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## LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN FAILED STATES

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## ABSTRACT

This paper demonstrates that military forces have very specific and limited utility in ameliorating the condition of failed/failing states based on the results achieved in the past 15 years of military involvement in such states. It argues that the utility of military intervention is limited to assisting in the establishment of security for the provision of Humanitarian Aid and the operation of Other Government Departments (OGDs) in medium to high risk environments, training indigenous militaries and police forces and setting the conditions for development of a stable and legitimate government to grow. It uses the Failed State Index (FSI) created jointly by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine to analyze what military activities will produce effects and the extent to which these effects persist over time. The countries of Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan are used as case studies to determine whether massive military intervention has produced a positive or negative outcome relative to both their relative placement on the Failed State Index and their index scores over time. The conclusions that are arrived at are that military intervention alone cannot be successful in improving the stability of a country and that improving group dynamics within a country is the key to lasting success.

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## CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

The use of military forces to assist failed or failing states in achieving sustained state functionality is not yet proven based on military interventions in such states since the end of the Cold War in 1989. Examining state failures of such countries as Afghanistan, Haiti and the former Yugoslavia, and their ongoing travails, suggests that military intervention does not provide the long term results that the international community is seeking in terms of global peace and stability. The presence of, and use of foreign militaries, within a territory being contested by resident factions does not assure a desired outcome either for the foreign power or for the country in question. Given these dynamics, there is a clear need to establish guidelines for Canadian policy advisors and politicians to raise their level of awareness the capabilities and limitations of the Canadian Forces in effecting change within, and to, a failed or failing state.

This paper demonstrates that military forces have very specific and limited utility in ameliorating the condition of failed/failing states based on the results achieved in the past 15 years of military involvement in failed states. It argues that the utility of military intervention is limited to assisting in the establishment of security for the provision of Humanitarian Aid and the operation of Other Government Departments (OGDs) in medium to high risk environments, training indigenous militaries and police forces and setting the conditions for development of a stable and legitimate government to grow. Ultimately, militaries enable the preconditions for a stable and peaceful society but are not generally mandated nor trained to conduct further development. Thus, the use of the

military alone in a failed/failing state as the Holy Grail of intervention mechanisms to create long-term stable effects within a society is a false one.

This paper will quantify when the use of military resources in assisting failed and/or failing states is useful for policy and decision makers. The second chapter will consider the surfeit of definitions that exist for failed and/or failing states. The third chapter will look at the underlying issues that can lead to reduced stability and state failure. The fourth chapter will expose the ways in which other states can intervene militarily to assist and influence the recovery of a failed or failing state. It will concentrate specifically on the effect military intervention may have in aiding recovery or preventing failure. The fifth chapter will focus on reviewing three cases where military intervention has occurred within failing states and the resultant outcomes. International and Canadian involvement will both be reviewed. The sixth chapter will concentrate on where and how Canada should use the Canadian Forces to assist failed and failing states. It will consider the deontological agendas of democracies to force democracy on those countries which it is aiding versus the clear need for a more utilitarian approach in countries where democracy is neither wanted nor feasible, at least in the near to medium term (5 years). All of this will serve to propose a framework establishing when the Canadian Forces can be used effectively within failed or failing states and without compromising Canadian values and ideals.

This paper will use existing academic research on failed and failing states, foreign and government policies, and existing military doctrine (as applicable) to define the

limitations of external military intervention in failed or failing states. In particular, the Failed State Index<sup>1</sup>, produced by the *Foreign Policy Magazine* and The Fund for Peace, will be used as an instrument to assess the success of military intervention. Each of the 12 indicators contained within the index will, in turn, be reviewed and analyzed in order to provide a sound basis with which to conduct further analysis of external military intervention in failed or failing states. Pertinent examples from states which score low on within the index will be used to illustrate each indicator.

Following the review of the Failed State Index indicators, military roles and capabilities will be juxtaposed against the effects that are required to achieve state peace and stability. Through extrapolation, an assessment of the utility of military roles and capabilities in effecting aspects of state peace and stability will be evident. Specifically, each indicator within the Index will be associated with potential military tasks. This will allow their military and strategic effects within the state to be ascertained as well as the potential for the effect to persist beyond the activity itself. By doing so, an understanding of the areas in which military capabilities can be expected to be effective will be evident as well as those areas in which they cannot improve the outcomes within the Failed State Index.

In order to reach a more fulsome understanding of the types of military operations that the United Nations (UN) approves for efforts to ameliorate the conditions and stability within failed or failing states, a review military tasks will be undertaken. The

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<sup>1</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace have jointly produced an annual Failed State Index commencing in 2005.



difference between kinetic and non-kinetic military options will be discussed. The breadth of military actions from humanitarian assistance to the concepts of peacekeeping, peach building and peace making will be looked at through the lens of both the UN and various academic sources. This will further inform the discussion of military utility in failed states and present a sound basis on which to analyze the case studies.

The states of Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Afghanistan will be used as case studies on the utility of both CF and coalition military intervention in failed states. The primary source documents in building the picture of military and political involvement in each of the case studies are official UN and CF unclassified accounts of their involvement in each country. Academic findings and data will be used as secondary sources to build the picture of external military intervention and its level of success in bringing about peace and security in each country. The mandates of both organizations and what each organization was tasked to achieve, the level and type of resources that were used and whether the mandate was effective in contributing to increased stability and peace within the state in question will be presented. This analysis will be aided by utilizing the Failed State Index to create a relative assessment of improvement or deterioration in the state's stability since the advent of external military intervention. Due to the fact that the Failed State Index was first established in 2005, the cases studies will use this as the baseline measurement against which progress will be assessed. By delineating mandates, resources and the quantifiable results of the Failed State Index, analysis of each state's weaknesses in terms of the Failed State Index indicators will be conducted. These weaknesses will be analyzed to determine what common theme(s)

underlies the weaknesses exposed in the case studies. This will in turn allow a determination to be made as to what the most important underlying factors contributing to state failure or success are and whether or not military capabilities can be used to achieve positive results.

Based on the foundation of the information collected and the analysis conducted within the case studies on the utility of external military intervention in failed states, the conclusion will be drawn that the fundamental key to achieving increased stability and peace within a given state is the ability of the various groups within the state to agree that they are better off working collectively than attempting to seize control of the levers of power and the resources that go with them for their own purposes. This realization will in turn show that while external military intervention is effective in separating groups with grievances, it is only effective for the duration of its presence within a failed state. This lack of persistence without presence clearly indicates that external military intervention is only an enabler and not a solution to the problems that exist within a failed state. Policy advisors and military planners alike must understand that external military intervention can only create a temporary respite from violence and discord. Only through other mechanisms that permit contending groups within a state to function effectively together will military intervention ultimately succeed in achieving a lasting effect.

## CHAPTER 2 – DEFINING FAILED AND FAILING STATES

Definitions of failed or failing states refer to ineffectual governance, provision of services, economic viability, cultural instability, and corruption amongst others. Like any definitions, these are often skewed by the agendas and biases of the organizations or individuals that are proposing them whether through conscious manipulation or inadvertent cultural or intellectual preconceptions. Thus there are a variety of different definitions that exist. In this chapter, a number of definitions of failed or failing states will be presented, compared and then analyzed to arrive at a core understanding of the failed state.

### FAILED AND FAILING STATE DEFINITION

It is clear that in any definition of a failed or failing state the existence and/or status of the government is a key element. The government is the representative of the society which connects to the international community of states. Max Weber defined the existence of a state by a government's "successful claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order."<sup>2</sup> While this definition does not define how or why a state may fail or be in danger of collapse, it serves admirably to focus on the reins of power and their extreme importance in determining the viability of a state. In parsing Weber's definition of the state, a great deal rests on

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<sup>2</sup> Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed. by Talcott Parsons, (New York: The Free Press, 1947), 154; [http://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=-WaBpsJxaOkC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=max+weber+failed+state+defined&ots=4IZEX\\_Bw22&sig=CHwARTEmRrTx74u-5eAuIRLEAhM#v=onepage&q=failed%20state&f=false](http://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=-WaBpsJxaOkC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=max+weber+failed+state+defined&ots=4IZEX_Bw22&sig=CHwARTEmRrTx74u-5eAuIRLEAhM#v=onepage&q=failed%20state&f=false); Internet; accessed 25 February 2012.

controlling the use of force. It is also interesting that the word “legitimate” is employed in defining what type of physical force is to be used in the enforcement of order. Weber defined legitimacy in this context as that which is derived through law but of necessity someone must have power to make law. The achievement of this power is thus central to the creation of the state and through this power one legitimizes the use of physical force. Thus, logically legitimacy is conferred upon a government through the monopolization of physical power.

Weber is not the only one to express his definition of a failed state in terms of legitimacy and physical force. The prominent philosopher and MIT professor, Noam Chomsky, also characterizes failed states through their ability to use force and their legitimacy. He does so in three ways; firstly by a state’s “inability or unwillingness to protect their populace from violence”, secondly by its “unwillingness to adhere to domestic or international law” and thus “willingness to use aggression and violence indiscriminately for their own purposes” and finally, “if they have democratic forms, they suffer from a serious democratic deficit that deprives their democratic institutions of real substance.”<sup>3</sup> Chomsky is therefore expanding on Weber’s definition and following a different approach.

These differences between Weber and Chomsky are both subtle and overt. In the first part of his definition Chomsky speaks of the failure of a state to protect its people. This presupposes that the governing organization in the country cares about its entire

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<sup>3</sup> Noam Chomsky, “Superpower and Failed States” in *Khaleej Times* 5 April 2006; accessed via the internet 26 February 2012; <http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20060405.htm>

population equally or that it must do so to be a successful state. This outlook is somewhat utopian in as much it is demonstrable that states continue to function effectively while subjecting all or portions of its population to violence or the threat thereof. One has only to look at the Chinese government's violent suppression of unrest in relation to the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 to see a government that used physical force against its own people willingly. The Libyan state under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi is another example where the exertion and threat of violence allowed for a relatively stable state for over forty years. Conversely, the inability to prevent violence does not in and of itself indicate a failed or failing state. Costa Rica has no military with which to defend itself and yet it is clearly a functioning state.

Chomsky also characterizes a failed or failing state by its lack of adherence to domestic or international law. The inclusion of domestic law as a criterion is difficult given that a government is the entity that creates or amends domestic laws. Furthermore a lack of adherence to international law is not in and of itself proof that a state is not viable. One has only to look at the existence of North Korea and the actions and rhetoric of Iran to see that nations flout international law without consequence. The anarchic nature of the international system itself means that states are free to do as they please subject to the threat of violence by other states.

Lastly Chomsky directs his definition to the inclusion of democratic forms and the presence of a democratic deficit within a democracy. While this inclusion implies that other forms of government are legitimate and successful, it then moralizes about the

substance of democratic institutions. The problem with the inclusion of this last assertion is that it appears to be included to legitimize arguments that he makes later on that the United States has the characteristics a failed state. Therefore, the problem with his definition is that he has engineered his definition to suit the bias of the article.

Unlike Weber, whose definition of the state is limited to the notion of the consolidation of legitimate force in one entity, it is clear that Chomsky has attempted to inject a certain Kantian concept of morality and ethics into the determination of whether a state has failed or is failing. No matter how laudatory this endeavour may be viewed, it is clear that it is more important to ascertain the viability of the state in terms of functionality vice trying to include moral judgement within the definition of what is or is not a failed state. Therefore, ideally, a definition of a failed state must therefore answer the question as to whether or not and to what degree a state is functioning effectively and not how it is functioning, which is a political, ethical and/or moral issue internal to the state itself.

### **International Definition of the Failed State**

In researching definitions of the failed state amongst international organizations, there is no clear agreement on an exact definition and in searching the online resources of the UN, NATO and the OSCE no definitive definition is apparent. According to an ICRC article, from an international legal perspective, the failed state “does not denote a

precisely defined and classifiable situation but serves rather as a broad label for a phenomenon which can be interpreted in various ways” according to legal, developmental and sociological perspectives.<sup>4</sup> While pariah states can be affected by sanctions and international censure, the “collapsed state” cannot be affected by such measures by the international community and therefore international actions must balance the competing principles of “sovereignty and equality of States and, on the other, the right of peoples to self-determination.”<sup>5</sup> This approach extends beyond the realist approach to international affairs as it values all persons as individuals and does not ignore them as unimportant.

Notwithstanding the lack of consensus on a definition of the failed or failing state, there is a consensus on the need for intervention and the need to address the ills that befall such states. Without a clear definition of a failed state, the international community must therefore decide upon intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state based on other criteria. Ghani and Lockhart speak of the “sovereignty gap” wherein states are understood legally to be sovereign at the international level while they are simultaneously “unable to provide basic services to their citizens” that are expected of a sovereign state.<sup>6</sup> This sovereignty gap and the extent to which the disparity between

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<sup>4</sup> Daniel Thürer, “The ‘failed State’ and international law,” *International Review of the Red Cross*, No. 836 (31-12-1999), 1; <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq6u.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 April 2012.

<sup>5</sup> Thürer, “The ‘failed State’ and international law,” 1.

<sup>6</sup> Ashraf Ghani & Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); <http://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=PfkdWlVn14C&oi=fnd&pg=PT3&dq=Fixing+Failed+States:+A>

reality and the legal aspects of sovereignty does not define the failed state but it does serve as a useful determination of the success or failure of a given state. The difficulty with this concept is that the idea is easily understood but the quantitative measurement of such gaps is not easily achieved given the multitude of variables that can be looked at and weighed as to their relative importance.

The UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, speaks of the international community's responsibility to intervene when the state government fails to protect its population from genocide.<sup>7</sup> While this is an admirable and wholly reasonable statement from a humanitarian viewpoint, from a practical standpoint, this does not intimate that the state in question is not fully functioning. In fact the very act of intervention, such as the 2011 NATO air and sea campaign in Libya, may precipitate the failure of the state itself as old arguments and factions begin to reassert themselves within a leadership vacuum.<sup>8</sup> This can beget even greater violence than that which the international community originally sought to prevent. It should be clearly understood that there is a difference between a state that is cruel to all or portions of its population and a state which has failed.

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[+Framework+for+Rebuilding+a+Fractured+World&ots=TSjAx3R4I&sig=VE6mc0V9JLprHvHJHJB386pMDw4#v=onepage&q=sovereignty%20gap&f=false](#); Internet; accessed 14 April 2012.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations, "Secretary-General stresses global responsibility to prevent genocide," (9 December 2010), 1; <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37001&Cr=genocide&Cr1=>; Internet; accessed 6 April 2012.

<sup>8</sup> Chris Stephen, "Libya Patience With Militias Wears Thin as Violence Spreads," *Business Week* [Online Journal] (3 April 2012), 1; <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-04-03/libya-patience-with-militias-wears-thin-as-violence-spreads>; Internet; accessed 6 April 2012.



## Canadian Governmental Definition

The most current Canadian military doctrine containing an official view on failed and failing states is contained within *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030*, published in 2009 by the Chief of Force Development. This document defines a failed state as:

A state that has lost physical control of its territory and/or the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure include the erosion of the legitimate authority to make collective decisions, the inability to provide reasonable public services and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.<sup>9</sup>

This definition was adopted from *The Foreign Policy Journal's* Failed State Index for 2007 which is produced collaboratively by the magazine and the “The Fund for Peace.”<sup>10</sup> It very much flows from the definition that Max Weber put forth but expands that definition by looking at the underlying causes and components that would lead one to

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<sup>9</sup> Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030* (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2009) 102; [http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/documents/CFD%20FSE/Signed\\_Eng\\_FSE\\_10Jul09\\_eng.pdf](http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/documents/CFD%20FSE/Signed_Eng_FSE_10Jul09_eng.pdf); Internet; accessed 7 February 2012.

