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IS THERE A CULTURIST IN THE HOUSE? OPERATIONALIZING AN INTEGRATED CF CULTURE

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MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES

**IS THERE A CULTURIST IN THE HOUSE?
OPERATIONALIZING AN INTEGRATED CF CULTURE**

By Lieutenant Commander J.W. Golden
Par Capitaine de Corvette J.W. Golden

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Contents

Table of Contents	4
List of Figures	5
Abstract	6
Chapter	
1. Introduction and Literature Review.	7
2. The Anatomy of an Organizational Entity.	21
3. The CF and the External Environment.	33
4. Is there a Culturist in the House?	58
5. Let's Call it a Draw!	70
6. Conclusion	85
Bibliography	88

List of Figures

Figure 1: CF Cultural Continuum - Operationalizing An Integrated CF Culture.	10
Figure 2: The Anatomy of an Organizational Entity.	24
Figure 3: Organizations Transformed - Adjusting to a Complex-adaptive Environment.	30
Figure 4: CF Institutional Rationale & Mindset.	37
Figure 5: Systems & the External Environmental.	51
Figure 6: 4GW Environmental Assessment Framework.	57
Figure 7: The CF Effectiveness Framework.	64
Figure 8: Inside the CF Effectiveness Framework.	66
Figure 9: Enhancing and Operationalizing an Integrated CF Culture.	71
Figure 10: Focusing on the Attributes of Common Culture.	76
Figure 11: Warden's Five Rings - A New Perspective.	79
Figure 12: The Integrated Force Culture Enabler.	80
Figure 13: Blending Functional Interests.	83

Abstract

Is there a culturist in house? The lights of the three services still burn brightly underneath the veneer of a Canadian Forces moniker. This highlights the state of the ongoing debate within the Canadian military institution between service-centre and integrated dominant cultures with those on one side of the institution heralding the progressive virtues of an integrated cultural dynamic to fulfill the defence mandate, while those on the other side, rightly believe that championing the virtues of a more traditionalist, strong service cultural era, represents the best approach to defending Canada and Canadian interests. This paper argues that it is time to call the service-oriented / integrated force debate a draw and bring the game of tug-a-war to a close. Those on both sides of the debate over whether Canada's defence interests are best served in an integrated or service-oriented culture posture are right. However, that state of righteousness depends on time, space, and context.

Inside the cultural hinterlands, this paper argues that the institution undergoes a cultural metamorphosis as it transitions from a service-centric cultural base to embrace a more integrated dynamic. It is at this juncture that CF culture must, in a manner of speaking, become operationalized, which is not something that the institution has done well in the past. CF unification efforts in the late 1960s can attest to institutional challenge of operationalizing an integrated cultural dynamic noting that it takes more than common uniforms, organizational restructuring, and Acts of Parliament, to achieve the benefits of integrated force effects. Tactical proficiency is heavily dependent on service-centric values and beliefs to shape the attitudes and form the behaviours needed to achieve success in operations. At the same time, the ability to blend service-centric ideologies and articulate an integrated perspective is vital and must be honed at the strategic level where the roots of implementing national defence strategy begin. This makes the transitioning phase, at the institution's operational level, a critical juncture in activating and unleashing or operationalizing, as it will be termed in this paper, the integrated CF cultural element inside the institution.

Operationalizing CF culture begins at the point where service-centric values, beliefs, and attitudes, give way to behaviours that blend with an integrated CF perspective. This paper contends that the CF, as an institution, while on the road to learning how to integrate, has not yet fully developed the cultural intellect to properly facilitate the transition from one cultural dynamic to the other. This speaks to the need for developing a strong force integration role within the ongoing CF Transformation framework to act as a champion for cultural integration.

“We’re going to wrap the Army, Navy, Air Force pillars in a Canadian Forces culture and develop a structure, organization, context and attitude that we work together as one operational footprint.”

General Rick Hillier¹

Chapter 1- Introduction and Literature Review

Canadian Forces’ (CF) folklore tells the story of three CF members, one who was in the army, the other one who was in the air force, and the third one who was in the navy. All three were asked to independently develop a plan to “secure a building”. The army member, being a diligent soldier, examined the building’s blueprints and the approaches to the building and developed a plan that saw barricades erected on the main road, armed guards at the entrance, roving patrols along the perimeter, and machine gun emplacements positioned to cover both the barricades and the building’s entrance. In addition, the army member had a 24-hour duty centre operating to ensure that there were duty personnel working inside the building. The air force member, envisioning security from her perspective, developed a plan that had a commissionaire stationed at the front desk to answer the telephone and respond to any walk-in queries. The navy member, steeped in naval tradition, believed that securing a building was a lot like securing one of Her Majesty’s Canadian ships. He saw no need to develop a plan when simply locking the building and going home would suffice. The idea of “secure”, in the eyes of the sailor, meant that it was time to go home.

¹General Rick Hillier, “CF Transformation: From Vision to Mission,” *The Maple Leaf* Vol. 8 No. 36 (19 October 2005): 7 [journal on-line] available from <http://www.dnd.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=1970>; Internet; accessed on 19 January 2012.

Simplistic and most certainly tongue-in-cheek, the above example highlights the challenges of working in the Canadian Forces' culturally diverse institution where wrapping three service cultures into one CF institutional culture can be nigh impossible. Operational perceptions inside the CF are filtered through a culturally-biased, service-oriented lens. This affects the CF's cultural intellectual capacity to appreciate the nuances of national defence from a multi-cultural (three service) perspective and this makes implementing an integrated national defense policy, particularly at the operational level a challenge on both military effectiveness and efficiency.²

In the Canadian Forces, the cultural effects coming from what has been describe as a tug-of-war between a strong service-centric ideal and a dynamic that favours a more integrated approach to implementing national defence strategy permeates all facets of institutional life.³ Force development, force generation, force management, and force employment, represent the process elements that drive the mechanism to develop and deliver defence services to Canadians These process elements are at the mercy of the dynamics that fuel the inter-cultural tug-of-war which, in the past, as lacked a strong force integration element. Yet, as the simple example of securing a building demonstrates, integrating these defence delivery processes can present a unique set of challenges when they are caught up in the ebb and flow of the service-oriented verses integrated cultural current that runs through the CF's institutional life blood.

²Cultural intelligence (CQ) is used in this paper from the multi-cultural perspective of the three services and their respective cultural environments. Originally developed to examine the multi-cultural dimension as it relates to military operations in foreign countries, CQ is also an effective mechanism in considering an integrated CF culture, which is examined in greater detail later in this paper. For greater understanding of CQ see Karen D. Davis & Justine C. Wright, "Culture and Cultural Intelligence," in *Cultural Intelligence & Leadership An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders*, edited by Karen D. Davis, 9-25 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009) .

³For greater insight into of this debate, see Major-General D. Gosselin, "A 50-Year Tug-of-War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and the Strong Service Idea," in *Operational Art: Canadian, Objectives, Context, and Concepts*, edited by Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Laurence M. Hickey, 129-187 (Kingston, ON; Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007) .

The lights of the three services still burn brightly underneath the veneer of a Canadian Forces moniker. This highlights the state of the ongoing debate within the Canadian military institution between service-centre and integrated dominant cultures with those on one side of the institution heralding the progressive virtues of an integrated cultural dynamic to fulfill the defence mandate, while those on the other side, rightly believe that championing the virtues of a more traditionalist, strong service cultural era, represents the best approach to defending Canada and Canadian interests. This paper argues that it is time to call the service-oriented / integrated force debate a draw and bring the game of tug-a-war to a close. Those on both sides of the debate over whether Canada's defence interests are best served in an integrated or service-oriented culture posture are right. However, that state of righteousness depends on time, space, and context.

Viewed on a continuum with individual army, air force, and naval units at the tactical end and the integrated force conglomerate at the strategic end, the cultural dynamics shift from a service-centric dynamic at the tactical end to an integrated dynamic at the strategic end with a cultural haze or fog forming at the middle where the tactical and strategic ends give way to the cultural hinterlands at operational level as depicted in Figure 1.⁴ Inside these hinterlands, this paper argues that the institution undergoes a cultural metamorphosis as it transitions from a service-centric cultural base to embrace a more integrated dynamic. It is at this juncture that CF culture must, in a manner of speaking, become operationalized, which is not something that the institution has done well in the past. CF unification efforts in the late 1960s can attest to

⁴The reference to strategic, operational, and tactical is meant to serve as an institutional divider and does not refer to the levels related to military operations as they are implied in a force employment capacity. The use of a spectrum serves to highlight the polarity surrounding the debate between service-centric and integrated cultural dynamics within the institution.

institutional challenge of operationalizing an integrated cultural dynamic noting that it takes more than common uniforms, organizational restructuring, and Acts of Parliament, to achieve the




Figure 2: CF Cultural Continuum - Operationalizing An Integrated CF Culture.

benefits of integrated force effects.⁵ Tactical proficiency is heavily dependent on service-centric values and beliefs to shape the attitudes and form the behaviours needed to achieve success in operations. At the same time, the ability to blend service-centric ideologies and articulate an integrated perspective is vital and must be honed at the strategic level where the roots of implementing national defence strategy begin. This makes the transitioning phase, at the institution's operational level, a critical juncture in activating and unleashing or operationalizing, as it will be termed in this paper, the integrated CF cultural element inside the institution.

⁵Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007) 247-254. In addition to Morton's historical perspective other authors have also presented on the historical dynamics of Minister of National Paul Helleher's drive to unification including J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army Waging War And Keeping the Peace* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 352-358 and Douglas Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 1 Defence Policy* (Kingston: Queen's University Press, 1997), 59-63.

Operationalizing CF culture begins at the point where service-centric values, beliefs, and attitudes, give way to behaviours that blend with an integrated CF perspective. This paper contends that the CF, as an institution, while on the road to learning how to integrate, has not yet fully developed the cultural intellect to properly facilitate the transition from one cultural dynamic to the other. This speaks to the need for developing a strong force integration role within the ongoing CF Transformation framework to act as a champion for cultural transition.

Before focusing on the proposed mechanics for operationalizing an integrated CF culture, readers must first understand the theory behind the mechanics, which centres on the organizational science, theory, and behaviour that articulates the social value of the CF, as an institution, to Canadian society. Chapter 2 begins the journey to understanding the theory behind the mechanics and through the work of organizational behaviourists Stephen Robbins, Nancy Langton, and Richard Daft, focuses on defining what organizational entities are and what the value or purpose they serve in society, particularly in an open-system's environment.⁶ Beginning with background, this chapter provides an historical perspective on organizations and on their evolution within the modern context of their rise during the 20th century using the works of organizational greats such as Max Weber, Frederick Taylor, Chester Barnard and Peter Selznick to set the stage.⁷ From this, emerges one of the more defining characteristics of 20th century

⁶Stephen P. Robbins and Nancy Langton, *Organizational Behaviour Concepts, Controversies, and Applications* (Toronto: Pearson Publishing Inc., 2003). Richard L. Daft, *Organizational Theory and Design* 9th Edition (Mason: Thomson Higher Education, 2007). It is important to note that there is a difference between organizations and institutions and these differences are discussed further when the CF's institutional dynamic is explored later in this paper. In reference to the discussion that follows, which uses organizational behaviour ideals to guide it, the terms organization and institution will be used interchangeably and where differences in terminology matter to the discussion at hand a distinction will be made.

⁷D.S. Pugh, *Organizational Readings* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Book Ltd, 1988). Chester Barnard, *Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938). Peter Selznick, *Leadership In Administration A Sociological Interpretation* (Berkeley: University of California Press Ltd., 1957).

organizations, which was the notion that organizations were a system of systems that affect and are affected by the interaction and influences inherent within their respective external environments.

Embracing Daft's view that organizations are comprised of structural and contextual dimensions that interact with their external environment⁸, Chapter 3 focuses on the conflict environment unfolding in 21st century, using the work of Mary Kaldor and Peter Van Creveld⁹ to define its dynamics, which has been one of the principal catalysts behind transforming the CF in the 21st century and moving towards an integrated CF cultural dynamic.¹⁰ Characterizing the 21st century conflict environment as a wicked problem,¹¹ Chapter 3 concludes by incorporating the CF into Daft's open system's context against Kaldor and Van Creveld's work, which defines the external environmental dimension. This transformation from a rigid and mechanistic organizational entity to one that is more flexible and organic-base serves to illustrate the complexity of the environment and the need for an adaptive culture to cope with its demands. This clash of external environmental factors with the structural and contextual dimensions of the CF at the turn of the 21st century, illustrates the power that external environmental factors hold over organizational entities and their ability to force change upon them.

⁸Richard Daft, *Organizational Theory and Design*...,14-15 and 17-20.

⁹Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars 2nd Edition Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) and Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York, The Free Press: 1991).

¹⁰For more on the state of the external conflict environment and the rationale behind transforming the CF see Lieutenant-General (Retired) Michael Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership As A Catalyst for Change* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 1-5.

¹¹H.W.J Rittel & M.M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," *Policy Sciences* Vol 4 (1973): 155-169 as cited in Canada. Defence Research & Development Canada. Dr. Alan Okros, John Verdun, and Paul Chouinard, *The Meta-Organization A Research and Conceptual Landscape* (Ottawa, ON: Minister of National Defence, 2011), 14-15. Available from http://pubs.drdc.gc.ca/inbasket/mmgreene.110706_1145.DRDC%20CSS%20TR%202011-13.pdf; Internet; accessed on 21 March 2012.

With Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the relationship between the structural and contextual dimensions of the CF institution and the ongoing 2-way interaction that takes place between these dimensions and the external environment, Chapter 4 centres on the cultural attribute that is resident in the structural dimension of an entity's organizational make-up. Chapter 4 seeks to forge a bond between culture and cultural intellect as it applies to the CF and then to look to exploit that bond as a way of understanding how to operationalize an integrated CF culture.

Drawing from Edgar Schein's definition of culture¹² and the work of Karen Davis, who linked cultural intelligence (CQ) and the CF institution together¹³, Chapter 4 is invested in better understanding the cultural transition that takes place at the point along the CF cultural continuum in Figure 1 where service-centric values, beliefs, and attitudes give way to behaviours that blend with an integrated CF cultural perspective. In studying this transition zone, where service-centric and integrated cultural dynamics blend, this paper looks further to develop an understanding for the institutional effort required to complete the transition and whether there is a role for a force integration process element in the development and delivery of defence services. This cultural transition, particularly from a CF perspective, produces a potentially volatile blend of knowledge, cognition, motivation, and behaviour, while needed to generate the mindfulness required to activate and unleash an integrated CF cultural dynamic, must be connected to processes that can read external environmental influences regulate the degree of integration

¹²Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishing, 1992), 12.

¹³Karen D. Davis & Justine C. Wright, "Culture and Cultural Intelligence" in *Cultural Intelligence & Leadership An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders*, edited by Karen D. Davis, 9-25 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009).

required at any one time. Much like a thermostat monitors temperature can regulates the degree of temperature change require to maintain individual comfort, the role of a force integration process element would be a dynamic function, constantly monitoring the external environment and regulating the degree of integration required to maintain institutional comfort and effectiveness.

From the framework developed in Chapter 4, Chapter 5, using the 2005 CF Transformation effort as a base of reference, examines the institutional effort behind building the cultural intellect and capacity required manage the force integration process within the transition zone along the CF cultural continuum element.¹⁴ While it is beyond the scope of this paper to look at the entire integration effort of the CF, Chapter 5 focuses on the blending service-centric and integrated ideals by concentrating on the knowledge, cognitive, motivational, and behavioural elements that were required to build the cultural intellect to support the integration effort throughout any transition phase. While simplistic in origin, Chapter 5 builds on an idea of taking what is different, looking for commonality, and then leveraging that sense of commonality to build and operationalize an integrated CF dynamic using a force integration enabler.¹⁵ This effort can be used to illustrate, from a microcosm perspective, what might be needed to manage the larger CF Transformation effort an operationalize an integrated CF cultural dynamic as envisioned not only in the work of General Rick Hillier's 2005 CF Transformation effort, but

¹⁴Lieutenant-General (Retired) Michael Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership As A Catalyst for Change* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009).

¹⁵Lieutenant Colonel Brian Murray, "What Air Forces Do," *Royal Canadian Air Force Journal* Vol. 4. No. 4 (Fall 2011) [journal on-line]; available from http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/dn-nd/D12-13-4-4-eng.pdf; Internet; accessed on 5 April 2012.

also in the pages of General Leslie's recent report on CF Transformation, which represents the next step in CF evolution.¹⁶

What does operationalizing an integrated CF culture entail? Envisioning an operationalized CF culture is challenging, but imagine, for a moment, a hockey team and on the team there are 21 people who are each trained to play specific positions. Some play forward, in an offensive capacity, while others play in a more defensive posture as either a defenseman or a goaltender. The players are sorted into lines that combine these offensive and defensive capabilities on each line together with three players playing offense, two players playing defence, and a goal tender that plays in the net for the entire game. The team's overall objective is to play with sufficient skill to win games and to win enough games in a season such that they can be declared the champions.

To achieve such a goal, individual skill is not enough. Winning games and taking home the championship, means integrating effort and coming together as a team. With all members of the team collectively applying their individual skills, in a harmonious manner on both offense and defence, the team works to outperform other teams to win. In order to achieve this, each player on the team must possess not only the capability to play their position with skill, but they must also have an appreciation for the skills required from the other players on the team and how those skills combined with their own come together to forge a winning team. Such understanding takes player's position knowledge and applies to the broader context of the game.

¹⁶Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report on Transformation 2011* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2011).

Understanding the intricacies and nuances of the game is not just about individual contributions, but rather how those individual contributions are integrated, which is job of the team's coach and captain, in their team integration capacity, both on and off the ice. This broader appreciation is achieved when team culture is operationalized and unleashed affecting the entire team dynamic

Moving from the ice rink to the modern battle space, from playbooks to national defence strategies, team culture means everything. When it comes to fielding an integrated CF culture in today's operational environment to achieve an intended outcome, the desired effect, outside of the tactical dimension is to generate an integrated cultural dynamic. Just as in the game of hockey, where each position is integral to the success of the team, within the context of executing today's national defence policy, each service-entity is integral to the overall effort made in defending Canada and Canadian interests. Operationalizing CF culture is not about choosing the right culture for the institution. It is about, given time, space, and external environmental influences, creating an integrated cultural dynamic that (1) enables and (2) multiplies the effects of desired military capabilities to achieve an intended outcome. It is about, to paraphrase Mark Twain, increasing the size of the fight in the integrated cultural dog.¹⁷

¹⁷Mark Twain, *ThinkExist.com*. available from; <http://thinkexist.com/quotation/its-not-the-size-of-the-dog-in-the-fight-it-s/14187.html>; Internet; accessed on 16 January 2012.

Literature Review

To date, there has been an ever-expanding array of research on CF culture and the Canadian military. Most of the work is unit oriented, service-centric, or society-specific focusing on civil-military relations and military relations with Canadian society. There has been very little done in the realm of considering the notion of a hybrid cultural dynamic that can encompass both service centric and integrated cultural dynamics across a single CF cultural continuum, and how such a cultural dynamic can be put to good use.

Shannon Murphy's work in 2006 to compile an annotated bibliography titled "*Annotated Bibliography: Culture in the Canadian Forces*" chronicles 179 sources that examine and question Canadian Forces' culture from a range of perspectives that span the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the institution.¹⁸ Some of the cited works in the compilation examine the concept of cultural adjustment, known as acculturation, from a service perspective such as in Donna Winslow's piece, written 2002, on "*Regimental Culture*". In this particular piece of work, Donna Winslow examined the extent to which the Canadian Army's Regimental system supported a Canadian Army culture and how areas within this dynamic may have been out of alignment, with some aspects of the traditional ethos found in the Canadian Army.¹⁹

As a follow-on to Donna Winslow's work, and more in align with the intent of this paper, Michael Capstick's piece, "*Defining the Culture: The Canadian Army in the 21st Century*",

¹⁸Department of National Defence Directorate of Strategic Human Resources, *D STRAT HR Research Note RN 04/04 Annotated Bibliography: Culture in the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2003).

¹⁹*Ibid.*,74.

considered Canadian Army culture in the 21st century and from this consideration from the perspective of questioning the CF's purpose and whether the CF, as an institution "is intended to "fight and win in war", or was it "a vital instrument for translating Canada's commitment to international peace, stability and security into action."²⁰ Questioning the core purpose of the CF as an institution, Michael Capstick points out that if the Canadian Forces is to remain a vital and relevant national institution, the desired military culture must be clearly articulated and shared by the Canadian Government, Canadian society and those who serve in uniform.²¹ Capstick's article on the subject is not a complete institutional perspective for it is limited to an army-centric line of reasoning and does not fully incorporate the RCN, RCAF, or civilian cultural contributions to the CF institution. This paper seeks to build from Capstick's work, and build a framework to facilitate discussion applying cultural intellect to a force integration process that is aimed at operationalizing an integrated CF cultural dynamic that has the capacity to support CF Transformation efforts and is capable of responding to the challenges posed by the external environmental influences of the current operating environment that defines the 21st century.

One of the most comparative, yet comprehensive, assessments between service-centric and integrated cultural dynamics comes from Major-General (Retired) Gosselin's work "*A 50-Year Tug Of War of Concepts At The Cross-roads: Unification and the Strong-Service Idea*".²² In this particular piece, Major-General Gosselin looks at the history surrounding the military institution's struggle to balance strong-service based institutional ideals with those ideals that

²⁰ Michael Capstick, "Defining the Culture: The Canadian Army in the 21st Century," *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2003): 47.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²For more information on the dynamics of this struggle, see Major-General D. Gosselin "A 50-Year Tug Of War of Concepts At The Cross-roads: Unification and the Strong-Service Idea" in *Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives Context and Concepts* edited by Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Laurence M. Hickey. 129-187 (Winnipeg: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005).

favour a more integrated approach to defence. Major-General Gosselin's historical recap focuses on the struggle between the two cultural dynamics. His conclusion supports a shifting of the sands towards a unified or integrated approach towards implementing a national defence strategy, all the while recognizing the importance that service-centric culture plays at the tactical level of the institution. At the time the piece was written, Canada was in the throes of a defence review and developing what would become the Canada First Defence Strategy and the operational commands had not been stood up.²³ Major-General Gosselin's piece offers some interesting insight into the cultural ebb and flow between service-centric and integrated cultural dynamics noting that "old-fashion ideas of single coherent defence policy and top-down strategic planning, which when combined with the joint influence, are weakening the strong service idea and unifying the forces in ways that Pope, Foukes, Pearkes, Claxton, Hellyer had only dreamed."²⁴

In a final piece on the subject of an integrated CF, Captain J.S. Dewar, Royal Canadian Navy, comments in a piece titled, "*The Impact of the Evolution of the Operational Level of War On the Structure of the CF: A Sailor's Perspective*", that given the evolving operational art of war and the advancements in war fighting technology combined with government demands for improved effectiveness and efficiency, the drive for a more integrated force presents a compelling

²³The 2005 CF Transformation effort, carried out under the direction of the Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier saw the creation of a CDS strategic advisory staff, known formally as the Strategic Joint Staff and the activation of four operational commands. Canadian Forces Expeditionary Command (CEFCOM) was placed in charge of all CF international operations that took place outside of North America. Canada Command (CANADACOM) exercised operational command of all CF operations taking place in continental North America and its approaches. Canadian Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM), while available to support both CEFCOM and CANADACOM, was placed under the direction of the Chief of Defence Staff, and conduct all special operations on behalf of Canada. Finally, Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) was in charge of providing all operational level support to operations undertaken by the three other operational commands. All of these commands were activated on 1 February 2006, with the exception of CANADACOM, which was activated on 1 July 2005.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 184.

argument, especially when US forces have so aggressively embraced an air of “jointness” within their own institution.²⁵

The value of this paper lies in identifying a mechanism that can facilitate institutional understanding and build cultural intellect that is capable of identifying a zone along the CF cultural continuum that is capable of taking service-centric values, beliefs, and attitudes and operationalizing the follow-on behaviours in such a way that they are capable of catering to a more integrated CF cultural dynamic.

²⁵ Captain J.S. Dewar RCN, “The Impact of the Evolution of the Operational Level of War On the Structure of the CF: A Sailor’s Perspective,” in *Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives Context and Concepts*. Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Laurence M. Hickey, 201-248 (Winnipeg: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 201-202.

Chapter 2 – The Anatomy of an Organizational Entity

Understanding organizational culture begins by understanding what an organization is and what purpose its existence serves society. Today's organizations (businesses, politics, religious entities, and others) are all subjected to a diverse array of cultural influences. These influences are powered by an ever-changing external environment that contains multiple stakeholders each with their own set of demands and a capability to uniquely influence the organizational environment. Amid this complexity, to those inside the organization it quickly becomes apparent that the organization's past is insufficient to explain what the future will have in store.

Organizational entities are the physical manifestations derived from a founder's vision and efforts to gather the collective will of individuals and then harness that will or energy inside a specifically defined social process that is designed to exploit a niche and satisfy a need or desire within the larger context of society.²⁶ While the present-day notion of what organizations are comes from the study of organizations and organizational behaviour, which gained prominence in the 20th century, the act of harnessing collective will is an age old concept dating back to the early hominid period of the Stone Age, some 500,000 years ago, when early humans, organized themselves into groups and formed the first social constructs.²⁷ Group dynamics of the day resulted in securing of collective will, which enabled the group's members to gather resources

²⁶Richard Daft, *Organizational Theory and Design*...,361. The discussion on the role of the founder in setting the cultural framework for an organizational entity is based on the discussion drawn from Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* 2nd Edition (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1992); and John P. Kotter and James L. Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance* (New York: Free Press, 1992). The collective will aspects can be found in Chester Barnard, "The Functions of The Executive", 30th Anniversary Edition, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 217-234.

²⁷Richard A. Gabriel, "Origins of War" in *The Ancient World: Soldiers' Lives Through History* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2007), 3.

and apply them to production-like processes from which they were able to attain the desired social outputs that ensured their larger society's collective prosperity and survival.

It was not until approximately 8,300 BC that humans began to organize themselves into permanently structured collectives in earnest and shift from their hunting-gathering ways to a life more agrarian based.²⁸ With this sense of permanency, the interaction between leader and follower and between followers themselves as well as society took on greater meaning. A social evolution unfolded, as this sense of permanency gave way to stability and the human interactions within society gave way to a need for rules and expected norms of behaviour that were shaped by the values, beliefs, and attitudes of the era.

