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REFLECTIONS OF ETHICS: A REVIEW OF THE SENIOR OFFICER SELECTION PROCESS

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ABSTRACT

The ethical failings of three senior Canadian Forces officers in 2010 highlight that the current policies and programs, as well as the assessment and selection tools relative to developing and maintaining an ethical climate in the CF are, at best, ineffective and at worst, ignored in practice by senior leaders. In order to meet its professional obligations to the Canadian public, Canadian Forces ethics regulations and training programs must work in tandem with the promotion process, and a psychometrically sound system for assessing ethical competencies must be central to the senior officer selection process. Psychometric testing will not only assist in identifying individual personality factors which are linked to unethical behaviour and decision-making, but it will also assist in ensuring that only those senior officers with the requisite ethical competencies are selected for senior command and institutional appointments. Therefore, when the CDS is next required to defend the organization as a result of an incident of unethical behaviour, he can be confident that the organization has done all that can be reasonably expected to mitigate the risk of unethical behaviour by senior officers.

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Reflect More. Risk More. Enjoy More. Love More. Return More.

**REFLECTIONS OF ETHICS:
A REVIEW OF THE SENIOR OFFICER SELECTION PROCESS**

*“...a leader who lacks ethical sense is not a leader in any sense of the word.”
- Chief of Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk¹*

2010 must have been a tough year for the Chief of Defence Staff. The Afghanistan detainee issue continued to unfold under intense media scrutiny, the CF response to the earthquake in Haiti added to the strain on resources not already allocated to the Vancouver Olympics and to Task Force Afghanistan, and the United Arab Emirates terminated its agreement to host Camp Mirage. However challenging, these issues were probably relatively minor when compared to the very public and very embarrassing situations in which three senior commanders displayed a lack of integrity and moral judgement: Colonel Russell Williams pleaded guilty to two counts of murder, two counts of sexual assault, and 82 counts of break and enter. He was subsequently released from the Canadian Force (CF) and stripped of his commission, medals, decorations, and any further association with the military; he is serving two life sentences with no chance of parole for 25 years.² Brigadier-General Daniel Menard still faces a Court Martial on two counts of ‘conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline’ and four counts of obstruction of justice, as a result of allegations of an inappropriate personal relationship while he was in command of the Canadian Forces Task Force in

¹ General Walt Natynczyk, “CDS on ethical leadership,” *Journal of the Defence Ethics Programme* 2, no. 1 (December 2009): 9.

² CTV.ca News Staff, “Forces mull ‘unprecedented’ steps for Col. Williams,” <http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/20101018/military-mulls-williams-rank-101018/>; Internet; accessed 18 October 2010; and General W.J. Natynczyk, Chief of Defence Staff, “CDS Message: Mr. Russell Williams,” dated 22 October 2010.

Afghanistan and for attempts to destroy evidence in order to hamper the ensuing investigation.³ Colonel Bernard Ouellette was not charged after allegations of an inappropriate relationship and management problems surfaced while he was the Canadian Forces Task Force Commander in the United Nations mission in Haiti; however, his deployment was abruptly terminated and he was quietly reassigned to a project staff position in National Defence Headquarters.⁴ Each of these incidents resulted in a high level of media interest and raised questions about how these individuals had reached the highest levels of authority and responsibility within the CF, yet were apparently so ethically flawed. Critics repeatedly took aim at the senior officer selection process and the credibility of the Canadian Forces as a national institution was questioned. Even renowned military historian Jack Granatstein was quoted as saying, “If your military leaders can’t be trusted to obey the rules, then the public is right to assume: Can anyone?”⁵

³ CBC News, “Canadian CO relieved of Kandahar duty,” <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/05/29/kandahar-menard.html>; Internet; accessed 24 November 2010; and CBC News, “Brig-Gen. Menard to face court martial,” <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/11/23/menard-court-martial.html>; Internet; accessed 24 November 2010.

⁴ Col Ouellette was reassigned to the Military Personnel Management Capability Transformation Project, which is designed to establish an integrated personnel, pay and pension system. Canada. Department of National Defence, “Statement of Operational Requirement Military Personnel Management Capability Transformation Project (MPMCTP)” (CMP, ADM (Fin CS), ADM (IM) Project Number 00001576 Version 4.0 (Draft), dated 30 Dec 2009); and The Canadian Press, “Canadian commander in Haiti sacked, faces probe,” <http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/20100709/haiti-commander-sacked-100709/>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2011.

⁵ Andrew Duffy, “Plea adds to rough week for Canadian military; Rape allegations, Semrau sentence and now Williams,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, 8 October 2010; Peter Worthington, “Rethinking promotions,” *Toronto Sun*, 25 October 2010; and Giuseppe Valiante, Canwest News Service, “Multiple military scandals: More misbehaviour or more accountability?” <http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=3262004>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2011.

The ethical failings of these three individuals are particularly poignant, given that the CF had already identified several problems with the senior officer selection process, particularly regarding the selection of officers to the rank of colonel and above. In light of these incidents, this thesis will examine Canadian Forces senior officer selection, in particular those elements related to professional and ethical performance, by reviewing initiatives taken in recent years to improve the process and by evaluating them within the context of their efficiency in enhancing professional and ethical performance.⁶ Research in the field of ethics and ethical development will be considered in order to provide recommendations on areas where improvements could still be made.

