and preservation of life or if a provincial minister of health requests it.⁴⁹ This only adds to the protection of the CF in the execution of Dom Ops, specifically being liable to a civilian illness, injury or death.

The FERP direction is coordinated and managed by PS on behalf of the GoC and was created in January 2011. Annex A of the FERP details which primary federal government department is the lead with regard to various types of national responses required. Assignment of duties is directly related to the area of specialty for each department. There are thirteen identified areas, none of which the CF is directly responsible but has been directed to assist in most. The key take-away from the FERP document from a CF perspective is that there is a better understanding of assigned and implied tasks and there is one federal department, PS, who is the main point of contact. With the release of the FERP, roles and responsibilities for an integrated GoC response to domestic emergencies are clear in written and official format along with reference to reinforcing legislation. This will only assist the CF in executing Dom Ops as all key players will be known and the responsibilities that they are charged with.

Additional legislation applicable to the CF is the *National Defence Act* (NDA). The NDA is a legislative document much closer and intimate to the CF and it provides provisions in addition to the ones already mentioned that facilitate CF Readiness in the execution of Dom Ops. It clearly articulates CF constraints and restraints, specifically

⁴⁸ QR&O 34.30.

⁴⁹ Department of National Defence. *Commander Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations Version 1, 2006 (CCDDO v1)*. Annex I, page 2/7

with regards to Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies (ALEA)⁵⁰ and Aid to Civil Power (ACP)⁵¹ where CF members may be given the powers and protections of *peace officers*⁵² in accordance with Section 2 of the Criminal Code of Canada⁵³ depending on the magnitude of the law enforcement assistance. This status is not assumed by the CF in Dom Ops. Subsection 273.6(2) of the NDA enables the CF to assist civilian LEAs when the demand is pursuant to the request for assistance (RFA) process and it obtains the legal authority. This process allows the required amount of scrutiny between the requesting minister and the MND, with over watch of the Solicitor General and PS, in order to arrive at a responsible CF response which is authorized by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

Serial	Canadian Legislature or Law regulating CF Dom Ops
1	Constitution Act (BNA) 1867
2	War Measures Act (WMA) 1914
3	National Defence Act (NDA)
4	Criminal Code of Canada (CCC)
5	Emergencies Act (EA) 1988
6	Emergency Preparedness Act (EPA) 1988
7	Emergency Management Act (EMA) 2007

Table 1.5: Key Legislation Regulating the Execution of Domestic Operations by the CF

CF support to ALEA specifically, is further enabled in addition to the NDA by orders in council and directives such as CF assistance to provincial police forces⁵⁴,

⁵⁰ Section 273.6(2) of NDA allows ALEA (Class 1 to 4).

⁵¹ Sections 279, 280 and 285 of NDA prescribe authority in the CF aid to civil power.

⁵² Department of National Defence. CFJP 3-2 *Domestic Operations*. Glossary. Pursuant to subsection 273.6(2) of the NDA and by virtue of QR&O 22.01(3), those CF members directly performing law-enforcement duties would have the status of *Peace Officer* during the time they are performing said duties.

⁵³ Section 2 of CCC.

⁵⁴ CFAPPF – Canadian Forces Assistance to Provincial Police Forces Directions is a standing order in council enabling CF ALEA support .

assistance to correctional services⁵⁵ and assistance to federal law in case of terrorist acts or similar violence⁵⁶. These legally binding orders add specification to CF support to various LEAs which facilitates a faster and more efficient requesting process. Recurring support and utilization of CF in this type of support role are further enabled with non-legally binding memorandums of understanding (MOUs). MOUs such as those between the CF and DFO for fishery patrols⁵⁷ and the CF and RCMP for counter drug operations⁵⁸ administratively establish a relationship and formal provision of support agreement making reaction even more efficient from the CF. Similar to subsection 273.6(2) for ALEA, section VI of the NDA facilitates the ACP support function of the CF where they could be called out to aid civil powers for disturbances of the peace or riots. Requesting procedures parallel ALEA and peace officer status can be obtained for ACP.

Highlighted in this section have been key legislature, laws and directives that enable and legally protect the CF to execute a role in Dom Ops. It is obvious that it is sufficient and abundant in order to enable the CF in its execution of Dom Ops, specifically ALEA and ACP. No apparent gaps appear when just investigating the law in isolation but perhaps there are gaps in the enabling of CF to execute Dom Ops from a GoC direction point of view. This will be examined in the next section of the CF Disposition.

⁵⁵ Assistance to Federal Penitentiaries Order – Another example of an order in council enabling CF support to ALEA

⁵⁶ CFAAD – Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directions is a standing order in council enabling CF ALEA support.

⁵⁷ MOU between the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and the CF respecting Surface Ship Patrols and Aerial Fisheries Surveillance. CFJP 3-2, page 6-8.

⁵⁸ MOU Respecting CF Assistance in Support of the RCMP in its Drug Law enforcement Role. CFJP 3-2, page 6-8.

Government Direction to the CF in the execution of Domestic Operations

The GoC considers the security and defence of Canada and its citizens at home its top priority. This was originally articulated by the GoC, in an official capacity, in the 2004 National Security Policy (NSP), titled *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*.⁵⁹ This policy was the first security framework that the GoC had published of this nature and highlighted three security areas of interest which were primarily domestic in nature and provided the CF with a more modern concept of *commander's intent* from the perspective of the GoC. The NSP was a pioneer document in the adoption a whole of government approach by integrating all departments, including the Canadian Forces (CF), into a security system and created an integrated threat assessment centre (ITAC) which all departments could have access to information.⁶⁰ A year later in 2005, the GoC released the International Policy Statement (IPS) which dictated the way ahead for the CF in the post 9-11 world of failed and failing states, highlighting the adaptive changes of CF transformation. Contained within the IPS was the Defence Policy Statement (DPS) which clearly identified the future security agenda and roll-out of new CF initiatives and command structures, including those concerning domestic operations (Dom Ops).⁶¹ The DPS highlighted certain aspects of domestic operations contained in the NPS, specifically the CF operational tempo and commitment to Dom Ops in the decade previous to the document's release.⁶² In accordance with the direction for the CF within the IPS, Canada Command (CanadaCOM) was created in

⁵⁹ Public Safety Canada website: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/pol/ns/secpol04-eng.aspx> accessed 18 March 2012. accessed 5 March 2012.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Government of Canada. *International Policy Statement 2005*.

⁶² Ibid. page 10.

2006 which would be the new command and control structure within the CF that is responsible for exercising Dom Ops and continental defence. Through CanadaCOM, the CF would be structured in a more efficient manner to fulfill the demands of the 2004 NPS and the 2005 IPS. In 2008, the GoC released the CFDS and it supersedes the GoC's 2004 NSP and 2005 IPS. The command and control structure of CanadaCOM will be elaborated upon in detail later within this chapter. The key differences or changes within the new CFDS are that there are six core missions for the CF identified, four of which are in the Dom Ops domain, whereas in the NSP there are three missions, two that are domestic in nature. The additional two Dom Op missions for the CF in the CFDS are an expansion or breakdown of the ones stated in the NSP, clearly articulating the expectations of the GoC. There are several CF asset changes in the CFDS with regard to the roll-out of the CF to ensure the security and defence of Canadians, citizens and sovereignty. The major change is the deletion of the Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF) which dictated the necessity of a roll-on, roll-off (RoRo) CF capability.⁶³

In addition to the policies and statements listed above, there are two other foreign policies that provide specific direction that the CF can extract guidance from and obtain insight into what the GoC's intent is with regard to defence and security issues. Those two policies are Canada's position on South America; *Canada and the America's: Priorities and Progress 2007*⁶⁴ and Canada's position on the Arctic; *Statement on*

⁶³ Government of Canada. *Canada First Defence Strategy 2008*. page 8.

⁶⁴ Government of Canada. *Canada and the Americas; Priorities and Progress 2007*. This policy provides vision and insight on possible support to counter drug and transnational crime issues.

Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy 2010.⁶⁵ The GoC policy on the America's provides the CF insight into the GoC vision on South America and provides a deeper understanding as to what the government's intentions are in that global region which has second and third order effects inside Canada. For the CF, possible duties may include support to counter drug operations in Canada and potentially supporting the effort against transnational crime. For the GoC policy on the arctic, the CF is able to understand its roles and responsibilities pertaining to sovereignty, security issues, search and rescue and disaster response demands. Table 1.6 on the next page lists the Government of Canada recent direction and policies affecting CF Dom Ops.

Serial	GoC Direction / Policy
1	GoC National Security Policy 2004 (NSP)
2	GoC International Policy Statement 2005 (IPS)
3	GoC Defence Policy Statement 2005 (DPS)
4	Canada and the Americas: Priorities & Progress 2007
5	GoC Canada First Defence Statement 2008 (CFDS)
6	GoC Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy 2010

Table 1.6: Government of Canada Recent Direction and Policies affecting CF Dom Ops

The fact that the GoC has released policy statements on security issues specific to territory inside Canada to include the Arctic allows the CF to continue its conduct of refined planning for what the CF should look like in the future and the development of corresponding doctrine. In addition, the GoC provision of policy on security affairs outside Canada highlighting the assistance to global partners allows the CF to move forward in the bonding of relationships with like-minded nations and strengthen security partnerships. In military terms, the CF is able to obtain commander's intent, scheme of

⁶⁵ Government of Canada. *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy 2011*. This provides insight and vision to CF roles and responsibilities with regard to sovereignty, arctic security, search and rescue, Canadian Rangers and northern disaster response.

manoeuvre and end state from these policy statements in a strategic context but the CF can promulgate this down to the operational and tactical levels providing an understanding of the GoC at the lowest levels. Considering the pattern of release of these policy documents, one area of concern does arise. If policy and vision changes annually and the changes are significant, it can dislocate and stunt the advancement of the CF. To date, changes of superseding documents have not been significant to the degree where this has occurred. It is apparent that there are no clear contributors that would threaten the Readiness of the CF to execute Dom Ops that can be attributed to GoC policy and direction. The direction communicated to the CF by the GoC for the execution of Dom Ops clearly identifies the mission sets necessary. In the next section, this paper will aim to see if there is any aspect of CF direction that contributes to a threat against CF Readiness.

Canadian Forces Direction, Doctrine and Policy for Domestic Operations

During the time period of Op RECUPERATION (Manitoba floods) in 1997, the underdeveloped state of CF Dom Ops doctrine along with the lack of established crisis management procedures contributed significantly to the inefficient provision of direction by higher headquarters.⁶⁶ In the case of Op RECUPERATION, the land force areas were initially forced to coordinate with the provinces and local LEAs in the absence of clear direction from the DCDS and CDS at that time. Fortunately regardless of this fact, planning and coordination was swift and efficient. This operation was successful in final outcome and it benefitted from the existing legislation of that time such as the EA and

⁶⁶ Department of National Defence. CF lessons Learned Staff Action Directive for Op RECUPERATION, 15 March 1999. 15.

EPA. What it did not benefit from was years of Dom Ops lessons learned and CF Dom Ops doctrine.

In an attempt to provide pro-active guidance for the conduct of CF Dom Ops, the DCDS issued guidance for their execution which took into consideration lessons learned from Dom Ops performed up to that time period.⁶⁷ This direction in conjunction with amassed lessons learned and a chapter in the CF doctrine for Land Operations were almost all the CF had to rely upon to perform duties across the entire spectrum of Dom Ops. Recently, the CF has release of flurry of direction, doctrine and policy since 9-11 which will be discusses in detail within this section to investigate CF Readiness pertaining to this subject. Unlike the CF Dom Ops before 9-11 such as Op SALON and Op RECUPERATION, CF Dom Ops in the post 9-11 era are armed with a vast arsenal of direction and doctrine. Below is Table 1.6 which illustrates key CF documents that are recent pertaining to direction, doctrine or policy of an integrated or combined context.

⁶⁷ Department of National Defence. NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98 Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations dated 10 July 1998.