The organizational construct of permanent settlements replaced the nomadic way of life, and by 5,000 BC, the ability to collectively acquire resources and apply production processes became sufficiently advanced enough to sustain larger and larger permanent population centres (towns to be precise).²⁹ With the rise of permanent tribal settlements came the need to form a group, a warrior caste, whose service to society was proclaimed in their ability to defend the population and its interests, including its resources and desired way-of-life, from those who sought to take it away from them for their own gains. Around 5,000BC, some 7,800 years before Clausewitz devised his famed trinity, the military organization and its contract with society, administered through a governing body was born.³⁰ Although not known at the time, with the development of

²⁸*Ibid.*,5.

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

the warrior cast, the military institution was born and a military cultural dynamic began to emerge.

Organizations are goal-oriented social collectives, deliberately structured and under executive guidance, to take society's resources and process those resources in a manner that provides a general benefit or service for the betterment of society.³¹ They possess both a structural and a contextual dimension that serve to define their design, which is then enabled through the founder's strategic intent to determine how objectives will be attained. Beneath such simplicity lies the human dimension with its values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours that are exhibited by those inside the organization. How these values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours mix and interact with the facets of both the contextual and structural dimensions forms the beginnings of what will become known as the organization's cultural dynamic.

As depicted in Figure 2, organizations are a composition of dynamic dimensions that serve to define organizational purpose and process in much the same way as personality and physical traits define people. These structural and contextual dimensions, in addition to shaping an organization, also play an important role in defining its culture. Organizations reflect the essence of a social contract. They exist to provide society, through a collective sense of synergy, the goods and services that individuals within that society are not able to provide on their own in a capable or efficient manner, in exchange, society provides the collective will to accomplish the task.

³¹Richard Daft, *Organizational Theory & Design*...,3.



Figure 2: The anatomy of an organizational entity and the interaction between the structural and contextual dimensions. (Adapted from Richard Daft, *Organizational Theory and Design...*,18.)³²

It is through the interaction of individuals in a defined social hierarchy involving leaders, followers and society-at-large, that common values and beliefs are formed and coalesce with one another to create the attitudes that lead to developing the desired behaviours that will create the culture needed to achieve the founder's vision. The following structural elements in the organizational dimension serve to identify and describe an organization's internal characteristics that lead to the formulation of organizational specific values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours. These elements serve to define an organization's DNA.³³

³²*Ibid.*,18.

³³*Ibid.*,18-20.

- Formalization – This element refers to the degree to which practices and procedures are codified. Policy, procedures, job descriptions etc. serve as foundation upon which behaviour is built and values and attitudes are shaped;
- Specialization – This trait refers to how tasks are divided up within the organization. Entities with a low degree of specialization have members who are capable of performing a diverse array of tasks, while those who are more narrowly focused, limit task diversity;
- Hierarchy of Authority/Span of Control - This trait is captured in an organization's organizational chart. It reflects the reporting relationship between superior and subordinate entities within the organization;
- Degree of Centralization - This trait reflects the decision making latitude that is accorded to various levels of authority within an organization. In centralized organizations, decision making authority is typically vested in one person or body at the top of the organization while decentralized organizations push decision making authority down to the lowest practical levels within the organization;
- Professionalism – This trait reflects the degree of formal education and training of those who work in the organization. It is considered high when members must endure years of formal education and training to complete their work; and

- Personnel Ratios – This refers to the deployment of people inside an organization. Such ratio analysis can be divided in a number of ways but most methods of division typically refer to a staff verses line ratio.

In an organization's contextual dimension, size, technology, environment, and goals are elements that constantly influence and shape the character and culture of an organization. These contextual elements interact with those that are resident in the structural dimension to shape and evolve the organization as need and circumstance dictate. Size as a characteristic of the contextual dimension is often measured in terms of the number of people employed within an organization. Technology relates to how adaptive the organization is at employing technological innovation when it delivers its product or service to society. While there is a tendency to view the application of technology from a manufacturing or production perspective, there is a certain sense of ubiquity in most of today's organizations as technology is employed to deliver products or services faster, better, and cheaper to society as a whole.³⁴

An organization's external environment is a powerful and yet nebulous element within the contextual domain. It encompasses all of the actors and stakeholders that influence life inside the organization. Due in part to the rapid expansion in capability through the use of technology and compounded by the effects of a shrinking world through the effects of globalization, organizations today interact with their external environment on an unprecedented scale, and because of such interactions, the number of actors and stakeholders grows and the degree of influence that each one exerts has also expanded. Brick and mortar entities are being replaced by the cyber market place and the global market which seemed so large in the early to mid-20th

³⁴*Ibid.*,18-20.

century has shrunk in size to the point where it can be crossed in a matter of seconds with a only a few keystrokes of effort on a computer. From a cultural perspective, environmental changes have made a significant impact on all organizations and from a military perspective this have given way to a problem dynamic that will be expanded upon in the next section of this paper through the works of Mary Kaldor and Peter Van Creveld as it applies to the changing face war and military organizations in the 21st century.

Articulated goals and strategy represent the elemental aspects of organizational intent and purpose and serve as a starting point in bridging the gap between strategic planning and strategic implementation of a given plan. An organization without intent, purpose, or goals is like a broken compass and those who serve within its walls will wander aimlessly, squandering resources and effort fulfilling futile tasks that have no meaning, because no direction has been provided. Goals and strategies also serve to focus those inside the organization, and with the help of an appropriate and well-articulated culture, will serve to define the atmosphere within an entity from which resources can be applied to defined processes in order to generate demonstrable and desired outputs.

The final contextual element to consider is cultural, which is the focus of this paper and is represented through the aggregate collecting and sharing of values and beliefs among all those who serve within an entity and whose attitudes and behaviours are shaped by the interaction of all the elements that make up the structural and contextual dimensions. Culture is the lifeblood of an organization, and for military organizations culture is very much the soul or essence of the institution. Military culture defines the degree of effectiveness that the military institution can

bring to bear in defense of a country and its national interests, which makes cultural well-being and intellect every bit as critical as the use of technology in achieving battle space success.³⁵ It is through this intellectual lens that the challenge of operationalizing an integrated CF culture will be considered as this paper unfolds.

Today's contemporary organizations bear little resemblance to their 19th and 20th century ancestors, which were ruled by concepts from the Industrial Age. Advocates from this era, such as Max Weber, who viewed bureaucracy as the most efficient organizational form, favoured organizations that were formal, hierarchical in nature, rigidly structured with centralized decision making processes vested in the executive.³⁶ Direction was top-down with no lower level input permitted or requested. As industrial-age technology progressed, the notion of efficiency rooted in scientific-management took hold as the work of Fredrick Taylor and his coal shoveling experiment at the Bethlehem Steele Company ushered in what was to become known as the Progressive Era.³⁷ Technology and process design through science shaped the structural and contextual dimensions of the organization and opened up some measure of autonomy and decision making for those who worked within the lower levels of an organization.

Transformed by social and technological revolutions, organizations become the benefactors of the technological impact of the information technologies that led to globalizing the organizational environment. Making the world a small place, these revolutions have altered

³⁵Walter F. Jr. Ulmer et al. *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*. (Washington: CSIS Press, 2000), p. xv as cited in Dr. Allan English, *Understanding Military Culture A Canadian Perspective* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 10.

³⁶D.S Pugh, *Organizational Readings...*,26.

³⁷*Ibid...*,157.

the dynamics of the structural and contextual dimensions of the traditionally mechanistically aligned organizational entities. Once exposed to the dynamics of the complex-adaptive environment, transformation gave way to a contemporary organizational make up that was capable of operating in the more expansive and influential open-system's environment. Such an environment favours flatter, nodal-design structures where horizontal and vertical networks foster relationships that build and embrace a more organic structure that is capable of thinking, learning, and adapting to the conditions inherent in its external environment where complex problems require unique solutions. Such is the state of affairs that the CF found itself in as the stable Cold War conflict environment succumbed to "new war" ways of the post-Cold War era as vividly describe by Mary Kaldor that defines the contemporary operating environment today.³⁸

³⁸ Mary Kaldor refers to the surge in asymmetric warfare in the mid-1990s as "new war". This state of conflict defines much of the conflict occurring in the contemporary operating environment. In her words, this state of conflict was characterized as one where violence is ubiquitous and the line between the sanctioned state's use of organized violence to preserve society is becoming blurred by the violence attributed to non-state conflicts between identities in the political, social, economic, and transnational segments that are fuelled by the effects of globalization and exponential change in technology. For further insight, see Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars 2nd Edition Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 2-4. This context is very similar to that described by General Sir Rupert Smith who refers to these same types conflicts in post-Cold War era as "war amongst people". See General Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force* (New York: Random House Inc., 2007).




Figure 3: Organizations transformed - from mechanistic to organic organizational design. Adjusting to a complex-adaptive environment. (Adopted from Richard Daft, *Organizational Theory and Design*...,29).

Detailed in Figure 3, the nature of this shift in the structural and contextual dimension designs has much to do with the way people today view organizations and how the challenges generated within the external environment affect it. 20th century Newtonian thinking viewed the world as an orderly, structured, and predictable environment, where an organization could be viewed from a scientific perspective as being a system made up of sub-systems.³⁹ In this context, organizations could be studied by breaking them down into their respective sub-systems whose contributions could be easily captured and defined inside a predictable sphere of influence.

³⁹Richard Daft, *Organizational Theory and Design*...,27.

Organizations were, in this context, the sum of their sub-systems, with each sub-system's contribution measureable and defined based on a predictive environment. With the loss of a predictable environment and a much broader range of external environmental influences at play, the complexity of the sub-system settings were altered.⁴⁰ Direct relationships between inputs and outputs, became difficult to establish as uncertain external environmental influences altered the direct relationship that once existed.

The dawning of the 21st century has given way to recognizing that the global environment in which organizations operate is anything but stable or predictable. Organizations must now survive in a complex, adaptive systems' environment, where it there is no definable relationship between input efforts, influences, actions, and effects.⁴¹ Prediction has now been render more of an art than a science, and for military organizations in particular, the 21st century world, has given way to a new line of academic reasoning and thought that is reshaping not only the structural and contextual dimensions of the military profession, but it is also shaping the military profession's relationship with society and the state that Clausewitz craved out in the form of his sacred Triangle.⁴²

As Chapter 2 draws to a close, having examined the structural and contextual dimensions of organizational entities in general and the propensity for these entities to shift from a mechanistic

⁴⁰For further discussion on systems theory and thinking see Bill Bentley, "Systems Theory, Systems Thinking and Culture," in *Cultural Intelligence & Leadership An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders*, ed. by Karen D. Davis, 1-7 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009) , 1-7.

⁴¹*Ibid.*...,27-28.

⁴²For a more detailed discussion on the reshaping of the Clausewitzian Triangle in an asymmetrical conflict setting see Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War Classical Strategic Thought*, 3rd Revised and Expanded Edition (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 104-105.

to organic style when confronting the challenges of a globalized external environment, Chapter 3 looks at the delicate nuances between organizations and institutions and what that distinction means for the CF and the move to operationalize an integrated CF culture, given the context of the prevailing 21st century conflict environment.

Chapter 3 – The CF and the External Environment

The cultural journey towards operationalizing an integrated CF culture has focused on raising reader appreciation for what organizations are and what their value is to society as a whole. This value is a product of the processes attributed to securing the collective will from human capital and leveraging the interactions of the structural and contextual dimensions of the organization to better anticipate the influential effects of the external environment. Within the context of these dimensions, an effort has been made to draw reader attention to what culture means to an organization and how culture, has both evolved organizations and been evolved, even revolutionized, through the dynamic external environmental influences that continuously shapes an organizational entity's structural and contextual dimensions. In Chapter 3, the delicate nuances on differences between organizations and institutions are explored and what, if anything, such a distinction may mean for the CF when it comes to operationalizing an integrated CF culture, given the prevailing conflict environment as presented through the work of Mary Kaldor and Peter Van Creveld.

In chapter 2, organizations were described as goal-oriented, social entities that were linked to their external environment through the deliberate structuring of a coordinated activity system that was designed to produce a socially desirable good or service. What distinction then, if any, separates the notion of an organization from that of an institution, given that the word

“institution”, by definition, conjures up notions of something unique, significant, or sacred to a society as in the case of the institution of marriage?⁴³

Institutions exist to serve a social purpose, which is often cast as a higher sense of calling as in the case of when one is focused on the church or describing marriage as an institution.⁴⁴ This purpose or intent legitimizes the entity or ideal in the eyes of society and serves as a basis for defining or contextualizing how well or how tight the fabric of society and the institution is woven together. Institutions require an organizing framework and they possess structural and contextual dimensions that have a cultural aspect and interact with influences in their external environment. Institutions have a sense of sanctity and longevity about them as they acquire and exploit needed resources and then process those resources through a defined process chain to satisfy social demand. In many ways, this perspective of an institution, except for the sense of sanctity and longevity, mirrors the organizational definition.

Author Peter Selznick, writing in 1957, characterized organizations from an industrial-age perspective describing them as an entity driven by a formal system of rules and objectives with tasks, powers, and procedures specifically designed according to an officially approved pattern. Describe heuristically in a mechanistic fashion, Selznick refers to the concept of an organization as being an expendable tool that is nothing more than a rational instrument designed to do a

⁴³The definition provided is drawn from the Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary. available from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/institution?show=0&t=1333223797>; Internet; accessed on 04 March 2012.