This analysis will be divided into four parts. Part one will provide an overview of the most recent initiatives taken to improve the development and selection of senior and executive officers, particularly related to ethics. These include the development of a Statement of Defence Ethics, the CF military ethos, and the codification of individual and collective ethical responsibilities; the inclusion of ethics, values, and integrity as part of the annual personnel assessment; and finally the development of the Canadian Forces Succession planning model. Part Two will be an evaluation of these initiatives in order to determine the level of effectiveness on the practical implementation of individual and ethical codas. Part Three will examine extant research in the field of ethics, with a focus on how individual, situational and systemic factors can affect individual moral judgement and contribute to unethical behaviour. Part Four will synthesize the information and

⁶ In the Canadian Forces rank structure, the term senior officer refers to a category of officers which comprises majors, lieutenant-colonels and colonels. However, for the purpose of this research, the term senior officer or senior and executive officers will refer to those officers of the rank of Colonel and above (i.e., general or flag officer), and the term senior officer selection will refer to the selection of officers to the rank of Colonel and above. Defence Terminology Bank, Record 32930, Defence Terminology Section, Domain: Personnel-Human Resources-CF Rank.

provide recommendations on where improvements could be made to these initiatives, and ultimately to the senior officer selection process. It will be shown that the current policies and programs, as well as the assessment and selection tools relative to maintaining an ethical climate in the CF are, at best, ineffective and at worst, ignored in practice by senior leaders. Furthermore, in order to meet its professional obligations to the Canadian public, it will be shown that the Canadian Forces ethics regulations and training programs must work in tandem with the promotion processes, and that a psychometrically sound system for assessing ethical competencies must be central to the senior officer selection process. Psychometric testing will not only assist in identifying individual personality factors which may be related to unethical behaviour and decision-making, but it will also assist in ensuring that only those senior officers with the requisite ethical competencies are selected for senior appointments. Therefore, when the CDS is next required to defend the organization as a result of an allegation of unethical behaviour, he can be confident that the organization has done all that it reasonably can to mitigate the risk of unethical behaviour by senior officers.

CANADIAN FORCES INITIATIVES

*“The truly great leader is one who, by his own high example, inspires his followers”
- Winston Churchill⁷*

Published in 1999, *Strategy 2020* was the strategic framework for future defence planning and decision-making, articulating both long-term objectives and short-term targets for organizational change. The intent was to shape the CF in a way that it could

⁷ Winston Churchill, quoted in Squadron Leader G.R. Truemner, “Some notes on – A Philosophy of Leadership,” *The Canadian Air Force Journal* 2, no. 4 (Fall, 2009): 48.

respond quickly to domestic and international crises, with a “modern, task-tailored, and globally deployable combat-capable force.”⁸ One of eight strategic objectives identified in *Strategy 2020* was the development of decisive leaders, through the definition of high standards for selection, development and assessment, and by strengthening professionalism and accountability.⁹ In support of achieving this objective, a strategic review was conducted to determine the requirements of this future officer corps. Once identified, an assessment was then made of the capability gaps which would exist between the current corps and the future corps if no additional professional development activities occurred. *Officership 2020* was the resultant publication which provided CF strategic guidance for the conduct of all future officer professional development activities, designed not only to reduce the noted capability gaps within the officer corps, but to support the achievement of the strategic vision of the CF having “exemplary leaders serving Canada and devoted to the profession of arms.”¹⁰ Of particular interest to this research is *Officership 2020* objective three - the achievement of the highest standards of professionalism. Inherent in this objective is the vision that all officers should exemplify a military ethos, and that their attitudes, values and conduct should be governed by respect for the rule of law. In order to achieve this, it was recognized that

⁸ Department of National Defence, *Sharing the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, June 1999, <http://www.cds-cemd.forces.gc.ca/doc/str2020-eng.doc>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2011, 6.

⁹ Department of National Defence, *Sharing the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, June 1999, <http://www.cds-cemd.forces.gc.ca/doc/str2020-eng.doc>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2011, 9.

¹⁰ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century: Detailed Analysis and Strategy for Launching Implementation (Officership 2020)*, 8 March 2001, ii; and Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020): Strategic Guidance for the Canadian Forces Officer Corps and the Officer Professional Development System*, February 2001, 8.

the military ethos needed to be strengthened and inculcated through communication and mentoring, and that adherence to high ethical standards and behaviour was imperative.¹¹ Several Departmental and Canadian Forces initiatives, including the development of the Statement of Defence Ethics, the CF military ethos, and the Defence Ethics Program, as well as refinements to the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System and the development of a CF Succession Planning model, all directly support the achievement of the laudable vision of exemplary leaders. Each of these initiatives as they relate to senior officer ethical responsibilities and to senior officer selection will be discussed in detail.