Serial	CF Direction and Doctrine for Domestic Operations	Description
1	DCDS 2/98 Guidance for the Conduct of Dom Ops (1998)	This document was superceded by the 2006 CCDDO.
2	Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations (CCDDO 2006)	This document will be superceded by the 2012 SOODO
3	Canada Command Standing Operations Order for Dom Ops (SOODO 2012)	This document provides Comd CanadaCOM direction on Dom Ops
4	CF Handbook for Interagency Operations (2005)	This document is dated but provides direction on OGD interaction
5	CFJP 3.0 Operations, Chapter 6, Dom Ops (2010)	First modern CF publication using current Dom Ops terminology
6	CFJP 3.2 Domestic Operations (2011)	This is the first CF publication dedicated entirely to Dom Ops
7	CFJP 5.1 Use Of Force, Chapter 3, Dom Ops (2008)	This doctrine allocates specific direction on Dom Ops use of force.
8	QR&O	34.30 - Restrictions on provision of Health Services to civilians. 22.01(3) - CF mbrs performing LEA duties; status of Peace Officer.
9	NDA	Subsections 273.6(2) allows ALEA (Class 1 to 4). Subsections 279, 280 and 285 of NDA prescribe auth in CF ACP.
10	USNORTHCOM/NORAD/CanadaCOM Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation (2009)	The Framework describes how the Tri-Command operates and interacts, highlights fundamental relationships, and underscores command responsibilities concerning mutual support and cooperation.
11	Tri-Command Basic Defence Document - BDD (2006)	The BDD resulted in the development of the Canada-US CDP to provide the framework for the combined defence of Canada and the United States during peace contingencies and war.
12	Tri-Command Civil Assistanec Plan - CAP (2008)	An unclassified bilateral plan which provides guidance for the military forces of one nation to support the military forces of the other nation that are providing support of civil authorities.
13	Tri-Command Combined Defence Plan - CDP (2001)	Created immediately after 9-11, it is a classified bilateral plan which provides a framework for the combined defense of Canada and the United States during peace, contingencies, and war.

Table 1.6 – CF Direction and Doctrine for Domestic Operations.

The first document that needs to be addressed is the *DCDS Direction for the Conduct of Domestic Operations 1998*. This document filled the void of direction and information which existed with regard to the conduct of CF Dom Ops. Proof of this can be understood by the statement by Land Force Western Area (LFWA) Dom Ops staff officers in 2000-2001 where they considered the DCDS 2/98 direction “the bible” of Dom Ops.⁶⁸ In 2004, the DCDS released another directive for Dom Ops but was very similar to the previous 1998 release less some minor additions to address the post 9-11 environment. The DCDS direction documents of 98 and 04 required updating due to the events of 9-11, the creation of Canada Command in 2006⁶⁹ as well as updated legislation such as the amendments to the EA, EPA and creation of the EMA which finalized in 2007. Although the Canadian Forces issued the *Interagency Handbook for Domestic*

⁶⁸ Stephen D. McClusky, LCol. *USNORTHCOM and Canadian Domestic Operations: An Opportunity for Positive Change*. School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, AY 03-04. Page 9.

⁶⁹ Department of National Defence website (Canada Command) accessed 5 March 2012. *Backgrounder on the Creation of Canada Command*. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/nr-sp/bg-do/10-001-eng.asp>

Operations by authority of the CDS in 2005, it was not all encompassing but it did provide detailed information on OGDs and functions similar to a “how-to” book on working with other departments on Dom Ops.⁷⁰ Separately, the newly released GoC FERP⁷¹ appears incredibly similar to the CF handbook which could deduce that the GoC may have learned lessons and received mentoring within this domain from the CF.

One of the first steps in actual evolution of CF Dom Ops direction took form in *Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations* (CCDDO) in 2006 shortly after the creation of the Command.⁷² This document directly targets the CF in its conduct of Dom Ops and aims to arm commanders and staff with the direction they require to execute Dom Ops in support of civil authorities. It does not provide direction on the defence of Canada and North America which is/was included in the Tri-Command CDP and is classified.⁷³ What the CCDDO did provide was a means to which the commander of CanadaCOM could communicate to the regional joint task forces (RJTFs) and any CF member who would participate, plan or command within a Dom Op, the baseline information required and a reference to guide their conduct including standard operating procedures all under one unified commander, intent and mission. Although not doctrine per-se and the CCDDO realigned the conduct of Dom Ops with the new C2 structure of CanadaCOM, it was an excellent evolutionary and comprehensive advancement.

The second evolutionary step in CF Dom Ops direction and doctrine arrived in the 2008 to 2012 timeframe. It materialized via a trifecta of CF Dom Ops doctrine

⁷⁰ Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-308/FP-010, *Canadian Forces Interagency Handbook for Domestic Operations*. 2005.

⁷¹ Government of Canada. *Federal Emergency Response Plan*. Annex A-Emergency Support Functions. January, 2011.

⁷² Department of National Defence. *Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations (CCDDO)*, Interim Version 1, 2006.

⁷³ Ibid. Preface page 2.

compounded with a standing operations order from commander CanadaCom for Dom Ops. The first doctrine to be released that made specific reference to Dom Ops was the Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) 5.1, *Use of Force*.⁷⁴ The third chapter of this document focuses solely on CF in a domestic context. The second piece of doctrine pertaining to Dom Ops was contained in CFJP 3.0, *Operations*.⁷⁵ The sixth chapter of this document defines what Dom Ops are to the CF and introduces the new terminology. The third and most recent release of CF doctrine addressing CF Dom Ops is completely dedicated to this domain of CF employment and is called CFJP 3-2, *Domestic Operations*.⁷⁶ This is the first CF doctrine released exclusively for Dom Ops in the post 9-11 era and it provides specific direction across the entire spectrum of CF Dom Ops response.

The new CF Dom Ops doctrine is also paired with the *Standing Operations Order For Domestic Operations (SOODO)* which was released in February, 2012.⁷⁷ The SOODO is a formal standing operation order that provides a common framework and commander's direction in the conduct of Dom Ops. Although mostly in draft form at this time and heavy on information detailed in annexes, it contains the more sensitive information on defence of Canada and North America that the CCDDO did not.

Other forms of direction that enable CF execution of Dom Ops and provide clarity are the NDA and QR&Os as described in the previous section on legislature guiding CF Dom. The combined direction involving the United States, such as the BDD, CDP and CAP will be discussed in more detail in the Chapter 5 section on Canada-US

⁷⁴ Department of National Defence. *CFJP 5.1, Use of Force*. Chapter 3.

⁷⁵ Department of National Defence. *CFJP 3.0, Operations*. Chapter 6.

⁷⁶ Department of National Defence. *CFJP 3.2, Domestic Operations*.

⁷⁷ Department of National Defence. Commander Canada Command, 6397-03000-01, Vol 005 (Dom Strat 1), *Standing Operations Order For Domestic Operations (SOODO)*, 21 February 2012.

interconnectedness. Having investigated the most recent releases in CF doctrine and direction with regard to Dom Ops as detailed in Table 1.6, it is apparent that much effort has been placed on arming the CF with the required documents needed to perfume this form of employment. The CF is without a doubt, enabled for Readiness.

CF Dom Ops Capabilities: Are There Enough Tools in the Toolbox?

Contrary to the quote provided by Comd CanadaCOM at the start of this chapter, CanadaCOM will generally lose a resource fight with CEFCOM, having SJS as the arbitrator, due to the loss of Canadian lives and dangers to Canadians deployed on expeditionary operations, specifically Afghanistan, that are seen on television on a routine basis. Having stated that, the theatre in Afghanistan is due to close in 2014 and combat operations in Kandahar province have already been ceased leaving less competition for Dom Ops. Regardless, as stated in the CFDS, the primary role of the CF is the Defence of Canada and Readiness must be ensured with regard to capabilities.⁷⁸ The CF is expected to conduct *routine, contingency* and *rapid response* Dom Ops⁷⁹ across the largest nation in the world⁸⁰ containing some of the most complex terrain using a military force that contains 68,000 regulars and 27,000 reserves.⁸¹ With recent budget reductions announced for the CF to the amount of 1.1 billion dollars over the next 2-3 years, targeting some CF activities such as training, the desire to have CF Readiness with

⁷⁸ Department of National Defence. “*Canada First Defence Strategy*”, Part III, Roles of the Canadian Forces; Defending Canada-Delivering Excellence at Home.

⁷⁹ Department of National Defence. *CFJP 3.2, Domestic Operations*. Page 4-1.

⁸⁰ United States. CIA World Fact book. Accessed by internet 2 April 2012.

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ca.html>

⁸¹ Campbell Clark. The Globe and Mail; *Deep cuts to military mark reversal for Harper*. Published Thursday, Mar. 29, 2012, accessed by internet 2 April 2012.

<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/budget/deep-cuts-to-military-mark-reversal-for-harper/article2386038/>.

regard to capability may be extremely difficult.⁸² In this section, capabilities for Dom Ops Readiness will be investigated to ensure the CF is resources for its missions assigned in the CFDS. Understanding that the Canadian Army (CA), Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) are the force generating organizations, the force employment elements within the Land Command Component (LCC), Maritime Command Component (MCC) and Air Command Component (ACC) of CanadaCOM will be examined.

From a CF perspective, the Land Command Component Immediate Response Unit (LCC IRU) is typically what is seen on front pages of newspapers for most categories of Dom Ops. Currently, the LCC IRU is based on a combat arms company organization with enablers such as communication specialists, engineers, medical, civilian military cooperation operators (CIMIC) and public affairs. Across Canada, the RJTFs less JTF North are to have 350 personnel on 8 hours' notice to move. That force can increase with escalation of response requirements to battalion organization of 1000 personnel in 24 hours or brigade size formations of 3000 personnel in 48 hours such as the size used in the 2011 Manitoba flood.⁸³ Although a force of last resort and not a first responder, the LCC IRU is typically the first CF response.

Within the LCC there is also the Canadian Rangers which are a force multiplier for Dom Ops in the north. There are 4250 Rangers which operate in 169 patrols, organized in 5 Canadian Patrol Groups (CRPGs) headquartered across the country but co-located

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Department of National Defence. *3350-1 (G5), Joint Task Force West Post Operations Report Op LUSTRE – CF Support to Flood Mitigation Efforts in Manitoba, 28 June 2011.*

with northern communities across the Canadian north and arctic.⁸⁴ Technically reservists, the Rangers focus on sovereignty and surveillance and have expanded into other domestic operations including response to natural and man-made disasters as well as humanitarian operations, in particular Search and Rescue operations.⁸⁵ They have always proven themselves, most recently in the GoC's marquee Whole of Government (WoG) arctic exercise, Operation NANOOK.⁸⁶

Embedded with the reserves is a capability specific to the Arctic for Dom Ops. The Primary Reserve possesses an Arctic Response Company Group (ARPG) with its nucleus being 38 Canadian Brigade Group (CBG), centered on the Winnipeg Rifles.⁸⁷ In concert with Canadian rangers, the ARCG can provide subject matter expertise to CF arctic operations and can be a key contributor to Dom Ops in a northern context. A similar reserve structure was created in 2007 called Territorial Defence Battalion Groups (TDBGs) which were formed to better respond to domestic emergencies, such as disasters or terrorist attacks.⁸⁸ Prime Minister Harper announced that there were supposed to be 14 of these spread across Canada but this plan has not survived.⁸⁹ The ARCG however, has survived.

⁸⁴ The Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program. *The Canadian Rangers*. Accessed by internet 2 April 2012. <http://gordonfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/images/The%20Canadian%20Rangers.pdf>

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Canada Command website accessed 2 April 2012. *Backgrounder: Operation NANOOK 2011*. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/nr-sp/bg-do/11-001-nanook-eng.asp>. Op NANOOK is an GoC exercise using a WoG approach. From a CF perspective, this is an integrated, combined and joint exercise that occurs annually in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions of Canada.

⁸⁷ R. Poirier, Colonel. *Arctic Response and 38 Canadian Brigade Group*. The Canadian Army Journal Volume 13.3 2010. 143.

⁸⁸ Kurt Grant, Sergeant. *Territorial Battalions: Can They Work?*. Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.2 (Summer 2008), 63-71.

⁸⁹ Government of Canada. *Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*. Volume 1, Second Session, Thirty-ninth Parliament, 2008.

The MCC also has a response unit for Dom Ops. The maritime domestic response consists of one ready Duty Ship (RDS) on each coast at 8 hours' notice for power.⁹⁰ The MCC must also contribute to maritime awareness and be prepared to support RJTFs or other CF efforts across the spectrum of domestic response.⁹¹ Dom Ops are more of a routine operation for the MCC and they possess many MOUs with OGDs in order to facilitate this which was described in the section on legislation readiness. Within the SOODO, the MCC is also responsible for domestic threats under Op NEPTUNE STRIKE to ensure the safety of Canada and Canadians or major maritime disasters (MAJMAR) such as a *Costa Concordia* type incident off the BC coast.⁹² Dom Ops for the navy is much more routine than that of their LCC brothers.

The ACC is responsible to be prepared for a Dom Ops immediate response in the form of an air package consisting of two CP-140 (Aurora), two CH-146 (Griffon) and two CH-124 (Sea King) all on 8 hours' notice as well as a CC-130 (Hercules) and a CC-117 (Globemaster) on 2 hours' notice.⁹³ Similar to the MCC, the ACC must provide air coordination to each RJTF and any additional support necessary, including personnel, depending on the domestic situation. Under CONPLAN NOBLE STRIKE, Canada's contribution to Op NOBLE EAGLE, the ACC has defence of Canada tasks which are classified. Under the umbrella of the ACC, the CF major air disaster (MAJAID) response is honed and exercised during the summer in the Arctic as a part of Op NANOOK. This

⁹⁰ Department of National Defence. SOODO. 15.

