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PANACEA OR INFECTION: CIVIL MILITIAS IN WEAK, FAILING AND COLLAPSED STATES

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Master of Defence Studies

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JCSP 37 - PCEMI 37

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES

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26 April 2011

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Word Count: 16140

Compte de mots: 16140

ABSTRACT

The nature of civil militias has evolved to reflect the demands of the security environment in weak, failing and collapsed states. Desperate governments without adequate state security forces are seeking to protect themselves by leveraging the short-term military potential of these forces. The proliferation of these organizations is the result of their immediate utility. They are inexpensive and achieve urgent security goals very quickly when state conventional forces are insufficient. These attractive characteristics mark their appeal. The benefits of civil militias, however, have not justified their adverse effects in the longer term. Unlike state security forces, members of contemporary civil militias act outside cultural, normative and regulatory boundaries of their host societies. Case studies reveal powerful evidence that extra-governmental militias deconstruct state and humanitarian securities through intractable violence and lawlessness. Despite their expediency, and often motivated by their own self-serving interests, civil militias operating in weak states ultimately undermine state legitimacy and the governmental control they were intended to preserve. This paradox and its future implications are the subject of this study.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Al-Qaeda (AQ)
Al-Qaeda-Iraq (AQI)
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia - AUC)
Juarez Citizens Council's (CCJ)
Civil Security Forces (CSF)
Concerned Local Citizens (CLC – Iraq)
Cooperativas para la Vigilancia y la Seguridad Privada (CONVIVIR)
Foreign Internal Defence (FID)
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC)
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército Popular (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army, FARC-EP)
Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN)
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Iraqi Police (IP)
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Military Transition Team (MTT)
Muerte a los Sequestradores (Death to Kidnappers – MAS)
Non-State Actors (NSA)
Private Security Companies (PSCs)
Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Ready Reserve Forces (RRF)
Sons of Iraq (SOI)
Southern Sudan People's Army (SPLA)
Southern Sudan Revolutionary Movement (SPLM)
Standby Reserve Forces (SRF)
Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA)
Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM)
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

INTRODUCTION

Giving evidence before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2008, General David Petraeus described "a dramatic reduction in violence levels and civilian deaths from fifteen months before when Iraq seemed on the brink of civil war."[1] Petraeus attributed this turning point, which was most apparent in the conflict's most violently contested areas of Al-Anbar province, only partially to the increased force presence afforded by the coalition surge of January 2007. Specific to this study, he gave equal credit to the Sunni militia movement commonly referred to as the Sons of Iraq (SOI). According to Petraeus, the SOI "contributed significantly in various areas", emphasizing specifically that SOI's "assistance" and "relentless pursuit" of anti-coalition forces had "significantly reduced" the threat posed by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).[2]

By early 2009, the "concerned local citizens" of the SOI program were being widely credited for achieving the military conditions permitting the transfer of enduring responsibility back to Iraqi security forces.[3] In an attempt to mimic the success of the SOI program, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under General Stanley McCrystal supported the establishment of a community based civil militia program in

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[1] Mark Wilbanks and Efraim Karsh, "How the "Sons of Iraq" Stabilized Iraq," *Middle East Quarterly* Vol XVII, no. 4 (Fall 2010) 57.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] Pete Hegseth, "Sons of Iraq: A Grassroots Surge Against Al-Qaeda," *National Review On-Line* (March 2008), Journal on-line; available from http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/223811/sons-iraq/pete-hegseth; Internet; accessed 27 February 2011.

Afghanistan in 2009.[4] This U.S. Special Forces sponsored program, termed the Local Defence Initiative (LDI), remains active in 2011 under Patraeus with the aim of "creat[ing] space for Afghans to solve their own problems, peacefully[and]…focus on building local capacity, rather than imposing external capacity…[that] is sustainable for the long run."[5]

Tribal militias are now viewed as the skeleton key to the asymmetric problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. Local irregulars have evened the playing field at the tactical level and the transition of security responsibilities to indigenous forces has demonstrated strategic progress. But, are these militias a panacea conflict termination strategy or do they serve to further infect the underlying socio-political problems in weak, failing and collapsed states? The answers to these and other pressing questions about these "elements of unstated statecraft" are important because they shape future approaches to Foreign Internal Defence (FID) and security assistance operations which have come to dominate the strategic demands of the post-Cold War security environment.[6]

A Wider View

Various types of civil militia organizations operate extensively in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Although state militaries claim a monopoly on the use of armed force, circumstances and societal characteristics of weak or failing states

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[4] Graeme Smith, "Afghan Militia Gears Up to Fight the Taliban," Globe and Mail, 17 February 2009: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/article972299.ece; Internet; accessed 15 January 2011.

[5] Joshua Foust and Paul Meinshausen*,"* Afghanistan Needs Local Politics, not Local Militias" *World Politics Review* (28 July 2010); http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6149 /afghanistan-needs-local-politics-not-local-militias; Internet; accessed 12 January 2011.

[6] Douglas Valentine, "The Pentagon's Local Defence Initiatives in Afghanistan: Making Everyone Feel Safer," *Global Research* [On-line Journal]; http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va &aid=19031; Internet; accessed 17 February 2011.

precipitated by ethnic violence and prolonged civil war have often prevented them from assuming that responsibility or the ability to exercise it.[7] This has created circumstances within vulnerable states in which the urgent demands on state security institutions have outstripped the available supply.

In the 1970s, Guatemala and El Salvador were the first Latin American states to be seriously threatened by modern insurgencies. Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Honduras followed in the late 1970s, 80s and 90s. In all cases it became apparent that the small state militaries lacked the combat power and intelligence capabilities required to defeat insurgent operations that raged against state societies in all corners of these rugged countries. Under these desperate circumstances, these threatened states began "relying on untrained, undisciplined, but well-armed outsiders" commonly known as the 'death squads' to restore and maintain security.[8] Over the long-term, however, this grass-roots approach to assuring human and state securities revealed paradoxical consequences.

The largest and most notorious Latin American pro-government paramilitary group, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, AUC), has been repeatedly cited in Human Rights Watch World Reports (1996, 2000 and 2001). In collaboration with the Colombian military, the AUC has allegedly participated in obscene, unregulated violence against public officials, trade unionists, journalists and the population - thereby overwhelming the state's ability to retain legitimate control.[9]

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[7] Micheal Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals and Methods* (Toronto ON: Pergamon Press Canada, 1990) 68.

[8] *Ibid*., 68-69 and 71.

[9] Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt,"The Military and Their Shadowy Brothers in Arms," Chapter 2 in *Armed Actors: Organized violence and State Failure in Latin America* (London UK: Zed Books, 2004) 29; and Luis Alberto Restrepo , "Violence and Fear in Colombia: Fragmentation of Space, Contraction of

This militia phenomenon has become even more widespread in Africa where government sponsored militias in Sudan, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are responsible for far higher levels of unbridled deconstructive violence and instability. For instance, the United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2004 that genocide has been committed in Darfur at the hands of the pro-government Janjawee militia where over 200 000 people had died and an estimated 1.4 million displaced.[10] Even lesser known contemporary experiences with civil militias in threatened states like Chechnya, Sri Lanka and Myanmar offer compelling and ominous evidence of the dangers of embracing the short-term leverage offered by civil militias.

This Study

Weak, failing and collapsed states suffering from insurgencies and protracted intrastate violence struggle to maintain (or regain) control. Their governments are desperate for survival and deprived of adequate professional security forces. They then seek to protect themselves by leveraging the military potential of civilians. Unlike professionalized militaries which act with varying levels of legitimately to protect the state, members of civil militias act for a variety of individual reasons. Not a regular state institution, civil militias employ methods outside the bounds of state and international law with shocking levels of impunity.

Time and Forms of Evasion," Chapter 11 in *Armed Actors: Organized violence and State Failure in Latin America* (London UK: Zed Books, 2004) 178-179.

[10] U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2007," http:// www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100506.htm; Internet; accessed 25 January 2011.

This study argues that the proliferation of these new world order militias is the result of their immediate utility. They are inexpensive and achieve urgent security goals very quickly where state conventional forces have been unsuccessful. These alluring characteristics mark their appeal to vulnerable governments in threatened states. The short-term benefits of using civil militias to preserve state control, however, have not historically survived their adverse effects in the longer term. Despite their expediency, and often motivated by their own endogenous interests, civil militias operating in weak states undermine the state control and legitimacy they were intended to preserve. This paradox and its future implications are the subject of this study.

This paper will proceed using institutional analysis as a framework to expose the security paradox posed by civil militias. In the first chapter of this study, contemporary theories on the origin, types and origin of modern militias will be reviewed to provide some initial institutional context. In the second portion of this paper, three distinct case studies will be dissected using institutional analysis to examine the distinct features of civil militias within threatened states from separate geopolitical regions. Within this framework, three key dimensions of civil militias will be explored in an effort to unravel the regulative, normative and cognitive institutional forces that lead to the liberalization of state violence in fragile states.[11] The first case study will analyze the case of the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, AUC) and aspects unique to pro-government paramilitary forces in Latin America including patterns of societal violence in Colombia and the role of the illegal narcotics trade. The second study will examine the case of the *Janjawee* militia in Sudan and the influence of ethnic

[11] Eric Ouellet and Pierre C. Pahlavi, "Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare: A Case Study of the French Army in Algeria 1954-1960," (Toronto ON: Canadian Forces College Paper) 1.

rivalry, resource scarcity and state sponsored genocide. The third case study will investigate the *Sons of Iraq*. In this final and most recent historical case study, the influence of divisional sectarianism and political incentives will be explored as societal drivers for civil militias. The third part and final chapter of this monograph will conclude by drawing common elements from the case study analyses to prove the current security paradox, discuss problems with demobilization and provide insight on future implications of these forces for state and human securities. Before delving into the first chapter of this paper, however, it is important to review the analytical framework that will be used throughout this paper up-front.

The Analytical Framework

Sociological institutional analysis is based on the principle that institutions, including civil militias, are comprised of three analytical domains, or pillars: regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive.[12] Within social institutions theory, the pillars exist interdependently although one may dominate in specific circumstances. Each pillar, however, "operates through distinctive mechanisms and sets in motion disparate processes."[13]

The regulative pillar concerns itself with the codified rules of institutions that involve, but are not limited to, "folkways such as shaming or shunning activities" or more formalized rules enforced by specialists such as laws, law enforcement and the courts.[14]

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[12] Richard W. Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests - 3rd ed* (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications, 2008) 47-48.

[13] *Ibid*.

[14] *Ibid*., 52.

Although "[f]orce, sanctions and expedience responses are central ingredients to the regulatory pillar", rules that solicit this response may be written or unwritten, and formal or informal.[15] Commonly, as is the case in legitimate democratic societies, the imposition of the regulative pillar is legitimized through a normative framework. The result of a legitimate regulative pillar is a "system of rules, whether formal or informal, backed by surveillance and sanctioning power that is accompanied by feelings for fear/guilt or innocence/incorruptibility…."[16]

The normative pillar concerns itself with the institutional values and norms that govern shared ends as well as the means to achieve those ends. The normative pillar identifies that values and norms may be specific to certain individuals or bodies within the institution, thereby recognizing distinct roles with institutions and the appropriateness of goals specific to specific roles. Normative social systems also regulate social behaviour action through the pressure to conform. Non-conforming behaviour may solicit feelings "shame or disgrace", where conforming behaviour evokes "pride and honour".[17]

The cultural cognitive pillar can be best described as "the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames [of cultural reference] through which the meaning is made."[18] Cultural influences are both the deeper, evolutionary cognitive processes that underpin prevailing foundational beliefs and institutions. Although they can be understood as universal and invariant across social groups in all situations, they

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[15] *Ibid*., 52.

[16] *Ibid*.

[17] *Ibid*., 55-56.

[18] *Ibid*., 57.

may vary across wider circumstances such as education and cultural conditioning. Cultural-cognitive patterns evolve "because other types of behaviour are inconceivable."[19] People who align their behaviour with cultural beliefs "feel competent and connected", whereas people are opposed are looked upon as incompetent or outliers.[20]

Taken together as an analytical lens for evaluating the sociological credibility of institutions, the three pillars "elicit three related but distinguishable bases of legitimacy."[21] The regulative pillar stresses the imperative of legitimate organizations to operate with the accepted and understood rules. The normative pillar emphasizes institutional legitimacy through adherence to value and moral societal imperatives. The cultural-cognitive pillar interprets legitimacy based upon "preconscious and taken for granted understandings."[22]

Conclusion

The following chapters expose civil militias as a resurgent, menacing and paradoxical phenomena in Colombia, Sudan and Iraq. The features and types of modern militias and their evolutionary transformation across a spectrum of legitimacy is revealed using the analytical framework. Case studies clearly demonstrate that the emergence of modern militias as state institutions is a crisis of legitimacy associated with the state's lawful monopoly of coercive military power and therefore the state itself. The

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[19] *Ibid*., 58.

[20] *Ibid*., 59.

[21] *Ibid*., 61.

[22] *Ibid*.

employment of militias as state security agents in weak states is a "super wicked problem" resulting from multiple activities and interactions across complex social, political and economic systems that produce unintended, perverse and cumulative impacts by very state seeking security.[23] Although the theories and case studies presented in this paper remain as evolutionary, some important conclusions and hypothesis concerning the future impacts of civil militias in weak states are presented.

It is important to state that this work does not intend to present a panacea to the spectrum of civil militias in threatened states. It is, rather, a modest attempt to isolate and prove the paradoxical consequences of liberalizing military violence to achieve urgent state security. Through this enhanced understanding, hopefully more viable and enduring security strategies will be applied to weak, failed and collapsed states.

[23] Steven Bernstein, Benjamin, Kelly Levin and Graeme Auld, "Playing it Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incrementalism, and the "Super Wicked" Problem of Global Climate Change," (Paper presented at the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, 2007) http://www.allacademic.com/meta /p179707_index.html; Internet; accessed 22 January 2011, 2

CHAPTER 1
A THEORETICAL REVIEW

Civil militias are not new institutions. They have a long tradition in the Weberian system.

> Conceptually, the historiography of militia could be placed within the framework of the theory of social contract and the formation of the state system. The peopling of society into organized beings was intended to avoid the nasty and brutish life in the Hobbesian society, which was replete with [human and state] insecurities.[24]

History is rife with examples of counterinsurgency campaigns that leveraged the advantages afforded by indigenous irregular forces.[25] The militia institution in the context of contemporary security environment in weak, failing and collapsed states, however, requires further dissection as transformational phenomenon.

In his analysis of civil militias in conflict-prone contemporary Africa, David J. Francis poses several questions germane to our understanding of modern militias.

> How do we define and conceptualize civil militias? Are they primarily an African phenomenon? Why and how do civil militias emerge in weak, failed and collapsed states, or why do they proliferate in situations of complex political emergencies?[26]

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[24] Gani Jooses Yoroms, "Militias as a Social Phenomenon: Towards a Theoretical Construction," Chapter 2 in *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005)

[25] For more information on the history of Compound Warfare, see Thomas M. Huber, *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot* (Fort Leavenworth, KA: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2002) and Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid vs. Compound War, The Janus Choice: Defining today's Multifaceted Conflict," *Armed Forces Journal* (October, 2009)[On-line Journal]; http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4198658/; Internet; accessed 2 March 2011.

[26] David J. Francis, *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005) 1.

Literature provides the answers to some of these questions. This chapter will review the historical lineage and recent theory of civil militias. It will further argue that our first generation understanding of traditional militias has evolved to meet the complex security challenges posed by weak, failed and collapsed states.

This chapter will proceed by first tracing the tradition of militias as legitimate and necessary elements of viable states in crisis. Theory on the features and emergence of second generation militias will then be presented in comparison with our traditional understanding of first generation militias. This chapter will conclude by exploring the correlation (and distinctions) between militias as private and public organizations. Before examining theory on the current state of civil militias in weak states, it is important to provide a historical context to present theory.

