

Canadian
Forces
College

Collège
des
Forces
Canadiennes



AN UNNATURAL OR ESSENTIAL PROCESS? THE WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO MAJOR EVENTS PLANNING IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND THE CARIBBEAN

Lieutenant Colonel Darnley Wyke

JCSP 37

Master of Defence Studies

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2011.

PCEMI 37

Maîtrise en études de la défense

Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2011.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 37 - PCEMI 37

Master of Defence Studies

AN UNNATURAL OR ESSENTIAL PROCESS?

The Whole-of-Government Approach to

Major Events Planning in Trinidad and Tobago and the Caribbean

By Lieutenant Colonel Darnley Wyke

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

Word Count: # 19,356

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Compte de mots : # 19,356

CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations	3-4
List of Figures	
Figure 1.1: Best Practice Whole-of-Government	20
Abstract	5
Chapter	
Introduction	6
Methodology	9
1. Definition of Whole-of-government approach (WGA)	12
2. Planning in Trinidad and Tobago	29
3. Formal adoption of the WGA	59
4. The Way Forward	74
Bibliography	82

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Allied Forces Humanitarian Exercise/ Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias 2011	FAHUM 2011
Cricket World Cup 2007	CWC 2007
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 2009	CHOGM2009
Caribbean Community	CARICOM
Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency	CDERA
Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive	CBRNE
Customs and Excise Division	C&E Div
Fifth Summit of the Americas 2009	VSOA 2009
Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago	GOTT
Heads of State	HOS
Immigration Division	IM Div
International Cricket Council	ICC
Joint Regional Communication Centre	JRCC
Joint Inter-agency Multi-national Public	JIMP
Ministry of National Security	MNS
Memorandum of Understanding	MOU
National Operations Centre	NOC
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States	OECS
Other Government Agencies	OGAs
Other Government Departments	OGDs
Port-of-Spain	POS
Rules of Engagement	ROE
Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre	RIFC
Regional Operations Coordinating Centre	ROCC

Treaty for Security Assistance	TSA
Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force	TTDF
Trinidad and Tobago Police Service	TTPS
Trinidad and Tobago Regiment	TTR
Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard	TTCG
Trinidad and Tobago Air Guard	TTAG
Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Reserve	TTDFR
Trinidad and Tobago Fire Service	TTFS
The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago	T&T
Visiting Forces Act	VFA
Whole-of-Government Approach	WGA
11 September 2001	9/11

ABSTRACT

Major events planning in Trinidad and Tobago has evolved from its historically *ad hoc* state to a deliberate well managed process that has been tried and tested by the stakeholders within the regional security sector. This evolution has occurred mainly over the past 22yrs due to two significant incidents in the local and international spheres. The first is the Attempted Insurrection of 27 July 1990, in Trinidad and Tobago, and the next is the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and other targets in the United States on 11 September 2001. The conjoined effects on the internal security in the local environment and the international pressure that was brought to bear on the countries of the Caribbean and around the world, forced an unprecedented and perpetual shift in planning for major events. This paper has sought to introduce the Whole-of-Government Approach as a possible methodology for major events planning in Trinidad and Tobago and the Caribbean. The examination of the approach in Australia and Canada revealed major benefits to the formal adoption of the process, while presenting it as a way to deal with the ‘wicked problems’ of cross organisational coordination, collaboration and communication. The study also scrutinized three major events held in the region and Trinidad and Tobago, post 9/11 to capture the lessons learned. These were the Cricket World Cup 2007, the Fifth Summit of the Americas 2009 and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 2009. When applied to the Trinidad and Tobago and Caribbean context, the process was exposed as a possible mechanism for enhanced interagency cooperation and strengthening of regional integration. The major recommendation is for a WGA, in a JIMP context using a National Operations Centre as the vehicle for implementation. The study moreover demonstrated that the whole-of-government approach to major events planning can also be the foundation for further research as a catalyst for Caribbean Community (CARICOM) unity.

AN UNNATURAL OR ESSENTIAL PROCESS?

The Whole of Government Approach to Major Events Planning in Trinidad and Tobago and the Caribbean

Planning is an unnatural process; it is far more fun to do something. The nicest thing about not planning is that failure comes as a complete surprise, rather than being preceded by a period of worry and depression.

Sir John Harvey-Jones, Joint Doctrine and Concepts, 2004¹

Every year the streets of Port-of- Spain and other city centres around the twin island Republic of Trinidad and Tobago come alive with a riot of sound and explosions of colour as thousands of revellers, spectators and visitors participate in the annual Carnival. Such a high profile event demands a multi-agency approach to planning year round and has been the norm for many years. The world famous Brazilian carnival in Rio de Janeiro, the Mardi Gras in New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, the Caribana in Toronto, Canada and the Olympics are just a few other well-known examples of similar multi-agency approaches to major events planning.

The last decade however, has seen a significant change in the global security environment due to international tensions following the 11th September 2001(9/11) attacks on the World Trade Centre and other institutions in the United States by international terrorists. Additionally the effects of globalization and the inordinate expectations placed on security at public events of a major scale have resulted in a new and complex set of planning standards to meet the demands of stakeholders.

¹Director General, Joint Doctrine and Concepts, *Joint Warfare Planning 5-00; Joint Operations Planning*, 2004), 1-1.

At the direction of the Government of T&T (GOTT) and in keeping with internationally accepted best practice regarding major events planning, these new standards have sought to involve a wider range of national agencies. They include the T&T Police Service (TTPS), the T&T Defence Force (TTDF), the T&T Fire Service (TTFS) as well as other Government Divisions of the Ministry of National Security (MNS), other Government Departments (OGDs) and other Government Agencies (OGAs). Notable among the other agencies are the following: The National Security Council (NSC), which is chaired by the Honourable Prime Minister, the Intelligence and Strategic Services Agency (SSA), the Special Anticrime Unit of T&T (SAUTT) and the Defence Transformation and Integration Secretariat of the Ministry of National Security (DEFTIST). These agencies along with the GOTT comprise the strategic level of national security in T&T and are currently focused on combating rising crime levels.

Like several other countries in the Caribbean, such as Jamaica and Guyana, T&T has experienced an upsurge in criminal activity over the last decade that threatens to spoil its image as a tropical paradise. This is due in part to the geography of the Caribbean region, which sees the islands' as ideal transshipment points for drug producing nations to the south to the consumer nations of North America and Europe.² In order to deal with the challenges presented by the rise in criminal activity locally and the changes in and the international security environment, the GOTT decided in 2008 to conduct a comprehensive review of the national security sector of the country.³

²Trevor Munroe, "The Menace of Drugs," in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, ed. Ivelaw L. Griffith, Vol. 1 (United States: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 172.

³Senator The Honourable Martin Joseph., "Media Statement in the Senate (22nd September 2009) Senator the Hon. Martin Joseph on the Review of the National Security Sector," <http://www.news.gov.tt/index.php?news=1914&print> (accessed 4 February, 2011).

In September 2009, Senator the Honourable Martin Joseph, Minister of National Security, outlined three critical areas within the national security framework that needed to be revised in order to meet the changing circumstances, one of which was the “Continued strengthening of inter-agency coordination and collaboration...”⁴ In his media statement on 22 September 2009, the Minister, also echoed the need for a similar approach regarding the security sector review in T&T and characterised it as follows:

There was also recognition of the requirement for a “whole of government” approach in revising the security landscape. Inputs of key Ministries are seen as crucial in the support of national security objectives. For example the national security landscape will see a greater role being played by the Ministry of the Attorney General, Ministry of Social Development and Ministry of Planning, Housing and the Environment, in goal setting, information gathering and reporting.⁵

This inter-agency coordination and collaboration are most commonly utilized in major events planning. The most prominent major events that attracted the international media and thousands of visitors to T&T and the region within the past ten years, post 9/11, have been the Cricket World Cup (CWC) 2007, the Fifth Summit of the Americas (VSOA) 2009, and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) 2009. The successful hosting of these international events sparked a fresh approach to major events planning, never before witnessed in either T&T or the Caribbean.

As a result, the use of a joint, inter-agency, multinational team to plan and execute these past notable events has gained favour as a possible model for major events planning in T&T and other Caribbean nations. The *ad hoc* nature of this new approach, however, has not maximised

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

the benefits that could be derived from a formalised framework for planning and hosting of similar major events in the future. Thus an examination of the role of the T&T Defence Force in developing a new process of what can be termed a whole-of-government approach (WGA) to planning and hosting major events, Joint Inter-agency Multinational Operations in T&T and the region, will be done to determine whether or not formalizing this approach is beneficial.

This paper will argue that there are major benefits to the nation of the Republic of T&T, its Defence Force as well as the entire Caribbean region in adopting a formalized WGA major events planning process.

In order to determine whether or not the formalizing of the WGA to major events planning or the maintenance of the current *ad hoc* approach or another model of planning will benefit all agencies involved in T&T, a methodology must be followed.

METHODOLOGY

Chapter 1 will examine the definitions of the WGA and outline its concepts. Through the use of a literature review, past examples of major failures and successes will demonstrate what has occurred in this field of study to date. To facilitate this, an examination of the WGA in Australia and Canada will be explored. The advantages and disadvantages of the experiences in these countries, as documented by the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, various authorities in the public services of the countries and by independent critics, will be highlighted to show some of the challenges and value that be expected when utilizing a WGA.

Chapter 2 will examine the historical as well as the current situation regarding the planning of major events in T&T. Specifically, examples from the CWC 2007, the VSOA 2009

and the CHOGM 2009 will be discussed in contrast to the annual hosting of the T&T Carnival Celebrations. The evolution of the planning process for major events from the two decades before 9/11 and the resultant radical changes that are now demanded because of the dynamic security environment post 9/11 that have emerged will be outlined. The framework used for CWC 2007, VSOA 2009 and CHOGM 2009 will then be closely examined and compared to the WGA used in Canada and Australia, two Commonwealth countries with similar political and legacy structures which can be gainfully examined determine the benefits and best ways of formalizing the desired approach.

The feasibility of the formal adoption of the WGA in T&T, citing specific examples of the pros and cons related to the legal, training, cultural and organisational implications will then be explored. This will be followed by an examination of what kind of command and control networks and relationships that will need to be built up to facilitate the smooth adoption of the WGA by all agencies of the GOTT. Obstacles to the implementation of a formalized approach will be then discussed. The possible negative and positive effects of this implementation on the interoperability with other Defence Forces in the region and among the divisions of the MNS and OGAs will be analysed and any concrete conclusions offered as proof of the value of the WGA. The application to other major events planning of national level operations and out of area (OOA) operations such as disaster response and management will also be done to further demonstrate the value of the WGA in the T&T context.

Finally, Chapter 4 will discuss the way forward for a future major events planning framework for T&T. The suitability of an optimal model which recommends a National Operations Centre (NOC) that will cater to the needs, culture and idiosyncrasies of the T&T and Caribbean situation will be outlined. The ideal conditions for its implementation will be

discussed and the reality will be contrasted to demonstrate the true worth of a formalized WGA to major events planning in T&T. The paper will conclude by highlighting that such an approach once adopted will set the stage for an efficient and robust national security landscape in T&T and enhance the Caribbean security environment as a whole.

CHAPTER 1- DEFINITION OF THE WGA

The term WGA can be defined as “public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues. They can focus on policy development, program management and service delivery.”⁶ The term can also be used interchangeably with several common terms which communicate the same concepts. These include: Joint Inter-agency Multinational and Public (JIMP), the three D’s approach (Defence, Diplomacy and Development), comprehensive operations, connected government, policy coherence, networked government, integrated approach and horizontal management. Additionally, in accordance with the United States Army Field Manual 3-07 (FM3-07) Stability Operations, “A whole of government approach is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.”⁷

Furthermore, the 2008 United States National Defence Strategy states, “A WGA is only possible when every government department and agency understands the core competencies, roles, missions and capabilities of its partners and works together to achieve common goals.”⁸ Essentially the WGA relates to the employment of several government agencies and departments working together from the planning phase of an activity to its end in order to satisfy one common

⁶Australian Public Service Commission., "Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges." <http://www.apsc.gov.au/mac/connectinggovernment1.htm> (accessed 10 February, 2011).

⁷Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, 2003), (1-4).

⁸Hans Biennendijk, *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations* Washington, DC: Published for the Centre of National Defence University Press, 2009), 233.

governmental goal. The WGA can therefore be seen as a new term to address the old issues of coordination and control.⁹

Coordination and control are at the heart of most issues that have led to both successful and inefficient or failed attempts at government department integration in the past. Some of these attempts can be identified in the literature on the WGA in Australia and Canada.

WGA in Australia

In Australia, the WGA is not a new concept. Issues with the concept of coordination have been a feature of the Australian Public Administration from as early as 1976.¹⁰ While the Australian Public Service strived to improve quality service delivery to the public by making a WGA work, “the Coombs Report in 1976 set the scene for better ways of approaching whole of government issues.”¹¹ The Coombs Report, also known as the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA), called for greater availability of comprehensive services for the people of Australia.¹² One of the key recommendations stemming from this report which was implemented in 1987 was the reduction of the number of government departments from 28

⁹Christenson, Tom and Per Laegreid, ed., *Transcending New Public Management: The Transformation of Public Sector Reforms* (UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 288.

¹⁰Australian Public Service Commission., *Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges.*, 3.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

to 18, and each was to be served by a Cabinet Minister.¹³ This attempt sought to integrate strategic decision making at the policy level with program and service delivery.