⁹¹ Ibid. 16.

⁹² Ibid. 20.

⁹³ Ibid. 16.

past year provided an unfortunate real-time accident in the form of First Air Flight 6560 plane crash in Resolute Bay, Nunavut concurrent to this exercise.⁹⁴

Canada's search and rescue (SAR) capability is a key contributor to CF Dom Ops, specifically in the disaster response domain and maintaining the confidence of Canadians in a government domestic response in any location within Canadian boundaries. The CF SAR is organized into three search and rescue regions (SRRs) located on each coast of Canada in Halifax and Victoria as well as central Canada in Trenton coordinated by a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC).⁹⁵ The three SRR commanders are accountable to commander CanadaCOM for SAR operations within their respective SRR. CF SAR assets include up to 750 SAR technicians (SAR Techs) who are highly qualified in the latest rescue techniques in complex terrain including para-rescue. SAR Techs are delivered to emergencies via CH-149 Cormorant or CH-146 Griffon helicopter and CC-115 Buffalo or CC-130E Hercules fixed wing aircraft.⁹⁶ Typically, ground SAR is a municipal, provincial or territorial responsibility but can be supported by CF SAR on a *provision of service* basis.⁹⁷

In a joint context, another key contributor to the CF Dom Ops fight is the CF Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). Although this highly skilled unit of 200 personnel generally provides the GoC and the CF with a high-readiness, rapidly deployable humanitarian and disaster relief capability internationally, the unit has a capacity to scale

⁹⁴ Canada Command Website accessed 2 April 12. Canada First: *CF provides critical assistance to airplane crash survivors in the North*. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/daily/archive-nanook11-eng.asp>

⁹⁵ Department of National Defence. *CFJP 3.2, Domestic Operations*. Page 5-5.

⁹⁶ Royal Canadian Air Force website accessed 2 April 2012. *What We Do - Search and Rescue*. <http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/v2/page-eng.asp?id=17#s2>

⁹⁷ Department of National Defence. *CFJP 3.2, Domestic Operations*. Page 5-5.

down its size and its IRU component can respond to incidents in Canada.⁹⁸ The DART is designed to quickly fly into disaster areas around the world with a primary goal of providing emergency services, such as drinking water and medical treatment, until long-term aid arrives. The DART will only go into areas where it would not face military resistance and its missions last no longer than 40 days.⁹⁹ Although not a traditional Dom Op, the DART's most recently deployed operation was Op HAMLET in Haiti during the 2010 earthquake where they distributed 224,760 litres of water, 124,300 meals and helped with the maintenance and security of UN displacement camps while clearing the roads and demolished unsafe buildings in Jacmel.¹⁰⁰ The same capability can be deployed almost anywhere in Canada and is under command of the First Canadian Division Headquarters in Kingston. This headquarters itself also contributes to CF Dom Ops Readiness by being capable of high readiness deployment to a range of *contingency* or *rapid response* Dom Ops.¹⁰¹

The next examples of CF Dom Ops capability are contained within the CF *Special Forces*. The first to mention is the Canadian Joint Incident response Unit (CJIRU) which is a high readiness unit designed to mitigate the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incident as a part of a national GoC response.¹⁰² Stationed in Trenton, Ontario, this battalion sized organization is prepared to provide the full spectrum of CBRN defensive services, in a very limited capacity, for a response to a

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ CEFCOM website accessed 3 April 2012. *The Disaster Assistance Response Team Factsheet*. <http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/dart-eicc-eng.asp>

¹⁰⁰ CBC news website accessed 3 April 2012. *Disaster Relief: Canada's Rapid Response Team*. Published 13 January 2010. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2010/01/13/f-disasters-military-dart.html>

¹⁰¹ Department of National Defence. *CFJP 3.2, Domestic Operations*. Page 3-5.

¹⁰² Ibid. 4-3.

terrorist incident or activity.¹⁰³ Its last deployment supporting CF Dom Ops was on Op PODIUM in support of the RCMP. The second *Special Forces* unit which contributes to CF Dom Ops is JTF 2. Although the majority of their activities are classified, under the *Ant-Terrorism Act of 2001* and *Canada's National Security Policy*, the JTF 2 is able to respond to terrorist threats in CanadaCOM's AOR for very specific missions.¹⁰⁴

From the detailed inspection of immediate response capability for CF Dom Ops that are available, and considering the four core missions that the CFDS has assigned the CF in a Dom Ops context, it is apparent that the CF is in possession of a formidable response when required. It can be said that there are enough *tools in the tool box* as the title of this section questions.

CF Command and Control: Is the Internal Structure Right?

Canada Command was created in 2006 through a transformation vision enacted by then CDS, General Hillier. It aimed to focus *unity of command*, place a separation between strategic and operational leadership, and place one individual in charge of one operational theatre, in this case domestic, who responsible to the CDS for that AOR.¹⁰⁵ Although the CDS is overall accountable and responsible for Dom Ops, Commander CanadaCOM facilitates Dom Ops Readiness by being the one responsible for the day-to-day oversight of domestic and continental routine and contingency CF operations to the CDS and MND. This new construct took this Dom Ops responsibility away from the

¹⁰³ Department of National Defence. *Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations (CCDDO)*, Interim Version 1, 2006. 7-2/5.

¹⁰⁴ Department of National Defence. SOODO (Draft), 12 February 2012. 18.

¹⁰⁵ Department of National Defence. CDS Action Team 1 on Transformation 2005 (Command and Control). *Executive Summary and Key Deductions*. Annex B, ½.

DCDS, now a non-existing position, and also differentiated commands responsible for Dom Ops (CanadaCOM) and expeditionary operations (CEFCOM). When requested, Commander CanadaCOM coordinates military support to Canadian civil and law enforcement authorities through his subordinate RJTF commanders and staff.¹⁰⁶ Usually these requests are received at the RJTF level and they possess the authority to perform routine *provision of service* Dom Ops as long as they adhere to the Provision Of Service (POS) manual. More complex contingency and rapid response Dom Ops require CanadaCOM involvement through a formal request for assistance (RFA)¹⁰⁷ that initiates at the municipal or provincial level to the Minister of Public Safety. The RFA transcends down as a task from the MND and CDS for execution. An illustration of the CanadaCOM structure can be seen at Figure 1.1 below.



Figure 1.1 – Canada Command Structure including RJTF Areas of Responsibility.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Canada Command website accessed 3 April 2012. *Canada Command Backgrounder*. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/nr-sp/bg-do/10-001-eng.asp>

¹⁰⁷ Department of National Defence. *SOODO (Draft), Annex G*. This Annex explains the entire RFA process.

¹⁰⁸ LGen M.J. Dumais; Comd CanadaCOM Brief on Canadian Interoperability Workshop, 28 March 2008.

As mentioned previously, CanadaCOM AOR includes Canada, continental United States, specifically the 48 contiguous states with Alaska and the nation of Mexico.¹⁰⁹

CanadaCOM's Domestic AOI includes any area that will have an impact on CanadaCOM's domestic AOR including any part of the globe, cyber and space domains.¹¹⁰ Considering the massive area that CanadaCOM is responsible for as well as an area of interest which generally includes the entire globe, an incredible amount of resources in the form of personnel and equipment are necessary to plan, coordinate, track and execute all things Dom Ops. Figure 1.2 below depicts CanadaCOM AOR.



Figure 1.2 – Canada Command Area of Responsibility.¹¹¹

In the unfortunate scenario that CanadaCOM loses power or control of its own operation centre and is not capable of coordinating and supervising Dom Ops, JTFA in Halifax is the step-up that will assume control in that situation ensuring Readiness at all

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Comd CanadaCOM, SOODO 12 Feb 12, page 2.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

times.¹¹² Although not a force generator, CanadaCOM is a force employer based on contributions from the ACC, LCC and MCC. In accordance with the newly released *Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations*, the level 1 commanders of each element are responsible to have a portion of their forces ready for employment by CanadaCOM. In theory, for a contingency Dom Op or an escalated rapid response Dom Op of significant size, a RJTF will be assigned as the force responsible to command it. Recent examples of this are Op CADENCE in Toronto¹¹³ and Op LUSTRE in Manitoba¹¹⁴ where commander JTFC and JTFW respectively were overall in charge and responsible to commander CanadaCOM. This is not the case in every Dom Op. There is flexibility to designate a separate joint task force, specifically in pre-planned CSSEs such as the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics facilitating Readiness. JTFP was not responsible as this task would have consumed it for the four years previous. In order to alleviate this burden, Joint Task Force Games was created and superimposed upon JTFP allowing the new organization to concentrate solely on support to RCMP security operations during Op PODIUM.¹¹⁵ After analysing the command and control of CanadaCOM, it is apparent that the internal structure facilitates Readiness.

Conclusion of CF Disposition: Are we ready?

After an inspection of the overall disposition of the CF, including legal authority, GoC direction, doctrine, capabilities and C2, to check its Readiness for the execution of Dom Ops, it is clear that the CF has the essential components to address the four core

¹¹² Ibid. 23-24.

¹¹³ CanadaCOM website accessed 3 April 2012. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/daily/archive-summ>. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/spec/lustre-mb2011-eng.asp> it-eng.asp.

¹¹⁴ CanadaCOM website accessed 3 April 2012. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/spec/lustre-mb2011-eng.asp>

¹¹⁵ Department of National Defence. Commander LFWA Post Operation Report, Op PODIUM, April 2010.

Dom Ops missions identified in the CFDS for the CF. See Table 1.7 for the synopsis.

<i>Criteria</i> <i>Core Domestic Missions</i>	1) Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD	2) Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics	3) Respond to a major terrorist attack	4) Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.
a) CF Disposition, and				
b) CF and Whole of Government Approach,				
c) Application of Lessons Learned				
d) Interconnectedness with the United States.				

Table 1.7 – CF Dom Ops Readiness Conditions Check for CF Disposition.

History and experience has proven that the CF is both capable and ready even in the case of multiple and concurrent complex Dom Ops both of a contingency and rapid response nature which was seen in 2010 via Op PODIUM and Op CADENCE. For the past 53 years, Canada and the US have solidified continental defence effectively through NORAD and with the addition of USNORTHCOM have addressed the terrorist threat which will be discussed in Chapter 5. The only test that has not occurred is in the form of a major terrorist attack or CBRN event. Although we have units ready and identified for such an unfortunate event, we have yet to prove this capability. The CF has routinely proven itself ready to support OGDs in a crisis or natural disaster and in most cases, lead from the rear.

CHAPTER 2 - WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH

“Comprehensive civil military coordination, effective coordination and timely decision making between the CF and Other Governmental Departments are key to effective support without trespassing on civilian responsibilities.”¹¹⁶

Joint Task Force GRIZZLY — The Commander’s ‘Strategic Centre of Gravity’

Introduction to the WoG

Traditionally, when a government delivers a response to anything, it aims not to duplicate efforts, ensure all affected are informed, economize where possible and produce the best possible response in a timely manner. Unfortunately government responses in Dom Ops, using multiple departments, are flush with competing egos, agendas, budgets and personalities. Often, bureaucrats in participating departments are guarded, paranoid and isolationists. This trend seems to be fading more and more with recent government responses to Dom Ops, specifically post 9-11.¹¹⁷ The *Comprehensive Approach* or Whole of Government (WoG) Approach is the new modus operandi for the GoC. It’s a total force government approach that brings the departments together in a joint fashion for a response making them interconnected emphasising relationships among partners in order to produce an improved and integrated result. This chapter will examine the GoC WoG approach and if it enables CF Readiness for Dom Ops.

¹¹⁶ Land Force Western Area Headquarters. (Ops 174), *Operation Order 002; Op GRIZZLY*. 22 May, 2002. pp. 1-2.

¹¹⁷ RAdm Nigel Greenwood, Comd JTF (Pacific) presentation to Comd Canada COM; *Op PODIUM Perspectives*.

CF Integration and the WoG Approach

As was introduced in Chapter One, the *Emergency Management Act* (EMA) is the Canadian legislation that has identified the Minister of Public Safety (MPS) the elected official in government who is overall responsible for a GoC response to an emergency.¹¹⁸ These emergencies necessitate the MPS to be able to react to “all-hazards” via a coordinated, integrated and harmonized response plan. This GoC plan in which the MPS is accountable for is the *Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP)*.¹¹⁹ Ultimately the Prime Minister (PM) is in charge, which answers the question of this section, but the key actors who hold responsibility for a GoC response will be investigated.

