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IDENTIFYING FUTURE INSTITUTIONAL LEADERS OF THE CF: WHY CFPAS FALLS SHORT

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JCSP 37

Master of Defence Studies

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PCEMI 37

Maîtrise en études de la défense

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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
JCSP 37 - PCEMI 37

Research Paper/ Mémoire de recherche

Master of Defence Studies / Maîtrise en études de la défense

Identifying Future Institutional Leaders of the CF: Why CFPAS Falls Short

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26 April 2011/le 26 avril 2011

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<u>Abbreviation</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
Capt(N)	Captain (Navy)
CAR	Canadian Airborne Regiment
CAS	Chief of Air Staff
Cdr	Commander
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CFPAS	Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System
CLS	Chief of Land Staff
CMS	Chief of Maritime Staff
Col	Colonel
Gen	General
LCdr	Lieutenant Commander
LCol	Lieutenant-Colonel
Maj	Major
MPRR	Military Personnel Record Résumé
PER	Performance Evaluation Report
VAdm	Vice-Admiral

ABSTRACT

The Canadian Forces (CF) has clearly defined what it expects of its leaders through publications of leadership doctrine including A-PA-005-000/AP-005 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People* and A-PA-005-000/AP-006 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*. These publications demonstrate that leadership is considered to be important to the CF. However, the performance appraisal system presently utilized by the CF has not adequately evolved to fully recognize the importance of leadership as it falls short in assessing the leadership potential of the officer corps; particularly senior officers given the increasing levels of leadership responsibility they assume as they are promoted through the ranks.

CF members at the ranks of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander are at the beginning of a transition from being leaders of people to potentially becoming future institutional leaders. Therefore, the assessment of their leadership potential should be based on factors that correspond to the abilities expected of institutional leaders in order to facilitate having effective promotion and succession planning processes. The thesis of this research paper states that the Performance Evaluation Report (PER) used for officers at the ranks of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander is inadequate for assessing institutional leadership potential. The CF is, in essence, selecting and grooming future institutional leaders based solely upon their abilities to lead people. However, according to CF leadership doctrine, the responsibilities associated with leading people are markedly different from those associated with leading the institution. This research paper proposes that the PER form be modified to address this shortcoming.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge and thank a couple of people for the assistance and support they provided me throughout the process of completing this research paper. First, I would like to extend my appreciation to my Academic Advisor, Dr. Richard Goette, Assistant Professor at the Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College (CFC), for his excellent advice, guidance, and flexibility. His door was always open to me and his assistance was instrumental in my completion of this research paper. Secondly, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my wife, Dr. Daphnée Simard, for her unconditional support, understanding, patience and encouragement throughout this process. Whenever I felt that I was hitting the wall, her words of encouragement fuelled me with the drive I needed to continue. She is a great source of inspiration to me, and her experience and wisdom as a professor benefited me greatly as I was able to use her as a sounding board for my ideas with respect to this research paper.

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Evaluate what you want-because what gets measured, gets produced.

-Dr. James A. Belasco, Author and Business Leadership Strategy Consultant¹

This quote from a best-selling author and business leadership strategist summarizes how important it is for any organization to have a performance appraisal instrument that suits its needs. Specifically, in order for a performance appraisal system to be useful, it must assess the individual effectiveness that it requires of its members to contribute to the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the organization itself. The Canadian Forces (CF) is no different in this regard when it comes to the importance of assessing the effectiveness of its individual members. According to Rick Hackett, “[i]ndividual effectiveness is achieved through members behaving in ways valued by the CF.”² In an ideal situation, these behaviours are the very same ones that are essential to accomplishing the goals and objectives of the CF.³

The CF is a multi-faceted organization with many different occupations and trades and a clearly defined rank structure consisting of non-commissioned members, non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers. Each of those three groups has members that represent the leadership of the CF. The CF as an institution has clearly defined what it expects of its leaders at various levels through publications of leadership doctrine. These keystone leadership publications include A-PA-005-000/AP-003

Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the*

¹ James A. Belasco, *Teaching the Elephant to Dance: Empowering Change in Your Organization* (New York, N.Y.: Crown, 1990), 191.

² Rick D. Hackett, “Understanding and Predicting Work Performance in the Canadian Military,” *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science* 34, no. 2 (April 2002): 131.

³ *Ibid.*, 131.

Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, A-PA-005-000/AP-005 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People*, and A-PA-005-000/AP-006 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*.⁴ With these efforts to publish leadership doctrine, it is evident that leadership is considered to be of utmost importance for the CF. However, the performance appraisal system presently utilized by the CF has not adequately evolved to recognize the importance of leadership as it falls short in assessing the leadership potential of the officer corps; particularly senior officers given the increasing levels of leadership responsibility they assume as they are promoted through the ranks. But why is leadership so important for the CF?

The CF defines what it signifies to be a member of the CF in its publication A-PA-005-000/AP-001 *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. In essence, this publication:

... describes the profession of arms in Canada for the benefit of members of the Canadian Forces (CF) and indeed all citizens. It presents the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the profession, shows how in practice it serves Canada and Canadian interests, and codifies, for the first time, what it means to be a Canadian military professional.⁵

Moreover, it outlines the importance of leadership for the CF by stating that “strong and effective leaders are at the heart of military professionalism.”⁶ The CF, as an institution,

⁴ These publications can be found at: Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005); Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-003 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005); Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-005 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2007); and Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-006 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2007).

⁵ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 55.

is a large and complex organization with a unique and strong culture that requires strategic leadership at its helm to guide it through its current operating environment and to prepare it for the challenges of tomorrow. A former Commander of the Army, Lieutenant-General (retired) Michael Jeffrey, has put forth that “[n]o institutional objective is more important than to ensure that it has effective strategic leadership. Institutional leaders are key to organizational effectiveness...”⁷ Strategic leaders are not developed overnight, and thus, it is important to identify those officers that have the potential to be leaders of the institution as early as possible in their careers. Therefore, it only stands to reason that the CF should assess behaviours, attributes, capacities, and capabilities that institutional leaders are expected to possess. How does the CF assess the potential of its members to become leaders of the institution?

Currently, the system that the CF uses for performance appraisal of its individual members is known as the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS). According to the CFPAS website, “The aim of CFPAS is to develop CF members through constructive feedback and to accurately assess the level of demonstrated performance and potential for career administration purposes.”⁸ The key document of CFPAS is the annual Performance Evaluation Report (PER). The annual PER is intended to appraise and report both the performance and the potential of individual members of the CF. National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) uses the PER for selection purposes including promotions, further terms of service (contracts), some postings and

⁷ Lieutenant-General (retired) Michael K. Jeffrey, “The CF Executive Development Program: A Concept for Development Period 5: The CF Officer Professional Development System” (15 July 2008), 3.

⁸ Department of National Defence, “Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS),” <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/cfpas-sepfc/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2011.

appointments, career courses, occupational transfers, administrative reviews, honours and awards, and officer commissioning programs.⁹

The PER has two major sections; one that assesses and reports performance and the other that rates potential. The performance rating section is intended to allow for a quantitative measurement of various factors relating to observed work and leadership skills. The quantitative assessment is also supported by a narrative with a view to providing an overall picture of a member's performance. The section where potential is rated is intended to be an assessment of the ability of an individual CF member to function at the next highest rank. Recommendations with respect to promotions and selection for career courses should be conducted based on the assessed level of potential of a member.¹⁰

From both the perspective of individual members and the CF as an organization itself, the PER is an extremely important document in that it is used to determine promotions and to select members for important career developmental and training opportunities, i.e., courses and postings. Moreover, it is a document that provides input into the selection of personnel for leadership positions.¹¹ It is of paramount importance to have a promotion selection system that allows for a distinction between those who are best suited for advancing through the ranks and those who are just performing adequately at their current ranks and are not necessarily suited for promotion.¹² Given the

⁹ Department of National Defence, *CFPAS Help File Version 2009.0.7*, Chapter 1, Section 104.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Section 104.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Section 104.

¹² Lieutenant-Colonel E.I. Patrick, "The Need for Better Selection and Training for Future Military Leaders." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 5, no. 3 (Winter 1975-1976): 37.

importance of the PER in determining promotions, it must be tailored to meet the requirements of the CF and it must be seen as a document that is applied fairly and equitably for the members whose careers are impacted by it.¹³ However, the PER does not fully meet the needs of the CF given that it uses a one size fits all approach for assessing the leadership potential of its members ranging in rank from corporal/leading seaman to lieutenant-colonel/commander.

Non-commissioned members do not perform the same duties as officers. However, within the officer ranks, junior officers do not have the same level of responsibility as senior officers. The same principle applies when comparing the level of responsibility of senior officers to executive-level officers: “One size will not fit all ... ranks ... - at least as far as performance appraisal goes.”¹⁴ Therefore, one can conclude that CFPAS is flawed as an instrument for measuring the potential of its individual leaders to advance through the ranks. The PER as a performance appraisal instrument has been criticized for many years. For example, Brigadier-General D.S. MacLennan published an article in 1971 in the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* titled “What is Wrong with the Performance Evaluation Reports.”¹⁵ In the article, he lamented that:

I believe that there is probably no subject which comes in for more discussion by people in the organization, and which there is greater potential for dissatisfaction, than that of officers’ confidential reports,

¹³ Brigadier-General D.S. MacLennan, “What is Wrong with the Performance Evaluation Reports,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Summer 1971): 44.

¹⁴ S.F. Cronshaw, T.B. Kondratuk, and G.A. Chung-Yan, *Performance Appraisal Discussion Paper: Prepared for the Canadian Forces*, Report Prepared for the Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, February 2003), 21.

¹⁵ Brigadier-General D.S. MacLennan, “What is Wrong with the Performance Evaluation Reports,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Summer 1971).

or Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) as they are now called in the Canadian Armed Forces.¹⁶

Thirty years have passed since the publication of the article, and the PER form has changed since then, but the potential for dissatisfaction still exists. There is always room for improvement.

One aspect of the PER where there is room for improvement is the potential section; more specifically, it is under-utilized to identify CF institutional leaders of the future. Given the time, effort and resources required to develop institutional leaders, the CF should employ a performance appraisal instrument that will assess the behaviours and attributes required of institutional leaders as early as possible in the careers of its officers. However, at what rank level should the CF start to evaluate whether or not its individual officers have the potential to be institutional leaders?

Canadian Forces members at the ranks of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander, through education, exposure and experience, embark on a developmental journey, which is the beginning of a transition from being leaders of people to potentially becoming future institutional leaders.¹⁷ In order to have an effective selection process that identifies future leaders of the institution, the measurement of leadership potential must include factors that correspond to the leadership abilities

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁷ At the tactical and operational levels, CF leaders, when carrying out their missions and assigned tasks, typically exercise influence over their subordinates in a face-to-face, direct way. This is known as the concept of “leading people.” Institutional leadership is carried out at the strategic level where leadership demands a wide-ranging point of view as it is concerned with the development and maintenance of the capabilities necessary to achieve success at the operational and tactical levels both in the present and in the future. It is about ensuring the long-term effectiveness of the CF. Influence at the strategic level is normally indirect. A discussion of how the CF views the concepts of institutional leadership and leadership of people will be discussed in further detail in chapter 3 of this paper. The following reference provides an overview of the two concepts: Department of National Defence, *A-PA-005-000/AP-004 Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005).

expected of leaders of the institution. This study will argue that the PER used for officers at the ranks of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander is inadequate for assessing the leadership potential of future leaders of the institution. Instead, the CF is in essence selecting and grooming future leaders of the institution solely based upon their abilities to lead people. However, according to CF leadership doctrine, the responsibilities associated with leading people are markedly different from those associated with leading the institution. It is essential to move the appraisal of potential of CF officers from being just a paper exercise to providing a mechanism to assess the potential of officers to become leaders of the institution at timely stages of their careers.

The next chapter of this research paper will explore senior leadership concepts and the importance of the succession planning of senior leaders. Included in this discussion will be an examination of the importance of strategic and transformational leadership and how they apply to the CF. The following chapter will examine how the CF views institutional leadership and leadership of people with a focus on the differences between the two concepts of leadership. This will be followed by a chapter on how the CF measures the potential of officers at the ranks of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander with a focus on why the current system of performance appraisal is problematic for officers at those ranks. The chapter will also explore the factors and behaviours that should be assessed in measuring the potential of those officers using CF leadership doctrine with respect to institutional leadership. The research paper will be concluded with a summary of the arguments presented in the paper.

The arguments in this research paper will be developed through the use of primary and secondary research material. Official DND/CF documents, studies and publications will form the basis of research from primary sources. Academic and professional journal articles and papers written by military leaders (past and present) as well as books and publications authored by human resource management professionals specializing in performance appraisal and assessment of leadership potential will also be used as research sources. A great deal of resources will be examined from print media; however, the world-wide web as well as the Defence Information Network will also be used to support the arguments put forth in this study.

CHAPTER 2 – SENIOR LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS AND SUCCESSION PLANNING

Introduction

True leaders get things done. That's their essential job description. They make sure that the institutions and organizations they lead are headed in a good direction, and they leave them better off than they found them.¹⁸

-General (retired) Tony Zinni from the book *Leading the Charge*

The quote above from retired United States Marine General Tony Zinni, former Commander of United States Central Command, emphasizes the importance of leadership for any organization. Military institutions, the CF included, have recognized for a long time that leadership is a vital ingredient in the accomplishment of operational goals.¹⁹ In fact, the CF has shown that it recognizes the importance of leadership with the creation of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI). CFLI is considered to be the centre of excellence for leadership in the CF, and it is mandated to:

... research, develop and disseminate core concepts of leadership and the profession of arms to the CF to stimulate and promote an intellectual base for best practice identification, professional development, articulation of core leadership and professional concepts, and to provide a focus and unity of thought in these domains.²⁰

The Challenges Facing Today's Leaders in the CF

It is important to emphasize that the requirements of military leadership differ greatly than those of the civilian world. As James Stokesbury put it, the profession of arms obliges that "... men agree to die if necessary in fulfilling their tasks. That is a

¹⁸ Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, *Leading the Charge: Leadership Lessons from the Battlefield to the Boardroom* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 13.