The WGA in Australia basically concentrated on connecting government departments and was seen as a necessary response to Australia's priority challenges. Some of those challenges included, firstly, the development of a supportive culture and skills base. Additionally, the enhancing of governance structures to create a positive fit, as well as instituting sound budget and transparent accountability frameworks.¹⁴ Next, the optimal use of information and communications infrastructure and the improvement of the interaction between government representatives with their various communities, also presented a challenge to the Australian administration. Additionally, capacity building for emergency response capabilities was addressed and finally preparation for unforeseen systemic upheavals in society engaged the attention of planners and precipitated the move toward the WGA in Australia.¹⁵

In attacking these challenging areas for reform, using the WGA was seen as progressive since the Coombs Report identified that "agencies should take a WGA {only} when there are clear benefits."¹⁶ The prevailing situation at the time saw the Australian Public Service being pressured more and more by an increasingly aware Australian public, to deliver high quality services to both individuals and the business community. Government Ministers were also expected to deliver policy initiatives in a timely fashion to the public using available technology. The greater availability of technology to the public also increased the close examination of all

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

government activities and raised the demand for better delivery of services as a result. The challenge of coordinated implementation of strategic advice in an integrated manner was also identified as a major weakness that required a WGA to be remedied.¹⁷

The key to the WGA in Australia was getting government departments to work across organizational boundaries.¹⁸ The identification of shared objectives that transcend the normal parameters which confine organizations to their own peculiar culture is a distinguishing characteristic of the WGA. Once these shared objectives have been identified, the challenge remains to ‘iron out’ the implementation of workable mechanisms to counter the cultural biases that constrict organizations to their particular mode of operation.¹⁹

The recognition of the complexity of social problems that faced Australia in the 1970’s, and the wide variety of skill sets that were needed to address them was another driving force behind the need for a WGA.²⁰ Some of the complex challenges included security and the necessity to deal with counter-terrorism, environmental issues and the effects of drug addiction since these crossed the boundaries of state and local government.²¹ The WGA instituted has continued to demonstrate a progression toward eliminating the historical biases of the Australian Public Service Administration. There is still a long way to go in changing the entrenched culture that created this challenge initially, so it is deemed as a ‘work-in-progress’.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

As reported, the force of “globalization is another key external driver.”²² In addition to affecting international competition in commerce, technological advancement added to the pressure on the Australian Public Sector to create the infrastructure to support expanded productivity for the economy to thrive. This is another shared objective that required the integration of a WGA. This integration further enhanced the need to work across organizational boundaries. “The internet in particular, eliminates boundaries and raises community expectations of integrated services.”²³ Since the advent of the internet in the Australian context, the information revolution has spurred a modern media and improved educational standards which create further public capacity to question government policies. The Public Services role to offer timely, accurate and comprehensive advice to the Australian government was also enhanced by utilizing the online external links to diverse advisors who provided different perspectives and views.²⁴

One of the internal drivers that have benefitted the Australian Public Service was the increased devolution of authority aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness. Even though bureaucratic red tape had been somewhat eliminated, the tendency of emphasising a ‘silo’ mentality and thus slowing the interaction between organizations was identified in the report as counter productive to the aim of the WGA.²⁵ Similarly, the robust nature of the challenge of removing departmental ‘silos’ or inertia as identified by Gavin Buchan regarding the WGA being used by the Canadian government in Afghanistan, speaks to the negative effects of this

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

concept.²⁶ This same tendency to concentrate on efficiency within vertical silos was identified among countries who participated in 'reinvention' programs in the 1980s and early 1990s.²⁷ The Connecting Government Report highlighted the flexibility gained through decentralization as useful in seeking solutions to those complex problems previously mentioned although it also emphasized the challenges faced in implementation of new processes and procedures aimed at making the WGA work smoothly.²⁸

The creation of a 'one stop shop' concept called '*Centrelink*' in 1997 was another idea from the RCAGA report.²⁹ Together with the concepts of 'Cooperative Federalism' in the 1970's and 'New Federalism' in the 1990's as promoted by the Fraser and Hawke government's respectively, the Australian administration crafted a place where all government transactions would be brought together.³⁰ This also emphasised corporation and coordination across organisational boundaries. Additionally, the introduction of a mechanism to enhance coordination between the three levels of government in Australia (federal, state and local) was done in 1992. This mechanism called the Council of Australian Governments was a forum

²⁶Garvin Buchan, "Breaking Down the Silos: Managing the Whole-of-Government Effort in Afghanistan," *Canadian Military Journal* 10, no. 4 (2010), 77.

²⁷University of Birmingham, "Joined-Up Government in the Western World in Comparative Perspective: A Preliminary Literature Review and Exploration," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 14, no. 1 (2004), 116.

²⁸Australian Public Service Commission., *Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges.*, 3.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

created to deal with issues that required a WGA which were of national priority, but crossed organizational boundaries.³¹

Another relative strength derived from the use of the WGA in Australia is the utilization of task forces. Since the 1980s the exploitation of task forces to bridge the multi-jurisdictional boundary challenge and bring together the right mix of people for high-priority tasks in the public services have been used.³² All these instances demonstrate the utility of a WGA over the full spectrum of government operations from peacetime coordination of government services to stabilization operations after conflict. In 2002, the Australian government further identified other priority areas that required a WGA and major consultation and partnership development.³³

These priority areas included the following:

- “National Security and defence
- Work and family life
- Demographics
- Science and innovation
- Education
- Sustainable environment

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

- Energy
- Rural and regional affairs and
- Transport.³⁴

The key to this list was the continuing nature of issues that crossed organizational boundaries with the added complexity of security and defence issues after 9/11.

While the challenge of using the WGA for solving complex issues across organizational boundaries sometimes called “wicked problems” remain pertinent, the danger of its utility for every day routine matters should be avoided.³⁵ Even though it is this very daily struggle to cause individuals to step outside of their comfort zone that creates the problems which cross departmental boundaries, the cost, time and competing political agendas needed to shape the desired outcomes must be justified.³⁶ The formalization of new structures to facilitate a smooth ‘culture of collaboration’ in dealing with these intractable problems is one way to overcome the difficulties encountered. The RCAGA report, therefore, recommended that issues be evaluated on their own merit to determine if a WGA is appropriate.³⁷

The evaluation of each issue to verify if a WGA is useful leads naturally to the conclusion that each country would have a different approach in accordance with their particular biases.³⁸ *The Connecting Government Report* on Australia as well as the *University of*

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid.

Birmingham - Joined-up Government in the Western World in Comparative Perspective: A Preliminary Review, both supports the conclusion that there is no “one size fits all” approach.³⁹

The WGA implemented in Australia does, however, endorse the fact that for this approach to work successfully, some common principles must apply. Figure 1 below shows those principles that relate to the Best Practice of the WGA.⁴⁰ In order to be successful at the WGA, not only must these principles be applied but several challenges must be overcome. These challenges include the development of a supportive culture and skills base which sustains the concept of the WGA with strong leadership and good communication as a key success factor. The existence of strong accountability, governance and budgetary frameworks are also essential. Elected officials must be the ones held accountable to demonstrate the effects their departments must achieve. The continuous improvement of cross-agency coordination and collaboration and the establishment of networks which can take advantage of superior communications and infrastructure will assist in maximising successes in the WGA.⁴¹ Additionally, the perception that “task forces” dilute the focus of OGDs, and the practice of selfishly guarding individual areas of responsibility from the unwanted influences of those very OGDs must be addressed. The RCAGA report concluded by recommending the need for building capacity to respond quickly and effectively to emerging issues and crises, since whole-of-government capacity was seen as essential in the effective handling of crisis situations.⁴²

³⁸University of Birmingham, *Joined-Up Government in the Western World in Comparative Perspective: A Preliminary Literature Review and Exploration*, 115.; Dr Peter Shergold AM, *Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges*, [2000].

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Tom Christenson, "The Whole of Government Approach- Regulations, Performance and Public-Sector Reform," , no. 6 (2006), 8.

The Australian WGA in response to the Olympic Games is one other example where the effective handling of a potential crisis situation was supported by the application of the lessons learned, and which needs to be further shared. The Sydney Olympics “in the year 2000 were the largest international event ever staged by Australia, and probably the largest sporting event staged internationally in the 10 years before the 11 September 2001 attacks.”⁴³ Subsequently, the experiences of 9/11 in the United States have also demonstrated the need for a comprehensive WGA to crisis management among all government agencies. This is endorsed by Hammond (2004), who agrees that governments need to avoid contradictory outcomes and ensure that information is shared between agencies; especially in matters of national security like terrorist attacks, natural disasters like tsunamis, or pandemics like SARS or bird flu.⁴⁴

Altogether, the WGA implemented in Australia stands as a good model of public administration. The key to its success was senior public servants being reliant on coordination across organizational boundaries. The use of technology to facilitate connections and raise community awareness of government services with their Centrelink Project was a major success. The advent of the internet to further eliminate boundaries and raise the people’s expectations of integrated services, while creating the capacity for public servants to identify and assess different perspectives and views was yet another pillar of the WGA. The various challenges faced by the Australian Public Administration summed up the complexity of the dynamic environment in which the WGA was implemented. However, despite the negative aspects of the WGA in

⁴³Clive Williams, *The Sydney Olympics: The Trouble-Free Games*. (Canberra.: Strategic and Defence Studies Center, 2002), 1.

⁴⁴Christenson, *The Whole of Government Approach- Regulations, Performance and Public-Sector Reform*, 7.

Australia like the attendant cost in time and money as well as the competing political agendas, which may detract from its objectives, the WGA was seen as a relative strength for Australia.⁴⁵

WGA in Canada

Like Australia, the WGA was also implemented in Canada with some success, and like Australia it was seen as nothing new. The concept was introduced in Canada with “a strong emphasis on ‘horizontalism’.”⁴⁶ Working horizontally in Canada has been the focus of the WGA to improve cross-organizational coordination between government departments and agencies. The hierarchical strengthening in both a political and administrative respect has seen the tightening of financial and accountability structures in Canada since the mid- 1990s.⁴⁷ However, as Bakvis and Julliet (2004) have highlighted, “departments working horizontally in the same area may well engage in competition and rivalry rather than cooperation.”⁴⁸ The desired cooperation in the Canadian context relates to efforts to improve public service delivery and accountability structures. Additionally, this cooperation also sought to ensure that Canadian operations in failed or fragile states receive the proper coordination and design for the implementation of a range of interventions from the Canadian government.⁴⁹ Special attention, therefore, has been given to the application of the WGA by Canada in Afghanistan.

⁴⁵Australian Public Service Commission., *Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges.*, 3.

⁴⁶Christenson, *The Whole of Government Approach- Regulations, Performance and Public-Sector Reform*, 7.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Michael H. Thompson, *Canadian Forces Education and Training for Interagency Operational Contexts*. (Guelph, Ontario, Canada.: Humansystems Incorporated, 2010), 1.

Canada's involvement in Afghanistan since 2002 is in response to a United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution and the US declaration of a war on terrorism, following the 9/11 attacks. Naturally, the main Canadian entity active in Afghanistan is the Canadian Forces (CF) as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). Following the cessation of hostilities and the transition to stability operations, "the primary role of the CF in Afghanistan has been to provide protection and security, thereby enabling the diplomacy, development and training mandates of the other participating Canadian OGDs and OGAs"⁵⁰

Coordination between government departments in Canada was enhanced in 2005 with the launch of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), whose intent was to encourage interagency coordination and collaboration between all government department in the delivery of Canadian foreign aid to Afghanistan. The challenge of coordination in the complex interagency environment of Afghanistan, saw the CF's direct involvement in 2005 as part of the Canadian government's new strategy for international operations. This new strategy which was once "called the 3D's +C (Defence, Diplomacy, Development and Commerce) approach was now referred to as the Whole of Government or 'Team Canada' approach."⁵¹

The main aim of this new approach was the achievement of coordination and collaboration of multiple government departments and agencies in an integrated coherent strategy.⁵² The government departments included in Team Canada are principally the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Correctional Services of Canada

⁵⁰Ibid., 6

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid.

(CSC) and the CF. Although this list is not exhaustive regarding the OGDs and OGAs involved in the interagency context within the JIMP construct, the term WGA brings more relevance than the expression ‘Comprehensive Approach’.

Using a WGA refers to the OGDs and OGAs of a specific country, example Canada, while a Comprehensive Approach (CA) speaks to International Organizations (IO) like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the involvement of other countries working collaboratively.⁵³ The CA, however, is seen as “an international grand strategy for conflict resolution”.⁵⁴ Both the United States (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have begun to design similar approaches that converge as the “new norm”⁵⁵ regarding an international response to conflict. While NATO is utilizing the lessons learned from its involvement in the Balkans and Afghanistan, the US is designing a coordinated comprehensive international approach built on Diplomatic engagement, Information communications, Military engagement, Economic and financial solutions and Societal-cultural resource allocation. (DIMES).⁵⁶ This CA is similar in many ways to the Canadian WGA.

Even though the WGA terminology may be a minor challenge, there are more challenges and successes associated with the implementation of this concept in the Canadian context. The most pronounced success of the WGA in Afghanistan is the implementation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These PRTs consist of personnel from the members of Team Canada, including DFAIT, CIDA, CSC, the RCMP and the CF. This mix of subject matter

⁵³Ibid., 3

⁵⁴Biennendijk, *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations*, 274.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid.

experts (SMEs) who are professional military officers, diplomats, development specialists, corrections experts as well as any other specialist area that may be needed, all strive to support Canada's WGA in Afghanistan.⁵⁷

The Canadian effort in Afghanistan is aimed primarily at reconstruction, governance, security and the training of host nation nationals for these tasks.⁵⁸ The challenges of coordination and collaboration of the members of Team Canada, with their various distinctive organizational cultures, which must integrate in order to be effective, are leveraged through the WGA. The development of trust across cultural boundaries is especially difficult for the CF.⁵⁹ Since the CF has traditionally operated in concert only with the militaries of other allied nations in combat zones, learning to trust OGDs is therefore a key to building successful relationships in Team Canada.

Even after the relationships are built, however, the challenges of capacity of the OGDs to provide personnel and resources, leadership of the team and unity of the Canadian effort will remain. This is also the experience of the Department of Defence (DoD) in the US context whose need to develop integrated operations training along the line of the WGA, is also affected by the similar challenges that the CF face.⁶⁰ The training for interagency/ integrated operations is one area that presents a workable solution for both the CF and DoD, regarding the desire to

⁵⁷Thompson, *Canadian Forces Education and Training for Interagency Operational Contexts.*, 4.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid., 6

⁶⁰Michael Spirtas, *Department of Defence Training for Operations with Inter-Agency, Multinational and Coalition Partners.* (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corp., 2008), 50.

develop cross-organizational trust and relationships with OGDs. In the CF context, integrated training with personnel from OGDs and OGAs already exists.