Origins of the Militia Tradition

The roots of the Anglo-American citizen militia are ancient in origin. Although historians long credited Alfred the Great with the development of the first national militia system, fresh research traces its roots to "at least to the seventh century… as an institution with a legal identity of its own, [and in some form it] had existed for centuries prior to the Norman Conquest."[27] As William Fields and David Hardy describe,

> [t]he Saxon militia, known as the fyrd, was a general militia composed of all able-bodied men. In times of emergency, it was called out only in districts actually threatened with attack. Service in the fyrd was usually of short duration and the participants legally were obligated to provide their own arms and provisions in accordance with their socioeconomic standings. The system was well suited for an

[27] William S. Fields and David T. Hardy, "The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History," *Military Law Review* (Spring 1992); http://www.saf.org/LawReviews/FieldsAndHardy.html; Internet; Accessed 12 February 2011.

> island kingdom with a simple agrarian economy and no need to project military power externally.[28]

The notion of a societal contract for citizen defence in times of state emergency survives today and is formalized by national laws in many states that specify conditions the state's can mobilize its citizens into military service. The balance between the exigencies of military service in times of crisis and the societal conscience of a de-militarized state has been the subject of debate through modern history. The Conscription Crises in Canada during the World Wars and the U.S. draft during the Vietnam War are but two examples. Samuel Huntington encapsulated these competitive social forces as an ongoing balance between "a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the societies security and a social imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies and institutions dominant within that society."[29] In its traditional forms, citizen militias met both of Huntington's imperatives as "the intensity of the security needs" were consistent with "the nature and strength of the value pattern of society."[30] This is balance of societal freedoms and shared responsibility in times if crisis underlies the concepts of first generation militias.

According to David Francis, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Chair of African Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Bradford, traditional militias under the Weberian system consist of a "citizen army made up of free men between the ages of sixteen and sixty who performed

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[28] *Ibid*.

[29] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Boston MA: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1957) 2.

[30] *Ibid*.

occasional mandatory military duty to protect their country, colony or state." [31] Francis further expands his description to include "armed and trained bands of locals who could arm themselves on short notice for their own defence."[32] Appropriately, according to Francis, "[t]he term militia has a Latin origin meaning *soldierly*, from the word *miles*, meaning soldier. The term has evolved over time to mean auxiliary or reserve military force."[33]

Sociologist Maurice Duverger provides a more inclusive description of militias as "a kind of private army whose members are enrolled on military lines, are subjected to the same discipline and the same training as soldiers, like them, wearing uniforms and badges, ready like them to meet the enemy with weapons in physical combat." [34] Differing from Francis' view, Duverger does not specific the age of service or the imperative of defence. Duverger, however, does specify that though

> these [militia] members retain civilians, in general, they are not permanently mobilized nor maintained by the organization, they are simply obliged to meet and drill frequently. They must always be ready to hold themselves at the disposal of their leaders.[35]

Duverger places clear limits on the status of militia members as civilians and impermanent members of a security force. He further emphasizes the obligations of militia members to professionalize through routine training and obey orders.

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[31] Francis, *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace…*1.

[32] *Ibid*.

[33] *Ibid*.

[34] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (London UK: Methuen, 1967) 36-37.

[35] *Ibid*.

The Special Representative of the President of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission, Dr. Istifanus Zabadi, contends that traditional militias possess certain characteristics that distinguish them from other armed groups in the security environment. Zabadi defines a civil militia as having the following features:

> …training similar to the military… [and] can actually function like the military in some regards; …not part of a regular professional military force; …permitted to carry arms and light weapons, usually for defensive purposes; …not necessarily subscribe to the same rigid organizational command and control structures and discipline which are hallmarks of the professional military; …usually established for a particular purpose, to protect the civilian populace during emergencies, either in absence of the regular army or as a compliment to them.[36]

Through his characterization, Zabadi echoes elements of both Francis and Duverger. Like Duverger, Zabadi cites a likeness to state military forces in terms of discipline and professionalism. Similar to Francis, Zabadi also raises the theme of protection. Zabadi, however, takes his framework one step further by stating that militias can act alongside or in the absence of state military forces.[37]

Author Usman Tar provides a third and more contemporary view of the term militia. Tar postulates that "[t]here is a tension between three sets of perspectives" that define the nature of civil militias and how they are perceived: state-centric perspectives; society-centered perspectives; and hybrid perspectives.[38] According to Tar, state-centric perspectives present civil militias as "state-centred projects or paramilitary units of the

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[36] Istifanus Zabadi, "Civil Militias: Threats to National and Human Security in West Africa," Chapter 6 in *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace*. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005) 118.

[37] *Ibid*.

[38] Usman A. Tar, "The Perverse Manifestations of Civil Militias in Africa: Evidence from Western Sudan," *Peace, Conflict and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, Vol. 7 (July 2005); http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/dl/July05Tar.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 February 2011 139-140.

state armed forces."[39] Society-centred perspectives "take into account the role of non-state variables (for instance sub-nationalist tendencies like ethnicity and racism)" and perceive civil militias as "non-state projects comprised of actors and interests that are either at war with the state or, conversely, in alliance with it."[40] Hybrid perspectives see civil militias as "complex phenomena that transcend simplistic formal/informal and state/state dichotomies – as demonstrated by the experience of weak or failing states, specifically conflict-prone, war-torn, post-conflict and transition societies."[41]

With variation - Francis, Duverger, Zabadi and Tar all attempt to describe the institution of civil militias. Characteristic of social theory, however, it is difficult to narrow the evolutionary nature to a single definition without providing some environmental context.

Second Generation Militias

David Francis, Gani Jooses Yoroms and Nandi Obasi, whose work focuses narrowly on conflict prone Sub-Saharan Africa, all present criteria that help us conceptualize a new kind of militia that reflects the unique environment of states in transition. Francis addresses the distinctness between traditional, first generation militias and what he describes as second generation militias. Yoroms builds on Francis' construct by further categorizing militias and offering reasons for the emergence of second generation militias. Obasi also provides his own categorization of second generation militias based on their own motivation.

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[39] *Ibid*.

[40] *Ibid*.

[41] *Ibid*.

Francis contends that in the context of the post-Cold War security environment, militias can be categorized into first generation and second generation institutions.

> First Generation interpretation and conceptualization of militias….presents the view that these are an organized group of citizens mobilized to provide military service; that they are trained as soldiers, but not part of a regular army, and are regarded as a supplementary force or reserve army organized by the state of government. In addition, they are composed of non-professional soldiers, retired, expelled, or trained soldiers often called upon in cases of emergency or crisis, or to protect governments or communities. [42]

Gani Yoroms further categorizes Francis' first generation of militias into three distinct categories of state sponsored militias. Ready Reserve Forces (RRF) who are paid for regular training and are subject to immediate call-up, Standby Reserve Forces (SRF) that may be mobilized and trained in time of state emergencies; Retired Reserve Forces that consist of retired military members called up for home guard duties in times of state emergencies.[43]

Francis acknowledges that his view of first generation militias is based on a series of assumptions. Firstly, that militia service is voluntary. Secondly, that "…militias are established by states, they are, therefore, regulated and accountable to the state…."[44] Third, that civil militias are purpose based institutions, "based on a state centric interpretation of security, with the state as the primary security provider with militias never intended to usurp the role of the regular forces, or contest the dominance of the

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[42] Francis, *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace…* 1-2.

[43] Gani Jooses Yoroms, "Militias as a Social Phenomenon: Towards a Theoretical Construction," Chapter 2 in *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005) 41.

[44] Francis, *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace…*2.

state."[45] Francis further acknowledges the limitations of his first generation view of militias in what he terms "conflict prone and weak states…and other developing regions of the world."[46] He states that the traditional interpretation of civil militias in complex and multifaceted nature of post-Cold War security environment is no longer applicable.[47]

To address this limitation, Francis postulates "a new conceptual interpretation of militias[, termed second generation militias,]…built on the specific context of "conflict-prone, war-torn, post-conflict or transitions societies, and, in general, in weak and failed states."[48] According to Francis, second generation militias are similar to their first generation counterparts in that they are initially established by state with the aim of improving state and human security. In weak, failing and collapsed states, however, second generation militias are "underwritten by prebendal governance, the normative ethos for the establishment is often subverted and privatized to serve particular vested interests."[49] In such an environment, the "demonstrable efficacy" of civil militias as counterinsurgents and anti-crime agents "has led to a situation whereby they usurp the security provision of the state…."[50]

Second generation militias are "organized by a diverse group of interest and stakeholders, including governments and regimes in power, mostly with no constitutional provision or legislation legalizing their existence" and consist of disenfranchised citizens

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[45] *Ibid*.

[46] *Ibid*.

[47] *Ibid*.

[48] *Ibid*.

[49] *Ibid*.

[50] *Ibid*.

and unemployed youths that perceive themselves "marginalized and dissatisfied with the prebendal state."[51] Francis therefore attributes the emergence of these new kinds of organizations to an imbalance between the demands of the state to provide security and the available supply of legitimate coercive power. Francis further states that this occurs for three primary reasons: the decision making process of the government becomes ineffective; rule of law becomes irrelevant in the absence of social cohesion in society; and that human security can no longer be guaranteed by the state within its declared territory. In this scenario, the excess and desperate demand for human and state security overflows into the private realm.[52]

Gani Yoroms postulates that second generation militias are "rooted in political economy of society."[53] Yoroms attributes their emergence in the contemporary security environment to five sociological needs:

> first, defending social and cultural values of the group…secondly, demanding a share in the economic resources of the country by violence when regular procedures have failed…thirdly…to liberate themselves from political repression or marginalization…fourthly, where the government fails to provide security some groups or individuals may organize vigilantes or personal security to protect themselves and their property without recourse to due process of the law…fifthly, for the purpose of protecting the environment from degradation…[or] to take ownership of resources which they have suffered in denial.[54]

Building on this concept further, Yoroms presents three broad categories of second generation militias that are indicative of their motivations - criminal, ethnic, and

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[51] *Ibid.*, 36.

[52] *Ibid*.

[53] Yoroms, "Militias as a Social Phenomenon: Towards a Theoretical Construction"…45

[54] *Ibid*.

mercinarian militias.[55] Nandi Obasi offers the similar categorizations of civil militias in Nigeria, again according to their motivation - vigilante organizations, militias organizations, and separatist movements.[56]

Expanding on Francis' framework, Yoroms further offers three theoretical constructs of what constitutes civil militias. State centric theory comprises first and second generation militias. Under state centric theory, first generation militias "operate in strong, viable states," while second generation militias "operate as a challenge to the state failure to meet the [security] expectations…operat[ing] as non-state actors (NSA)…[that] could manifest some guerrilla and terrorist or as some mercenarian-militias attributes."[57] State centric theory militias

> emerge as either a result of increasing inability of regular military forces to cope with the ebbing social problems of society…[or] to complement state security forces in the times of wars, disasters, emergencies and related civil police actions….[58]

State centric theory militias are organized, trained, uniformed, paid, and legitimized by the state and "serve as an active component to the state military."[59]

Non state theory militias contend with the state to secure their own private interests. It is a private force organized into "armed men for the purpose of challenging the status quo, or with the purpose of achieving their goals and objectives within the

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[55] Gani J. Yoroms, "Militias as a Social Phenomenon: Towards a Theoretical Construct," *National Workshop on Ethnic Militias, Democracy and National Security in Nigeria* (Abuja: National War College, 2002) XX.

[56] Nnamdi Obasi, Ethnic Militias, Vigilantes and Separatist groups in Nigeria (Abuja: Third Millennium Ltd, 2002) XX.

[57] Yoroms, "Militias as a Social Phenomenon: Towards a Theoretical Construction"…35-36

[58] *Ibid*.

[59] *Ibid*.

larger environment where they are marginalized, denied their rights and/or alienated."[60] Yoroms specifies two types of non state theory militias: party militias and private militias. Party Militias are armed wings of political parties seeking power and are socially guaranteed by the state. Private society militias may not be guaranteed by the state, but are normally tolerated as they indirectly support the existence and objectives of state militias. "They could be ethnic, religious, labour, and ideological or some form of interface," [and] "recruit on basis interest, multiple identities and ideologies…[that] cut across boundaries and barriers…."[61] Non state theory militias are private organizations "recruited and trained to defend the interest of their [non-state] sponsors." [62]

Fluid theory militias are much more ambiguous. They have no formal identity or distinguishing features. They "emerge as a result of social and economic conflagration of the state" and are often termed mercenarian militias as well armed and trained outlaws who fight for economic gain.[63] Fluid theory militias can also be "integrated into the cause of their employers" and thus also fight for cause that will benefit them.[64] They have further been described as "juvenile delinquents who have been affected by social ills, either as a case of parental breakage, economic crisis, urban decay, failing moral values, lack of economic engagement and other social vices…" that normalize serious crime such as murder, rape and narcotics trafficking. [65]

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[60] *Ibid*.

[61] *Ibid*.

[62] *Ibid*., 37-38.

[63] *Ibid*.

[64] *Ibid*.

[65] *Ibid*., 39.

The Public-Private Continuum

Thus far, civil militias have be defined and categorized by theorists who have introduced several other related, but distinct armed groups with whom militias share their environment in weak states. One group that requires further discussion is private security corporations (PSC), and its relationship with civil militias. Specifically, what is the difference between civil militias and PSCs?

In an effort to provide criteria that distinguishes civil militias from other private and publicly armed groups, Ruben Thorning presents the militia continuum. According to Thorning, there is a wide variety of groups and organizations that exist in the contemporary security environment in weak states. These groups have a wide variety of exclusive and overlapping interests in religious, political, social and economic domains of society. They also are not static and evolve within the continuum. The feature that they all share, however, is the "need to be compensated for their services, thus, at the end of the day such [security] providers are only relevant to people who can pay."[66]

Thorning terms civil militias that assume the state function of security civil Security Forces (CSFs). Thorning argues that CSFs are

> any civil grouping with the declared task of creating or maintaining security for a 'client', defined as a private company, ethnic group, political party, or group of population, regardless of the groups affiliation, modus operandi or previous alignments and tasks.[67]

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[66] Ruben Thorning, "Civil Militias: Indonesia and Nigeria in Comparative Perspective," Chapter 5 in *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005) 93.

[67] *Ibid*., 93-94.

On the militia continuum CSFs occupy a position between the polar ends or exclusively private and public organizations. This is because Thorning views CSFs "operating in the grey-zone between public and private spheres,…still dependant on some degree of public consent preventing them from the pure pursuit of profit."[68]

PUBLIC ⟵		⟶ PRIVATE
Ideological Militia	Civil Security Force	Private Security Company

Table 1.1 – The Militia Continuum[69]

Thorning's continuum describes a CSF as transitional organization in a "continuum along which a militia group develops from being a militia set-up on public demand to the defence of a given 'cause'. Over time, as the groups advance to a higher level of organization, increased power and authority corrupts the 'cause' because of the possibilities of material gain offered by both civil society and political or cooperate elites." As a CSF organization, "it is more flexible choosing jobs and modi operandi." [70] CSFs are "mainly concerned with income generation and status restoration. Narratives of ideology, ethnic history or crime busting, for CSFs, only serve as a legitimizing gateway to controversial private entrepreneurship in the business of violence."[71]

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[68] *Ibid*.

[69] Francis, *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace*…2-3; and Ruben Thorning, "Civil Militias: Indonesia and Nigeria in Comparative Perspective"…94.

[70] Thorning, "Civil Militias: Indonesia and Nigeria in Comparative Perspective"…94.

[71] *Ibid*., 93-94.