The MPS duties also include that of supervisor for all things emergency response. In that duty the MPS must ensure that all GoC departments, including DND/CF, have an emergency response plane, exercise it and ensure that it is integrated with other departments.¹²⁰ The FERP, as enforced by the MPS, clearly articulates roles of each department and identifies which department possesses a primary, supporting or coordinating function. This also includes special duties of assistant and deputy ministers.¹²¹

Transitioning focus on DND and the CF, the person responsible for CF Dom Ops response is Commander CanadaCOM accountable to the CDS and MND. The DND interface with the overall GoC official in charge (OIC), MPS, is the MND. For a typical

¹¹⁸ Government of Canada. *Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP) 2011*. 1.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid. 8.

contingency or rapid response Dom Op, an RJTF will be assigned as the responsible formation by Commander CanadaCOM.

Although the MPS is the OIC, the MND has much to offer in the execution of a GoC emergency response in addition to manpower and equipment. Often when the CF is offered, the magnitude of the force arrival, the professionalism and effectiveness of the personnel creates the belief that the CF is in charge.¹²² This is very much not the case. Only in case of a national emergency where all federal agencies and departments are overwhelmed and response exceeds their capability, such as a response for a war emergency as dictated in the *Emergencies Act*, will the CF ever take the lead.¹²³ In accordance with Annex A of the FERP, DND/CF is not the primary on any GoC response but is a supporting department in all responses except those involving health services and policy.¹²⁴

As was seen in Op RECUPERATION, the Quebec ice storms in early 1998, it was very difficult to understand who exactly was in charge.¹²⁵ The storm affected three connecting provinces but initial request for assistance initiated from the province of Ontario and Land Force Central Area (LFCA) was given the task to assist Hydro Ontario. As the storm exponentially increased in size, Hydro Quebec in the eastern townships was the most forward leaning organization on the ground and on many occasions prioritized

¹²² Department of National Defence. Army Lessons learned Centre. *Analysis Report; Op RECUPERATION, 2 September 1998.*

¹²³ Department of National Defence. *CFJP 3-2 Domestic Operations 2011*. Page 3-2, 3-3.

¹²⁴ Government of Canada. *Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP) 2011*. Annex A.

¹²⁵ Department of National Defence. Army Lessons learned Centre. *Analysis Report; Op RECUPERATION, 2 September 1998.*

work for the CF.¹²⁶ Provincial Emergency Management Organizations (EMOs) from Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick initially operated in isolation and were not coordinated federally at the beginning in order to properly allocate resources in an integrated WoG response. Soon into the operation, a federal emergency office was established. From the top at the federal level to internally within the CF, the question of who was in charge was not very clear in the early stages.¹²⁷ Fortunately, the GoC and DND have benefitted from the lessons learned from this event and several others to arrive at the clear unified chain of command that exists today with civilian lead. Now that a unified chain of command has been identified to the highest levels of federal government, actual integration and synergy will be explored for existence in modern Dom Ops.

CF integration with OGDs: Is There Synergy?

The key for the CF to being truly integrated with other government departments (OGDs) pertaining to a WoG approach is working together and producing synergistic effect.¹²⁸ The mutually advantageous component of the WoG approach to all departments is increased efficiency and improved outcomes with decreased friction and aggravation. Not only does this benefit each department by performing better with less headaches, it also produces a more efficient, coordinated and deliberate GoC approach to domestic responses. In this section of Chapter 3, CF integration with OGDs will be explored with the intent of examining overall CF Readiness.

¹²⁶ Ibid. 9.1.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Meriam Webster Dictionary. Definition of Synergy: a mutually advantageous conjunction or compatibility of distinct business participants or elements (as resources or efforts).

From a CF perspective, much effort has been placed into being better integrated with OGDs starting with the creation of the CanadaCOM construct. In fact, the published centre of gravity (CoG) for CanadaCOM is *relationships with our partners*.¹²⁹ In fact, this is also the CoG for the Tri-Command with NORAD/USNORTHCOM but using a different word; *Partnerships*.¹³⁰ Another step in the right direction with regard to integration and produced a clearer understanding of OGDs and how they operated was the release of the *CF Interagency Handbook for Domestic Operations*.¹³¹ This handbook was released just prior to the creation of CanadaCOM in 2005 and provided CF members with a detailed description of the key OGD players for security operations and those involved in natural/man-made disasters. It also made the first reference in any publications to a “cultural sensitivity” which acknowledged the cultural differences between the CF and other departments, an opinion shared by academics Dr. Brad Gladman and Dr. Peter Archambault.¹³² Most departments have their own culture and occasionally they collided negatively such as the cultures between DFAIT and the CF. The *CF Interagency Handbook for Domestic Operations* was an educational tool, a sort of *aide memoire* coupled with some *intelligence preparation of the battlefield* on OGD partners the CF must perform Dom Ops for and with.

Recently there has been increased effort and desire to exercise with OGDs and various provincial EMOs in order to test CF responses. Specifically, each RJTF has been directed to conduct an annual Dom Op exercise using a WoG approach, inviting OGD

¹²⁹ Department of National Defence. *CFJP 3-2 Domestic Operations 2011*.

¹³⁰ Victor Renuard, General, Commander NORAD/USNORTHCOM and A.B. Donaldson, Vice Admiral, Comd CanadaCOM. US Department of Defence and Cdn Department Of National Defence Bi-National Document. *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation, September 2009*.

¹³¹ Department of National Defence. *CF Interagency Handbook for Domestic Operations 2005*.

¹³² Dr. Brad Gladman and Dr. Peter Archambault. *Journal of Military and strategic Studies*, Volume 13, Issue 2, Winter 2011. *A Role for Effects-Based Planning in a National Security Framework*. 5.

key players such as RCMP, DFAIT, PS, CBSA, CCG, Transport Canada and Health Canada. Recent examples are JTF(Central) Ex TRILLIUM RESPONSE in 2012 focusing on MAJAID, JTF(Eastern) Ex RAFALE BLANCE in late 2011 focusing on assisting civilians in extreme cold weather and JTF(North) Ex NANOOK focusing on domestic responses of all natures in arctic and sub-arctic climates. In the case of Ex NANOOK, it is now claimed by the GoC as a marque WoG emergency response and sovereignty exercise but renamed Op NANOOK. This is a perfect example of positive influence of the CF on the OGDs and GoC. This is also proof that the WoG integration Readiness is validated by a robust exercise regime, not necessarily a “distance learning” approach to WoG education at the ADM level. The MPS does adhere to a National Exercise Program, however the CF participation is almost exclusive to Op NANOOK.¹³³ Having stated that, common education which is interactive contributes significantly to CF-OGD integration and synergy. For example, on the *CF Joint and Command Staff Program* there are RCMP and CCG personnel that routinely attend full-time or just partially for the training exercises. This provides an opportunity for mutual sharing of ideas and insight to various planning and decision making processes.¹³⁴

Yet another evolution in a positive direction pertaining to CF integration OGDs and WoG approach resides in the RJTFs. Although pre-existing but not standardized across all areas in the old C2 structure, RJTFs under CanadaCOM have mandated Dom Ops liaison officers (DLOs) across their AORs and possess a J5 Dom Ops officer their headquarters to coordinate, and plan Dom Ops activities as well as integrate with OGD

¹³³ Public Safety Canada. “National Exercise Program.” Public Service Canada website accessed 23 April 2012. <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/nep/index-eng.aspx#in>

¹³⁴ CF OPP integration with RCMP along with Operation Centre SOP sharing for CSSEs has proven extremely successful in Op PODIUM.

partners at the provincial and municipal levels.

As stated at the beginning, CanadaCOM CoG is relationships. The CF can enforce this by not only by mentoring in a WoG approach but also act as a catalyst in planning, organizing and coordinating which is the CF's strength compared to the OGDs. Applying information in the *CF Inter-Agency Handbook for Domestic Operations* as well as adhering to the direction provided in the *FERP* will ensure CF-OGD integration and overall synergy for a WoG domestic response.

OGD Commitment: Are They Leaning Forward?

Since the less than GoC coordinated Dom Ops such as op RECUPERATION in the 1990s, there has been a perception specifically in the CF that it is leading from the rear. There could be some truth to this with regard to the proficiency of the CF to plan and execute coupled with a cultural attitude of never failing or giving up. CF officers are trained to plan and make decisions from basic officer training to the time of release in the form of formal education and courses. It has also been noted that the OGDs are simply not transforming and integrating to the same extent as the CF.¹³⁵ Although the reference to the last statement was in 2009, this does not represent the *Department of Public Safety* today, specifically pertaining to its efforts with the newly released *FERP* and its emergency coordination efforts at the PMO with OGDs during the recent flooding in Quebec and Manitoba.

¹³⁵ Paul Gravel, LCdr. *The Canadian Forces and Interdepartmental Cooperation Towards Domestic Security: Tear Down Those Walls*. Canadian Forces Joint Command and Staff Program 35, Exercise New Horizons. 5.

There also exists a belief that there is a dependency on the CF to do everything and that the default setting is that the CF will fill gaps.¹³⁶ This may be due to the fact that the CF may be the fastest responding department and in possession of specialist with specialist equipment, such as SAR.¹³⁷ In the case of the Arctic, the CF is the only department that can respond in a timely and sustained manner.¹³⁸ The capacity and capability of the CF personnel and equipment should not overshadow the efforts of OGDs to the degree where they are perceived as not leading or not leaning forward. Perception must take into consideration resource and cultural differences between the CF and OGDs. OGDs such as the RCMP are incredibly forward leaning and are transforming towards improved integration for a harmonized WoG domestic response. This was proven during Op PODIUM (Vancouver Olympics) and the entire four-year road to high readiness in which they participated as well as Op CADENCE (G8/G20 Summit).¹³⁹ Their attendance on military senior command colleges to understand the CF decision making process as well as obtaining an increased knowledge of security issues speaks volumes to their commitment. The same can be stated about other close partners to the CF such as the CCG and CBSA.

Conclusion: Is there a Delta?

The WoG approach is an evolutionary process and progress has been made in the post 9-11 era. There exists a common misunderstanding that the OGDs other than the CF are not leaning forward and that the CF is leading from the rear or performing work of

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Dr. Brad Gladman and Dr. Peter Archambault. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Volume 13, Issue 2, Winter 2011. *A Role for Effects-Based Planning in a National Security Framework*. 6.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Department of National Defence. *Joint Task Force Games Post Operation Report 2010*.

others. This is simply not true. By the virtue of the CF profession and its culture of leaders, the CF provides an aspect of mentorship to other departments coupled with extremely well trained specialists on technically advanced, and very expensive, equipment. This is confused with leading. To answer the question of this section, there is no delta. With the advent of the newly formed department of Public Safety armed with the FERP, integration and coordination as a part of a WoG is in its infancy. Considering that emergency response in Canada is inevitable, the WoG approach will be tested on a routine basis and with the CF in support physically as an asset and theoretically as a mentor, response will only get better. Below in Table 1.8 is the CF Dom Ops Readiness Conditions Check as it pertains to Whole of Government Approach based on the investigation above.

<i>Criteria</i> <i>Core Domestic Missions</i>	1) Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD	2) Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics	3) Respond to a major terrorist attack	4) Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.
a) CF Disposition, and				
b) CF and Whole of Government Approach,				
c) Application of Lessons Learned				
d) Interconnectedness with the United States.				

Table 1.8 – CF Dom Op Readiness Conditions Check for the WoG Approach.

CHAPTER 3 - LEARNED LESSONS FROM DOM OPS: 10 YEARS LATER

“Cops don’t do woods.....or mountains”¹⁴⁰

Colonel Dave Barr – Op GRIZZLY 2002

Introduction to Dom Ops evolution

CF domestic operations have evolved over the past decade to include force structure and integration with OGD partners. Considering that Dom Ops conducted in a Pre 9-11 context were generally less threatened by a terrorist element for contingency CSSEs and the fact that rapid response Dom Ops appeared to be less in quantity, the CF has had no choice but to evolve and transform in the domestic response domain. In this chapter it will be examined if the CF has actually obtained lessons learned by investigating a 10 year snapshot of Dom Ops executed immediately after 9-11 to present day. A two-part comparison has been structured to compare two categories of Dom Ops, specifically planned *contingency* Dom Ops and *rapid reaction* Dom Ops. Within contingency Dom Ops, a cross-comparison will be performed on Op GRIZZLY which occurred just immediately after 9-11 in 2002 and Op PODIUM which occurred in early 2010. Focus will be placed on lessons learned, if they were applied and if leaning or evolution has actually occurred. The second part focuses on a cross-comparison of rapid reaction Dom Ops, specifically Op PEREGRINE which occurred in 2003 and Op LUSTRE in 2011. The same method of analysis will be used in this part concentrating on lessons learned, their application and the validation of learning.

¹⁴⁰ Dave Barr, Colonel. *The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study In Interagency Cooperation*. The Canadian Military Journal, Volume 4, Number 4.

Contingency Dom Ops Survey: From GRIZZLY to PODIUM; Have We Learned?