The inclusion at all levels of the organization of these potential Team Canada members in senior staff training at the strategic (National Security Program) and operational levels (Joint Command Staff Program) as well as in pre-deployment training at the tactical level is bearing much fruit.⁶¹ The thinking is that once relationships are developed during these training opportunities, the natural progression will be for healthy interagency cooperation and collaboration across organizational boundaries in theatre, to follow. Empirical evidence of this progress is not yet available, but the inclusion of OGD and OGA personnel is having a very positive effect on pre-deployment training for both CF personnel as well as the civilians.⁶²

Likewise, with the training for integrated operations by the DoD in the US context, there is a recognition that this concept must move beyond the efforts of just training, exercises and education to include areas such as officer and enlisted recruitment, career management, doctrine and organization.⁶³ The more integration and inclusion of OGDs and OGAs that occur in training, the greater understanding of the military processes like the CF OPP and the military planning styles, which are key enablers that can assist in further developing understanding of the diverse cultures in team Canada.⁶⁴ In summary, the WGA both in Australia and Canada has sought to develop a workable mechanism to facilitate the structures, processes and relationships that promote cross-organizational coordination and interagency collaboration. The need to work

⁶¹Thompson, *Canadian Forces Education and Training for Interagency Operational Contexts.*, 67.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Spiras, *Department of Defence Training for Operations with Inter-Agency, Multinational and Coalition Partners.*, 58.

⁶⁴Thompson, *Canadian Forces Education and Training for Interagency Operational Contexts.*, 67.

outside of the old “stovepipe” mentality is a reality that has always been evident, but which has become more pronounced with the advent of globalization, the information revolution and the after effects of 9\11. The need for allied militaries who once only worked with each other on the battle-fields of past eras, is now further extended to OGDs and OGAs who more and more each day have a clear role to play in the post conflict reconstruction and stabilization phase of operations in failed or fragile states.

The development of a new normal way of approaching conflict management in world affairs is being led by the US and NATO as continued international upheaval is seen as the future unfolds. The US are crafting this latest approach using the diplomatic, information, military, economic and social dimensions, while NATO are relying on best practices from lessons learned in their past exploits. The evolution of public administration from its original form practised in times past to its new form is still aimed at tackling the wicked problems of coordination and cross boundary collaboration. The WGA is simply another dimension on the same continuum.

The advent of a comprehensive approach is yet another episode in the same move to improve accountability structures and interagency sharing at the strategic and operational level, in order to promote organizational effectiveness. The advantages and disadvantages of the WGA used by both Australia and Canada serve to demonstrate that this approach, despite its detractions, has value in its implementation across organizational boundaries. The challenges of diverse organizational cultures, political agendas and scarce resources will continue to exist in the future. Nevertheless, the old issues of coordination and collaboration, in the complex world of the joint interagency multinational and public context can be sufficiently addressed with the application of a WGA to planning and execution of operations.

CHAPTER 2 PLANNING IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

The deliberate planning of major events in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago has not historically taken a WGA, but has been done in an *ad hoc* manner. This chapter will first outline what has occurred regarding the planning of major events in T&T to date, and will show the marked changes that have taken place from the advent of 9/11. The use of the most recent examples of present day planning for major events, in contrast to what took place before will be explored using the operational plans for CWC 2007, VSOA 2009 and CHOGM 2009. This will be contrasted with the planning for the annual Carnival celebrations in T&T which represents one of the largest public events of an international nature held in that country. The definition of a major event will be outlined to situate the discourse, and the government agencies involved in the planning and hosting of these events will also be scrutinized. An examination of the framework used for the above mentioned events will be given a closer look and this will be compared to the WGA used in Canada and Australia to determine show that this approach can be beneficial in the T&T context.

Major events planning in T&T has historically taken place in an atmosphere of relative safety and has not been defined by a credible threat to state security, occasioning the loss of life or damage to property. However, over the past 22 years, two significant events have focussed the attention of law enforcement agencies (LEA) and security personnel and have forever changed the way planning and hosting of major public events in T&T have been conducted. These events are the Attempted Insurrection of 1990 and the 9/11 attacks on the US.

The traditional areas of concern for law enforcement prior to the events of 1990 and 9/11 have been traffic management, crowd control and an isolated rise in the larceny of motor

vehicles, relative to the hosting of an event. The actions of the LEA, to deal with an overzealous patron, who may wish to gain illegal entry to a seasonal cricket match, or an unruly party goer who may have had too much alcohol to drink, is usually the highlight of police reports following such an event. The principal non-traditional threat in that era to T&T and indeed the Caribbean region, mainly due to geography, has been the transshipment of illegal drugs and the international drug trade.⁶⁵

The 1990 Attempted Insurrection

Following the 1990 attempted insurrection, the increase in the proliferation of small arms and related criminal violence caused a “significant psychological effect”⁶⁶ on citizens with a rise in gun related homicides in the country. Prior to this attempted insurrection by members of the ‘Jammāt Al Muslimeen’, a radical Muslim group led by Yasin Abu Bakr, a former police constable, the citizens of T&T lived a relatively peaceful life. This peaceful existence was, however, disrupted for a six day period on 27 July 1990, when the country’s parliament, that was in session, and personnel from the lone television station at the time, were held hostage by 114 members of the Muslimeen group. The group also simultaneously bombed the headquarters of the T&T Police Service, killing the duty sentry and other members of the service in the line of fire. The sitting Prime Minister, ANR Robinson, and another member of parliament (MP) were also shot in the process and unfortunately the Member of Parliament, Mr Leo De Vines lost his life as a result of injuries suffered on that fateful day.

⁶⁵Edmund Dillon, "Regional Security Cooperation: Traditional and Non-Traditional Areas," in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, ed. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 473.

⁶⁶Colvin Bishop and Oral Khan, "The Anti-Terrorism Capacity of Caribbean Forces," in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror*, ed. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 396.

The same day, and within hours, the T&T Regiment rapidly deployed to Port of Spain and contained the situation by surrounding the 'Red House' (parliament building) and T&T Television (TTT) after a fierce street to street battle with the insurrectionists. The ensuing six day siege precipitated negotiations after a cease fire was called in order to evacuate the wounded Prime Minister and others to safety. After negotiations with the insurrectionist, a Presidential amnesty was granted for their safe passage into state custody, which saw the beginning of a long three year legal battle. That legal battle went through all stages of the country's legal framework, all the way to the Privy Council in London, England. Although the insurrectionists were found not guilty by the High Court in T&T, since the Presidential pardon was deemed valid in a Habeas Corpus motion, the Privy Council overturned the ruling years after in favour of the state. The state, however, was not cleared to re-arrest the rebels, as this was seen as against their human rights and inimical to the society's interests. This event, therefore, marked a major turning point in the status of the internal security of the Republic of T&T. The resultant change in the factors for consideration of the nation's internal threats when planning major events took a drastic turn from this era until the present. Yet, it was the events of the 9/11 attacks which ushered in the "Age of Terror"⁶⁷ in T&T and the Caribbean.

Effects of 11 September 2001 Attacks in the US

The US response to and the effects of the 9/11 attacks, on Caribbean island nations was the crucial external catalyst that radically changed the T&T approach to major events planning. The response by the US to the terrorist attacks on 9/11 included a call to nations to support the

⁶⁷Edmund Dillon, *Regional Security Cooperation: Traditional and Non-Traditional Areas*, 481.

global war on terror. The conditions of ‘friend or foe’ placed on the international community, spurred all to action.⁶⁸

Since Caribbean nations can all be considered small and vulnerable, by the world development index standards, the option of non-alignment or neutrality was not a wise choice, especially given the fact that the Caribbean is widely considered as the third US border.⁶⁹ As the “notional” third border, Caribbean nations were forced to embrace their responsibility, much like Canada to strengthen their relatively open borders as a means of protecting US interest in the region, while concurrently securing their own interest.

Caribbean interests affected by 9/11 also transcended the limits of traditional security to include its economic vulnerability which was exposed as the heart of the region’s weakness.⁷⁰ The economic backlash felt by most Caribbean nations as a result of 9/11, showed the fragility of small island states, specifically their dependence on tourism and their reliance on international trade with the US. That very trade that undergirded the region’s economic security was severely threatened when rigorous demands to adhere to stringent security best practices were placed on them by the US. This caused an acute change in the culture of planning, in order to hold fast to the burden of the new security standards and thus a new approach to setting up major events began.⁷¹

⁶⁸Colvin Bishop and Oral Khan, *The Anti-Terrorism Capacity of Caribbean Forces*, 394.

⁶⁹Dorith Grant-Wisdom, "United States Caribbean Relations: The Impact of 9/11," in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror*, ed. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 266.

⁷⁰Colvin Bishop and Oral Khan, *The Anti-Terrorism Capacity of Caribbean Forces*, 398.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 401

The ad hoc Planning Era

Prior to the birth of this new approach, the events of 9/11 and the 1990 attempted insurrection, major events in T&T, was somewhat limited, while the planning was ad hoc. The annual carnival celebrations were the most frequently hosted event of a significant nature. The definition of a major event is an event planned for the community that attracts in excess of 5000 persons of local and foreign origin.⁷² The Carnival celebrations customarily would attract well in excess of 100,000 persons, both of local and foreign origin. The locals usually come from all communities in T&T to play 'mas' in the streets of Port-of-Spain the capital city, for a two day period immediately before the Lenten season. Foreigners from all over the world, including T&T and Caribbean Diasporas, tourist and international media all converge to have a time of fun in what has been arguably called the greatest show on earth.

LEA staff also makes up a large part of the numbers of personnel involved in the festivities, although from a different perspective. Historically, planning for this annual event meant using of all LEA human resources to police the crowds in Port-of-Spain and the other main city centres in both Trinidad and also in Tobago. The recall of LEA personnel from annual/ casual leave, and the strengthening of numbers for duty were not uncommon during this period. Additional attention to minor offences like larceny, pick pocketing and driving under the influence of alcohol was also expected by the police. Likewise another common facet of carnival duties was the presence of additional Immigration and Customs Divisions personnel from the Ministry of National Security. They facilitate the heavier than normal inflow of foreigners at the country's two international airports and were also customary during the carnival

⁷²City of Casey, "Event Definitions," <http://www.casey.vic.gov.au/eventcomplianceguide/article.asp?Item=9310> (accessed March/20, 2011).

season. The posting of safety officers from the TTFS at the entrance and egress of public shows and parties, and at strategic locations during the two day festivities was also normal.

Additional nurses and doctors would be placed on call rosters to cater for any health-care related eventualities, by the Ministry of Health as a precaution as well. Even the confinement to barracks of soldiers, sailors and air men of the TTDF in anticipation of calls for assistance from the TTPS was a contingency plan that was always practised.

All these security and public safety related activities, however, were in reaction to individual organizational experiences through the years, and would instinctively take place in isolation and in an uncoordinated manner. This lack of coordination and collaboration in planning for and hosting what for T&T is a major income earner and tourist attraction could not remain unchanged, following the terror attacks of 9/11. The security demands due to 9/11 created peculiar challenges faced by LEAs worldwide, which made the need to quickly upgrade security planning standards for all public events compulsory. Some of these challenges included the attention to the movement of international terrorists and the need to intuitively share information across not only organizations but regional and international borders as well. The registration and tracking of internationally known targets of interest, from criminal personalities to those involved in peaceful protests, also became of value, in the war on terror. The implementation of more stringent immigration and border control measures in T&T and throughout the Caribbean was also high on the agenda for overhaul by the regions national security agencies. The upgrade of electronic information systems for the efficient gathering, analysis and networking of intelligence products of LEAs both regionally and internationally also attracted the attention of the GOTT. The infamous air and sea port regulations and pre-checks to enter the US, especially including those for containerized cargo from across the globe

have now become second nature to all travellers, agents and national authorities alike. Consequently, the significant changes in the approach to planning major events have gone through a similar metamorphosis in order to comply.

These changes included the need to consider additional factors such as potential high value targets for terrorists engrossed with hurting American global interests. This was not restricted to US companies or citizens only, but it also extended to infrastructure and lines of communication and supply of allies and trading partners of the United States of America.⁷³ Accordingly, T&T as a trading partner of the US became a potential target as well. The comprehensive evaluation of risks and never before considered elements of international security planning became relevant, virtually overnight, in T&T and the Caribbean following 9/11. These risks naturally would have mitigation measures connected to them, but also carried with their consideration a hefty and prohibitive cost factor. For small and vulnerable island nations these costs could mean the difference between state failure and their survival as sovereign nations. Therefore, in order to upgrade the national framework used by the GOTT in hosting major events, the TTDF was brought into the forefront of the planning arena.

Some TTDF Contributions

The TTDF have been long recognised as one of the premiere organizations responsible for the defence and security of the state of T&T. The TTDF is made up of four formations each representing land, sea and air components. The land formation, the T&T Regiment (TTR), the maritime formation is the T&T Coast Guard (TTCG) and the air formation, the T&T Air Guard (TTAG), are all supported by the fourth formation which is the T&T Defence Force Reserves

⁷³Colvin Bishop and Oral Khan, *The Anti-Terrorism Capacity of Caribbean Forces*, 396.

(TTDFR). The TTDFR is made up of elements of each component, and together with the TTAG represents the younger formations of the force, formed only in 2004. It was the TTDF in 1990, led by the Land Forces element of the force, the TTR, which successfully repelled and put down the attempted insurrection in 1990. For their distinguished service to the nation the TTR received the nation's highest award, the Trinity Cross. The TTR boasts of a professionally trained volunteer force, whose motto is to 'Guard and Defend'. Among its most notable strengths is the TTR's ability and competence in planning and executing light infantry operational tasks. Since its origin in 1962, as a pre-condition for independence from the United Kingdom's colonial rule, the TTR has been involved in the roles of defence of the nation against external aggression and assisting with the internal security of T&T. Although not involved in war fighting throughout its history, the TTR nevertheless has developed a well known reputation regionally for its contributions in exercises and operations throughout the Caribbean. Among the most notable of these operations and exercises was the TTR's involvement in the US led invasion of Haiti to restore democracy in 1994,⁷⁴ and the annual 'EXERCISE TRADEWINDS'.

Exercise TRADEWINDS is an annual joint military training exercise, involving those Caribbean nations who possess military forces, in conjunction with the US military. The aim of the exercise is to enhance the basic military skills and interoperability of the Caribbean military forces, in order to improve regional cooperation and security. The role played by Combat Engineers from the TTR in the reconstruction of infrastructure in Grenada in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and its assistance to Jamaica after Hurricane Hugo in 1989, are but a few instances, when a key contribution was made by the TTR.