¹⁹ Shaun Newsome, Arla L. Day, and Victor M. Cantano, *Leader Assessment, Evaluation and Development*, Report Prepared for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2001), 5.

²⁰ Canadian Defence Academy, "Canadian Forces Leadership Institute," <http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/cfli-ilfc/cfli-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 26 February 2011.

rather different affair from the possibility of losing one's job if one does not do well."²¹ Military leaders must have great confidence in their subordinates and this high level of confidence must be reciprocal. They must possess the ability to inspire those under their command to risk their lives in the pursuit of mission accomplishment, and they must have the courage to ask their subordinates to put their lives on the line if necessary.²² This is what makes leadership in the military such a challenge and it is what differentiates it from leadership in most other fields. However, there are some commonalities that apply to leadership in general that are worth exploring.

John Kunich and Richard Lester point out the reality that regardless of the job, being a leader is not a simple task. If it were simple, more people would take on leadership roles. Leaders have to be able to inspire people that do not necessarily want to be inspired; they have to explain their superiors' sometimes inexplicable decisions and be loyal to those decisions; and they must also make difficult and often unpopular decisions themselves and implement them. Moreover, leaders must remain calm even in the face of harsh opposition or criticism.²³

The key consideration of leaders, particularly military leaders, in performing their duties is accomplishing the missions assigned to them. Today's military leaders are called upon to perform missions in complicated and rapidly changing operating environments as a result of globalization, which has led to the breaking down of borders,

²¹ James L. Stokesbury, "Leadership as an Art," in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, ed. Robert Joseph Taylor, William E. Rosenbach, and Eric B. Rosenbach, 7-24 (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 2009), 65.

²² *Ibid.*, 66.

²³ John Charles Kunich and Richard I. Lester, "Reality Leadership," *Air and Space Power Journal* 20, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 83.

a burst of information access and technology, a shift in power bases, failures of governments and economic systems, mass migrations, increased urbanization, and the rise of non-state entities that are not confined to borders. These factors are creating stressors on a global scale as failed and failing states have become havens for those that have an axe to grind.²⁴ What does this mean for the leadership cadre of the CF?

These factors make missions all the more complex for CF officers, who are being called upon to perform a broad range of responsibilities including, but not limited to, nation building, diplomacy, and humanitarian relief on missions that range from peace support operations to combat operations. Moreover, a single operating environment may see the full spectrum of warfare ranging from peace support operations to counterinsurgency operations to full combat operations; all of which require different sets of skills. They also have to work with many different players including allied military partners, non-governmental organizations, other government departments and the media to name just a few.²⁵ Operating in these environments becomes even more complex and unclear as the ranks of officers increase.²⁶

Given the myriad responsibilities assigned to CF senior officers and the complexity of the environments in which they perform their duties, senior leader development is vital for ensuring the operational success and the professional well-being

²⁴ Zinni and Koltz, *Leading the Charge: Leadership Lessons from the Battlefield to the Boardroom*, 23.

²⁵ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-003 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

of the CF.²⁷ This is especially true for leaders at the strategic level of the CF.

Strategic Leadership

Executives in private companies perform work that is uncertain, unstructured and probably the most important for their organizations.²⁸ The same thing applies for the general and flag officers that lead the CF as an institution. Therefore, it is desirable for the CF to have strategic leaders at the general and flag officer ranks due to the complexity of the environments in which they work and the great amount of responsibility they are assigned. However, there is not a generally accepted CF definition of strategic leadership.²⁹

A strategic leader must possess wisdom and be a visionary. Moreover, a strategic leader must have the capacity to develop and carry out plans, to make an impact on the culture of an organization, and to have the capacity to make decisions in a complex, unclear, and ever-changing environment. A strategic leader does all these things through strategic-level policies and directives while building consensus amongst the leadership of an organization. Strategic leadership is not necessarily synonymous with institutional leadership, but it is a facet of it.³⁰ Nonetheless, strategic leadership is an extremely important part of institutional leadership as leaders of the institution must be strategic in their thinking, and thus are expected to be strategic leaders. Therefore, it is vital for the CF to select and professionally develop generals and flag officers that can carry out the

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

²⁸ Clinton O. Longenecker and Dennis A. Gioia, "The Executive Appraisal Paradox," *The Academy of Management Executive* 6, no. 2 (May 1992): 18.

²⁹ Jeffrey, *The CF Executive Development Program: A Concept for Development Period 5: The CF Officer Professional Development System*, 3.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

duties and responsibilities that are expected of them as strategic leaders.³¹

Given that the CF operates in ever-changing, complex environments, it requires institutional leaders that can think strategically; leaders who will question the continued adherence to an organizational structure and constantly rethink how the CF is designed, structured, equipped, trained and oriented. Therefore, one could argue that the CF must strive to identify and professionally develop officers who have high potential to make the leap from the lower levels of leadership where transactional, direct leadership tends to be predominant, to the senior levels of CF leadership where transformational leadership is required to ensure that the CF continually updates itself so that it keeps pace with an ever-changing global operating environment.

Transactional vs. Transformational Leadership

Two widely explored leadership concepts are transactional and transformational leadership. It is of value to discuss these concepts and how they relate to the CF leadership concepts of “leading the people” and “institutional leadership.” But what exactly is the difference between transactional leadership and transformational leadership and are they mutually exclusive?

Bernard M. Bass, who passed away in 2007, was a widely cited professor emeritus at the School of Management at Binghamton University and founding editor of *The Leadership Quarterly Journal*.³² Considered a leader in his field, he spent many years researching the development and application of transformational leadership. He asserted that managers seldom rely on their legitimate or on their coercive power.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

³² Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, “Obituaries,” <http://www.siop.org/tip/Jan08/23obit.aspx>; Internet; accessed 15 April 2011.

Instead, managers are likely to enter into a transaction with their employees whereby managers explain the results that are expected of employees and the compensation that the employees will receive if the results are indeed achieved.³³ This transaction or exchange amounts to a promise of reward for getting the job done effectively or conversely, to a threat of discipline for performance that does not meet expectations. This form of leadership is known as “transactional leadership,” and Bass proposed that leaders who exhibit transformational leadership are more likely to be viewed by their subordinates and peers as effective leaders than those who exhibit transactional leadership.³⁴ However, Peter Bradley and Danielle Charbonneau, members of the Department of Military Psychology and Leadership at the Royal Military College of Canada, have pointed out that transactional leadership can be useful for the military in situations where soldiers are called upon to perform monotonous tasks. Transactional leadership’s “controlling and coercive” nature could be what is necessary to make certain that monotonous jobs are completed as subordinates may not respond to transformational leadership in such instances.³⁵ But what exactly is transformational leadership and what are the indicators that a leader is transformational in his/her behaviour?

According to Bass, transformational leadership takes place when leaders generate and increase the interest of subordinates, when they inspire subordinates to accept their missions and the reasons for them, and when they rally their subordinates to put the

³³ Bernard M. Bass, “From Transactional to Transformational Leadership: Learning to Share the Vision,” *Organizational Dynamics* 18, no. 3 (Winter 1990): 19-20.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 20-21.

³⁵ Peter Bradley and Danielle Charbonneau, “Transformational Leadership: Something New, Something Old,” *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 10.

interests of the team ahead of their own.³⁶ Bradley and Charbonneau add that “[t]ransformational leadership has also been found to contribute to the self-confidence of followers, organizational commitment, group cohesion, trust in the leader and work satisfaction.”³⁷ However, transformational leaders can accomplish these results in different ways and through different personal styles. Bass proposes that transformational leaders can inspire their subordinates by being charismatic, by satisfying the emotional needs of their subordinates, or by intellectually stimulating their subordinates.³⁸ Kevin Donahue and Leonard Wong add that transformational leaders also demonstrate a high degree of confidence in their subordinates and they show concern for their subordinates.³⁹ Although transformational leaders may differ in styles and behaviours, Donahue and Wong point out that the one thing they have in common is that they develop and communicate a vision. In order for a vision to become transformational, it must become something that gives rise to a group’s pride binding them together in purpose. Ideally, a vision should serve as a clear picture of what an organization should look like in the future without discounting what an organization has accomplished in the past.⁴⁰

Which brand of leadership is better: transactional or transformational? Bass argues that transactional leadership can often lead to mediocrity, especially when leaders rely on what he refers to as “passive management by exception” where they intervene

³⁶ Bass, *From Transactional to Transformational Leadership: Learning to Share the Vision*, 21.

³⁷ Bradley and Charbonneau, *Transformational Leadership: Something New, Something Old*, 8.

³⁸ Bass, *From Transactional to Transformational Leadership: Learning to Share the Vision*, 21.

³⁹ Kevin S. Donohue and Leonard Wong, "Understanding and Applying Transformational Leadership," *Military Review* 74, no. 8 (1994): 29.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 28.

with their teams only when desired results are not being achieved.⁴¹ This type of leadership will likely not foster an environment in which performance standards are exceeded. Donahue and Wong concur that transformational leadership results in better performance than transactional leadership, but they point out that the two styles of leadership are not mutually exclusive and that transformational leadership is not necessarily the remedy to overcome all the challenges that leaders may encounter. In fact, transactional leadership is generally simpler to use and for certain tasks where short-term results are required, it may indeed be adequate.⁴² The organizational level at which a leader works is also a factor in determining whether transformational and/or transactional leadership should be used. Senior leaders looking at longer-term results will find transformational leadership to be more appropriate, but this does not imply that junior leaders cannot use transformational leadership.⁴³ Bradley and Charbonneau support this as they assert that military members at various rank levels can employ transformational leadership.⁴⁴ In fact, they argue that the transformational leadership model provides leaders at all rank levels with guidance on how to “...project their influence and achieve objectives, arguably the central goals of military leadership.”⁴⁵ Therefore, it can be concluded that if junior leaders can exhibit transformational leadership, it only stands to reason that their capacity to be transformational leaders can be assessed. In the past, it could be argued that the CF did not necessarily identify and

⁴¹ Bass, *From Transactional to Transformational Leadership: Learning to Share the Vision*, 20.

⁴² Donohue and Wong, *Understanding and Applying Transformational*, 30.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

⁴⁴ Bradley and Charbonneau, *Transformational Leadership: Something New, Something Old*, 12.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 13.

groom transformational leaders. In fact, the CF has faced leadership crises due to a lack of transformational leadership at its most senior levels.

One crisis that stands out in recent times is the events surrounding the troubled deployment of the now disbanded Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR). The unit's task was to execute peacekeeping in Somalia for a duration of six months in 1992 and 1993 during which a Somali youth was tortured and murdered by members of the CF. This dishonourable conduct coupled with the failure of the leadership of the CAR and the higher levels of the CF resulted in a Commission of Inquiry being launched. In its final report, the Commission of Inquiry discussed the concepts of transactional and transformational leadership, and it alluded to an apparent lack of transformational leadership in the CF.⁴⁶ The whole episode amounted to a wake up call for the CF in that it could no longer afford to be stagnant and to have institutional leaders that would not force the institution to transform in order to adapt to changing circumstances.

The CF, in its doctrine, recognizes that transformational leadership is beneficial given that it operates in environments laden with myriad challenges where the trust and commitment of individual members are vital for achieving success.⁴⁷ The CF as an institution cannot afford to be ill-prepared, and thus, leaders at the strategic level must act

⁴⁶ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia Volume 2, Chapter 15* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997); <http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/vol2/v2c15e.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 March 2011.

⁴⁷ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-003 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, 23.

as agents for change.⁴⁸ Referring to the necessity of change, Kunich and Lester put it well by postulating that:

This age of instability can be an uncomfortable time for people who long for things to remain as they are – familiar, well understood, and routine. Since continual change is a given, a leader must resolve to put change to work, squeeze a harness around it, and ride it toward the right horizon.⁴⁹

It could be said that given the turbulent times in which we live, transformational leadership for the CF is more relevant than ever.

History provides many examples of those that serve as models of transformational leaders. One such historical example of a transformational leader is General George C. Marshall, who was the United States Army’s Chief of Staff during World War II and went on to become Secretary of State following the war. Jack Uldrich illustrates the greatness of Marshall’s leadership by emphasizing that he not only performed monumental tasks; he also made the world a better place. His accomplishments were many, but a few are especially noteworthy. As head of the U.S. Army during the war, he transformed a poorly equipped force of 175,000 soldiers into the most powerful military in the world; he managed the requirements of five different theatres of war; and last but definitely not least, as the Secretary of State in 1947 he introduced the “Marshall Plan” for the recovery of the European economy decimated by World War II.⁵⁰ In 1953, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for the resulting European Recovery Plan.⁵¹

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁴⁹ Kunich and Lester, *Reality Leadership*, 89.

⁵⁰ Jack Uldrich, “Leadership Candor,” *Leadership Excellence* 22, no. 5: 9.

⁵¹ David D. Van Fleet and Gary A. Yukl, *Military Leadership: An Organizational Behavior Perspective* (Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1986), 78.