The Defence Ethics Program and the Canadian Forces military ethos

The Statement of Defence Ethics is a public declaration by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces of a commitment to ethical principles and obligations in pursuit of the defence of Canada. The statement identifies a hierarchical set of ethical principles, specifically those universal ethical obligations to humanity, society and lawful authority, as well as six ethical obligations of integrity, loyalty, courage, honesty, fairness and responsibility. The intent is that all members of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces will use the Statement of Defence Ethics as a normative guide to professional conduct and that it will serve as the

¹¹ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century: Detailed Analysis and Strategy for Launching Implementation (Officership 2020)* 8 March 2001, iii, I-18, I-27 to I-28. Available at http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/Academics/officership2020_das_e.pdf.

foundation for the development of organizational codes of conduct.¹²

The Canadian Forces military ethos is an extension of the Statement of Defence Ethics. A concept promulgated in Canadian Forces professional doctrine, the ethos establishes the ethical framework for the Canadian Forces by setting the standards for personal and professional conduct. The ethos is comprised of three elements: (a) beliefs and expectations about military service, specifically the concepts of discipline, teamwork, and the fighting spirit; (b) Canadian values, such as those expressed in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and finally (c) Canadian military values - duty, loyalty, integrity and courage.¹³ Of particular note, the ethos defines integrity as accountability for one's actions, honesty, high ethical standards, behaviour which conforms to the military ethos, and the pursuit of truth regardless of the personal consequences. The ethos also highlights that integrity "must especially be manifested in leaders and commanders because of the powerful effect of their personal example on peers and subordinates."¹⁴ Recognizing that competencies and skills develop over time, it is expected that a junior officer will internalize the military ethos from watching and emulating the behaviour of their supervisors, while a senior officer will act as a steward, as exemplified by the "highest stages of moral/identity development."¹⁵ The CDS

¹² Department of National Defence, *Statement of Defence Ethics*, <http://www.dep-ped.forces.gc.ca/dep-ped/about-ausujet/documents/statements-enonce-eng.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2011; and Department of National Defence, *Defence Ethics Program: Fundamentals of Canadian Defence Ethics*, <http://www.dep-ped.forces.gc.ca/dl-tc/dep-ped/about-ausujet/fundamentals-fondements-eng.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2011, 8.

¹³ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), 25-31.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁵ Department of National Defence, Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, *The Professional Development Framework: Generating Effectiveness in Canadian Forces*

reinforced this notion when he stated that “leaders at every level...have a special responsibility to promote ethics and to set high ethical standards... [and that] a leader who lacks ethical sense is not a leader in any sense of the word.”¹⁶

In addition to individual ethical responsibilities, it was recognized that in order for an organization to be successful it must be “ethically fit” at the collective level.¹⁷ Thus the Defence Ethics Program (DEP) was developed as the means by which the CF would communicate, promote, and enable an ethical organizational climate. The aim of the program is to foster an ethical workplace, both in operations and in garrison, so that CF members and DND employees “will consistently perform their duties to the highest ethical standards.”¹⁸ Some of the key elements of the program include communication of ethical policies and expectations, leadership commitment, a motivational strategy (including training), readily available development and education tools, and oversight mechanisms which continually update and refine the program in order to meet the evolving needs.¹⁹ Although not directly addressed in this research, the DEP also incorporates issues such as conflict of interest and post-CF employment regulations.

Leadership (Ottawa: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2006), 31-32, 41.

¹⁶ General Walt Natynczyk, “CDS on ethical leadership,” *Journal of the Defence Ethics Programme* 2, no. 1 (December 2009): 9.

¹⁷ Department of National Defence, *Defence Ethics Program: Fundamentals of Canadian Defence Ethics*, <http://www.dep-ped.forces.gc.ca/dl-tc/dep-ped/about-ausujet/fundamentals-fondements-eng.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2011, 19.

¹⁸ Department of National Defence, *Defence Ethics Program*, <http://www.dep-ped.forces.gc.ca/dep-ped/index-eng.aspx>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2011.

¹⁹ Department of National Defence, *DAOD 7023-1, Defence Ethics Program*, <http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/dao-doa/7000/7023-1-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2011.

The DEP reiterates the expectation of a high level of individual and organizational ethical integrity. In addition, by being committed to the program and by serving as role models, through personal and professional conduct that is above reproach, the senior leadership plays a key role in fulfilling these organizational responsibilities.²⁰ Recognizing that an organization with a strong ethical climate has fewer ethical problems and indeed better success in dealing with problems when they do arise, and that unethical behaviour puts the effectiveness, legitimacy and reputation of the organization at risk, the DEP specifically tasks the Level 1 Advisors to ensure that the DEP is implemented within their area of responsibility.²¹ This specifically includes appointing ethics coordinators, maintaining an ethics implementation plan, and ensuring that DEP elements and training are included in ethics programs.²² On an annual basis, Level 1s provide input to the Management Accountability Framework (MAF) report specifically in support of the Values-based Leadership and Organizational Culture element. Designed to enforce Treasury Board expectations for the management of a department or agency, the MAF is a departmental report card of sorts.²³ In relation to ethics, the MAF therefore represents a

²⁰ Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy-Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 52.