PSCs, on the other hand, "are corporately affiliated and regulated by law" and do not possess the "ideological heritage which provides for public legitimacy and support due to their altruistic background…"of CSFs. In addition, PSCs are normally not operated by local people, which challenge any appearance of legitimate security forces.[72] Violent actors with PSC can be categorized according to motivation: entrepreneurial actors, deprived actors, and opportunists.[73]

David Francis recognizes the public-private continuum theory, stating that

> both first and second generation definitions and conceptualizations of militias illustrate a public-private continuum. Legitimate militias are public institutions regulated by and under control of the state. [74]

Francis further acknowledges the difficulty in categorizing civil militias as purely public organizations.

> They are however private in the sense that they are drawn from the civilian populace, a citizen self-help force to provide security and defence, and to be called upon in times of emergencies. As a private force, they can protect the state and people or even challenge the status quo…in marginalized and polarized societies. [75]

Francis does not describe the migration along the continuum that Thorning does, but there is consensus that civil militias are neither exclusively public nor private organizations.

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[72] *Ibid*., 94.

[73] *Ibid*., 95-96.

[74] Francis, *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace…*3-4

[75] Ibid., 3.

Conclusion

The first generation understanding and conceptualization of traditional militias has evolved as a function of the contemporary security environment. Second generation militias, although historically rooted in our traditional understanding of militias, have emerged as manifestations of the complex security environment. Second generation militias can be understood by their definitions, features and the degree to which they lean toward being more public or private institutions. It is also important to note that, as a function of fluid environments, second generation militias in weak states are adaptable and evolutionary organizations whose path is as uncertain as the environment itself.

One of the remaining questions that will be broached in the following three case studies is Ruben Thorning's theory that "the emergence of organized civil security militias usurping the security functions of the state or challenging the state legitimate authority, is a global phenomenon a – social phenomenon with possible global reach."[76] Although focused on Africa, David Francis further hypothesizes that the

> militarization of states and the crisis of state formation and nation building are not unique to Africa…[,]comparison demonstrates that marginalized societies and groups, whose basic survival are threatened, will potentially react in diverse ways, and one such response is armed violence and civil militarism to protect their interests.[77]

Through institutional analysis of civil militias in disparate and weak states, we will now investigate these organizations before making some conclusions on their future impacts on fragile societies.

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[76] Thorning, "Civil Militias: Indonesia and Nigeria in Comparative Perspective"…94.

[77] Francis, *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace…*22.

CHAPTER 2
CASE STUDY 1:
THE UNITED SELF-DEFENCE FORCES OF COLOMBIA

Colombian politics are dominated by "…three powerful military machines, each more occupied with conquering territory at the cost of the unarmed human population than with gaining its sympathy."[78] Firstly, there are two well-armed communist insurgent groups: the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército Popular (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army, FARC-EP), with approximately 18,000 fighters and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN) with about 6,000 fighters. Secondly, there are powerful criminal cartels which act unilaterally or in combination other state or guerrilla aligned groups as it benefits them. Finally, and most germane to this chapter, there is the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia - AUC) - a kaleidoscope civil militia that consists of 11,000 militants.[79]

The resulting political landscape is one where **"**formal democratization…has been permanently bedeviled by institutional confusion, political turmoil, conflicts and violence."[80] Within Colombia, this enduring instability has precipitated

> strong dualisms in society and its exclusionary characteristics, the general socio-economic inequalities, the weakness of institutions in the executive and judiciary,…the lack of social and political consensus regarding long-term

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[78] Luis Alberto Restrepo , "Violence and Fear in Colombia: Fragmentation of Space, Contraction of Time and Forms of Evasion," Chapter 11 in *Armed Actors: Organized violence and State Failure in Latin America* (London UK: Zed Books, 2004) 173.

[79] *Ibid*.

[80] *Ibid*.

> objectives and the means of national development and the weak legitimacy of the state and its institutions.[81]

This weak legitimacy of the Colombian military and police in combination with societal inequality has led to the proliferation of the AUC in geographically isolated frontier regions. This chapter will argue that the AUC is an increasingly private and illegitimate civil security force that operates outside established laws and cultural-cognitive norms, abdicating societal responsibilities in favour of economic and political empowerment through deconstructive violence.

This chapter will prove this argument in four parts. First, the new political culture of anarchical violence in Colombia's ungoverned regions will be exposed as it relates to the emergence of the AUC. Second, the regulative surface of civil society will be pealed away in order to reveal the contradiction between AUC security and legitimate state regulation. Third, the social norms of Colombia's uncivil society that allowed the AUC to grow and gain privileged economic power will be uncovered. Fourthly, this chapter will conclude by demonstrating how the cultural, normative and regulative aspects of the AUC and Colombian society clash in violent competition.

Political Culture in Colombia's Ungoverned Spaces

Civil militias, termed paramilitaries in Latin America, originated from the Latin American century old tradition of body guards to wealthy landowners who were the natural targets of the leftist insurgents. In Colombia specifically, the Muerte a los Sequestradores (Death to Kidnappers – MAS) was the first 'Death Squad' organization to

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[81] Menno Vellinga,"Violence as a Market Strategy in Drug Trafficking: the Andean Experience." Chapter 5 in *Armed Actors: Organized violence and State Failure in Latin America* (London UK: Zed Books, 2004) 73.

became involved in murdering Marxist-Leninist guerillas and their sympathizers in the 1980s. MAS "was made up of the bodyguards of and followers of the largest cocaine lords, whose families were targeted by the guerillas and held for large ransoms."[82] Coinciding with the narcotics explosion, MAS developed into a territorial anti-guerilla strategy in the Medio Magdelena area in the 1990s. Paramilitaries proliferated under MAS sponsored by powerful drug lords and large landowners. They were supported technically and logistically by military, which reciprocated by participating in military intelligence operations. This began the symbiotic relationship between the Colombian military and the paramilitaries as military received large sums of money from drug and emerald smuggling.

CONVIVIR (Cooperativas para la Vigilancia y la Seguridad Privada) emerged as a network of rural community self-defence associations created by the government in 1993. Territorial 'fronts' and 'blocs' of disparate regional paramilitary organizations self-unified in 1997 following the death of Pablo Escabar and the end of intra-cartel warfare. [83] They were officially abolished in 1999 after much controversy of being linked to the paramilitaries. However, "they did not disappear, but became semi clandestine, and, according to various sources and declarations of their leaders, put themselves at the disposition of the paramilitaries."[84] The AUC "as the unified paramilitary

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[82] Micheal Radu and Valdamir Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals and Methods* (Toronto ON: Pergamon Press Canada, 1990) 69.

[83] Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt ,"The Military and Their Shadowy Brothers in Arms." Chapter 2 in *Armed Actors: Organized violence and State Failure in Latin America* (London UK: Zed Books, 2004) 28.

[84] Cubides C., Fernando, "From Public to Private Violence: the Paramilitaries," Chapter 6 in *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace* (Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2001) 130-131

forces…[became a] product of the initiatives of the landed elite and the representatives of the clandestine economy commissioned to protect their interests."[85]

According to an AUC document circulated widely in 1997 entitled "The Political and Military nature of Our Movement", the AUC described themselves as a "self-defence organization" that emerged

> as a consequence of the political, economic, and cultural contradictions of Colombian society. These contradictions have progressively worsened as a result of the failure of the State to fulfill clear constitutional provisions that require it to guarantee life, social order, and peace, the economic, cultural, and ecological patrimony of the nation, social and economic justice, free democratic participation, public security and so on. … The failure to guarantee these rights has led to the rise of armed groups whose existence is the sole responsibility of the State but whose violent acts are borne by the immense majority of defenceless Colombians living in the vast regions of the country where the government is unable to fulfill its constitutional obligations. [86]

The weak military and police presence in the outlying coca growing regions became Colombia's "ungoverned spaces" where the paramilitaries brutally competed with guerillas in the absence of the state.[87] This circumstance combined with the heritage of social exclusion in Latin American society provided a firm foundation for the AUC to flourish.

Cultural violence in Latin America has been "nurtured by long lasting patterns of social exclusion of parts of the population. … social cleavages, characterized by short, intense and disparate violence, leading to informalization of society and the subsequent

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[85] Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, "Armed Actors, Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America: A Survey of Issues and Arguments," Chapter 1 in *Armed Actors: Organized violence and State Failure in Latin America* (London UK: Zed Books, 2004) 12.

[86] Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Penaranda and Gonzalo Sanchez G, *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace* (Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2001) 246.

[87] Vellinga,"Violence as a market Strategy in Drug Trafficking: the Andean Experience"…77.

erosion of citizenship."[88] "The European conquest of the region was mainly based on the destruction of existing social patterns and the systemic use of violence….repression was essential for domination of slave peasants and forced laborers." [89] This was followed by the wars of independence, the struggle for national power with the caudillo regimes at the turn of the century until the depression years, the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes and the revolutionary movements of the 1960s and 1970s.[90]

Throughout this period, private armed groups were customarily established by pro-status quo elites and ruling political parties. They were "backed by economic elites for whom armed groups served to defend property, repress social protests or carve out space in local political arenas."[91] All these elements of cognitive social culture manifested in "the most recent, largest and most notorious force in the history of Latin American paramilitarism: the AUC."[92]

Since the return of democracy in 1985, political culture in Colombia has been more characterized by "periods of explosive violence followed by more diffuse and hidden, smoldering turbulence."[93] Normal life takes place against a background of "an undeclared war of low but tangible intensity…[as] violence, fear and distrust contribute to the disintegration of the social fabric."[94]

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[88] Koonings, Kees and Kruijt, Dirk, "Violence and Fear in Latin America"… 3-4.

[89] *Ibid*., 5.

[90] *Ibid*.

[91] *Ibid.*

[92] *Ibid*

[93] Koonings and Kruijt ,"The Military and Their Shadowy Brothers in Arms"…16.

[94] Koonings and Kruijt, "Armed Actors, Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America: A Survey of Issues and Arguments"…14.

As a result, the paramilitaries in Colombia emerged to as a necessary substitute to state security forces [95] In Colombia, however, paramilitary operations have led to a culture of "anarchical violence…[and] permanent [underlying societal] anxiety about uncertain dangers."[96] Unlike syndicated Mafia violence in the United States in which killings were performed within the bounds of cultural perspectives, never harming family members of the victim and sending condolences to the funeral, Colombian violence was excessive and applied not only to the targets but to their wives and children.[97] This type of extreme violence has led to

> …manifold flaws in the design of functioning of political democracy and governance. These range from issues related to institutional design (electoral systems, state apparatus, decentralization, among others) to problems of accountability and political culture. [98]

Secondly, it has also led to a deep seated political culture of societal schizophrenia and cycle of violence described as the "…de facto coexistence of formal constitutionalism, (electoral) democracy and an often vibrant society on the one hand and the use of force to stake out power domains or pursue economic interests on the other."[99]

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[95] *Ibid*.

[96]Restrepo , "Violence and Fear in Colombia: Fragmentation of Space, Contraction of Time and Forms of Evasion"…173.

[97] G. Gugliotta and J. Leen, *Kings of Cocaine* (New York NY: Harper and Row, 1990) 106; and Menno Vellinga,"Violence as a Market Strategy in Drug Trafficking: the Andean Experience." Chapter 5 in *Armed Actors: Organized violence and State Failure in Latin America* (London UK: Zed Books, 2004) 83.

[98] Koonings and Kruijt, "Armed Actors, Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America: A Survey of Issues and Arguments"…5.

[99] *Ibid*.

Rule of law: human rights and citizen rights	**Unrule of law: violence, fear and insecurity**
Citizenship and civil society	**Armed actors and uncivil society**
Legitimate and effective empowerment	**The politics of coercion**
Decent states and public polices	**State failure, arbitrariness, rule of the jungle**

Figure 2.1 The Fuzzy Realms of Democracy and Violence in Latin America[100]

The Regulative Surface Civil Society

In Colombia, the AUC claim for themselves a function that is parallel and complementary to, but much more successful than the state military or police forces.[101] This "legacy of violence" has created ambiguity among the recognized regulative bodies of the state and by institutionalizing "arbitrary violence."[102] Figure 2.1 further illustrates the ambiguity of legitimate control in Colombia through contradicting elements that remain present in society. This erosion of civil society, beyond a thin veneer, is the underlying reason that stable democracy in Colombia has remained elusive.

> Democracy is about citizenship rights and the structures and mechanisms to put these into practice. Citizenship means the incorporation of individual agents or groups in the modern nation state in order to realize civil, political, social and cultural participation. A democratic social and political order therefore means the mutually reinforcing coexistence of civil society, political society and the state. A

[100] Koonings and Kruijt, "Armed Actors, Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America: A Survey of Issues and Arguments"…8.

[101] Fernando, "From Public to Private Violence: the Paramilitaries"…142.

[102] Koonings and Kruijt, "Violence and Fear in Latin America"… 4.

> democratic state presupposes the rule of law. The rule of law presupposes the effective monopoly of the collective means of coercion of the state. Democracy stands for as a condition for the legitimacy of this violence monopoly.[103]

Despite the existence of the AUC and the overwhelming evidence of its extra-legal use of military power, the Colombian government maintains its claim over the legitimate monopoly on armed force.[104] Institutional and environmental realities, however, inhibit the military from taking on and enforcing that responsibility.[105] Such circumstances are counter to traditional notions of nation building that emphasize "cumulative pacification and institutionalization of conflicts within modern societies."[106] States have a responsibility to symbolize this kind of development by firstly, ensuring a legitimate monopoly of the coercive means of collective violence, and secondly by providing the "frame of reference" for the peaceful resolution of social conflicts within civil society.[107]

Until the late 1970s, Latin American militaries could manage dissident and criminal violence within their territories. Coinciding with the explosion of the narcotics trade, insurgent violence began to rival the state's ability to control it. Colombia's demands for security quickly outran its available supply.[108] Protracted intra-state violence was waged at the village level in frontier areas that the state could not secure. The poorly enforced rules of these ungoverned spaces vanished altogether and "an almost

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[103] *Ibid*., 5.

[104] Radu and Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals and Methods*…68.

[105] *Ibid*.

[106] Koonings and Kruijt, "Violence and Fear in Latin America"…4.

[107] *Ibid*.

[108] Radu and Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals and Methods* …68.

purely Hobbesian environment takes over. …debtors kill their creditors under the cover of either revolutionary justice or anticommunism, old blood feuds acquire political undertones and the communities are violently split…."[109] This anarchical violence precipitated the expansion of "expansion of legal violence to extra legal violence in the name of law and order."[110] Irregular forces legitimized by the state like the AUC were "extra-legal organizations that have taken the law into their own hands and, in their struggle against the guerrillas, replicate the guerrilla methods step for step."[111]

Violence perpetrated by the AUC was not only extra-legal in the sense that it overstepped the limits of legality in the manner it sought and imposed justice, it also violated the social contract as a principle based on "non-state violence and the rule of law."[112] The corrupted criminal justice system became "subject to the rules of bargaining…[and] legal and jurisdictional norms lost their regulatory function."[113] The clearest example of this erosion of state power to regulate itself manifested in the systems of reducing sentences which represented "a subtle form of compromise…[which] contributed to an overall sense of impotence."[114]

The introduction of special legislation in Colombia in 1968 that advocates "relative immunity" for members of the military and supporting paramilitaries regarding

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[109] *Ibid*.,70.

[110] Koonings and Kruijt, "Armed Actors, Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America: A Survey of Issues and Arguments"…9.

[111] Fernando, "From Public to Private Violence: the Paramilitaries," Chapter 6 in *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace* …130.

[112] Koonings and Kruijt, "Armed Actors, Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America: A Survey of Issues and Arguments" …6.

[113] *Ibid*.