Two things that stood out about Marshall were his vision for a better future and his putting of the greater good ahead of his own interests. Though he could have pressed President Roosevelt for an operational command, he understood his value as an institutional leader in Washington and acceded to the president's desire that he remain in the Chief of Staff post for the duration of the war. Having contributed so much to the war effort, he could have easily stepped away from public service following World War II, but he chose not to do so as he answered the call of President Truman to become his Secretary of State. He saw that in order to prevent another world war, chaos and poverty in Europe had to be replaced with hope and prosperity. At great cost to the treasury of the United States, George C. Marshall convinced the citizens of America and the American congress that it was in the best interests of the world that the United States finance the economic recovery of Europe. His vision of how the world could be a better place and his ability to see that vision through is what made him an excellent historical example of a great transformational military leader.⁵²

A more recent and a Canadian example of a transformational military leader is General (retired) Rick Hillier, who finished a distinguished career as Canada's Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) from 2005 to 2008. General Hillier left his mark on the Canadian Forces through his leadership of the monumental project known as CF Transformation, which saw a major reorganizing, restructuring and reorientation of the CF.⁵³ The Canadian Defence Academy recognized the importance of General Hillier's work as well

⁵² Jack Uldrich, *Leadership Candor*, 9.

⁵³ Jeffrey asserts that CF Transformation could very well be considered as the most significant change to the CF in more than 50 years. See Lieutenant-General (retired) Michael K. Jeffrey, "Inside Canadian Forces Transformation," *Canadian Military Journal* 10, no.2 (2010): 9.

as the value of transformational leadership by contracting Lieutenant-General (retired) Michael Jeffrey, a former Chief of the Land Staff, to write a book about Canadian Forces Transformation entitled *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change*. In essence, the book is a case study of the institutional leadership behind CF transformation, which highlights how Hillier as an institutional leader was able to inspire and effect change to achieve the vision he had for what the CF should be as an institution.⁵⁴

General Hillier became the CDS on February 4, 2005, and from the time he started the job, he had a vision for how the CF should be transformed as an institution. He wasted no time in commencing the work to move towards this monumental transformation.⁵⁵ One of the key elements of General Hillier's vision was to make changes to the CF's command and control structure. Specifically, he envisaged the transformation of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) into a strategic level headquarters and the establishment of operational commands external to NDHQ.⁵⁶ His intent was to improve CF effectiveness by having a command and control structure that was more operationally focused.⁵⁷ In fact, the highest priority of CF transformation was the creation of four operational unified commands: Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, Canada Command, Canadian Operational Support Command, and Canadian Special Operations Force Command. All four of these commands were declared

⁵⁴ Lieutenant-General (retired) Michael K. Jeffrey, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, xi.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁵⁷ Major-General Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 Years Old – Part Two," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 3 (2009): 8.

operational on February 1, 2006 just one year after General Hillier became CDS.⁵⁸ This is a true testament to his ability as a transformational leader as he not only had a vision of the need for the CF to have a better focus on the operational level of command; he saw that this vision was carried out quickly.

General Hillier's concern with respect to the CF's operational effectiveness was what drove his vision that the CF needed to change. Although the CF had conducted itself reasonable well on many different deployments, he saw much room for improvement as the command and control architecture of the CF was unresponsive and bureaucratic, and the culture of the CF was dominated by the three environments (Army, Navy and Air Force) where joint cooperation amongst them was limited. All of this in his view was constraining the overall effectiveness of the CF and would handicap its capacity to respond to the missions it would face in the future.⁵⁹ Communicating this need for change was vital for General Hillier.

General Hillier continually delivered a message of optimism to members of the CF. In fact, when speaking about CF transformation, he received standing ovations on many occasions.⁶⁰ He did not just make efforts to communicate with members of the CF; he was also highly visible to the Canadian population with whom he was able to establish a strong connection. He did this not as a political act, rather he saw that it was necessary for Canada as a democratic society to have confidence in the CF because it belonged to the people of Canada. He saw the key to fostering the confidence of the public as being

⁵⁸ Jeffrey, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change*, 29.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 49.

the development of a bond between the citizens of Canada and their forces, and the only way to establish that bond was through trust and credibility. General Hillier acted as an able ambassador in building that trust and credibility.⁶¹ Major-General Daniel Gosselin affirmed this by commenting that: "... Hillier has helped restore pride in the CF, has brought new confidence to the Canadian military, [and] has reconnected Canadians to its armed forces ..."⁶² A tremendously effective communicator, he was able to capture the imagination of and inspire the audiences he addressed with his uplifting message.⁶³

There may be some debate as to whether or not General Hillier's vision for the CF was the right one, but he nonetheless transformed the CF as an institution. Allan English has contributed to that debate in his article "Outside CF Transformation Looking In" where he postulated that CF Transformation fell short in terms of its strategic planning process, suffered from a shortage of resources, and failed to fully undertake a stringent analysis of the concepts and organizational constructs being considered.⁶⁴ It has also been stated that the creation of the four operational commands has caused duplication of efforts and increased the number of personnel required for the CF command and control structure.⁶⁵ General Hillier's transformation of the CF should be studied and analyzed so

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 47-48.

⁶² Gosselin, *Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 Years Old...*, 15.

⁶³ Jeffrey, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change*, 55-56.

⁶⁴ Allan English, "Outside CF Transformation Looking In," *Canadian Military Journal* 11, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 18.

⁶⁵ David Pugliese, "Will a Review of Canadian Forces Transformation Bring Back the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Position?" *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 June 2010; <http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2010/06/14/will-a-review-of-canadian-forces-transformation-bring-back-the-deputy-chief-of-defence-staff-position.aspx>; Internet; accessed 8 April 2011.

as to draw lessons for the leadership of the CF at all levels. The CF should strive to identify and develop transformational leaders such as General George C. Marshall and General Rick Hillier, but such an endeavour should not be left to chance. An effective succession planning process is vital for the identification and the grooming of future CF institutional leaders.

Succession Planning

The Need for Succession Planning

Organizations must be keenly aware of the need to have members with the appropriate skill sets for critical positions, and thus, they must meticulously assess the potential of their members to advance to key leadership positions and plan the training and employment opportunities required to facilitate their advancement.⁶⁶ The CF, like other organizations, uses what is known as succession planning to conduct staffing and selection decisions for key leadership positions.

Jeffrey Kerr and Ellen Jackofsky define succession planning as “the systematic management of [human resource] mobility patterns in an organization.”⁶⁷ In general, succession planning has both long-term and short-term objectives. The short-term objective of succession planning is to maintain a detailed list of managerial resources to be used to respond to forecasted and non-forecasted vacancies. The long-term objective of succession planning is to ensure that there is an adequate pool of qualified managers

⁶⁶ Marc Gerstein and Heather Reisman, “Strategic Selection: Matching Executives to Business Conditions,” *Sloan Management Review* 24, no. 2 (Winter 1983): 43.

⁶⁷ Jeffrey L. Kerr and Ellen F. Jackofsky, “Aligning Managers with Strategies: Management Development Versus Selection,” *Strategic Management Journal* 10 (Summer 1989): 158.

by mapping out the requisite training and professional development of individual managers so that they can realize their potential within an organization.⁶⁸

Performance appraisals and recommendations for promotion are used in the formulation of succession planning. A truly effective succession planning system formally identifies members that have a great deal of potential and formulates a plan to address their individual professional development needs. A professional development plan should spell out how individual members are to be trained and their forecasted career path, i.e., the planned sequence of job placements.⁶⁹ It is important to note that the CF, unlike most other institutions, must build its leadership cadre from within its own ranks. Because of the unique nature of the CF's role, it does not have the luxury of parachuting in personnel from the outside to fill key executive-level leadership positions. This means that the CF must pay particular attention to the succession planning process.

The CF does not have an overarching joint policy with respect to succession planning, but the Army, the Air Force and the Navy each have their own respective policies. At this point, it is beneficial to provide an overview of the manner in which each of the three elements of the Canadian Forces conducts the succession planning of their respective officer corps.

Army Succession Planning

The Army has published a detailed directive on succession planning, which is known as "Land Forces Command Order (LFCO) 11-79 – Army Succession Planning." The Army views the aim of its succession planning as the placement of "the most

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 158.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 158.

appropriate person, in the right position, at the right time.” Its purpose is to plan how to bridge the gap between current competencies and the future needs with respect to Army leadership.⁷⁰

Army succession planning is conducted annually with the intent of achieving three objectives. First, it should enable the Chief of Land Staff to develop the human resources of the Army (i.e. the leadership cadre) from both long-term and short-term perspectives thereby facilitating the success of the Army as an institution. Secondly, Army members are selected for key appointments to satisfy short-term leadership requirements such as Unit Commanding Officer. Finally, it has the objective of assessing the long-term potential of officers over a horizon of five to ten years.⁷¹

For long-term succession planning, the Army uses what they call the multi-tier system to match the potential of an officer to a so-called tier level for command and strategic/key appointments.⁷² There are a total of six tiers, which are summarized in table 2.1. Lieutenant-colonels and majors can only be assessed to a maximum of tier 3. However, lieutenant-colonels can be determined as having “high potential” within tier 3. Members are informed of their tier level, but they are not advised if they are deemed as being high potential officers.⁷³ When determining the long-term potential of officers, the Army reviews various documents including Military Personnel Record Résumés

⁷⁰ Chief of the Land Staff, *Land Forces Command Order 11-79 Army Succession Planning*, 2.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 5.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 6-7.

(MPRR)⁷⁴, PERs, commendations, course reports and other career documents.⁷⁵

Table 2.1 – Army Long-Term Succession Planning Tier Levels

Tier Level	Long-Term Potential	Applicable Positions
Tier 1	Senior strategic leadership appointment at the command and CF level beyond the rank of Brigadier-General.	Chief of Land Staff, Commander of an Operational Command, etc.
Tier 2	Strategic leadership appointments at the rank of Brigadier-General.	Land Force Area Commander, Director General, etc
Tier 3	Operational leadership appointments at the rank of Colonel.	Brigade Commander, Area Support Group Commander, etc.
Tier 4	Tactical leadership appointments at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.	Commanding Officer of a unit or a school, etc.
Tier 5	Sub-unit command level	Commander of a company, a battery, a squadron, etc.
Tier 6	Sub-sub unit command	Platoon/Troop Commander.

Source: Chief of the Land Staff, *Land Forces Command Order 11-79 Army Succession Planning*, 6-7.

Air Force Succession Planning

The Air Force policy document that provides direction with respect to the succession planning of its officer corps is “Air Command Order (ACO) 1000-7 Air Force Personnel Management – Officers.” The stated objective of the policy is as follows:

... to ensure that individuals with the capability to achieve senior appointments are identified, tracked and provided with developmental opportunities very early in their careers. This will ensure the selection and guidance of the most appropriate individuals towards senior command.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ A MPRR is a CF member’s electronic human resources record, which provides a centralized record of a member’s posting history, mission deployment history, course qualifications, second language test results, fitness test results, medical category, etc.

⁷⁵ Chief of the Land Staff, *Land Forces Command Order 11-79 Army Succession Planning*, 8.

⁷⁶ Chief of the Air Staff, *Air Command Order 1000-7 Air Force Personnel Management – Officers*, 2-3.

ACO 1000-7 details two different processes: succession planning and the appointment process. The appointment process is designed to satisfy short-term requirements to assign Air Force officers to key positions. On the other hand, succession planning is intended to fulfill the long-term need to identify and mentor Air Force officers possessing the potential to perform in senior appointments throughout the CF. The policy states that the two processes are linked and must be synchronized so that high potential Air Force officers are assigned to key appointments permitting them to develop professionally and to provide them with an opportunity to further demonstrate their potential to advance through the ranks.⁷⁷ It could be argued that the two processes are actually succession planning, i.e., the appointment process is short-term succession planning and the succession planning process is long-term succession planning. Therefore, this study will consider both processes to be succession planning.

The appointment process is conducted via an Air Personnel Appointment Board (Officers) [APAB(O)], which is convened annually. It is mandated to identify Air Force officers to fill key positions for the next annual posting season and to ensure their suitability and willingness to do so.⁷⁸ The long-term succession planning process is conducted annually by the Air Personnel Management Board (Officers) [APMB(O)]. The APMB(O) is mandated to review the status of Air Force officer occupations, to produce potential and ranking lists, and to propose developmental plans for high potential

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

officers.⁷⁹ The two key documents that are produced are the ranking lists and the potential lists.

The purpose of the potential lists is to identify Air Force officers who have demonstrated high potential to make it to the executive ranks, colonel and higher, and to see that they are provided with the opportunities to prove that they can realize that potential. The Air Force recognizes the need to do this early in the career of officers in order to allow time for their development thereby ensuring that the Air Force receives the optimal return on investment from its senior leaders. The Air Force identifies leadership as the key criterion for being put on a potential list. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Air Force asserts that its officers should be assessed against the competencies required of executives as detailed in the CFPAS Executive/Senior Officer PER.⁸⁰ The performance and potential factors detailed in the Executive/Senior Officer PER are much different than those detailed in the PERs of officers at the ranks of major and lieutenant-colonel. These differences are significant and will be highlighted in Chapter 4 of this study.