To provide some context, both Op GRIZZLY and Op PODIUM were CF *contingency* domestic operations in support of OGDs for a Canadian Special Security Event (CSSE). Op GRIZZLY was the CF support to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and the RCMP for the 2002 G8 Summit held in Kananaskis, Alberta.¹⁴¹ Approximately 5000 CF personnel were involved in Op GRIZZLY with Land Force Western Area (LFWA) as the overall formation in charge.¹⁴² This operational headquarters and its personnel were responsible to assist the RCMP with security of a circular zone up to 200km in diameter. CF tasks were mostly ALEA in nature from Class 1 to Class 4 in the form of integrated foot patrols, ground to air defence, casualty evacuation and IPP escort,¹⁴³ but other tasks also included ceremonial duties, ground logistics and communications support.¹⁴⁴ Op PODIUM was the CF's support to the RCMP for the 2010 Winter Olympics held in Vancouver and Whistler, BC. It was Canada's largest joint domestic operation.¹⁴⁵ Roughly 5000 CF personnel were employed on Op PODIUM with a special Joint Task Force Games (JTFG) created 4 years

¹⁴¹ Department of National Defence. LFWA website accessed 5 April 2012, *Op GRIZZLY*. http://www.army.gc.ca/lfwa/photo_gallery_Grizzly-eng.asp

¹⁴² Department of National Defence. NDHQ Operation Grizzly Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive, annex A, 22 November 2002.

¹⁴³ Department of National Defence. *CFJP 3-2 Domestic Operations*. **Class 1**- CF personnel and operational equipment when a disturbance of the peace is occurring or may occur. Approval authority for this class has been retained by the MND; **Class 2** – Non-operational equipment when a disturbance of the peace is occurring or may occur. Approval authority for this class has been delegated to the commanders of Operational-Level formations; **Class 3** – CF personnel and operational equipment when there is no potential for the occurrence of a disturbance of the peace. Approval authority for this class has been delegated to the commanders of Operational-Level formations. **Class 4** – support for other-than-law-enforcement operations, including CF personnel, operational or non-operational equipment, and use of ranges, training areas, and other infrastructure facilities. Approval authority for this class has been delegated to the lowest possible level of approval authority as described in the *Provision of Services Policy*.

¹⁴⁴ Department of National Defence. NDHQ Operation Grizzly Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive, Annex A, 22 November 2002. 2.

¹⁴⁵ Department of National Defence website: http://www.army.gc.ca/lfwa/dom_operations-eng.asp

previous to be the overall operational formation in charge. This was done deliberately by CanadaCOM to relieve pressure off Joint Task Force (Pacific) in order for them to execute daily routine operations.¹⁴⁶ The tasks were similar from Op GRIZZLY to Op PODIUM but the AOR and AOI was much larger for the Olympics. The AOR was up to 112 nm from Vancouver to Whistler. In the next two sections we will investigate the “key” Dom Ops lessons learned starting with Op GRIZZLY.

In 2002, Op GRIZZLY occurred in a timeframe just immediately after 9-11, there was no CanadaCOM and the DCDS was in charge of Dom Ops. The CF did not have a comprehensive doctrine to follow with regard to the domestic domain. The best piece of Dom Ops direction available was the *DCDS Direction for Domestic Operations 2/98*. In Op GRIZZLY Commander’s (Brigadier General Fenton) post operation report (POR), he states that there was a clear necessity for CF Dom Ops SOPs, despite the ones existing in LFWA, and there was an obvious need for CF doctrine in Dom Ops regardless how complicated and different Dom Ops are in scope.¹⁴⁷ This was also captured as the initial lessons learned from an NDHQ perspective for this operation.¹⁴⁸ By the time Op PODIUM was in the planning stages, CF doctrine was in draft, Commander CanadaCOM issued his direction for Dom Ops (*CCDDO 2006*) and the CF had issued the Interagency Handbook for Domestic Operations in 2005. On top of this doctrine and direction, the CF had at least 8 *contingency* and *rapid response* Dom Ops worth of experience.¹⁴⁹ In all the unclassified Op PODIUM lessons learned and post op reports analyzed, there was no

¹⁴⁶ RAdm Nigel Greenwood, Comd JTF (Pacific) presentation to Comd Canada COM; *Op PODIUM Perspectives*.

¹⁴⁷ Department of National Defence. *LFWA Post Operation Report, Op GRIZZLY, 28 August, 2002*. 2.

¹⁴⁸ Department of National Defence. *NDHQ Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive, 22 November 2002*. 4.

¹⁴⁹ See Table 1.2 and Table 1.4.

mention of doctrine or policy specifically leaving the assumption that the lesson had been learned. However, there was a registered lesson learned for Op GRIZZLY that still existed in Op POIUM pertaining to doctrine and policy and that was certification for force generation.¹⁵⁰ Less this one easily fixed detail, the doctrine and policy lesson was learned.

Another key lesson learned from Op GRIZZLY was the command and control structure. During Op GRIZZLY, Commander LFWA was not given overall authority for assets in his AOR and was often directed by NDHQ.¹⁵¹ Specifically, the ground based air-defence (GBAD) was cut away from LFWA and was placed under the control of NDHQ via 1 CAD/NORAD. Additionally, orders were generated from both NDHQ and the DCDS downwards and not integrated with LFWA. This also occurred with OGD coordination which complicated interagency cooperation significantly. Operational orders from Op GRIZZLY were coming from a strategic headquarters and an operational headquarters and not cross-checked or coordinated. Essentially, Op GRIZZLY was NDHQ/DCDS led, not LFWA/JTF GRIZZLY led.¹⁵² Brigadier General Fenton did not benefit from an operational command buffer between him and NDHQ. As the lessons learned have articulated, often his higher headquarters would give tactical direction and conduct tactical OGD coordination. See Figure 1.3 for Op GRIZZLY command structure.

¹⁵⁰ Department of National Defence. *NDHQ Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive*, 22 November 2002. And RAdm Nigel Greenwood, Comd JTF (Pacific) presentation to Comd Canada COM; *Op PODIUM Perspectives*.

¹⁵¹ Department of National Defence. *NDHQ Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive*, 22 November 2002. 6.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*




Figure 1.3 – Op GRIZZLY Organizational Relationships.¹⁵³

For Op PODIUM, this lesson was learned. With the advent of CanadaCOM in 2006 and the deletion of the DCDS position, the CDS and NDHQ had an operational buffer between their strategic headquarters and the tactical areas, now structured as RJTFs. Operational Orders went from CanadaCOM to JTFG. CanadaCOM coordinated with OGDs at their equivalent of the operational level. JTFG coordinated with OGDs at the tactical level. To alleviate pressure and make command and control more effective, op PODIUM went to the extreme of setting up a separate JTFG superimposed on JTFP allowing routine operations to be separated from Olympic security tasks.

Within the realm of command structure lesson learned from Op GRIZZLY, there was

¹⁵³ Dave Barr, Colonel. *The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study In Interagency Cooperation*. The Canadian Military Journal, Volume 4, Number 4.

the issue of too many headquarters at various levels, creating redundancy and an insatiable appetite for information systems.¹⁵⁴ Not only did LFWA headquarters deploy but also the headquarters of 1 CMBG and all its units employed. For Op PODIUM, the sizeable land command component (LCC) under the command of JTFG was given to 1 CMBG and it only employed two units, the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) in Vancouver (TFV) and Second Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry in Whistler (TFW). Using Olympic terms, the levels of command were Gold (JTFG), silver (LCC) and Bronze (TFV, TFW). This made for an understandable and functional organization chart which not only facilitated CF C2 but also the integration of OGDs, specifically the RCMP, at the Gold, Silver and Bronze levels. See Figure 1.4 for Op PODIUM Organisation Structure.




Figure 1.4 – JTFG Organizational Structure.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Department of National Defence. *NDHQ Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive*, 22 November 2002. 7.

¹⁵⁵ RAdm Nigel Greenwood, Comd JTF (Pacific) presentation to Comd Canada COM; *Op PODIUM Perspectives*. Slide 8.

During Op GRIZZLY, it appeared that the CF element was very forward leaning in planning but the OGDs, specifically the RCMP and DFAIT, were hesitate and slow in the planning and preparation stage. The slowed pace often presented problems for the CF provoking continued questions such as determining how many soldiers are required, what ROEs are needed to enable the soldiers and what exactly is expected of the CF in the form of clearly articulated tasks.¹⁵⁶ This made the supporting CF element, specifically LFWA, frustrated in designing plans for the supported RCMP and DFAIT elements. There was also no central integrated headquarters perform this task. The JTF GRIZZLY headquartered in HMCS Tecumseh in Calgary while the RCMP and DFAIT headquartered in various buildings throughout Calgary, both approximately one hour from the venue site further contributing to obstruction of planning and integration.¹⁵⁷

The proposed lesson identified by Op GRIZZLY was that OGD C2 arrangements and intentions must be known well in advance in order to facilitate better integrated planning and an efficient integrated response.¹⁵⁸ Op PODIUM appeared to have hoisted this aboard in the early stages of planning by having CF and RCMP senior leaders brought in earlier during the planning stages providing an opportunity to seek commander's direction and guidance. The Integrated Security Unit (ISU), established in 2003, united RCMP, provincial and municipal law enforcement with the Canadian Forces and was located in one building in Vancouver. The ISU was responsible for planning and conducting security operations including venue security, marine & aviation security,

¹⁵⁶ Department of National Defence. *NDHQ Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive*, 22 November 2002. 7.

¹⁵⁷ Dave Barr, Colonel. *The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Interagency Cooperation*. The Canadian Military Journal, Volume 4, Issue 4.

¹⁵⁸ Department of National Defence. *NDHQ Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive*, 22 November 2002. 7.

transportation & traffic incident management, physical security, accreditation screening and verification and protective policing in an integrated fashion.¹⁵⁹ This integrated unit facilitated the early establishment of CF tasks which triggered an early Rules Of Engagement Request (ROEREQ) enabling CF member to perform their job on land, sea and in the air.¹⁶⁰

The last “key” lesson learned from Op GRIZZLY to ensure CF Readiness pertained to CF and integrated training. For Kananaskis, it was non-existent from an OGD perspective and either non-existent or limited from a CF point of view. The most critical point that summarized this point was that a WoG integrated exercise did not take place.¹⁶¹ Although NDHQ had dictated that exercise VIRTUAL GRIZZLY was to take place in preparation for the *G8 Summit*, there was no guidance provided as to what individual or collective battle task standards were to be achieved.¹⁶² In fact, VIRTUAL GRIZZLY was the design of LFWA to test its staff and it coincidentally served as the only exercise in which some OGDs, NDHQ and some tactical units participated in limited numbers.¹⁶³ In addition to the lack of training exercise issue, there was no existence of a validation exercise certifying either the CF or OGDs operational ready.¹⁶⁴

Op PODIUM went to the other side of the spectrum for both CF exercises and integrated exercises. A design was made to crawl-walk-run from an integrated training perspective in the form of exercises (Ex) BRONZE, SILVER and GOLD. Ex BRONZE

¹⁵⁹ Government of Canada. Canada Games website accessed 6 April 2012: *Fact Sheet - Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit*. <http://www.canada2010.gc.ca/mmedia/kits/fch-6-eng.cfm>

¹⁶⁰ RAdm Nigel Greenwood, Comd JTF (Pacific) presentation to Comd Canada COM; *Op PODIUM Perspectives*.

¹⁶¹ Department of National Defence. *NDHQ Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive*, 22 November 2002. 11.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* 12.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

was held in November 2008 and examined regional safety and security issues. Three months later, Ex SILVER practiced safety and security plans, procedures, and interoperability. Ex GOLD was a full-scale operational exercise to confirm Readiness for the Games. Tactical units in the LCC such as Task Force Vancouver (TFV) and Task Force Whistler (TFW) were able to conduct their own exercises in addition to participating on the integrated exercises in the form of Ex UNIFIED GUARDIAN, just prior to the Olympics opening.¹⁶⁵ Both TFV and TFW benefitted from the advantage of having the Op PODIUM ROE in advance in order to train properly, which was proposed by Op GRIZZLY.¹⁶⁶ All of these exercises provided an opportunity for comprehensive training, integrated and CF specific, with the authorized ROE and receive validation at the tactical and operational level both for the RCMP and CF.

There were numerous lessons learned from Op GRIZZLY and Op PODIUM but the “key” lessons learned from Op GRIZZLY pertaining to CF readiness were extracted and applied to Op PODIUM. It is clearly evident that Op PODIUM addressed the majority if not all lessons to some degree ensuring an improved domestic response for CSSEs such as the Olympics or G8 Summits proving that learning did occur resulting in positive Dom Ops evolution for the CF with regard to contingency domestic operations.

Rapid Response Dom Ops: From PEREGRINE to LUSTRE; Have We Learned?