[114] *Ibid*.

past or present human rights violations has further served to reinforce illegitimate methods of pursuing security.[115] Another clear dichotomy is the that the paramilitaries have maintained close relations with state military, despite the fact that the Colombian government has declared paramilitaries illegal[116] This is the "janus face of [Colombian] security forces: compliance on paper with the principles of democracy and the rule of law, but violating these same principles in practice."[117] Even after being nationally outlawed in 1989, Colombians continue to colloquially refer to the AUC as "paras" – indicating increasingly normal acceptance this kind of duplicitous law and order.[118]

Normative Uncivil Society

Origins of Colombian paramilitaries and the "economic rationality that called them into existence", in combination with their violent modus operandi, have placed organizations like the AUC in a "special category…[which recognizes] their singularities and special weight in the framework of Colombian violence."[119] In Colombia the AUC is not the only proprietor of violence. The guerrillas and the drug cartels use violence as a matter of course. At lower levels of Colombian society, violence has come to mean a "career or instrument for social mobility, or even an instrument for reversing traditional social hierarchies" in the context of these various armed actors. [120]

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[115] *Ibid*.,18-19.

[116] Koonings and Kruijt ,"The Military and Their Shadowy Brothers in Arms"…29-30.

[117] *Ibid*., 29.

[118] Fernando, "From Public to Private Violence: the Paramilitaries"…130.

[119] *Ibid*., 129.

[120] Koonings and Kruijt, "Violence and Fear in Latin America"…11.

As a result, the national murder rate in Colombia is one of the highest in the world. Between 1980 and 1995 the country averaged 70 per 100 000 and as high as 400 per 100 000 in some areas. There was 900 recorded killings of more than five people between 1988 and 1995 resulting in over 5000 deaths. The victims were trade unionists, political activists and even presidential candidates. A political party, the Patriotic Union (UP, Union Patriotica) was completely wiped out. [121] Although not all of these killings can be directly attributed to the AUC, their existence and methods directly contributed to a chaotic social culture.

Despite their seemingly arbitrary use of violence, the AUC recognize

> "a typological distinction between three kinds of violence in the history of Latin America: violence related to maintaining the traditional rural and oligarchic social order; violence related to modernization of the state and incorporate of the masses in politics; violence related to present day difficulties of consolidating democratic stability, economic progress and social inclusion."[122]

In areas like Magdelena Medio and Uraba, where several armed groups are competing for territory and marginal youth ascend through violence, "[t]he civilian population is subjected to the rule of silence, and massacres, civilian flight, thuggery and atrocities, fear and suspicion continue to be the rule."[123] The results of this "banality, or ordinariness of violence" refined by the AUC has been the normalization of extreme extra-state violence in Colombian society. [124]

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[121] Pécaut, Daniel, "From the Banality of Violence to Real Terror: The Case of Colombia," Chapter 7 in *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War and Terror in Latin America* (London, UK: Zed Books Ltd, 1999) 141.

[122] Koonings and Kruijt, "Violence and Fear in Latin America"…3.

[123] Pécaut, "From the Banality of Violence to Real Terror: The Case of Colombia"…141.

[124] *Ibid*.,142.

This banality of violence precipitated by widespread extra-state violence at the hands of the AUC provokes ordinary citizens to form free-radical local and regional self-defense groups to protect themselves from ordinary criminals masquerading as civil security forces, but who act to take advantage of the collapse of civil order resulting from condition of enduring civil war. These law abiding citizens seek to protect their lives and property from violent actors as they perceive themselves unprotected from the government, military and police. They are able to do this as firearms laws are liberal and the means of political violence are easily obtainable.[125]

The lucrative narcotics trade has further served to expand the ambition of the AUC whose use of violence has become a profitable share of the market economy. Specifically, the AUC have used violence to

> "ensure compliance in business transactions; as means to protect one's market share; as means to protect and conquer primary materials, precursor chemicals and smuggling routes; as means to protect property obtained through illegally begotten funds against other armed groups; and finally as a means to pressure authorities or eliminate those in law enforcement who endanger the interests of the drug industry." [126]

Profit in this market share had transformed the AUC from the protectorate of the "ungoverned spaces" to the merciless controllers of agricultural land. According to AUC leader, Carlos Castano, economic power was pursued by buying land cheaply that was contested by guerrillas and irradiating the guerrillas. The land could then be given away in return for "voluntary payments". In this way they presented themselves as "restorers of social order lost with the arrival of the guerrillas" while combining their economic

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[125] Radu and Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals and Methods*…69-70.

[126] F.E. Thoumi, *Political Economy and Illegial Drugs in Colombia* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995) 134.

power with the private use of force.[127] Through that progression the AUC "learned that violence, in addition to accomplishing retaliatory objectives to satisfy private aims, is an efficient mechanism of social control."[128]

Self-Declared Legitimacy

This state failure to restrain the AUC and monopolize coercion and therefore uphold law exposes the paradox of "modus vivandi with the hybridity of legitimate institutions and extra legal violence."[129] It has resulted in an "uneasy coexistence of the legal democratic order and the new violence in a parallel logic that is at the same time antagonistic and complimentary."[130] This results in a highly obscured form of state failure where the rule of law appears to be intact on the surface, while, at the core, any notion of state legitimacy is undermined by unbridled violence.[131]

Despite their flawed claim to legitimacy, the AUC have successfully claimed for themselves a share of political power in Colombia. On the matter of peace negotiations between the government of Colombia and the FAR-C in 1997, the AUC openly communicated the following message to the media:

> We are heartened by President Ernesto Samper Pizano's announcement asking for our presence at the negotiations table…We believe our right to participate at the negotiating table is legitimate and we invite the guerrillas to allow that sector of the people that they claim to represent be asked if they feel truly represented by

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[127] Fernando, "From Public to Private Violence: the Paramilitaries"…133-134.

[128] *Ibid*., 132.

[129] Koonings and Kruijt, "Armed Actors, Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America: A Survey of Issues and Arguments"…15.

[130] *Ibid*., 9.

[131] Ibid.

> them. We are ready to do the same with the great numbers of Colombian citizens who, we are convinced, feel represented by the AUC.[132]

In an effort to further secure the perception of legitimate body, the AUC has articulated their own political and ideological considerations in six affirmations: "compliance with the laws and common practices of international humanitarian law"; the "natural right to defend the lives, property, liberty and peace of a citizenry that lacks efficient guardianship by the state"; not negotiate with guerrillas who employ kidnapping as a political method, when it is well recognized as an economic one; the pursuit of "social justice, institutional presence, security, economic justice, authority" and peace; the understanding that AUC actions, under the "exceptional conditions which they take place, are legitimate"; never serve interests "distant or aloof from the cause of those persons marginalized, excluded, or abandoned by the state." [133] The pillars of institutional analysis, however, have been useful in revealing the true nature of the AUC as "pillars of veiled incivility in society and politics."

The foundation of AUC's sociological credibility as a legitimate civil security force is fundamentally flawed across all three dimensions of institutional analysis. Regulation of social behaviour by the AUC is only attained through illegal violence. Further, the AUC regulates inconsistently across state, dominating in rural, isolated areas with impunity. In carrying out these terror operations, the AUC adheres to the values of the criminal elite for mutual profit and dismisses the moral societal imperatives of greater society such as basic human rights. Culturally, the AUC has furthered the perversion of a

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[132] Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Penaranda and Gonzalo Sanchez G, *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace* (Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2001) 255.

[133] *Ibid*., 253-255.

new culture of social exclusion, inequality and anarchical violence in Colombia initially reserved for the cartels. Although the AUC attempts to legitimize itself as public security force through public statements, its inhumane and indiscriminate methods, loyalty to self-interest rather than state interest (other than when they overlap) and transparent pursuit of economic power and reluctance to acquiesce to the state reveals its true nature. Its existence is cause for the existing, deconstructive paradox of Colombian society: "the persistence and proliferation of violence and the simultaneous adoption of democracy, citizenship and the rule of law as norm and goal." [134]

Conclusion

The AUC is an increasingly private paramilitary force whose ultimate goal is economic and political empowerment through deconstructive violence. It is an uncivil and extralegal state institution, precipitating from the weak legitimacy of the state military and police in combination with societal inequality in Colombia's coca growing regions.

Despite its claim to legitimacy through state affiliation and political affirmations, the AUC's powerbase is its means for forcible coercion rather than societal credibility as a civil defence force. The extremely violent modus operandi of the AUC, and their attempt to use violence as a share in the illegal narco-economy has lead to a banality of violence outside the norms of any civil society. In the absence of a normative framework, AUC justice is simply punitive violence accompanied only by feelings of fear.

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[134] Koonings and Kruijt, "Armed Actors, Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America: A Survey of Issues and Arguments"…8.

Cumulatively, this enduring cycle has precipitated a new culture of political violence and victimization in the name of profit and power.

The distinguishing feature and contradiction of the case of Colombia and the AUC is surface veneer of a civil, tractable society. Colombia's state institutions are weak, but it is not a failing or collapsed state. The test-bed for civil militias in failing states, and the subject of the following chapter, is sub-Saharan Africa. The case of the AUC is different and should be uniquely regarded as one where "the formal institutions of the state endure, albeit with varying legitimacy and effectiveness."[135]

[135] Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, "*Armed Actors: Organized violence and State Failure in Latin America* (London UK: Zed Books, 2004) 2.

CHAPTER 3
CASE STUDY 2: THE JANJAWEE

Sudan has suffered years of political instability, minimal socio-economic development and cultural disorder as a result of "conflicting aspirations based on political, cultural, racial and most important, religious heterogeneity."[136] Unresolved, this cycle of social volatility has successively "fanned the embers of one war [only] to ignite another."[137] To the developed world, Sudan and its neighbouring states are

> …the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real strategic danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism.[138]

In 2003, clashes in the Darfur region of Sudan between ethnic African groups (Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa) and Arab nomads were depicted by the Sudanese government as disputes over resources resulting from the desertification of traditional African farmlands. The conflict ignited when two ethnic African rebel movements, the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM), emerged demanding a share of political power from the Arab dominated state government, an end

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[136] E.N. Wakoson, "The Politics of Southern Self-Government, 1972-83,"in *Civil War in Sudan*. (London UK: British Academic Press, 1993) 27

[137] M.W. Daly,"Broken Bridge and Empty Basket: The Political and Economic background of the Sudanese Civil War," In *Civil War in Sudan* (London UK: British Academic Press, 1993) 1.

[138] Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol 273, No 2 (February 1994) 1.

to social marginalization, and state intervention to stop the abuses of their Arab rivals who had a heritage of nomadic militias.[139]

Weakened and under threat from an on going insurgency in the South, General Omar El-Bashir's regime in Khartoum responded to this (SLA/JEM) Western Rebellion by targeting civilian populations suspected of providing support to the rebel groups. To achieve his strategic goal of isolating the Western Rebellion, the regime purportedly entered into a military alliance with Arab nomadic militias whom it organized, trained, armed and provided with legal protection to "carry-out atrocities in the name of counterinsurgency."[140] By 2004, it had become apparent that this alleged competition for resources had become an ethnic genocide affecting about two million people in the Western Sudanese Darfur region. [141]

The character of the regime's response to the Western Rebellion transformed the Arab Janjawee militia from a "naïve and outlawed ethnic vanguard" to an organized and reinforced irregular military force with conventional weapons, communication equipment, logistical support and legal protection.[142] This chapter will demonstrate that the Janjawee behave outside accepted societal rules and cultural-cognitive norms, defy moral societal imperatives, and are therefore an illegitimate civil security force.

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[139] Human Rights Watch, *Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan*, Report of the Human Rights Watch (April 2003) Vol 16, No 5(a); http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0404/3.htm#_Toc68525371; Internet; accessed 17 February 2011, 1.

[140] Usman Tar, "Counter-Insurgents or Ethnic Vanguards: Civil Militia and State Violence in the Darfur Region, Western Sudan," Chapter 7 in *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace*. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005) 131

[141] *Ibid*., 131.

[142] *Ibid.*, 145.

This part of the monograph's argument will be explored in four parts, again using institutional analysis to distinguish the basis of illegitimacy. The first part will begin by demonstrating the extreme cultural heterogeneity of the environment and that lack of shared conceptions. In the second part, the Janjawee's rule of the jungle will be shown as a deconstructive force inconsistent with accepted laws and societal norms. In the third part, the divergence of normative and lawful military operations will be distinguished between Janjawee operations targeting civilian populations. In the final part, this chapter will conclude by showing how these elements combine to undermine state legitimacy.

The Culture of Heterogeneity

The biggest challenge to establishing shared conceptions and an overlapping frame of cognitive reference is the heterogeneous nature of Sudanese society. Sudan is the largest nation-state in Africa sharing boarders with several states in the region- Chad, Egypt, Congo, Central African Republic, Eretria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Uganda. The porous boarder with Chad is particularly disconcerting as this is where most of the Janjawee come from and flee back to – providing them with an international safe haven.[143] Sudan is also described as the most "ethnically and religiously diverse countries with a population estimated at close to 28 million drawn from about 20 linguistic groups and half-a-dozen hundred sub-dialects." [144]

> 597 tribes speak more than 400 languages and dialects and practice a variety of religious traditions with each of the three major groupings: Islam, indigenous

[143] *Ibid*., 149.

[144] Hans van de Veen, "Sudan, Who Has the Will for Peace," *Searching for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities* (Utrect NL: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999) 168.

> African beliefs and Christianity in that quantitative order. The combination of Hamitic, Semitic, Nicotic, Bantu and other ethnic groupings has resulted in the world most heterogeneous society.[145]

The ethnic breakdown in percentage is approximately, Arabs 39 and Africans 61 percent. The dominant religion is Muslim at 70 percent, with the 30 percent Christian and traditional African believers.[146]

Even for the most stable government, this type of patchwork society would be very difficult to maintain inclusive politically to all groups. Within Sudanese society the deeper cultural-cognitive divisions give rise to rise to prevailing foundational beliefs of social exclusion and paranoia. As the fabric of Sudanese society erodes through intense deconstructive violence, existing divisions become evolve and become more polarized.

Although peaceful negotiation and reconciliation used to be understood as universal and invariant cultural values across Sudanese social groups, this commonality has lost its traditional place in society between the governing Arab elite and the ethnic African tribes. Due to their sheer majority in the northern capital region, Arab Muslims have been dominant in Sudan's national government since 1956.[147] This has resulted in a culture of Islamic domination in ethnic African regions, like Darfur, where the yoke of Islamic law has been perceived as the national legal device. This perceived repression in combination with "unequal regional development combined to provide for the impetuous for rebellion and secessionist struggles from marginalized…Sudanese since

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[145] Peter K. Bechtold, "More Turbulence in Sudan: A New Politics This Time?" *Middle East Journal* Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn, 1990) 579.

[146] Tar, "Counter-Insurgents or Ethnic Vanguards: Civil Militia and State Violence in the Darfur Region, Western Sudan"…133.

[147] *Ibid*., 134.

independence."[148] Further expressions of Sudan's instability include state crisis arising from enduring differences among political actors, the command of the central government by northern Arabs and their introduction of oppressive and intolerable laws in the marginalized ethnic African areas of the country.

Consequentially, divisive cultural-cognitive patterns have evolved within Sudan. The northern Arab sections of the country have aligned their cultural foundations along dominant Islamic lines. This explains whey even "[i]n the poor quarters of Arab North Africa…there is much less crime, because Islam provides a social anchor: of education and indoctrination."[149] Sudanese Arabs who align their behaviour with this culture of righteous domination over ethnic Africans feel as though they are fulfilling their duty, whereas the ethnic Africans feel excluded. This cultural evolution has manifest itself as the

> key differences between the 2003-2004 conflict and prior bouts of fighting. The…[2003-2004] conflict has developed serious racial and ethnic overtones and clearly risks shattering historic if fragile pattern of coexistence. A number of ethnic groups previously neutral are now positioning themselves along the Arab/African divide, aligning and cooperating with either the rebel movements or the government and its allied militia.[150]

This cultural polarization of Sudanese society has resulted in a moral dead-space where horrific and widespread violence against civilians at the hands of Janjawee militia have been able to operate with complete moral immunity.

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[148] *Ibid*.

[149] Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy"…1.

[150] Human Rights Watch, *Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan.* Report of the Human Rights Watch (April 2003) Vol 16 No 5(a); http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0404/3.htm#_Toc68525371; Internet; accessed 17 February 2011, 8.