The Air Force compiles three potential lists: O1, O2 and O3. The O1 list designates the Air Force officers deemed to have the potential to attain the rank of lieutenant-general. In order to be considered for the O1 list, officers must be observed for at least one year as lieutenant-colonels on the O2 list or hold the rank of colonel. Air Force Officers on the O2 list are viewed as having the potential to attain the general officer ranks. The O3 list is referred to as the “feeder list” for the O2 list, and it identifies recently promoted majors and senior captains who are deemed to possess the potential to

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

be rapidly promoted to the subsequent two ranks and to reach the general officer ranks. With the O3 list, the Air Force emphasizes the necessity to identify early in the career of an officer whether or not he/she has the potential to be an institutional leader. ACO 1000-7 touches on this point with the following statement:

... without such early identification, developmental opportunities can be missed resulting in individuals being delayed from significant appointments where essential qualifications or experience would be gained.⁸¹

Navy Succession Planning

The Navy has yet to promulgate a policy document on the succession planning of officers, but the Chief of the Maritime Staff has issued letters in October 2009 and October 2010 detailing the Navy's policy with respect to Succession Planning.⁸² These letters show that the Navy has placed much greater emphasis on succession planning in recent years. The navy conducts succession planning annually, and the aim of their succession planning process is detailed as follows:

Ultimately the aim of succession planning activities is to identify and position the most appropriate individual, in the right position – whether for an appointment or training opportunity, at the right time – for now or for the future. ... The aim of the NSP [Navy Succession Plan] is to effect an objective assessment of the longer-term potential of Naval officers to perform in Command and in the most senior appointments across the CF. ... In order to ensure this careful career progression that will be required to prepare our officers to succeed at the highest levels of leadership in the CF, and ensure a continuum of approach within the Navy, early identification of those officers is necessary.⁸³

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

⁸² VAdm P. Dean McFadden, *Navy Succession Planning Process/Policy* (Chief of the Maritime Staff: file 3371-5075-1 (D HR Strat/RDMIS #182365), 19 October 2009) and VAdm P. Dean McFadden, *Navy Succession Planning (NSP) Process* (Chief of the Maritime Staff: file 3371-5075-1 (D Strat HR/RDMIS #203510), 19 October 2010).

⁸³ VAdm P. Dean McFadden, *Navy Succession Planning Process/Policy*, 1-2.

This stated aim indicates that the Navy has a strong focus on long-term succession planning for those officers that are deemed to have high potential for advancement. The Navy succession plan also addresses short-term requirements, but any decisions with respect to short-term succession planning must support the long-term succession plan.⁸⁴

The Navy places the most emphasis on succession planning for the MARS (Maritime Surface and Sub-Surface) officer occupation, as this is the occupation that commands ships, coastal fleet commands, and Maritime Command itself. Long-term succession planning for MARS officers commences at the rank of lieutenant-commander in order to plan as early as possible the matching of personnel with command appointments, other key employment experiences, and professional development and training opportunities so that officers with high potential can have the requisite opportunities to realize their potential.⁸⁵

Closing Thoughts on Succession Planning

The policies for all three environments of the CF are not identical, but they all recognize the need to identify and groom officers with high potential to become executive and/or institutional leaders as early as possible during their careers. Specifically, all three environments place a great deal of emphasis on the succession planning of officers at the ranks of major and lieutenant-colonel. This is recognition that the sooner that officers with high potential to advance to the ranks of institutional leaders are identified, the better the chance the CF has of developing the strategic leaders that the CF will need in the future. However, this is not as simple as it sounds. For any

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

organization, identifying members with high potential for advancement is a much more complex process than just maintaining a list of the current top performers. Moreover, determining what constitutes high potential as well as assessing the capacity and motivation of individuals to succeed in roles that require a different set of skills and competencies than jobs that they have performed in the past is far from being an exact science.⁸⁶

The CF, as part of both the promotion selection process and the succession planning process, normally selects officers for senior appointments that perform well in situations requiring direct, face-to-face leadership. The underlying assumption is that these officers will develop the requisite skills and abilities to effectively exercise strategic leadership as institutional leaders.⁸⁷ This assumption may not always hold true as not everyone can make the leap to institutional leadership. The CF has identified in its leadership doctrine that there is a marked difference between the leadership skills and abilities required at the institutional level than those required at the direct leadership level, which the CF refers to as leading people. Therefore, the CF should strive to have a PER that assesses the potential of CF officers at the ranks of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander to exercise the competencies required of institutional leaders vice those required to lead people directly.

Conclusion

CF leaders are called upon to work in ambiguous, complex environments where they perform myriad responsibilities including nation building, diplomacy, humanitarian

⁸⁶ Dave Zielinski, "Best and Brightest," *Training* 43, no. 1 (January 2006): 12.

⁸⁷ Michael Flowers, "Improving Strategic Leadership," *Military Review* 84, no. 2 (March-April 2004): 42.

relief, etc. Furthermore, a single operating environment may see the full spectrum of operations ranging from peace support operations to combat. The responsibilities of CF officers become even more complex as they progress through the ranks. Therefore, leadership selection and development is vital to the CF, as it must groom institutional leaders that possess the strategic and transformational leadership qualities necessary to excel in such environments. History has shown that nations can pay an exorbitant price when they select the wrong institutional leaders. However, having great institutional leaders such as General George C. Marshall and General Rick Hillier can have an enormously positive impact on a military force and the nation it serves. Succession planning is the key to selecting and developing great institutional leaders. The succession planning process is only as good as the inputs that go into it, and one document that is a key input is the PER. The CF requires a PER that serves the purpose of assessing the institutional leadership potential of its senior leaders of tomorrow, i.e., officers who are capable of making the jump from leading people to being institutional leaders. The next chapter explores the difference between the concepts of leading people and institutional leadership.

CHAPTER 3 - INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP VS LEADERSHIP OF PEOPLE

Introduction

Commanders are better paid and better mounted than they may endure more than those under them; greater and greater grow the demands for tireless vigilance as the grade of the officer increases.

-Brigadier General Lincoln C. Andrews, Commander of the U.S. 86th Infantry Division during World War I⁸⁸

The quote above by Brigadier General Lincoln C. Andrews, commander of the U.S. 86th Infantry Division during World War I, illustrates that the burden of leadership becomes greater for officers as they climb through the ranks. There are definitive differences in the priorities of leaders at the lower and higher levels of responsibility in the CF. Moreover, the environments in which CF officers function become more complex and ambiguous as they move through the ranks.

At the lower and middle rank levels, officers typically engage themselves in the development of and execution of short-term plans. They direct, motivate, and enable their subordinates, teams, units and higher formations to accomplish the missions entrusted to them. The CF refers to this specific function of leadership as “leading people” due to the need for face-to-face, direct influence and interaction. As officers reach the senior rank levels, they focus on longer-term organizational issues. They frequently create and implement significant policy and organization changes. They also have greater responsibility to oversee system performance and are charged with sustaining CF capabilities while concurrently planning and building the strategic capabilities necessary for the CF to function effectively in the future. Furthermore, the

⁸⁸ Lincoln C. Andrews, “Leadership,” in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence* (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 2009), 10.

amount of people requiring direct leadership normally shrinks while the collegial network grows larger at the highest rank levels. This major leadership function is known as leading the institution.⁸⁹

Brigadier General Andrews was on the mark with his comments, as leading an institution is definitely a more complex venture than leading people. Although the two functions of leadership are both important for the CF, each function has different responsibilities requiring unique competencies. The following sections will discuss the CF Effectiveness Model and the responsibilities of CF officers as they relate to the two major leadership functions and the five effectiveness dimensions detailed in the CF Effectiveness Model.

The CF Effectiveness Model

Leadership positions in the CF, much like those of other organizations, are intended to serve overall or collective effectiveness. Therefore, leadership effectiveness must be looked at from the point of view of CF effectiveness. As shown in figure 3.1, the CF uses a model known as the CF Effectiveness Model to define leadership effectiveness with respect to five dimensions: mission success, internal integration, member well-being and commitment, external adaptability, and military ethos.⁹⁰

Mission success is the effectiveness dimension that is the most important for the CF. In fact, the overarching objective of all military operations is mission accomplishment, which often can occur at some risk to those charged with the mission

⁸⁹ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 4.

⁹⁰ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-003 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, 3.

and at substantial costs (personnel, materiel and financial). Mission success is the primary effectiveness outcome for CF leaders whether they are working on bases, conducting training activities or deployed on operations.⁹¹



Figure 3.1 – CF Effectiveness Model: Essential Outcomes and Conduct Values

Source: Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-003 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, 3.

Internal integration involves the internal organization of units, systems and the CF. It also refers to the esprit de corps and teamwork of the people that comprise a team or an organization and the coordination of the activities of multiple teams, units and formations. Every part of an organization and their members must work in a concerted effort for an organization to be effective.⁹² Cohesion and teamwork are what the CF refers to as force multipliers making the overall effort of a team or group larger than the

⁹¹ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 19-20.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 20-21.

sum of its individual components. CF leaders at all levels are expected to build effective teams and to act for the benefit of the CF itself.⁹³

External adaptability is the ability to function in the greater operating environment by having the capacity to foresee changes and adapt to them. In order to have success in adapting to changing circumstances, CF leaders must be flexible, creative, and innovative. Furthermore, external adaptability requires CF leaders to work with other organizations to achieve the missions assigned to them, and the key to doing so is effective communication. Even at the most junior levels, CF leaders are called upon to work with other agencies including the militaries of other nations, non-governmental organizations, the media, other government departments, and even the public. At the same time, CF leaders must be able to adapt to changes to the external environment whether those changes are to technology, to society or to the operating environment itself.⁹⁴

The effectiveness dimension known as member well-being and commitment is essentially leaders taking care of their people. It is, in essence, a value that denotes a concern for CF members and their service conditions including the impacts of practices and policies, professional development opportunities, fair treatment, and job satisfaction. The CF relies on voluntary service and people are its most important resource. It can ill afford to have widespread dissatisfaction with the conditions of service, which could diminish morale and ultimately lead to people leaving the CF to pursue better work

⁹³ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-005 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2007), 5.

⁹⁴ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 21.

conditions and job satisfaction. It takes a lot of time and money to train military personnel, and the CF cannot afford to prematurely lose the knowledge, experience and professional expertise that are developed over a long career. Moreover, a chronic lack of job satisfaction would lead to decreased levels of individual performance, which would negatively impact the performance of the CF as a whole. The effectiveness dimension of member well-being and commitment is vital for mission success and contributes to internal integration and external adaptability. It is of paramount importance that CF leaders have concern for their subordinates because the CF is nothing without its people.⁹⁵

The effectiveness dimension of CF military ethos is fundamental to CF leadership as illustrated in figure 3-1, and consists of the values that establish appropriate professional conduct. It is derived from democratic values, the rule of law, ethics concerning operational conduct, and the central military values of valour, loyalty, duty and integrity.⁹⁶

Mission success, internal integration, external adaptability, and member well-being and commitment are effectiveness dimensions that are essential outcomes. In other words, CF leaders must strive to achieve these effectiveness dimensions. Mission success, as the primary outcome, is of paramount importance and internal integration, external adaptability, and member well-being and commitment all represent enabling outcomes intended to facilitate mission success. The final effectiveness dimension, military ethos, sets out the benchmarks for conduct and how outcomes may be pursued

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁹⁶ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-003 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, 4.

thus making it central to CF leadership.⁹⁷ The CF manual A-PA-005-000/AP-003 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* summarizes very well how leadership at all levels must respect the CF Effectiveness Model by stating that “[e]ffective CF leadership is about accomplishing essential outcomes but it is also about achieving these outcomes in ways that are consistent with the military ethos.”⁹⁸ However, the CF recognizes that those who lead people and those who exercise institutional leadership work to achieve the effectiveness outcomes in vastly different ways.

Functional Responsibilities of CF Leaders

According to CF doctrine, the functional responsibilities associated with each of the effectiveness dimensions are not the same for the two major leadership functions of leading the institution and leading people. Table 3.1 expands upon those differences by outlining the responsibilities of CF leaders as they apply to the two major leadership functions and the five effectiveness dimensions.

Table 3.1 – Responsibilities of CF Leaders Related to Major Functions and Effectiveness Dimensions

Effectiveness Dimensions	Major Leadership Functions	
	Leading People	Leading the Institution
Mission Success	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Achieve professional competence & pursue self-improvement. • Clarify objectives & intent. • Solve problems; make timely decisions. • Plan & organize; assign tasks. • Direct; motivate by persuasion, example, & sharing risks and hardships. • Secure & manage task resources. • Train individuals & teams under 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish strategic direction & goals. • Create necessary operational capabilities (force structure, equipment, command & control). • Exercise professional judgment in relation to military advice & use of forces. • Reconcile competing obligations & values, set priorities, & allocate resources.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

	demanding & realistic conditions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop the leadership cadre.
Internal Integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structure & co-ordinate activities; establish standards & routines. • Build teamwork & cohesion. • Keep superiors informed of activities & developments. • Keep subordinates informed; explain events & decisions. • Understand & follow policies & procedures. • Monitor; inspect; correct; evaluate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a coherent body of policy. • Support intellectual inquiry & develop advanced doctrine. • Manage meaning; use media & symbolism to maintain cohesion & morale. • Develop & maintain effective information & administrative systems. • Develop & maintain audit & evaluation systems.
Member Well-being & Commitment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mentor, educate, & develop subordinates. • Treat subordinates fairly; respond to their concerns; represent their interests. • Resolve interpersonal conflicts. • Consult subordinates on matters that affect them. • Monitor morale & ensure subordinate well-being. • Recognize & reward success. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accommodate personal needs in professional development/career system. • Enable individual & collective mechanisms of voice. • Ensure fair complaint resolution. • Honour the social contract; maintain strong QOL & member-support systems. • Establish recognition & reward systems.
External Adaptability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain situational awareness; seek information; keep current. • Anticipate the future. • Support innovation; experiment. • Learn from experience & those who have experience. • Develop effective external relationships (joint, inter-agency, multi-national). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather & analyze intelligence; define future threats & challenges. • Initiate & lead change. • Foster organizational learning. • Master civil-military relations. • Develop external networks & collaborative strategic relationships. • Conduct routine external reporting.
Military Ethos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seek and accept responsibility. • Socialize new members into CF values/conduct system, history, & traditions. • Exemplify and reinforce the military ethos; maintain order & discipline; uphold professional norms. • Establish climate of respect for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clarify responsibilities; enforce accountabilities. • Develop & maintain professional identity; align culture with ethos; preserve CF heritage. • Exemplify and reinforce the military ethos; develop & maintain military justice system. • Establish an ethical culture.

	individual rights & diversity.	
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Source: Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 48-49.