<sup>10</sup> The Fund for Peace is an independent nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C. that collaborates with The Foreign Policy Journal to produce an annual Failed State Index. <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/>; Internet: accessed 7 February 2012.

conclude that a state has or is on the verge of failure. This paper will thus continue to look further into the methodology and categories of how the index arrives at its assessment of state viability in the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER 3 – THE UNDERLYING FACTORS OF STATE FAILURE**

In an attempt to expand upon the definition of what constitutes a failed or failing state organizations have sought to define the underlying factors required to assess the functionality of states. The Fund for Peace and *The Foreign Policy Journal* produces an annual report on Failed and Failing States which ranks all countries based on 12 indicators. These criteria include: demographic pressures, refugees and internal displaced persons (IDPs), group grievances, human flight and brain drain, uneven economic development, poverty and economic decline, legitimacy of the state, public services, human rights and the rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external intervention. Each of these will be looked at and discussed in turn and their military implications *vis a vis* potential use of the Canadian Forces will be discussed.

### **FAILED STATE INDICATORS**

#### **Demographic Pressures**

There are a variety of demographic sub-indicators that are used by the index to assess the viability of states in order to arrive at an assessment in this category. The Fund for Peace looks at these demographic factors in terms of the pressure that they bring to bear against state viability. The sub-indicators include: density relative to the supply of basic necessities such as food and water; settlement patterns and the ability to fully participate in a country's economic, social and political systems; group settlement

patterns and land ownership, border disputes, religious/historical sites; population pressure from uneven bulges in different ages of the population; the impact of disease; the impact of natural disasters; and the pressure exerted by the uprooting of communities to make way for infrastructure development that negatively affect both indigenes and the rest of the population in a given area.<sup>11</sup>

### FSI Measures & Possible Questions to Ask – Demographic Pressures

Disease Control - *Is there a system for controlling spreading of diseases or pandemics?*

Disease Epidemics - *Is there a high likelihood or existence of diseases of epidemics?*

Environmental Policies - *Do sound environmental policies exist?*

Environment Practices - *Are actual environmental practices sustainable?*

Starvation - *Is there a short-term food shortage that needs to be alleviated?*

Malnutrition - *Are there long-term food shortages affecting health?*

Food supply - *Is the food supply adequate to deal with potential interruption?*

Drought - *Is there a high likelihood of droughts or is there currently a drought?*

HIV Aids Growth Rate - *What is the rate of spread of HIV Aids Infection cases - most recent and projected?*

Land competition - *Does land competition exist and are there laws to arbitrate land disputes?*

Resource Competition - *Does resource competition exist and are there laws to arbitrate resource disputes?*

Likelihood of Natural Disasters - *Is a natural disaster likely, recurring?*

Impact of Natural Disasters - *If a natural disaster occurs, is there an adequate response plan?*

Deforestation - *Is deforestation taking place or are there laws and policies to protect forests?*

Water Supply- *Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?*

Orphan Population - *Is there a high orphan population?*

Population Density - *Is population density putting pressure on areas of the state?*

Population Distribution - *Does the country*

<sup>11</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators: The Fund for Peace Country Analysis Indicators and Their Measures*, (Washington: 2011), 6-7; <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cr-10-97-ca-conflictassessmentindicators-1105c.pdf>; Internet: accessed 7 March 2012.

Number Infected with HIV Aids- *How many HIV Aids cases are there? have a normal population distributed - actual and projected?*

Population Growth - *Is the population growth rate sustainable?*

Infant Mortality - *What is the infant mortality rate - actual and projected?*

Table 3.1<sup>12</sup>

Demographic instability and/or lack of sustainability can be a very good indicator of problems or potential problems within a given state. For instance, Haiti, number five on the Failed State Index for 2011 has suffered from a variety of ills but some of its greatest challenges are demographic in nature.<sup>13</sup> From its historic roots as a country which suffered from racist discrimination between black and white, between mulattos and blacks and between blacks themselves, Haiti has suffered from a fragmented society.<sup>14</sup> In the intervening centuries, no lasting success has been achieved in eliminating the factions inherent in Haitian society.<sup>15</sup> There is a clear recipe for difficulty in achieving a viable state in Haiti if the high birth rate, high incidence of disease, decrease in arable land over

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<sup>12</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 6-7.

<sup>13</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "2011 Failed State Index," [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011\\_failed\\_states\\_index\\_interactive\\_map\\_and\\_rankings](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings); Internet; accessed 7 Mar 2012.

<sup>14</sup> Jean-Germain Gros, "Haiti: The Political Economy and Sociology of Decay and Renewal" in *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2000; 212; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692049?seq=1>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2012.

<sup>15</sup> Gros, "Haiti: The Political Economy and Sociology of Decay and Renewal," 213.

time and the recent earthquake are considered.<sup>16</sup> This bears out in the 2011 Failed States Index which gives the Haitian State the worst rating possible in terms of demographics.<sup>17</sup>

### **Massive Movement of Refugees and IDPs**

The entry or exit of refugees into or out of a country as well as the number of IDPs, measure a state's ability to function in that they determines a country's ability (or willingness) to protect its citizens.<sup>18</sup> While in large part, the creation of IDPs and Refugees stem from demographics, the upheaval and level of violence commonly associated these two groups is significant and is thus a good indicator of social breakdown within a country. One measure used to measure the impact of refugees and IDPs is the crude death rate (CDR). The CDR for refugees as of 1993 was 5 to 12 times that of the country of origin and for IDPs it was even worse at "12 to 25 times the baseline CDRs for the non-displaced".<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Anthony P. Maingot, "Haiti: Problems of a Transition to Democracy in an Authoritarian Soft State" in *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter, 1986-1987), 78; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/165747?seq=4>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2012.

<sup>17</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "2011 Failed State Index," [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011\\_failed\\_states\\_index\\_interactive\\_map\\_and\\_rankings](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings); Internet; accessed 7 Mar 2012.

<sup>18</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 8.

<sup>19</sup> Michael J. Toole, MD, DTM&H; Ronald J. Waldman, MD, MPH, "Refugees and Displaced Persons War, Hunger, and Public Health" in *The Journal of the American Medical Association*, (1993;270(5):600-605); <http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/270/5/600.short>; Internet; Accessed 8 March 2012.

### FSI Measures & Possible Questions to Ask - Massive Movement of Refugees and IDPs

Number of IDPs- <i>How many IDPs are there in relation to population?</i>	Increase in Refugee Camps - <i>Are there sufficient refugee camps or are refugees integrated into communities?</i>
Increase in IDPs - <i>Are IDPs likely to increase in the near future?</i>	Violence against Refugees - <i>Are there reports of violence against refugees?</i>
Impact of IDPs - <i>Are there resources to provide for projected and actual IDPs?</i>	Safety of Refugee Camps - <i>Are conditions safe in refugee camps?</i>
Influx of Refugees - <i>Are refugees likely to come from neighboring countries?</i>	Relief Efforts - <i>Is there access to additional resources from international community for refugees and/or IDPs?</i>
Impact of Refugees - <i>Are there resources to provide for projected and actual refugees?</i>	Relocation & Settlement - <i>Are there plans for relocation and settlement of current IDPs and/or refugees?</i>

Table 3.2<sup>20</sup>

One of the countries on the index that exhibit large numbers of refugees and IDPs is Somalia. As of August 2011, approx. 1400 Somalian refugees were arriving at the refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya alone and the crude mortality rate exceeded emergency thresholds.<sup>21</sup> This is not only a problem within Somalia, it is a problem for the surrounding nations who may or may not be able to cope with the prodigious flow of

<sup>20</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 8.

<sup>21</sup> Spiegel, Paul B, MD; Burton, Ann; Tepo, Adan; Jacobson, Lara M, MD; Anderson, Mark A, MD; et al., "Mortality Among Refugees Fleeing Somalia - Dadaab Refugee Camps, Kenya, July-August 2011" in *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report*, Vol. 60, Iss. 33, (Aug 26, 2011), 1133; <http://search.proquest.com/docview/887640235/1355D3012AA4DF86B53/1?accountid=9867>; Internet; accessed 8 March 2012.

people across their borders and it is a challenge to the international community at large to assist these people.

### **Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Paranoia**

While arguably a subset of demographics within a nation, the Failed State Index splits out the fallout from aggrieved groups within a given state as a separate measure of the health of a given state. Such factors as history, patterns of atrocities committed against communal groups, variable treatment of minority groups by the dominant group, “institutionalized political exclusion”, “scapegoating” of groups believed to have undue influence, power or money and “groups aggrieved because they are denied autonomy, self-determination or political independence” are all considered in arriving at a determination of whether a state is close to failure or has failed.<sup>22</sup>

#### **FSI Measures & Possible Questions to Ask - Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Paranoia**

Compensation for Victims - <i>Are victims of past atrocities compensated or is there a plan to compensate them?</i>	Amnesty - <i>Has amnesty been granted?</i>
Truth & Reconciliation - <i>Does a Truth &amp; Reconciliation process exist or is one planned, needed?</i>	Reintegration - <i>Have groups been reintegrated, if applicable?</i>
Distribution of Resources - <i>Is there an equitable and efficient distribution of</i>	History of Group Grievance - <i>Is there a history of violence against a group or group grievance?</i>
	Intertribal Relations - <i>How are intertribal</i>

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<sup>22</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 9.



<i>resources?</i>	<i>relations?</i>
Ethnic Hatred or Tolerance - <i>Are there feelings of or reports of ethnic violence?</i>	Interethnic Relations - <i>How are interethnic relations?</i>
Religious Hatred or Tolerance - <i>Are there feelings of or reports of violence based on religion?</i>	Vigilante Justice - <i>Are there reports of vigilant justice?</i>
Group Oppression - <i>Are groups oppressed or do they feel oppressed?</i>	War Criminals - <i>Are war criminals apprehended and prosecuted? Do the public feel war criminals are properly treated?</i>
Reconstruction - <i>Is there a plan for reconstruction and development?</i>	Mass Violence - <i>Are the reports of mass violence?</i>
Religious Persecution or Tolerance - <i>Is there freedom of religion according to laws and practiced by society?</i>	Racial Violence - <i>Are there reports of violence that is racially motivated?</i>
Religious Violent Persecution - <i>Are there reports of violence that is religiously motivated?</i>	Mass Killings - <i>Are there reports of mass killings?</i>

Table 3-3<sup>23</sup>

Within the 2011 index, Sudan has one of the most negative ratings for group grievances.<sup>24</sup> Given the religious and ethnic divides in the south with the recent creation of the new state of South Sudan and the history of persecution of non-Arabs by the “Janja Weed militias” in the western region of Darfur this rating makes intuitive sense. In particular, the Janja Weed is all but fully sanctioned by the national government as they

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<sup>23</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 9-10.

<sup>24</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, “2011 Failed State Index.”

are the likely supplier of arms, uniforms and other enablers to the militias. In fact, members of the Janja Weed were reportedly recruited into the Sudanese national police force to restore order in Darfur, the very area that the militias have been terrorizing.<sup>25</sup>

### **Chronic Human Flight and Brain Drain**

The chronic and continued exit of human capital from a given state is a factor in assessing the viability of the state itself. The state receives no return on their considerable investment in terms of education and support as professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents take their particular skills and abilities to other states. The Failed State Index uses the voluntary immigration of “the middle class” due to economic deterioration, particularly economically productive segments of the population, and the growth of expatriate communities or Diaspora to assist in its determination of a state’s viability.<sup>26</sup>

#### **FSI Measures & Possible Questions to Ask – Chronic Human Flight and Brain Drain**

Brain Drain - <i>Is there a relatively high proportion of higher educated people leaving the country?</i>	Political Drain or Return- <i>Are politicians leaving the country?</i>
Remittances - <i>Are there a large amount of remittances coming to families from relatives overseas?</i>	Professional Flight - <i>Are professionals leaving the country?</i>
	Return of Middle Class - <i>Is the middle class</i>

<sup>25</sup> Gethin Chamberlain, “Janjaweed militia recruited for Sudanese police force in Darfur,” *The Scotsman*, (Edinburgh : 10 Aug 2004); 1; <http://search.proquest.com/docview/327123961/1355E65B306789397F9/4?accountid=9867>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2012.

<sup>26</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 11.

*beginning to return to the country?*

Table 3-4<sup>27</sup>

An example of the impact of this indicator and how it can affect not only the current position of a state but its future as well is Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has one of the worst scores in this particular category within the 2011 Failed State Index.<sup>28</sup> While current figures are not readily available, in 2007, 25000 Zimbabwean teachers left the country.<sup>29</sup> The teachers have left Zimbabwe and other countries are reaping the benefit. In addition to these teachers, doctors, lawyers and other professionals consistently seek to leave the country. Nearly a quarter of Zimbabwean citizens, (3 of 12 million) live outside the country and while they may remit foreign currency to their relatives still in Zimbabwe, this consistent drain of human capital cannot be seen as other than detrimental to the state.<sup>30</sup>

### **Uneven Economic Development**

The “uneven economic development amongst groups” within a state is used by the Failed State Index to assess the prospects for a given state. The actual or perceived

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<sup>27</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 11.

<sup>28</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, “2011 Failed State Index.”

<sup>29</sup> Nqobizitha Khumalo, “Zimbabwe: Union says 25,000 teachers 'have left country since January 2007” in BBC Monitoring Africa (London: 14 Nov 2007); 1; <http://search.proquest.com/docview/458396412/1355DA2789625A39E68/15?accountid=9867>; Internet; accessed 8 March 2012.

<sup>30</sup> Nqobizitha Khumalo, “Zimbabwe: Union says 25,000 teachers 'have left country since January 2007,” 1.

inequality in the delivery of services such as education and/or economic prosperity, the impoverishment of one group while others are advancing and the “rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities” are all looked at in assessing the balance with which a state achieves growth both in absolute and relative terms.<sup>31</sup>

This measure is very much a relative measure in that it seeks to determine the level of disparity between groups and not the actual economic progress within a state. The underlying subtext appears to be that the inequality is usually the product of passive or active discrimination on the part of a dominant group to the detriment of the smaller(s) groups within a nation and may be a product of racism or some other underlying factor of discrimination.

#### **FSI Measures & Possible Questions to Ask – Uneven Economic Development**

Discriminatory Economics - <i>Is the economic system discriminatory?</i>	Fair Housing - <i>Is there a housing system for the poor?</i>
Economic Equality - <i>Gap Is there a large economic gap?</i>	Existence of Ghettos or Slums - <i>Do ghettos and slums exist?</i>
Economic Justice - <i>Does economic justice exist?</i>	Hiring Practices - <i>Are hiring practices generally fair - legally and the perception of others?</i>
Free Education - <i>Does free education exist and if so, to which grade?</i>	Job Training - <i>Do programs for job training exist?</i>
Equal Education - <i>Is the education provided relatively equal?</i>	Job Training Use - <i>Do people know about the job training and is it available based on qualification and need?</i>
	Social System - <i>Do equal rights exist in the society?</i>

<sup>31</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 12.

Equal Rights Legislation - *Are there laws protecting equal rights?*

Table 3-5<sup>32</sup>

In a Canadian context, one has only to look at the disparity in economic advantages between aboriginal Canadians and the greater Canadian community to see how the disparity in incomes, education, etc. causes grievances to fester and can lead to violence such as in the cases of Oka in Quebec and Caledonia within Ontario. A good example of passive discrimination is the 2% cap on increases to aboriginal education while the cost of Canadian provincial education systems has increased at a much greater rate.<sup>33</sup> However well-meaning and fiscally prudent the policy was intended to be, it is clear that it has had the effect of creating an imbalance between federally funded aboriginal education and that which is funded by the provinces for the greater part of Canadians.

### **Poverty and Economic Decline**

States that exhibit declines in economic indicators of wellbeing on individual and a state level are viewed as having a greater potential for failure whether the indicator is

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<sup>32</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 12.

<sup>33</sup> John Ibbitson, "Tories fashion native education system to improve life on reserves" in *The Globe and Mail*, (9 January, 2012); <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/john-ibbitson/tories-fashion-native-education-system-to-improve-life-on-reserves/article2295443/>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2012.