²¹ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), 25; Department of National Defence, *DAOD 7023-1 Defence Ethics Program*, <http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/dao-doa/7000/7023-1-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2011; Damian F.W. O’Keefe, “Assessing the Moderating Effects of Ethical Climate on the Relation Between Social Dominance Orientation / Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Self-reported Unethical Behaviour,” (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2006), 10. Of note, in the CF chain of command, Level 1 advisors report directly to the Chief of Defence Staff. Level 1 advisor normally refers to the environmental and operational level commanders, as well as other specific advisors.

²² Department of National Defence, *DAOD 7023-1, Defence Ethics Program*, <http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/dao-doa/7000/7023-1-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2011.

²³ Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, *TB Management Accountability Framework*, <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/maf-crg/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 8 February 2011.

consolidated report of Level 1 actions and initiatives in support of the DEP, thereby reinforcing that the organizational culture is founded on values and ethics.

Described as “one of the most active and successful ethics programmes in the federal government,” the DEP has, over the years, expanded to include a comprehensive and impressive range of training programs and personal and professional development tools, all of which are available to every member and employee through the DEP website.²⁴ The *Journal of the Defence Ethics Programme* is another DEP initiative that is dedicated to promoting ethics at all levels, and provides a forum for discussion, reflection, and learning relative to ethical issues. Finally, a Defence Ethics Survey is conducted approximately every three years to assess the ethical climate and examine approaches to ethical decision-making. The survey was also designed to provide the senior leaders with information that would “assist them in meeting their mandate of ensuring that ethics are effectively practiced and advanced...through their Level One Ethics Implementation plans.”²⁵ Since its first administration in 1999, and again in 2003 and 2007, the Defence Ethics Survey results have identified an incremental, but overall, improvement in the organizational ethical climate and level of organizational fairness.²⁶ The 2010 survey results had not yet been published at the time of writing. It is important to note that the Defence Ethics Survey does not necessarily reflect an empirical assessment of improved ethical behaviour, but rather it provides an empirical assessment of the *perception* of improved ethical behaviour within the organization.

²⁴ Department of National Defence, “Ethics Advisory Board Meetings Minutes,” (Director Defence Ethics Program: file 1000-26-31 (DDEP), dated 27 January 2009), 1.

²⁵ Department of National Defence, *2003 Defence Ethics Survey* (Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation Sponsor Research Report 2004-18), 2005, iii.

²⁶ *Ibid*, iii-iv.

The Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS)

The CF Personnel Appraisal System, with the PER process as its basis, is designed to be the methodology by which the CF determines the merit ranking of its members. This in turn is used to decide which members deserve to be considered, in a highly competitive environment, for promotion to increasingly higher rank. Given that careers are effectively determined by the cumulative results of the most recent evaluation reports, a great deal of time and effort is devoted to ensuring the effective implementation of the PER process by supervisors, unit PER monitors, and the Chief Military Personnel organization (essentially the CF's human resources department).

The Senior Officer Performance Evaluation Report (PER) is currently the only formal mechanism for the assessment of individual and collective ethical responsibilities at the senior and executive levels in the CF. An annual process, senior and executive officers are rated by their supervisor on current performance, as well as future potential to succeed at the next higher rank. The PER process is designed both as a personal and professional development tool through constructive feedback and to inform career administrative decisions, such as succession planning, promotion, and course selection; however, the promotion function often overshadows the others.²⁷ Ethics and values is one of 14 leadership factors rated in the individual performance section of the PER. Evaluated on a five point scale ranging from the basic (or fundamental) level of competency, through competent, proficient, and accomplished, to the highest (or

²⁷ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Force Personnel Appraisal System*, Chapter 1, Article 101; Available for download at <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/cfpas-sepfc/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2011.

mastered) level of competency, CF senior officers are expected to act as role models, make ethical decisions, foster an ethical climate, and engage in discussions on ethics and values.²⁸ Integrity is one of 11 future potential factors assessed. Evaluated on a four point scale from low, through normal and superior, to outstanding potential, the expectation is that the senior officer will behave in accordance with the CF code of ethics, doctrine and policies, and make decisions that do not compromise existing standards and expectations.²⁹ The inclusion of ethics and integrity in the Senior Officer Performance Evaluation Report is a positive indicator of the organizational importance placed on ensuring ethical responsibilities are executed at the senior and executive levels. It is also recognition that the CF believes ethics should be an important and necessary part of senior and executive officer selection. Whether this intent has been effectively operationalized or not will be discussed further.

The Canadian Forces Succession Planning Model

By 2009, well before the latest public criticism surfaced regarding senior officer selection, the CF had already identified problems with the succession planning processes of the key environments (a term used in this context to refer to the Army, Air Force, Navy, Health Services, and the Support Career Field & Occupation Authority). Specifically, there was a lack of established assessment criteria and no formalized method of assessing these criteria. More importantly, the process did not meet the institutional needs of identifying quality senior officers for key senior institutional

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Chapter 7, 7A11.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Chapter 7, Section 705, 7A11, 7B05.