The lessons learned from Op PEREGRINE were very similar to those of the *contingency* Dom Ops Op GRIZZLY which occurred the year previous and was led by

¹⁶⁵ Department of National Defence. 3350-1/Op PODIUM (S3), Task Force Whistler General Instruction, Exercise Unified Guardian 10, 15 January 2010.

¹⁶⁶ Department of National Defence. NDHQ Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive, 22 November 2002. 11.

the same organization. Some “key” lessons contributing to improved CF readiness for CF Dom Ops will be explored in this section. By way of providing context to this section, on August 2, 2003 with fires burning all over the province, the Government of British Columbia declared a state of emergency. The next day the B.C. government requested military assistance, and Op PEREGRINE was launched.¹⁶⁷ At the height of the crisis, about 800 fires were burning in B.C. and tens of thousands of people had been ordered out of their homes. Op PEREGRINE lasted 45 days and involved more than 2,600 Canadian Forces personnel under the command of LFWA commander, Brigadier General Fenton, once again similar to Op GRIZZLY the year previous.¹⁶⁸ LFWA acted on the RFA from the province of BC and responded as a *rapid response* domestic operation (RRO) through the provision of service (POS). Originally the RFA was for 85 personnel and some logistical support but as the fires grew out of control the RFA grew exponentially in magnitude.¹⁶⁹ The initial response was the designated IRU Vanguard Company from First Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry but evolved to the deployment of the majority of what was remaining of LFWA that summer including reservists.¹⁷⁰ The supported OGD was provincial in nature in the form of the British Columbia Ministry of Forests.

Eight years later in May 2011, due to the flood affected areas along the Assiniboine River, the province of Manitoba was forced to declare a state of emergency

¹⁶⁷ Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 15 - Evidence, March 1, 2005.

¹⁶⁸ Department of National Defence. Canada Command website accessed 6 April 2012. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/daily/archive-opgen-eng.asp>

¹⁶⁹ Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 15 - Evidence, March 1, 2005. Statements of Mr. Ron Mattiussi, Director of Planning and Corporate Service, City of Kelowna summarized.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. Statements of Colonel Jim Ellis, LFWA Chief of Staff during Operation Peregrine.

of their own. On 8 May, 2011 the province submitted an RFA for CF assistance and Op LUSTRE was initiated.¹⁷¹ While concurrently exchanging information with CanadaCOM, JTFW deployed the IRU Vanguard Company from Second Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. Similar to Op PEREGRINE, the situation deteriorated and the province increased the demand from the original RFA. At its peak Op LUSTRE was a CanadaCOM operation led by JTFW with 1 CMBG being the LCC with 6 sub-units deployed including two Domestic Response companies from the Primary Reserve. The ACC was based on 400 Squadron comprised of Griffon helicopters augmented by Manitoba Ministry of Forest helicopters and coordinated by JTFW ACCE. The flooded prairie even had an MCC provided by HMCS CHIPAWA from Winnipeg in the form of Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs), zodiacs and dive teams. CF tasks included providing support to preserve essential infrastructure, reinforcing existing dykes, observing and monitoring sandbag dykes, providing essential logistical and material support and providing assistance through the voluntary evacuation of civilians where flooding poses a threat to their lives.¹⁷²

The first "key" lesson learned from Op PEREGRINE pertained to the headquarters. LFWA HQ was not structured, manned or equipped sufficiently to deploy on protracted *rapid reaction* Dom Ops. During the fire headquarters required significant augmentation to complete its tasks.¹⁷³ Normally, the joint operations group (JOG) now First Canadian Division (1 Can Div) headquartered from Kingston and 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade

¹⁷¹ Department of National Defence. 3350-1 (G5), *Joint Task Force West Post Operations Report Op LUSTRE – CF Support to Flood Mitigation Efforts in Manitoba, 28 June 2011*. 2.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 15 - Evidence, March 1, 2005. Statements of Colonel Jim Ellis, LFWA Chief of Staff during Operation Peregrine summarized.

Headquarters provides headquarters for austere locations in JTFW, as with the Winnipeg floods in 1997.¹⁷⁴ This lesson was only partially learned in Op LUSTRE. By 11 May 2011, JTFW staged a forward HQ in Winnipeg with full operational capability occurring on 12 May quickly realizing it was understaffed. There was no intent of using 1 Can Div for this operation but there was a heavy reliance upon 1 CMBG HQ to command and coordinate the LCC directly or indirectly.¹⁷⁵

The Primary Reserve commitment to Dom Ops was another “key” lesson learned from Op PEREGRINE. Although the reserve commitment to this operation was apparently outstanding, Class “C” contract screening presented difficulties legally as well as availability due to high school, university and regular civilian employment. For Op PEREGRINE, Commander LFWA employed the reserves on his authority which was contrary to QR&O 9.08.¹⁷⁶ Basically Commander LFWA vectored reserve training and concentrations to locations where CF assistance was needed. The British Columbia Dragoons were the lead CF organization during the initial stages of Op PEREGRINE to facilitate this.¹⁷⁷ During Op LUSTRE, the existence of CanadaCOM, RJTFs and the creation of Domestic Response Companies (DRCs) within the RJTFs benefitted the operation greatly. CanadaCOM was able to perform the staff interaction required to obtain CDS approval under QR&O 9.08 and deliver to JTFW for reserve employment. DRCs composed of reserves were trained in Dom Ops and ready in JTFW to deploy with

¹⁷⁴ Department of National Defence. *CFJTP 3-2 Domestic Operations*. Page 3-5.

¹⁷⁵ Department of National Defence. *3350-1 (G5), Joint Task Force West Post Operations Report Op LUSTRE – CF Support to Flood Mitigation Efforts in Manitoba, 28 June 2011*. 4.

¹⁷⁶ Department of National Defence. *3000-2 (DLFR 3-5) Lessons Learned Op PEREGRINE – DLFR Input, 7 Oct 03*. 2. IAW QR&O 9.08, the reserve member but be approved by the CDS and assigned to the establishment of a Regular Force Unit or supernumerary to the Regular Force unit.

¹⁷⁷ Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 15 - Evidence, March 1, 2005. Statements of Colonel Jim Ellis, LFWA Chief of Staff during Operation Peregrine summarized.

two companies of volunteers in 48 hours.¹⁷⁸ The reserve lesson from Op PEREGRINE was learned for Op LUSTRE. Still existing were civilian employment issues as well as school commitments however, until the GoC obtains legislature to protect reservists in the civilian employment, this will continue and is beyond the control of the CF.

Yet another “key” lesson learned from Op PEREGRINE that can contribute to CF Dom Ops Readiness is the OGD need of CF Dom Ops liaison officers (DLOs) at the municipal and provincial level. LFWA made the recommendation that within regional emergency plans having a member of the CF as a DLO would be mutually beneficial to the CF and OGDs.¹⁷⁹ On many occasions proved that quick and direct communication could not move up through the provincial emergency preparedness organization and then down through the chain of command to the CF.¹⁸⁰ By the time Op LUSTRE occurred, JTFW has a resident J5 Dom Ops staff Officer, Dom Ops detachments in Manitoba at Winnipeg with several DLOs scattered around the province and the same structured detachment in Saskatchewan at Regina.¹⁸¹ These staff officers and DLOs were linked in with municipal and provincial emergency management offices as well as critical infrastructure establishments. For Op LUSTRE, the Dom Ops staff assisted the province in the RFA request as they were well informed before there was ever a need. The Dom

¹⁷⁸ Department of National Defence. 3350-1 (G5), *Joint Task Force West Post Operations Report Op LUSTRE – CF Support to Flood Mitigation Efforts in Manitoba, 28 June 2011.*

¹⁷⁹ Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 15 - Evidence, March 1, 2005. Statements of Colonel Jim Ellis, LFWA Chief of Staff during Operation Peregrine summarized.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Department of National Defence. 3350-1 (G5), *Joint Task Force West Post Operations Report Op LUSTRE – CF Support to Flood Mitigation Efforts in Manitoba, 28 June 2011.*

Ops detachment in Manitoba also provided the ground brief and orientation to the IRU Vanguard and recce party which expedited the response.¹⁸²

Lastly, the fourth lesson learned from Op PEREGRINE that was extracted from reports post-operation pertaining to CF Readiness was that there were no Dom Ops exercises in existence for RRO. This has changed significantly by the timeframe of op LUSTRE and it was evident with the performance of the DRCs from JTFW. Annually RJTFs are mandated by CanadaCOM to exercise in the Dom Ops domain however, reserve units often will hold a unit level Dom Ops training event, which was discussed in Chapter One, to further hone their skills.¹⁸³

Conclusion: Has the CF Learned and is it Ready for Both?

The aim of this section was to determine if there has actually been “learning” with regard to CF Dom Ops and positive evolution, specifically to Readiness and employment. Both *contingency* and *rapid response* Dom Ops were examined using Op GRIZZLY lessons learned applied to Op PODIUM and Op PEREGRINE lessons learned applied to Op LUSTRE respectively. Information extracted from various formal reports as well as first hand testimony produced several “key” lessons learned that were central to Readiness. For contingency operations, it was evident that the lessons of Op GRIZZLY were learned specifically pertaining to early integration with OGDs, centralizing and streamlining integrated C2 structures and acknowledging that training in an integrated

¹⁸² Department of National Defence. *3301-1/Op LUSTRE, 1 CMBG Post-Operation Report, Op LUSTRE, 21 June 2012.*

¹⁸³ Department of National Defence. *Land Force Central Area News Bulletin, 7 February 2012; Canadian Forces Training In Northern Ontario, Ex TRILLIUM RESPONSE 2012.* Accessed by internet 6 April 2012. http://www.town.cochrane.on.ca/files/%7BB8B5C819-2B68-4E78-BAF6-7146C3506636%7DMilitary%20Training_Press%20Release.pdf

fashion prior to the event is vital. Specifically training must include an exercise with ROE applied and one culminating with a certification of *operational ready* which has been learned and is now routine. For *rapid response* Dom Ops, lessons were found to be learned but not to the same degree as *contingency* Dom Ops were. In Op PEREGRINE, it was re-iterated multiple occasions in various post operation reports and first hand testimony that there are issues with reserve Class C contracts and overall employment that needs resolution. This has not been fully learned by op LUSTRE. Also, the suggestion of using 1 Can Div HQ for rapid response Dom Ops was not hoisted aboard even though it has been a repeated suggestion as well as an entire section in the CF Doctrine. Overall, the “key” lessons were learned such as reservist Readiness in the form of DRCs and training in preparation for *rapid response* Dom Ops. The most significant ‘key’ lesson learned was that the CF has bought into the Dom Ops agenda by valuing preparedness and integration relationship building. This was proven by the robust Dom Ops staff and liaison personnel that exist within the RJTFs. In this circumstance, simple social interaction works as a lubricant for interagency success in Dom Ops. Overall, it can be concluded that the CF is ready for both with some minor points for improvement. Arctic, NORAD and terrorist threat readiness will be examined thoroughly in the next chapter explaining why “partially ready” is reflected in Table 1.9 at this point.

<i>Criteria</i> <i>Core Domestic Missions</i>	1) Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD	2) Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics	3) Respond to a major terrorist attack	4) Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.
a) CF Disposition, and				
b) CF and Whole of Government Approach,				
c) Application of Lessons Learned				
d) Interconnectedness with the United States.				

Table 1.9: CF Dom Ops Readiness Conditions Check on Application of Lessons Learned.

CHAPTER 4 – CANADA INTERCONNECTEDNESS WITH UNITED STATES

*Threats to the United States are threats to Canada and there is no threat to the National Security of the United States which does not represent a direct threat to this country (Canada).*¹⁸⁴

Minister of Public Safety Vic Toews 2011.

Introduction to the US relationship

Canada and the United States share one of the longest undefended borders in the world, economies are mutually benefiting of each other, they enjoy close ties in the research and development sector and they share a determined and deliberate commitment to protect and defend their citizens. It has been in the best interest of both countries to work collaboratively and strengthen their relationship with regard to defence and security of North America to protect these interests.¹⁸⁵ Canada-U.S. defence interconnectedness began formally in 1940 during the *Ogdensburg Agreement*, when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD).¹⁸⁶ Since that time relations and defence interconnectedness strengthened further through their contributions in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, then their creation the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) in 1958.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Vic Toews when addressing a US-Canada Security Conference, 25 October 2011, Ottawa, ON.