⁴⁴Peter H. Wilson, “Defining Military Culture” *The Journal of Military History* 72 (January 2008): 16.

specific job.⁴⁵ Contrast such an image with his thoughts on the definition of an institution and there is that reoccurring sense of an enduring entity, whose significance or importance to society is so overwhelming that its very essence is captured in the intricately woven social fabric which affects all aspects of life in that particular society. It is, from Selznick's perspective, that the concept of an institution is related to being a natural product, a responsive, adaptive organism derived from the pressure of society's needs in much the same way that a diamond is derived from the pressure that takes place below the Earth's surface.⁴⁶ Taking Selznick's perspective, the CF is an enduring institution, intricately woven into the fabric of Canadian society and shaped, much like a diamond, by the pressures that human interaction and conflict exert on the military institution at large.

The ideal of an institution conjures up entities such as the church, the polity, the state, or other socially engineered professions, including the military, which serves to both propel society and to protect societal interests from competing, destructive outside influences. Institutions are socially conceived entities and there are a number of proposed models that offer some insight into the rationale behind their existence. Because each model purports a different motivation for the institution's existence, the impact to an institution's founding culture can have an impact on institutional development. The population-ecology model suggests that institutions are a product of their environment, and in an effort to respond and keep pace with the changes demanded from environmental influences, the institution adopts an adaptive state where it finds itself being

⁴⁵Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration A Sociological Interpretation* (Los Angeles: University of California Press Ltd., 1957), 5-6.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*

reborn as the necessity for change demands it.⁴⁷ This particular model fuels a cultural air of effectiveness about it as the institution secures collective will from human capital to gather its resources and process them to satisfy both founding and societal desires. The air of effectiveness within its culture is spawned in response to the impact of change upon the institution that is carried through external environmental influence. The resource-dependency model, keeping the notion of environmental influence present, shifts the focus for institutional development to survival and concentrates on the internal processes that provide the means for the institution to perpetuate and fulfill its obligations. As resources either increase or shrink, the institution works to configure itself accordingly to either exploit or restrict its development.⁴⁸ Where the culture in the first model was effectiveness based on external environmental influence, the resource-dependency model focus on a culture of efficiency and adapts its processes and cultural mindset to minimize inputs and process with the intent of maximizing output.

The final theory, rational choice, perpetuates institutions as goal-oriented entities whose culture is shaped through the entity's intended mission, where rational choice pertaining to the ways to achieve the ends drives the entity's efforts.⁴⁹ Institutions founded on this theoretical mindset are not exclusively concerned with efficiency or effectiveness, but have a cultural orientation that is rationally focused on the entity's desired end-state. A conscious decision is made within the institution's executive to trade off measures of effectiveness and efficiency in order to achieve what they desire.

⁴⁷Peter H. Wilson, *Defining Military Culture...*,16.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*...,16-17.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

Taking these three models in account, which model, best depicts the CF's institutional rationale and mindset? Using Figure 4, all three models are placed on an institutional continuum that depicts the institutions rationale and mindset with the population-ecology/effectiveness base at one end and rational theory/efficiency-effectiveness trade off at the other, the CF lies on the cusp of the continuum that connects the population-ecology and resource-based theories.⁵⁰




Figure 4: CF Institutional Rationale & Mindset.

Evidence to support this position on the continuum exists if one looks at the history of CF and the approach that successive Canadian Governments have taken when it comes to prioritizing and funding defence in the wake of other national interests and in the context of a Canadian

⁵⁰A more comprehensive discussion on the three models is available through Richard Daft, *Organizational Theory & Design* 9th Edition (Mason: Thomson South-Western, 2007), 154-156.

public that, until recently over the last 10 years had difficulty relating to the CF.⁵¹ While more fully explored when the founding culture perspective of the CF is presented, if one looks at the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) allocation toward defence, since the Second World War, it has been, up until the CF mission in Afghanistan starting in 2002, in a steady state of decline with 17.8 percent of GDP spent on defence in 1945; 7.8 percent of GDP expended at the height of the Korean war; and a continuing decline to as little as 1.1 percent of GDP in 2002.⁵² Post-Second World War, the factors in the external environment, most notably the western US-led efforts to contain the spread of communist aggression, which gave way to a bi-polar power struggle between the US and the Soviet Union and led to the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliances as a means of securing bi-polar alliance support for respective superpower objectives. With the external conflict environment of the day favouring military buildup and Canada's service chiefs seeking to expand Canadian military capabilities, these external environmental desires on the part of the service chiefs clashed with the fiscal realities imposed by the Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton to demobilize the Canadian military following the end of the Second World War so that funding could be made available for more peaceful Government pursuits.⁵³

This state of affairs launched what was certainly not first and definitely not the last round in an effectiveness verses efficiency tug-of-war between the military and the Government in a test of

⁵¹For more on the Canadian public's apathy on defence spending and the state of the CF see General Rick Hillier, "A Soldier First Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War," (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2009), 107-131 and 345.

⁵²J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed The Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Phyllis Bruce Books and Harper Flamingo Canada, 2004), 242.

⁵³For a discussion on the military as an institution see Department of National Defence, *Duty With Honour*, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 6-7.

civil-military relations.⁵⁴ Today, with the release of General Leslie's *Report on Transformation* in 2011, the terms of reference of the report also included an efficiency versus effectiveness mandate that was responsible for looking at ways to achieve cost efficiency, all the while mindful of the defence and security challenges present in the current and future security environment that Canada was and has yet to face.⁵⁵ With almost 65 years between the highlighted events above and while the actors and circumstances have changed, the dynamics that frame the CF institutional rationale and mindset have varied little with the CF institution sitting upon the cusp between resource dependency and population-ecology.

The CF is an institution. It is a distinct professional body within Canadian society and this distinction is captured quite readily in the CF's military ethos framework that links CF values, beliefs, and attitudes to Canadian society. The CF is populated by professionals who apply and acquire body of knowledge under the governance of regulation that is set by a governing body. It uses a code of ethics to establish a standard of conduct and care that benefits society, and it applies this code of conduct to satisfy the institution's obligation to apply and manage all legitimate or sanctioned means of violence thereby protecting society from itself and from those who would seek to impose their will on it by force. Its members, while in uniform, are easily identifiable as belonging to the institution, and through the trappings of uniforms, equipment, bases, media attention and customs and traditions of military practice, the institution stand out as

⁵⁴ For more information and insight into Canada's post-Second World War demobilization challenges and the effectiveness versus efficiency tug-of-war between the military and the Minister see Douglas Bland, "Hillier and the New Generation of Generals: The CDS, The Policy, and The Troops," *Options Politique* (March 2008) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/mar08/bland.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012 and also see the works of Constantine Panos Danopoulos and Cynthia Ann Watson, *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Inc., 1996), 44-45.

⁵⁵ Department of National Defence, *Report on Transformation 2011*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2011), 1.

a distinct segment of Canadian society. What sets the military institution apart from other institutions in society are the notions of sacrifice and violence in their purest form. Those within the military institution bear an unlimited measure of liability and sacrifice in that their profession can demand their very lives to the cause of fulfilling the entity's obligation to society – the legal application of violence for society's benefit. This demand is unique to no other institution.⁵⁶

Having resolved organization versus institution question on the CF in favour of the institution, attention now turns back to the pursuit of operationalizing an integrated CF cultural dynamic from an institutional perspective. To begin, all culture starts with an original set of values, beliefs, and attitudes carried forward by one person or group, the founder(s). The founding entity, based on the continued success of their efforts, teaches the secrets of those successes to those in the organization and to those who will follow in their footsteps.⁵⁷ Beginning with an historical overview of military culture in Canada, this section sets out to deconstruct the CF cultural spectrum into its founding roots in order to better understand the underlying conditions that gave way to the military culture in Canada evolving into its two-state, tug-of-war dynamic. With this founding service-centric cultural dynamic explored, a foundation can emerge upon which an integrated force culture dynamic can be operationalized to aid in adapting the CF institution to its complex external environmental setting.

⁵⁶The notion of unlimited liability applied in this paper is drawn from the CF Publication "Duty With Honour The Profession of Arms in Canada 2009", which favours an institutionalized CF. The concept of unlimited liability service found within the publication was extracted from Samuel Huntington, "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations." (New York, Random House, 1960).

⁵⁷Edward Schein, "The Role of the Founder in the Creation of Organizational Culture," *Organizational Dynamics*, (Summer 1983), 13-28.

The root of institutional culture lies in the founder's vision, and in the values and beliefs that shape the attitudes and behaviours of those who come inside the walls of the institution.⁵⁸ With respect to Canadian military culture, the vision, values and beliefs cannot be attributed to any one individual. The quest to find a founder becomes the classic chicken and egg argument when the concept of a founder is tied to Canada's military culture, which did not truly come from any one person, group, or one set of circumstances, but rather through a successive series of interactions between society, the state, and the military as they existed at the time and in how, as collective, they responded to the dynamic influences that were at play in the external environment of the day.

To simply select a starting point invites the risk of misinterpreting or misrepresenting an event that may have had cultural implications on the institution, and yet without a starting point, building a cultural intellect required to operationalize an integrated CF culture cannot take place. To begin, and hopefully minimize this dilemma, it is recognized that Canada's military culture was shaped through history and had many founders starting with British, French, American, Spanish, and First Nations' interactions that spanned the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, but, for a purely Canadian perspective, it was the birth of Canada as a nation in 1867 that sparked, in its purest form the Clausewitzian relationship between Canadian society, the state, and its young military, the Canadian militia.⁵⁹ So as to include the other founding service-centric cultures in this perspective, this section will present the formative years of each service entity as they came

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

⁵⁹For more information on the Clausewitzian relationship see Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89 and for further interpretation see also Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War Classical Strategic Thought*, 3rd Revised and Expanded Edition (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 104-107.

into existence, which will include the period from Confederation in 1867 to the post-war year of the First World War and the founding of the RCAF in 1924.

On July 1st, 1867, the British North-America Act came into effect and Canada achieved nation status within the Commonwealth, albeit with some restrictions.⁶⁰ Defending Canada and Canadian national interests, part of the traditional national defence roles in Canada, were still very dependent on British support, which was largely enlisted due to the requirement to counter the American threat to conquer British interests north of border. In 1867, the Canadian military consisted of the militia, which was trained under British Army's regimental system like many other Commonwealth nations. There was no purely Canadian naval presence and the air element of the defence component was non-existent given that the airplane had not been invented yet. Although technically a sovereign nation, the defence of Canada was largely reliant upon the efforts of British army and naval forces to counter a threat from the United States – the country's only potential aggressor.

Confederation conferred the country's first Militia Act upon Canada in 1868 with Sir George Étienne Cartier becoming Canada's first Minister of Militia. Mustering in 9 districts, four in Ontario, two French-speaking and one English speaking unit in Quebec, and one in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.⁶¹ To these districts fell the colonial recruiting responsibilities to recruit and train Canadian cavalry, artillery, and infantry and in February 1869 Cartier reported

⁶⁰While this date is recognized as the birth of Canada as a nation, it was a slow transition to full statehood for the country. The Statute of Westminster, passed in 1931, gave Canada control over its own foreign policy and with it the ability to ratify treaties without the need to go to the British Parliament. The requirement to bring matters to the British Parliament became more symbolic with the passage of time with the repatriation of the Constitution in 1982 being technically the last vestige of British control over Canada.

⁶¹Desmond Morton, "*A Military History of Canada*" (Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2007), 90.

that the nominal rolls of this militia force numbered some 37,000 volunteers with another 618,000 men in reserve.⁶² The Militia however remained an auxiliary force to the British Regular military stationed in Canada, and there was great reluctance, in the eyes of Canadian politicians to assume a greater responsibility in the defence of Canada, preferring to spend only the bare minimum on colonial defence and arguing with British authorities that it was their responsibility to bear the cost of maintaining Imperial defence facilities in Canada with what was considered an imperial responsibility governing much of the debate.⁶³ With upwards of 20,000 volunteers training and drilling at week long summer camps with frugal equipment stocks, and an annual defence budget of \$1 million dollars, it was a challenge for the fledging force to survive.⁶⁴

In the period from 1870-1900, with no demonstrable threat to Canada from the US, the militia became a more of a social and political tool with patriotism demonstrated in the form of political loyalty to either the Conservative or Liberal Party depending upon the militia unit's commanding officer's political loyalties.⁶⁵ The Fenian Raids in 1870 and the Riel Rebellion in the North West Campaign of 1885 provided some opportunity for the militia, in concert with the newly formed North West Mounted Police, to put training into practice, but both of these events were readily suppressed. The ebb and flow of political life within the militia gave way to Canada's first expeditionary operation in 1899 when the British formally requested colonial support to defeat the Boer threat imposed on the self-governing colonies, Cape and Natal, in

⁶²*Ibid.*

⁶³*Ibid.*, 91.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 88-95. The figure quoted was voted in in 1863 and between 1863 and 1871, the budget fluctuated between \$650,000 and \$1 million.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 94.