GNP, poverty levels or child mortality rates.<sup>34</sup> The Failed State Index also weighs the economic decline and poverty of a state to assist in the determination of potential or actual state failure. Other issues that are looked at within this indicator are trade imbalances, decline in foreign investment, currency devaluation or collapse, social hardship due to the imposition of economic austerity programs, growth in illicit trade (black markets) and an increase in corruption or the increased propensity of citizens to operate outside the legal marketplace.<sup>35</sup>

#### FSI Measures & Possible Questions to Ask – Poverty and Economic Decline

Government Debt - <i>What is the government debt?</i>	GDP - <i>What is the GDP - actual and projected?</i>
Interest Rates - <i>How are the interest rates - actual and projected?</i>	Unemployment - <i>How is the unemployment - current and rate of unemployment?</i>
Inflation Rate - <i>How is the inflation rate - actual and projected?</i>	Economic Focus - <i>Does one product make up the majority of the economy?</i>
Consumer Confidence - <i>How do people view the economy?</i>	Business Climate - <i>for FDI Is the business climate attractive to FDI?</i>
National Economy - <i>How do experts view the economy?</i>	Business Climate for Entrepreneurship - <i>Do the laws and access to capital allow for internal entrepreneurship?</i>
Productivity - <i>What is the productivity?</i>	

Table 3-6<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> *The Fund for Peace, Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 13.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

The Western world is not immune to the effects of a sudden decline in economic viability. One has only to look at Greece and the upheaval that is going on within the country due to the imposition of an austerity program to prevent the sovereign bankruptcy of the state and its need to honour its commitments to the Eurozone countries. The impact on the Greek economy of the recession that began in 2008 continues to have repercussions and led immediately to riots by Greek youth who saw diminishing prospects for employment and a fulfilling life.<sup>37</sup> The full impact of the Greek defaults has not yet been seen but it is clear that it is causing social upheaval within the society as a whole.

### **Legitimacy of the State**

As seen in the definition of a failed state posited by Max Weber and that officially sanctioned by the Canadian Forces Chief of Force Development, legitimacy is a key component whether as a qualifier to the use of power in Weber's case or the authority of the power being used in the case of the CF. The Failed State Index looks at such variables as: "massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites," the reluctance for accountability/ transparency or journalism practices to expose corruption,

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<sup>37</sup> Christos Lyrintzis, "Greek Politics in the Era of Economic Crisis: Reassessing Causes and Effects," in *GreeSE Paper No 45, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe* (London: The Hellenic Observatory, March 2011), 1-2; [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/33826/1/GreeSE\\_No45.pdf](http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/33826/1/GreeSE_No45.pdf); Internet; accessed 8 March 2012.

loss of confidence in the state and its institutions by the population and negative reactions created thereby and linkages of crime syndicates to the ruling elites.<sup>38</sup>

### FSI Measures & Possible Questions to Ask – Legitimacy of the State

Armed Insurgents - <i>Are there reports of armed insurgents and attacks?</i>	Confidence in Government - <i>Does the government have the confidence of the people?</i>
Suicide Bombers - <i>Have there been suicide bombings and how likely are they?</i>	Makeup of Government - <i>Is the government representative of the population?</i>
Corruption of Federal Officials - <i>Is there evidence of corruption on the part of federal officials?</i>	Most recent Leadership Transition - <i>Have there been recent peaceful transitions of power?</i>
Accusation of Corruption of Federal Officials – <i>Are federal officials considered to be corrupt?</i>	History of Leadership Transitions - <i>What is the longer term history of transition of power?</i>
Corruption of Local Officials - <i>Are local officials considered to be corrupt?</i>	Political Rights - <i>Do political rights for all parties exist?</i>
Accusation of Corruption of Local Officials - <i>Are local officials considered to be corrupt?</i>	Political Assassinations - <i>Are there reports of politically motivated attacks and assassinations?</i>
Perception of Elections - <i>Are elections perceived to be free and fair?</i>	Riots & Uprisings - <i>Have riots occurred?</i>
Monitoring of Elections - <i>Have elections been monitored and reported as free and fair?</i>	Peaceful Demonstrations - <i>Have peaceful demonstrations occurred?</i>

Table 3-7<sup>39</sup>

Jamaica is an example of how the linkages of crime syndicates to political parties can become entrenched in a society and diminishes the legitimacy of the state. The drug

<sup>38</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 14.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.



gangs or posses in Jamaica were used to organize and gain power by Jamaican political parties. This symbiotic relationship, however useful in the attainment of political power had the adverse effect of actually undermining the political system as the potent threat of violence by the posses and the inability or neglect of the government towards the poor made the government less legitimate within the neighbourhoods of the capital city, Kingston.<sup>40</sup> The repercussions of this were felt outside of Jamaica as the posses became extremely powerful so much so that in 2010, 73 people were killed in Jamaica in the fight to arrest the leader of the “Shower Posse’s” leader so that he could be extradited to the United States.<sup>41</sup>

## **Public Services**

Another indicator used by the Failed State Index is the deterioration in Public Services provided by the state. It should be understood that the public services that are used are at the basic end of the spectrum and not the higher level ones that could be judged as superfluous to the health and welfare of the state and its population. The Failed State Index focuses on such basic services as: the protection of the people from violence, the provision of basic services such as health, education, water, sanitation and public

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<sup>40</sup> John Lancaster, “John Lancaster follows the trail of the notorious Jamaican gang Shower Posse,” *The National - CBC Television* (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 19 January 2012); <http://search.proquest.com/docview/916898048/1355E4DF655779CAEE/1?accountid=9867>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2012.

<sup>41</sup> Lancaster, “John Lancaster follows the trail of the notorious Jamaican gang Shower Posse,” *The National - CBC Television*.

transportation and the provision and availability of services to all members of a society and not just a select privileged few. The index also looks at the discontinuation of a given service or services over time to determine the ability of a state to continue to provide such services.<sup>42</sup>

### Measures & Possible Questions to Ask – Public Services

Access to Housing - <i>Do the poor have access to adequate housing?</i>	Number of Physicians - <i>Are there an adequate number of medical professionals for the population?</i>
Housing Costs - <i>Are housing costs in line with the general economy?</i>	Infant Mortality - <i>What is the infant mortality rate - actual and projected?</i>
Education Enrollment - <i>What is the level of school enrollment? Different for boys and girls?</i>	Potable Water - <i>Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?</i>
Literacy Rates - <i>What are the literacy rates? Different for boys and girls?</i>	Public Services Equality - <i>Is there equal access to public services?</i>
Fuel Supply - <i>Is there an adequate supply of fuel?</i>	Public Services General - <i>What are the general conditions of public services?</i>
Accesses to Medicine - <i>Do people have adequate access to medicines?</i>	Roads - <i>Are roads adequate and safe?</i>
Number of Clinics or Hospitals - <i>Are there an adequate number of medical facilities for the population?</i>	Sanitation - <i>Is sanitation system adequate?</i>
	Airports - <i>Are there adequate airports for sustainable development?</i>
	Railroads - <i>Are there adequate railroads for sustainable development?</i>

Table 3-8<sup>43</sup>

<sup>42</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 14-15.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

The failure to ensure the delivery of education and an inadequate medical system are two signs of a state in difficulty. Amongst the world's states, the 2011 Failed State Index gives Haiti the dubious distinction of maxing out on the scale for its public services. It is a state that "has relied on outside agencies such as NGOs and the UN "to fill significant gaps in its institutional capacity to provide basic public services such as healthcare, security, and education for its people."<sup>44</sup> The ability of the state to deliver basic services such as education is suspect despite the fact that public education is officially available to all children. Haitians "must pay for uniforms, textbooks, supplies, and other inputs."<sup>45</sup> This burden, in a country where families are unable to pay for such necessities of education, has, as a result, less than 35% completion rate for primary school.<sup>46</sup> The state of medical care is such that the mortality rate for children is 1 in 8 and the average life expectancy is roughly 20 years lower than that of the U.S. or Canada.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Elizabeth J.C. Cutler, *Moving Mountains: The Challenges of Contemporary U.S. Foreign Aid in the Context of Post-Disaster Haiti*, (Washington, D.C.: UMI, 2011), iii; <http://search.proquest.com/docview/864899586/1356C763D7E3CD3E19E/2?accountid=9867>; Internet: accessed 12 March 2012.

<sup>45</sup> U.S. State Department, *State Department Issues Background Note on Republic of Haiti*, (Washington, D.C: Targeted News Service, 19 Oct 2011), 1; <http://search.proquest.com/docview/900951384/1356C763D7E3CD3E19E/6?accountid=9867>; Internet: accessed 12 March 2012.

<sup>46</sup> U.S. State Department, *State Department Issues Background Note on Republic of Haiti*, 1.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

## Human Rights and the Rule of Law

The realm of human rights and the rule of law are also used in grading countries to determine where they may lie on the failed or failing states spectrum. The Failed State Index includes such elements such as the emergence of autocratic rule “where constitutional and democratic processes are suspended or manipulated”, an increased number of “political prisoners and dissidents who are denied due process”, and the pervasive abuse of a citizenry’s legal, social and political rights, as measures to determine the undermining of human rights and the rule of law within a state.<sup>48</sup>

### Measures & Possible Questions to Ask – Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Child Labor - *Are there child labor laws or reports of child labor?*

Power Sharing - *Is there a process and system that encourages political power sharing?*

Civil Rights - *Are there civil rights laws and are civil rights protected?*

Prison Conditions - *How are the prison conditions?*

Communal Rights - *Do communal rights exist and are they protected?*

Fair Trials - *Do accused receive a fair and timely trial? Is this equal for all?*

Labor Rights - *Do labor rights exist and are they protected?*

Religious Freedom - *Does religious freedom exist?*

Legal System - *If rights are not protected, is there a legal system in which that can be addressed?*

Religious Extremism - *Does religious extremism exist?*

Minority Rights - *Do communal rights exist and are they protected?*

Forced Relocation - *Are groups forced to relocate?*

Access to Information - *Is there equal access to information?*

Compensation for Relocation - *If relocation occurs, is there a system that ensures proper compensation?*

<sup>48</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 16.

Freedom of Movement - <i>Is there freedom of movement?</i>	Right to Life - <i>Is the right to life protected for all citizens?</i>
Arbitrary Arrests - <i>Are there accusations or reports of arbitrary arrests? Are these state-sponsored?</i>	Torture - <i>Are there reports of state or group-sponsored torture?</i>
Illegal Detention - <i>Are there accusations or reports of illegal detention? Are these state-sponsored?</i>	Freedom of Speech - <i>Are there laws protecting freedom of speech?</i>
Political Rights - <i>Do political rights exist and are they protected?</i>	Existence of Independent Media - <i>Does an independent media exist? Do its reporters feel free to publish accusations against those in power?</i>
	Systemic Violation of Rights - <i>Is there a history of systemic violation of rights by the government or entity therein?</i>

Table 3-9<sup>49</sup>

The situation in Sudan is a good example of a country where human rights abuses are pervasive. Sudan has had ongoing internal strife in both the south and in the west of the country. The UN Human Rights Commission has condemned Sudan for human rights abuses.<sup>50</sup> The Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) is able to detain persons “without judicial oversight for up to 4 and half months”.<sup>51</sup> This new law has been used to arrest people within refugee camps where “at least two were reportedly tortured and remained in *incommunicado* detention without charge at the end of the

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<sup>49</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 16-17.

<sup>50</sup> Anonymous, “U.N. Faults Sudan and Iraq On Human Rights Violations” in *New York Times* (New York: 11 Mar 1993); <http://search.proquest.com/docview/428974207/1356C98FD035B7D80AF/36?accountid=9867>; internet; accessed 12 March 2012.

<sup>51</sup> Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2011: The State of the World’s Human Rights, Sudan*; <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/sudan/report-2011#section-133-6>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2012.

year.”<sup>52</sup> One can see that this fear, while seemingly strengthening the central governments grip on power creates fear and thus cleaves the population into groups which have no attachment or faith in the central government.

## **Security Apparatus**

The security apparatus of a state and a tendency to gear that apparatus to the maintenance of power by the existing government is an indicator of state fragility. The Failed State Index seeks to determine if a state’s security apparatus is geared towards protecting the state and its population or if it geared towards preserving and maintaining the power of the current ruling elite regardless of any impact on the citizenry writ large. The Failed State Index looks at determining: the existence or emergence of a force dedicated to a leader and separate from the regular military, the existence of state supported private militias that are used to suppress political dissent, the emergence of an “army within an army” or a separate intelligence unit focused not on threats to the state but on political threats to the leadership, and the presence of “armed resistance, violent uprisings or insurgency” dedicated to challenging the states monopoly on power.<sup>53</sup>

### **Measures & Possible Questions to Ask – Security Apparatus**

Arms Proliferation - *Is there a high availability*      Accusations of Police Brutality - *Are there*

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<sup>52</sup> Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2011: The State of the World’s Human Rights, Sudan*.

<sup>53</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 18.

*of weapons?*

DDR Program - *If in reconstruction, is there an adequate plan for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants?*

Use of Force - *Does the military and police maintain proper use of force?*

Guerrillas - *Are there guerilla forces operating in the state? Do they control territory?*

Militias - *Do private militias exist against the state?*

Military - *Is the military under civilian control?*

Paramilitary - *Is there paramilitary activity?*

*accusations of police brutality?*

Professionalization of Police - *Are the police considered to be professional?*

Political Violence - *Is violence often state-sponsored and politically motivated?*

Private Forces - *Do private armies exist to protect assets?*

Government Response to Security Threats - *Is the government dealing well with any insurgency or security situation?*

Table 3-10<sup>54</sup>

The state's viability, as has been discussed previously, is ultimately tied to the ability of a political entity to maintain control over the legitimate use of force within the boundaries of that state. Most would agree that "the ideal of a neutral and effective force loyal to the state is shared by a great majority of the population" of a given country.<sup>55</sup> When the governing organization in charge of a country begins to lose its grip on power it is conceivable that that organization will seek to perpetuate its hold on power via means that are partisan, illegitimate and hurtful to the population at large. The "security

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<sup>54</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 18.

<sup>55</sup> Andreas Mehler, "The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic," *GIGA Working Papers*, (GIGA - German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 26 Aug 2010), 1; <http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2081/>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2012.

apparatus” indicator provides a means to determine the imposition of tighter controls by political organizations that seek to do this. One of the countries that rates poorly on the Failed States Index with respect to this criterion is the Central African Republic. The Central African Republic has had a history of having a “presidential guard” whose purpose was to protect the ruler/ruling elite and their grip on power.<sup>56</sup> Accordingly, the focus of this force was most often on quelling dissent over the ruler’s right to govern within the country through force if necessary.<sup>57</sup>

### **Factionalized Elites**

The Failed State Index, in a further attempt to determine the role and nature of elites within a state uses such indicators as: the “fragmentation of ruling elites” along lines of ethnicity, race, religion, etc., the “use of nationalistic rhetoric by the ruling elites” or “communal solidarity” in cleaving groups along the same lines as the elite themselves and “the absence of legitimate leadership widely accepted as representing the entire citizenry.”<sup>58</sup>

#### **Measures & Possible Questions to Ask – Factionalized Elites**

Concentration of Wealth - *Is wealth concentrated in the hands of a few?*

Control of Resources - *Does any one group or party control the majority of resources?*

Growing Middle Class - *Is there a burgeoning*

Distribution of Resources - *Are resources fairly*

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<sup>56</sup> Mehler, “The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic,” 9-10.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 12-13.

<sup>58</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 19.