⁷⁴Ibid., 405

CWC 2007

In 2007, the TTDF was involved with the planning and hosting of the International Cricket Council's, (ICC) Cricket World Cup 2007 (CWC 2007) which was the first major event of its size to be held in the Caribbean following 9/11. The CWC 2007 was considered the third largest international sporting competition in the world, which attracted 16 teams, in 9 host nation countries across the Caribbean. In all, eleven stadia across the region were used, with an average seating capacity of 20,000 people and 800,000 potential ticket sales worldwide. There were also approximately 3000 volunteers to be used as casual labour over the 67 days of the tournament and an approximate television audience of between 1.4- 2.2 billion globally. Additionally an estimated 100,000 visitors to the region were expected for the tournament.⁷⁵ The security footprint created by the convergence of Police, Military (both local and foreign) and Private Security personnel also was well in excess of 7000 persons across the region.

The **2007 ICC Cricket World Cup** was the ninth edition of the tournament and took place in the West Indies from 3 March to 28 April 2007, using the sport's One Day International format. There were a total of 51 matches played, three fewer than at the 2003 World Cup (despite a field larger by two teams). The 16 competing teams were initially divided into four groups, with the two best-performing teams from each group moving on to a "Super 8" format. From this, Australia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka and South Africa won through to the semi-finals, with Australia defeating Sri Lanka in the final to win their third consecutive World Cup.⁷⁶

The planning for this tournament began in June 2006 in Barbados as a Regional Security effort for the CWC 2007. The outline plan was drafted by a team of military and police staff officers

⁷⁵Major P. A. Sealy, *International Cricket Council Cricket World Cup 2007, Local Security Committee Presentation*, [June 2006]).

⁷⁶International Cricket Council, "Cricket World Cup 2007," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Cricket_World_Cup (accessed March/ 25, 2011).

from various Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries. This team was called the CARICOM Operations Planning and Coordinating Staff (COPACS) which was officially established on 6 July 2006, and was convened on 15 August 2006. It was the main CARICOM agency responsible for the CWC 2007 regional security planning effort.⁷⁷ “The scale of planning and preparation for CWC 2007 was unprecedented in the region.”⁷⁸ Similarly, the Sydney Olympics of 2000 saw the establishment of a Games Coordination Task Force, similar to COPACS well in advance of that event, since security could not simply be thought of as only crowd control following the 1972 Munich massacre.⁷⁹ Therefore a new security framework to cater to the multi-dimensional challenges after 9/11 was designed.

This framework included the formation of various security sub-committees utilizing a joint multi-interagency approach. The agencies included those from regional Police Forces, the Military, Customs, Immigration, Port (Sea and Air) Security, Public Health and Safety and Disaster Management.⁸⁰ In order to create the conditions for effective coordination and collaboration across the various agencies, a regional mechanism for joint operations was needed. Therefore, the Regional Operations Coordinating Centre (ROCC), the Joint Regional Communications Centre (JRCC), the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) and the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC) were all formed for the purpose of CWC 2007.⁸¹

⁷⁷COPACS, *Final Reprt on Regional Security Operations for Cricket World Cup 2007- Executive Summary*.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Williams, *The Sydney Olympics: The Trouble-Free Games.*, 1.

⁸⁰COPACS, *Final Reprt on Regional Security Operations for Cricket World Cup 2007- Executive Summary*, 1.

⁸¹Ibid.

New agreements and policies to enable international cooperation with agencies such as Interpol and other intelligence centred organizations were also needed, and these came through the signing of Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and legislation like the Visiting Forces Act. Additionally, legislation was also supported by the Treaty for Security Assistance (TSA) among CARICOM states, which was responsible for the advancement of efficiency and effectiveness in the deployment of Joint Task Forces within the region. The TSA facilitated the deployment of visiting forces throughout the security operations for CWC 2007 and helped manage the complexity of command and control, the bearing of arms and host-nation responsibilities.⁸² The similar approach to legislative amendments was used in Australia to give “the Commonwealth a robust legislative basis from which to act”⁸³ during the Sydney Olympics. Although some of the legislation used for CWC 2007 was considered ‘sunset legislation’ since it was only to be used for the staging of the event, the successful outcome provided the catalyst to retain some legacy benefits which enhanced regional security integration. These benefits included the maintenance of the RIFC, the JRCC, the CARICOM IMPACS and the coordinating structures used for COPACS as a model for regional operations planning. This model used a structure of reporting which spanned the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The strategic link was formed using a council of ministers from across the region led by the Deputy Prime Minister from Barbados, Ms Mia Mottley. Ms Mottley liaised directly with the Heads of Government of CARICOM and downward with the ROCC at the operational level. This was undergirded by three Joint Task Forces (JTFs) at the tactical level. These JTFs were responsible for liaison within each host nation for support of their individual security plans, in accordance with the ICC’s security

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Williams, *The Sydney Olympics: The Trouble-Free Games.*, 11.

standard operating procedures (SOPs) for CWC 2007. The JTFs were mainly supplied from and commanded by the larger regional military forces and deployed into different geographic areas across the Caribbean. Jamaica and the countries of the Regional Security System (RSS) were responsible for operations in the northern Caribbean, while Guyana and personnel from RSS were covering those match venues in the central Caribbean region and T&T and RSS were responsible for the southern Caribbean.⁸⁴ The plan called for a comprehensive security blanket which covered the land, maritime and air environments.

The coordination of these environments was further complicated with the integration of international specialist teams which catered to capabilities like Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) detection, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) which Caribbean militaries lacked. The airlift capacity was also supplied by foreign specialists' teams. The coordination of the various requests for international assistance was one of the areas that were dealt with by a trained team of Foreign Service Technicians from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Security in T&T, in conjunction with the T&T Defence Attaché in Washington.⁸⁵ Assistance was sought from Brazil, Columbia, France, India and South Africa and the Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP) nature of the task forces were a hallmark of the CWC 2007 operations. The other civilian agencies that worked in collaboration with COPACS included the CARICOM IMPACS who handled the financing of operations and the Media Relations Committee, made up of media professional from across the region. Media relations for CWC 2007 benefited from a recommendation coming out of Sydney Olympics 2000 in that media support should be built in to any structure for a national

⁸⁴COPACS, *Final Reprt on Regional Security Operations for Cricket World Cup 2007- Executive Summary*, 3.

⁸⁵Ibid.

event with a significant security dimension.⁸⁶ This was therefore done for CWC 2007 media relations.

The structure that was developed for CWC 2007 resembled the whole-of-government structure now being used by Canada in Afghanistan with some minor changes. Additionally, Australia also recognised the need for a WGA in the research and planning for the Sydney Olympics in 2000, which was a similar major sporting event.⁸⁷ However, the approach used for the planning and execution of operations across a wide cross-section of the Caribbean, for what was deemed the largest international major event post 9/11 was efficient and effective. Altogether the CWC 2007 was considered a foremost success, as the games were hosted in an atmosphere of relative safety, security and relaxation synonymous with events in the Caribbean.

CWC 2007 Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from the experiences of CWC 2007 just two years prior were eagerly implemented for the VSOA 2009. These lessons included “the early identification of roles and responsibilities for visiting forces as a necessary pre-requisite for achieving success.”⁸⁸ The land component’s lessons for implementation called for the enhancement of contingency plans for other eventualities like a natural disaster. Therefore the increase in collaboration with the staff planners of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) was required.⁸⁹ The maritime and air component’s lessons learned pointed to the need to cater for the unavailability of berthing for tier 3 assets, which are those vessels responsible for the area from 12 to 200

⁸⁶Williams, *The Sydney Olympics: The Trouble-Free Games.*, 12.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 2

⁸⁸COPACS, *Final Reprt on Regional Security Operations for Cricket World Cup 2007- Executive Summary*, 3.

⁸⁹Ibid.

nautical miles or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Additionally, the problems experienced with secure communications between maritime units and host nation operations rooms needed to be addressed. The use of cell phones in operations clearly created a critical vulnerability that had to be mitigated in future operations, given the growing threat of cyber attacks in a modern scenario.⁹⁰ As noted by Clive Williams in his ‘Working Paper #371 on *The Sydney Olympics: The Trouble Free Games*’ “Effective communications is of course a key factor in responsive security architecture”⁹¹

The lessons learned regarding international support included the need to adjust planning time lines for the early integration of foreign troops and the effective legal coverage through treaties and MOUs.⁹² The language barrier between donor and host nations also needed further consideration that would require “dedicated international liaison officers, who possess the requisite language skills and technical competence”⁹³ (military translators) consistent with the areas of specialists support involved. Numerous lessons regarding logistic support for an operation of this scale and complexity were learned from CWC 2007 and were able to inform the planning and execution of both VSOA and CHOGM 2009. The volume of numbers to be catered for, in food, accommodations, transport, ammunition and other peculiar needs based on nationality and agency specific preference certainly created a sharp learning curve. The value in the early production of an Aide Memoire that covered the legal guidelines governing operations and Rules of Engagement (ROE) for all personnel was recognised and retained as an

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Williams, *The Sydney Olympics: The Trouble-Free Games.*, 4.

⁹²Ibid., 6

⁹³Ibid.

international best practice prior to and following CWC 2007. The key lesson learned in the Media Relations field was the maintenance of a proactive media posture. While this was not always achieved for CWC 2007 the use of embedded media in the structure of future planning staffs was seen as critical.⁹⁴ Lastly the lessons learned from the financial aspects of CWC 2007 were invaluable to the process of maintaining flexibility and freedom of movement for commanders and finance officers alike while, not compromising the fundamental principles of accountability.⁹⁵ The relationship between COPACS and CARICOM IMPACS worked well to set the conditions for success that was finally achieved in the realm of the financial sphere. CWC 2007 was completed without any major incidents and the lessons learned were fully appreciated by all involved as a valuable experience to build upon.⁹⁶ The increase in interagency coordination and collaboration in the planning and execution of the operation was a major step forward for regional security corporation. The new organizations that were kept as legacy benefits from the process all represent the future potential of Caribbean integration. The interagency corporation and collaboration between OGDs, OGAs and the military planners of COPACS also gave hope to the WGA now evident in relations with personalities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. These relationships that were built across organizational boundaries and cultures clearly demonstrated a strength and willingness to work toward self sustainment in security within the region. This strength was to be tested in the near future through the next two major events, the VSOA and CHOGM 2009.

⁹⁴Ibid., 9

⁹⁵Ibid., 11

⁹⁶Ibid.

VSOA and CHOGM 2009

Having applied the lessons learned from the involvement in the planning process for the CWC 2007, the TTDF was able to successfully assist with the planning and hosting the VSOA and the CHOGM 2009. These two international conferences together represented the largest international security undertakings by the GOTT post 9/11. This planning effort commenced in March 2008 with the establishment of the Operations Planning and Coordinating Staff (OPACS). Similar in structure to its predecessor COPACS, the OPACS was established as a joint multiagency planning team.⁹⁷ Members from the following agencies were all seconded to the National Secretariat responsible for overall planning for the conferences, as the security planning staff.

The agencies included:

- The TTPS (lead agency)

As the lead agency the TTPS was responsible for all law enforcement related issues, pertaining to the safety and security of the nation during the conferences. The decision to include a crime reduction plan nine months prior to the conferences was a valuable precursor that set the conditions for success of security operations in T&T during the period. The noticeable decrease in homicides and other serious crimes in the capital was commendable. The traffic management counter terrorist operations, crowd control and close protection plans that were executed by the TTPS were also critical success factors. Additionally the interagency coordination during the planning phase and the integration of forces during the

⁹⁷Operations Planning and Coordination Staff (OPACS), *Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) 2009, After Action Report.*, [Dec 2009].

execution phase worked well. This is testimony that the WGA to major events planning and execution is indeed a superior approach for the future of security operations in T&T.

- The TTDF

The TTDF played the major supporting role to the TTPS for the both conferences. The greatest contribution was made in the planning phase when the military operational planning process (OPP) was utilized to guide the development of comprehensive plans for the operations. The ease with which understanding of the process was transferred to the non-military components of the planning team, demonstrated the invaluable professional leadership of the TTDF. That professionalism extended into the role as force multiplier for the supporting command of the TTDF, especially with some military skill sets that were made available to the TTPS. Those skill sets included the Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) search teams from the 1st Engineer Battalion; the Counter Terrorist team from the Regiment's Special Operations Detachment; the Specialists Diving Teams from the TTCG and the Surveillance and Search and Rescue (SAR) capacity provided by the TTAG.

- Special Anti-Crime Unit of T&T (SAUTT)

SAUTT is a law enforcement agency (LEA) formed to augment TTPS in the ongoing fight against crime in T&T. It provided specialist support to the TTPS in the areas of Canine Search Teams, Forensic Investigative Teams, Air Surveillance and Counter Terrorist Team support. Its input into the Crime reduction phase also saw a Special Investigative Team on criminal gangs in the East Port-of-Spain area, a crime ridden haven for drug and gang leaders, being effectively leveraged, as the statistics told the story. SAUTT was also used in the setting up and efficient running of simulated training exercises for each operational sector

as well as the strategic operations group, which saw ministerial involvement for the first time. This ministerial involvement was exercised in order to make the critical link between the strategic and the operational levels of command, and was as a result of lessons learned from CWC 2007 as well.

- The TTFS

The TTFS are the national first responders to fire and safety issues and played a crucial role in the assessment of critical infrastructure related to the venues used for VSOA and CHOGM 2009. The unique safety perspective brought to the planning staff by the professional contributions made by members of the TTFS was invaluable. These contributions emphasized the true worth of the WGA used in the planning of operations for the two conferences. The uniformed presence of TTFS personnel also brought a calming effect to what could be termed the hectic pace of a day at OPACS.

- The T&T Prison Service (TTPS)

The Prison officers seconded to the OPACS also brought a valuable alternative opinion which created 'food for thought' among discussion groups, and was well equip to contribute mainly in the areas of logistic support.

- Customs and Excise Division (C&E Div)

The smooth reception and processing of arriving and departing HOS and VIPs at Piarco International Airport was due in large part to the hard work of staff planners from the C&E Div. Their technical know how and expert anticipation of issues at the port of embarkation clearly set the conditions for success in this phase of the operation. Their complete

assimilation into the OPACS is testimony of the lasting value of the WGA used, and is highly recommended to be retained.

- Immigration Division (IM Div)

Members of the IM Div worked in harmony with the C&E Div and also added a new dimension to the planning staff that never fully considered the legal aspects to foreign nationals being turned away at the ports of entry. This though was clearly articulated by them and provided an education to the planning staff. The ease, with which immigration information was shared through the Advance Passenger Information System across the region for CWC 2007, was a precursor to the successful implementation of security checks and balances for the both conferences. The seamless integration of the staff officer from immigration into the planning team is yet another view of the WGA in action.