positions.³⁰ Instead, the environmental processes focused solely on the selection and development of those individuals identified with the potential to command at the highest levels within that environment, while the remainder (i.e., the B team) were given little attention. An unfortunate result of this environmental focus is that when asked for individuals to fill senior institutional (i.e., Canadian Forces or Department of National Defence) positions outside of their respective chains of command, the environments can be accused of holding back the most promising and talented individuals for their own command positions and instead nominating members of the B team. The irony of this is that many members of the B team end up in very important staff and support positions where they have considerable authority and influence. Therefore, even though senior appointments are essential to the long-term effectiveness of the institution, they were not always filled by the most suitable individual, potentially placing the organization at risk.³¹

Convinced that a more effective system was necessary to ensure that the most qualified and suitable individuals were selected for senior appointments, both command and institutional, it was determined by Armed Forces Council that a common CF succession planning model was required.³² In order to be effective, the model had to be

³⁰ Department of National Defence, “Joint Retention Strategy Action Team (JRSAT) Working Group Meeting,” presentation by the Directorate Military Personnel Strategy and Coordination, 13 Nov 09.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Armed Forces Council is the senior military body of the Canadian Forces and is designed to advise the Chief of the Defence Staff on “broad military matters pertaining to the command, control, and administration of the Canadian Forces and to help the CDS make decisions.” The Armed Forces Council is chaired by the CDS, and includes the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, the Environmental Chiefs of Staff (Army, Air Force and Navy) and other senior military advisors such as the Chiefs Military Personnel, Defence Intelligence, and Reserves and Cadets, the Judge Advocate General; and the Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer. Department of National Defence, “About the

fair and transparent, organizationally efficient across the environments, defensible as a process and therefore compliant with laws, regulations and directives, and finally it needed to support the retention of talent and enhance performance on the job.³³ Based on these criteria, a model was proposed which called for the identification of the key senior appointments, as well as the associated competencies necessary to succeed in those positions. The new process would be used to identify individuals with the capacity to achieve the identified competencies, develop them professionally through the enhancement of knowledge, skills and abilities, and finally manage them through a pan-CF management centre. This would ensure that individuals would be selected for key positions based on their competencies. In other words, it was recognition that a CF-centric succession plan that was based on defined competencies, formally assessed criteria and demonstrated individual merit – not on the relative position on the merit list or the result of environmental preference - was necessary to meet the institutional needs.³⁴ This would effectively eliminate the manipulation of merit list positions and environmental nominations which might not always be in the CF's best interest.

Concurrent with the development of the new succession planning model, and precipitated by the arrest of Russell Williams, the CDS ordered an additional review of

CDS – Armed Forces Council – Biography”; <http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/bio/afc-cfa-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 16 April 2011.

³³ These criteria were adapted by CMP from an organizational assessment model developed at the University of Montreal. Department of National Defence, “Integrated Military Personnel Career Planning (IMPCP) Succession Planning Model,” presentation by Directorate Military Personnel Strategy and Coordination, LCol M. Villeneuve, DMPSC 4, 26 November 2009.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

the senior officer selection process.³⁵ The intent was to assess the efficacy of the process and to determine two things: (a) if there was anything that could have been done to identify Williams' character flaws sooner, and more importantly (b) how to avoid any future similar situations. A 'tiger team' was convened that included CF representatives in the fields of human resources, personnel selection, mental health, and policing.³⁶ A key question posed to the team was whether the CF should consider the use of psychometric testing in senior officer selection. The resultant Briefing Note to the CDS provided an overview of the three primary types of structured personnel selection processes used by the CF: the first on recruitment, through the use of cognitive ability testing, a medical assessment, a background security check and a structured interview; the second during the annual selection boards for promotion and command or specialty appointments, through the use of the PER on an annual basis, a medical check on a two to five year basis, and a background security check on a five or ten year basis; and finally, during selection for specialty or high-risk employment areas (i.e., Special Operations Forces, Military Police, and Human Intelligence operators).

It was noted that psychological testing was conducted only as part of the specialty employment selection process and was specifically designed to screen in positive attributes (i.e., conscientiousness) and screen out negative attributes (i.e., anxiety, depression, anti-social behaviours, and narcissism). It was also noted that to extend psychological testing to other areas of selection within the CF, for example command and

³⁵ Laura Stone and David Wylie, "Charges move military to review selection process," *The Montreal Gazette*, 11 February 2010; <http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Charges+move+military+review+selection+process/2545271/story.html>; Internet; accessed 5 March 2011.

specialty appointments, “could be extremely difficult.”³⁷ This assessment was based on the argument that it was difficult to detect these extremely rare behaviours, such as the psychopathy displayed by Williams, that it was difficult to accurately predict future human behaviour, that existing psychopathy assessment tools were not designed for use on the general population, and finally, the testing of these rare behaviours was prone to false positives and false negatives due to the ability of individuals to “fake good.”³⁸ Ultimately, the team agreed that there were “no reliable mechanisms to screen for such psychopathology in a selection scenario.”³⁹ Therefore, the final conclusion to the CDS was that the present approach to senior officer selection (i.e., the exclusion of psychological screening) “was appropriate and correct.”⁴⁰ Having essentially made recommendations based on the ‘bad apple’ theory to be expounded upon later, the team was subsequently disbanded.