Reinstating the Rule of Jungle

The Janjawee have emerged as a manifestation of the complete failure of the post-colonial Sudanese state to provide and enforce codified societal rules. Within Sudan, the societal imperative for "formal and positive value orientation for the growing population of youth" has been completely ignored by the state. [151] This circumstance has been compounded by an "absence, failure or ineffectiveness of the state to secure the lives and property of citizens" which has further precipitated an urgent need for "self-help initiatives by citizens both within and beyond the scope of the law."[152] In the absence of codified societal rules and out of necessity, civil society, in an effort to preserve itself, has sought responsibility for its own defense and justice.

Regulative measures within a society are legitimized by the elements of force, sanctions and responsiveness applied in an equal and unbiased way. In Janjawee controlled Darfur, the population remains unprotected by a corrupted regulative system characterized as the rule of the jungle.

> Suspected criminals were never brought to the police, because many claimed they would be set free without trial or sanctions if they or their relations could bribe them out. The masses considered this as a betrayal of justice, and consequentially decided to 'correct' the judicial system in these rather unruly ways.[153]

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[151] Istifanus Zabadi, "Civil Militias: Threats to National and Human Security in West Africa," Chapter 6 in *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace*. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005) 124.

[152] *Ibid*.

[153] Cage Banseka, "The 'Anti-Gang' Civil Militias in Cameroon and the Threat to National and Human Security," Chapter 8 in *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005) 168.

This informal, widely unaccepted process of adjustment is unwritten and unregulated leading to even greater inequality and exploitation.

In the Darfur scenario, the state has defined the "confrontational, re-traditionalized, voluntary security systems…" as anti-government insurgencies. [154] This

> definitional stigmatization is a disingenuous securitization strategy that enables the state to carry out considerable military reprisals…leading to indiscriminate extra-judicial killings and devastation of defenseless local communities. […] Non-state interference with the operations of retraditionalized security is tantamount to the legitimization of the law of the jungle…where penal justice is at best administered without benefit of a proper trial and the sentences awarded…hardly have any proportionality of the alleged crimes.[155]

This notion of "justice miscarried with impunity" is scarcely a legitimate course of action to fulfill the state's responsibility to provide "internal order, protection of lives and property and provision of basic developmental facilities."[156]

In legitimate democratic societies unlike Sudan, the imposition of the regulative framework is legitimized through an accepted normative system. The result is legitimate regulative system of rules upheld by supervision and enforcement power. In Sudan, however, raw coercion has been legitimized, even rationalized. [157] The law of the desert or that of the jungle became the unaccepted norm in militia dominated areas across Africa, and individuals were dealt with in very horrific ways, in some cases being set on fire in public places out of a mere suspicion of having stolen.[158] Vigilante militias emerged to

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[154] Kenneth, Omeje, "The Egbesu and Bakassi Boys: African Spiritism and the Mystical Retraditionionalism of Security," Chapter 4 in *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005) 72.

[155] *Ibid*.

[156] *Ibid*.

[157] Cage Banseka, "The 'Anti-Gang' Civil Militias in Cameroon and the Threat to National and Human Security"…168.

[158] *Ibid.*

fill a regulatory void, "illegally administer[ing] jungle justice to their victims who they fear might not be adequately punished by the operational machineries of state criminal justice."[159]

Normative Violence in Sudan

In a 2004 Human Rights Report, Amnesty International claimed that the Janjawee militia had been given "free rein" to eliminate the source of the Western Rebellion.[160] This liberalization of state violence was inconsistent with norms that govern what armed conflict was supposed to achieve and how it was supposed to achieve it. According to eye witnesses in Darfur, government attacks against civilian populations "came in phases, ascending in order of severity: initial, intermediate and chronic attacks." [161]

> The initial phase involves visitation by well-armed Janjaweed militia often resulting in theft of livestock, verbal threats on the population and firing into the air. The intermediate and chronic phases, usually occurring in quick successions, and involving combined attacks by the militia and army, graduate into more violent attacks on communities.[162]

These were the stages "at which state coercions are heavily applied" including heavy bombardment from Antonovs and Su-25s, T-54/55 encirclement, and Janjawee sweep and clearance operations.[163] Other forms of terrorism such as rape, abduction,

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[159] Gani Jooses Yoroms, "Militias as a Social Phenomenon: Towards a Theoretical Construction," Chapter 2 in *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005) 40.

[160] Human Rights Watch, Q&A: Crisis in Darfur (April 2008); http://www.hrw.org/en /news/2008/04/25/q-crisis-darfur; Internet; accessed 2 January 2011

[161] Tar, "Counter-Insurgents or Ethnic Vanguards: Civil Militia and State Violence in the Darfur Region, Western Sudan"…150.

[162] *Ibid*.

[163] *Ibid*.

disappearances, the deliberate destruction of water sources and mass killings occur during these attacks at the hands of the Janjawee.[164] This type of extreme behaviour by the Janjawee identifies that certain norms may be specific to their institution, thereby recognizing a distinct roles for the Janjawee as ethnic terrorists.

Within the Janjawee normative social values also regulate social behaviour through the pressure to do adhere to behavioural codes. Non-conforming behaviour may solicit institutional shame where as conforming behaviour induces loyalty.

> The range and nature of violent, ethnically motivated, abuses carried out by the Janjaweed militia are wide, gruesome and horrific. In a recent report classified Janjaweed/army violence into the following categories: indiscriminate attack against civilians; rape and other forms of sexual violence; destruction of property and pillage; forced displacement; disappearances; and prosecution and discrimination.[165]

These kinds of behaviors, intended to terrorize the civilian populations, are not only outside accepted norms, but are outside norms by intended design. It is there clash with normative ethical standards that make these actions such effective (albeit monstrous) terrorism tools.

Unlawful Terror

Motivated by a confluence of regional, ethnic, racial and religious differences, Sudan's ruling elite and other private interest groups have publicly admitted to "manipulating and mobilizing divisive tendencies" to incite conflict between the Arab and ethnic African population.[166] This enduring instability has allowed these groups to

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[164] *Ibid*.

[165] *Ibid*., 149.

[166] *Ibid*., 133.

benefit and quietly extinguish their rivals through the proxy Janjawee. This abuse of state power justifiably places the legitimacy of the state system in suspect. Under this construct, and divisions resulting from the pluralist Sudanese society,

> …it is possible for the emergence of group and fluid militias to challenge the legitimacy of the state to monopolise the use of force. Because they are not as strong as the state military forces and other security organs, they engage in the act of terrorism. They blend into terrorist act and guerrilla tactics to express their frustration. [167]

Using institutional analysis as an analytical tool for evaluating the sociological credibility of the Janjawee, the three domains reveal distinct bases of illegitimacy. The regulative domain, to begin, stresses the requirement for legitimate organizations to operate with accepted rules. Janjawee operations in Darfur, however, have resulted in the "complete breakdown of the law…."[168] Even more powerful than the Sudanese military, the Janjawee have come to represent an intractable threat that the power to the central government whose reach no longer extends into Janjawee dominated areas. Evidence of the regime's own growing fear of a powerful "…militia with narrow political or sectarian loyalties" was manifested in the Armed Forces memorandum to the Sudanese government in February 1989 calling for assimilation into existing state security strictures.[169]

The normative domain emphasizes institutional legitimacy through observance to moral societal imperatives such as the civil, protective responsibilities of a militia force. In the case of the Janjawee, the state has used a proxy military force construed as a militia

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[167] Yoroms, "Militias as a Social Phenomenon: Towards a Theoretical Construction"…33.

[168] A. DeWaal,"Some Comments on Militia in the Contemporary Sudan," In *Civil War in Sudan* (London UK: British Academic Press, 1993) 147.

[169] *Ibid*.

"…to attack civilians while somewhat hiding the government's hand."[170] The Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs has even admitted to "a common cause" with the Janjawee in "targeting the rebellion", but denied Janajweed has been used as a tribal militia involved in ethnic cleansing and further downplayed deaths to a mere 600. [171] As an additional measure of assurance of the Sudanese government's objectives, no Sudanese military forces with large numbers of soldiers from the Darfur region have deployed there. Evidence has also mounted that the Sudanese government has used ethnic militias as proxy forces in the past in southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. The use of proxy irregulars provides the state with plausible deniability and as it claims the militias are uncontrollable. There is no proof that the state has ever attempted to intervene against the militias in Sudan is overwhelming evidence that militias are financed, equipped, organized and directed by Sudanese military intelligence officers. The quid pro quo is that the tribal militias provide the Sudanese government with cheap and effective military forces, "as the militias stand to benefit financially (loot and land) from their participation in the fighting"[172] This interdependent relationship between the Sudanese government and the Janjawee is further reinforced by Usman Tarr.

> It is inadequate, even misleading, to consider the Janjaweed militia either as exclusively 'counterinsurgents' or 'ethnic militias': in the context of this crisis, the two elements come together as a composite descriptive feature of the Janjaweed. The binding force for these two descriptive elements is the role played by the government in supporting the militia group to commit all sorts of ethnically motivated human rights abuses in the name of counterinsurgency.[173]

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[170] Human Rights Watch, *Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan*…22.

[171] Tar, "Counter-Insurgents or Ethnic Vanguards: Civil Militia and State Violence in the Darfur Region, Western Sudan"…146.

[172] Human Rights Watch, Q&A: Crisis in Darfur….

[173] Tar, "Counter-Insurgents or Ethnic Vanguards: Civil Militia and State Violence in the Darfur Region, Western Sudan"…145.

Finally, the cultural-cognitive domain bases legitimacy upon preconscious conceptions of the environment. Post-colonial Sudan, not dissimilar the post colonial African State in general, "[has] become to partial, exclusivist, and is extremely weak in the pursuit of the cardinal rules…such as social justice, the rule of law and democratic governance."[174] It has therefore become is unviable for the state to intervene objectively in social disagreements. "Thus, the autonomy of the state and its legitimate power are called into question by social forces in society."[175]

Conclusion

The Janjawee undermine its own legitimacy as a civil militia by behaving outside accepted societal rules and cultural-cognitive norms, and by defying moral societal imperatives. This tendency has also led to the Sudanese government to recognize the group as a intractable threat to national security. There remains, however, overwhelming evidence that the Janjawee, as a state backed irregular proxy force, committed genocide and other illegitimate acts of state sponsored violence on behalf of the Sudanese government.

And like the AUC in the previous chapter, the Janjawee, as an example of an African civil militia, "challenge state legitimacy, the rule of law, democracy, public order and

[174] Yoroms, "Militias as a Social Phenomenon: Towards a Theoretical Construction"…32.

[175] *Ibid*.

national stability…[fully abdicating their moral responsibility for] protection of and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."[176]

This chapter demonstrated the challenges of cultural heterogeneity in Sudan and revealed the moral dead-space that exists between the Arab and ethnic African populations that permitted the Janjawee to operate. It also showed the rule of the jungle as a deconstructive force inconsistent with accepted laws and societal norms. The chapter also discussed the divergence between normative and lawful military operations as distinguished by Janjawee modus operandi. Finally, this chapter revealed all how these elements combine to provide thee distinct basis of illegitimacy.

[176] Omeje, "The Egbesu and Bakassi Boys: African Spiritism and the Mystical Retraditionionalism of Security"…72.

CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDY 3:THE SONS OF IRAQ

"If you help me get rid of those who mean me harm, then you're obviously my friend. If you fight along with me and shed your blood, you're my brother."[177] These were the words from the tribal Sheikh of al-Anbar province to Major General Walter E. Gaskin, Commanding General of Multinational Forces-West in Iraq in 2007. This kind of cooperation between U.S. led coalition military forces and the Sunni tribes was "unthinkable in the midst of the 2004 urban battles in Fallujah, the sustained insurgency of 2005, and the rising violence in 2006 and early 2007."[178] A year later, control of the most contested areas of Iraq in al-Anbar province, including Fallujah, were handed over to provincial Iraqi control.

Indignant with the extreme violence introduced by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its flagrant disrespect for the traditions and leadership of the Sunni tribes in al Anbart, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha announced the formation of a tribal movement, the Sahawa al-Anbar (translated al-Anbar Awakening) in September 2006. Following Sheikh Sattar's proclamation, civil militiamen under his influence began cooperating with the Coalition and actively targeted AIQ in al-Anbar.[179] This dramatic change in circumstances in al-Anbar coincided with U.S. President George Bush's widely

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[177] Timothy S. McWilliams and Kurtis P. Wheeler, *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 1 - American Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009*. (Quantico VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009) 1.

[178] *Ibid*.

[179] *Ibid*.,12.

publicized 'surge' and a coalition change in focus toward "…development of the Iraqi security forces (ISF)…."[180]

By early 2007, the U.S. led coalition was well aware of the opportunity and "…took advantage of the situation by striking political deals with the disaffected local populations, most of whom are Sunni Arab."[181] Initially termed Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs), the successes of Sunni militias against AQI in al-Anbar were quickly regarded as a panacea solution for FID operations in the contemporary security environment.

> Everything revolved around the CLCs: using them to build on the improved security in much of Iraq; getting them to cooperate with the Iraqi police; getting their members on the police force; making sure they aren't bringing heavy weapons to their checkpoint sites; synchronizing their goals to those of the Iraqi government, etc. …now, when reporters refer to armed groups of civilians manning checkpoints and doing the work that the Iraqi police and Army either will not or cannot do, know that they are the "Sons of Iraq.[182]

Despite the initial tactical successes against AQI, more recent reports cite that the SOI has relapsed against the state. The intention of the U.S. military to integrate former SOI militia into the political mainstream and give fighters jobs in state security forces appears to be failing in the hands of the Shiite dominated Iraqi bureaucracy. "Instead, some have fled into exile; others have been arrested or slain. Those not in jail worry that

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[180] Robert B Neller, "Enabling the Awakening, Part 2" in *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 1 - American Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009* (Quantico VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009) 163.

[181] Ahmed Farook, "Sons of Iraq and Awakening Forces," *Backrgounder #23 for the Institute for the Study of War – Military Analysis and Education for Civilian Leaders (February 2008)*; http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/sons-iraq-and-awakening-forces; Internet; accessed 7 February 2011, 1.

[182] Paul McLeary, "Meet the Sons of Iraq," *Colombia Journalism Review* (February 2008); journal on-line; available at http://www.cjr.org/the_kicker/meet_the_sons_of _iraq.php; Internet; accessed 18 February 2011.

they could be detained at any moment." [183] It is reported that some have even joined AQI for better pay.[184]

In chapters 2 and 3, militia groups were analyzed from the perspective of a weak and failing state. In this chapter 4, the Sons of Iraq (SOI) will be examined from the perspective of a collapsed state that is being propped-up by a stable external military power. This chapter will argue that the SOI are legitimized by an external military force using a process that is outside accepted societal rules and cultural-cognitive norms in Iraq, and accounts mostly for their own Western values.

This chapter will be presented in four parts. It will begin by revealing the role that ethno-sectarianism plays undermining a shared cultural-cognitive frame of reference. Second, Sunni tribal law will be shown as distinctly different from AQI and coalition accepted laws and societal norms. In the third part, normative military operations under Sunni tradition will be contrasted with forms AQI coercion and coalition allegiance. The final part of this chapter will conclude by showing how these elements combine to prevent SOI from assuming an enduring legitimate role in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

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[183] Ned Parker and Caesar Ahmed, "Sons of Iraq Movement Suffers Another Blow," The Los *Angeles Times*, 30 March 2009; http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/30/world/fg-iraq-sunnis30; Internet; accessed 17 February 2011.

[184] Michal Harari,"Uncertain Future for the Sons of Iraq," *Backrgounder for the Institute for the Study of War – Military Analysis and Education for Civilian Leaders (August 2010)*; http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Backgrounder_SonsofIraq.pdf; Internet; accessed 8 February 2011.