- Joint Intelligence Group (JIG)

The JIG was also a structure created for CWC 2007 which was retained and used effectively for the transfer of intelligence products from the full spectrum of agencies responsible for collection and dissemination in a timely fashion to the JIMTF and operational commanders. Links with the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC), extended the information network to international partners like Interpol and the British MI6. These links, once they were established, demonstrated their value to the planning process, by providing real-time updates of crucial intelligence daily.

- Organization for Disaster Preparedness and Management (ODPM)

The ODPM provided the vital link with the disaster preparedness environment both locally and regionally with the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA). The lessons learned from CWC 2007 once again were implemented here as the planning staff critically needed to consider the likely-hood of a major natural disaster occurring during the hosting of the conferences. This was thought of as realistic, since the position of T&T on the active Caribbean tectonic plate which interacts with the South American plate that reaches to Venezuela, just seven miles east of Trinidad's north western coast, can experience a major earth quake at any time. Additionally the islands also fall just outside the recognised path of tropical hurricanes annually, and the CHOGM was hosted in November 2009, which was predicted to be an active hurricane season. That prediction though did not materialise and a lower than average Atlantic Hurricane Season occurred instead.⁹⁸ The ODPM also contributed to the evaluation of critical infrastructure in conjunction with the TTFS and the Ministry of Works and Transport, Civil Engineering Section. Although this critical infrastructure team was hurriedly put together, the successful outcome of their evaluation reports were able to inform planning by OPACS. The coordination of this team is seen as another lesson learned to be implemented in the future, since a major collaborative effort was needed to co-opt the competent team members and inform stakeholders of the critical infrastructure of their mission. A formalized WGA in this instance would pre-empt the untidy arrangements that characterised this occasions efforts.

⁹⁸Reuters, "Forecasters See Active 2009 Season," <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/10/us-storm-hurricanes-forecast-idUSTRE4B93XM20081210> (accessed March /27, 2011).

- Airport Authority of T&T (AATT)

The AATT is the security arm of the airport operations in T&T. Early in the planning phase for the VSOA and CHOGM 2009, they indicated that a shortage in manpower would seriously hamper their ability to provide adequate levels of security in accordance with the desired end state of OPACS. The physical upgrade to the security infrastructure at Piarco International Airport, the main port of entry for Heads of State and VIPs was scheduled, but the more important human dimension was woefully lacking. This meant that their human resources had to be complimented by TTDF personnel and private security as well. The coordination and synchronization of this effort eventually went well as the WGA taken at OPACS encouraged dialog and the contributions of all resources were made.

- Port Authority of T&T (PATT)

Similar plans at the PATT were instituted to augment their security staff. The added legal demands for compliance at the Port of Port-of-Spain with new US regulations on cargo emanating from foreign ports, destined for the US market also presented some challenges. The challenges included the installation of scanners and close circuit television (CCTV), the pre-checking and registration of cargo manifests in an updated format as well as the underwater inspection of hulls of vessels entering the port. This latter challenge became sensitive since the conference venue at the Hyatt Regency, Trinidad, was at the Port-of-Spain waterfront in close proximity to the port operations.

- Civil Aviation Authority of T&T (CAATT)

The valuable advice and cooperation of the CAATT brought a clear view of the international standards involved in the receipt of information regarding the arrival of aircraft bringing

Heads of State, VIPs and other dignitaries to T&T. They work in conjunction with the AATT, C&E Div and the IM Div to ensure a seamless operation at the PIA.

- National Helicopter Services Limited (NHSL)

The NHSL work along with the TTAG in air the operations coordination cell of OPACS to ensure air surveillance and emergency casualty evacuation was catered for in the movement of Heads of State and VIPs throughout the conferences.

Security plans for both conferences were divided into geographic sectors based on the Joint Operations Area (JOA). This included sectors 1-5 which represented the following areas:

- Sector 1- Piarco International Airport (PIA): Arrival and Departure of Heads of Government

This sector was made up of the main International Airport and its environs that included the airfield and the access roads that surrounded the PIA. The critical infrastructure located in the sector was also given particular attention. This infrastructure included the Aviation Refuelling Station which represented a high value target (HVT) to any would be terrorist groups wishing to disrupt the arrival and departure of very important persons (VIPs) and Heads of State (HOS). The water treatment facilities, power substation and communications towers on the perimeter of the PIA also needed to be secured. The aircraft runway approach, which extended into an unsecured savannah area, was included as well in the area of operations (AO) for this sector. Two terminal areas and extended parking aprons for aircraft of HOS, were utilized in order to separate arriving and departing VIPs and HOS from the general airport traffic as well. The level of security put in place catered to all risks and was deemed as unprecedented in this regard.

- Sector 2- Main East-West Routes

Sector 2 was secured by both static and roving patrols of joint army police (JAP) personnel. The clearance and securing of the main and the secondary routes was undertaken by explosive ordinance disposal technicians, using canine handlers and their charges, prior to their use. The traffic control on these roads was especially complex as they represented the regularly traversed dual carriageways that accounted for the heaviest combined load of east-west traffic daily. The security for this sector was further enhanced by real time CCTV that was especially installed for the conferences. This technology gave live imagery of the routes directly to the command centre and valuable situational awareness to the Gold Commander (Operational Commander TTPS) to enable operational decision making. This was also complimented by a live data feed from air assets tasked with over-watch of the routes and the movement of VIP convoys to and from the PIA during arrival and departure of HOS. The level of efficiency realised on these routes enabled the usual 45min journey into Port-of Spain, to be cut to 12- 15mins maximum, a feat that was widely commended by many HOS.

- Sector 3- Port-of-Spain and Environs: Included the Island site

Port-of-Spain (POS) is the capital city and together with its environs represented sector 3. The main conference venue, the sites for the opening and closing ceremonies, plenary sessions for Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the cultural performances, as well as the President's House used for the state banquet, all made up this sensitive sector. The hotel accommodations used by the President of the United States of America, President Barak Obama and the President of Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez as well as other HOS also was a part of this sector. The use of two large cruise ships as floating hotels to compliment

the room stock for support staff and additional security personnel needed in this sector was also a novel idea implemented for both conferences. The Island Site was a secure area surrounding the Hyatt Regency Hotel which was the actual summit venue that was manned by its own security force and commanded by a separate sector commander to sector 3. This area represented the most sensitive security concern where only accredited persons were allowed access. The challenge here was the proximity of the media centre which created a security nightmare for close support escorts as the balance between coverage and safety for the HOS needed to be constantly maintained. That balance represented a critical factor for the success of security operations as the professional application of lessons learned from previous commonwealth summits were astutely applied.

- Sector 4- Pointe-à-Pierre Wild Fowl Trust : Spouses Program

The operations of sector 4 were confined to the compound of the Pointe-à-Pierre Wild Fowl Trust and its immediate environs, which is a 25 hectare wildlife conservation park and wetlands bird sanctuary, in south-west Trinidad. The compound comprises two lakes on a large petrochemical estate, which is covered with dense tropical vegetation and criss-crossed with a well developed network of secondary roads and nature trails⁹⁹. This was the site of the HOS spouses program, for VSOA 2009 and which created its own peculiar challenges for security personnel. These challenges, although not insurmountable, ranged from the inability to discharge firearms in the vicinity of the refinery to restrictions on disturbing the delicate balance of flora and fauna in the protected wetlands of Pointe-à-Pierre.

⁹⁹Operations Planning and Coordination Staff (OPACS), *Fifth Summit of the Americas (VSOA) 2009, Operational Overview*, [2009].

- Sector 5- Tobago

Tobago is the sister isle to Trinidad and is the more quiet, tourist oriented destination between the two locations. Tobago was used for the Youth Forum of the CHOGM 2009, and although there were no major security challenges, the logistics to enable the smooth running of this aspect of the conference was tedious, given the inter-island transport of participants. The anticipated protest from groups wishing to make a political point did not materialize so the Youth Forum was eventually run without interruption.

The VSOA 2009 was held in T&T from 17-19 April 2009 and saw a total of 34 Heads of State from across the Americas gather for discussions on the issues of global importance affecting all nations. The Honourable Patrick Manning, then Prime Minister of The Republic of T&T as he addressed the forum, said:

The deliberations over the past day and half centred on the three main pillars of Declaration of Commitment of Port of Spain - human prosperity, energy security and environmental sustainability. The discussions also focused on the re-integration of Cuba into the Inter-American system, and on developing relevant responses to the current global financial crisis¹⁰⁰

Mr Manning also commented about the commitment of the leaders to deal with the issue of financial assistance for Haiti at the next Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly. Likewise, the CHOGM 2009 was the second major international conference of a similar nature which was held in T&T during the period 27-29 November 2009. Mr Manning previously offered to host the 2009 CHOGM in T&T at the 2005 CHOGM in Valletta, Malta. The decision to do so was confirmed at the next CHOGM which was held in Kampala, Uganda in November 2007, and the National Secretariat was set up in March 2008 to begin the planning

¹⁰⁰Government of Trinidad and Tobago, "Fifth Summit of the Americas: Official Statements," [http://www.fifthsummitoftheamericas.org/official_statements\(1\).htm](http://www.fifthsummitoftheamericas.org/official_statements(1).htm) (accessed April/ 02, 2011).

for the two conferences.¹⁰¹ The CHOGM 2009 however, catered for the attendance of 53 Heads of State and Government as opposed to 34 that were hosted for VSOA earlier that year.

Additionally, on that occasion the conference was held simultaneously with a State Visit of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, of the United Kingdom and Great Britain. Approximately 5000 plus visitors, members of delegations, observers, protesters and other interests groups as well as the international media were expected, thus making it an event of international scope and magnitude.¹⁰² This also meant that further consideration for the safety and security of the CHOGM ‘Mace and Goblets’ had to be made in accordance with international best practice for this event.¹⁰³

The deliberations on both instances were conducted in the safety and security of the summit/ meeting venue based on the planning and coordination done by OPACS. This planning involved the joint interagency multi-national approach used in CWC 2007 and improved upon by the application of the lessons learned on that occasion. Specifically, the staff system used reflected the ‘Continental J Staff’ branches from 1-7; personnel; intelligence; operations; logistics; public affair; communications; information and communications technology. The inclusion of the International Security Assistance Group (ISAG) from the Ministry of National Security and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the planning and requesting for the international military specialist assistance needed to augment the skills that were unavailable in the local security sector was invaluable. This represented a major improvement in communication, coordination and collaboration between OPACS and the OGAs that was implemented as a lesson

¹⁰¹Operations Planning and Coordination Staff (OPACS), *Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) 2009, After Action Report*.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Ibid.

learned from CWC 2007. This communication will be further enhanced though if a formalized approach to planning is adopted. The direction by the executive in the form of a strategic document outlining the structure and approach for future operations of this nature can compliment the already outstanding efforts by planners to mesh the sometimes disjointed effects seen in the execution of operations.

Although the WGA envisioned for T&T should mirror the approach used in Australia and Canada, careful attention must be paid to avoid making fundamental mistakes made by them in their implementation of the WGA. As highlighted in the *'Briefing Paper- Submission to the Independent Panel on Afghanistan- Canada's Whole-of-Government Approach in Afghanistan: Implications on Development and Peace-Building'* "Canada's 'integrated' 3 D's, or whole-of-government, approach encompassing development, diplomacy and defence... in Afghanistan has had adverse effects on development and peace-building."¹⁰⁴ These adverse effects mentioned here refer to the opinion that diplomacy and development fails to get adequate attention in favour of defence. A more coordinated approach is recommended, so that the balance and distinction between the 3 D's can be maintained.¹⁰⁵ Similarly the Australian approach to the hosting of the Sydney Olympics highlighted this key learning: "When faced with a national security imperative, a centrally coordinated planning structure may be needed to bring about effective coordination of players who traditionally have limited need to come together"¹⁰⁶ The T&T model therefore should seek to maintain the open communication, coordination and

¹⁰⁴Surendrini Wijeyaratne, "Canada's Whole-of-Government Approach in Afghanistan: Implications on Development and Peace Building," Abstract. (2007), 1.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Shergold AM, *Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges*, 214.

collaboration seen in the experiences of CWC 2007, VSOA and CHOGM 2009 across the joint interagency multinational and public spectrum. The early integration of foreign troops into the local security architecture for VSOA and CHOGM 2009 paid handsome dividends for regional and international security cooperation. This cooperation was based on the Visiting Forces Act legislation which was originally drafted for CWC 2007 and kept as a legacy benefit and used for both the VSOA and the CHOGM 2009 conferences. Enhanced communication by OPACS with the Caribbean nations, who deployed troops under the Visiting Forces Act, prior to their arrival in T&T, was also seen as vital to their smooth integration on this occasion. This was achieved through a timed visit to each of the seven countries that contributed troops and police, to deliver a briefing package on logistics, pre-deployment training and readiness, and operations. The inclusion of five CARICOM staff officers who were integrated into OPACS also echoed the lessons learned from CWC 2007 and contributed to the WGA used as well as regional security cooperation. This cooperation was further enhanced by the interaction across normal boundaries between OPACS and OGDs and OGAs responsible for finance, logistics, media relations and the national secretariat.

In summary, the planning of major events in T&T have taken on a new and improved culture since the experiences of 27 July 1990 in Trinidad and the events of 11 September 2001 in the US. The changes due to an upsurge in crime internally following the 1990 insurrection and the security demands enforced by the US since 9/11 and the war on terror have completely revolutionised the approach to planning and execution of major public events forever. The ad hoc arrangements that were historically seen as adequate security measures in the era prior to these two significant milestones quickly became impractical, in the 'age of terror.' The effects of the change in the approach was also seen in the planning for the annual carnival celebrations,

which represented the most common major event in the T&T perspective, and for which some measure of heightened security planning was experienced for years. The historical expectation by law enforcement agency personnel to deal with minor infractions of the law during major events hosted in T&T was replaced by the realities of a complex security environment following the 1990 attempted insurrection and 9/11. These realities precipitated the shift in the approach to planning occasioned by additional risk factors that need to be considered. International terrorist activity, burgeoning crime and the demands placed on the region by the US after 9/11 have all led to the necessity to 'ramp up' planning methods. The planning effort exercised in CWC 2007, VSOA and CHOGM 2009 was a watershed for regional military cooperation and the lessons learned from these operations, demonstrated the latent ability for enhanced regional integration through the use of the WGA in major events planning.