Table 3.1 is taken directly from the CF doctrine publication A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, and it clearly demonstrates that, according to CF doctrine, the responsibilities associated with leading people are much different than those associated with institutional leadership. One example of a difference in the functional responsibilities is that in terms of mission success, those who lead people are charged with clarifying objectives and intent, whereas institutional leaders have much greater responsibilities such as establishing strategic direction and creating requisite operational capabilities including force structure, command and control, and equipment. Another example can be found in the effectiveness dimension of external adaptability where leaders of people have to maintain situational awareness, but institutional leaders face the much more daunting task of analyzing intelligence information to ascertain future menaces and challenges. It is important to emphasize some of the key reasons for such differences as they pertain to each effectiveness dimension.

For the effectiveness dimension of mission success, institutional leaders must act in the role of visionary, i.e., they must be able to forecast the future and chart a course for the CF to remain successful as an institution over the long-term whereas officers that are charged with leading people generally carry out the tasks that are assigned to them in the

short-term.⁹⁹ With respect to internal integration, institutional leaders view requirements from a system's perspective and play the role of spokesperson for the CF, whereas officers leading people are focused on being a coordinator and team-builder. Institutional leaders maintain and transform the systems required for internal integration and those that lead people work within those systems.¹⁰⁰

In terms of member well-being and commitment, institutional leaders champion CF personnel by providing adequate conditions of service and mechanisms whereby members can bring forth their concerns. On the other hand, officers who lead people act in the roles of sustainer and developer where they are concerned with, among others, individual tasks, managing interpersonal conflict, representing the interests of subordinates, and mentoring future leaders.¹⁰¹

With respect to external adaptability, institutional leaders must act as brokers and lead change. As brokers, they develop and maintain sound relationships with, among others, the government, other government departments, other nations' militaries and non-governmental organizations. As change leaders, institutional leaders must understand the external environment and how it impacts the CF. Moreover, they must anticipate how the external environment will change, and from that determine how the CF should transform itself in order to remain relevant in the future. On the other hand, officers responsible for leading people must act as innovators and learners. As learners, they must seek to understand what is expected of them by drawing on the knowledge of more experienced

⁹⁹ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 51.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 50-51.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 50-51.

officers, and they must learn to function in joint, multinational, and inter-agency environments. As innovators, they must look for and be open to new practices that could improve their respective teams and they must encourage their subordinates to use their initiative and to be innovative as well.¹⁰²

Institutional leaders have the responsibility to ensure that the CF culture is properly aligned with the standards and values of the military ethos. Moreover, they establish training and educational programs in the domains of ethics and law. Conversely, officers who perform the function of leading people are directly responsible for the maintenance of good order and discipline of CF members under their command.¹⁰³

Closing Thoughts on the Leadership Dimensions

Why is it important to differentiate between the concepts of leading people and leading the institution? Institutional leaders who are in charge of big organizations with many thousand members and huge amounts of resources can not count on leadership competencies they used at lower rank levels to achieve success.¹⁰⁴ When officers make the leap to the general and flag officer ranks, they work in ambiguous environments where the decisions they make are longer-term and more abstract. They often have little personal, direct control over events, but they are held more accountable than they were as officers at lower rank levels.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, they perform their craft in environments laden with complex, collaborative relationships, competing interests and divergent points

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 50, 52.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 51-52.

¹⁰⁴ Flowers, *Improving Strategic Leadership*, 40.

¹⁰⁵ Montgomery C. Meigs, "Generalship: Qualities, Instincts and Character," *Parameters* 31, no.2 (Summer 2001): 4.

of view. They must manage myriad interpersonal relationships that are highly political in nature. Institutional leaders must have the capacity to exercise influence up and down the chain of command as well as within their peer groups.¹⁰⁶

General and flag officers make decisions that could potentially cost lives and impact national interests.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, the CF needs and deserves institutional leaders who have the ability to inspirationally convey a vision to their subordinates, the citizens of Canada, the Parliament, the Minister of National Defence and the Prime Minister. Further to that, their vision must take the CF to where it needs to be so that it can serve in the best interests of Canada. Being a military institutional leader in Canada is not simple in today's world as Douglas Bland aptly illustrated with the following comments:

New factors, such as the apparent “revolution in military affairs” and a world order built around unpredictable “coalitions of the willing” are changing the methods, if not the nature, of military command. Officers in Canada, therefore, must cope with a national way in warfare characterized by political indifference, disharmony between policy and objectives, an uncertain commitment horizon, a national skepticism (largely founded on a national myth) about the utility of Canada as a military actor, and a growing complexity of technologies and international politics.¹⁰⁸

Not every officer has the potential to deal with such complexities, and it takes a great deal of time and resources to develop officers that possess such potential. Therefore, the CF requires a performance appraisal instrument designed to assess institutional leadership potential at the right time in the careers of officers.

¹⁰⁶ Department of National Defence, *A-PA-005-000/AP-003 Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, 36.

¹⁰⁷ Meigs, *Generalship: Qualities, Instincts and Character*, 5.

¹⁰⁸ Douglas L. Bland, “Military Command in Canada,” in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 121-136 (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 123-124.

Assessment of institutional leadership potential should start at the rank of major/lieutenant-commander. After all, this is the rank where officers are in fierce competition to be selected for the Joint Command and Staff Programme at the Canadian Forces College, which is where they are introduced for the first time to strategic thinking and high-level leadership issues. The CF needs to ensure that it is maximizing its investment in selecting and promoting high-potential officers. It needs a system that can differentiate between those that have the potential to be institutional leaders and those that should not advance beyond roles that call for them to exercise leadership of people.

Conclusion

CF leadership doctrine has identified two distinct major leadership functions, which are leading people and institutional leadership. Each leadership function has unique responsibilities. For example, there are marked differences in the priorities and the time horizons for each major leadership function. Those who lead people are generally engaged in the development and execution of short-term plans where there is a need for face-to-face, direct influence and interaction. On the other hand, institutional leaders exercise indirect influence by focusing on long-term organizational issues such as planning and developing the strategic capabilities necessary for the CF to function effectively in the future. Although both leadership functions are important, institutional leadership is more complex and requires unique competencies. The PER should be an enabler in identifying officers that have the potential to exercise institutional leadership competencies, but the next chapter will show that it falls short in this regard.

CHAPTER 4 – THE MALADY AND THE REMEDY

How the CF Currently Assesses the Potential of Majors/Lieutenant-Commanders and Lieutenant-Colonels/Commanders

I am deeply committed to ensuring that the Canadian Forces have the leadership they need to successfully confront the challenges of the future with confidence. It is our duty. Our legacy will be the Canadian Officers Corps of the future.

-General (retired) Maurice Baril, Former Chief of Defence Staff¹⁰⁹

The preceding quote from retired General Maurice Baril, Canada's CDS from 1997 to 2001, is taken from *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020)*, which was issued to provide strategic guidance to the CF with respect to its Officer Corps and the Officer Professional Development System. It is a powerful message that rings true, and it is important to understand the context behind the message. General Baril assumed the role of CDS in 1997 during a troubling period for the CF, which had recently gone through the Somalia scandal resulting in the disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment and in a loss of public confidence in the CF.¹¹⁰ Moreover, members of the CF were becoming frustrated with the outdated equipment they were using, and there was a growing feeling amongst CF members that they were over-worked and not paid enough. In an interview with CBC News in 2003, Baril summed up the situation he found himself in when he took over as CDS with these words: "... walking [away from

¹⁰⁹ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020): Strategic Guidance for the Canadian Forces and the Officer Professional Development System* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001), 16.

¹¹⁰ See Chapter 2 of this paper for some additional background information on the impact of what transpired during the Canadian Airborne Regiment's deployment to Somalia in 1992 and 1993.

the job] was not an option. But it was obvious to me we had to change, otherwise we were going to self destruct.”¹¹¹

The CF has made great strides in officer professional development through the guidance of publications such as *Officership 2020*. Furthermore, as seen in previous chapters, the CF has recently published leadership doctrine detailing the responsibilities of its leadership cadre including the officer corps. Nonetheless, the fine tuning of the officer professional development program and the establishment of leadership doctrine are only two of the key ingredients required to produce an officer corps that can successfully meet the challenges of the future. Another important ingredient is the assessment of the potential of members of the officer corps to become the institutional leaders that will ensure that the CF remains relevant in the future. Not every officer has the potential to become an institutional leader, and it takes time and a lot of resources to professionally develop such leaders. Furthermore, choosing the wrong officers to helm an organization as complex as the CF may not only negatively impact the CF; it may also be to the detriment of the national interests of Canada. The CF needs officers that are going to ensure the institution remains relevant well into the future by having the capabilities necessary to fulfill its mandate and to meet future threats and challenges. Given the need to identify high potential officers as early as possible, assessment of institutional leadership potential should commence with officers at the ranks of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander as they have progressed from being junior officers to senior officers, and they are exposed to more complex issues

¹¹¹ CBC News, “In Depth: Friendly Fire (Maurice Baril),” http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/friendlyfire/baril_maurice.html; Internet; accessed 16 March 2011.

and situations, which provides opportunities to assess their institutional leadership potential. But how does the CF assess the potential of officers at these ranks?

As detailed in Chapter 1 of this paper, the keystone document of the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) is the annual Performance Evaluation Report (PER), which is intended to assess both the performance and the potential of individual members of the CF. Section 4 of the PER is where performance is evaluated and Section 5 is used to assess potential. This chapter will discuss the assessment criteria used in Section 5 given that this study focuses on the assessment of the potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders. Section 5 of the PER has six assessment criteria: leadership, professional development, communication skills, planning and organizational skills, administration, and dedication. The potential factors are assessed in terms of an individual's capacity to perform at the next rank using the following four ratings: low, normal, above average, and outstanding. Table 4.1 provides a description of how these ratings should be applied to the six potential factors.

Table 4.1 – Description of Potential Factors Found in Section 5 of the PER

Potential Factor	Rating	Description of Rating
Leadership	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incapable of producing expected results through his/her leadership styles. • Ineffective at developing subordinates or promoting teamwork.
	Normal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capable of producing expected results through his/her leadership styles. • Effective at developing subordinates or promoting teamwork.
	Above Average	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very effective in terms of leadership results and appropriate application of leadership styles • Very effective in developing subordinates and promoting teamwork.
	Outstanding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly effective in terms of leadership results and adept at the application of leadership styles. • Highly effective in developing subordinates and promoting teamwork.

Potential Factor	Rating	Description of Rating
Professional Development	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hesitant to pursue formal/informal opportunities for self-development. • Does not fully apply oneself when given the opportunity. • Marginal results on professional development initiatives and opportunities.
	Normal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pursues formal and informal opportunities for self-development. • Demonstrates reasonable effort when provided with developmental activities. • Achieved acceptable results on professional development initiatives and opportunities.
	Above Average	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Committed to pursuing formal and informal opportunities for self-development. • Exerts concerted effort when provided with developmental opportunities. • Achieved very good results on professional development initiatives and opportunities.
	Outstanding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enthusiasm for personal growth which inspires others. • Exerts tremendous effort when provided with developmental opportunities. • Achieved excellent results on professional development initiatives and opportunities.
Communication Skills	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incapable of meeting communication demands (either written or verbal)
	Normal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capable of meeting both written and verbal communication demands.
	Above Average	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proficient in verbal and written skills.
	Outstanding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extremely effective at communicating verbally and in written format.
Planning and Organization Skills	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incapable of devising solutions for increasingly complex problems. • Unable to select or implement appropriate courses of action.
	Normal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capable of devising solutions for increasingly complex problems. • Selects and implements appropriate courses of action.
	Above Average	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develops very workable solutions for increasingly complex problems. • Selects and implements most appropriate courses of action.
	Outstanding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develops innovative and extremely viable solutions for increasingly complex problems. • Selects and implements decisions swiftly and effectively.

Potential Factor	Rating	Description of Rating
Administration	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Unwilling or unable to apply administrative and logistical knowledge and skills.
	Normal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Motivated and capable of applying administrative and logistical knowledge and skills.
	Above Average	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Very motivated and very capable of applying administrative and logistical knowledge and skills.
	Outstanding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Highly motivated and highly capable of applying administrative and logistical knowledge and skills.
Dedication	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Hesitant to put forth additional effort or assume extra responsibilities. •Typically puts own needs before those of the organization.
	Normal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Willing to put forth additional effort or assume additional responsibilities. •Effectively balances organizational needs with own needs.
	Above Average	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Frequently puts forth additional effort and actively seeks additional responsibilities. •Effectively balances organizational needs with own needs.
	Outstanding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Always expends additional effort and uses full initiative to further unit and organizational goals. •Effectively balances organizational needs with own needs.

Source: Department of National Defence, *CFPAS Help File Version 2009.0.7*, Chapter 5, Annex B, Appendices 1-6.