Africa.⁶⁶ Supporting the Imperial declaration to counter the Boer threat, Canada generated an expeditionary force of 8,300 Canadians and suffered only 242 casualties, but the war itself was a precedent setting event in the eyes of the newly minted Canadian political and military institutions with the polity dealing with the politics of war and military institution distinguishing itself in battle.⁶⁷ Canadian involvement in the war sparked the first of many wartime debates over supporting Britain's imperialist aims around the world between English and French Canada, with French Canadians vying to seek greater self-determination over what conflicts the country entered into, and English Canadians viewing war and their enlistment to the cause as a patriotic duty to be embraced for King and country.⁶⁸

The Boer War also set a second precedence that became a part of the Canadian military cultural psyche and defined how Canada would participate in the First and Second World Wars and in Korea as well as the numerous peacekeeping missions that would fall to the country under the auspicious of the United Nations in the years to come. The act of providing an overseas contingent for military service was culturally embedded early into the psyche of both the Canadian polity and the Canadian military with the Canadian polity preferring to seek concurrence with like-minded nations on military action and the military institution preferring to more closely align itself with its coalition partners, rather than looking inward to its service-centric partners and embracing a more integrated force construct. As a result of the Boer War, Canadians would serve together, on oversea missions, as formed cohesive units under the direct

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 113-115.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 117.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 117-118. The notion of conscription among the two solitudes of Canada (English Canada and French Canada) was diametrically opposed to one another. The question of self-determination and loyalty to the Empire would play out again in the both the First and Second World Wars.

command of Canadian officers, who took Imperial direction from their British officers. Command of the Canadian officers evolved overtime with British superior officers taking command of Canadian led units at the start of World War I and Canadian officers eventually assuming those duties and responsibilities by the war's end. Today, Canadian forces may very well be placed under control of foreign authorities when deployed on overseas missions in alliance or coalition-led operations, but command of those forces will remain with Canada.

The period from 1900-1920 gave rise to the birth of Canada as an independent nation with its own interests in world affairs as the Department of External Affairs came into being in 1909.⁶⁹ In the absence of a demonstrable threat for much of the period, Canada maintained a policy of spending the minimum on national defence. With no standing army, national defence was predicated upon an all-volunteer, militia-centric force with only a small permanent custodial cadre to oversee training and employment much like it was done in the previously.

In 1911, with the garrisoning of Esquimalt and Halifax under Canadian control, the British Government, caught up in a naval arms race against Germany turned to its colonies for support, demanding they help fund the Empire effort.⁷⁰ The Canadian Government, under Sir Wilfred Laurier refused to the support the Empire effort, but accepted a compromise by agreeing to form a naval service in Canada that would be at the ready should the Empire call. Political rhetoric was intense. Amid cries of imperialism from French Canadian politicians in both parties, and the

⁶⁹Department Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "A Sort of Foreign Office 1909-39," available from http://www.international.gc.ca/history-histoire/photos/foreign_office.aspx?menu_id=36&view=d; Internet; accessed on 17 March 2011.

⁷⁰Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada...*,124.

inherent waste of imperial resources from imperialist-loyal Canadian politicians who favoured supporting the Empire's call, there was little support for a Canadian naval presence. On May 4th, 1910, the Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier, as the Liberal Government in power, exercised Liberal party discipline, to ensure the passage of the Naval Service Act and the birth of the Royal Canadian Navy.⁷¹

Born under a cloud national controversy and allegations that linked the Canadian Naval Service to conscription in the eyes of French Canadian politicians and accusations of poorly prioritizing imperial responsibilities for those loyal to the Empire, the Canadian Naval Service, consisting of the Royal Canadian Naval College in Halifax and two aging Royal Navy destroyers, one renamed HMCS *Rainbow* and stationed in Esquimalt, and the other renamed HMCS *Niobe*, came into being.⁷² Under the direction of Canadian-born Rear-Admiral Charles Kingsmill, Royal Navy, attempts were made to grow the fledging service inside a militia dominated and politically controlled environment. In its first year of existence, 28 cadets enrolled in the naval service and the number of officers and ratings totalled 704. However these numbers continued in steady decline and by the start of World War I, the number of cadets entering the Naval Service fell to 4 and the total number of officers and ratings serving in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) fell to 330.⁷³ Similarly naval expenditures carried the same pattern with a projected expenditure of \$1.7 million in 1910 falling to \$0.6 million at the outbreak of World War 1 in August 1914. When contrasted against the funding for the militia, which total \$7 million dollars in 1911 for a

⁷¹*Ibid.*...,124-125.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 125-126. See also Craig Collins, "Canada's Naval Institution at 100," *Canadian Navy Centennial Celebrating A National Institution*, (2010): 6-12.

⁷³*Ibid.* In addition to the above, further historical background, in a concise format, on the formation of the Royal Canadian Navy can also be found at <http://www.readyayeready.com/timeline/1910s/index.htm>.

permanent force troop strength of almost 3,100 and a volunteer militia force of just over 74,000, it is easy to see the how the effects of politics, which nearly saw the RCNs demise, under the Sir Robert Borden's Conservative Government at the start of the war, and how an established militia presence paved the way for an army-centric focus to Canada's war effort during World War I.⁷⁴ The RCN, what it lacked in size, it made up for in statue. As the war evolved and German submarine warfare threatened shipping on the Atlantic, the RCN embraced and developed a prowess in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) that would not only keep the Atlantic sea lanes open, but would also serve to carve out a niche for it that would last through the ages giving the RCN the ASW reputation it so richly deserved and earned.⁷⁵

With the advent of powered flight taking off first with the Wright Brothers in 1903 and the first successful Canadian powered flight lifting off in 1909, the roots of what would become the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1924 first took shape as the Canadian Aviation Corps (CAC) in 1914-1915.⁷⁶ In 1914, the CSC, consisting of two officers and a mechanic, with a budget of \$5,000 purchased a bi-plane from the Burgess-Dunne company and accompanied the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) to Britain. Given that neither of the officers nor the mechanic were qualified pilots, the aircraft never left the ground in Britain. The aircraft deteriorated and with it Canada's first exposure to military aviation and air expeditionary operations went with it.⁷⁷

⁷⁴Desmond Morton. *A Military History of Canada...*, 127.

⁷⁵For more on the RCNs role in the First World War see Craig Collins, "Canada's Naval Institution at 100," *Canadian Navy Centennial Celebrating A National Institution* (2010): 6-12.

⁷⁶Dr. Allan English and Colonel John Westrop (Retired). *Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command The Human Dimension of Expeditionary Air Force Operations*, (Ottawa: Minister of National Defence, 2007), 4-5.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*

While the CAC never left the ground, Canadians enjoyed success in the air with Britain's Royal Flying Corps (RFC), which eventually evolved into the Royal Air Force (RAF) by war's end when it was combined with the Royal Naval Flying Corps. Canadians made up 25 percent of all RAF flying personnel and approximately 40 percent of RAF pilots on serving on the Western Front were Canadians.⁷⁸ Canadians established a reputation that was out of proportion for the numbers that were serving. Of the 127 Canadian air aces in the war, the top 10 aces accounted for some 462 enemy aircraft out of the 1,500 that were shot down. The exploits of Canadian fighter aces, like Billy Bishop and Raymond Collishaw, went on to become legends that would go on to shape the Canadian military's warrior ethos.⁷⁹

Canadians and their air force contributions also heralded success in the first joint operations in support of the CEF. At Vimy Ridge, where Canadian battlefield success was Canada's rite of passage into nationhood, the combine army and air effort led to the accurate plotting and destruction of German artillery. Of the 212 German batteries identified during the Vimy offensive, 180 were knocked out of action before the offensive began.⁸⁰ Similarly, Canadian air-ground coordination during the last 100 days of the war, led to the destruction of potentially devastating German ground batteries that could have inflicted heavily losses upon Canadian forces.

⁷⁸*Ibid.* As cited in S.F Wise, *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Vol. 1: Canadian Airmen and the First World War* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1980) 25-30.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 6. As cited in S.F Wise, *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Vol. 1: Canadian Airmen and the First World War* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 401, 409.

Following the end of the First World War, debate ensued in Canada over establishing an air service in support of military operations. An Order-in-Council was set out and established the Canadian Air Force (CAF) in February 1920 and with six officers and men assigned to the service, the CAF was established with the express mandate of giving refresher training to Canadian and British wartime air crews.⁸¹ Following the establishment of a CAF Association with regional offices to maintain rosters of qualified personnel, the potential for an “air militia” to exist became a reality with an estimated 23,000 personnel to fill its ranks.⁸² With further restructuring and the introduction of the National Defence Act in Canada in 1923, the service departments of the Militia and Defence, the Naval Air Service, and the Air Board, the successor that combined the Civil Operations Branch into the Canadian Air Force, were blended into one ministry, the Ministry of National Defence. In 1924, the CAF received its Royal designation to become the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF).⁸³

Reviewing, from a founders’ perspective, the birth of the service institutions that were to become the forerunners to today’s Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Air Force, tells a lot about today’s cultural dynamic and its apparent army-centric focus. Vested in the phrase, “the way that we have always done things around here”, Canada, since its inception at Confederation, has had a national affinity for land-based operations. The Canadian Army, birthed from Confederation is Canada’s senior service and when one considers that much of Canada and its history in conflict took place in a land-centric posture, a pattern that explains army centricity begins to emerge. Nowhere is this affinity more prominent held by Canadians,

⁸¹*Ibid.*, 9.

⁸²*Ibid.* As cited in Samuel Kostenuk and John Griffin, *RCAF Squadron Histories and Aircraft 1924-1968* (Toronto, ON: Samuel Stevens Hakkert and Co., 1977), 144.

⁸³*Ibid.*

then in honouring the accomplishments of the nation at Vimy Ridge. The Battle of Vimy Ridge in France, in April 1917, was Canada's baptism by fire into nationhood and earned Canada the respect of its allies and a seat as an equal among nations at the close of the First World War.⁸⁴

While Canada acknowledges the nation's sacrifices of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) during the Battle of the Atlantic and the RCAF's contribution and sacrifice to Britain during the Battle of Britain in the Second World War, it is the Battle of Vimy Ridge that is burned into the Canadian social psyche and passed down to generations of Canadians as the birth of Canada as a warrior nation.

With a founder's cultural propensity for army-centric operations and a national identity that was born from the sacrifice at Vimy Ridge, the dominance of an army-centric culture and a natural gravitation towards a service centrality in today's military institution is readily understood and appreciated, as each service seeks to define its own identity within the larger CF institution.

However, the demands of a 4GW war are best served through collaborative and not competitive interests. With a founder's perspective established the focus now shifts to understanding the external environment and the influence that this particular dimension has on the other facets of the structural and remaining elements contained within contextual dimensions.

In keeping with the open-system's perspective, an institution's external environment is wrought with unknowns and uncertainty that interact with the mechanisms that support "how things are done" inside the institution. Given the globalized context of the world today,

⁸⁴J.L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton. *Canada and the Two World Wars*, (Toronto: Key Porter Books Ltd., 2003) 90-91.

externalities force the institution to respond in an effort to either mitigate risk or seize opportunity.⁸⁵ If an entity is viewed as collection sub-systems, as in Figure 3, where some of the sub-systems are responsible for securing the much need input resources and where others reflect the entity processes to transform inputs to outputs, and then external environmental influences




Figure 5: System and sub-system perspective of external environmental influences on institutions.

can exert pressure over a wide spectrum of events within the entity, making the institution's cultural interaction not only possible, but probable.

⁸⁵ For more on the impact of globalization and the effects of the external environment on organized entities see Steven L. McShane, *Canadian Organizational Behaviour* 6th Edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2006), 7 or Richard Daft, *Organizational Theory & Design* 9th Edition (Mason: Thomson South-Western, 2007), Chapter 4.

Influences present within the external environment, derived in this case from the effects of political and technological influences as well as from the effects of globalization, will prompt the institution to respond, and if its cultural repertoire does not foster such an ability to adapt, then the institution risks faltering on its commitments to society. As a case in point, one could see the events that led to the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment as a failure of CF institution to adapt to changed Canadian societal values and a failure to adopt an appropriate stance to the political influences exerted on the institution through the prevailing external environment of the mid-1990s when the Regiment was disbanded.⁸⁶

As with any institution that interacts with its external environment, the CF, as a military institution, must be capable of responding and adapting to the effects of the influences imposed. In a general military context, during the First World War, on the Western Front, the area between the German and Allied trenches was known as no-man's land. The land was a quagmire. Neither side could advance against the other as neither side had learned how to develop the strategies to apply the industrial age technologies of the era effectively. Caught in warfare's generational abyss, society, on both sides - its people, its politicians, and its institutions became caught up in a wave of external environmental influence imposed by the revolutionary change in the way that wars were to be fought. They had to confront the realities of a new war and work to redefine their respective military institutions and their military cultures to accommodate the new found external environment that came with the birth of conflict in the Industrial Age.

⁸⁶For more on the events that led to the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, including the troubled Somalia mission and the death of a Somalia teenager at the hands of a CF member see David Bercuson, *Significant Incident Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder In Somalia*, (Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996).

Today, a new generational abyss has opened up and again society, its polity, and its military institution, are slow to emerge and adjust to the effects of a new-war era. Author William L. Lind, in “*Understanding Fourth Generation War*” studied generational evolution of war beginning in the post-Westphalia era in 1648 where the newly formed notion of a state was granted a monopoly over the use of organized mass violence and conferred that monopoly on to the military institution as its agent. Beginning with the 1st generational warfare perspective (1GW), from 1648-1860, battle was defined in terms of lines and columns and there was a regimented formality to war, which was held to be largely within the conflict purview of states and administered by state actors.⁸⁷ By the mid-19th century technological advances in warfare and arms made it all but suicidal for forces to continue to wage war within the orderly context of line and column characterizations.