¹⁸⁵ Department of National Defence. Canada Command Background, 3 March 2011. *The Canada - U.S. Partnership on Security and Defence.*

¹⁸⁶ Stephen Clarkson and Erin Fitzgerald. *A Special Military Relationship? Canada's Role in Constructing US Military Power.* Journal Of Military and Strategic Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, Fall 2009. 4.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

Almost fifty years later in 2009 through the bi-lateral document titled *The Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation*, a new defence relationship has been created between Canada and the US in the form of the Tri-Command.¹⁸⁸ The Tri-Command takes into consideration two newly formed nation defence commands which are not rooted in a *Cold War* construct, such as NORAD, but address the aid to civil authorities, symmetrical and asymmetrical threat existing in the post 9-11 era on Canadian and American soil. The two new commands are the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) formed in 2002 and Canada Command (CanadaCOM) formed in 2006.¹⁸⁹ In this Chapter, Canada's interconnectedness with the United States will be examined to determine if the two nations are mutually supporting each other in defence, ensuring overall Readiness with respect to CF Dom Ops. Specifically the Tri-Command will be the subject of investigation starting with NORAD.

The Canadian Forces and NORAD: Is this an Obsolete Concept?

The military relationship bonded between Canada and the United States is extraordinarily unique. These two nations possess the only bi-national command agreement between two militaries in the form of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)¹⁹⁰ which has existed successfully over the past fifty-four years. NORAD has become synonymous with combined Canada-United States (CANUS)

¹⁸⁸ Victor Renuard, General, Commander NORAD/USNORTHCOM and A.B. Donaldson, Vice Admiral, Comd CanadaCOM. US Department of Defence and Cdn Department Of National Defence Bi-National Document. *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation, September 2009*. 3.

¹⁸⁹ Department of National Defence. Canada Command Backgrounder, 3 March 2011. *The Canada - U.S. Partnership on Security and Defence*. 3.

¹⁹⁰ *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation. Annex A. Mission of NORAD* - In close collaboration with homeland defense, security, and law enforcement partners, NORAD will prevent air attacks against North America, safeguard the sovereign airspaces of the United States and Canada by responding to unknown, unwanted and unauthorized air activity approaching and operating within these airspaces, and provide aerospace and maritime warning for North America.

success and sets the example for other CANUS endeavours. NORAD is also a symbol of strength to other nations or collection of states which mitigates the possibility of military threat to domestic North America. NORAD, as a symbol of strength, also deters unwanted infringement on CANUS territory such as the arctic waters and the aerospace over it. NORAD has become a brand-named representing strong CAN-US relations. The CF has been better prepared to respond to domestic threats as a result of this mutually benefiting continental security agreement, specifically those from the air and aerospace but has expanded to include approaches from the maritime domain as well.

One of the main arguments about NORAD is that it has become obsolete. Some believe that it is a *Cold War* relic and with the advent of CanadaCOM and USNORTHCOM there are significant redundancies.¹⁹¹ Throughout the history of NORAD, many Canadians and Canadian politicians thought of NORAD as a means for the US to use Canada as their battleground to fight the aerospace portion of the *Cold War*.¹⁹² This is not the case and a reason why NORAD continues to exist after the 2007 review for its continuance. One example of NORAD necessity, including Canada's participation, pertains to the existing asymmetrical threat in the post 9-11 era. There is a real missile and maritime threat posed by an enemy using rudimentary means but potentially very effective and devastating. Maritime warning is a newly acquired mission of NOAR along with Aerospace and missile warnings.¹⁹³ One threat is the maritime launched short range missile loaded with a CBRN natured war head, or more commonly

¹⁹¹ Joseph T. Jockel. *Canada in NORAD 1957-2007: A History*. McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston ON. 2007. 187-198.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation. Annex A.*

known as the *scud-in-a-tub*.¹⁹⁴ Although the threat of this type of attack is higher in the Gulf States and within Europe¹⁹⁵, the threat is very real to North America to the point where up to three billion dollars will be invested to counter the *scud-in-a tub* scenario.¹⁹⁶ Another counter argument to the belief that NORAD is obsolete is the possibility of a second iteration of 9-11. This threat has been very real and Canada-US efforts through NORAD and other combined organizations have diligently worked towards successfully preventing this from reoccurring.¹⁹⁷ NORAD has now changed its focus from just looking outward to concurrently looking inward, working closely with NAV Canada (NavCan) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ensuring that Canada and the US are mutually protected from an external air and maritime threat as well as an internal air threat. Suspicious aircraft flying in an irregular fashion within North America immediately triggers the potential threat of a terrorist threat. These aircraft are tracked diligently with the appropriate defence mechanisms applied controlled through the bi-nationally led NORAD. The air threat also continues from an external manner through the rejuvenated Russian Tupolev flights, or more commonly known as *Russian Bears*. The re-initiation of *Bear* flights nearing NORAD airspace, specifically over the northern arctic cap, started in 2007 demonstrating *Cold War* nuclear bomber flight patterns.¹⁹⁸ From 2007-2009, there were as many as 20 flights of this nature which continue to occur but are closely tracked by NORAD.¹⁹⁹ Although this was not an incursion, Russia may

¹⁹⁴ Stephen D. Terstegge, Major. *Ballistic Missile Defense in the European Theater: Political, Military and Technical Considerations*. US Naval war College, Newport, R.I. 15 April, 2007.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Peter Huessy. Missile Defense in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation. The Jewish Policy Centre Journal *inFocus*, Winter 2009, Volume 3, Number 4.

¹⁹⁷ Joseph R. Inge and Erica Findly. *North American Defense and Security after 9/11*. Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 40, 1st quarter 2006.

¹⁹⁸ Nancy Teeple. *A Brief History of Incursions into the Canadian Arctic*. Canadian Army Journal Vol. 12.3, Winter 2010. 56.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

perhaps be just exercising their rusting military assets or perhaps they are just trying to communicate to the world that they are a strategic power with influence. Regardless, the counter-argument could be that Russian probing of Canadian / NORAD airspace is a testing of NORAD's ability to detect foreign aircraft and its capabilities to respond.²⁰⁰ In these circumstances, Canada has been watchful within NORAD ensuring that these incidents are closely tracked with the appropriate reaction applied with its US partners.

Canada has had unbroken participation with the US in NORAD for the past 54 years ensuring mutual protection of North America against internal and external threats from the air through Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE), from the sea through Operation NEPTUNE STRIKE (ONS) and from other threats including space and cyber through CONPLAN 3310.²⁰¹ This long-lasting protection provided by NORAD has proven that the organization is not obsolete. NORAD is a symbol of Canada-US strength and commitment to mutual Readiness in the domestic domain.

CanadaCOM and USNORTHCOM: Different but the Same.

As mentioned in earlier sections, USNORTHCOM was created in 2002 and CanadaCom was created in 2006 to deal with homeland domestic safety, security and defence needs of both nations. CanadaCOM AOR is depicted in Figure 1.2 with an AOI encompassing the globe as it is the interest is anything that has an impact on the AOR.²⁰² NORTHCOM has an area of responsibility that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Joseph Inge and Erica Findly. *North American Defense and Security after 9/11*. Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 40, 1st quarter 2006 and ²⁰¹ *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation, Annex A*.

²⁰² Comd CanadaCOM, SOODO 12 Feb 12, page 2.

miles, including the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida.²⁰³ The USNORTHCOM AOR includes all of CanadaCOM's AOR. With a similar AOR, responsibilities are shared which is most evident in border regions, the Canadian Arctic and maritime domain which will be discussed later in this chapter.²⁰⁴ Arctic response in case of disaster in the form of Navy, Coast Guard and Search & Rescue assets are shared the most.²⁰⁵

Even though CanadaCOM and USNORTHCOM are national organizations reporting to their independent governments unlike the bi-national Command of NORAD, there are many bi-lateral agreements to ensure mutual protection, efficiency and Readiness. The first major bi-lateral agreement of this kind under the watch of USNORTHCOM-CanadaCOM was the creation of the Basic Defence Document (BDD), signed by Canada's Chief of Defence Staff and U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 2006.²⁰⁶ This document requires Commander USNORTHCOM²⁰⁷ and Commander CanadaCOM to establish close relationships with each other to ensure a timely and coordinated response to defence and security challenges to Canada and the United States.²⁰⁸ The BDD spawned the refinement and development of two *intermestic*²⁰⁹

²⁰³ United States. William Knight. Congressional Research Service. *Homeland Security: Roles and Missions for United States Northern Command*. 3 June, 2008.

²⁰⁴ Government of Canada. *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy; Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad, 2010*. 6.

²⁰⁵ *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation, Annex A*.

²⁰⁶ Joseph Inge and Erica Findly. *North American Defense and Security after 9/11*. Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 40, 1st quarter 2006 and ²⁰⁶ *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation, Annex A*.

²⁰⁷ Commander USNORTHCOM and Commander NORAD are the same person. This four-star general commands both organizations with different roles. His staffs are double hatted in most cases except for chief of Staff and J3 functions. Canada only plays a liaison role in USNORTHCOM where it plays a much larger integrated role in the bi-national NORAD where the Deputy Commander is always a Canadian Lieutenant General.

²⁰⁸ Victor Renuard, General, Commander NORAD/USNORTHCOM and A.B. Donaldson, Vice Admiral, Comd CanadaCOM. US Department of Defence and Cdn Department Of National Defence Bi-National Document. *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation, September 2009*. 3.

plans, the first being the Canada-US Combined Defence Plan (CDP) which was initiated in 2002 but continues to be refined through BDD requirements.²¹⁰ This classified document provides the framework for the combined defence of Canada and the United States during peace contingencies and war.²¹¹ The 2006 BDD also directed the development of the Civil Assistance Plan (CAP) in 2008 which provides guidance for the military forces of each nation to provide support to the other nation's military force during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.²¹² Commander USNORTHCOM and Commander Canada COM are the designated planning agents of the BDD and are responsible for the production of the CAP in synchronization with the CDP. Examples of the CAP in action are the US CBRNE provision to Vancouver 2010 Olympics, staged in the state of Washington and Canadian Search and rescue arctic mass casualty (MASCAS) tentage provision to the US in order to increase their MASCAS capacity for 320 personnel in the Arctic. Other examples from Canada to the US may include in the future the sharing of the *hub-and-spoke* sustainment model Canada has developed in the Arctic as a part of the *National Emergency Response Plan (NESP)* in the Arctic which is still in draft form.²¹³

In addition to the CDP and CAP which are updated every 5 years by Commanders of USNORTHCOM and CanadaCOM through the PJDB (an annual meeting as described in

²⁰⁹ Dwayne Lovegrove. *Sutherland in the 21st Century: Invariants in Canada's Policy Agenda Since 9/11*. The Canadian Military Journal, Vol 10, No 3, 2010. The term 'intermestic' was coined by social scientists to describe the merge of domestic and international concerns within and between states, or the internationalizing of domestic issues including those defence in nature.

²¹⁰ *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation, September 2009*. Annex A.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² US Department of Defence and Canada Department of National Defence. Comd USNORTHCOM and Comd CanadaCOM. *Canada and United States Civil Assistance Plan (CANUS-CAP 08)*, 18 February 2008.

²¹³ Department of National Defence. "The CF in the North." CanadaCOM website accessed 23 April 2012. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/nr-sp/bg-do/12.003-north-nord-eng.asp>

the introduction of this chapter), the BDD has introduced an information sharing directive in the form of a memorandum of understanding (MOU). The USNORTHCOM-CanadaCOM Information Sharing MOU was signed this past January by both commanders and in addition to updating and formalizing existing arrangements between USNORTHCOM and CanadaCOM, it has identified areas to improve in both information and intelligence sharing.²¹⁴ This has already occurred in the form of computer information systems integration via NIPRnet and SIPRnet²¹⁵ as well as the exchange of two liaison officer each in the respective headquarters. In order for both nations to mutually benefit and respond in a timely manner to domestic incident, systems must be but in place to expedite intelligence and information sharing.

This investigation has shown that the CF through NORAD, USNORTHCOM and CanadaCOM, the two nations are extremely interconnected. One final piece of evidence is the fact that the centre of gravity (CoG) for CanadaCOM and USNORTHCOM are almost identical, illustrating that they share the same outlook as the two nations of Canada and The United States do for the most part. CanadaCOM CoG is *Relationships with our Partners* while USNORTHCOM/NORAD is *Partnerships*. This parallel thinking will only strengthen the existing bond and will facilitate a unified and effective domestic response. This collective thinking was formalized in the Tri-Command study which will be examined in the next section.

²¹⁴ Department of National Defence. Canada Command Website accessed 8 April 2012. *Canada, U.S. Militaries Sign Frameworks For Enhanced Defence Cooperation following Permanent Joint Board on Defence Meeting*. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/daily/archive-canusa11-eng.asp>

²¹⁵ United States. Department of Defence. The Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRnet) is the US DoD's network for the exchange of classified information and messages at the SECRET level. The National Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRnet) is the unclassified counterpart. Accessed by internet on 8 April 2012: <http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/csg/s1class/siprnet.htm>

The Tri-Command Study: USNORTHCOM, NORAD and CanadaCOM; Issues?