The Influence of Iraqi Ethno-Sectarian Culture

The cultural-cognitive prism of Iraqi society is biased by deep ethno-sectarian divisions. These divisions not only make it impossible for Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds to view their environment with the same perception, it makes understanding and assessing these fault lines difficult, if not impossible for an outsider. Following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, sectarian and religious violence was unleashed across Iraq that had been contained by his autocracy.

> As early as April 2003, while coalition forces were still mopping up the last traces of Baath resistance, a prominent Shiite leader, Abdul Majid al-Khoei, who had just returned from exile, was murdered in the holy town of Najaf. Four months later, on August 29, 2003, a car bomb exploded outside that very mosque, killing more than 100 people, including Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, leader of the Iranian-sponsored Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). On February 1, 2004, another 100 people were killed in two suicide bombings in the Kurdish town of Erbil.[185]

Although several incidents of sectarian violence were attributed to extremist Shiite militias that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. invasion, the primary instigator was the minority Sunni population which had controlled Iraqi politics under Saddam's regime and which "resented its exclusion" from the freshly minted Iraqi institutions introduced Shiites, Kurds and coalition military forces.[186] This conflict within a conflict quickly manifested itself in the notorious "Sunni Triangle", enclosed by Baghdad in the South, Mosul in the North and Rutba in the East, which rapidly descended into anarchical violence.[187]

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[185] Mark Wilbanks and Efraim Karsh, "How the "Sons of Iraq" Stabilized Iraq," *Middle East Quarterly* Vol XVII, no. 4 (Fall 2010) 58.

[186] Ibid.

[187] Ibid.

Following the U.S. invasion, Iraqi "identity politics came to be viewed through an ethno-sectarian prism that delineated the vast majority of individuals as Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, or Kurds."[188] Witness to ensuing ethno-sectarian violence, various sects and insurgent groups within Iraq armed themselves for there own protection.[189] In particular, Sunnis viewed the new state government in Baghdad as "non-supportive" based on the opinion that it was a Shiite-led, Iranian-backed government.[190] This cultural view underpinned the prevailing Sunni belief that they were marginalized by the Shiite majority – particularly when it came to the dispersion of state resources.[191]

Culturally, the Sunnis were conditioned to compete with their rival Shiite countrymen for power and resources within Iraq. Power sharing and inclusive policies had become inconceivable. At their foundation, the tribes and their leaders were "all guided by self interest. Not selfish, necessarily, but self interest…."[192] This made political censuses, even in the broader interest of stability and good government, impossible.

The dissolution of the Iraqi military was a coalition misstep that exacerbated this underlying social paranoia. "The Coalition Provisional Authority's decision to disband the Iraqi military and conduct de-Ba'athification in 2003 was especially disruptive to al-

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[188] Farook, "Sons of Iraq and Awakening Forces"…1.

[189] *Ibid*.

[190] *Ibid*.

[191] David G. Reist, "Enabling the Awakening, Part 1," in *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 1 - American Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009* (Quantico VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009) 154.

[192] McWilliams et al, *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 1 - American Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009*…15.

Anbar province given the concentration of Sunni military officers and the former regime members there."[193] Further fueling the social anxiety, the

> American misunderstanding of Iraqi culture also contributed to this [perception of dominating invaders, occupiers and crusaders]. For example, the way they conducted searches and raids created friction between them and the local people. […]…when an Iraqi was searched it was looked upon as an assault.[194]

The combination of these elements of fear and uncertainty precipitated an alignment of Sunni behaviour to galvanize a feeling of unification and belonging. For fighters who were former members of Saddam's regime, the prevailing impetus was loyalty. For the thousands of former military personnel who had lost their livelihood when the Sunni dominated military was disbanded in May 2003, it was vengeance. Some elites also felt shamed that they had been excluded from the state's new provisional government. [195]

> All feared and resented their possible domination by the despised Shiites and their perceived paymaster—Iran's militant Islamist regime—and all wished to regain lost power and influence. These grievances were further reinforced by tribal interests, values, and norms. The Sunni Triangle is a diverse mosaic of hundreds of small and medium-sized tribes, as well as a dozen large tribal federations, notably the Dulyam and the Shammar Jarba, each comprising more than a million members. Under Saddam, many of these tribes, especially the Dulyam, had been incorporated into the regime's patronage system. With such material benefits and political prestige curtailed after the U.S.-led invasion, many tribesmen joined the insurrection.[196]

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[193] *Ibid*., 2.

[194] Tariq Yusif Mohammad al-Thiyabi, "Perspectives of the New Security Forces" Chapter in in *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 2 - Iraqi Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009* (Quantico VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009) 180.

[195] Wilbanks et al, "How the "Sons of Iraq" Stabilized Iraq"…58.

[196] *Ibid*.

Fearing the same kind of marginalization and persecution that they had delved out to the northern Kurds under Saddam, the Sunnis united with the coalition after their leaders and their family's had been mistreated by AQI.

> Forced marriages in particular played an important role in pushing the Sunni tribes into fighting AQI. According to David Kilcullen, marrying leaders into prominent local families is of al-Qa'ida's "standard techniques…." The marriages helped to cement al-Qi'ida's relationship with locals, adding kinship to the religious and ideological appeals of the group. However, this technique was not acceptable to most Iraqi tribes. […] According to Kilcullen, "marrying women to strangers, let alone foreign fighters [most of all AQI's senior leadership is not Iraqi] is just not done"…." […] The refusal of AQI's demands for marriage led to violence. In one instance, AQI killed a sheikh for refusing to handover his daughter. When the people then attacked AQI in response, AQI brutally retaliated, "killing the children of the sheikh in a particularly gruesome manner…."[197]

These factors combined to influence the Sunni tribal leadership to seek coalition protection. It would also be their opportunity to leverage a share of the new state power that had previously eluded them as a branded insurgent and AQI aligned tribe.

Regulative Tribal Law

In Iraq in 2006 the regulative pillar of Iraqi society consisted of three influential groups (excluding the coalition): the tribes; the former regime elements; and the foreign fighters. Of these groups, the tribes were viewed by Iraqis as the most important regulative body guided by a network of sheikhs and elders.[198] The endurance of the tribes as a social institution remained invariant in Iraqi society despite the unraveling of

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[197] Anthony H Cordesman, *Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict -Vol 2*. (Westport CT: Praeger Security International, 2008) 515.

[198] McWilliams et al, *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 1 - American Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009*…5.

former regime institutions.[199] In the Sunni Triangle, in particular, it was tribal law codified by the sheiks that held sway – before and after the Awakening.

Sheik Sattar of al-Anbar was an instrumental force mobilizing the SOI movement. He is quoted as stating, "leave it to me and I will take care of it," by other provincial Sunni leadership.[200] Sattar spoke to other tribal sheikhs individually and explained that he was ready to do something against AQI. On 14 September 2006, Sattar held a tribal conference and issued a communiqué was issued outlining his 11 basis for establishing the Awakening:

> first, to bring back the army in Anbar and to bring the tribal sons into the police and army; second, to declare war on AQI...; to bring back the respect that is due to the tribal sheiks; American forces were to be considered friendly, and attacking them was forbidden…; to treat Ba'athists humanely; no cooperation or negotiation with AQI; to re-open the judiciary and bring criminals before the law; to be presented as government officials, as people who follow the law and not the militias; to enter into the political system…and to participate in the election."[201]

By a tribal approach all elements of the regulatory pillar of society - force, sanctions and expedience responses – would be done by the SOI. Through these codified regulations, Sattar formalized the institutional rules of the SOI and the Sunni society as a whole in the lawless Sunni Triangle.

Sattar's normative framework for the establishment of the SOI also included parameters that governed standards of recruitment. A senior coalition officer illustrated the recruitment and training process for SOI as follows:

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[199] Reist, "Enabling the Awakening, Part 1," in *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 1 - American Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009*…157.

[200] Ahmad Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi, "Tribal Perspectives," Chapter in in *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 2 - Iraqi Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009* (Quantico VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009) 156.

[201] Ibid.

> You had to kind of read and write. You had to have, I think, twenty-two teeth. … They had mixed standards, and we would vet them and, of course, BAT [Biometrics Automated Toolset System] them ... And so this is all good stuff. But we would build the police and the army by recruiting. And they would recruit and basically use the sheikhs. The next day six hundred or seven hundred guys would show up, and we would put them through the process. Who was eligible, who met the criteria to join the army or the police. So we built the first and seventh Iraqi army divisions, and we increased the police from about 5,000 to almost 28,000 in that year. And that was the Sons of Anbar.[202]

During training period, former Iraqi military officers and non-commissioned officers were recognized as potential leadership in one of the elements of ISF or SOI. Volunteer males outside the 18-48-year age bracket of SOI were acknowledged for



Figure 4.1 - How to Win the War in Al-Anbar[203]

[202] Wilbanks et al, "How the "Sons of Iraq" Stabilized Iraq,"…61.

[203] Neil Smith and Sean McFarland, "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point," Military Review (March-April 2008), 48.

participating in the process and retained on a list of potential workers for civic construction projects. As areas where SOI units operated became secure, SOI members were siphoned away from the SOI where they were no longer needed to work on civic construction projects as well. Educated SOI members who were literate were encouraged to apply to join either the new Iraqi military or state police forces. In this way, the SOI was to be gradually demobilized or incorporated into elements of the legitimate ISF.[204]

The resulting legitimization of the SOI as a regulative pillar in Iraqi society was sufficiently backed by coalition surveillance and sanctioning power. The links between the development of SOI and the coalition are represented in Figure 4.1. Although members the SOI, under coalition supervision, were able to carry weapons after a probationary period, they were not intended nor designed as a permanent solution to Iraqi instability. The SOI was intended rather as civil defence force with the objective of providing intelligence to the coalition and denying AQI a foothold in Sunni villages. The SOI were a stop-gap solution to buy time for the ISF to grow sufficiently capable of addressing the states urgent security needs. Since inception, the Coalition commanders' and the Iraqi Government plan for SOI had always been to incorporate 20 percent into the ISF and gradually demobilize the remainder as the security situation permitted.[205]

The SOI program was also highly effective as a regulative institution within wider society. In 2007 alone "…attempted violent incidents (more than half of which are

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[204] Gordon, Alanko, "Sons of Iraq," *The Long War Journal* (February 2008); Journal on line; available from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/02sons_of_iraq.php; Internet; accessed 11 February 2011.

[205] Farook, "Sons of Iraq and Awakening Forces," *Backrgounder #23 for the Institute for the Study of War – Military Analysis and Education for Civilian Leaders …*2.

discoveries of unexploded IEDs) dropped by approximately 90%, bringing relative calm to a previously violent environment." [206]

SOI assisted coalition forces in what was previously unachievable – the expulsion of AQI "from the major population centers into small, isolated pockets where they could be targeted and eliminated without being able to project force against the Coalition, Iraqi Forces, or Iraqi population."[207] Additionally, the ISF gained the breathing room it desperately needed to grow, equip and train into a viable state security force. This cumulative success enabled coalition units to transition their daily security responsibilities to the ISF sooner than anticipated.

Normative Greed and Violence in Iraq

The institutional values and norms of the SOI that governed the shared ends, including the means to achieve those ends, did not stay consistent with the coalition for long. Initially, Sheikh Sattar's "manifesto denouncing al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and pledging support to U.S. forces" appeared to be consistent with coalition aims in Iraq and purely motivated by the normative vales that reflected security for their people.[208] In the Western tradition, local militia members were paid $10 (U.S.) per day "to maintain order and to collect intelligence in their neighborhoods."[209]

> Though there was initially no money involved for the Awakening movement, this issue quickly came to the fore. Just as tribal support for the "Great Arab Revolt" against the Ottoman Empire had been motivated by the glitter of British gold and the promise of booty (nearly half-a-century later Lawrence of Arabia would still

[206] *Ibid.*, 7.

[207] *Ibid*.

[208] Wilbanks et al, "How the "Sons of Iraq" Stabilized Iraq"…60.

[209] Hegseth, "Sons of Iraq: A Grassroots Surge Against Al-Qaeda"....

> be remembered by Bedouins as "the man with the gold"),so the Anbar sheikhs were not immune to the allure of American money. Brigade level commanders doled out millions of Iraqi dinars and, in some places, U.S. dollars every month, and by the summer of 2007 the movement was fully subsidized by the coalition…As a senior Iraqi official explained: In addition to monthly salaries, the coalition also paid for results. [210]

In regions where security was good, the SOI became a kind of social welfare, indirectly combating AQI by providing alternate income opportunities to joining AQI. As described by a local sheikh:

> Let's be honest. They established the Sahwa in our city after all the doors had been shut in our face because there was no chance to hold jobs. The first reason for establishing the Sahwa was because there were no jobs; the second reason—to provide money for the families; and the third reason—to protect the civilian people.[211]

By the end of 2008, the U.S. government had established the SOI program at a cost of US $400 million, with an ongoing average monthly commitment of over US $21 million. The program cost reached a nadir in March 2008 of nearly US $39 million. For the Coalition commanding general, General David Petraeus, "this was a worthwhile investment that not only saved lives in Iraq but also U.S. taxpayers' money."[212] Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2009, Patraeus justified the expenditure stating that "the savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced violence, not to mention the priceless lives saved have far outweighed the cost of their monthly contracts."[213] The issues of money revealed the values and norms specific to the sheikhs and the role of the coalition commanders as bankrollers. Although the overlapping goal

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[210] Wilbanks et al, "How the "Sons of Iraq" Stabilized Iraq,"…67.

[211] *Ibid*.

[212] *Ibid*.

[213] *Ibid*.

of expelling AQI remained, it became clear that the sheikhs became motivated by the allure of coalition wealth. The coalition forces had transitioned from liberator, to invader lastly to paymasters.

This normative social system of self-interest provided the Sunni sheikhs with an attractive alternative to violent AQI social pressure to submit. Recognizing the challenge, AQI elevated violence to even higher levels.

> A U.S. Marine colonel cited this example: Fallujah … I remember the day [March 2007] that I got there. I think it was the secretary of the city council, his nephew … a 12-year old boy [who] was hit by AQI right on the main street in Fallujah. Ran him over with a vehicle several times. Broke several, maybe all his bones. Then threw him on the door step of the secretary of the council's house and shot him in front of everybody. … We couldn't get there. Everybody got there too late. The populace knew who did it. They knew why they did it…[214]

The slightest gesture toward coalition forces were justification for AQI to retaliate with severe consequences. Sunnis in al-Anbar who acknowledged U.S. soldiers waving vehicles "could consider themselves dead."[215] AQI even murdered people on suspicion.

> They did not need absolute proof-or any proof to kill a person. […] This is the way the ideology works: if we kill him, and he's made a mistake, then he deserved what he got; but if we kill him by mistake, then God will forgive us for what we have done.[216]

As examples, teachers where executed in the presence of their students and students in front of their classmates.

> [AQI] reached a level of criminality-monstrosity. They would behead a person, and they would bring his head to his mother and say, "Here's your son's head." The overstepped all the red lines. There was a sense of revolt, but because of fear,

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[214] Ibid., 59.

[215] al-Thiyabi, "Perspectives of the New Security Forces" Chapter in in *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 2 - Iraqi Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009*…181.

[216] Ibid.

> people could not revolt. […] Nobody could open his mouth [without fear of being brutally reprised against.[217]

There was a large gap between AQI norms in the pursuit of objectives and the Sunni military tradition. As former leaders within the relatively professional pre-invasion Iraqi military, the Sunni community leaders in al-Anbar rejected AQI's violent radicalism. Coalition allegiance through the SOI program not only provided the Sunni tribes with the physical means to expel AQI, it also provided wealth and jobs to Sheikhs and common people respectively. SOI became the vehicle for the Sunni tribes to realign there societal norms, roles and goals with stability and prosperity that was offered by the coalition. Expulsion of AQI, then, became an incentive by default rather than the primary objective.