With the new CF succession planning process approved, and no changes recommended by the tiger team, work continued on the identification of competencies which would be necessary to succeed at the senior and executive levels. Nested within the five meta-competencies already identified as necessary for effective leadership (i.e., expertise, cognitive capacities, social capacities, change capacities, and professional

³⁶ The term ‘tiger team’ is often used to refer to a cross-disciplinary group of individuals who have been gathered to solve a specific issue or problem.

³⁷ Department of National Defence, “CF Personnel Selection Screening and Psychological testing,” Briefing Note for the CDS, 12 February 2010, 1.

³⁸ Department of National Defence, “CF Personnel Selection Screening and Psychological testing,” Briefing Note for the CDS, 12 February 2010, 1; and LCol L. Noonan, Email correspondence with the author, 12 April 2011.

³⁹ LCol L. Noonan, Email correspondence with the author, 5 April 2011.

⁴⁰ Department of National Defence, “CF Personnel Selection Screening and Psychological testing,” Briefing Note for the CDS, 12 February 2010, 2.

ideology), 23 sub-competencies were subsequently identified as a common standard against which all senior and executive officers would be assessed.⁴¹ Defined as a “set of characteristics, skills and other abilities...which underlie effective leader performance,” the competencies range from technical expertise to behavioural flexibility, communication and creativity. Commitment to the CF military ethos and moral reasoning were also identified as competencies necessary for professional ideology, and are of specific interest to this research because of their association with ethical and professional behaviour.⁴²

It should be noted that some research suggests that basing executive selection processes solely on end-state competencies could be a double-edged sword, in that competencies are often based on past requirements for success rather than on future requirements. The risk is that an organization will select executives who have performed well in their previous positions but who may not have the capabilities required for future

⁴¹ The meta-competencies identified to achieve effective leadership were developed by the CF Leadership Institute (CFLI) in 2006 and published as the Professional Development Framework (LDF). The 23 competencies identified for effective leadership are captured here in conjunction with the associated meta-competency (in bold): **expertise** (organizational awareness, visioning, results management, resource management, information management, and technical expertise); **cognitive capabilities** (creativity, analytical thinking and systems thinking); **social capacities** (interpersonal relations, partnering, teamwork, communication, conflict management and service orientation); **change capacities** (developing self and others, behavioural flexibility, change management and stress tolerance and management); and **professional ideology** (commitment to the CF military ethos, moral reasoning, impact and influence; and action orientation and initiative). Department of National Defence, “Competency Profiles for the Canadian Forces (CF): Col/Capt (N) Rank,” Presented by Line St-Pierre DRPG of DGMPPRA, December 2010. Briefing slides accessed through CMP, DMPSC; and Department of National Defence, Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, *The Professional Development Framework: Generating Effectiveness in Canadian Forces Leadership* (Ottawa: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2006), 28.

⁴² Department of National Defence, Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, *The Professional Development Framework: Generating Effectiveness in Canadian Forces Leadership* (Ottawa: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2006), 51; and Department of National Defence, “Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI) Meeting on Competency Dictionary,” presentation by Directorate Military Personnel Strategy and Coordination, LCol Martin Villeneuve, DMPSC, 8 September 2010.

positions of increasing scope and scale. Instead, it is suggested that the ability to ‘learn from experience’ may be the ultimate competency in the selection of executives, as opposed to more currently valued competencies.⁴³ If one accepts this premise, it could be argued that the identified competencies in the CF Succession Planning process, such as behavioural flexibility and change management (change capacities), creativity and analytical and systems thinking (cognitive capacities), and action orientation and initiative (professional ideology), adequately capture the ability to learn from experience.⁴⁴ It appears then that the new CF succession planning process should provide the necessary flexibility to meet not only the current, but also the future leadership requirements.

Once identified, it was then determined that a valid and objective assessment mechanism was necessary for each of the 23 competencies. It was subsequently determined that a competency dictionary would be the most appropriate mechanism. As with the existing PER word picture methodology, behavioural indicators reflective of the level of capability and competency required for each criterion are under development. In the absence of a more valid and reliable assessment tool, behavioural indicators will also be developed for ‘commitment to the CF military ethos’ and ‘moral reasoning’ as they relate to individual and collective ethical responsibilities.⁴⁵

⁴³ Gretchen M. Spreitzer, Morgan W. McCall, Jr and Joan D. Mahoney, “Early Identification of International Executives,” Center for Effective Organizations – Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California-Los Angeles, July 1996, 3.

⁴⁴ Department of National Defence, “Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI) Meeting on Competency Dictionary,” presentation by Directorate Military Personnel Strategy and Coordination, LCol Martin Villeneuve, DMPSC, 8 September 2010.

⁴⁵ Department of National Defence, “Competency Profiles for the Canadian Forces (CF): Col/Capt (N) Rank,” presentation by Director General Military Personnel Retention and Attrition, Line St-Pierre, December 2010.