As mentioned in the previous section, USNORTHCOM and Canada COM are national commands reporting to their respective governments while NORAD is slightly different with a bi-national command reporting to both Canada and the United States.²¹⁶ To differentiate, NORAD's mission responsibilities are in aerospace and maritime domains while USNORTHCOM and CanadaCOM have responsibilities in all domains, including the support to civil authorities.²¹⁷ To investigate the future roles, missions and relationships for the three commands, the CDS and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) initiated a study in 2007 called the *Tri Command Study*.²¹⁸ This *Tri Command Study* examined shared responsibilities of CanadaCOM, USNORTHCOM, and NORAD's for the defence of North America. The overall goal of the study was to increase defence and security in North America while respecting national sovereignty. The *Tri Command Study* focused on strengthening the ability of Canadian and U.S. armed forces to act in a more timely and coordinated fashion as well as providing the same response support to civil authorities thus increasing overall Readiness. The initial product of the study arrived in the form of the 2009 *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation* (FEMC).²¹⁹ In addition to labeling the three Commands as the *Tri Command*, the FEMC describes how the *Tri Command* operates and interacts, emphasizes relationships and command responsibilities concerning mutual support and

²¹⁶ United States. Department of Defence. George Gaines. *Tri-Command Study Report 2010*. The National Strategic Forum Review, Summer, 2010. 1.

²¹⁷ Victor Renuard, General, Commander NORAD/USNORTHCOM and A.B. Donaldson, Vice Admiral, Comd CanadaCOM. US Department of Defence and Cdn Department Of National Defence Bi-National Document. *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation, September 2009*. Annex A.

²¹⁸ Department of National Defence. *BG 09.05 - CanadaCOM Backgrounder on Tri Command Study, 28 September, 2009*. Canada Command website accessed 8 April 2012. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/docs/pdf/BG-Framework-eng.pdf>

²¹⁹ United States. Department of Defence. George Gaines. *Tri-Command Study Report 2010*. The National Strategic Forum Review, Summer, 2010. 3.

cooperation as described in previous sections of this paper.²²⁰ Other products from the study included the *Tri-Command Study Action Plan*, *Tri-Command Communications Strategy*, *Tri Command Vision* and *Tri-Command Strategy* all supporting the various initiatives, guidance and goals of the FEMC.²²¹

Through the annual PJDB meetings chaired by the commanders of CanadaCOM and NORAD-USNORTHCOM as well as many CAN-US staff coordination sessions and exercises, the *Tri Command* has already demonstrated some real time successes. The Vancouver Winter Olympics was the most significant example involving the participation of up to 5000 CF members led by the RCMP ISU. The US involvement included operation planning by NORAD and USNORTHCOM as well as specific roles for both US Commands. The NORAD role was exclusive to air defence with aerospace and maritime warning while USNORTHCOM was prepared to provide military CBRN capability that was pre-positioned in Washington State. This complex and successful operation demonstrated the unity of effort of the *Tri Command* in action highlighting interconnectedness and overall Readiness.²²²

Considering the increase in size of AORs for USNORTHCOM and CanadaCOM²²³, the *Tri Command* is responsible for almost the entire Western hemisphere to their respective governments and each other. Points of concern in the Arctic have been addressed but not in the South of the Western hemisphere. There is a mutual concern of security in

²²⁰ Victor Renuard, General, Commander NORAD/USNORTHCOM and A.B. Donaldson, Vice Admiral, Comd CanadaCOM. US Department of Defence and Cdn Department Of National Defence Bi-National Document. *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation, September 2009.*

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Department of National Defence. *CanadaCOM Backgrounder on The Canada - U.S. Partnership on Security and Defence, 3 March 2011.* Canada Command website accessed 8 April 2012. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/docs/pdf/BG11-001-canusa-eng.pdf>

²²³ SOODO 14 February 2012 states that unlike USNORTHCOM and CanadaCOM, NORAD does not possess an AOR, just an area of operation (AOO).

Mexico the Americas, mostly due to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and the illegal trade of drugs, weapons and other contraband items. South American and Mexican TCOs are a major focus area for the *Tri Command* effort as summarized by academics Paul Chapin and George Petrolekas in their *Conference of Defence Associations Institute* Vimy paper on the 2012 Strategic Outlook for Canada.²²⁴ Chapman and Petrolekas summarize that Mexico and South America are of special importance to both the United States and Canada. With regard to Mexico specifically, the concern is the high intensity conflict between the drug cartels and the Mexican government. The additional fear is the high potential for exportation of that war to neighboring nations in that region and possibly to other parts of the world as the cartels are highly mobile and interconnected.²²⁵ The bi-lateral Western Hemisphere Policy the Americas is yet another example of the *Tri Command* success.

Although this section has highlighted various successes of the Tri Command, there has been no mention of potential contributing factors to a reduction in Readiness. An unfortunate example of this is the product of recent *CF Transformation* in the form of the new Joint Operations Command (JOC) that aims to combine both CanadaCOM and CEFCOM under one commander.²²⁶ Unlike the USNORTHCOM-NORAD command structure where one commander is double hatted, the new JOC commander will have one commander of lesser rank in charge for each of two commands. Considering the planned reductions within the CF under CF Transformation, there will be a double hatting of staff in the JOC and the new Commander of CanadaCOM will be now of significant lower

²²⁴ Paul Chapin and George Petrolekas. *Vimy Paper Volume 5, 2012 Strategic Outlook for Canada*. Conference of Defence Associations Institute. 37.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Brian MacDonald. *Transformation by the Numbers*. The Conference of Defence Associations Institute. On Track Journal, Autumn 2011, Volume 16, Number 3. 15.

rank than his US counterpart in USNORTHCOM-NORAD of four-star stature. The possible problem could be a reduction in the established connectivity and interoperability within the *Tri Command* due to a change in organization structure including command as well as staff numbers. Many have invested incredible amounts of work to create the Tri Command which has evolved in the post 9-11 era and CF Transformation may cause the first decline in that relationship. It is unknown at this time if Dom Ops will be the exclusive responsibility of CanadaCOM or there will be a re-introduction of a DCDS to perform that role. All of these potential factors could be disastrous to the already established and well-functioning *Tri Command*.

Conclusion: Are we supporting each other?

In this chapter, an effort was made to determine CF Readiness to perform Dom Ops in accordance with domestic core missions as set out by the CFDS. This was done by the examination of interconnectedness between Canada and the United States through exploration of existing CAN-US relations in NORAD, USNORTHCOM and CanadaCOM. It was found that the NORAD was not obsolete in the post 9-11 era and the threats existing within this era are capably addressed by both CanadaCOM and USNORTHCOM. Gaps in capability are bi-laterally covered by support articulated in the BDD directives of the CAP and CDP. Other gaps in the maritime or aerospace domains are covered through bi-national agreements of NORAD such as ONE, ONS and CONPLAN 3310. To address the southern TCO threat in the Western Hemisphere, the *Tri Command* is focusing on a policy to confront this issue and increase the Tri Command influence among Mexican, South American and Caribbean states. Without question, the CAN-US interconnectedness has demonstrated significant Readiness

pertaining to Dom Ops threats and responses to them through *Tri Command* efforts and we are covering each other's arcs. Below in Table 2.0 is the CF Dom Ops Readiness Conditions Check as it pertains to the Interconnectedness with the United States.

<i>Criteria</i> <i>Core Domestic Missions</i>	1) Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD	2) Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics	3) Respond to a major terrorist attack	4) Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.
a) CF Disposition, and				
b) CF and Whole of Government Approach,				
c) Application of Lessons Learned				
d) Interconnectedness with the United States.				

Table 2.0: CF Dom Ops Readiness Conditions Check for Interconnectedness with the US

FINDINGS

"First and foremost, the Canadian Forces must ensure the security of our citizens and help exercise Canada's sovereignty. Canadians rightly expect their military to be there for them in domestic crises."

*Canada First Defence Strategy 2008.*²²⁷

Declaration of CF Dom Ops Readiness

The Canadian Forces obligation to Canada and Canadians, which the opening quote of this chapter alludes to, is first and foremost highlighting the importance of Domestic Operations. This obligation has been most recently formalized by the Government of Canada through the *Canada First Defence Strategy* and its specific articulation of six core missions for the Canadian Forces, four of which are domestic in nature as illustrated in Table 1.1. The four core domestic mission can be summarized as daily Dom Ops including the Arctic, supporting a major security event, terrorist attack response and supposing civilian authorities. These domestic missions are arduous and presumptuous in nature for the CF in that the government assumes that the CF is capable and ready to do the tasks as assigned. This research paper aimed at deducing if these four core domestic missions were in fact too arduous or presumptuous and to determine if the CF possessed the Readiness necessary to achieve the demands required for assigned domestic core missions as stated in the CFDS. Four distinctly different and key enabling criteria for the execution of CF Dom Ops were applied to the core domestic missions, also illustrated in Table 1.1. These criteria included the CF current disposition, whole of government approach, lessons learned in Dom Ops over the past decade and the Canadian

²²⁷ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, Part III, Roles of the Canadian Forces; Defending Canada-Delivering Excellence at Home. 7.

interconnectedness with the United States all themed towards the domestic agenda. Using the criteria for evaluation against the core domestic missions assigned by the CFDS, it was found that the CF demonstrates Readiness it that it possesses collective preparedness, capability and ability to respond to situations across the domestic response spectrum. Below in Table 2.1, CF Readiness is illustrated in all categories.

<i>Criteria</i> <i>Core Domestic Missions</i>	1) Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD	2) Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics	3) Respond to a major terrorist attack	4) Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.
a) CF Disposition, and	Green	Green	Yellow	Green
b) CF and Whole of Government Approach,	Green	Green	Yellow	Green
c) Application of Lessons Learned	Green	Green	Yellow	Green
d) Interconnectedness with the United States.	Green	Green	Green	Green

Table 2.1: Overall CF Dom Ops Readiness to perform domestic core missions of CFDS

Using the legend provided at Table 1.1 and allocating a logical assessment of 1 point for a green evaluation, $\frac{3}{4}$ point for a green-yellow mix evaluation, $\frac{1}{2}$ point for an evaluation of yellow and 0 for red; it can be deduced that the CF readiness score is 13.25/16 or 82.8%. In collegiate terms this is an A- grade is an acceptable score to declare the CF as Dom Ops *ready*. In order to provide substantiation and context on the evaluation of the criteria, a brief review from the previous chapters is needed.

The CF disposition criteria was evaluated by breaking it down into elements including legal authority for the CF to perform Dom Ops, government and CF direction for conduct, CF capability in executing and CF capacity in commanding and controlling Dom Ops. All categories were found to fully meet Readiness requirements less responding to a major terrorist attack which was assessed as *partially ready*. This was

due to the minimal capacity of CBRN assets. There is a reliance on US forces to significantly augment this function in case of terrorist attack or even contingency CSSEs. The *Whole of Government Approach* received the lowest rating of Readiness of 81.25% which still is an above average rating. The issues within this criteria centered on the fact that the OGDs are simply not transforming and integrating to the same extent as the CF, specifically with terrorism, sovereignty in the Arctic and taking charge of crisis situations.

Lessons Learned from domestic operations such as Op GRIZZLY in 2002 and Op PEREGRINE in 2003 from a *contingency* and *rapid response* domestic operation perspective were applied to Op PODIUM and Op LUSTRE respectively which occurred almost a decade later within the post 9-11 era. The examination aimed to deduce if lessons were actually learned and applied facilitating improved CF Readiness in Dom Ops. It was found that lessons were learned with a resulting score of 87.5%. the key issues within this criteria centered on lack of learning with regard to employment of Class “C” Reservists on domestic and continental operations in that it is still a lengthy and cumbersome approval process and civilian employment has yet to be protected like the CF’s US counterparts. Also, the lack of standing ROE for the land component in Dom Ops or Dom Ops training presents an issue for many including the maritime and air component who possess standing . Another issue was the partially ready nature of CJIRU as the CF CBRN response for terrorism attack. It is simply too small despite its excellent capability, training and renowned respect.

Interconnectedness of the CF with the US to ensure mutual readiness in Dom Ops response and the “covering of arcs” scored the highest rating of 100%. No other nation relationship in the world compares to the existing CAN-US bi-national arrangement in NORAD and bi-lateral arrangement in the Tri Command including USNORTHCOM and CanadaCOM. Highlighted successes are the Tri Command *Basic Defence Document* (BDD), *Civil Assistance Plan* (CAP), *Combined Defence Plan* (CDP) and the all-encompassing *Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation* (FEMC) which initiated the *Tri Command* concept and directs the reviews of the BDD, CAP and CDP every five years.

The *Canada First Defence Strategy* is the current and primary Government of Canada document that guides CF direction in which fashion it operates and plans for the future. As demonstrated by this paper, the CF has satisfied the requirements of Readiness. The Canadian government and Canadians can be assured that the CF is ready to execute its core domestic tasks as assigned in the *Canada First Defence Strategy*.

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