*middle class?*

Fragmentation - *Are there factionalized elites, tribal elites and/or fringe groups? How powerful are they?*

National Identity - *Is there a sense of national identity?*

Law - *Are the laws democratic or extreme?*

Leadership - *Is the leadership fairly elected?*

Nationalism - *How strong are feelings of nationalism?*

Representation in Judicial System - *Is the judicial system representative of the population?*

Representation in Military - *Is the military representative of the population?*

*distributed?*

Revenue Distribution - *Does the government adequately distribute wealth through its tax system and taxes?*

Extremist Rhetoric - *Does hate radio and media exist?*

Political Reconciliation - *Is there a political reconciliation process?*

Separatism - *Are there calls for separatism?*

Stereotyping - *Is religious, ethnic, or other stereotyping prevalent and is there scape-goating?*

Cross Cultural Respect - *Does cross-cultural respect exist?*

Table 3-11<sup>59</sup>

The problem with having an elite ruling class is that it almost inevitably intertwines its own interests with that of the country when, in fact, the two might be very different. This also creates a sense of disassociation on the part of the general populace with the government of the country. This in turns creates fertile ground for strife and disillusionment when portions of the population are not seen to be benefiting as others are or if the country's fortunes take a turn for the worse. One such country is Nigeria whose

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<sup>59</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 19.

political system is arguably designed such that the ruling elite can cling to power, a sure sign of authoritarianism.<sup>60</sup>

## External Intervention

Lastly, the Failed State Index uses the presence of external intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state as a viability indicator. More specifically, the Failed State Index measures the presence of overt or covert military engagement by an outside force to affect internal power struggles, the scale economic interference by other states or entities that seek to affect the economic policies of the state or create “economic dependencies”, or “the humanitarian or strategic intervention by outside forces into an internal conflict or for regime change.”<sup>61</sup>

### Measures & Possible Questions to Ask – External Intervention

Covert Intervention - <i>Are covert operations taking place?</i>	Presence of Foreign Troops - <i>Are foreign troops present?</i>
Economic Intervention or Aid - <i>Is the country receiving economic aid?</i>	Military Assistance - <i>Is there external military assistance?</i>
Dependency on Aid - <i>Is the country dependent on economic aid?</i>	Military Training - <i>Are there military training exercises with other nations or support of military training from other states?</i>
External Support for Factions - <i>Is there external</i>	

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<sup>60</sup> Anonymous, “Nigeria: Political Forces”, *EIU ViewsWire*, (Dec 23, 2008); <http://search.proquest.com/docview/366428495/fulltext/1356D592FB64FC3E2B5/2?accountid=9867>; Internet; accessed 12 May 2012.

<sup>61</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 20.

*support for factions opposed to the government?*

*Peacekeeping - Is there a peacekeeping operation on the ground?*

*Military Attacks Across Borders - Are military attacks from other countries occurring?*

*Training of Police - Is there external support for police training?*

Table 3-12<sup>62</sup>

A clear example of a country that has had a series of external interveners in its affairs is Afghanistan. This state has seen a series of foreign countries place their troops on its soil whether in solidarity with the existing government or not. From Alexander the Great, the British Empire, the Soviet Union or today with the US and NATO, Afghanistan has seen foreign militaries within its borders. It has also seen undue influence of neighbouring states such as Pakistan with its support to the Taliban regime while it held power in the post-Soviet period.<sup>63</sup> As nothing happens in a vacuum, the very presence of the foreign interventions can be destabilizing in the short term and the long term. In the short term, it can create regime change as the US invasion of Afghanistan did with its ouster of the ruling Taliban government. In the long term, it can create dependencies which are unsustainable such as with Afghan President Hamid Karzai's 2011 assertion at a conference in Bonn that the international community would

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<sup>62</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 20.

<sup>63</sup> Amin Saikal, "Afghanistan: A Seriously Disrupted State," *Global Dialogue* (Online) 13. 1, (Winter 2011), 82-93; <http://search.proquest.com/docview/883389200/1356D6201927C9794CE/3?accountid=9867>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2012.

need to fund Afghanistan to the tune of \$10 billion/annum so that the existing government could continue to function.<sup>64</sup>

## **FAILED STATE INDEX CRITICISM**

One criticism that can be leveled at the Failed State Index is its close alignment with Western values of democracy and individual human rights. For instance, China and India were both ranked below Libya in the Index which may be a surprise to some given the economic success of both countries. The Fund for Peace argues that China and India are higher on the Index due to the greater social, economic and political challenges that they face.<sup>65</sup> It must be remembered that the indicators are only that and are not necessarily indicative of the ability of a particular country to handle adversity.

It is also evident that a fair, equitable and legitimate government is a vital component in ensuring that a failed/failing state has the leadership that it requires to extricate itself from the difficulties that it may be encountering. Without that legitimate government that is fully recognized by the resident population, no international intervention is likely to meet with success. No political system is ever equal in the sense that all persons are remunerated equally and enjoy the same standard of living equally.

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<sup>64</sup> John Daly, "Karzai Afghan "President for Life?" Bad for Democracy, Good for Pipelines," *Oilprice.com*, (08 December 2011); <http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Karzai-Afghan-President-for-Life-Bad-for-Democracy-Good-for-Pipelines.html>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2012.

<sup>65</sup> J.J. Mesner, "Failed States Index 2011: Remarks on Index Highlights", (Transcript of speech presented to the Failed States Index 2011 Launch Event by J. J. Messner, Senior Associate at The Fund for Peace, at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on June 29, 2011); <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=node/143>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2012.

There will always be winners and losers even in the most socialist of systems. That does not mean that fairness is not achievable. The socio/political/economic situation can be judged to be fair as long as all groups have equal opportunity.

There are two ways in which leadership may emerge within a vacuum. One is through the collective expression of the people's will of which democracies are an expression. The other method is through the consolidation of power by an entity or individual such that all practical exceptions and dissent disappear or are quashed. There are a variety of such forms of state government whether it is called a dictatorship, an absolute monarchy or some other type of authoritarian regime. The Failed State Index does not state its distaste for authoritarianism explicitly but it is easy to see the bias that is present within it given the number of criteria that centre on properties that are almost exclusive to democracies. It is easy to see how these biases came into being as fully formed democracies tend to be more stable than authoritarian regimes, if only due to the formal mechanism present for the transfer of power and the catharsis generated by the ability of the people to express their collective will in the form of elections whether or not they actually participate or not. The conundrum is that forming a democracy by fiat or direct intervention seems to be impossible in practical terms. This may be due to factors such as the need for a collective will amongst the population to vote in elections and a lack of fear that the majority will bring tyranny to the minorities present within a given state. Whatever the reason, it is a fact that democracy rarely thrives when it is imposed upon a population.

## SUMMARY

The definition of a failed/failing state is dependent on the existence of a group that can lay claim to being the sole authority for the legitimate use of force within and by the state. This is a requirement due to the fact that without a central body (or person) that can make this claim, the state does not exist as a political entity. The importance of a set of indicators of failed or failing states such as have been reviewed with the Failed State Index put forth by The Fund for Peace and the *Foreign Policy Journal* is that it gives a clear picture of the states that have failed or are failing and allows insight into the elements of their weaknesses.

A clear theme that emerges in reviewing the Failed State Index indicators is that they ultimately lead to the cleavage of the body politic into groups that have legitimate grievances and are underrepresented in the organization that holds power. Whether it is a case of a group having violence perpetrated against it or the fact that a group is not sharing the societal and/or economic gains of the state, the indicators all point to reasons why factionalization and separation of groups within a state can occur. The ability of a state to deal with the friction points that exist between the peoples that populate it and to ensure that they are enfranchised is a key element of sustainability of the state and speaks to its ability to continue to thrive during adversity and success.

While a state may be functioning in accordance within the definition of a state, The Failed State index can point towards its resilience in the face of challenges to its

existence. While there is no reason to say that a state cannot be successful without full representation such as in the case of a democracy, the lack of said representation makes the state more “brittle” in the face of change and uncertainty as the mechanisms to effect change are weak and the ability for the smooth transition of power may be non-existent. From a military context then, it must be determined exactly what the military brings to the table in terms of its ability to halt and reverse the decline of a given state. It is easy to generalize the military impact under the security umbrella but this umbrella contains a number of different options such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding, which will be looked at in the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER 4 – TYPES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN FAILED OR FAILING STATES**

This chapter focuses on the specific ways in which militaries can and have been used to support interventions in failing states. Largely, the types of intervention can be classified along “kinetic” and “non-kinetic” lines. In military parlance, kinetic operations refer to those operations that have a traditional military warfighting element. In other words, these options require the use of weapons. The non-kinetic types of military intervention are those types of operations that do not involve the use of weapons and can often appear to be tasks that could be done by others given the opportunity. However, military non-kinetic operations are linked to the achievement of military objectives and thus may only peripherally support any diplomatic or developmental goals where they coincide.

### **FRAMEWORK FOR OPERATIONS**

#### **Humanitarian Assistance**

The military is often called upon to support quick initiatives to support humanitarian assistance because it has the necessary capabilities to do so, whether it be the delivery of supplies, the treatment of the ill and injured or the prevention of violence against refugees and IDPs. This assistance is generally done in support of a larger



international call for support and often is done in response to an event such as a natural disaster. Examples of these types of operations include tsunamis, earthquakes and famine. These operations are often short in duration and tend to do little to address any long lasting or enduring problems present within the host nation itself.

### **Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Peacemaking**

The classic role for militaries in creating a secure environment by interposing themselves between warring states and factions within states is known as peacekeeping. Classical peacekeeping “has traditionally been used to describe various forms of legitimised collective intervention aimed at avoiding the outbreak or resurgence of violent conflict between disputants.”<sup>66</sup> Traditionally, there has always been a need for a brokering of a ceasefire agreement as the two sides in a conflict had to be willing to start the process towards peace. The UN has three basic principles for UN peacekeeping: “consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate”.<sup>67</sup>

Following the end of the cold war, this approach was seen as limiting and thought was given to pushing the boundaries of classical peacekeeping. The need to interpose a

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<sup>66</sup> Mats R. Berdal, “Whither UN peacekeeping?: Introduction,” *The Adelphi Papers*, (London: Routledge, 02 May 2008), 1; <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/05679329308449194>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2012.

<sup>67</sup> United Nations, “What is peacekeeping?” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2012.

neutral force between belligerents without their consent to enforce peace became a more palatable option.<sup>68</sup> Thus peacekeeping expanded to include the enforcement of peace under the auspices of UN Security Council resolutions. These additional roles came with new labels, “peace making” and “peace enforcement.” The UN refers to peace making as a proactive diplomatic approach to bringing warring parties to the bargaining table in the hopes of reaching a negotiated settlement.<sup>69</sup> UN peace enforcement “involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force” and “requires the explicit authorization of the Security Council.”<sup>70</sup> It can be argued that peace enforcement activities are difficult to label as impartial given that often one of the factions involved is likely to be disadvantaged because it can no longer use military force as a tool to gain concessions or regain lost ground. In essence, the presence of UN troops freezes the conflict at the time and place of enforcement creating a situation in which one of the parties to the conflict is likely to be aggrieved.

The expansion of peacekeeping beyond the interposition of an impartial neutral force between belligerents who had asked for its presence to a more robust definition has occurred over time. The UN now describes peacekeeping as multidimensional in that they “facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of

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<sup>68</sup> Berdal, “Whither UN peacekeeping?: Introduction,” 4.

<sup>69</sup> United Nations. “Peace and Security,” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2012.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.”<sup>71</sup> This is a departure from the original concept which was to interpose UN forces between two belligerents who themselves had either exhausted their will to fight or had asked for a third party to place itself between them to monitor a cease-fire or truce. It allows the UN the UN to expand its role without giving up the brand that the concept of peacekeeping has become. The difficulty with this lies in the fact that it can be misleading to the general public of troop contributing nations in as much as they may view peacekeeping as a relatively benign, low risk activity when it has become inclusive of more risky endeavours.

### **Sanctioned and Unsanctioned International Military Operations**

Increasingly, the international community (or members of it), led by the US, have become involved in conflicts, which have little or no peace to enforce. While most of these interventions have taken place under the auspices of an UN Security Council resolution, some have not. Perhaps the most relevant example of such an intervention is that of NATO’s Kosovo bombing campaign. One of the clear issues that the UN faces is that it was never intended to bring its attention to conflict occurring within the boundaries of a state itself notwithstanding the inclusion of human rights and chapter VII enforcement measures in the UN charter.<sup>72</sup> The legalities of the intervention in Kosovo

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<sup>71</sup> UN, “Peace and Security,” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml>.

<sup>72</sup> Francesco Francioni, “Of War, Humanity and Justice: International Law after Kosovo,” *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, ed. by J.A. Frowein and R. Wolfrun, (Netherlands: Kluwer Law

were arguably illegal under international law and the former state of Yugoslavia (Serbia) initiated a complaint to the International Court of Justice. Depending on where one stands on the legal spectrum, the intervention was either an act of aggression or fully compliant given the importance of human rights in international law.<sup>73</sup> The fallout from these two diametrically opposing views is that “the first could open the flood gates to unilateral interventions” by powerful states under the auspices of “justice and human rights” while the second would see the old Cold War paradigm reinforced with no allowances for the alleviation of human suffering.<sup>74</sup> The result of the case was very much caught up in legal wrangling over jurisdiction and while the court expressed “concern over the human tragedy in Kosovo and with the loss of life and human suffering ‘in all parts of Yugoslavia’” and the fact that it “raised serious issue of international law,” it was not conclusive.<sup>75</sup>

Subsequent to the Kosovo intervention, the international community and the UN developed a concept known as the “Responsibility to Protect”<sup>76</sup> (R2P) in an effort to address the vacuum of international agreement for intervention on a humanitarian basis.

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International, 2000), 107; [http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/francioni\\_4.pdf](http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/francioni_4.pdf); Internet; accessed 14 March 2012. 107-126.

<sup>73</sup> Francioni, “Of War, Humanity and Justice: International Law after Kosovo,” 110.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 111.

<sup>75</sup> Peter H.F. Bekker & Christopher J. Borgen, “World Court Rejects Yugoslav Requests to Enjoin Ten NATO Members from Bombing Yugoslavia,” *ASIL Insights* (June 1999); <http://www.asil.org/insigh36.cfm>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2012.

<sup>76</sup> International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, “Summary on the UN Secretary General’s Report on the Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.” (July 2011); <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/7%20July%20Summary%20of%20the%20SG%20report.pdf>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2012.

In 2011, the Secretary General released a report on R2P. Within, it echoed a 2009 report in emphasizing three pillars:

I. The enduring responsibility of the state to protect its own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement;

II. The commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting those obligations; and,

III. The responsibility of member states to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a state is manifestly failing to provide such protection.<sup>77</sup>

The report emphasizes the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in effecting this new paradigm. While not explicit in the report, it is clear that consensus on R2P has not been reached in the international community given the reluctance of states to allow outside intervention in what they view as internal and therefore sovereign affairs.<sup>78</sup> The implementation of the third pillar is viewed with concern by certain nations given how NATO implemented UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in Libya, the emphasis on

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<sup>77</sup> International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, "Summary on the UN Secretary General's Report on the Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect."

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

regional vice international arrangements and the use of force as a last resource after all other efforts have been exhausted under pillar III.<sup>79</sup>

One can argue that the intervention in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and then assist in the creation and support of a subsequent government was the most robust action by a foreign military force in a state to date. It is even argued that the invasion of Afghanistan by the US and the coalition of the willing was itself illegal as it was not an “armed attack” by the state of Afghanistan but rather a “criminal” one.<sup>80</sup> This argument may be moot but it does speak to the extent to which the international community is now willing to extend itself in intervening in sovereign states for the purposes of self-defence to protect against regional or global threats. Regardless of the text of supporting UN Security Council Resolutions for the international community and specifically NATO’s ISAF intervention in Afghanistan, it is clear that there has been a large expansion of the military’s role from the days of classical peacekeeping to the present. The extent of the support by external states of the Karzai regime in Kabul against what is, in effect, the deposed former government could easily be construed as intervention in a civil war.

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<sup>79</sup> International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, “Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.”

<sup>80</sup> Marjorie Cohn, “Afghanistan: The Other Illegal War,” ( 1 Aug 2008); <http://www.alternet.org/world/93473/afghanistan: the other illegal war/>; Internet: accessed 14 March 2012.

## Peacebuilding

The non-kinetic spectrum of military tasks in support of a failed or failing state are also important, not only to the kinetic military mission in a dynamic battle space but as ends in themselves which support higher level strategic goals in the diplomatic and developmental aspects of supporting a failed or failing state. The UN's stated aim in peacebuilding is "to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development."<sup>81</sup> The elements associated with peacebuilding can include "protecting civilians, assisting in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, supporting the organization of elections, protecting and promoting human rights" as well as "restoring the rule of law."<sup>82</sup> This is another area in which a moniker which includes the tagline of peace within it can be misleading to the general public in terms of the risk that must be undertaken by the troops that are used to accomplish the given mandate.