Slow to emerge, 2GW gave rise to the mass firepower and attrition warfare that characterized the First World War and saw the introduction of “No Man’s Land” to the lexicon of war to characterize the area on the front line that separated the warring states where neither side could leverage an advantage and defeat the other.⁸⁸ 3GW emerged at the end of the First World War and evolved throughout the 20th century up until the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The 3GW environment advocated manoeuver warfare and speed and pushed the military institution to develop, apply and leverage technology that would enhance these environmental attributes of generational warfare. Speed, manoeuvrability, and mass destruction capabilities were first focused on getting into the enemy’s rear and collapsing

⁸⁷William S. Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” *Military Review* (September-October 2004) [journal on-line] available from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/lind.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 16 March 2012.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*

the enemy from behind, but as technology and capability improved speed and manoeuvrability would give way to wars of short, but decisive duration with mass destruction, as heralded by the advent of nuclear weapons and the tenant of mutually assured destruction being responsible for the bi-polar stability that characterized the latter half of the 20th century.⁸⁹ With the collapse of the Soviet Union the Cold War ended and the external environment ushered in the new-war conflict era known as the forth generational warfare environment (4GW).

Retired US Marine Corps Colonel Thomas Hammes, in 2003, defined 4GW as an evolved form of insurgency that uses political, social, economic, and military networks to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.⁹⁰ This network centric approach has evoked non-traditional influences within the external environment where the military institution operates, and while characterized as an evolved form of insurgency, for the military institution the generational leap in understanding this environment in relation to the first three generational shifts is perhaps one the greatest leaps that the institution has been faced with since generational analysis of warfare was undertaken.

Fourth generational warfare challenges the military institution and the state over its monopoly over the use of organized violence. Fuelled by what Mary Kaldor describes as a conflict in identity politics, non-state actors are rising up and exploiting the technological opportunities of

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 13.

⁹⁰Colonel Thomas Hammes, USMC (Retired), "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Generation Emerges," *Military Review* (May-June 2007) [journal on-line]; available from http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume5/july_2007/7_07_1.html; Internet; accessed on 16 March 2012.

the globalized age to challenge the society's state mechanisms, such as the military institution, over its exclusive use of organized violence.⁹¹ In the hands of these non-state actors, the goal is no longer to bring conflict to a defined end, but to extend it and expand it for ethnic, religious, and/or economic, profit-oriented purposes. Martin Van Creveld believes these motives will lead to diminished state capacity in protecting and preserving societal interests, and with the eventual demise of the state, he sees the complete collapse of society into chaos and anarchy.⁹²

The 4GW environment that defines the nature of conflict in the 21st century brings forth a mass of social issues that are complex, dynamic, multi-faceted, chaotic, and contradictory when it comes to seeking resolution.⁹³ Summarized as a wicked problem, states have sought to bring forth a comprehensive or "whole-of-government" approach in attempting to resolve conflicts in the 4GW environment as no one entity or agency possesses all of the resident skill sets needed to address the issues.⁹⁴ Wicked problems, such as the state of the conflict in Afghanistan can attest to, display a host of characteristics including that they⁹⁵

- are difficult to define;

⁹¹Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars 2nd Edition Organized Violence in a Global Era*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 2-4.

⁹²Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York, The Free Press: 1991), 195-196.

⁹³H.W.J. Rittel, & M.M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning." *Policy Sciences* Vol 4 (1973): 155-169 as cited in Defence Research & Development Canada. Dr. Alan Okros, John Verdun, and Paul Chouinard, *The Meta-Organization A Research and Conceptual Landscape*, (Ottawa: Minister of National Defence, 2011), 14-15. available from http://pubs.drdc.gc.ca/inbasket/mmgreene.110706_1145.DRDC%20CSS%20TR%202011-13.pdf; Internet; accessed on 21 March 2012.

⁹⁴More on the "whole of government" comprehensive approach analysis and wicked problem context can be found in Canada. Defence Research & Development Canada. Dr. Alan Okros, John Verdun, and Paul Chouinard, *The Meta-Organization A Research and Conceptual Landscape* (Ottawa, ON: Minister of National Defence, 2011), 14-22. available from http://pubs.drdc.gc.ca/inbasket/mmgreene.110706_1145.DRDC%20CSS%20TR%202011-13.pdf; Internet; accessed on 21 March 2012.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 15.

- are highly dynamic, non-linear, non-reducible, non-compressible, and often unstable;
- are socially complex;
- involve responsibilities of multiple organizations with overlapping areas of jurisdiction and responsibility;
- have no clear or “quick-fix” solution; and
- will present unforeseen consequences with any attempt to address them.

These characteristics have shaped the CF’s institutional response to conflict in the 21st century and have been one of the major catalysts behind greater integration of the CF institution.

To better understand the new-war complexities in the contemporary operating environment that defines 4GW, Figure 6, presents a framework to consider environmental uncertainty in the 4GW context. The model looks at the degree of complexity in the elements that are working to influence in the external environment and then compares those elements to the degree of complexity that is generated when influence is exerted.




Figure 6: 4GW Environmental Assessment Framework (Adapted from Richard Daft, *Organizational Theory and Design*...,145-146).

Having put the 4GW environment into context as a wicked problem, housed as part of a complex and unstable environment, attention now turns to enhancing and operationalizing an integrated CF culture on the cultural continuum at Figure 1. The acts of enhancing and operationalizing an integrated cultural dynamic are vested in the institution's ability to develop the cultural intellect (CQ) and that ability is hidden inside the CF Effectiveness Framework both of which are presented in the next section.⁹⁶

⁹⁶Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-004, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 17-23.

Chapter 4 – Is There a Culturist In The House?

Building the Cultural Intellect for a Better Tomorrow.

Enhancing and operationalizing an integrated CF culture involves bringing together and emphasizing, among the services, what it is common in each culture's environment as it relates to operations. Building on those commonalities or functions that are carried out in operations, creates a common understanding of operations within the integrated environment on how each entities service-specific contribution contributes to the overall projection of military power with respect to a given mission. The first step in this process is to develop the cultural intellect (CQ) or mindfulness on what the cultural aspects of the service-specific contributions and then understanding the cultural mindset or rationale behind how these contributions are applied.

In an open system's setting, perceiving the system, in this case the military institution, from a non-linear vice linear perspective minimizes the likelihood that the complexities, which are inherent in the external environment from being discounted.⁹⁷ In a linear context, systems can be taken apart and analyzed in such a way that the sum of each part in the system will add up to the system's whole, making it possible to find a direct and relevant causal relationship between the influential effects exerted upon the institution caused by its interaction with the external environment.⁹⁸ The ability to determine the causal relationship adds a measure of predictability in being able to prepare the correct respond to any challenge that the entity may face. In a non-linear setting, such causal relationships are often obscured by the complexity of the problem at

⁹⁷For more on the system's perspective and complexity see Richard Daft, *Organizational Theory and Design...*, 14-15 and 147-154.

⁹⁸Dr. Bill Bentley, "Systems Theory, Systems Thinking and Culture," in *Cultural Intelligence and Leadership An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders*, ed. by Karen D. Davis, 1-7 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 5.

hand, which makes it nigh impossible to breakdown the system and analyze from a linear perspective to determine a causal relationship.⁹⁹ The causal linkages to the problem set are obscured by the complexity. Given the nature of the wicked problem environment that a 4GW problem set brings, as already discussed in this paper, the intertwined nature of the problem elements can make it challenging for military institution to respond to the environmental influence with even an optimal solution, which affects the likelihood of achieving an intended or even favourable outcome.

As a wicked problem set, 4GW can generate causal effects out of all proportion to any sense of predicable consequence that could be drawn from analyzing the external conflict environment. This leaves organizational entities, like governments and military institutions, in a reactionary vice preparatory or preventative frame of mind to respond, and in response the evolution of comprehensive operations has emerged. Governments are looking to achieve a greater degree of integration between their military and non-military organizations, like other-government agencies and non-government partners in response to dealing with the challenges in the 4GW wicked problem set.¹⁰⁰ This attempt to integrate non-tradition partners places greater emphasis on altering the structural and contextual dimensions of the government institution as stovepipes

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁰⁰For a practical example on articulating the whole-of-government approach, see Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 1-6. available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf; Internet; accessed on 24 March 2012. The intent here is not to move into a discussion on comprehensive operations and integrating non-traditional partners, but this linkage mirrors the same dynamics for enhancing and operationalizing an integrated CF cultural dynamic in that non-traditional partners are being brought together, which creates a blending of cultures. For more on the comprehensive approach in this context see Defence Research & Development Canada. Dr. Alan Okros, John Verdun, and Paul Chouinard, *The Meta-Organization A Research and Conceptual Landscape* (Ottawa: Minister of National Defence, 2011), 14-22. available from http://pubs.drdc.gc.ca/inbasket/mmgreene.110706_1145.DRDC%20CSS%20TR%202011-13.pdf; Internet; accessed on 24 March 2012.

merge at given points and collective pools of consensus and collaboration are formed on organic vice traditional mechanistic entity design.¹⁰¹ This move from mechanistic to organic allows organizational entities to re-design their sub-systems and build in greater degrees of integration and adaptability in order to enhance responsiveness to external environmental stimuli.

From a CF institutional perspective, shifting the structural and contextual dimensions from a mechanistic to an organic dynamic in order to grapple with the non-linear effects of the 4GW wicked problem environment means greater integration and cultural impact. To build on the service commonalities and blend service-specific military effects to achieve greater military power projection means strengthening integrated cultural intellect (CQ) within the CF. CQ commonly refers to the ability of people and/or institutions to recognize the shared values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours within, and to then apply this knowledge towards attaining a greater cultural awareness enhancing one's perspective and ability to attain a specific goal.¹⁰² In looking at the dynamics of enhancing and operationalizing an integrated CF culture, CQ is more than just recognizing "the way that things are done" within an institution. It is about recognizing the cultural shaping in each service's response to the 4GW wicked problem set and then acting upon that information, with an air of cultural mindfulness, to blend the service-specific efforts in operations into a more holistic and effective CF response.

¹⁰¹For further discussion on organic versus mechanistic processes see Richard Daft, *Organizational Theory and Design...*, 151.

¹⁰²Karen D. Davis and Justine C. Wright, "Culture and Cultural Intelligence" in, *Cultural Intelligence and Leadership An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders* ed. by Karen Davis, 9-23 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 9-11.

In her work to compile, *Cultural Intelligence & Leadership An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders*, Karen Davis, portrayed this ability in the context of a multi-cultural international setting where the Canadian Forces was deployed on operations such as those that were underway in Afghanistan at the time, where understanding local culture had been one of the driving factors to understanding and winning over the local populace, which was seen as key to achieving success in defeating the insurgency operations of the Taliban. CQ is also a valuable internal tool for understanding the complex dynamics in institutional environments where multiple cultures and sub-cultures influence one another and are influenced by factors prevalent within the external environment.¹⁰³ In this regard, CQ becomes an excellent tool for understanding the cultural dynamics that are at play between the desire for a strong inter-service based culture and the perceived need for a more integrated CF culture. The key to ending the cultural tug-of-war that has been playing out and enhancing and operationalizing an integrated CF culture dynamic lies in acquiring the cultural intellect to recognize the appropriate time and space within the CF cultural continuum where an integrated CF cultural dynamic is appropriate.

Although Karen Davis' work is focused on the value of applying cultural intellect in an operational setting involving military and local populace, the tenants of her work also lend itself to examining the knowledge, cognitive, behavioural, and motivational dimensions needed to consider the cultural aspects of the integrated CF cultural dynamic discussed so far.¹⁰⁴ There is no one dimension more important than another. All of the dimensions provide value-added

¹⁰³Richard D. Bucher, *Building Cultural Intelligence* (Columbus, OH: Pearson Education Inc. 2008), 6-10.

¹⁰⁴Karen Davis & Justine C. Wright, "Culture and Cultural Intelligence," in *Cultural Intelligence and Leadership...*, 11-15.

insight in identifying the type of integrated CF cultural dynamic and the time and space along the cultural continuum that is the most fertile to support activating its integrated attributes.

Using the knowledge-cognitive-behavioural-motivational nexus as a potential avenue to enhancing and operationalizing an integrated CF culture draws from what David C. Thomas considered to be a sense of awareness to a state of awakening or mindfulness inside the entity.

This state of awareness is achieved by¹⁰⁵

- Bringing forward relevant knowledge such that it becomes the focal point with an enhanced level of awareness at the institutional level;
- Deferring an immediate response, or what some would describe as a “click whirrrl response”; and
- Quelling the desire to make an unfavorable response. This is linked to the human need to appear to be consistent when making decisions and ensuring that the decisions made are in line with broader goals and motives.¹⁰⁶

With the demands of the 4GW wicked problem environment and the Canadian Government’s articulation of a whole-of-government approach to defence and national security articulated in the CFDS mentioned earlier, an operationalized integrated CF culture has its place in the CF institution, but what is a challenge is understanding where on the CF cultural continuum does an integrated CF culture fit and what degree of integration is required. Does the 4GW problem and the comprehensive approach necessitate the need for a US Marine style dynamic, or would the

¹⁰⁵David C. Thomas, “Domain and Dominance of Cultural Intelligence: The Importance of Mindfulness,” *Group and Organizational Management* 31 (2009): 85-86 as cited in Karen Davis & Justine C. Wright, “Culture and Cultural Intelligence,” in *Cultural Intelligence and Leadership...*, 11-15.