It is noteworthy that the same assessment criteria are used for CF members serving at the rank of corporal/leading seaman all the way up to lieutenant-colonel/ commander. Therefore, it can be concluded that the CF uses a one size fits all approach in assessing the potential of most of its members even though duties and responsibilities become more complex and challenging as individuals progress through the ranks. Majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders do not perform the same duties as corporals/leading seamen; not to mention the fact that they are only one or two ranks below the executive rank levels, which commence at the rank of colonel. Within the executive ranks, strategic or institutional leaders are generally seen as those officers at the general/flag officer ranks while the rank of colonel/captain (navy) can be

viewed as being a transitional rank between the tactical and the strategic/institutional levels.¹¹²

Majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders are only one or two ranks away from progressing to the executive ranks where institutional and strategic leadership skills are required. However, they are assessed on potential criteria that relate to responsibilities associated with leading people rather than those associated with institutional leadership. This can be verified by comparing table 3.1 with table 4.1. The results of this comparison are found in table 4.2, and it demonstrates that five of the six potential assessment factors can be directly correlated to responsibilities associated with leading people. Not one of the potential assessment factors is comparable to responsibilities associated with institutional leadership. Therefore, it can be concluded that at the ranks of major/lieutenant commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander, the potential of individual members to become future institutional leaders is not being assessed. This amounts to a missed opportunity. The next section of this chapter will explore how the CF can better capitalize on the annual PER as a tool to assess the potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders to become future institutional leaders.

¹¹² E.S. Fitch, "Evaluation and Development of Strategic Leaders" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College National Security Studies Course Paper, 1999), 4.

Table 4.2 – Correlation of PER Potential Factors to Leadership Responsibilities Associated with Major Leadership Functions and Effectiveness Dimensions.

Potential Factor	Assessment Factor Criteria	Applicable Leadership Function	Applicable Effectiveness Dimension & Responsibility
Leadership	Developing subordinates and promoting teamwork.	Leading People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Member well-being & commitment: Mentor, educate, & develop subordinates. • Internal integration: Build teamwork & cohesion.
Professional Development	Pursue opportunities for self-development	Leading People	Mission success: Achieve professional competence & pursue self-improvement.
Communication Skills	Proficiency in verbal and written skills.	Leading People	Internal integration: Keep superiors and subordinates informed.
Planning & Organizational Skills	Devise solutions and implement decisions.	Leading People	Mission success: Solve problems; make timely decisions.
Administration	Motivation and capacity to apply administrative and logistical skills.	Not applicable.	Correlation not found.
Dedication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effort put forth • Extent to which additional responsibilities are sought • Capacity to balance organizational needs with personal needs 	Leading People	Military ethos: Seek and accept responsibility

Sources: Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 48-49 and Department of National Defence, *CFPAS Help File Version 2009.0.7*, Chapter 5, Annex B, Appendices 1-6.

How the CF Should Assess the Potential of Majors/Lieutenant-Commanders and Lieutenant-Colonels/Commanders

Introduction

The challenge in leading the institution is that you have to take all your operational skills and you have to utilize them, but in a very different way than you would on the bridge of a warship, or in the command vehicle in the field, or in the fighter aircraft.

-Vice-Admiral (retired) Ron Buck, former Chief of the Maritime Staff and former Vice Chief of the Defence Staff¹¹³

This quote from Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, former Chief of the Maritime Staff and former Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, indicates that leaders step into a different world when they enter into the institutional leadership domain, and they must exercise leadership in a much different way. They have to be strategic in their thinking and look at the organization as a whole both as it is now and what it should look like in the future. Strategic leadership is vital with respect to ensuring the operational effectiveness of any organization like the CF, and thus, having the right institutional leaders is essential.¹¹⁴ Therefore, it is of paramount importance to have an appraisal system that assesses the potential of officers to exercise the competencies required to act as the institutional leaders of tomorrow. This section will explore the competencies on which majors/lieutenant commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders should be assessed in terms of their potential. Before doing so, it is important to consider what is at stake if an organizational like the CF does not choose the very best as its institutional leaders.

¹¹³ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-006 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2007), vii.

¹¹⁴ Jeffrey, *The CF Executive Development Program: A Concept for Development Period 5: The CF Officer Professional Development System*, 3.

Consequences of Not Getting it Right

Before moving on to an examination of the factors that should be assessed to determine the potential of officers to develop into institutional leaders, it is important to consider the consequences of not selecting the right officers as institutional leaders. Having a system that fosters the selection and development of the very best officers to be the senior leaders of the CF is extremely important given that their successes and failures have the potential to enormously impact the CF and its capacity to serve the national interests of Canada; much more so than at the lower leadership levels. History has shown the consequences of the errors of senior military leaders.

Paul Yingling, in his controversial article “A Failure in Generalship,” outlines the costs of developing and selecting the wrong officers as institutional leaders. One example from history he uses is how unprepared the French military was for the type of warfare that took place in World War II. Prior to World War II, French Generals trained, equipped and prepared their forces to fight the last war using fixed fortifications and taking it for granted that the next war would involve static battles. German generals, on the other hand, were busy developing a new method of warfare, the *blitzkrieg*, which made use of mobility, firepower and decentralized decision-making. The German army trialed this form of warfare in Poland in 1939, but they did not get it exactly right even though the campaign was successful. However, they critically looked at their operations in Poland and made the necessary modifications to their doctrine and tactics prior to their invasion of France. As a result, the Germans easily overran the French defences and

successfully occupied France for most of World War II.¹¹⁵ The point is that the institutional leaders of the German Army looked to the future when they were preparing their forces while the French Army was stuck in the past due to the failure of its institutional leadership to have a vision of what the future of warfare would look like.

Yingling also uses more recent examples of the failures of military institutional leaders. One such example is the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War. Yingling makes the point that the generals of the United States Army failed to prepare it for unconventional warfare even though there were indications that the Army needed to prepare itself for such a contingency. The French provided obvious lessons through their experiences with unconventional warfare in Indochina and Algeria. However, the United States failed to see the signs and to learn the lessons of other nations such as France, and they were stuck with a military that was a conventional war machine unprepared for the much different dynamics of unconventional warfare. The end result was a long, bloody war, which amounted to an embarrassing defeat for the United States.¹¹⁶

Yingling postulates that the general officer corps of the United States military when planning and executing the second Gulf War did not learn from the mistakes that were made by their predecessors in preparing the United States Army for the Vietnam War. He asserts that the United States military only planned for the conventional aspect of the second Gulf War, which was the requirement to defeat Saddam Hussein's military forces. However, the United States military did not adequately plan and prepare itself for the counterinsurgency it would fight in the occupation of Iraq. He makes the argument

¹¹⁵ Paul Yingling, "A Failure in Generalship." in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 2009), 183.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 184-186

that the United States did not have enough troops on the ground and that they were not using the proper tactics to mount a counterinsurgency.¹¹⁷ Statistics support Yingling's argument. The American military entered Iraq in March of 2003, and Saddam Hussein's forces were defeated within a few weeks with American forces suffering 139 members killed in action with another 542 that were wounded.¹¹⁸ However, although the defeat of Saddam Hussein's forces was not difficult, the numbers show that the American military was not well prepared to stabilize Iraq. As of 28 March 2011, 4,444 United States soldiers have lost their lives in Iraq and another 32,051 have been wounded. Iraqis suffered even more casualties, as 114,578 Iraqi civilians have lost their lives as of February 2011. Eight years after the invasion of Iraq, the United States still has 47,000 military members on the ground in Iraq.¹¹⁹ John Nagl concurs with Yingling that the United States Army was not well suited to stabilize Iraq with a counterinsurgency campaign, as he asserts that they did not have the appropriate education, training, doctrine and structure.¹²⁰ The general officer corps who guided the institution must bear some responsibility for this failure.

Yingling blames the general officer corps for letting themselves be bullied by the political establishment into limiting the number of troops that were deployed and into not conducting the planning required to stabilize Iraq after the defeat of Saddam Hussein's

¹¹⁷ Yingling, *A Failure in Generalship*, 186-188.

¹¹⁸ Nora Bensahel, "Preventing Insurgencies after Major Combat Operations," *Defence Studies* 6, no. 3 (September 2006): 278.

¹¹⁹ Brookings Institute, "Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq," updated 31 March 2011: 3, 11, 13, and 18; <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2011.

¹²⁰ John Nagl, "Let's Win the Wars We're In," *Joint Forces Quarterly* First Quarter, no. 52 (January 2009): 22.

forces. Yingling proposes that the institutional leaders of the United States military should have been more active publicly in trying to persuade the political establishment to better prepare for the occupation of Iraq.¹²¹ This last point, however, is debatable because even generals have to maintain loyalty to their superiors, which were in this case the political establishment. But he is correct in that generals must take an active voice in declaring the right approach for the forces they lead.

There are also Canadian examples of institutional leadership failures. The inappropriate usage of public funds by high ranking officers and the unacceptable conduct of CF members overseas during the 1990s, such as the murder and torture of Shidane Arone in Somalia in 1993, are events that pointed to problems with respect to military ethos for which the institutional leadership was responsible.¹²² The Somalia scandal proved to be a turning point for the CF, as the Commission of Inquiry brought to light deficiencies in its senior leadership. In fact, the Commission was very critical of the leadership of General John de Chastelain, CDS at the time of the scandal. The Commission's report painted a bleak picture of his leadership with these comments:

... although Gen de Chastelain is ultimately responsible for the failures that occurred below him, he is also responsible for what he did or did not do in allowing the failing to occur. In this respect, Gen de Chastelain's primary failure may be characterized as one of nonexistent control and indifferent supervision.¹²³

¹²¹ Yingling, *A Failure in Generalship*, 186-188.

¹²² Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 101.

¹²³ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia Volume 4, Chapter 27* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997); <http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/vol4/v4c27e.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2011.

The Commission of Inquiry concluded that Gen de Chastelain not only failed in his duties as CDS; he also failed the government of Canada and the CF.¹²⁴ It can be speculated that with effective institutional leadership, the circumstances of the troubled Canadian Airborne Regiment's deployment to Somalia would have unfolded much differently and without so much discredit being brought to the CF. There is too much at stake in the selection and development of CF leaders to get it wrong, as an institutional leader can guide an organization to great successes or to monumental failures.

Such failures may be attributed to problems with CF culture. Allan English touched on this issue with his comments that:

...the bureaucratization and civilianisation of DND have led to an ethos within the CF that has focused more on business practices than the virtues of the warrior that are necessary in a military culture. Officers, particularly senior officers, are perceived as being more interested in their careers than in service to the nation.¹²⁵

The institutional leadership that allowed such a culture to foment must bear responsibility. Great institutional leaders who possess transformational leadership competencies can make a great difference, as they have the potential to greatly influence the CF culture to ensure that the appropriate military ethos is espoused. Such competencies do not develop overnight. Therefore, the CF needs to seek out and professionally develop those officers that have the capacity to be institutional leaders as early as possible in their careers ideally at the ranks of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*, 109.

The Importance of Early Assessment of Institutional Leadership Competencies

When viewing the CF from a holistic perspective, it is evident that aggregate performance and effectiveness are the result of the combination of many factors at the individual, group and institutional levels. First, the knowledge, abilities, and personality of individual CF members have an impact on the collective performance of the CF. Secondly, at the group level, the characteristics and dynamics of units and teams also have an impact on the collective performance of the CF. Finally, collective performance at the institutional level is impacted heavily by the structure, culture, and policies of the CF. Therefore, leadership, whether viewed from the strategic, operational or tactical levels, is just one of several factors impacting overall performance. However, leaders have the potential to greatly affect the internal and external environments that influence performance. In other words, CF leaders have the potential to greatly influence every aspect of how the CF functions.¹²⁶ With this being the case, one could argue that assessing the potential of officers should be weighted heavily towards the assessment of leadership potential.

Such an argument about placing the highest priority on the assessment of leadership potential could be countered by putting forth that not every CF officer will act as a leader, and that many CF officers will only be employed as staff officers and will never attain the heights of institutional leadership. However, in order for staff officers to be truly effective, they must understand and share the vision and global view of the institutional leaders for whom they work and support. Staff officers are implicated in institutional leadership as they must work to carry out the strategic guidance and

¹²⁶ Department of National Defence, *A-PA-005-000/AP-003 Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, 16.

direction established by the senior leaders for whom they serve. Moreover, they must possess the capacity to exercise influence upwardly, downwardly and laterally while carrying out the direction of senior leaders.¹²⁷ Stephen A. Shambach expressed it well in the *Strategic Leadership Primer* published by the United States Army War College by saying that "... anyone working in a staff position working for a strategic leader should be well-trained as a strategic thinker or they cannot adequately support the leader."¹²⁸ This illustrates the importance of understanding the performance domain of officers whether they are in command or staff positions.

Shaun Newsome, Arla Day, and Victor Cantano have postulated that the CF must make efforts to link leadership performance requirements to functional levels. Furthermore, they have put forth that a clear comprehension of the domain of leadership performance is paramount for the efficacy of the CF performance assessment process, and that the specific dimensions of the leadership performance domain vary as the functional level varies.¹²⁹ With this in mind, it only stands to reason that the CF should vary its assessment of leadership potential depending upon the rank of the member being evaluated with a view toward the subsequent ranks in the promotion ladder. Therefore, the CF could benefit by looking at the factors it uses to assess the performance of officers at the rank of colonel/captain (navy) and consider using those same factors to assess the potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹²⁸ Stephen A. Shambach, *Strategic Leadership Primer* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Department of Command, Leadership and Management, United States Army War College, 2004), 2.

¹²⁹ Newsome, Day and Cantano, *Leader Assessment, Evaluation and Development*, 55-56.