The military often has the capacity to perform functions that would normally be performed by civilians in a more benign environment. For instance the same engineering and contracting capabilities that are necessary for combat functions can be put to use in organizing or constructing schools and other infrastructure projects. The same road

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<sup>81</sup> United Nations, "Peace and Security,";  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml>.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

improvements that are necessary for the military to operate more efficiently within a given environment can also be extremely beneficial to the civilian economy. It was certainly effective for the Roman Empire. The planning and organizational skills that are taught to military planning staffs can be equally effective in organizing new governmental institutions. This was seen in the arguable success of the Canadian military's Strategic Advisory Team to the Afghan government which, although operating within a civilian bureaucracy, provided assistance on the Afghan National Development Strategy.<sup>83</sup>

The fact that peacebuilding efforts can often force military and civilian authorities to interact in the pursuit of a common aim sometimes jeopardizes the impartiality of one or both parties.<sup>84</sup> While their activities may be sequential and/or complementary to one another, the fact that the military is acting in the same space as diplomatic, development and humanitarian workers means that belligerents may not see the civilian side as apolitical given their effect on the ground of supporting the legitimization of the government in being. This often leads to a "catch 22" situation. Given the dangerous level of violence and security risks to these civilian agencies, they may decline to

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<sup>83</sup> Michel-Henri St-Louis, "The Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan – Part of the Canadian Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 9 No.3, (1 Mar 2009); <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no3/09-stlouis-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2012.

<sup>84</sup> Volker Franke, "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Co-operation in Stability Operations," *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Volume 11, Number 2, (Autumn/Winter 2006), 1; Internet; [http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol11\\_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol11_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf); Internet; accessed 14 March 2012.



continue to operate as the International Red Cross did in Iraq in 2003 due to targeted suicide bombing.<sup>85</sup>

Even though militaries are generally not geared nor inclined to take on the tasks commonly associated with civilian governmental and non-governmental agencies they may be tasked to do just that. In their zeal to achieve objectives they can also be seen to be hampering the long term developmental efforts of the civilian non-governmental agencies that are there for the longer term. Militaries are often deployed for short periods given the cost of sustaining their own operations. This creates an impetus for short term “quick hit” projects that assist the military in winning the hearts and minds of the local citizenry and are seen as “achievable.” This focus, while getting things done, can lead to results such as having schools that are empty due to a lack of teachers and educational resources. It can also be challenging to train military personnel to switch back and forth between kinetic and non-kinetic operations given the psychological strain that it can cause.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Volker Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Co-operation in Stability Operations 1-2.

<sup>86</sup> Gerald P. Krueger, “Contemporary and Future Battlefields: Soldier Stresses and Performance,” in *Performance Under Stress*, ed. by Peter A. Hancock & James L. Szalma, (Burlington, Vt: Ashgate, 2008), 20;  
<http://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w19X0p5g6TYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA19&dq=3+block+war+psychology+difficulty+soldiers&ots=lymdxzrekT&sig=BN7llmJJsXfRMiczGvMnJH3HSTE#v=onepage&q&f=false>;  
Internet; accessed 6 April 2012.

## **SUMMARY**

Militaries have an important role to play in creating a stable environment in which peace can be achieved and people's lives can improve without the spectre of violence eliminating any efforts to improve their lives. Whether a military is employed somewhere on the spectrum of security operations from peacekeeping to peace enforcement or in non-kinetic peacebuilding operations, the capability of militaries are considerable. However, it must be understood that military forces can be polarizing within a failed or failing state regardless of impartiality. This fact must temper the willingness to employ militaries outside of their traditional security role, especially in environments, which are far from benign.

## **CHAPTER 5 – REASONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN FAILED STATES**

National military capabilities are often used by states to achieve effects on the international stage. The spectrum of military capabilities that can be brought to bear by a state or group of states includes open warfare on one end and assistance to NGOs and national/international aid organizations for the distribution of humanitarian aid on the other. Within this chapter, the reasons for intervention in failed/failing states will be examined as well as the components of a successful military strategy in dealing with a failed/failing state. It will build on the review of the Foreign States Index by assessing what the military option (and capabilities) can bring to bear in terms of capabilities that assist in ameliorating the conditions that created problems in any one indicator. Finally, it will look at the potential effects of military involvement in a failed or failing state and their lasting endurance.

### **FAILED STATE INDEX AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT**

The Failed State Index indicators were introduced in the previous chapter but no link was made between the indicators and the role of the military in addressing any of the issues that contribute to a state being classified as a failed or failing state. Table 4-1 below provides that linkage between the indicator and potential tasks for external militaries to perform by matching military tasks. The measurement criteria found within The Fund for Peace's "Conflict Assessment Indicators" were used to extrapolate potential

military tasks (if any) that can be associated with each indicator. Military tasks which would logically produce an effect that would improve the outcome of measuring the criteria associated with each indicator contained within the Failed State Index have been included in the table. The table then describes what the expected military effect would be from the assignment of these tasks. Finally, it will describe the likely duration of that effect if unaccompanied/unaccompanied by other efforts as well as some additional remarks.

### Potential Military Involvement in Addressing Failed/Failing States

Indicator	Potential Military Tasks (if any)	Military Effect	Strategic Effect & Duration	Remarks
Demographic Pressures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Humanitarian Assistance(Food and Medical Aid)</li> <li>-Security of Humanitarian Aid organizations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Relief of suffering due to natural disasters, food shortages, disease</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Positive short term effect</li> <li>-Little lasting effect</li> <li>- Little to no impact on underlying causes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Military action is confined to ameliorating suffering for the duration of deployment.</li> </ul>
Refugees and IDPs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security</li> <li>- Humanitarian Assistance (Food and Medical Aid)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reduction or elimination of violence against and amongst refugees/IDPs</li> <li>- Relief of suffering due to food shortages, disease</li> <li>- May allow return of IDPs and Refugees to homes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Positive short term effect</li> <li>-Little lasting effect if underlying issues are not addressed diplomatically</li> <li>- Little to no impact on underlying causes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Military intervention is positive but diplomatic efforts must be successful for lasting effect</li> </ul>
Group Grievance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security operations (peacemaking/ peacekeeping)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Separation of groups to avoid conflict</li> <li>-supervision of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Long term effect if accompanied by diplomatic</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Military intervention is positive but diplomatic</li> </ul>

		negotiated settlement	enablers such as truth and reconciliation, negotiated settlement agreeable to all parties	efforts must be successful for lasting effect
Human Flight and Brain Drain	N/A	N/A	N/A	-Military is of little practical use in addressing issues related to this indicator
Uneven Economic Development	N/A	N/A	N/A	-Military is of little practical use in addressing issues related to this indicator
Poverty and Economic Decline	N/A	N/A	N/A	-Military is of little practical use in addressing issues related to this indicator
Legitimacy of the State	- Security operations	- neutralization of armed insurgency - military and police training	-short term on its own -med to long term when accompanied by diplomatic solutions to corruption, disputes and illegitimacy of the state	-Military action can treat symptoms but is only part of the solution for long term stability.
Public Services	-Medical Aid - Development projects (small scale)	-short term relief of inadequate service delivery  - Infrastructure works that will assist in	-infrastructure projects may have lasting effect but will be commensurate	-Military can alleviate issues in short term but is not a development

		provision of services (wells, roads, etc.)	with scale of the projects themselves	agency.
Human Rights and Rule of Law	- Security Operations (peacekeeping/ peacemaking)	-Cessation of violence against civilian population	-No lasting effect without change in host nation government	-Military can only address the effects of disregard for human rights and rule of law.
Security Apparatus	- Security Operations (peacekeeping/ peacemaking)	-Dismantlement of “private militias” -Peace enforcement -Professional military training of local military and police forces	-No lasting effect without change in host nation government	-Military effect will not last if changes in government are not achieved
Factionalized Elites	-Security Operations (peacekeeping)	-maintain stable environment between factions while diplomatic efforts take place	-Military efforts only set the conditions for strategic efforts to succeed	-Military is of little practical use in addressing issues related to this indicator
External Intervention	- Military assistance - Military training -Counterinsurgency operations -Security operations	- Increased Host Nation capability to defend itself against conventional and insurgent forces  - Neutralization of invading covert/overt military forces	-Military assistance can have positive lasting effects if accompanied by diplomatic success	- Military can be used but can cause imbalance and dependence by HN on external support

Figure 4-1<sup>87</sup>

One of the conclusions that can be drawn from Table 4-1 is the fact that military forces cannot be the primary contributor to the successful re-emergence of a state from failure and must therefore be a part of a larger effort which includes both development and diplomatic efforts. Military intervention is an enabler but cannot be the primary

<sup>87</sup> The Fund for Peace, *Conflict Assessment Indicators*, 1-18.

effort if there is to be lasting effect within a failed state to improve its functioning. Military effort can only provide safety and security for other activities to occur which can have a long term effect on a failed state. The reason for this is somewhat obvious given the fact that none of the 12 indicators contained within the Failed State Index benefit from direct military involvement except the last one which places an emphasis on a lack of direct intervention in a state by foreign military forces. The remainder are such that the military can only affect them indirectly as part of a broader and more comprehensive approach. This makes sense given that militaries are first and foremost a political tool which can bring to bear violence to achieve political aims. Violence can only destroy something. It cannot build.

It therefore stands to reason that “only by addressing the challenges of development can durable security be achieved, which is the core of the security-development nexus.”<sup>88</sup> Development and reinforcement of a viable state are the keys to ameliorating the conditions of a failed state. It should be understood that lasting and enduring security is achieved by building a political and social structure in which all people feel that they can address their concerns without resorting to violence or leaving the state in search of stability and prosperity elsewhere.

A second conclusion that can be drawn from Table 4-1 is that Military forces, due to their large size and capabilities can be used to successfully relieve suffering by

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<sup>88</sup> Sean McFate, “Lessons Learned from Liberia: Security Sector Reform in a Failed State: Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies,” *RUSI Journal* 153. 1 (Feb 2008): 62-66; <http://search.proquest.com/docview/212147365/1365ABA8E02563B7F09/10?accountid=9867>; Internet; accessed 27 Apr 2012.

assisting the delivery of humanitarian aid. While not lasting in impact in terms of its effect in improving the status of a failed state, the delivery of a humanitarian assistance to a distressed population should not be seen as meaningless. While the ultimate goal of international intervention in a state should strive to create the conditions for success of the state itself, individual suffering cannot be ignored from a human perspective.

The difficulty in the use of military forces to deliver aid is that they are not seen as apolitical actors and this has consequences for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), the population towards whom the aid is directed and the long term viability of achieving a stable state. The blurring of the lines between civilians and soldiers can also be an issue as the NGO workers are seen as furthering the ends of the military forces that are aiding them in the eyes of an insurgent force such as in the case of Afghanistan.<sup>89</sup> This blurring of the lines makes the ability of NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid or provide development support unsustainable as they cannot act without the security provided by the military but that very security makes it untenable for the general population to accept their assistance as it puts their lives in danger.

The most important conclusion that can be drawn from Table 4-1 is that military intervention, and the tasks that military forces can perform, mostly lack the ability to achieve lasting effect in terms of improving the status of any given indicator in the Failed State Index. If one questions why this is so, the common denominator that is arrived at

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<sup>89</sup> Nancy C. Roberts, "Spanning "Bleeding" Boundaries: Humanitarianism, NGOs, and the Civilian-Military Nexus in the Post-Cold War Era," *Public Administration Review* 70. 2, (Mar/Apr 2010); <http://search.proquest.com/docview/852810291/1365AC7444C3B52DB10/3?accountid=9867>; Internet; accessed 27 Apr 2012.



is that militaries are geared to accomplish two things in terms of their direct intervention in failed states. Military forces are geared to prevent individuals and groups from taking negative actions whether that is violence towards other groups or criminal activities. The obvious corollary to this is that military forces, while they can enforce rules and regulations, cannot compel groups or individuals within a nation to do so of their own accord. Thus, the removal of the external military forces from the failed state simply removes a foreign object from the natural system. The situation within the state in question therefor is likely to revert back to the way it was before the intervention or, even worse, the various factions resident within the state have husbanded their resources in the intervening time period in order to gain advantage for the inevitable withdraw of foreign troops. This does much to explain the non-persistence of the military effect in a failed state.

The one exception to the non-persistence of most military intervention tasks in a failed or failing state is the assistance in training indigenous security forces. This one task is an exception in that it allows the state to interpose itself between potential internal aggressors, defend itself against external military incursions and create an environment where the rule of law holds sway and the other institutions that are required to provide the very services that define a successful state become viable.<sup>90</sup> There are obvious impediments in achieving this equilibrium. The first impediment that must be overcome is that the native police and military forces must be apolitical in order to prevent further

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<sup>90</sup> Derick W. Brinkerhoff, "Rebuilding governance in failed states and post-conflict societies: core concepts and cross-cutting themes," *Public Administration & Development* ( Feb 2005); <http://search.proquest.com/docview/216163354/1365AD1EB243DD99A4D/11?accountid=9867>; Internet; accessed 27 April 2012.

factionalization and/or the takeover of the government by the force which is meant to protect it. The second impediment is that the maintenance of security forces is expensive and may be beyond the means of the failed state to support if there is a need for a large force structure due to a high level of continued animosity within the state between competing actors. Neither of these impediments can be easily overcome in a situation where factions are suspicious of each other and there is no tradition of impartiality. In many cases the concept of loyalty to the state is a foreign concept, especially if other organizations such as tribal and/or clan affiliation have long held the loyalty of individuals. This makes the institutionalization of impartiality and loyalty to the existing government a difficult thing to achieve.

### **Failed or Failing States as Regional and/or Global Threats**

The main role of a military force in a failed or failing states environment is security at all levels.<sup>91</sup> This is borne out by the analysis conducted in the preceding table of potential military tasks. Almost every indicator line had a role for the military to play in the realm of security. As mentioned previously, militaries may be called upon to conduct a variety of tasks in support of a failed or failing state. “3 Block War” is a term that is often used to describe this flexible approach where the battle space is no longer linear in nature nor is it solely a war fighting operation. The term “3 Block War” was championed by General Charles Krulak, the Marine Corps Commandant from 1995-

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<sup>91</sup> David Carment, “Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States,” prepared for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute’s “Research Paper Series,” (Calgary: CDFAI, 2005), 11; <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Effective%20Defence%20Policy%20for%20Responding%20to%20Failed%20and%20Failing%20States.pdf>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2012.

1999. He predicted that his marine corps would be asked to fight an engagement on one block, conduct peacekeeping operations on another and hand out humanitarian aid on a third, all within the same city.<sup>92</sup> This concept is particularly apt within a failed or failing state as the situational dynamics often change and there can be a rapid shift from one aspect of the military's mission to another. Given that the "3 Block War" is primarily tactical in nature, the "3D" approach is more appropriate as a term at the strategic level as it involves defence, diplomacy, and development and thus a wider spectrum of capabilities and responses to the problems encountered within a failed or failing state.<sup>93,94</sup>

## SUMMARY

The thorough review of the Failed State Index indicators in relation to potential military tasks to ameliorate the conditions that led to state failure allows the conclusion that military action alone can neither prevent failure nor achieve a complete return from failure. The nature of their effect on a failed or failing state is either of short term duration limited to the length of their presence if it is not used in conjunction with other avenues of approach on the diplomatic and development fronts. It is apparent, however, that without the security provided by a military response or presence, the long term projects and support needed to bring about real change can often not begin as either the

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<sup>92</sup> Matt Zeigler, *3 Block War* (Lincoln: iUniverse publishing, 2004), 27-28.

<sup>93</sup> Tactics are the science and art of disposing and maneuvering forces in combat; <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tactics>; Internet; accessed 6 April 2012.

<sup>94</sup> Strategy is the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war; <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strategy>; Internet; accessed 6 April 2012.

risk environment will simply not allow it or the necessary breathing space is not present for the roots of real change to take hold before internal disputes end up destroying any diplomatic or developmental progress. So far, this paper has looked at the qualities of a failed or failing state and the potential for military involvement in ameliorating their condition. In the next chapter, the focus of the paper will now shift to a review of case studies to discern the actual vice theoretical effects of external military intervention within failed states.