External Legitimization

The SOI was established in conjunction with coalition forces with Sunni Arab cultural-cognitive concepts in mind. This was an important step by the coalition to seek legitimacy in the eyes of the Sunnis by acknowledging their tradition of tribal security. As a the senior U.S. officer in Ramadi recalls,

> When the tribes began to work with us, they began sending their young men off to Iraqi Police training. The first combat outposts, or IP stations, were in the tribal heartland so that the IPs that were going off to Jordan for training didn't have to worry about the safety of their loved ones while they were serving as police. After they sent off 600 or 700 guys to training, they said, you know, we need to take a knee for about a month until some of these guys start coming back from training, because it's a three to four month turnaround, because they needed to keep enough of their tribal militia folks around them to secure their families.[218]

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[217] al-Thiyabi, "Perspectives of the New Security Forces" Chapter in in *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 2 - Iraqi Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009*…183.

[218] Sean B. MacFarland, "Partnering with the Tribes in Ramadi, " Chapter in *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 1 - American Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009* (Quantico VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009) 181.

In addition to recognizing the need for Sunnis to protect their tribal areas, the coalition encouraged the Arab tradition of reconciliation between the Sunni sheikhs and the Shitte central government. These two aspects of cultural understanding greatly assisted the U.S. in gaining support for the SOI program as a legitimate institution among Sunnis in Sunni Triangle.[219]

Despite SOI legitimacy in the eyes of both the Sunnis and the coalition, the organization had limited appeal to the majority Shiite population as an enduring component of the national Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Despite the SOI's efforts for a "legal revolution against AQI" the now Shitte dominated national government "did not accept our [tribal] behaviour."[220] In an effort to show the nationalist nature of SOI and counter Shitte paranoia, Shiekh Sattar met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Minister of the Interior to seek a more legitimate approach. Backed by the U.S. government, Sattar obtained "hiring orders for thousands of police recruits throughout the province." In addition, the Shitte government asked SOI to establish three "emergency battalions" throughout al-Anbar.[221]

SOI's efforts to operate with the accepted rules stood in stark contrast with AQI and other illegial forces. There was hope among provisional Iraqi government that after the United States removed the last of the five surge Brigade Combat Teams that SOI would be integrated into the ISF to fill the void. The U.S. government was also hopeful

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[219] Ahmad Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi, "Tribal Perspectives," Chapter in in *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 2 - Iraqi Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009* (Quantico VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009) 47.

[220] al-Thiyabi, "Perspectives of the New Security Forces" Chapter in in *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 2 - Iraqi Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009*…190-191.

[221] Ibid.

that "the SoI program could be a useful tool that allows the Iraqi government to provide security to the public and its legitimacy."[222]

Regardless of the SOI's institutional legitimacy through adherence to value and moral societal imperatives, they became increasing vulnerable to AQI without the large number of coalition forces. Since the withdraw of the U.S. surge,

> over 100 Awakening Council leaders, several tribal leaders, and approximately have been killed in suicide bombings and ambushes, which worries Coalition leaders. […] A portion of the attacks, however, seem to have been carried out by the extremist Shi'as …connected to the Iraqi government's Shi'a leadership.[223]

This type of ethno-sectarian violence against the SOI leaves its predominately Sunni leadership with the perception that the real threat could be a Shitte government in Baghdad and not AQI. These circumstances appear to be leading to a situation in which political exclusion on behalf of the central government destabilizes Iraq even further. "Furthermore, the perceived inability of the United States and Iraqi Security to protect Awakening Council and SOI leadership is decreasing American credibility as well as Iraq's governmental legitimacy."[224] Remaining U.S. military forces in Iraq are struggling to protect some SOI members from elements of the provisional Iraqi government. [225]

For their part, the Iraqi government has reservations that it can have power over the Sunni-dominated SOI and Awakening groups to the extent it controls the Shiite dominated ISF.

> The situation has been characterized by the United States' leadership in Iraq as being one where the Sunni groups recognize that they lost the sectarian struggle

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[222] Farook, "Sons of Iraq and Awakening Forces"…2.

[223] *Ibid*.

[224] *Ibid*., 12

[225] *Ibid*.

> and have decided to come to the table. Conversely, the "Shi'a don't recognize yet that they've won" and are not yet willing to accept what amounts to a negotiated surrender on the part of the former supporters and members of insurgent movements. [226]

Exacerbating the situation, Sunni impatience is mounting with what they consider "foot-dragging on [SOI] integration into the Iraqi security forces." [227] The Sunnis desire legitimacy, however they have not been represented in the ISF to the degree they expected. Although 12,000 SOI members have pursued an application with the ISF, "only 490 have undergone the necessary vetting and training needed to make the transition…giv[ing] credence to Sunni claims of the Iraqi government stalling on the issue."[228]

Conclusion

Although the SOI were viewed as legitimate among the Sunni population, they were legitimized by an external military force imposing a process that is outside accepted societal rules and cultural-cognitive norms in Iraq. The coalition applied SOI integration they way they would integrate forces in the Western world without due consideration for the cultural fault lines that existed between the Sunni SOI and the Shiite central government. Although this is a relatively new development in Iraq, it seems as though the once promising program known as SOI has become a divisive force within Iraqi society.

This chapter began by presenting the significance of ethno-sectarian culture plays undermining a shared cultural-cognitive frame of reference. It then demonstrated the

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[226] *Ibid*.

[227] *Ibid*.

[228] *Ibid*.

effectiveness of the SOI as a regulative institution in Sunni areas and their attempt to achieve legitimacy through adherence to accepted regulative norms or methods in contrast with AQI. Shared norms and goals were explored in terms of expelling AQI, but it was also revealed that AQI acted well outside accepted normative behavioral bounds and that the leaders of SOI became very interested in financial wealth. The final part of this chapter showed how these elements combine to prevent SOI from assuming an enduring, legitimate role in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

The next chapter will draw on observations from this case study of an externally backed militia in a failed state, along with the others, to determine what the divergence or overlap is between this type of militia and the other types. It will also delve deeper into the question of whether the SOI, or militias by that model, are an effective conflict termination strategy or a convenient exit strategy.

CHAPTER 5
THE PARADOX, A BETTER MODEL AND SOME FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

In chapter 1, David J. Francis asked the following questions in his work on civil militias in Africa:

> How do we define and conceptualize civil militias? Are they primarily an African phenomenon? Why and how do civil militias emerge in weak, failed and collapsed states, or why do they proliferate in situations of complex political emergencies?[229]

The aim of this study was to not merely to expand the narrow focus of African militia research, but to further expose the paradox of civil militias and state control as a global phenomenon. Correspondingly, this work also intended to offer universal model for analyzing civil militias, and shed light on future implications of such forces in the quest for human and state securities in the conflict-prone fourth world.

In this, the final chapter of this study, themes from the case studies will be brought forward to support several conclusions concerning contemporary civil militias in weak, failing and collapsed states. In the first section, the paradox of civil militias as stabilizing security elements will be exposed as a fourth-world-wide phenomenon, not just an African problem. In the second section, a graphical model based on the pillars of institutional analysis will be offered as an analytical tool to investigate and determine the varying dimensions of legitimacy as they pertain to contemporary civil militias. In the third and fourth sections, case study evidence will be presented to support the future implications of civil militias on host and external states respectively. This chapter will

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[229] Francis, *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace...*1.

conclude with some recommendations on areas for further study that where beyond the scope of this paper.

The New Militia Paradox

The case studies examined in this paper are strong evidence that proliferation of civil militias in weak, failing and collapsed states result of their immediate utility. In Colombia, Sudan and Iraq, the respective militia forces are cheap and achieve urgent security goals very quickly when state conventional forces have struggled for the upper hand. Levelling of the insurgent asymmetric playing field is best documented in Iraq where hard data was recorded following the emergence of the SOI.

> Discoveries of weapons caches have risen 190-percent…." […] There was 50-percent drop in violence after local tribes joined U.S. and Iraqi forces in combating AQI. Attacks in March 2007 averaged four a day, compared with 25 a day the previous summer. […] The average weekly attacks in al-Anbar dropped from about 250 in May 2006 to 100 in May in 2007. There were only 30 attacks in Ramadi, compared to the 254 attacks in May 2006. This downturn is violence in Ramadi was the result of a sustained military presence…6000 U.S. troops, 4000 Iraqi soldiers, 4500 Iraqi policemen, and 65 police stations and joint combat outposts.[230]

These appealing characteristics mark their appeal to vulnerable governments in threatened states. AUC success in Colombia against the FARC and ELN has been equally as effective in rooting out guerilla strongholds in isolated regions beyond the operational reach of the Colombian military forces.

> When the [Colombian] paramilitaries began, and were totally ineffective in operational terms, they enjoyed explicit support of respectable sectors of opinion and a level of social consensus in their favour that might have permitted them to be socially constructive. Now, when they have obviously become operationally

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[230] Cordesman, *Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict -Vol 2*…516.

> effective, they are explicitly condemned, and there is a growing consensus they are socially destructive.[231]

In Sudan, the Janjawee have been monstrously effective at destroying the villages that supported the Western Rebellion in the Darfur region. In the later two cases, however, these 'victories' have also resulted in violence directed at civilian populations.

Despite lavish credit that was bestowed on the SOI for achieving such a decisive effect against AQI, Iraqis noticed that "…the Americans [seemed to] have two Armies: this army with the tanks and the marines and everybody, and the other army is the militias…."[232] The SOI program was never intended to be a permanent solution, but an urgent measure to buy time until the newly re-established Iraqi military could meet the state's security needs on its own. The re-integration of SOI into society has gone much slower than anticipated and the U.S. military has been quick to counter reports of frustrated SOI fighters joining AQI.

> Some point out that the Sons of Iraq program is a temporary solution to a permanent problem because it does not permanently provide the public with security. They argue that the security in Iraq could quickly degenerate to the situation that existed prior to the troop surge. This is only true to an extent. First, there has not been an instance whereby all the members of an SOI group have demonstrated recidivism. Therefore, if members of the Sons of Iraq program decide to defect to the insurgents, they will have to do so without the support of their fellow SOI members, who are in a position to inform on them. This self-policing mechanism mitigates the risk of entire SOI groups becoming compromised. Furthermore, the biometric data that the Coalition and Iraqi forces have gathered on SOI members as well as the personal familiarity that would exist between those remaining loyal to the Iraqi government and any rogue members

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[231] Fernando, "From Public to Private Violence: the Paramilitaries," Chapter 6 in *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace*…128.

[232] Nuri al-Din Abd Al-Karim Mukhilf al-Fahadawi, "Perspectives of the New Security Forces - Interview 13," Chapter in *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 2 - Iraqi Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009* (Quantico VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009) 197.

> would make it more difficult for SoI members to defect. The threat of this issue therefore seems overblown.[233]

The fact that SOI, the most controlled civil militia of the case studies reviewed, is showing signs of unraveling is troubling news.

Colombia, Sudan and the provisional Iraqi government all turned to their respective militia forces as a desperate measure to preserve state control. In the short-term, the AUC, Janjawee and SOI provided what they were intended to provide. Longer term studies of civil militias in weak, failing and collapsed states that are unable to regain there monopoly of military violence have yielded paradoxical effects. "These types of militias mushroom in weak, failed and collapsed states where the authority and legitimacy of the government or the state is contested, and where the state does not have control or monopoly of the threat or the use of force."[234]

Even with the SOI having achieved such demonstrable results against AQI, there was also mounting evidence that the extra-legal framework was deconstructing state and humanitarian securities through intractable violence and lawlessness.

> The new recruits proved particularly efficient in the fight against the al-Qaeda jihadists and their local allies. The Sunnis knew where al-Qaeda fighters lived and worked because they had harbored them initially, and they had no qualms about using the same brutal methods in fighting back. This resulted in a swift routing of al-Qaeda in a revenge-based frenzy: "They hunted al-Qaeda down with a vengeance. They dragged al-Qaeda guys through streets behind cars ... they had videos of feet on the altars in mosques ... It was pretty much just a ruthless slaughter." An Iraqi official recalled how a tribal sheikh gleefully told him how he had a certain al-Qaeda operative beheaded: "And then he smiled and said, 'I want to show you something you will like.' One of the [al-Qaeda] people who tried to assassinate him, and he showed me on the telephone a picture of a head.[235]

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[233] Farook, "Sons of Iraq and Awakening Forces"…12

[234] Francis, *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace...*2.

[235] Wilbanks et al, "How the "Sons of Iraq" Stabilized Iraq"…62.

Regardless of their expediency, the militias often became fuelled by their own self-interests. The SOI sought coalition payroll, the AUC carved out a market share of the narco-economy and the Janjawee benefited from the expulsion of ethnic Africans from the remaining farmable land. In all these cases, civil militias operating in weak, failing and collapsed states ultimately undermined the state control and legitimacy they were intended to preserve. As David Francis noted,

> capitalizing on its mandate on security contract, the state strengthened its security capacity by raising paramilitary forces to meet the challenges of governance. …the state manages to monopolize the use of force for the purpose of diffusing rather than intending to cause violence. But in the end violence is inevitable.[236]

Given this security paradox attributed to civil militias in weak, failing and collapsed states, what is needed is an objective, analytical model for best understanding and assessing their degree of nefariousness.

The Institutional Model for Militias

Institutional analysis across three interrelated domains of legitimacy has been shown as an objective model for understanding and assessing civil militias.

> Paramilitaries have become part of our time and it is useless to deny their power. We do not say this in the fantastic sense that we should submit ourselves to the paramilitaries power, but in the realistic sense that it is not enough to deny, curse or dismiss that power as unqualified. We must begin to recognize that power for what it is if we are to confront it.[237]

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[236] M. Janowitz, Military Conflict: Essays in the Institutional Analysis of War and Peace (London, UK: Sage Publications, 1975) 10-11.

[237] Fernando, "From Public to Private Violence: the Paramilitaries," Chapter 6 in *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace*…147.

Unlike definitions, characteristics, or continuum presented in the first chapter, institutional analysis transcends cultural boundaries to gauge the legitimacy of civil militias within the context of their own cultural frames of reference.

Represented graphically, the three domains of institutional analysis present eight sectors where civil militias can be plotted to represent the relationship of the three pillars of legitimacy. The x, y and z axis correspond to scales of culture-cognitive, normative and regulative pillars and reveal an area of highest legitimacy where all values on all axis are assessed to be above the invariant centre point.



Figure 5.1: The Institutional Model for Analyzing Militias

The invariant centre point is the anchor that permits the institutional model to be trans-cultural. Although the concept of a single point could be misconstrued as cultural

relativism, it is intended to provide a definitive point above which cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative expectations of a given society are meet in a positive way. Below the centre point in any domain represents a deficiency in that domain. In this way, pillars are permitted to be more dominant in determining the level of legitimacy or illegitimacy. Civil militias may occupy static or transitional spaces within this model as it is intended to characterize the ongoing relationships between the domains of institutional analysis.

The case studies provide us with the examples to demonstrate the utility of this model and show that its analysis is independent of region, ethnicity, motivation or degree of privatization. The AUC is measured in the least legitimate region of the model as it violates cultural-cognitive basis of coercive violence, operates outside societal norms and regulates society outside codified laws. The Janjawee score extremely low in the normative and regulatory sectors as the dominant pillars, but is culturally more accepted than the AUC by its ethnic Arab protectorate. Similarly, the SOI score well on the culture-cognitive and normative scales, but are viewed as unlawful by the Shiite dominated central government. Although more justification for these placements resides in the case study chapters of this paper, this brief exercise demonstrates the universal applicability of the institutional model. It further permits isolation of dominative pillars and therefore a means of further distinguishing between legitimate state security forces and illegitimate state armed groups.