Factors Used to Assess the Performance of Colonels/Captains (Navy)

Officers at the rank of colonel/captain (navy) are evaluated using a different annual PER form than the one used for majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders. Colonels/captains (navy) like those officers of lower rank receive an assessment on both their performance and their potential. However, the assessment of their performance is referred to as a leadership assessment, which demonstrates the importance that the CF places on leadership at that rank level. With respect to leadership, colonels/captains (navy) are assessed using fourteen different factors including cognitive capacity, creativity, visioning, action management, organizational awareness, teamwork, networking, interpersonal relations, communication, stamina/stress resistance, ethics and values, personality, behavioural flexibility, and self-confidence.¹³⁰ A description of these assessment factors is provided in table 4.3.

Table 4.3 – Leadership Assessment Factors Used for Colonels/Captains (Navy)

Leadership Assessment Factor	Description of Leadership Assessment Factor
Cognitive Capacity	CF Senior Officers perceive, understand and process the information that is inherent in their work. This processing includes focusing on, organizing, analyzing and synthesizing information and exercising judgment. Cognitive capacity is the basis of common sense, problem-solving, both preventative and responsive, and the development of short-, medium- and long-term plans.
Creativity	The changing strategic defence environment brings new types of challenges. CF Senior Officers generate innovative, imaginative solutions by adapting and expanding conventional methods, integrating intuition, non-linear thinking, fresh perspectives and information from non-traditional fields. CF Senior Officers create an environment that fosters creativity. As well, they personally pursue and promote continuous learning and improvement in their organizations.
Visioning	The work of the Public Service and the Canadian Forces is guided by its vision. CF Senior Officers play a strong role in shaping the vision of the Department and the Canadian Forces, while interpreting and implementing the vision of the Public

¹³⁰ Department of National Defence, “Performance Evaluation Report – DND Executives/CF Senior Officers Version 2009,” in *Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System*.

	Service and the objectives of the Government. They align their organizations with the broader vision and promote enthusiasm and commitment to the vision.
Action Management	CF Senior Officers make things happen, accomplishing strategic objectives to ensure that the Canadian public is ultimately well served. They prioritize their work and time, and use all resources at their disposal to meet objectives in an effective and efficient manner.
Organizational Awareness	CF Senior Officers understand the structures, relationships, processes and stakeholders in their work environment including the Canadian Forces, the chain of command, other federal Public Service organizations, various levels of government, international governments, the private sector, and professional organizations. CF Senior Officers strive to keep their organizational awareness comprehensive and current. This understanding, coupled with an awareness of relationships among key players, formal and informal agendas, and organizational cultures, allows CF Senior Officers to position their organizations to achieve immediate and future objectives. The organizational awareness of CF Senior Officers concerning the broader Public Service and the political environment represents a unique contribution to advancing the defence vision and agenda.
Teamwork	CF Senior Officers recognize that military and civilian personnel are all personnel of the defence team. Accordingly, they contribute actively and fully to team projects by working collaboratively with military and civilian personnel in DND, and with others in the federal Public Service (e.g., the unions). CF Senior Officers develop and maintain respectful, cooperative working relationships with team personnel, capitalizing on the diversity of experience and knowledge that enhance a team's work.
Networking	CF Senior Officers work with partners outside the federal Public Service to advance the defence vision and agenda. Partners share common goals, solve common problems, and work hand in hand for the common good, not simply of the partners but most importantly of the Canadian public.
Interpersonal Relations	CF Senior Officers interact effectively with individuals from the private sector as well as the public sector, including superiors, peers and subordinates, whether they be civilian or military. Their interactions are based on respect and an appreciation that people with varying backgrounds and viewpoints enrich the organization. CF Senior Officers resolve difficult and complex interpersonal situations using approaches and resources that are consistent with the values of integrity, loyalty, moral courage, honesty, fairness and responsibility. For CF Senior Officers, interpersonal skills are not simply social graces; they are means of achieving important objectives for DND and the Canadian Forces.
Communication	CF Senior Officers recognize that, to be effective, communication needs to be a two-way process, whether with subordinates, superiors, varied stakeholders or political officials. Accordingly, they listen attentively to others, seeking in-depth and comprehensive understanding. They also provide others with the type and level of information needed. CF Senior Officers communicate with impact. Adapting their communication to the needs of different audiences, they use varied communication vehicles to gain and sustain understanding of and support for the work of the organization.
Stamina/Stress Resistance	In facing strenuous demands and prolonged exposure to stressors, CF Senior Officers resist stress and remain energized. They are realistic about their own

	limits and the limits of their organizations, and they use and promote effective stress reduction and coping strategies. CF Senior Officers respond to early signs of burnout in themselves and their organizations to ensure that energy reserves remain high over the long term.
Ethics and Values	CF Senior Officers treat others with dignity, act in the interest of the Canadian public and obey and support lawful authority. They exemplify the organization's values of integrity, loyalty, moral courage, honesty, fairness and responsibility.
Personality	Maintaining focus and composure, as well as commitment and drive, CF Senior Officers pursue a standard of excellence for themselves and their organizations. They are motivated by the challenge of protecting and serving the public good. The essential aspect of Personality for CF Senior Officers is the absence of characteristics such as arrogance, vindictiveness, timidity and discouragement that can negatively affect the workplace.
Behavioural Flexibility	CF Senior Officers adjust their behaviour to the demands of a changing work environment in order to remain productive through periods of transition, ambiguity or uncertainty. Behavioural flexibility allows CF Senior Officers to function effectively in a broad range of situations, and with varied people, and groups. As work contexts and roles change, they adapt to the characteristics of particular situations, acquiring new, more effective behaviours, and discarding other less effective actions.
Self-Confidence	CF Senior Officers possess realistic self-confidence. Being self-directed, they speak truth to power. They also take calculated risks as well as ownership for their decisions and recommendations.

Source: Department of National Defence, *CFPAS Help File Version 2009.0.7*, Chapter 7, Annex A, Appendices 1-14.

Table 4.3 demonstrates that the CF not only places a great deal of emphasis on the leadership performance of its officers at the rank of colonel/captain (navy); it also emphasizes the importance of leadership at the institutional level. As shown in chapter 4 (see table 4.2), the assessment of the potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders is heavily focused on leading people. Moreover, the competencies on which the potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders is assessed do not match the competencies on which the performance of colonels/captains (navy) is assessed. This amounts to a lack of congruence within the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System as it falls short in assessing the potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-

colonels/commanders to advance to and perform at the executive rank levels starting at colonel/captain (navy).

If the CF were to modify the annual PER used for majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders so that the potential section mirrors the leadership performance assessment section of the PER used for colonels/captains (navy), the number of potential assessment factors would increase from six to fourteen. Having this many potential assessment factors may be perceived as being administratively cumbersome, but there is another option.

Zaccaro's Requisite Executive Leader Characteristics

Renowned organizational behaviour specialist, Stephen J. Zaccaro, in his 2001 book titled *The Nature of Executive Leadership: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis of Success*, conducted an exhaustive review of research conducted on executive leadership characteristics and competencies. His work resulted in the development of what Zaccaro calls "Requisite Executive Leader Characteristics," which include "cognitive capacities, social capacities, personality, motivation, and knowledge and expertise."¹³¹ Table 4.4 provides a list of these characteristics and the skills pertaining to each characteristic.

Robert W. Walker of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute referred to Zaccaro's consolidation of leadership characteristics into only five domains as a breakthrough. Walker summarizes well what these domains cover with the following comments:

These domains cover the functional expertise and knowledge required; the "intelligence" and creative and reasoning capacities; the "people skills" of communicating, negotiating, influencing and understanding;

¹³¹ Stephen J. Zaccaro, *The Nature of Executive Leadership: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis of Success* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2001), 291.

the preference to grow and achieve and improve and change, and to influence others to do likewise; and the character dispositions of openness to ideas and experiences, to exercise initiative and confidence and assertiveness, and to be trustful and courageous and stable.¹³²

Table 4.4 – Zaccaro’s “Requisite Executive Leader Characteristics”

Category	Skills
Cognitive capacities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence • Analytical reasoning • Flexible integrative complexity • Metacognitive skills • Verbal/writing skills • Creativity
Social capacities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Behavioural flexibility • Negotiation skills • Conflict management skills • Persuasion skills • Social reasoning skills
Personality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Openness • Flexibility • Adaptability • Risk propensity • Locus of control • Self-discipline • Curiosity
Motivation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need for achievement • Self-efficacy • Need for socialized power
Knowledge and expertise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Functional expertise • Social expertise • Knowledge of environmental elements

Source: Zaccaro, *The Nature of Executive Leadership: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis of Success*, 292.

An advantage of Zaccaro’s set of requisite executive leadership characteristics is that it is a compendium of only five leadership characteristics that incorporate the essential skills required of executive-level leaders. Those writing an evaluation of

¹³² Robert W. Walker, “The Professional Development Framework: Generating Effectiveness in Canadian Forces Leadership” (Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Technical Report 2006-01, September 2006), 23.

potential may have an easier time getting their heads wrapped around five domains instead of the fourteen performance factors used to evaluate the leadership performance of colonels/captains (navy). But regardless of the format, any PER that fails to assess the potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders to assume the role of executive leader, and by extension institutional leader, is a missed opportunity and a failure to assess officers on the competencies they will have to use when they advance to the next level. The PER format must be analyzed and revised to ensure that it fully meets the need to identify as early as possible officers who possess the potential to be future institutional leaders.

The Need for Improvement

It is essential at this point to reiterate the importance of the PER document to the CF. It is used to determine promotions and to select members for professional development opportunities and postings. Moreover, it is a document that provides input into short-term and long-term succession planning of high potential officers for key positions. It is essential to have a promotion selection system and a succession planning framework that are optimized in being able to distinguish between officers who are best suited for advancing through the ranks to senior leadership positions and those who are just performing at acceptable levels in their current jobs and are not necessarily ideal candidates for advancement to the highest levels. David Bercuson highlighted the importance of promotion selection by stating that:

All the leadership training in the world is of no use in instilling leadership qualities in men and women who are not natural decision-makers and who do not also have the personal charisma, the certainty of

self, or the ability to evoke trust that are the essential ingredients for leadership of any sort.¹³³

Given the importance of the PER in determining promotion selections and conducting succession planning, it must be designed to meet the requirements of the CF.

Unfortunately, the PER does not completely satisfy the requirements of the CF in that it uses a one size fits all approach for assessing the leadership potential of its members ranging in rank from corporal/leading seamen to lieutenant-colonel/commander. This is a rather large range of ranks, and it does not account for differences in leadership responsibilities between junior and senior ranks. Furthermore, officers at the rank of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander are only assessed on their potential to lead people, but they are only one or two promotions away from being executive leaders where they will have to start exercising institutional leadership skills. CF institutional leadership doctrine provides an excellent reference that can be used to improve the PER document utilized to assess the potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders. Given the importance of institutional leadership, the CF must recognize this need for improvement and take the necessary steps to change the PER document for the better. However, there are other measures that the CF could take to improve its identification of leaders who possess the transformational leadership qualities indicative of the potential to become institutional leaders. One such measure that merits some attention and consideration is the 360° performance appraisal.

¹³³ David J. Bercuson, "A Man (or Woman) for All Seasons: What the Canadian Public Expects from Canadian General Officers," in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 409-422 (St. Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 420.

360° Performance Appraisal

A limitation of this study is that it focused specifically on the design of the PER form itself and not on the method that the CF employs to conduct performance appraisal. One aspect of performance appraisal outside the scope of this study, but worthy of further study and consideration, is the value of using 360° performance appraisal in the assessment of CF officers. As its name suggests, it is a multi-source system that utilizes feedback from supervisors, peers, subordinates and, in some cases, the person being rated.¹³⁴

The appraiser is a significant part of the appraisal process.¹³⁵ As it stands now, the views of peers and subordinates play absolutely no role in the assessment of an officer's potential for promotion and higher command. To advance through the ranks, an officer needs only to impress and please his superior officers. In such a system, there is a danger for officers to have the tendency to rate subordinate officers who are more like them as being the most worthy of promotion. Such a situation tends to breed conformity thereby creating an atmosphere in which the status quo is not questioned.¹³⁶ Moreover, military members do not necessarily interact in the same manner with their superiors as they do with their peers and subordinates.¹³⁷ Therefore, officers are seen in a totally different light by their peers and subordinates than they are by their supervisors. Timothy

¹³⁴ G.P. Latham, *et al*, *The Science and Practice of Performance Appraisal: Recommendations for the Canadian Forces*, Report Prepared for the Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, February 2003), 12.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹³⁶ Yingling, *A Failure in Generalship*, 189.

¹³⁷ G.P. Latham, *et al*, *The Science and Practice of Performance Appraisal: Recommendations for the Canadian Forces*, 12.

R. Reese touched on this point extremely well by commenting that “Bosses are often fooled by the sycophant or by the bully – peers and subordinates are not so easily taken in.”¹³⁸

An officer’s subordinates and peers directly see his/her performance on a daily basis and can provide valuable perspectives and insights on his/her potential. Walter F. Ulmer points out that the problem of using superiors as the sole source of information for the assessment of potential is that they have the tendency to look at immediate task completion, decisions and adherence to commander’s intent. On the other hand, transformational behaviours including, among others, the conveyance of a motivational vision, openness to new ideas, the demonstration of moral courage, inspiring teamwork and the subordination of one’s own self-interests to the cause are not observed well by superiors although this is the very information that is required so that performance appraisals are optimized as a tool for promotion decisions and succession planning.¹³⁹ Subordinates and peers are in a better position to see the exhibition of transformational leadership qualities. Ulmer put it well by stating that “[o]nly the led know for certain the leader’s moral courage, consideration for others, and commitment to the unit above self.”¹⁴⁰

The amount of observation time available to the appraiser is also a factor that must be considered. Research has shown that supervisors pass roughly one percent of their time at work observing their subordinates. When a superior has a limited amount of

¹³⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Timothy R. Reese, “Transforming the Officer Evaluation System: Using a 360-Degree Feedback Model.” (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Paper, 2002), 11.