## **CHAPTER 6 - CANADIAN FORCES EFFECTS ON FAILED OR FAILING STATES**

Canada has been engaged in dealing with international conflicts for a long time and was one of the driving forces behind the design and development of peacekeeping as a mechanism for international interventions. This chapter will look at three operations in which the Canadian Forces have participated since the Cold War ended in 1989 and seek to ascertain the ultimate success that the countries in question have had in improving their situations. These three countries will include Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina (part of the former Yugoslavia), and Afghanistan. The following elements will be extracted in each case study for review:

- Mandate of the International Force (UN, NATO, Coalition);
- CF Operation (mandate, length, resources)
- Score on the Failed State Index pre-intervention (if available or 2005 if not);
- Score on the Failed State Index post-intervention; and,
- Current Score on the 2011 Failed State Index.

From these data points, it will be possible to determine what the lasting effect of the operation(s) was by the end of each operation (s) and subsequently the level of resilience that was instilled by the lasting effect on the nation's FSI score.

## CASE STUDY # 1 - HAITI

### Background

Haiti has been a country with which Canada has had a long history of involvement. Founded by slaves and forced to accept a national debt of penurious effect, it has had a sad history of suffering. This case study will look at the intervention of the international community and Canada's contributions to these interventions since the end of the Cold War in 1989.

The UN has had a constant presence in Haiti since 1990 and the fall of the autocratic and corrupt Duvalier regime. This presence was initiated in order provide impartial observers for elections that were held in 1991 and which resulted in the democratic election of President Aristide. Shortly thereafter, a military coup overthrew Aristide and although the coup was condemned by the international community and various embargoes ensued, human rights abuses were rampant and the UN contingent was withdrawn twice. President Aristide was eventually returned to power in 1994 but the ill trained Haitian police force was not effective and a UN mandate was established to assist in the professionalization of the Haitian Police. This mandate has proven to be unachievable to date as the UN has repeatedly attempted to improve the Haitian Police force only to see recurring instances of problematic behaviour.<sup>95, 96, 97, 98, 99</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> United Nations, *Haiti: Background*; <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihbackgr1.html>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

The UN authorized the formation of a multinational military force for Haiti in 1994 as well. From this point to the present day a multinational force has been almost continually present in Haiti. Unfortunately, this has not stopped the stability of the country from periodically disintegrating. There was a first successful democratic transfer of power in 1996 when President René Préval assumed power and then a second back to Aristide. However, due to widespread violent protests within the country in 2004, Aristide was forced to leave the country. Préval was returned to the presidency after elections in 2006 only to see Haiti rocked by hurricanes in 2008 and then a massive earthquake in 2010 which devastated the country.<sup>100, 101, 102, 103</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> United Nations, “Three Years of Defending Human Rights,” (September 1995); <http://www.un.org/rights/micivih/rapports/3years.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>97</sup> United Nations, “Haiti Mandat,” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unsmihmandate.html>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>98</sup> United Nations, “United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti”; <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untmih.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>99</sup> United Nations, “United Nations Police Mission in Haiti”; <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/miponuh.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>100</sup> United Nations, “Security Council authorizes three-month Multinational Interim Force for Haiti”; <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=9926&Cr=Haiti>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>101</sup> United Nations, “MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti”; <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>102</sup> United Nations, “MINUSTAH Background”; <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>103</sup> Melinda Miles, “Haiti Brief on Political Situation: March 1 2012,” *Let Haiti Live.org*; <http://www.lethaitilive.org/news-english/2012/3/2/haiti-brief-on-political-situation-march-1-2012.html>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

The Canadian Forces' involvement in Haiti after the Cold War really commenced in 2004 with the deployment of a task force to assist in quelling the violence surrounding the ouster of Aristide from the presidency.<sup>104</sup> A small Canadian Forces presence was maintained through the contribution of a small contingent of staff officers to assist in the UN Multinational Forces' headquarters right through until present day.<sup>105</sup> In addition to this, the Canadian Forces have been called upon in both 2008 and 2010 to provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of both natural disasters where significant resources were mobilized to assist the Haitian people. The military contributions were short and focused on the relief of suffering in the aftermath of these terrible events.<sup>106, 107</sup>

Despite the considerable effort and time of the international community, Haiti has seen little improvement in its failed state ranking within the Failed State Index. It has worsened relative to other states both in terms of its raw score and in its ranking having moved from 10<sup>th</sup> to 5<sup>th</sup> on the list and from a raw score of 99.2 to 108 between 2005 and 2011.<sup>108, 109</sup> This worsening situation in Haiti seems at odds with the level of support from the international community.

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<sup>104</sup> Department of National Defence, "Operation HALO - CF Commitment to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)"; <http://www.cefcom-comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/halo/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>105</sup> Department of National Defence, "Operation HAMLET"; <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/hamlet/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>106</sup> Department of National Defence, "Operation HORATIO"; <http://www.cefcom-comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/horatio/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>107</sup> Department of National Defence, "Operation HESTIA and Joint Task Force Haiti,"; <http://www.cefcom-comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/hestia-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.



## Analysis

Haiti is the “largest recipient of Canadian long-term development assistance in the Americas.”<sup>110</sup> Canada has consistently come to the aid of Haiti in participating in UN missions as well. Haiti has had an ongoing international presence of both civilians and military intent on assisting them to create a stable and secure environment as well as solidify the rule of law and human rights within the country and yet the country has encountered consistent setbacks not only from the natural disasters that it incurred in 2008 and 2010 but from its own propensity for political instability and corruption. From the perspective of the Failed State Index, both Haiti’s position and score have worsened despite the efforts of the international community and any supporting CF efforts. A of comparison Haiti’s scores are provided below.

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<sup>108</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, “Failed State Index 2005,” *Foreign Policy Magazine*, (1 July 2005); [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/07/01/the\\_failed\\_states\\_index\\_2005?page=0,1](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/07/01/the_failed_states_index_2005?page=0,1); Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>109</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, “2011 Failed State Index.”

<sup>110</sup> Department of National Defence, “Operation HORATIO”; <http://www.cefcom-comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/horatio/index-eng.asp>.

## FSI Score Comparison for Haiti

	Demographic Pressures	Refugees and displaced persons	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Economic Decline	Delegitimaton of State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External intervention
2005	8.8	8.0	7.7	3.4	9.0	8.1	9.4	9.8	8.7	7.8	8.5	10.0
2011	10.0	9.2	7.3	8.9	8.8	9.2	9.4	10.0	8.0	8.4	8.8	10.0
+/-*	- 1.2	-1.2	+4	-5.5	+0.2	-1.1	0.0	-0.2	+0.7	-0.6	-0.3	0.0

Figure 5-2<sup>111,112</sup>

\* (+) indicates an improvement as lower scores are better within the FSI.

There are easily explainable reasons for some of the declining scores seen above in the table. Given the devastation caused by successive natural disasters in 2008 and 2010, there is little doubt that any country would have been worse off in many areas. This is even truer given the small size of Haiti and the relative percentage impact of a natural disaster on both its land mass and population. This can at least provide reasonable explanation for the decreased scores in refugees, human flight, economic development, economic decline and public services.

The unfortunate part is that the scores for the security apparatus and factionalized elites have not improved but have worsened in the intervening time period. This is especially disheartening given the emphasis that the UN missions have placed on the professionalization of the police service, the rule of law and human rights. Over and above the devastation of the hurricanes and the 2010 earthquake Haiti suffers from a

<sup>111</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2005."

<sup>112</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2011."

demographic time bomb with a rapidly increasing population competing for rapidly declining natural resources in a country that has been almost completely deforested and which is suffering from massive topsoil erosion.<sup>113</sup> Cultural and racial divides continue to exacerbate the political life of the country, increased violence is occurring with arsons of businesses and there are alarming signs of a reforming military not linked to the government.<sup>114</sup> From a Canadian perspective, there is unquestionably a moral impetus to stop suffering which is seen amongst the various Canadian deployments to Haiti since 2004. While this may relieve short term suffering, the UN's return on investment in Haiti from a failed/failing state view has been less than optimal. While the multinational forces that Canada participated in were successful in the short term in restoring democracy and the rule of law, their lasting effect is questionable.

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<sup>113</sup> Jean-Germain Gros, "Haiti: The Political Economy and Sociology of Decay and Renewal," 217.

<sup>114</sup> Melinda Miles, "Haiti Brief on Political Situation: March 1 2012."

## **CASE STUDY #2 – BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (FORMER YUGOSLAVIA)**

### **Background**

The breakup of the Yugoslavia began 25 June 1991 with the declaration by Slovenian and Croatian members of the Yugoslavian National Assembly of the intent of their republics to separate.<sup>115</sup> Following this event, the breakup of the former Yugoslavia continued with the establishment of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and eventually the partition of Kosovo from the Serbian State. The UN, NATO and the EU all took part in various international missions between 1991 and 2010. The establishment of Bosnia-Herzegovina was tied up in the fact that the boundaries of the new states were not consistent with the location of various ethnic enclaves. Adding to the mix was that the new states each espoused different religions with the Croats being predominantly catholic, the Serbians predominantly orthodox and the Bosnians being predominantly Muslim. Mass graves and ethnic cleansing occurred as the majorities sought to cleanse their lands of minority populations.

In 1992, the UN approved international military intervention with the formation of UNPROFOR as an “interim measure to create the conditions for peace and security

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<sup>115</sup> Department of National Defence, “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation BOLSTER”; <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=37&CdnOpId=37>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.”<sup>116</sup> Despite this intervention, the force was somewhat ineffective in halting the continued violence between the various parties for a long time. The international community would maintain an international presence within the former Yugoslavia on a massive scale, following up UNPROFOR with SFOR and then IFOR until 2004 with troop levels that approached 50,000 personnel. Even then, the European Community took over the mission with the formation of EUFOR which has continued external intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the current day.<sup>117, 118</sup>

The Canadian Forces involvement in the former Yugoslavia commenced with a small contingent of military observers in 1991 but expanded considerably in 1996 with the creation of IFOR and then SFOR when 1000 Canadian personnel were deployed to the area and all three services participated in the international intervention. Canada's contribution eventually reached a peak of 1300 personnel. The Canadian Forces were charged with the following tasks:

- establish freedom of movement throughout the area of operations;
- supervise the withdrawal and separation of previously warring factions and their heavy weapons;

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<sup>116</sup> United Nations, “Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR,” [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof\\_p.htm](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm); Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>117</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “SFOR: Stabilization Force,” <http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>118</sup> European Union. “EUFOR Fact Sheet,” [http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=134](http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=134); Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

- patrol cease fire lines;
- supervise the removal of land mines and unexploded ordnance;
- settle disputes and help with redeployment of UN personnel and equipment still in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- maintenance of a maritime blockade; and
- enforcement of a no-fly zone.

In 2004 it began to reduce its contributions, eventually withdrawing its remaining small contribution to EUFOR in 2010.<sup>119, 120, 121</sup>

The ranking of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the Failed State Index has seen marked improvement from when the UN mandate ended in 2004 until 2011. It has improved from 22<sup>nd</sup> on the list to 69<sup>th</sup> and its raw score has improved from 93.5 to 80.9.<sup>122, 123</sup> This improvement on the Index certainly paints a portrait of success even if it took

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<sup>119</sup> Department of National Defence, "Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation BOLSTER."

<sup>120</sup> Department of National Defence, "Operation Bronze," <http://www.cefc.comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/bronze/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>121</sup> Department of National Defence, "Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation HARMONY," <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpld=267&CdnOpld=315>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>122</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2005."

<sup>123</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2011."

over 20 years for it to be accomplished. The following section will provide an analysis of the reasons for this success.

## Analysis

### FSI Score Comparison for Bosnia-Herzegovina

	Demographic Pressures	Refugees and displaced persons	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Economic Decline	Delegitimization of State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External intervention
2005	7.0	8.0	8.6	5.7	9.0	5.7	8.5	6.0	7.3	9.0	8.7	10.0
2010	5.3	7.1	8.7	5.6	7.1	5.7	8.0	5.4	5.9	7.2	9.2	8.3
2011	5.0	6.8	8.4	5.9	6.8	5.2	7.6	5.0	6.1	7.0	9.2	8.0
+/-*	+2.0	+1.2	+0.2	-0.2	+2.2	+0.5	+0.9	+1.0	+1.2	+2.0	-0.5	+2.0

Figure 5-4<sup>124,125</sup>

\* (+) indicates an improvement as lower scores are better within the FSI. Comparison is between 2005 and 2011.

It is rather remarkable that Bosnia-Herzegovina has improved from 22<sup>nd</sup> to 69<sup>th</sup> on the Failed State Index between 2005 and 2011. Just as remarkably, there has been very little slippage between 2010 when most official support ended and 2011's index. While optimism may be premature, the improvement is important and the underlying reasons for that success need to be further examined given the failures in other states listed on the Failed State Index in which the international community has invested considerable time and effort as well, Haiti being only one. The successive handovers from the UN to

<sup>124</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2005."

<sup>125</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2011."

NATO to the EU kept interested parties in the troubled areas and contributed to the success. The Canadian military contribution was prolonged as it extend over 15 years in various forms and leadership.

Unfortunately, a large element of the success could be construed as a grand failure. From a failed/failing state perspective, it is clear that the former Yugoslavia failed so severely that not only did its constituent parts separate but each part proceed to conduct ethnic cleansing to rid itself of non-core ethnic and religious groups. The success therefore may be more due to the move towards homogenization of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina than it is to the international community. The only success was in holding the warring factions apart somewhat successfully from 1995 onwards such that they were each able to grow and develop without a need to resort to violence against their neighbors. This element is born out in the great decrease in demographic pressures.



## CASE STUDY #3 – AFGHANISTAN

### Background

In 2001, the terrorist organization Al Qaeda attacked the U.S. by hijacking airplanes and flying them into the Pentagon and the World Trade Center Towers in New York. A fourth plane was hijacked but was unsuccessful in its intended target of the White House. The US enacted NATO chapter VII and a coalition, under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom, was formed to oust the Afghan government (Taliban) and destroy Al Qaeda. This was collectively known as the War on Terror. After the ouster of the Taliban, international Forces stayed on to rebuild Afghanistan and prevent the Taliban from reassuming power.

Initially, from 2001 to 2005 there were two parallel international interventions in Afghanistan. One was the continuation of Op Enduring Freedom under the leadership of the American military and the other was the International Security Assistance Force which rapidly came under the leadership of NATO in 2003.<sup>126</sup> NATO has remained the leader of ISAF since this time to the present day. This resulted in a two pronged approach where Op Enduring Freedom continued to hunt down terrorists while ISAF became focused on developing a viable state government within Afghanistan. A third entity, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), was created “to assist the Afghan government and the people of Afghanistan in laying the foundations for

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<sup>126</sup> NATO, “International Security Assistance Force,” <http://www.isaf.nato.int/>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

sustainable peace and development in the country”.<sup>127</sup> It was only in 2010 that the UN mandate for the international effort was widened to support Afghan government with “security, governance and economic development, and regional cooperation” in accordance with international agreements. Then, in 2011, UN agencies and programs agreed on the following priorities:

- 1) peace, reconciliation and reintegration;
- 2) human rights protection and promotion;
- 3) sub-national governance and the rule of law;
- 4) maternal and newborn health; and
- 5) sustainable livelihoods.

Thus, despite the fact that the international intervention in Afghanistan had commenced in 2001 following the terrorist attacks on the U.S., the real business of trying to ensure that Afghanistan would be a viable state did not truly commence until much later.<sup>128</sup>

Canada has participated in all three of the international interventions in Afghanistan.<sup>129</sup> It provided a minor contribution to UNAMA but it continually provided military personnel without restrictions to both Op Enduring Freedom and subsequently ISAF from 2001 to 2011.<sup>130</sup> Originally, Canada provided an infantry battalion and maritime interdiction forces in the form of naval commitments from 2001 to 2005 at

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<sup>127</sup> United Nations, “UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan,” <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1742>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2012.

<sup>128</sup> United Nations, “UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.”