The CF succession planning process remains under development; individual professional development and management aspects have not yet been implemented and the competency dictionary is not yet fully compiled. Ideally, the new model would be implemented as soon as possible; however, this is not likely to occur before 2013. Once fully operational, the model will help mitigate the inconsistencies in senior officer selection and ensure that both institutional and command positions are filled by the most capable and suitable individuals, regardless of environmental preference. It will also ensure that a more robust mechanism is in place for the assessment of ethics and ethical responsibilities at the senior and executive levels. In the meantime, the Director of Senior Appointments continues to use assessment criteria that are partially reflective of the current PER criteria, and which incorporate ethical behaviour as one of the five personal attributes relative to potential to succeed at the next higher rank.⁴⁶ Of note, the criteria are undefined and no related or objective assessment formula has been published to date.

To summarize, the Statement of Defence Ethics, the CF military ethos, and the Defence Ethics Program all represent positive developments of the past decade regarding the promotion of an organizational ethical climate. Not only do they serve as comprehensive guides for professional and ethical conduct, they clearly outline the individual and collective responsibilities of senior officers, as well as the institutional expectation that they act as role models and stewards of ethics. The incorporation of these individual and collective responsibilities as assessment factors (i.e., ethics and

⁴⁶ Department of National Defence, "Update to Capt (N) and Col," presentation by the Director Senior Appointments (DSA), February 2011.

values, and integrity) in the annual performance evaluation report demonstrates the commitment to the concept and the overall importance of ethics to the institution, as well as the importance of ethics in the assessment and selection of senior officers. The review of the senior officer selection process and the subsequent development of a pan-CF selection model, which codifies the competencies necessary to be successful at the senior officer level (including commitment to ethos and moral reasoning) and provides for a standardized and objective assessment mechanism, will help mitigate the challenges previously experienced regarding senior and executive officer selection. If effectively implemented, it will also help ensure that only the most competent individuals in general, and the most ethically competent in particular, will be selected for key institutional and command positions. The question remains if this important commitment will be realized in the face of resource pressures and environmental objectives.

EVALUATION OF CF INITIATIVES

*“...we are professional soldiers to whom ethics are not, repeat not, an optional extra.”
- (former) Chief of the Land Staff, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie⁴⁷*

Simply considering the events of 2010 noted earlier in the introduction, it could be argued that despite the clear articulation of individual and collective ethical responsibilities in the Statement of Defence Ethics, the CF military ethos, and the Defence Ethics Program, as well as an annual assessment of individual ethical behaviour through the PER system, these alone have not been sufficient to ensure ethical behaviour at the senior level in the CF. The publication of a CF-wide message by the CDS

⁴⁷ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Discernment: CLS guidance on ethics in operations* (Strategic Edition), 2009, 13.

reminding senior leaders of their responsibility to “sustain and promote the four core military values of duty, loyalty, integrity and courage” is also an indication that he still had concerns regarding the state of the ethical climate at the senior levels of the organization.⁴⁸ Having said that, in the absence of a specific or egregious incident, it is virtually impossible to empirically assess the level to which commanders and senior leaders are actually satisfying their individual and collective responsibilities as role models and ethical stewards. It is also difficult to objectively assess the effectiveness of the Defence Ethics Program in fostering an ethical climate, particularly given the relative short life of the program. The same can be said about the PER as an effective assessment tool of ethics, and the environmental succession planning process as an effective selection tool, particularly in relation to ethics. However, if one accepts the premise that the creation and maintenance of an ethical organizational climate, an effective and objectively based performance appraisal system, and a comprehensive succession planning process that is designed to create a true meritocracy and from which only the most competent individuals are selected, are conditions which should contribute to the achievement of the ethical and leadership goals of the CF, it would appear that there exists significant room for improvement. The following examples illustrate how effectively these goals are being achieved.

⁴⁸ Department of National Defence, “Message from the CDS to the Leaders of the Canadian Forces,” Canadian Forces General (message) 131/10 CDS 018/10 191424Z JUL 10, Item 2.5.

Creation and maintenance of an ethical organizational climate

As mentioned, the Chief Review Services (CRS) has responsibility for, among other things, the development, administration, and implementation oversight of the DEP.⁴⁹ CRS has allocated resources toward these responsibilities; however, other than dealing specifically with issues of conflict of interest and post-employment regulations (which are not voluntary aspects of the program) none of them are directed at ensuring compliance with the DEP. In fact, given the decentralized and voluntary nature of the program, there is “really no way to enforce it.”⁵⁰ Without an enforcement mechanism, or even a mandate to do so, CRS can only assist and advise those Level 1s who are interested in the implementation of the DEP. Recognizing this as a limitation, the DEP staff has focused their efforts on overall awareness of the program, developing training programs for all levels, conducting the individual and institutional level ethics surveys, and several other related initiatives. However, under the rubric of the *Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act*, CRS staff is in the process of developing additional DEP components and enhancing existing initiatives which, with the force of legislation behind them, will ultimately enable a more proactive enforcement role.⁵¹ Once implemented, Level 1s will no longer be voluntary participants in the DEP and CRS will be enabled to push for greater substance in and compliance of Level 1 ethics programs. Ideally, these

⁴⁹ Department of National Defence, *DAOD 7023-0, Defence Ethics*, <http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/dao-doa/7000/7023-0-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2011.

⁵⁰ Maj Susan Gray, Defence Ethics Program staff, email correspondence with author, 15 February 2011; and Mr. Denis Beauchamp, Defence Ethics Program staff, discussion with author, 1 Apr 2011.