¹³⁹ Walter F. Ulmer, “Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another Bridge too Far,” *Parameters* 28 (Spring 1998): 15-16.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

time to observe a subordinate, there is a greater susceptibility for the appraiser to be erroneous.¹⁴¹ This does not diminish the importance of the point of view of a supervisor as an appraiser, but it does strengthen the argument for a multi-source system, which provides an integrated, balanced view of the assessment of an officer, as it does not rely on just one source, i.e., the supervisor. In addition, it is congruent with a concept that is extremely important to the CF, which is teamwork, as it shows that team members and their feedback are valuable.¹⁴²

360° performance appraisal would be extremely useful as an input tool for promotion boards and succession planning. Given its potential to identify whether or not leaders have transformational leadership skills, it would be particularly useful for succession planning boards that take a long-term view in looking for high potential officers, who possess the ability to construct and maintain strong, productive organizational climates. It would also be of benefit for short-term succession planning in that it provides a more complete vantage point of an officer's skills, thus facilitating the selection of officers for leadership positions that require specific abilities.¹⁴³ However, 360° performance appraisal may be perceived as having shortcomings.

Naysayers of multi-rater performance appraisal systems may say that such a system is complicated and administratively taxing, but this does not have to be the case. Implementing 360° performance appraisal would surely come at a cost as the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) would have to be modified, personnel

¹⁴¹ G.P. Latham, *et al*, *The Science and Practice of Performance Appraisal: Recommendations for the Canadian Forces*, 16.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁴³ Reese, *Transforming the Officer Evaluation System: Using a 360-Degree Feedback Model*, 16.

would have to be trained on the new system, and new procedures would have to be written to provide guidance on the process. However, the costs must be weighed against the potential benefits of improved leadership selection, morale, and operational success.¹⁴⁴ Finally, the system would not have to be changed for officers at all ranks. The most cost effective option would be to use multi-rater feedback only for officers at the rank of major and above as succession planning typically focuses on these rank levels, and the traditional CFPAS system could remain the performance assessment tool for all other officers.

Another argument against 360° performance appraisal is that given that the ratings provided by peers and subordinates would be anonymous, it would provide an opportunity for disgruntled peers and subordinates to exact revenge. However, it would not be difficult to set up the system to disallow individual ratings that do not fall within the statistical norms for the officer being rated.¹⁴⁵

If the CF desires to maximize its chances of selecting and developing institutional leaders who possess creativity, intelligence and moral courage, it should give strong consideration to researching the possibility of implementing 360° performance appraisal. Furthermore, the implementation of such a system would send a strong signal to the officer corps that the CF is serious about seeking out officers that lead in accordance with CF leadership doctrine and ideals, and that it expects nothing but the best from those that are selected to one day be at the helm of the CF as an institution.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 17

Conclusion

The CF has made great strides in officer professional development and has recently published leadership doctrine detailing the responsibilities of its leadership cadre including the officer corps. Professional development programs and leadership doctrine are only two of the key elements required to produce an effective officer corps. Another important element is the assessment of the potential of CF officers to advance through the ranks to become institutional leaders. It takes time and a lot of resources to professionally develop such leaders, and thus it is extremely important to have a performance appraisal system that can differentiate between those who have institutional leadership potential and those who do not. Officers at the ranks of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander are only one or two ranks from progressing to the executive ranks where institutional and strategic leadership skills are required. However, they are assessed on potential criteria that correspond to responsibilities associated with leading people instead of those associated with institutional leadership. In fact, this chapter demonstrates that five of the six potential assessment factors correspond to responsibilities of those who lead people. Not one of the potential assessment factors could be linked to institutional leadership responsibilities. This amounts to a missed opportunity, but the CF has options to rectify this situation.

One option is apply the factors used to assess the performance of colonels/captains (navy) to the assessment of the potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders. Officers at the rank of colonel/captain (navy) are assessed using a different annual PER form than the one used for

majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders. Colonels/captains (navy) like other CF members receive an assessment of both their performance and their potential. However, the assessment of their performance is referred to as a leadership assessment, which demonstrates the importance the CF places on leadership at that rank level, and they are assessed on fourteen different strategic leadership competencies ranging from cognitive capacity to self-confidence. The competencies on which the potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders is assessed do not match the competencies on which the performance of colonels/captains (navy) is assessed. This amounts to a lack of congruence within the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System. If the CF were to change the potential section of the PER form for majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders to rectify this shortcoming, the number of potential assessment factors would increase from six to fourteen.

Having so many potential assessment factors could be seen as administratively burdensome, but there are other options such as using Stephen J. Zaccaro's "Requisite Executive Leader Characteristics," which is a compendium of only five leadership characteristics that incorporate the essential executive leadership skills. Given the importance of institutional leadership selection and development, the PER must be analyzed and revised to ensure that it fully meets the need of early assessment of institutional leadership potential.

A limitation of this study is that it focuses strictly on the design of the PER form and not on the method of conducting performance appraisal. The CF should consider implementing a multi-rater performance appraisal system, i.e., 360° performance

appraisal. Currently, the CF relies solely on supervisors as the source of performance appraisal. The observation time of supervisors is limited, and their feedback has the potential for bias. Moreover, they may not be in the best position to see the transformational leadership qualities of their subordinates. However, an officer's subordinates and peers directly see his/her performance on a daily basis and can provide valuable insights on his/her transformational leadership competencies. The CF should give strong consideration to researching the possibility of implementing 360° performance appraisal as it has the potential to be a valuable input in the selection and development of institutional leaders.

CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION

The CF has made a commitment to the study and improvement of leadership. This is evident given the creation of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI), which was put under the umbrella of the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA). CFLI has proven its worth with the production and publication of much-needed leadership doctrine manuals, which identify two major leadership functions: leading people and leading the institution. With this doctrine, the CF has very clearly established what it expects of its leaders at all levels. Moreover, it has recognized the importance of leadership to its overall functioning. Therefore, it is vital to have a performance appraisal instrument that supports the appropriate selection of leaders at all levels. Unfortunately, there are shortfalls in CFPAS, as it does not adequately assess the leadership potential of the officer corps; particularly senior officers given the increasing responsibility they are expected to assume as they advance through the ranks to the executive levels. Specifically, this study argues that the PER used for officers at the ranks of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander is inadequate for assessing institutional leadership potential.

The first chapter of this study discussed the performance appraisal instrument currently utilised by the CF, the PER. The annual PER is intended to assess and report the performance and potential of individual CF members. The CF uses the PER as a key input for selection purposes including promotions, offers of terms of service (contracts), postings, command appointments, career courses, honours and awards, etc. The PER has two major sections; one that assesses and reports performance and the other that rates potential. This study focuses on the part of the PER that is used to assess potential, as

promotions, appointments to leadership positions, and selection for career courses are based on the assessed level of potential of CF officers. It is vital for the CF to have a promotion selection system that allows for the distinction between those who are best suited to advance through the ranks and those who are performing adequately at their current ranks and are not necessarily suited for promotion. Given that the PER is a major input used in the promotion selection system, it is important for it to be designed to correctly assess leadership potential. Unfortunately, the CF uses a one size fits all approach in that the same PER form is used to assess the potential of CF members ranging in rank from corporal/leading seaman to lieutenant-colonel/commander. Given that majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders are only one or two ranks away from the executive leadership ranks, which start at the rank of colonel/captain (navy), where strategic and institutional leadership skills are required, using the same PER form to assess such a wide range of ranks does not make sense. Moreover, the CF has identified that there are major differences in the responsibilities of institutional leaders and of those who lead people.

The second chapter of this study explored senior leadership concepts and the importance of the succession planning of senior leaders. In today's world, CF officers are called upon to work in ambiguous, complex environments where they perform myriad responsibilities. These responsibilities become even more complex as officers progress through the ranks. Therefore, leadership selection and development is vital to the CF, as it must groom institutional leaders that possess the strategic and transformational leadership qualities necessary to excel in such environments. Succession planning is the key to selecting and developing great institutional leaders. The succession planning

process is only as good as the inputs that go into it, and one document that is a key input is the PER. The CF requires a PER that serves the purpose of assessing the institutional leadership potential of its senior leaders of tomorrow, i.e., officers who are capable of making the leap from leading people to being institutional leaders.

The two major leadership functions, institutional leadership and leading people, were compared and contrasted in the third chapter of this study. At the lower and middle rank levels, officers typically engage themselves in the development and execution of short-term plans. They direct, motivate, and enable their subordinates, teams, units and higher formations to accomplish the missions entrusted to them. The CF refers to this specific leadership function as “leading people” due to the need for face-to-face, direct influence and interaction.

On the other hand, institutional leadership is much different. The CF is a multi-faceted, national-level organization composed of almost 70,000 regular force members and billions of dollars worth the equipment with a major military commitment in Afghanistan and many other commitments to small missions all throughout the globe. It is a complex organization that is called upon to work in ambiguous, rapidly changing environments. It is not an easy organization to run, and the profession of arms can be a dangerous business. CF institutional leaders have the mammoth task of maintaining the capabilities required to meet its current commitments. Furthermore, they must have the vision to foresee the future environments in which the CF will operate and to determine the capabilities, systems and structures required to ensure that the CF will have the capacity to achieve its long-term commitments. These are not easy tasks; they require the very best leaders that the CF can produce. The CF, unlike other organizations, does not

have the luxury to recruit and parachute in senior leaders from outside of the organization due to the unique nature of the business it conducts. It takes unique skills to be an institutional leader in the CF and many years to develop those skills. This makes the timely assessment of institutional leadership potential all the more important for the CF. Institutional leadership is complex and requires unique competencies, and the PER should be an enabler in identifying officers that have the potential to exercise institutional leadership competencies.

The fourth chapter of this study focused on the shortcomings in the design of the potential section of the PER used for majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders and what could be done to rectify the situation. Officers at the ranks of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander are only one or two ranks from progressing to the executive ranks where institutional and strategic leadership skills are required. However, they are assessed on potential criteria that correspond to responsibilities associated with leading people instead of those associated with institutional leadership. In fact, this study demonstrates that five of the six potential assessment factors correspond to responsibilities of those who lead people. Not one of the potential assessment factors could be linked to institutional leadership responsibilities. This amounts to a missed opportunity, but the CF has options to rectify this situation.

One option is to apply the factors used to assess the performance of colonels/captains (navy) to the assessment of the potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders. Officers at the rank of colonel/captain (navy) are assessed using a different annual PER form than the one used for

majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders. The performance assessment section of the PER for colonels/captains (navy) is referred to as a leadership assessment, which is comprised of fourteen different strategic leadership competencies ranging from cognitive capacity to self-confidence. The competencies on which the potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders is assessed do not match the competencies on which the performance of colonels/captains (navy) is assessed. This amounts to a lack of congruence within the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System. If the CF were to change the potential section of the PER form for majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders to rectify this shortcoming, the number of potential assessment factors would increase from six to fourteen. Having so many potential assessment factors may be seen as administratively burdensome, but there are other options such as using Stephen J. Zaccaro's "Requisite Executive Leader Characteristics," which is a compilation of five leadership characteristics that incorporate the essential executive leadership skills. Regardless of the format, the PER should be revised to ensure that it better satisfies the need for timely assessment of institutional leadership potential.

Whether members of an organization like it or not, performance appraisals must be conducted. For an organization like the CF, the performance appraisal process takes a relatively short amount of time per member; perhaps three to four hours per year. However, performance appraisals can have a significant impact that far outweighs the relatively small investment of time it takes to complete them.¹⁴⁶ The PER is an extremely important document for the CF because it is one the key elements considered in

¹⁴⁶ Clinton O Longenecker, Henry P. Sims Jr. and Dennis A. Gioia, "Behind the Mask: The Politics of Employee Appraisal," *The Academy of Management Executive* 1, no. 3 (August 1987): 183.

promotion decisions and the succession planning process. In essence, it is a tool that is used to help identify and select the best institutional leaders of tomorrow. Therefore, it is important for the CF to correctly determine the appropriate rank level at which PERs should start to be used as a tool to assess the institutional leadership competencies of officers.

This study has shown that the CF is selecting and grooming future institutional leaders based solely upon their abilities to lead people, but CF leadership doctrine identifies that the responsibilities associated with leading people and institutional leadership are much different with each major leadership function requiring different competencies. Furthermore, this study has argued that the CF should start assessing institutional leadership potential at the ranks of major/lieutenant-commander and lieutenant-colonel/commander. These officers are only one or two ranks away from the executive rank levels, which start at the rank of colonel. Colonels are on the cusp of becoming institutional leaders, and it is a waste to elevate officers to that rank level that do not necessarily have the requisite competencies to perform effectively as institutional leaders. One may excel at leading people, but not necessarily have the skill sets required of an institutional leader. With this in mind, the CF should undertake an examination of how the PER is structured to assess the leadership potential of majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders in order to make it congruent to its institutional leadership doctrine so that it becomes a more fruitful document for succession planning and the promotion system.

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