¹⁰⁶Robert Cialdini explores these behaviours at the individual level and since organizations and institutions are comprised of people, such behaviour is mimicked at the organizational level. For more see Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence Science and Practice* 4th Edition, (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 2001).

interests of national defence be better serviced by those at the operational and strategic level from each of the environments working in an integrated environment that serves to foster greater collaboration, but falls just short of a US Marine-style integration effort?¹⁰⁷ Knowing what the best fit entails is about developing, within the institution, the cultural intellectual capacity to know where the tipping point between where the marginal utility of a strong service-based culture begins to decline and where the merits of an integrated force culture begin to take hold.

This search begins with the executive, when the CF institutions' senior leadership begins to define the nature of the relationship between the cognitive, motivational, and behavioural elements that link each service to the CF institution, and it ends when the knowledge that is gleaned evolves into a state of awareness whereby the CF institution embraces the idea of supporting and sustaining an operationalized integrated CF culture dynamic. To aid in such discussions, the idea of military effectiveness will figure prominently and since culture plays an intricate part of that effectiveness equation, often described as the bedrock of military effectiveness, the starting point to operationalizing an integrated CF culture begins within the CF Effectiveness Framework as detailed in Figure 4.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷There is no intent to explore the details of this question in this paper. The point is raised to highlight the range of discussion that is possible when it comes to entertaining the idea of an integrated CF. Several CFC students have examined this issue and a good presentation on the subject can be found in Lieutenant Commander L.N. Hartell, "A Canadian Marine Corps: Semper ethologus?" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Joint Command and Staff Course, 2008). available from <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/294/287/hartell.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 15 February 2012.

¹⁰⁸Walter F. Jr. Ulmer et al. *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*. (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2000), p. xv as cited in Dr. Allan English, *Understanding Military Culture A Canadian Perspective* (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 10.

The CF Effectiveness Framework represents an institutional specific competing values model based on the Robert Quinn's competing values model designed to capture organizational effectiveness.¹⁰⁹



Figure 7: The CF Effectiveness Framework.

CF effectiveness is not grounded in the success of any one service, but rather in the success of the overall institution to which each service entity is a member of and makes an integrated contribution by virtue of its presence. The model applies three enabling outcomes (External Adaptability, Member Well-being and Commitment, and Internal Integration) and seeks to ensure that these outcomes are achieved within the ethical confines as dictated within the bounds

¹⁰⁹Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-004, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 17-23.

of the Canadian military ethos framework in order to achieve mission success.¹¹⁰ As a competing values model the competition between the outcomes is readily apparent when one considers that mission success may mean loss of life, which compromises member well-being and commitment.¹¹¹ This reflects the nature of military service and the risks of inherent in the unlimited liability aspects of the profession. However, within the confines of this model, the enabling outcomes and the military ethos that they espouse, are common across the CF, and here the roots of integrated fabric can be found.

The relationship between external adaptability and internal integration plays a role of interest in the discussion of operationalizing an integrated CF cultural dynamic. External adaptability refers to the institution's ability to understand its environment and adapt to the changes that the external environmental influences impose on it. Such a capability is inherent of a learning institution and CF external adaptability at the operational and strategic levels demands the creation of networks that cater to success within a joint or multi-agency setting of a wicked problem environment.¹¹² Internal integration reflects the degree to which the institution can coordinate the larger defence effort, given the influence challenges imposed on the institution from the external environment.¹¹³ Internal integration is designed to reduce uncertainty and bring about a sense of order within the institution which is accomplished, in part by understanding the CQ relationship contained within the knowledge, cognitive, motivational, and

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹¹*Ibid.*...,20.

¹¹²*Ibid.*...,21.

¹¹³*Ibid.*...,20-21.




Figure 8: Inside the CF Effectiveness Framework. Internal CQ integration – blending the service knowledge-cognition-motivation-behaviour to form an integrated CF CQ capacity.

behavioural elements that are housed inside this enabling objectives effectiveness framework that were mentioned previously.

Linking integrated CQ, as shown in Figure 8, to the internal integration arm of the CF Effectiveness Framework, effectively illustrates that operationalizing an integrated CF cultural dynamic means tapping CQ intellect from the respective services and housing it in a combined CF CQ pool that the institution can draw upon in developing the wicked solutions to the 4GW wicked problems that it is forced to confront when the CF implements Canadian defence strategy. As Karen Davis and Justin Wright are quick to note, knowledge and cognition are closely related. Knowledge is rooted in the strategic culture of an entity, which refers to the socially transmitted habits of mind, tradition and preferred methods of operations specific to a given security community.¹¹⁴

Linking knowledge, cognition, motivation, and behaviour begins with focusing on the habits that surround tradition, mind, and preferred methods of operation within each service entity and then developing an understanding for which service-centric values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours can be brought into an integrated realm. Having already provided a brief and simplistic overview on the circumstances that gave way to the cultural founding of each service, it is easy to understand why a strong Canadian Army dynamic commands a powerful presence in an integrated setting. When one looks at founding culture in light of tradition, that powerful army-centric presence that exists in an integrated setting has links to the fact that the Canadian Army evolved at the same time as Canada did as a nation, and it was the only service entity in existence for some 45 years, looking from the time of Confederation to the founding of the Canada's Naval

¹¹⁴ Karen Davis & Justine C. Wright, "Culture and Cultural Intelligence," in *Cultural Intelligence and Leadership*..., 11-15. Within their context, reference is made to the effects of specific geographical dispersion on strategic culture. This paper, while this particular effect is important, when looking at the issue of internal cultural dynamics of the service-centric versus integrated argument, geographic dispersion is not as discriminating a factor. Treating this effect as a sunk factor, means that it affects all cultures equally as in not an incremental consideration when it comes to considering the question of operationalizing an integrated CF culture within the confines of this paper.

Service. The Canadian Army forged its cultural dominance early and from the same fires as the country did on the battlefields of Africa, in the Boer War and in Europe during the First World War in the places where battles like Vimy Ridge were fought. The Canadian Army was largely responsible for the birth of Canada's international credibility on the world stage at the end of the First World War.

This is not meant to down play the contributions of the other two services. Both the RCN and the RCAF, have stalwart cultural founding attributes, in the own right, but came of age, as service entities during the Second World War with the RCN's renowned abilities to keep the sea lines of communication open during the Battle of the Atlantic and the RCAF's performance to safeguard the British home front during the Battle of Britain to name but two. Nor is it meant to diminish the contributions and accomplishments of all three services during the Cold War era. However, the Canadian Army occupies a special place within the national Canadian psyche and its exploits largely resonate louder with Canadians than do those of the RCN and RCAF. This is due in large part due to its early successes in the conflicts that helped to define Canada as a nation since Confederation, both home and abroad, such as at the Battle of Vimy Ridge.¹¹⁵

Extending this notion through the Cold War, while each of three services countered the Soviet threat from a service specific perspective with the Canadian Army, concentrating its efforts in Europe, the RCAF, focusing on continental air defence within NORAD, and the RCN countering

¹¹⁵ J.L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton. *Canada and the Two World Wars*, (Toronto: Key Porter Books Ltd., 2003), 90-91.

Soviet naval threats in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.¹¹⁶ However, Canada's international reputation during the Cold War was not built on its Cold War performance, but rather on its performance within the UN by contributing to UN global peacekeeping missions.

With the RCN and the RCAF acting as sentinels within NATO and NORAD guarding against the Soviet threat, the Canadian Army also took on the brunt of Canada's peacekeeping missions and these missions, largely land-centric in nature became the hallmark of what it meant to be Canadian so much so that it displaced Canadians' perception of their military professionals as warriors and war fighters and turned them into peacekeepers. The army-centric dominance of Canada's military exploits is cemented within the Canadian national psyche and this bond is so strong that it merits mentioning that when the CF was unified in 1968, the uniforms that were selected to be worn by the integrated force were not dark blue for the RCN or light blue for the RCAF, but rather army green, which stripped the other two services of their visible cultural affinity and identity. While perhaps not consciously done, the influence of a strong army-centric culture across the CF institution was certainly visible.

¹¹⁶For further information on Canada's Cold War participation and on its UN Peacekeeping efforts during the latter half of the 20th century, see Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada...*, 225-269.

Chapter 5 – Let’s Call it a Draw!

Operationalizing An Integrated CF Cultural Dynamic.

Operationalizing an integrated CF culture takes more than merely appreciating the founding cultures that form the roots of each service’s cultural identity. It means nurturing and then activating an integrated pool of CF cultural intellect. Nurturing the cultural intellect means getting inside each service entities’ mind and tapping into its knowledge base to learn what will motivate its cognitive abilities and enable it to develop integrated behaviours so that it can acquire sufficient understanding to developing an integrated cultural perspective of the CF. Taking this process one step further, once motivation and cognitive capacity has worked to acquire the knowledge-base capable of supporting an integrated cultural dynamic, the next step is to activate or unleash that knowledge through demonstrable behaviour as presented in Figure 9.




Figure 9: Enhancing and operationalizing an integrated CF culture.

Each service entity, while having some common CF cultural linkages, also has unique values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours, which gives way to a unique or filtered outlook on how its

members see themselves within the context of the Canadian military profession.¹¹⁷ The RCAF worships at the “Alter of Technology” and views the world as knowable, definable, and programmable and uses logical reasoning to assess factual information.¹¹⁸

Focused on generating an applying air power, the RCAF mind and preferred method of operation functions like an airplane. The RCAF sees itself has a system where there are indicators that monitor system performance to ensure that everything is functioning within acceptable tolerances. The role of the commander within this environment is to ensure that the system functions efficiently and to use the social settings within it to monitor and ensure that human capital effort is optimized.¹¹⁹ This perspective promotes an open cultural dynamic and breeds familiarity, which is needed to encourage people (the indicators) to flash when things begin to go wrong. Given today’s 4GW wicked problem environment, where uncertainty and complexity can overwhelm the sense-making capacity, the turbulence created in the environment can easily rock the system and thwart efforts to view the world in comfort, as a knowable, definable, and programmable environment.

Unlike the orderly, systemic view held of the world by the RCAF, the Canadian Army mindset views its world as chaotic, where improvisation and contingencies are everything. Seeing life as nasty, brutish, and short, adaptation and improvisation are critical to the Army’s way of doing things.¹²⁰ From an Army leadership perspective, intuition and gut-feel are used to

¹¹⁷Dr. Alan Okros, *Leadership In The Canadian Military Context Monograph Series Leadership*, (Toronto, ON: Minster of National Defence, 2010), 26-30.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, 27.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*

¹²⁰*Ibid.* 28.

counter the belief that the facts never tell one everything that they need to know. This gut-feel perspective on world, serves to supplement what the facts won't always reveal, and it is what is at the heart of the Army's effort to "walk the ground" and learn the lay of the land.¹²¹ The Canadian Army's view of the world is one that is almost the polar opposite to that of the RCAF's. By its very nature land warfare is brutal, violent, and plagued with uncertainty. The focus is on the Army's centre of power, which is the soldier, and the soldier-collective. Leadership is about focusing on the individual and on the individual's commitment to the group.¹²² The Canadian Army views uncertainty as something to be embraced and overcome not feared. There is a purposeful intent behind the leadership to bring about a sense of order to a sea of unfolding chaos. This perhaps accounts for the service's rigorous need to plan and the almost religious-like fervor to adhere to defined planning processes.

From a leadership perspective, being that the focal point of kinetic power is vested in an individual or small group of individuals with weapons, the army concentrates on individuals and individual collectives, because ensuring their psychological well-being is the key to delivering the right effect at the right location at the right time. Investing in that sense of psychological well-being is tied to regiment, discipline, and adherence to routine. This perspective of its world makes the Army, relatively well-positioned to confronting the challenges posed in a 4GW wicked problem environment.

¹²¹*Ibid.* 28.

¹²²*Ibid.* 29.

If the RCAF and the Canadian Army are at situated at either ends of the mind and operational preference spectrum, the RCN is positioned somewhere in the middle, as a blend of the two approaches. The RCN caters its mindful-view of the world and operational preference to signalling when their needs to be a shift in identity, moving closer to the Army model or the Air Force as the situation or circumstances dictate.¹²³ When on watch at sea, the Navy, tends to prefer the technical environmental advantages that the Air Force holds in its approach towards small team technical leadership. Each person is a technical expert in their respective field and this technical expertise commands a certain level of referent power in how leadership is exercised. Yet, while this approach has a place and a time, the RCN also shares some facets of its environment with the Army and its psychological interest in the welfare of the individual and the collective team, which is manifested in the structured and functioning of the RCN's Divisional System's approach to personnel management.

In reconciling its view of the world, the RCN leadership approach is a social exercise, in which a specific identity, tailored to the social situation is developed. Chameleon, in its approach, such a flexible view of the world is an inviting trait when it comes to operationalizing an integrated CF culture. It allows one to function in an environment where technical certainty is demanded, while at the same time is able to blend the army dynamic of gut feel and intuition with a strong dose of improvisation when the situation warrants it.¹²⁴

¹²³*Ibid.*

¹²⁴*Ibid...*, 29-30. For additional insight into the unique dynamics of the three services see Dr. Allan English and Colonel John Westrop (Retired), *Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command The Human Dimension of Expeditionary Air Force Operations*, (Ottawa: Minister of National Defence, 2007), 92-102.