Using legitimacy to determine the constructive or deconstructive nature of civil militias is important in weak states because

> …where the state institutions are criminalized, the legitimacy of the state system is held in suspect. Given this understanding,…militaries [in weak states] lack the

> capabilities to strengthen the…state. Because the military has become unprofessional, being divided by the plural [or exclusionary] nature of society, it is possible for the emergence of group and fluid militias to challenge the legitimacy of the state to monopolise the use of force. Because they are not as strong as the state military forces and other security organs, they engage in the acts of terrorism. They blend into terrorist act and guerrilla tactics to express their frustration. [238]

Impacts on Human Securities

The impacts of violence on human securities at the hands of civil militias is intractable. As civil militias also have the tendency to normalize and elevate the general levels of violence in society, it also becomes more difficult to trace second or third order violence back to militia organizations. Colombia is an excellent example.

> In 2002, homicides in Colombia reached 28,837 and kidnappings reached 2,986. between 1996 and 2002, a homicide occurred every 20 mins and a kidnapping every 3.2 hours. A child was kidnapped every third day. In the same time period it is estimated that 939,155 Colombians were displaced from their homes due to violence (average of 368 a day). […] The situation regarding children is worse. According to interviews' conducted between 1996 and 1998 by the Defensoria de Pueblo (Colombian Human Rights Ombudsman) 18% of children interviewed had killed at least once. 60% had seen someone killed and 78% had seen mutilated bodies. 25% had seen someone kidnapped and 13% had been kidnapped at least once. 18% had seen someone tortured, 405 had used a firearm against someone at least once and 28 % had been wounded.[239]

In addition to the obvious negative societal effects of such endemic violence, it also leads to "forms of flight" according to Luis Restrepo. The first form of flight, spatial flight or escape, has resulted in as many as 300 000 farmers per year being displaced from their inherited land between 1997 and 2000 and over one million Colombians

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[238] Yoroms, "Militias as a Social Phenomenon: Towards a Theoretical Construction"…33.

[239] Restrepo, "Violence and Fear in Colombia: Fragmentation of Space, Contraction of Time and Forms of Evasion"…173.

fleeing the country entirely. These figures represent both industrial-agricultural and professional hemorrhaging of a weak state that has invested precious resources developing and educating them. Colombia's chief export has become its people.

Restrepo cites other forms of flight including a systemic rise in alcohol, drugs and sex in minors, and "the proliferation of satanic sects and the rise of suicides among youths related…to the occlusion of the future by the violence." According to Restrpo, these outlets for affected Colombian youths represent

> all attempts to forget the past, to deliberately deny the future, and to flee from the present. […] …[T]hese phenomena are related to poverty and lack of future, but all have their roots, in the first instance, in the little value that human life has in an environment of violence as unbridled as Colombia.[240]

Restrepo further postulates that the longer term outcome of widespread extra-state violence in weak states results in "societies of fear," wherein vulnerable societies accept extreme extra-state violence as the regulative mechanism of their civil society. [241] Fernando Cubides echoes Restrepo's sentiments further stating that

> Fear is the institutional, cultural and psychological repercussion of violence [and] …a response to institutional destabilization, social exclusion, individual ambiguity and uncertainty. In Latin America, a latent though sometimes open 'culture of fear' has obtained institutional characteristics induced by systemic yet arbitrary violence…" from the state or it's proxy organizations.[242]

According to David Francis, the situation is the same in failing African states where militias behave outside both state law and humanitarian law. He further accuses African militias of being "complete strangers to the very basic norms of human rights and

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[240] *Ibid*., 184.

[241] *Ibid*., 173.

[242] Koonings et all, "Violence and Fear in Latin America"…15.

international law relating to the conduct of warfare…[who are] only accountable to their interest groups…."[243]

In Iraq, although a more concerted effort has been made demobilize the SOI program by incorporating qualified individuals in the ISF, there are ominous indicators that this plan will mature without U.S. military supervision or bankroll. In spite of the work of the National Reconciliation Commission, headed by Zuhair Chalabi, to increase SOI salaries to the US $300 a month they used to receive from the coalition, the central government has further cut their pay citing budget shortfalls."[244] The integration of SOI has also been problematic for other reasons.

> The GoI still does not have the logistical infrastructure, administrative capacity, or the resources to swiftly integrate thousands of SoIs and provide them with civil employment. Related to this is the question of need. Even if the Iraqi government had the capacity to integrate these fighters, there are limited positions for young and uneducated men. The U.S. military worked diligently to assemble lists of the names of SOI fighters it received from local leaders, and gave them to the Iraqi government to receive approval.[…] Lack of trust has also been an issue.[…] Elements within Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government have long distrusted the SOIs, fearing they would threaten government authority. Such distrust has meant that many SOIs were denied approval on the basis of their tribal affiliation, not their actual criminal past. The feeling of distrust is mutual. SOIs are often suspicious of government actions; even when members are denied transition approval for legitimate reasons, some SOIs view the denial as illegitimate and based solely on their Sunni identity.[245]

In addition to these threats to human securities within host states, these come with consequences for external states. Most notably of these consequences are the massive transnational migrations and humanitarian crisis that result from refugee emergencies.

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[243] Francis, *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace…*20.

[244] Musings on Iraq: Iraq News, Politics, Economics, Society, "What's in the Future for The Sons of Iraq," http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2010/12/whats-in-future-for-sons-of-iraq.html; Internet; accessed 21 February 2011.

[245] Michal Harari,"Uncertain Future for the Sons of Iraq," *Backrgounder for the Institute for the Study of War – Military Analysis and Education for Civilian Leaders (August 2010)*; http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Backgrounder_SonsofIraq.pdf; Internet; accessed 8 February 2011.

Colombia's migration has already been discussed and accurate data on Iraq is not yet available. In the Darfur region where Janjawee violence has been specifically aimed at displacing populations, there have been adverse impacts on neighbouring states, further stressing their respective delicate security balance. These displaced refugees also become a drain on national resources to sustain such large operations for indefinite periods.

> As of April 2008, some 2.5 million displaced people live in camps in Darfur and more than 200,000 people have fled to neighboring Chad, where they live in refugee camps. In addition to the people displaced by the conflict, at least 2 million additional people are considered "conflict-affected" by the United Nations (UN) and many need some form of food assistance because the conflict has damaged the local economy, markets, and trade in Darfur.[246]

This impact of civil militias on human populations in Africa and other weak, failing and collapsed states has had the effect of "deconstruct[ing] humanity and community spirit of the Africans from their physical realm as fear and insecurity would predominate the social and economic as well as political arena of the environment."[247] Ineffectively contained or solved, these implications within the human security domain have corresponding impacts on state security.

Impacts on State Securities

In his study of civil militias in weak African States, David Francis underscores the enduring nature of the threat to state existence.

> In conflict-prone and transition societies, they threaten public order, social cohesion and stability. They not only contribute to the further polarization of

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[246] Human Rights Watch, Q&A: Crisis in Darfur (April 2008); http://www.hrw.org/en /news/2008/04/25/q-crisis-darfur; Internet; accessed 2 January 2011.

[247] Yoroms, "Militias as a Social Phenomenon: Towards a Theoretical Construction"…47.

> already bitterly divided societies, but also aggravate ethnic tension and intra-communal violence. […] The [subsequent] erosion of the states' monopoly over the use of force has led to the privatization of security and violence, thereby presenting the perpetual image of these countries as being unstable and ungovernable.[248]

In Latin America, this same privatization of violence is leading a "model of uneasy, fragmented democracy…that permanently endures 'acceptable' levels of violence within a publicly disputed domain…." [249] The behavior of civil militias in weak, failing and collapsed states "threaten to replace the rule of law and the ballot box with gun law and armed violence," therefore undermining legitimate state governance.[250]

National attempts have been made to demobilize these deconstructive institutions (or outlaw them in the case of Colombia), however, civil militias in threatened states have stubbornly clutched to their beneficial roles. The Janjawee have been aptly characterized as "…'wild cats' illustrating the challenge associated with 'taming' (demobilizing it)."[251] Through their involvement in the Darfur conflict, the Janjaweed have ascended to one of the wealthiest organizations in Sudan. "They have amassed cars, houses and money, and therefore, developed a huge stake in the current crisis. They have also come to wield a significant degree of power by virtue of the convergence of interest they share with the state."[252] These circumstances have made it difficult for the state to make demobilization an attractive alternative. Although some Janjawee have be assimilated into state security elements such as Border Intelligence, Popular Defense Forces and Central Reserve Police,

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[248] Francis, *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace*...20.

[249] Koonings et al, "Violence and Fear in Latin America"…15

[250] Francis, *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menac*...20.

[251] Tar, "Counter-Insurgents or Ethnic Vanguards: Civil Militia and State Violence in the Darfur Region, Western Sudan"…151.

[252] *Ibid*.

the state has not delivered on its commitments for salaries. In some instances, this has led to a switch of allegiances. "For example, in early 2008, Janjaweed leader Mohamed Hamdan briefly made an alliance with both the SLA and JEM, before reaching a new agreement with the government."[253]

In addition to competing with private clients, state demobilization of civil militias can also create a wake of expectations that joining a militia is a pathway to a legitimate job. Following the assimilation of a large number al-Anbar based members of SOI in the ISF, members of similar 'awakening groups' were turned away from the fully fleshed out ISF. This not only had a destabilizing effect between regional awakening movements which competed for ISF employment, but raised more fundamental questions about the nature of these left-out actors.

> …what happened in Diyala or Ninawa, they were late in awakening. They do not have any place for them to join. The Iraqi organizations have been completed. So they are like militias now. They are civilians. …there is no explanation for them. Are they Iraqi army or police? Or are they some other organization?[254]

In attempting to use assimilation into the ISF as way to legitimate alternatives to awakening forces in Iraq, an expectation was created on the part of the state that joining a militia would provide opportunities in the ISF. The demobilizing strategy was having a mobilizing effect, and further diluted the state's monopoly on coercive means.

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[253] Human Rights Watch, *Q&A: Crisis in Darfur*…

[254] Abdullah Mohammad Bahir Al-Jaburi, "Perspectives of the New Security Forces – Interview 14," Chapter in *Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 2 - Iraqi Perspectives: US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009* (Quantico VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009) 217.

Within weak states, civil militias can also lead an "economy of affections"[255] Although the Janjawee's and SOI's financial interest in their respective conflicts has already been discussed, those examples pale in comparison to the potential of Latin American paramilitaries in the lawless regions of the narco-states. The paramilitaries' involvement in securing a share of the private security market has given rise to a new type of economic system that stresses rapid gains at the expense of long-term development, ultimately undermining state growth.

> It appears that the brand of capitalism that we find in many Latin American countries [explosive drug related growth in the last 25 years], which has been operating on the basis of a 'production-speculation' mentality, with little investment in long term capital equipment, a focus on commerce and quick turn over on short term profits, generated an economic 'climate' propitious to the growth of a 'great risks-high profits' sector such as the drug industry: discouraging the development of more stable economic activities and encouraging speculation. In a situation of weak state legitimacy, lack of accountability, inability to govern with a minimum degree of efficiency and failure to provide justice and personal security to the state's subjects, this brand of capitalism made a particular impact.[256]

Specifically, the encouragement of the drug trade and discouragement of longer term investment not only retards state economic growth, it further enables the cycle of urgent security needs verses lack of state security forces.

State failure and collapse as a result of civil militia is also a threat to external states for two reasons. Firstly, "the continuous failure…to address the internal logic of conflicts in their frontiers could make possible for civil militias to become recruits for

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[255] G. Hyden, "The Post Colonial State: Crisis and Reconstruction," quoted in "Militias as a Social Phenomenon: Towards a Theoretical Construction," Chapter 2 in *Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005) 47.

[256] Menno Vellinga, "Violence as a market Strategy in Drug Trafficking: the Andean Experience." Chapter 5 in *Armed Actors: Organized violence and State Failure in Latin America* (London UK: Zed Books, 2004) 73.

both national and international terrorism."[257] AQ in Afghanistan in the late 1990s would be a good example of this nexus between militias and support to a transnational terrorist organization. Secondly, "persistent instability created by militias can lead to authoritarian dictatorships in affected areas."[258] Akin to civil militias, dictatorships address short-term stability but lack longer term legitimacy due to internal inequality and social exclusion.

Conclusion

To summarize this final chapter, the paradox of civil militias and state control in weak, failing and collapsed states is a global phenomenon. Institutional analysis provides common model for analyzing civil militias on the basis of legitimacy. From these two aforementioned conclusions, the chapter presents the implications of civil militias on human and state securities from the perspectives of the three case studies.

This chapter has brought forward themes from the three case studies to support its conclusions concerning contemporary civil militias in weak states. In the first section, the paradox of civil militias as stabilizing security elements was exposed as a fourth-world-wide phenomenon, not just an African problem. In the second section, a graphical model based on the pillars of institutional analysis was offered as an analytical tool to investigate civil militias across different political and cultural settings. The third and fourth sections presented case study evidence to support the future implications of civil militias on host and external states respectively.

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[257] Yoroms, "Militias as a Social Phenomenon: Towards a Theoretical Construction"…47.

[258] *Ibid*.

CONCLUSION

The questions surrounding civil militias are now more urgent than ever. In addition to the U.S. and NATO sponsored militias operating in Iraq and Afghanistan (respectively) at the time of this paper's research, the number of extra-legal militias continues to proliferate as an increasingly accepted alternative to state security forces. Pro-government vigilante militias in Mexico such as the Juarez Citizens Council (CCJ) and Muammar Gaddafi's Tuareg militias in Libya are but two more recent examples of how the lines that distinguished various types of armed actors are becoming blurred in the context of the contemporary security environment of the third and fourth worlds. Even within the United States, the most unassailable and powerful state in existence, the number of private self-professed civil militias is on the rise.[259]

Worlds apart from the relative stability of United States, Mexico and even Libya - weak, failing and collapsed states suffering from insurgencies and protracted civil war battle for survival. Desperate, determined to survive and lacking sufficient state security forces, their governments then seek to protect themselves by leveraging the military potential of civil militias. Civil militias, however, are motivated by a range of self-serving interests. Civil militias also behave outside the bounds of codified laws with impunity.

Militias are used by threatened states because of their immediate efficacy. They are inexpensive and achieve urgent security goals very quickly when state conventional forces have either been unsuccessful or unwilling. These characteristics mark their appeal

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[259] Barton Gellman, "The Secret World of Extreme Militias," *Time Magazine; http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2022516,00.html;* Internet; Accessed 20 April 2011.

to vulnerable governments in weak states. Although civil militias preserve state control in the short term, they have demonstrated themselves to be dangerously deconstructive over time. Case studies of the use of civil militias in Colombia, Sudan, and the Iraq reveal commanding evidence that civil militias undermine state and humanitarian securities through intractable violence and lawlessness. Despite their expediency, and often fuelled by their own self-serving incentives, civil militias operating in weak states undermine the state control and legitimacy they were intended to preserve. This is the new paradox of civil militias in weak, failing and collapsed states.

This paper used institutional analysis as a framework to expose this universal paradox. The first chapter overviewed the dominant theories on the origin, types and characteristics of civil militias to provide context for this study. The second portion of this paper used institutional analysis to examine the AUC, the Janjawee and SOI. This framework exposed the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive forces that lead to the liberalization of state violence in fragile states.[260] Specifically, the AUC case study explored elements unique to pro-government paramilitary forces in Latin America including patterns of societal violence in Colombia and the role of the illegal narcotics trade. The Janjawee study examined the influences of ethnic rivalry, resource scarcity and state sponsored genocide. The final and most recent case study on SOI analyzed the influence of divisional sectarianism and financial incentives as societal drivers for civil militias. These papers concluded by drawing evidence from the case studies analyses to prove the militia paradox, demonstrate the utility of the institutional model, and provide insight on future implications of these forces for state and human securities.

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[260] Eric Ouellet and Pierre C. Pahlavi, "Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare: A Case Study of the French Army in Algeria 1954-1960"…1.

From this analysis, it is clear that civil militias are not a panacea in threatened states seeking control or conflict termination. There are paradoxical consequences of liberalizing military violence to achieve urgent state security. Through this enhanced understanding, more viable and enduring security strategies can be sought in weak, failed and collapsed states.

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