<sup>129</sup> Department of National Defence, “Past Operations,” <http://www.cefc.comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/pastops-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>130</sup> Department of National Defence, “Operation ACCIUS,” Internet; accessed 16 March 2012.

which point Canada agreed to take over certain responsibilities in the southern region of Afghanistan. It increased its contributions to include a military medical hospital, a provincial reconstruction team based in Kandahar, a Canadian Brigade group, Operational Mentor Liaison Teams for the purpose of assisting Afghan security forces, and an Air Wing.<sup>131</sup> Additionally, a Strategic Advisory Team was formed by 15 people, of whom twelve were military, to assist the Afghan government with “strategic planning, national development strategy, public administration reform and gender equity policy”.<sup>132</sup> This team existed from 2005 to 2008. It was very unique in that these are not normally military roles. Following the exit of Canadian Forces from Kandahar province, 950 troops were maintained within ISAF by Canada to assist in the training of Afghan security forces although their role has changed significantly. Their tasks include “development programming in education and health; advancing security, the rule of law and human rights, promoting regional diplomacy; and helping deliver humanitarian assistance.”<sup>133</sup> This agenda is more aligned with sustainable development but the willingness of the international community and Canada to continue their presence in Afghanistan is not unlimited.

In looking at the international intervention in terms of the status of Afghanistan on the Failed State Index, one learns the following. In 2005 when the index was created,

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<sup>131</sup> Department of National Defence, “Operation ATHENA,” <http://www.cefc.comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/athena/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>132</sup> Department of National Defence, “Operation ARGUS,” <http://www.cefc.comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/argus/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2012.

<sup>133</sup> Department of National Defence, “Operation ATTENTION,” <http://www.cefc.comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/attention/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

Afghanistan stood 11<sup>th</sup> on the index and had a raw score of 99.<sup>134</sup> In 2011, Afghanistan's position on the index had worsened to 7<sup>th</sup> relative to other failed or failing states and its score had worsened to 107.5.<sup>135</sup> This lack of success will be further analyzed in the following section.

## Analysis

### FSI Score Comparison for Afghanistan

	Demographic Pressures	Refugees and displaced persons	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Economic Decline	Delegitimization of State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External intervention
2005	9.0	8.0	8.0	7.4	8.8	7.5	8.1	8.1	7.9	8.2	8.0	10.0
2011	9.1	9.3	9.3	7.2	8.4	8.0	9.7	8.5	8.8	9.8	9.4	10.0
+/-*	-0.1	-1.3	-1.3	+0.2	+0.4	-0.5	-1.6	-0.4	-0.9	-1.6	-1.4	0.0

Figure 5-8<sup>136,137</sup>

\* (+) indicates an improvement as lower scores are better within the FSI.

A 2007 BBC poll of Afghanis found that 72% of the population believe the government is corrupt.<sup>138</sup> It is plausible that this figure would be even greater today

<sup>134</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2005."

<sup>135</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2011."

<sup>136</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2005."

<sup>137</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2011."

<sup>138</sup> John W. Warnock, *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*, (Halifax: Fernwood, 2008), 164.

given that the legitimacy of the government on the FSI scale has almost reached the maximum. There is a clear indication by looking at the collective differentials of the factionalized elite, government legitimacy and security apparatus indicators between 2005 and 2011, that the current Afghan government is not only seen as corrupt but that it is seeking to perpetuate itself at the cost of the Afghan people given that the security apparatus indicator is almost at the maximum worst level as well. It is also entirely plausible that the increase in the group grievance indicator is at least partially the result of the government shoring up support amongst its key followers and supporters prior to the anticipated departure of the bulk of international military forces by 2014. This trend has to be disheartening for the international community that has spent so much time, effort and resources within the country.

It is clear from the chart above that despite the billions of dollars that Canada and other nations have poured into Afghanistan that the situation is worse today than it was before the campaign began. The proportion of military spending to spending on development and diplomacy has been greatly in favour of the military with a ratio of around 10 to 1 between 2001 and 2007. According to DFAIT, Canada's priorities in Afghanistan are the following:

- investing in the future of Afghan children and youth through development programming in education and health, and improving the lives of Afghans, especially women and children;

- advancing security, the rule of law and human rights, including the provision of up to 950 military trainers, their support personnel and approximately 45 Canadian civilian police to support and train Afghan National Security Forces;
- promoting regional diplomacy; and
- helping to deliver humanitarian assistance.<sup>139</sup>

From a strictly humanitarian and security viewpoint, there is little to fault in the stated goals of the Canadian government or UNAMA. The difficulty lies in that the FSI points to a problem with the legitimacy of the government and the increased discord between the constituent groups that make up the general population and none of the four goals above seek to address these issues. Afghanistan is a tribal society with Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaks, Turkmen and Balochs representing different peoples.<sup>140</sup> The largest group, the Pashtuns, represent 42% of the population but even within the Pashtuns, each Pashtun tribe is relatively autonomous, fragmentary and self-

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<sup>139</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada's Approach in Afghanistan," <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/approach-approche/index.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2012.

<sup>140</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Afghanistan," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2012.

regulating.<sup>141,142</sup> The groupings come together only so far as the charisma and leadership of any one individual can achieve and this is often for only so long as that leader can hold the various factions within his group together.<sup>143</sup> This constant rising and falling of leaders is almost organic in nature and does not subscribe to the precise timetables of a regular election cycle. A rigid, imposed government from above, to which not everyone subscribes, is antithetical to the tribal nature of the largest tribal/ethnic group within the country. It is little wonder then that over time the legitimacy of the Karzai government has disintegrated. It is vexing that the international community has this information available to it, but has not tried to assist the Afghanis in coming up with a governing structure that suits their natural style of governance at the national level instead of propping up a longstanding government that appears doomed to failure.

## **SUMMARY**

Within this chapter, three different countries in which Canadian Forces have been involved have been looked at in terms of the international missions associated with them, Canada's military operations within the countries and the Failed State Index results for each of the countries over time to determine if there has been any progress made. In two of the three cases, Haiti and Afghanistan, not only was there no marked improvement in

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<sup>141</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Afghanistan."

<sup>142</sup> Antonio Giustozzi & Noor Ullah, "'Tribes' and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005," *Crisis States Research Papers No. 2*, (September 2006), 2-4; <https://www.dfid.gov.uk/R4D/PDF/Outputs/CrisisStates/wp7.2.pdf>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2012.

<sup>143</sup> Giustozzi & Ullah, "'Tribes' and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005," 4.

the Failed State Index score for each country, there was a notable increase. In the third country that was looked at, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country did show a considerable degree of improvement with a decreased score.

In looking at the three states in question to determine why one has seen improvement and the other two have not, it is instructive to look at the differences in how international military, diplomatic and development efforts were applied. First in the case of Bosnia –Herzegovina, it did not exist prior to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia into separate entities. The former Yugoslavia could not be salvaged and the states that formed out of it were formed along the lines of groups that could not ultimately get along. Haiti and Afghanistan have not been allowed to break up into smaller parts along tribal, racial or other differentiators.



## CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION

Stabilization operations have been referred to as the “3 Block War” in military parlance, referring to the need to be able to adapt and carry out the full spectrum of military operations within the same operational or even tactical environment. This paradigm has also been accepted by the Canadian government in its 2005 International Policy Statement. At the same time, nations have referred to the “3 Ds” of defence, diplomacy and development as the keys to arresting the chaos contained within a failed or failing state from a strategic viewpoint. Within the International Policy Statement, failed and failing states are mentioned as posing a dual challenge in that the suffering associated with them is an “affront to Canadian values” and it also states that they “plant the seeds of threats to regional and global security.”<sup>144</sup> Thus within this paper attention will now start to focus on the utility of military intervention in both confronting challenges to “Canadian values” and preventing threats to regional and global security.

### THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS

In looking at the Failed State Index review conducted in Chapter 2, as well as the case studies in Chapter 5, it is clear that regardless of the indicator that is looked at, there is a great deal of importance that must be placed on dealing with perceived and/or real disparity between groups whether they are of a religious, ethnic, tribal or any other nature. The only real success story amongst the case studies reviewed in this paper is that

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<sup>144</sup> Carment, “Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States,” 1.

seen in the former Yugoslavia and, as previously mentioned, much of that success can be attributed to the international community's acquiescence to the facts on the ground that the various parties to the conflict should be separated. The international community focused on keeping them apart until normalcy and peace could take hold vice trying to force them to make it work together. Contrast this with Afghanistan, where tribal factions are being expected to subsume themselves within a political structure that is not consistent with their historical organizational politics and it is difficult to see anything but an inevitable conflict once the international community withdraws.

### **INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM STASIS VS. CHAOS**

Another important factor in assessing failed states and the international community's ability to effect positive change is the issue of demographics and resources. In looking at Haiti, there is a clear reason that it is in dire straits above and beyond its political instability and that is the fact that it does not have the natural resources required to support its population of today, let alone its population of tomorrow. No amount of development can change this fact. The equation is stark in its simplicity. If one cannot increase the amount of resources necessary to sustain the population, only a decrease in population can rectify the situation. Prior to the existence of the Westphalian notion of the state, there have been constant migrations of peoples. Whether it was the prehistoric movement of humans out of Africa or the closeness of the Sanskrit, Gaelic and Italic languages, humanity has constantly shifted to address conflict and lack of resources.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> T. G. E. Powell, "Celtic Origins: A Stage in the Enquiry," in *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* Vol. 78, No. 1/2 (1948), 71-79;

The hardening of borders in modern times has left little opportunity for this to occur and Haiti is a prime example of the result, a fecund people with no options to improve their lot.

## **CANADA'S LIMITED REACH**

One of the problems that Canada faces and will continue to face in its approach to assisting international efforts to build up failed or failing states is that it will almost inevitably operate militarily at the tactical and operational levels while the strategic level decision making will be dominated by nations such as the US and international coalitions such as NATO or the UN. This fact can lead to situations where Canadian efforts may be successful at the tactical and/or operational level but are simply unsustainable because the effort at the strategic level is not effective. Compounding this issue is that the United States, with its new National Security Policy is moving away from the use of its forces for stabilization operations.<sup>146</sup> Whether this is due to budgetary constraints, US weariness of the protracted struggles it has undertaken to stabilize Iraq and now Afghanistan with no guarantee of long term success or the spectre of a new international order in which it is not the sole superpower, it means that Canada will find it increasingly

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<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2844525?uid=20741&uid=3739448&uid=2&uid=3737720&uid=3&uid=20738&uid=67&uid=62&sid=56002365863>; [journal online]; Internet; accessed 6 April 2012.

<sup>146</sup> John A. Tirpak, "Leaner force, just as mean?; Kansas bait and switch?; Not the end of the world .... A Postwar Defense Strategy," *Air-Force Magazine.com*, (February 2012); <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/February%202012/0212watch.aspx>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2012.

difficult to adhere to the altruistic “Canadian values” that it has espoused in its International Policy Statement.<sup>147</sup>

The case studies in Chapter 5 point to the difficulties the international community has in achieving success through direct intervention in a failed or failing state. Over and above the case studies looked at in this paper, the situation in Somalia, Sudan amongst others that figure prominently in the Failed State index point to that very fact as well. While there is value in helping the individuals suffering from the resultant problems inherent in failed states for purely humanitarian purposes, there should be no illusions that this type of aid has any long term impact in improving the overall situation within a given failed state. One fights against inertia at one’s own peril.

## **REVIEW OF FINDINGS**

This paper has presented the issue of failed and/or failing states in the context of the utility of external military intervention in effecting positive and lasting peace and stability. It has provided definitions of what constitutes a failed state, reviewed the indicators of failure contained within the Failed State Index, contemplated military actions that could be applied in support of improving a state’s score based on the dynamics of each indicator and discussed the various types of military intervention in failed or failing states from the non-kinetic to the kinetic.

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<sup>147</sup> David Carment, “Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States,” 7.

The focus of the paper then shifted from the general to the specific in reviewing three instances where the CF, as part of the international community, was used to intervene in the affairs of a failed or failing state to assist in improving peace and stability. The three case studies that were looked at were Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan. Each case study reviewed both the UN mandate and the CF's contribution to it for the country in question and any subsequent changes. The political reasoning and/or strategy were looked at if they had been documented or commented on in the aftermath of the intervention. The success of external military intervention in achieving the mandate was looked at as well as whether or not it had any real or lasting impact. An assessment was then put forth as to why success or failure resulted from the intervention.

The results of the case studies were used to determine the usefulness of external military intervention in assisting failed or failing states. This in turn laid the groundwork for a determination of external military effectiveness in improving peace and stability within a failed state and the point at which that effectiveness ends. This determination presents planning input for policy advisors and decision makers to understand the capabilities and limitations of using a military force to achieve strategic objectives within failed or failing states.

This paper first determined that the CF's definition of a failed or failing state is consistent with both the original definition put forth by Weber and *Foreign Policy Magazine* and The Fund for Peace's Failed State Index. It drew the conclusion that the indicators used to determine where a country lies on the Failed State Index are ultimately

benchmarked against the effect it has on creating divisions and cleavages within a society whether it is based on race, religion, economic advantage or ability to be heard in the political realm.

The case studies that were reviewed were diverse both in time, space and military approaches and yet the end results were much the same from a military perspective. It was made clear that military intervention alone, while useful in establishing the secure conditions necessary for development and growth to occur, cannot achieve lasting peace and stability. It will only postpone the failure that will inevitably occur without other mechanisms. In the one case where failure may be seen to have been averted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the reality is that Bosnia-Herzegovina exists due to the failure of the Yugoslavian state and its various constituent groups to achieve a peaceful and lasting end to their disagreements. The creation of a new country for an aggrieved group cannot be seen as success in preventing a state from failure as fragmentation of the world's countries is not a desirable end state, especially for a country such as Canada which must be conscious of the precedent that is being set with respect to its own internal disputes.

It is clear that policy makers and decision makers do not fully understand the limitations of the CF in effecting positive change within a failed or failing state. The CF is particularly useful in establishing security within a state as long as the mandate it is given is robust. It can ensure the safety of humanitarian assistance work and the distribution of food stuffs to its intended recipients. The fact that external military intervention often only occurs at a point where inaction is unacceptable for political

reasons is a hindrance but it is not the largest issue. Militaries are simply not designed to create an effective government within a foreign state nor is it conceivable to a modern democracy that its military would be used to “colonize” a foreign country in order to restore a stable government to power. It is simply not the right mechanism to bring groups that have difficulty co-existing within a given space and time. It is, however, often a vital and necessary tool to bring about the secure environment and proverbial “breathing space” that is required for any follow-on developmental and diplomatic efforts to be effective in the long term. Unfortunately, given the size and cost of military deployments, governments have had outsized and unrealistic expectations of what can be achieved militarily in these circumstances. The gap between militaries’ ability to ensure security and the creation of a legitimate government through diplomatic and developmental efforts continue to remain largely unfilled.

This paper has shown that external military intervention has very specific and limited utility in ameliorating the condition of failed/failing states based on the results achieved in three significant instances of external military intervention in failed or failing states. It has shown that the utility of the external military involvement is limited to establishing security for the provision of Humanitarian Aid and the operation of OGDs in medium to high risk environments, and ultimately setting the conditions necessary for development to occur. Militaries are useful in setting up the preconditions for successful intervention but are not an appropriate mechanism to conduct further development which will increase stability, achieve peace and create an effective state. The use of external military intervention alone in a failed/failing state will not lead to the successful

resurrection of a state from failure. Military intervention is only a means to allow other methods of intervention the chance to succeed through the creation of an environment in which diplomatic and development efforts can be achieved.



## Appendix 1 - Timeline of International Missions and Canadian Support to Haiti

### International Missions & Key events 1989 – Present (Name, Mandate, Duration)

1) ONUVEH -1990 -1991 – UN Observer group for the verification of elections in Haiti 1990-91 following the request of the provisional government.

1991 elections held, Jean Bertrand Aristide elected President.

- Military Coup led by Raoul General Cedras. Coup condemned by Organization of American States, UN. Oil and arms embargo implemented.

2) MICIVIH (UN Civilian Mission in Haiti) -1993-96 – established to monitor human rights. Limited impact.

July 1993 - Governor's Island Agreement signed allowing for return of President Aristide.

93-94- Human rights deterioration attributed to Haitian military. Extrajudicial execution, enforced disappearance, torture and arbitrary arrest and rape as a tool of political repression. Mission forced to leave on two occasions in 93 and 94 due to security of personnel and withdrawal of recognition by Haitian Military.

1994 – President Aristide returns and mission re-enters Haiti.

- Human rights situation improves. Ill trained police force and ineffective judicial system cited as impediments for further improvements.

- Mission continues to promote and work on establishing infrastructure and institutions to promote human rights.