While there is an element of distinctiveness within each service entity, that distinctiveness is important to the entity in building the service-centric cultural that is needed within the CF cultural continuum. Each service entity also shares a common bond that collectively binds all three entities together and that bond is developed through Canada's military ethos. It is learning to deal with the nuances of the service-centric values, beliefs, and attitudes that impinge upon the CF institution's ability to develop and operationalize an integrated CF cultural dynamic; however, at the core of the CF institution and its military effectiveness, there are those values, beliefs, and attitudes that are common to all three services, and can be captured in one quality that all soldiers, sailors, and air force personnel benchmark their conduct in military operations against – honour.

Honour is a powerful common denominator in the effort to develop and operationalize an integrated CF cultural dynamic, and is earned when CF members uphold the ascribed values and beliefs towards military service that are detailed in the Canadian military ethos framework.¹²⁵ Developed and implemented in the late 1990s for an institution that lost its way largely as a result of the events surrounding the Canadian Forces in Somalia and the subsequent demise of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, whose antics reflected just how detached the CF was from Canadian society and just how detached Canadians were from their military.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence, *"Duty With Honour,"* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 34-35.

¹²⁶While mentioned earlier in the work of David Bercuson, *Significant Incident Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder In Somalia* (Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996), General Rick Hillier discusses the impact of the CF as a lost institution from society in General Rick Hillier, *"A Soldier First Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War,"* (Toronto, ON: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2009), 125-131.

Canadian military ethos links expectations about military service and Canadian national values, expectations, and beliefs into a Canadian military values dimension as detailed in Figure 7 below.




Figure 10: Focusing on the attributes of common culture. The CF Military Ethos. (Adapted from Canada. Department of National Defence, *"Duty With Honour,"* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 35.)

Establishing this linkage, such a framework joins the conditions and values essential for military service, which are common to all three services, to the philosophy of service that governs Canadian society's values, expectations, and beliefs. Combining these two dimensions into a

common Canadian military values nexus provides a conduit that links the CF to the larger Canadian society as well as, internally, the military ethos framework shapes the military concept of professionalism and caters to supporting environmental sub-cultures, but not at the expense of operationalizing an integrated CF culture. Focusing on what is common among the service elements is the key and then shaping that common operating picture by adopting a more integrated Canadian military perspective on operations will enable an integrated CF culture to flourish.

It will take more than a common military ethos to enhance and operationalize an integrated CF culture. Recalling from Chapter 2, where the CF cultural continuum spans from a service-centric culture at the tactical level to an integrated perspective at the strategic, the tipping point, where the service-centric cultures blends into the integrated perspective, begins to appear at the operational level where the operational art of war is practiced. Thinking integrated vice service-centric begins here.

Thinking integrated vice service-centric is at the heart of what operationalizing an integrated CF culture is all about. The 4GW wicked problem environment requires that conflict in the contemporary operating environment be thought of in a new perspective. Writing on the battlefield of the future, Colonel John A. Warden, suggested that war is no longer about fighting and killing the enemy. It is about making your enemies do something that you want them to do when they do not want to it and then, at the same time, preventing them from doing something

that you do not want them to do to you.¹²⁷ Warden's perspective on the future battle space, while air force centric in nature, very much can be used to describe, in a generic fashion, the 4GW wicked problem-set that is resident in today's contemporary operating environment. This effects-based approach enables operational commanders to consider the full spectrum of both kinetic and non-kinetic options that are available to dissuade an adversary from taking action that is contrary to one's own better interests; however for the effects-based perspective to be effective, it is the integrating of service-centric capabilities, spurred on by a blended sense of values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours that permits an integrated military force to apply its powers of persuasion from a more holistic perspective.

From a CF perspective, viewing the 4GW wicked-problem set as Warden would, a system comprised of leadership, essentials, infrastructure, population and military force sub-systems, enables one to see the problem as more of an exercise of persuasion and influence at the strategic vice solely one of killing and destruction at the tactical. Viewed, in this light, Warden's Five Rings' perspective changes the dynamic for what it means to apply effective military power and this perspective favours and enables a more integrated approach. Warden's perspective defines an inter-relationship among these sub-system elements, known more commonly as "Warden's Five Rings" and reveals that¹²⁸

- The adversary is a system of inter-dependant sub-systems that is vulnerable to varying degrees of persuasion.

¹²⁷Air University. Colonel John Warden III, "Chapter 4 Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century", 2. Available from <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle/bftoc.html>; Internet; accessed on 4 April 2012.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, 4-5.

- There is an order of precedence to the ringed set of sub-systems with the most important sub-system located at the centre.
- Based on this order of precedence and either directly or indirectly, all military capabilities, both kinetic and non-kinetic, should be focused on changing the mind of the adversary's leadership.
- The adversary's military shields his system and destroying the military does not necessarily guarantee that the adversary will bend to one's will. The military is only one sub-system in a larger system and its loss will not necessarily compromise the overall system.
- The problem of getting the adversary to do something that one's wants him to do is not truly a tactical force on force problem, but is rather more strategic in context as indicated by the leadership effects positioned at the centre.




Figure 11: Warden's Five Rings. A new perspective on the system of war and the future battlefield. (Adopted from - Air University. Colonel John Warden III, "Chapter 4 Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century". available from <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle/bftoc.html>; Internet; accessed on 4 April 2012.)

With the CF Military Ethos providing the base and applying a system's perspective on war in the 4GW wicked-problem environment, the framework for operationalizing an integrated CF culture can now be developed. This framework, depicted in Figure 12¹²⁹, places the CF Military Ethos

¹²⁹The operational functions depicted in Figure 12 are derived from B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 Canadian Forces Joint Publication, *CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine, 2009-04, 2-7*, available from <http://dsp->

at its base from which common service-centric values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour can define a common reference point that will anchor the operational pillars




Figure 12: Operationalizing an integrated CF culture. The Integrated Force Culture Enabler.

within each of the three environmental services. The challenge here, returning to the opening analogy of the hockey team, is to continue to promote a common understanding among all of the services that no one player, position, or line is the catalyst behind the team’s success. It is a two

psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2010/forces/D2-252-2009-eng.pdf; Internet; accessed on 5 April 2012. The functions for each service were extracted from in Figure 12 are from Lieutenant Colonel Brian Murray, “What Air Forces Do,” *Royal Canadian Air Force Journal* Vol. 4, No. 4 (Fall 2011) [journal on-line]; available from http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/dn-nd/D12-13-4-4-eng.pdf; Internet; accessed on 5 April 2012. The RCN does not denote officially specific operational functions. The ones portrayed are the terms commonly portrayed when describing operational functions in a naval-specific manner.

part process. At the individual level, it is each player, honing their own professional skill sets and developing an individual culture of success. The next step is taking the individual and integrating that culture of success into a larger winning dynamic, and for operationalizing an integrated CF culture, this is where the challenge begins.

Writer Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Murray believes that, from an RCAF perspective, the operational functions used to describe what the air force does are inadequate and leave a layman wanting for understanding.¹³⁰ Murray's views showcases, as an institution, how difficult it is to arrive at a "common understanding", when service-centric cultural dynamics filter perspectives. Murray contends that the army-centric operational functions adopted for use in the CF joint community, fall short of describing what is that the RCAF does in an operational sense. Murray is correct. Command, sense, shield, and act are nebulous terms at best and when, from an RCAF perspective, the term generate is added to the mix, it does little to better articulate aerospace functions or what it is that an air force does. However, what it is that an air force does, particularly in the context of the RCAF and CF, must also be articulated from the perspective of what it is that the RCAF does for the CF.

¹³⁰Lieutenant Colonel Brian Murray, "What Air Forces Do," *Royal Canadian Air Force Journal* Vol. 4. No. 4 (Fall 2011) [journal on-line]; available from http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/dn-nd/D12-13-4-4-eng.pdf; Internet; accessed on 5 April 2012. In this article, Murray argues that the CF operational functions are too army-centric and do not adequately portray the RCAF's airpower functions. Murray questions the RCAF's own aerospace power doctrine perspective, which adopted the original operational functions, and he proposes his own perspective, which places the aerospace functions as sub-functions within the larger CF operational context. This design is a powerful representation for the symbiotic relationship that exists between the three services and the greater CF.

In an integrated force context, the operational functions, command, sense, shield, act, and sustain describes how a military force operates and these five functions are performed across the three environments. What changes is the way that the five functions are performed and this is to be expected. The point that is illustrated here is how does one accommodate both a valid service-centric argument that the operational functions should describe what a service does, while at the same time, appreciating the perspective that what a particular service does to hone its own skill sets and generate a culture of success within must be then translated into generating success within the confines of a larger integrated team dynamic, namely the CF?

One solution, which Murray advocates and which balances the validity of both the service-centric and integrated cultural perspectives, is to parcel out the service-centric functions into sub-functions. Taking an example from Murray's article, Figure 13 captures this concept:¹³¹

¹³¹ *Ibid.*...,45.




Figure 13: Blending service-centric and integrated functional interests.

Murray's proposal optimizes the best of both the worlds. Integrating the service-centric functions by articulating them as sub-functions establishes a connection between what is common from an integrated perspective to what is unique from a service-centric perspective. This dynamic is a powerful representation for the symbiotic relationship that exists between each of the services and the greater CF and satisfies the remit to articulate a common functional perspective noted in Figure 12.

To conclude this last chapter, Figure 12 represents the integrated force culture playbook for operationalizing an integrated CF cultural dynamic. This playbook was written by,

- Constructing a force integration enabler whose foundation used the CF Military Ethos framework as a common cultural point of reference to orient the three services to an integrated common cultural perspective;
- Combining that perspective with Warden's dynamic Five Ring interpretation of conflict system dynamic, which is readily suitable to the complex 4GW wicked-problem setting found in the contemporary operating environment; and
- Linking all of the to the common CF operating function perspective with a recommendation to have the main functions retained for as function descriptors for all three services while at the same time allowing each environment to sub-divide their respective functions into sub-functions that better describe each environment's operational contribution.

Chapter 6 - Conclusion

Culture, to describe it as simply being the “way that we do things around here” while accurate, does little justice in articulating its many complexities that lie just beneath the surface. This paper has been a comprehensive cultural journey into the psyche of the CF - an institution that has been tasked with the impossible – protecting society from itself. How best to accomplish this task was the focus of this paper, and the idea of operationalizing an integrated CF cultural dynamic was explored from the perspective of looking at the dynamics that make organizational entities in general and then moving to examine the CF institution within that context specifically. Focusing on the inter-relationship between the structural and contextual dimensions saw the impact on an organizational entity’s culture when it is exposed to the influences that are exerted from its external environment. How it copes with those cultural impacts and the second order effects on its goals, strategy, and structural dimensions formed the basis for the remainder of the paper, which concentrated on the CF’s efforts to cope with the 4GW wick-problem environment and the need for an integrated force perspective.

For the Canadian Forces, the cultural effects of what has been describe as a tug-of-war between a strong service-centric ideal and a dynamic that favours a more integrated approach to implementing national defence strategy is rooted in history and permeates all facets of institutional life.¹³² Force development, force generation, force management, and force employment, represent the manner or processes that drive the mechanisms to do what it is that the CF does in developing and delivering defence services to Canadians. These process elements

¹³²Again for additional background into the service-centric versus integration debate see Major-General D. Gosselin, “A 50-Year Tug-of-War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and the Strong Service Idea,” in *Operational Art: Canadian, Objectives, Context, and Concepts*, edited by Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Laurence M. Hickey, 129-187 (Kingston, ON; Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007) .

are at the mercy of not only an internal cultural tug-of-war that has been played out for more than 50 years, they are also at the mercy of a contemporary conflict environment that has political, economic, social, and military dynamics that are so intertwined that when they come together they create a complex, wicked problem that is set against the demands of a globalized environment.

The lights of the three services still burn brightly underneath the veneer of a Canadian Forces moniker. This highlights the state of the ongoing debate within the Canadian military institution between service-centre and integrated dominant cultures with those on one side of the institution heralding the progressive virtues of an integrated cultural dynamic to fulfill the defence mandate, while those on the other side, rightly believe that championing the virtues of a more traditionalist, strong service cultural era, represents the best approach to defending Canada and Canadian interests. This paper argued that it is time to call the service-oriented / integrated force debate a draw and bring the game of tug-a-war to a close. Those on both sides of the debate over whether Canada's defence interests are best served in an integrated or service-oriented culture posture were right. However, that state of righteousness depends on time, space, and context, which are all defined by a provocative external environment.

Leveraging the ideal that wicked problems require wicked solutions has meant a departure for the CF from its mechanistic ways of integrating defence development and delivery processes. Looking for a more organic perspective, where service-centric and integrated ideas can be harmonized to achieve the greater military effect now warranted in a battle space that demands brain over brawn to achieve a desired end-state. Focusing on the time, space, and context

dimension has served to remind the reader that culture in the CF lives on a continuum, and that service-centric identities are symbiotic in relation to the greater CF. In such a context, neither entity or dimension can exist without the other, and if an integrated balance cannot be achieved there is not merit in writing such a playbook. The CF, as an institution, needs to continue to work at its ability to balance service-centric and integrated cultural dynamics and there is role within the institution for an integrated for enabler that focuses on blending the service-centric differences with institutional commonalities in order to generate the optimal military effect desired.

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