This approach was compared by the writer to the WGA used by Australia and Canada, and similarities were observed in the benefits gained and challenges experienced. The cooperation and collaboration between the operational planning staff for each operation and their civilian counterparts in OGDs and OGAs also showed the budding strengths of the WGA in this operational context. Conversely, the weaknesses seen and the negative effects experienced, served to inform lessons learned that were implemented with success and which can and will be utilized in future endeavours. The communication between relevant authorities from varying government departments worked well, but staff needs to continue relationship building in order to take advantage of the full potential of the WGA. The formalizing of the WGA is seen as a way to maximise the benefits and militate against the negatives of the approach used for the operations. The joint interagency multinational and public frameworks employed in the structure of the planning staffs on each occasion, was a definite pillar in the eventual successful outcome

of the events. The use of staff officers from all national agencies and government departments together with those from CARICOM participating nations was another strength that characterised the WGA used. Once the formal structure for future operations of this nature is communicated by the executive and the cultural, legal and organisational parameters are defined, the WGA to planning and execution of operations in T&T can be of value to the TTDF, the country and the region significantly.

CHAPTER 3 FORMAL ADOPTION OF THE WGA IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Having explored the planning structures and relationships used for the three operations post 9/11, the CWC 2007 and the two international conferences, and observed the close association in relation to the WGA used in Australia and Canada, this chapter will examine the feasibility of formalizing these structures in order to maximize the benefits of a similar approach in T&T and mitigate against the drawbacks of the negative effects observed. Firstly an examination of the legal, training, cultural and organisational implications of an official adoption of the WGA to planning and hosting major events in T&T will be explored. Next the command and control mechanisms needed to support such a structure and provide for its seamless activation will be deliberated. The obstacles to this move will be scrutinized next and the negative and positive effects on the interoperability with other Defence Forces in the Caribbean region will be scanned. The OGDs, OGAs and the other divisions of the Ministry of National Security in T&T will also be examined in this context to confirm that the formalised WGA is valuable. Finally, a look at the application of this formalised approach to other national level operation and out of area missions like disaster response and management will also be done to further demonstrate the significance of the WGA.

Legal, Training, Cultural and Organisational Implications

As observed with the staging of the CWC 2007 and the two international conferences held in T&T in 2009, there was need to enact enabling legislation to bring effect to intended operations that crossed interagency, regional and international boundaries. In the case of CWC 2007, VSOA 2009 and CHOGM 2009 the Visiting Forces Act was the main legislative support required to formalise the levels of interaction needed. It was also observed that for the Sydney

Olympics a similar strengthening of legislation occurred with the Australian Defence Act in order to give the Australian Defence Force a firmer footing to take action “in relation to the exercise of powers for different tasks.”¹⁰⁷ Likewise, the need to have a directed strategy for the implementation of the WGA in T&T may need to be set in the context of enabling legislation to cause the smooth sharing of critical information and resources across interagency, regional and international boundaries to occur. This can be achieved through a National Security Strategy being articulated to encompass existing laws, and if needed new memoranda of understanding or treaties to support the promotion of interagency cooperation and collaboration for the planning and execution of major events in T&T and the Caribbean. In accordance with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report on ‘*Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States: Governance, Peace and Security*’, “The starting point for an effective whole-of-government approach is clear political guidance and leadership.”¹⁰⁸

The strategy should communicate the T&T Government’s commitment to the WGA and spell out the roles that each national player is assigned in order to create a logical fit into a proposed structure. Regionally, the development of treaties of cooperation to facilitate continued security assistance when required should be pursued. These treaties can be moulded along the model of the Visiting Forces Act used for CWC 2007, but should cover mutual assistance in a much broader spectrum of civil organisations and state bodies across the region. The CARICOM Council of Ministers should spearhead these legal articles, in order to give credibility to the efforts. While the benefits of mutual support regionally are anticipated, the historical lack

¹⁰⁷Williams, *The Sydney Olympics: The Trouble-Free Games.*, 11.

¹⁰⁸Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States," (2006), 23.

of the political will of CARICOM governments for formalised security assistance is expected.¹⁰⁹ Nonetheless, the development of any national security strategy should include the legal parameters that promote and develop further regional communication, cooperation and collaboration, especially in matters that can yield obvious benefits from economies of scale. These benefits may include cooperation in the areas of training and the sharing of intelligence and which can build on the legacy of CWC 2007 and on the already established 'EXERCISE TRADEWINDS'.

The training value that is already accruing annually through EXERCISE TRADEWINDS can be further enhanced to reflect the realities of the small and vulnerable nations of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and those of the wider Caribbean. Since the OECS nor any single Caribbean country cannot afford to fund developmental training on their own for the myriad of threats due to globalisation, natural disasters or an international terrorist attack, then a collaborative approach is essential. One such combined approach was observed recently when the GOTT partnered with the Government of the United States of America and hosted the annual '*Allied Forces Humanitarian Exercise/ Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias*' (**FAHUM**) 2011 in T&T. "FAHUM 2011 is a training exercise that focused on enhancing the nation's response capabilities and ability to operate with regional and international military forces and humanitarian assistance groups."¹¹⁰ Over fifteen international, six regional and fifty local agency participants including organisations from the US, UK, Canada, and the Caribbean

¹⁰⁹Bishop, Lt Col Colvin W., "Caribbean Regional Security: The Challenges to Creating Formal Military Relationships in the English Speaking Caribbean" (Masters of Military Art and Science, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.), 87.

¹¹⁰Government of Trinidad and Tobago, "Being Prepared and Ready to Act," <http://www.news.gov.tt/index.php?news=7466&print> (accessed April/18, 2011).

region were involved. The US Ambassador to T&T Ambassador Beatrice W. Welters in her press release on FAHUM remarked:

Having strong regional partnerships enhances our abilities to provide security and stability especially in times of crisis. Focused regional security cooperation is the key to strengthening our capacity for mutual cooperation in order to provide an effective emergency response¹¹¹

While this type of training must involve a range of government agencies across the region, it is practical to suggest a WGA to ensure the optimum benefits are derived. Training in this regard will greatly benefit from a formalised adoption of the WGA as the unity of effort observed in FAHUM can be further enhanced, for the advantage of all involved.

Another advantage that can be exploited by adopting the WGA is from the cultural diversity of the region and its many organisations. The strength of the Caribbean culture is its variety. Operating together in a WGA to major events as seen in CWC 2007 leveraged the cultural strengths of all associates. This can be further optimised since improved communication, cooperation and collaboration will be a clear implication for its adoption. On the other hand, cultural differences can also cause friction and have a major impact on effectiveness.¹¹²

The organisational implications of the adoption of the WGA present some challenges. This may include the historical complaint of a lack of resources by some agencies and can cause an imbalance in implementation. This may be the case with Canada's involvement in Haiti,

¹¹¹U.S. Ambassador Beatrice W. Welters, "2011 Press Releases:Embassy of the United States, Trinidad and Tobago," <http://trinidad.usembassy.gov/pr041311.html> (accessed April/25, 2011).

¹¹²Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*, 31.

where CIDA does not possess sufficient man-power to maintain continuous rotations of their personnel and funding for projects.¹¹³ During the execution of VSOA and CHOGM 2009 in T&T, a lack of financial support for security operations was also noted as the ambitions of government to host the conferences were not always matched by its commitment to fund the required demands of international security best practices.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, the use of liaison officers from each organisation can foster cross organisational relationships that can fulfil the mandate for representation around the planning table, in order to facilitate smooth operations.

Working in a whole-of-government context does have its difficulties but there are many lessons learnt from experiences in the past that can be applied to improve the planning process. Some of these lessons have been drawn from case studies related to the OECD Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) study on fragile states, and mirror those events witnessed in CWC 2007, VSOA and CHOGM 2009. The OECD study characterises fragile states as those where:

- A lack of political will and a weak capacity to build up and execute policies to deal with poverty exists and
- Poor authority structures and violent conflict are typical.¹¹⁵

Consequently, some Caribbean nations like Haiti and other border line states can be deemed fragile, and so can benefit from the lessons learnt. One of the lessons has to deal with “the need

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Operations Planning and Coordination Staff (OPACS), *Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) 2009, After Action Report.*, 24.

¹¹⁵ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*, 16.

for formal structures”¹¹⁶ like the WGA. Although the current ad hoc approach to planning has its own value and has worked in the past, it does also have limitations. Those limitations in the present global security environment post 9/11 must be mitigated and so the formalised WGA is seen as a viable alternative.

In summary, the legal, training, cultural and organisational implications for the implementation of the WGA are many and varied. Although those highlighted are not exhaustive, they point to the need for vigilance when consideration is given to the formal adoption of the WGA to major events planning in T&T and the Caribbean.

Command and Control

Equal attentiveness is also necessary when the command and control mechanisms required for the smooth implementation of the WGA among all agencies of the GOTT is being considered. There has been previous command relationships established to cater for the transfer of instructions from the strategic to the operational and tactical levels for the full spectrum of operations. These relationships are grounded in the laws of T&T that govern the use of the main agencies like the T&T Police Service (TTPS) and the T&T Defence Force (TTDF) to name but two. Chapters 15:01 and 14:01 of the Laws of the Republic of T&T clearly set out the roles, scope and functions of the two main agencies respectively. These laws however, although still relevant for independent action of each agency, did not cater for the current interagency construct that is most prevalent today. It is therefore crucial to shape the networks and relationships that will facilitate the smooth adoption of the WGA given the drastic changes that have occurred in the current security environment post 9/11. Even before the security

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

demands of 9/11 were thrust upon the country, attempts to align the command and control mechanisms with today's realities were seen in the 90's following the attempted insurrection, of 27 July 1990. The most memorable effort at interagency coordination in T&T saw the formation of the Joint Operations Command Centre (JOCC) in 1996. The JOCC was "tasked with facilitating and coordinating inter-agency cooperation and unity of effort among the respective internal agencies and external security organizations to deter and disrupt unlawful elements in the society."¹¹⁷ Although the formation of the JOCC was accompanied by a memorandum of agreement by the major stakeholders for the attachment of personnel to operate at the site of JOCC and the Coastal Radar Surveillance Centre, it was not until 20 March 1998 that full manning of the centre was achieved. This was due in part to the late approval by government for the increase in the manpower establishment of the T&T Coast Guard, in order to man the Coastal Radar Surveillance Centre, which was received on 19 February 1998. The slow reaction by US contractors who were retained to supply and install the necessary hardware and software for the equipping of the JOCC also caused inordinate delays in its start-up.¹¹⁸ The reluctance on the part of agency heads to give up personnel for the task at the JOCC was also indicative of the common 'stovepipe' attitudes prevalent at the time. The support for the JOCC only came after internal tensions between the state and the Jamaat-al-Musimeen, the dissident group that staged the attempted coup in 1990 reached an impasse that the full operations of the JOCC was realised.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷Joan Massiah (Mrs.) and Commodore Richard Kelshall, "Establishment of a Joint Operations Command Centre for Trinidad and Tobago" 1997).

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

Further relationship building is important if command and control of national level operations in the interagency context is to be successful. Evidence of continued efforts, in this regard, aimed at reaching a workable model for T&T was encouraged in the latest review of the Security Sector done by HCR Security International Limited in 2009. One recommendation by the consultant was for the Ministry of National Security (MNS) and its Divisions to “work towards a closer relationship by initially having informal meetings and retreats involving both Divisions and Section Heads in an environment of non-retribution.”¹²⁰ The sentiments of Colonel David Barr, in his case study in ‘*Interagency Cooperation: The Kananaskis G8 Summit*’ also suggests that “excellent personnel relationships... should not be underestimated as a factor for success of interagency operations.”¹²¹

The model of interagency cooperation required by T&T to achieve successful command and control must be built on sound interpersonal relationships and should resemble one exhibited by the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in Africa. According to the Commander USAFRICOM, General William “Kip” Ward, significant progress in this combatant command (COCOM) was made since their interagency-oriented design was built by the “Department of Defence to institutionalize interagency perspectives into its mission and activities.”¹²² This model which is set in a WGA in the interagency context is addressing the many challenges faced by African nations, and although the T&T context is not as desperate, a similar approach by local security organisations can have a comparable effect. The informal relationships that are built up

¹²⁰HCR Security International Ltd, *Review of the National Security Sector of Trinidad and Tobago (the Ross Report)*, [2009].

¹²¹David Barr, "The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Inter-Agency Coopertion," 06 (2003), 20.

¹²²General William "Kip" Ward, "What "Right" Looks Like in the Interagency: A Commander's Perspective," *Interagency Journal* 2, no. 1 (2011), 3 (accessed March 2011).

in the interagency context can go a long way in smoothing the facilitation of the adoption of the WGA among national security entities in T&T. The use of the USAFRICOM design that recognises that the efforts of all players are mutually supportive and complimentary can also work for the command and control of national operations in T&T. Once the historic ‘stovepipe’ attitudes seen in previous iterations of the command and control model for interagency operations, like the JOCC is replaced with genuine whole-of-government communication, cooperation and collaboration, built up through personal interaction,¹²³ a workable model for T&T will be realised.

Obstacles to formal Adoption of the WGA

Even after personal relationships are established across interagency boundaries, there are still some expected obstacles to a formalized approach that may need to be eliminated. These problems may include the bureaucratic systems, leadership and issues of joint planning. The current state of the Ministry of National Security (MNS) as highlighted in the HCR Security International report in 2009 is listed as “administratively badly out of balance.”¹²⁴ The MNS has a broad mandate as the sole government organization responsible for both national security and defence of the nation.¹²⁵ Since crime and security are by far the most critical issues on the national agenda, the overwhelming nature of the MNS work in the current global environment of

¹²³Joan Massiah (Mrs.) and Commodore Richard Kelshall, *Establishment of a Joint Operations Command Centre for Trinidad and Tobago*. For instance; Stovepipe mentality was clearly exhibited during the formation of the JOCC when the major stakeholders like the TTPS, TTDF, C&E Div and the IM Div refused to send personnel to staff the Command Centre and the Coastal Radar Surveillance Centre. *HCR Security International Ltd.34; and The Establishment of a Joint Operations Command Centre for Trinidad and Tobago. Joan Massiah(Mrs)*

¹²⁴HCR Security International Ltd, *Review of the National Security Sector of Trinidad and Tobago (the Ross Report)*, 50.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*

unpredictability is understandable. Having to administer the affairs of all its many divisions, including the police, defence force, fire, prisons, immigration, forensic science labs, intelligence agencies and central administration with what has been termed “archaic laws and regulations”¹²⁶ is counter-productive. The procurement regulations and laws that govern the civil service were enacted over 50 years ago and have outlived their relevance in a fast paced, modern, computer driven, globalized world. “Overworked and underpaid staff” exist in an overcrowded work environment that is generally unresponsive to the current demands of business machines and ergonomic furniture. This presents a barrier to the smooth implementation of a formalized approach to national operations.