1995 – New Parliamentary elections held. Coalition led by President Aristide forms government.

3) UNMIH – (UN Mission in Haiti) -1993- 96 – established to modernize Haitian armed forces and create new police force. Embargo lifted.

1993 - UNMIH leaves Haiti in, Mandate undermined by non-compliance of military.

- Embargo re-established and strengthened to include all trade minus food and medical supplies.

1995 – UNMIH takes over from Multinational Force. Mandated to create secure and stable environment.

4) Multinational Force - Jul 94 - 1995 – UN Security Council authorizes Multinational Force led by US and mandated to use all means necessary to effect departure of military rule and return the country to democratic rule.

September 1994 – Under pressure from UN, Haiti’s military leaders leave and arrangements are made for new elections.

-Multinational Force deploys to Haiti comprised of 20,000 personnel from 28 nations.

1995 – Multinational Force relieved by UNMIH.

5) UNSMIH (UN Support Mission in Haiti) –1996-97 – mandated to create safe and secure environment, train police force and co-ordinate infrastructure and institution building. (300 police officers and 500 troops)

1996 – First peaceful transfer of power between Presidents in Haitian history. President René Préval forms government.

6) UNTMIH (UN Transition Mission in Haiti) - 1997 – mandated to continue professionalization of Haitian Police Force. (250 police and 50 military)

7) MINOPUH (UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti) - 1997-2000 - mandated to assist Haiti in professionalization of its police forces with focus on supervision and special units. (300 Police and 200+ civilian support staff)

2000 – Jean-Bertrand Aristide re-elected as President. Second successful transfer of power without violence.

2000-2004 – Some successes developmentally but political crisis was a constant.

Feb 2004 – President Aristide resigns amidst widespread violence. Boniface Alexandre, President of Supreme Court sworn in as interim President.

8) MIF (Multinational Interim Force) -2004 – mandated to contribute to a secure and stable environment, facilitate aid distribution and assist Haiti in maintenance of law and order as well as human rights over 3 month period. (2700 personnel)

9) MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) - 2004 -present – mandated to ensure secure and stable environment; assist in reforming national police, disarmament; restore and maintain rule of law, human rights and support the transitional government. (6700 military, 1622 police, 700 UN civilians, 1000 local staff)

2006 – President René Préval re-elected as President after successful elections.

- Positive progress made but Haiti still a weak state.

2008 – Haiti struck by 4 successive hurricanes.

12 Jan 2010 – Massive Earthquake strikes Haiti. 220,000 deaths, thousands injured and 1.5 million left homeless. MINUSTAH hit hard organizationally.

-additional 680 police authorized to assist in building up Haitian police force. Military force ceiling increased to 8940.

20 March 2011 – Election held. Michel Martelly elected President. MINUSTAH force reduced in size.

February 2012 – Haitian Prime Minister resigns. Signs point to political crisis once again with President Martelly overstepping constitutional boundaries of his position.

### **CF Operations**

Task Force Haiti (Mar – Jun 2004) – CF contribution to MIF for duration of 90 day mandate. Transitioned to MINUSTAH upon UN request. Mandate mirrored that of MIF.

500 personnel, 6 Griffon CH-146 helicopters.

OP HALO (2004) – CF Operation in support of MINUSTAH from June 2004 until mid-August 2004.

OP HORATIO (Aug 2008) - Canadian operation in support of humanitarian assistance following 4 hurricanes that struck Haiti.

Resources: Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team (ISST) included CF Joint HQ personnel. 1 frigate with embarked helicopter.

- Forces conducted food stuff deliveries to region south of capital.

OP HAMLET - Canadian Contribution to MINUSTAH. Canadian mandate is to support MINUSTAH.

Resources: 5 personnel. Senior is Chief of Staff to the Force Commander.  
- Provides staff assistance to MINUSTAH.

Op HESTIA (Jan – Apr 2010) - Canadian humanitarian response following devastating Earthquake.

Resources: Headquarters, 1 Destroyer, 1 Frigate, 2 Sea King helicopters, 6 Griffon Helicopters, Operational and Tactical Airlift, 1 Battalion Group (3 R22eR), Disaster Assistance Response Team, Field Hospital, Village Medical Outreach Teams, Task Force Support Element.

- Tasks included Distribution of Humanitarian Aid, Health Care, Co-ord and Security of humanitarian aid distribution, Water purification, Engineering/Construction.

**Failed State Index Ranking & Score Pre-Intervention (or at start of FSI in 2005)**

10<sup>th</sup> (99.2) (2005)

**Failed State Index Ranking & Score Post Intervention**

N/A, MINUSTAH still ongoing.

**Failed State Index Ranking & Score 2011**

5<sup>th</sup> (108)

148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162

<sup>148</sup> United Nations, *Haiti: Background*; <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihbackgr1.html>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>149</sup> United Nations, "Three Years of Defending Human Rights," (September 1995); <http://www.un.org/rights/micivih/rapports/3years.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>150</sup> United Nations, "Haiti Mandat," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unsmihmandate.html>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>151</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti"; <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untmih.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>152</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Police Mission in Haiti"; <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/miponuh.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>153</sup> United Nations, "Security Council authorizes three-month Multinational Interim Force for Haiti"; <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=9926&Cr=Haiti>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>154</sup> United Nations, "MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti"; <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>155</sup> United Nations, "MINUSTAH Background"; <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>156</sup> Melinda Miles, "Haiti Brief on Political Situation: March 1 2012," *Let Haiti Live.org*; <http://www.lethaitilive.org/news-english/2012/3/2/haiti-brief-on-political-situation-march-1-2012.html>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>157</sup> Department of National Defence, "Operation HALO - CF Commitment to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)"; <http://www.cefcom-comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/halo/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>158</sup> Department of National Defence, "Operation HORATIO"; <http://www.cefcom-comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/horatio/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>159</sup> Department of National Defence, "Operation HESTIA and Joint Task Force Haiti,"; <http://www.cefcom-comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/hestia-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>160</sup> Department of National Defence, "Operation HAMLET"; <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/hamlet/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>161</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2005."

<sup>162</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "2011 Failed State Index."



## Appendix 2 -Timeline of International Missions and Canadian Support to Bosnia-Herzegovina

<b>International Missions &amp; Key events 1989 – Present (Name, Mandate, Duration)</b>
<p>European Community Monitoring Mission in the Former Yugoslavia (ECCMY) -</p> <p>25 June 1991- Slovenia and Croatia announce plans to separate from Yugoslavia.</p> <p>- Yugoslav forces enter Slovenia and are repulsed by Slovenian forces.</p> <p>7 Jul 91 – Cease fire signed and ECCMY observers enter country.</p>
<p>United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) -1992-1995 – “interim measure to create the conditions for peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.” The mandate of UNPROFOR was to demilitarize three UN Protected Areas in Croatia and protect the people there from attack. It was enlarged to include monitoring in other areas of Croatia and the control of exit and entry of people and trade into and out of the UN Protected Areas.</p> <p>- 38,599 military personnel, including 684 United Nations military observers; 803 police, 4,632 civilian staff.</p> <p>June 1992 – Mandate expanded to Bosnia-Herzegovina to “ensure the security and functioning of the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to that city and its environs.”</p> <p>September 1992 – Mandated “to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross so requested.”</p> <p>- Additionally, “the Force monitored the "no-fly" zone, banning all military flights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the United Nations "safe areas" established by the Security Council around five Bosnian towns and the city of Sarajevo.”</p> <p>1994 – Commenced monitoring cease fire agreement between Croats and Croat Serbs after violence between the groups in 93.</p> <p>February 1994- commenced monitoring of cease-fire agreement between Bosnian</p>

Government and Bosnian Croat forces.

1 January 1995 – commenced monitoring cease-fire arrangements between Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs forces.

United Nations Confidence Restoration Organization (UNCRO) -1995 – “mandate to demilitarize and disarm UN Protected Areas (UNPAs); restore normal civil authority to UNPAs; return displaced persons their homes in UNPAs; and monitor border crossing points in the Krajina Region.”

August 1995 – Croatia successfully invades and takes over Krajina and Western Slavonia. Eastern Slavonia continues to fall under UNCRO mandate.

15 Jan 96 – UNCRO mandate ends with signing of Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Barania and Western Sirmium between Croatia and Croatian Serb leadership.

United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) (1995-2002) – created an International Police Task Force and Civilian office in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

International Force (IFOR) – 1996 – Mandated to ensure compliance with the military terms of the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Stabilisation Force (SFOR) - 1996-2004 – Mandated to deter hostilities, stabilize the peace, contribute to secure environment through presence operations, support key civil implementation organizations and progress towards peace without NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

European Union Force (EUFOR) -2004-present – mandated to provide a military presence to contribute to a safe and secure environment, deny conditions for a resumption of violence, and manage any residual aspect of the Dayton accords in BiH. Originally comprised of 7000 military personnel.

### **CF Operations**

Op BOLSTER (1991-94) – Military Observer mission. 12 personnel (10 observers). Tasked with assisting ECMMY in monitoring cease fire. Canadians perform in disproportionate number of supervisory positions.

Op HARMONY (1995) –mandated as part of UNCRO to “demilitarize and disarm UN Protected Areas (UNPAs); restore normal civil authority to UNPAs; return displaced persons their homes in UNPAs; and monitor border crossing points in the Krajina Region.”



Resources: Canadian Infantry Battalion Group

-Despite buildup of tensions between Serb and Croat Forces, Canadians lack mandate to intervene and must watch invasion of Krajina occur.

Op ALLIANCE (1996) – (NATO) IFOR - Canada deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of IFOR which was responsible for ensuring compliance with the military terms of the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Resources: 1000 personnel (armoured reconnaissance squadron, an infantry company, an engineer squadron, a national support element, an advanced surgical centre and a military police platoon.) Brigade HQ and Signals for Multinational Force and Canadian Multinational Brigade.

Tasks – establish freedom of movement throughout the area of operations,

- supervise the withdrawal and separation of previously warring factions and their heavy weapons
- patrol cease fire lines
- supervise the removal of land mines and unexploded ordnance
- settle disputes and help with redeployment of UN personnel and equipment still in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

NATO Op SHARP GUARD – Canada contributed to maritime blockade.

NATO Op DECISIVE MANOEUVRE – Canada contributed to enforcement of “No-Fly Zone” in the region.

Op PALLADIUM (1995-2004) – Canadian Contribution to SFOR.

Resources: 1,300 personnel: an infantry battalion group with tactical helicopter support; an armoured reconnaissance squadron; an engineer squadron; an administrative company; a National Support Element; and a National Command Element.

-“Over the years, as the security situation improved and institutions of government took hold in Bosnia-Herzegovina, SFOR - including its Canadian contingent - gradually decreased in size while adjusting its capabilities to help the Bosnian people rebuild their society and its infrastructure.”

Op BRONZE (2004-2010) – Canadian mission in support of NATO HQ Sarajevo (NHQS). Canada provided HQ staff within NHQS. Assisted in transition of peace

support operation from NATO SFOR to EUFOR.
<b>Failed State Index Ranking &amp; Score Pre-Intervention (or at start of FSI in 2005)</b>
22 <sup>nd</sup> (93.5) (2005)
<b>Failed State Index Ranking &amp; Score Post Intervention (2010)</b>
60 <sup>th</sup> (83.5)
<b>Failed State Index Ranking &amp; Score 2011</b>
69 <sup>th</sup> (80.9)

163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170

<sup>163</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2005."

<sup>164</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2011."

<sup>165</sup> Department of National Defence, "Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation BOLSTER."

<sup>166</sup> Department of National Defence, "Operation Bronze," <http://www.cefcom-comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/bronze/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>167</sup> Department of National Defence, "Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation HARMONY," <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=267&CdnOpId=315>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>168</sup> United Nations, "Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR," [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof\\_p.htm](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm); Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>169</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "SFOR: Stabilization Force," <http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>170</sup> European Union. "EUFOR Fact Sheet," [http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=134](http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=134); Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

### Appendix 3 - Timeline of International Missions and Canadian Support to Afghanistan

<b>International Missions &amp; Key events 1989 – Present (Name, Mandate, Duration)</b>
<p>International Campaign against terror (US Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) (2001-2005) – US led coalition to defeat the Taliban government of Afghanistan which was supporting Al Qaeda terrorist training up to and after the attacks on the U.S. World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. It carried on as a parallel operation to ISAF.</p> <p>International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (2001-present) “mandate to maintain security in and around Kabul so employees of the Afghan Interim Authority (the body governing Afghanistan under the terms of the Bonn Agreement) and the United Nations could operate in a secure environment.”</p> <p>2002 - Loya Jirga established Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Harmid Karzai appointed interim President.</p> <p>2003 – ISAF becomes NATO mission.</p> <p>2004 – Canadian LGen. Rick Hillier appointed ISAF Commander for six month period.</p> <p>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (2002-present) - “is a political mission established by the Security Council in 2002 at the request of the Government to assist it and the people of Afghanistan in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development in the country.”</p> <p>2010 – Further mandated to support Afghan government with “security, governance and economic development, and regional cooperation” in accordance with international agreements.</p> <p>2011 – Priorities agreed to by all UN agencies and programs: “1) peace, reconciliation and reintegration; 2) human rights protection and promotion; 3) sub-national governance and the rule of law; 4) maternal and newborn health; and 5) sustainable livelihoods.”</p>
<b>CF Operations</b>
<p>OP ACCIUS (Nov 02 – Jun 2005) – Support to UNAMA. Canada contributed two officers to the Military Advisor unit within UNAMA.</p>
<p>OP APOLLO (October 2001-October 2003) CF operations in support of international</p>

campaign against terrorism.

OP ATHENA (Jul 2003- Dec 2011) – Canada’s Contribution to ISAF. Phase I was a peace- support mission in Kabul until end 2005. Phase II started in early 2006 and was predominantly a combat mission in Kandahar.

Phase I resources: 1 Infantry Battalion Group

Phase II resources: Role 3 Medical Hospital, Kandahar PRT, Canadian Brigade group, Operational Mentor Liaison Teams, Air Wing. (approx. 2600 pers.)

OP ARGUS (Sep 05- August 08) – Strategic Advisor Team to Afghan Government mandated “to provide direct planning support to government ministries and working groups responsible for development and governance.”

Assets: 15 military and civilians

-a small command and support element;

-two teams of strategic planners;

-a defence analyst;

-a strategic communications advisor; and

-a development expert.

Tasks: -assist Canadian Ambassador

- assist Afghan ministries in strategic planning

- assist Afghan government with national development strategy

- assist Afghan government with public administration reform

- assist with Afghan gender equity policy

OP ATTENTION (2011-present) – Canada shifted its focus to the NATO Training Mission- Afghanistan (NATM-A) and the training of the Afghan Army and Police Forces respectively. NATM-A

Resources – 950 trainers, National Command and Support Element

Key Canadian tasks - development programming in education and health;

- “advancing security, the rule of law and human rights, including through the provision of up to 950 trainers for Afghan national security forces”;

- “promoting regional diplomacy”; and - “helping deliver humanitarian assistance.”
<b>Failed State Index Ranking &amp; Score Pre-Intervention (or at start of FSI in 2005)</b>
11 <sup>th</sup> (99.0) (2005)
<b>Failed State Index Ranking &amp; Score Post Intervention</b>
N/A (Intervention ongoing)
<b>Failed State Index Ranking &amp; Score 2011</b>
7 <sup>th</sup> (107.5)

171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179

<sup>171</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, “Failed State Index 2005.”

<sup>172</sup> Foreign Policy Magazine and The Fund for Peace, “Failed State Index 2011.”

<sup>173</sup> Department of National Defence, “Past Operations,” <http://www.cefcocomfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/pastops-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>174</sup> Department of National Defence, “Operation ATTENTION,” <http://www.cefcocomfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/attention/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>175</sup> Department of National Defence, “Operation ATHENA,” <http://www.cefcocomfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/athena/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>176</sup> NATO, “International Security Assistance Force,” <http://www.isaf.nato.int/>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2012.

<sup>177</sup> Department of National Defence, “Operation ARGUS,” <http://www.cefcocomfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/argus/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2012.

<sup>178</sup> United Nations, “UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan,” <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1742>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2012.

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