Strategic Leadership

In addition to the issue of outdated systems that serve to frustrate¹²⁷ the best efforts at success by operational commanders from all agencies, growth in leadership is essential. Strategic guidance is the most disturbing aspect of the leadership realm. Although there was a common desire for effective government, through a vision to attain developed nation status by the year 2020, the strategic leadership is a fundamental requirement.¹²⁸ Translating desire into articulate direction is not a strategic strong point in T&T. The sometimes volatile strategic level that is vulnerable to easily swayed public opinion can add another dimension of discouragement to eager operational commanders who simply want to get on with the job. The question of who leads has fortunately not been a problem, as the military tradition of leadership from in front,

¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷Ibid. For instance, the procurement system for critical working parts for aircraft and surface vessels of the TTD is archaic and would often frustrate the ready posture needed to keep these assets operational

¹²⁸Government of Trinidad and Tobago, *Draft Strategic National Plan (Vision 2020)*, [2005].

‘when in charge’, and from the back when not in charge is understood and well established in the minds of all concerned.

Joint Planning Doctrine

Interagency cooperation does not equal joint planning. There are fundamental differences between the organisations that must operate together that are annoying.¹²⁹ Training and standard operating procedures (SOPs) are germane to the success of any operation, while doctrine is essential to drive training in any environment. The absence of conceptual doctrine for the TTDF that informs joint planning is worrying. Although planning and execution of joint operations for CWC 2007, VSOA and CHOGM 2009 was a turning point for T&T, there is still need to anchor our successes in sound doctrine, in order to maximise the lessons learned. Added to this is the ad hoc nature of operations as evidenced by comments made to the HCR Security International Ltd during the security review 2009, “a lack of doctrine leads to everything being done in an ad hoc manner”.¹³⁰ The burden of charting a course for joint planning and execution of national operations has been shouldered by the TTDF, even though in most instances it is the domain of the law enforcement agency that is being traversed. Application of the lessons learned from CWC 2007 and the hosting of the two major conferences can foster continued interagency cooperation and collaboration in the future JIMP environment. In order to manage the implementation of the WGA to reduce possible friction, a Joint Operations policy must be

¹²⁹HCR Security International Ltd, *Review of the National Security Sector of Trinidad and Tobago (the Ross Report)*, 67. For instance, the TTPS is a unionised organisation while the TTDF is not. Their terms and conditions of service are fundamentally different and this creates anxiety with troops working continuously in close quarters to the police, when soldiers see their police counterparts going home after an eight hour tour of duty, and earning in excess of what the soldier takes home in his pay cheque, while essentially doing ‘police work’

¹³⁰Ibid.

developed for all agencies of National Security.¹³¹ This policy should also be accompanied with a comprehensive memorandum of understanding (MOU) that clearly addresses the obstacles mentioned, since this will be critical to its success, and should be treated as a centre of gravity for this process. In the case of the CF and the RCMP for the G8 Summit a similar memorandum of understanding (MOU) to guide request and approval procedures was recommended as a lesson learned.¹³² Like the CF the TTDF recognises that continued interagency interaction in domestic operations is essential to the safety and security of our nations, therefore inappropriate systems, leadership and joint interagency planning and execution of operations must be all overcome.

Interoperability

The value of the WGA to major events planning in the joint interagency context can be demonstrated through consideration of the positive effect this approach will undoubtedly have on the interoperability with the other Defence Forces in the region. The operational fit with the other divisions of the MNS and the other government departments and agencies in T&T is a less complex equation. The Oxford Dictionary of the US military defines interoperability as “the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”¹³³ The positive attributes of the WGA on the interoperability with other defence forces can be seen in the areas of training, the development of common doctrine, bargaining power with donor nations as well as the potential for collective security of the region. Training

¹³¹Ibid.

¹³²Barr, *The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Inter-Agency Cooperation*, 15.

¹³³Answers.com, "What is Interoperability," <http://www.answers.com/topic/interoperability#ixzz1KDYPJGHd> (accessed April/20, 2011).

has already been used as a vehicle for enhanced interoperability across the Caribbean through mechanisms like the Regional Security System established among OECS states, and exercises like EXERCISE TRADEWINDS and FAHUM spoken about earlier. The obvious benefits that accrue to the small, less wealthy nations of the Caribbean, who can ill afford to spend enormous sums of scarce capital from their national purses, are enormous. The economies of scale that can be gained and exploited through collective training easily justify the multinational WGA. This training benefit can also capture other needy areas that feed into national development, and can be built along the 3D's concept. The strengthening of institutional capacity in all nations of the region can be achieved through mutually beneficial training.

The development of common doctrine for purely military and joint interagency multinational operations, fashioned after CWC 2007 is another positive feature of interoperability. The nations of the Caribbean all currently utilise the doctrine manuals of our developed nation partners like the US, UK and Canada. Although these manuals may not always be applicable in our scaled down scenario, nevertheless they still are relevant since we face the same threats from globalization and international terrorism as every other nation. The opportunity presented through the unity of effort gained from enhanced interoperability with each other in the WGA is ripe for the development of a common doctrine that can serve all our nations. The employment of the common doctrine can lead to the cementing of security assistance, cooperation and eventually integration on a wider scale.

Once there is political will throughout the region to move the process ahead, security integration can lead to the fulfilment of the CARICOM objectives of political and economic integration, better known as the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)¹³⁴. The advantage of collective security in the region can catapult progress in development to significant heights over time. The global leverage of the region can also grow immensely as the true worth of the interoperability is realised. Bargaining for security and economic assistance for the less developed countries of the region like Haiti can be greatly enhanced with the WGA being fully implemented throughout the Caribbean.

This may be a utopian view of how things can develop, given the possible negative effects that can also have a devastating outcome on CARICOM relations. The pessimistic outlook for the WGA may aggravate the perceived threat to sovereignty felt by member states, as well as the real burden of financial commitments that can arise for the wealthier states like T&T. Historically, the smaller states of the OECS have felt threatened by the gaze of the larger Caribbean nations on their lifestyles and rights to govern themselves.¹³⁵ Whether justified or not, this has been the genesis of the inability to achieve consensus on a way forward for the region. Although five decades have passed since the first talks of integration, the common ground to bring the nations together remains elusive.¹³⁶ The question remains then, could it be the security from global threats or natural disasters that affect all Caribbean nations that will be the thread that binds the region? The answer will only unfold with time, but the potential of the WGA to be a unifying methodology and a catalyst for regional integration is clear.

¹³⁴ CARICOM Secretariat, "CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)," (accessed April/25, 2011).

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

WGA value in planning other Major Events

The application of the WGA in the planning and execution of other major events of on national and regional scale is worth exploring. The potential for its relevance in disaster management and response is already established. The response by the international community to devastating natural disasters around the world in the last two years alone is testimony of the WGA in this context. T&T's assistance to Grenada in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and the international community's response to the earthquakes and resultant tsunamis in Haiti, Chile and Japan are further evidence of the value of the WGA in these instances. Canada's model of whole of government that is being applied in Haiti is well documented and can be replicated in the regional context. The FAHUM 2011 exercise that was just completed in T&T also bears witness that the joint interagency multinational WGA is a valuable model that is worthy of consideration for implementation in the T&T and the regional scenario of the future.¹³⁷ Like disaster response and major events planning the WGA can also be utilized to great advantage in the war on drugs that is one of the region's prime challenges.¹³⁸

In summary this chapter examined the feasibility of the formal adoption of the WGA in T&T. The advantages and drawbacks to the legal, training, cultural and organisational implications were also reviewed. Command and control relationships and its historic path that has been developed over time to the present were revisited to determine the best way to implement the process across the agencies of the government of T&T. Some of the impediments to the smooth adoption of a formalised approach were examined and the value of interoperability

¹³⁷LtCol Peter Sealey, *After Action Report on FAHUM 2011*, [2011].

¹³⁸Glyne Grannum, "Towards a More Secure Caribbean: Enhancing Military Cooperation within the Caribbean Community," 25 (2007), 38.

across the region was shown to be high. The use of the process in planning and execution of other major events, as a catalyst to regional development and integration was illustrated. The clear conclusion therefore is that the WGA to major events planning for the TTDF, T&T as a nation and the Caribbean region as a whole, has tremendous value waiting to be harnessed.

CHAPTER 4 THE WAY FORWARD

Before consideration of harnessing the many benefits that an implemented, accepted and operational WGA in T&T and the Caribbean can offer, the possible framework for such an approach will be further examined and the probable major events that are anticipated will be listed and rationalised. Secondly an optimal model that recommends a National Operations Centre that will provide for the requirements, culture and mannerisms of T&T and the CARICOM will be highlighted. Next, the ideal conditions for its performance will be discussed and contrasted with the reality of such a move. Finally, the legacy of the WGA to future planners will be outlined and the conclusion of the paper will discuss anticipated further research in this field of study.

The Future of Major Events Planning

The future of major events planning in T&T and the Caribbean pre-supposes that there will be further occasions to cooperate on the scale of CWC2007, VSOA and CHOGM 2009 or greater. These may include but are not limited to the following: Deliberate planning for the hosting of an Olympic Games, the FIFA World Cup, another ICC Cricket World Cup, and Summit of the Americas or a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, within any of the nations of the Caribbean. The possibilities can also include the hosting of a United Nations Forum that brings together the leaders of the world in one of the territories of the Caribbean. Likewise, the value of the WGA can be brought to bear on the plight of our poorest neighbours who are currently in need like Haiti, and hopefully it would not be in the case where another Caribbean nation is devastated by an earthquake, tsunami or major hurricane or natural or manmade disaster. The likelihood of a major terrorist attack on one or more of the Caribbean

states, or the infiltration of insurgents from the organised drug cartels that are waging war on the Mexican government is not farfetched. In any of the scenarios outlined, the scale of conscious planning used for CWC 2007 will have to be employed with its attendant levels of security and the opportunity for the employment of the WGA will again be available. Even better, the pre-planning and crafting of contingency plans for all these circumstances in a framework that is especially designed to take full advantage of the lessons learned from the joint interagency multinational and public (JIMP) WGA is extremely valuable.

The suitability of an Optimal Model

The suitability of an optimal model that exploits the characteristics inherent in the JIMP and WGA can be designed and built into a National Operations Centre (NOC) in T&T. Once the full value of the model is tried and tested using the contingency plans for any of the above mentioned major events, it can be reproduced in each of the CARICOM states and networked accordingly to multiply its value across the region. The idea of a NOC is not new, since this same concept has been used for years in developed nations of the world. Even in T&T the model of a NOC is not novel, since this type of operations centre existed with the Joint Operations Command Centre (JOCC) spoken of earlier and also is resident in each of the operational agencies within T&T. The HCR Security International Report also endorses the creation of a single NOC that is appropriately staffed from all agencies with authority to task resources horizontally in day-to-day operations, as a means to providing operational decision makers with situational awareness and combating the high crime rate in T&T.¹³⁹ However, like the USAFRICOM, the interagency perspectives must be institutionalized and built into its mission

¹³⁹HCR Security International Ltd, *Review of the National Security Sector of Trinidad and Tobago (the Ross Report)*, 93.

and activities from inception. In order to make the NOC a reality, the legislation to support the formation, manning and operations of the NOC should be initialised in a JIMP and WGA. The doctrine and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the NOC can be crafted with a JIMP and WGA in mind, in order to make full use of all agency contributions equally. The command and control relationships must be clearly thought out to reflect the coordination, collaboration and communication channels that must be set up to bring life to the interagency concept. The leadership of the NOC should mirror the realities of the particular nation's modus operandi and provide for suitably qualified personnel in order to command in the interagency context.¹⁴⁰ Lastly, the financial commitment by the government for the tools, equipment, software, training and personnel to staff and run the NOC must be secured before the concept can be fully adopted.

Once the financial commitment is received, the next step in the process is to identify the needs, culture and idiosyncrasies of T&T or the particular Caribbean nation and plan in accordance with these for the implementation of the NOC. The most critical need for T&T is to address the current crime situation. The design of the NOC should therefore cater to the presence of law enforcement, legal and corrections personnel from inception. The interface between these prime agencies will no doubt create a synergy that can produce operational contingency plans that must realistically address the current crime situation. The inclusion of all the other agencies and departments that deal with youth delinquency, reform and social opportunities can be brought into the mix as needed. Education, Social Welfare and the Media will also have to play their role. The TTDF, IM Div and C&E Div will naturally all have a place in the planning staff in order to make use of the best and brightest planners. The use of a 'National Think Tank' and links to get ideas on studies from abroad that are related to crime

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

fighting, can be arranged through researchers at the University of the West Indies and the University of T&T. The cultural paradigms and mannerisms inherent in T&T should also be fully considered. These will assist in introducing the needed environment in the NOC from the beginning, and aid in producing home grown traditions that are familiar to all planners.

The Ideal Conditions for Implementation

The ideal conditions for the implementation of the WGA to major events planning in a JIMP context may never be assured, however the presence of the political will for the move is a crucial enabler and success factor. Once the government is sufficiently convinced of the result that such an approach can have on the current crime situation, the future value of the WGA will justify its total implementation without much effort. The WGA must truly be whole-of-government and not simply a Ministry of National Security initiative. It must be driven from the strategic level by the Prime Minister (PM), and led by the National Security Council (NSC), which is chaired by the PM. The Strategic Command Operations Group (SCOG) will be the interface between the strategic and the operational level planners, resident in the NOC. The PM can also seek to exert political influence on regional leaders in order to set the conditions for further adoption of the concept. The conditions for Caribbean Integration have been heightened by the recent catastrophic events in Haiti, Chile, New Zealand and Japan. The world economic collapse, the effects of organised crime cartels,¹⁴¹ the war on terror and the effects that each has had on regional development is further evidence of the need to quickly identify a mechanism to kick start CARICOM efforts at regional integration. The WGA being proposed, using the model

¹⁴¹Grannum, *Towards a More Secure Caribbean: Enhancing Military Cooperation within the Caribbean Community*, 48.

of the NOC as a standard to apply regional solutions can assist in creating the circumstances for that integration.

Caribbean integration can also be prompted by the accession of states to the objectives of the CSME. The full adoption of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) as the final appellant court for all CARICOM member states, was the first objective that has been stalling the process. It should be noted, that although the CCJ is headquartered in T&T, that country's government has chosen to remain tied to the UK's Privy Council as its final appeal court. Hypothetically speaking, following the CCJ's adoption would be the declaration of the region as one economic space and monetary unification should follow. The concept of one geographic space has already been used successfully in CWC 2007, when the nine host nation locations were all deemed as 'one space' using 'sunset legislation' to facilitate easing of Immigration and Customs regulations for visitors.¹⁴² This would then be trailed by economic and political union.¹⁴³ This would constitute the ideal conditions within CARICOM. Support for regional development from wealthier nations like the US, UK and Canada, who traditionally has supplied aid, can then be directed through the CARICOM framework. The CARICOM framework can also be the engine to foster collective security treaties, utilizing the NOCs in each country as nodes on a network for the planning and implementation of development policy. Another legacy from CWC 2007 that can be used to enhance the integration process is the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS). This agency is being currently used to manage pooled funds from member states for the fight against crime in the region, and can be further expanded to cater for the handling of development funds. These development funds can be used for reconstruction

¹⁴²Sealy, *International Cricket Council Cricket World Cup 2007, Local Security Committee Presentation*, 24.

¹⁴³CARICOM Secretariat, *CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)*, 1.

and recovery from natural disasters and as needed across the Caribbean. Legislation to support all these CARICOM mechanisms can be grounded in the revised treaties for cooperation and arbitrated if needed using the CCJ by all member states. While this paper does not address CARICOM integration directly, it is the writer's opinion that integration is an important by-product of the WGA. Since many attempts at CARICOM integration has so far failed, it is felt that the WGA can certainly act as a catalyst for this much needed amalgamation to flourish. Once the value of the WGA is recognised and exploited issues like collective security among all regional stakeholders can be successfully used to combat the global security threats facing each member state.

The reality of the Caribbean integration process is that it may take another cataclysmic event to unify the political leadership of the region and jolt them into integrated action. One more economic crash that devastates the viability of the regional markets, or a major natural disaster is both possible. The erosive effects of globalization on vulnerable small states continue to occur daily, while little is being done to buttress the fragile security environment in the Caribbean. The lasting value that should be realised with the implementation of the WGA to major events planning can have a positive effect on the outlook for CARICOM member states. The promise of improved regional security and enhanced economic relations among nations is a step in the right direction. The use of National Operation Centres as a model built on the Joint Interagency Multinational Public WGA carries with it a valuable investment that can bear much fruit in the Caribbean of the future.

Summary

In summary, the future of major events planning in T&T and the Caribbean may lie in the adoption of the WGA in a JIMP context, using a National Operations Centre as an optimal model. The crafting of the model should give careful consideration to the needs, culture and mannerisms of T&T's operational environment to come up with the best fit as necessary. The ideal conditions for the implementation of the WGA is set in the presence of the political will of not just T&T's leadership, but more so in the resolve of CARICOM Heads of State for regional integration. The reality of the possibility of further growth in regional unity may be dependent on an unfavourable outcome in world events in order to jump-start the much needed process. The legacy for future planners can be rooted in the WGA to major events that are built on a JIMP platform utilizing a National Operations Centre to deliver consummate value. The use of the WGA as a mechanism for furthering CARICOM integration is an ideal topic for future research, as this writer proposed. Its tenets encourage coordination, collaboration and enhanced communication between agents that commonly act in isolation, and therefore can kick-start the stalled process of Caribbean unity.

Conclusion

This paper sought to define the WGA and illustrated that it was the efforts of public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated response to particular issues. The term whole-of-government can also be used interchangeably with other terms that mean roughly the same thing like the 3 D's concept, joined-up government, JIMP and integrated approach to name a few. The use of the WGA was examined in the context of Australia and Canada and the lessons learned by these two countries were explored to

determine the value and challenges of the approach in both the domestic and international context. Next, the historical progression to the present day that characterised the T&T experience with planning for and hosting major events was tracked. An examination of the CWC 2007 operations revealed a turning point in the approach to planning and this was contrasted with the annual hosting of Carnival celebration in T&T. The impact of the events of 27 July 1990 and the 11 September 2001 was identified as the major catalysts in precipitating a change from ad hoc planning to modern, deliberate planning. The hosting of the VSOA and CHOGM 2009 in T&T took advantage of the lessons learned from CWC 2007. When compared to the Australian and Canadian context the value in formalizing the WGA was also borne out as beneficial. The feasibility of the adoption of the WGA in T&T was then explored and the legal, training, organisational and cultural implications were investigated to show the need for a proper fit of the proposed model to be established upon adoption. The command and control relationships were explored and the requirement of informal bonding of personnel from all agencies was recommended as an enabling factor for the smooth adoption of the WGA by the relevant agencies. The benefits to interoperability between regional forces as a result of the WGA were identified and the impediments to a formalised approach were discussed. The true value was also demonstrated in the wider use of the WGA for disaster response and enhanced regional integration. Finally, the recommendation of a NOC as the vehicle that can amalgamate the WGA in a JIMP context to maximise the potential of the planning efforts was determined. Through the examination of the ideal conditions for the implementation of the WGA it was realised that the approach can stimulate regional integration once political intentions were homogenous. This was also deemed by the writer to be an area for further research, since setting

the conditions for regional integration could precede collective security and eventual Caribbean unity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. [Ottawa]: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003.
- Adams, Gordon. "The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Separating the US Civilian and Defence Missions." (1 February 2010).
- Adams, Gordon. "The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Separating the U.S. Civilian and Defence Missions." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (: 01/20/2011-1-5.
- Albert, D. S. "Agility, Focus, and Convergence: The Future of Command and Control." *The International C2 Journal* 1, no. 1 (2007): 1-30.
- Anderson, D. "Slim: Field-Marshal Lord Slim." Chap. 16, In *Churchill's Generals*, edited by J. Keegan, 298-322. London, United Kingdom: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991.
- Australian Public Service Commission. "Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges." <http://www.apsc.gov.au/mac/connectinggovernment1.htm> (accessed 10 February, 2011).
- Barr, David. "The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Inter-Agency Cooperation." 06, (2003).
- Baylor, R. A. *Field Marshal Sir William J. Slim: Paragon of Moral and Ethical Courage*. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Army War College, 1998.
- Biennendijk, Hans. *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations* Washington, DC: Published for the Centre of National Defence University Press, 2009.
- Bishop, Lt Col Colvin W. "Caribbean Regional Security: The Challenges to Creating Formal Military Relationships in the English Speaking Caribbean." *Masters of Military Art and Science*, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas., 2002.
- Braveboy-Wagner, Jacqueline. "Opportunities and Limitations of the Exercise of Foreign Policy Power by a very Small State: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. 23 NO. 3, (2010): 407-427.
- Buchan, Gavin. "Breaking Down the Silos: Managing the Whole-of-Government Effort in Afghanistan." *Canadian Military Journal* 10, no. 4 (2010): 75-79.
- Canada, Department of National Defence. *A-PA-005-000/AP-001. Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003.

- . *A-PA-005-000/AP-004, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005.
- . *A-PD-131-002/PT-001 Leadership Volume 2: The Professional Officer*. Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 1973.
- . *B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Land Force Command*. Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy, 1996.
- . "Inter-Agency Handbook for Domestic Operations; B-GJ-005-308 FP-010." (2004).
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, A-PA-005-000/AP-004* Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005.
- Christenson, Tom. "The Whole of Government Approach- Regulations, Performance and Public-Sector Reform." no. 6 (2006): 1-29.
- Christenson, Tom and Per Laegreid, ed. *Transcending New Public Management: The Transformation of Public Sector Reforms*. UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2007.
- City of Casey. "Event Definitions."
<http://www.casey.vic.gov.au/eventcomplianceguide/article.asp?Item=9310> (accessed March/20, 2011).
- Cohen, E. A., and J. Gooch. "Analyzing Failure." In *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. 1st ed., 29-57. New York, New York: Free Press, 1990.
- Colvin Bishop and Oral Khan. "The Anti-Terrorism Capacity of Caribbean Forces." Chap. 16, In *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror*, edited by Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 391-412. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004.
- Connolly, O. *On War and Leadership: The Words of Combat Commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- COPACS. *Final Report on Regional Security Operations for Cricket World Cup 2007- Executive Summary*.
- Director General, Joint Doctrine and Concepts. *Joint Warfare Planning 5-00; Joint Operations Planning 2004*.
- Donihee, John. "Land Claim Agreements and the North to 2030."
- Dorith Grant-Wisdom. "United States Caribbean Relations: The Impact of 9/11." Chap. 10, In *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror*, edited by Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 252-272. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004.

- Edmund Dillon. "Regional Security Cooperation: Traditional and Non-Traditional Areas." Chap. 19, In *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, edited by Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 462-484. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004.
- Evans, G. Lieutenant General Sir. "Field-Marshal the Viscount Slim." In *Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century: The War Lords*, edited by Carver, M. Field Marshal Sir, 375-389. London, England: Pen and Sword, 2006.
- General William "Kip" Ward. "What "Right" Looks Like in the Interagency: A Commander's Perspective." *Interagency Journal* 2, no. 1 (2011): 3.
- Government of Trinidad and Tobago. "Being Prepared and Ready to Act." <http://www.news.gov.tt/index.php?news=7466&print> (accessed April/18, 2011).
- . . . *Draft Strategic National Plan (Vision 2020)*, 2005.
- . "Fifth Summit of the Americas: Official Statements." [http://www.fifthsummitoftheamericas.org/official_statements\(1\).htm](http://www.fifthsummitoftheamericas.org/official_statements(1).htm) (accessed April/ 02, 2011).
- Grannum, Glyne. "Towards a More Secure Caribbean: Enhancing Military Cooperation within the Caribbean Community." 25, (2007).
- HCR Security International Ltd. *Review of the National Security Sector of Trinidad and Tobago (the Ross Report)*, 2009.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Stability Operations and Support Operations* 2003.
- Hickey, M. *The Unforgettable Army: Slim's XIVth Army in Burma*. London, United Kingdom: Tunbridge Wells, 1992.
- Hogan, D. *Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India 1942-1945*. 1st ed. New York, New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000.
- Horn, B., and S. Harris. *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*. St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing, 2004.
- Joan Massiah (Mrs.) and Commodore Richard Kelshall. "Establishment of a Joint Operations Command Centre for Trinidad and Tobago."
- Karp, Aaron. "The Changing Ownership of War: States, Insurgencies and Technology." *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 2 (2009): 375-394.
- LtCol Peter Sealey. *After Action Report on FAHUM 2011*, 2011.

- Marquis, Jefferson P. *Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations*. Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Arroyo Centre, 2010.
- Munroe, Trevor. "The Menace of Drugs." Chap. 6, In *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change.*, edited by Ivelaw L. Griffith. Vol. 1, 154-175. United States: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004.
- Northouse, P. G. *Leadership Theory and Practice*. Fourth ed. London, United Kingdom: Sage Publications Ltd, 2007.
- Ogilvie, Major Jaimie S. A. "Exploring the Future of Regional Security in the Caribbean." Masters of Military Art and Science, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas., 2007.
- Operations Planning and Coordination Staff (OPACS). *Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) 2009, After Action Report.*, Dec 2009.
- . . *Fifth Summit of the Americas (VSOA) 2009, Operational Overview*, 2009.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. "Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States." (2006): 1-55.
- Pigeau, R., and C. McCann. "Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control." *Canadian Military Journal* 3, no. 1 (2002): 53-64.
- . "Using the Command and Control Framework to Analyze Command Challenges."
- Pile, Tyrone. Rear Admiral, Canadian Forces. "Supporting RCMP-Led Security for the 2010 Winter Games." *Gazette- the Canadian Forces* 72, no. 2 (2010-06-28, 2010): 01/25/2011-3, <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/gazette/vol72n2/sub-rep2-eng.htm>.
- Richards, Anthony and Fussey, Pete and Silke, Andrew. *Terrorism and the Olympics: Major Event Security and Lessons for the Future (Political Violence)*, edited by Anthony Richards, Pete Fussey and Andrew Silke. New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Sealy, Major P. A. *International Cricket Council Cricket World Cup 2007, Local Security Committee Presentation*, June 2006.
- Senator The Honourable Martin Joseph. "Media Statement in the Senate (22nd September 2009) Senator the Hon. Martin Joseph on the Review of the National Security Sector." <http://www.news.gov.tt/index.php?news=1914&print> (accessed 4 February, 2011).
- Shergold AM, Dr Peter. *Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges*, 2000.

- Sixsmith, E. K. G. *British Generalship in the Twentieth Century*. Leeds, United Kingdom: Arms and Armour Press, 1969.
- Spirtas, Michael. *Department of Defence Training for Operations with Inter-Agency, Multinational and Coalition Partners*. Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corp., 2008.
- Thomas J Miller. "Interagency Cooperation: An Ambassador's Perspective." *Interagency Journal* 2, no. 1 (2011): 11.
- Thompson, Michael H. *Canadian Forces Education and Training for Interagency Operational Contexts*. Guelph, Ontario, Canada.: Human systems Incorporated, 2010.
- Trinidad and Tobago Government. "Trinidad and Tobago Connect Online Services." http://www.gov.tt/gortt/portal/ttconnect/Cit_jobseekerDetail/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/gortt/wcm/connect/gortt+web+content/TTConnect/Citizen/Role/AJobSeeker/FindAJob/ttconnect+Service+Centres (accessed March 14, 2011).
- University of Birmingham. "Joined-Up Government in the Western World in Comparative Perspective: A Preliminary Literature Review and Exploration." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 14, no. 1 (2004): 103-138.
- Wijeyaratne, Surendrini. Canada's Whole-of-Government Approach in Afghanistan: Implications on Development and Peace Building. Abstract. (2007): 1-12.
- Williams, Clive. *The Sydney Olympics: The Trouble-Free Games*. Canberra.: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2002.
- Williams, Lt Col JE. "Transnational Crimes: Toward Enhancing Regional Security Effectiveness in the Caribbean Community." Masters in Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College