⁵¹ The *Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act* came into force on 15 April 2007. Section 6 (1) directs that “every chief executive shall establish a code of conduct applicable to the portion of the public sector for which he or she is responsible.” Based on this legal obligation, the CF has developed a

new initiatives will commence in late 2011; however, until that occurs, the program remains voluntary.⁵²

It follows then that there are no concrete repercussions for non-compliance, and that implementation of the DEP is left to the discretion of Level 1s. This might seem perfectly reasonable; however, it also appears to have been largely ineffective. As mentioned, Level 1 responsibilities include appointing ethics coordinators, maintaining an ethics implementation plan, and ensuring that DEP elements and training are included in an ethics programs.⁵³ DEP staff report that with a few exceptions, every Level 1 has submitted an ethics implementation plan and that many have or intend to incorporate their ethics program into command orders or directives, including the Army, Air Force, and Navy. However, there appears to be one key weakness in the implementation of the DEP: ethics training. For example, despite a Land Force Command Order directing that all Land Force personnel complete annual ethics training, during the period 2007 – 2010 only 55.3% (on average) of CF Army units offered the one day of mandated training. Of particular note, the Army HQ itself averaged only 8.0% compliance during the same period of time.⁵⁴ The Navy reported an 86.6% compliance rate for annual training in the period 2009-2010, while the Vice Chief of Defence Staff 2009-2010 MAF input provided no training statistics, but noted that “most L2 reps [reported] having conducted one or

Departmental code of conduct for Public Servants code and a CF organizational code of conduct, expected to be issued in late 2011. The Act is available at <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ve/pda-eng.asp>.

⁵² Mr. Denis Beauchamp, Defence Ethics Program staff, discussion with author, 1 Apr 2011.

⁵³ Department of National Defence, *DAOD 7023- Defence Ethics Program*, <http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/dao-doa/7000/7023-1-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2011.

⁵⁴ Department of National Defence, *Land Force Command Order 21-18* Article 5(d) (2); and LCol Y. Martineau, CLS staff, email correspondence with author, 10 February 2011.

more awareness sessions... [which] varied from stand-alone ethics discussions/presentations to embedded portions within town hall discussions, welcome or CO briefs.”⁵⁵ The Air Force statistics were not released for the purposes of this research. Instead, the author was advised that compliance with the Air Command Order, which directs that every individual participate in an “ethics discussion at least once a year,” was “dependent not only on leadership, but [on] all the day to day and year by year commitments of Wings, units, squadrons.”⁵⁶ Recognizing that the Land Force is numerically a much larger structure than other Level 1 organizations and thus enforcement is probably more difficult, four inferences can still be made from this information. First, without an enforcement mechanism, implementation of the DEP is inconsistent across the Canadian Forces. Second, implementation of the DEP is not necessarily an organizational priority and must compete for scarce organizational training time and resources. Third, organizations are reluctant to provide implementation statistics, presumably because they reflect a less than stellar compliance rate. And fourth, implementation can be based on the personality of the commander. One could argue that if accurate, none of these inferences meet the spirit or intent of the stewardship responsibilities of senior leaders.

⁵⁵ Department of National Defence, *MARCOM ETHICS PROGRAM 2009-2010*. (Chief of the Maritime Staff: file 3371-1950-2 (D Mar Pers 2-5, RDIMS#203874), dated 15 October 2010); Department of National Defence, “VCDS Group Defence Ethics Program Report Update.” (Vice Chief of the Defence Staff: file 1000-2 (SA VCDS), 15 October 2010).

⁵⁶ Department of National Defence, *Air Command Order ACO 5000-5 Air Command Ethics Program*, 6; and Maj F. Boyes, DMP 2-5, email correspondence with author, 21 February 2011.

Effective and objective merit system

Given the CDS' comment regarding the importance of promoting high ethical standards and the requirement of ethics in all leaders, it is clear that ethics and professionalism should be part of the regular performance appraisal system.

Unfortunately, it seems that the effectiveness of the assessment (PER) and selection processes for senior officers, particularly in relation to ethics, meet neither the CDS' expectations nor the requisite organizational standard.

Despite clear guidelines and repeated reminders about how it should be completed and employed, it is common knowledge within the CF that the PER process has some fundamental challenges. Only as effective as the individual supervisor writing it, evaluation reports are often inflated in order to expedite a promotion, advance an individual ahead of their peer group, or simply to avoid arguments over poor performance assessments. Other common issues include supervisors re-copying individual assessments from one year to the next, or simply using assessments from one individual for another.⁵⁷ Indeed, the idiosyncratic characteristics of supervisors can result in more than 50% of the variance in performance ratings from year to year.⁵⁸ For example, a supervisor who likes the subordinate will tend to be more lenient and prone to inflated ratings, and provide even higher ratings if they see the subordinate as similar to themselves. Supervisor personality traits, such as the level of agreeableness and

⁵⁷ Department of National Defence, "CFPAS and Selection Board Observations 2011," Canadian Forces General (message) 015/11 CMP 007/11 271920Z JAN 11, paragraph 6.

⁵⁸ Department of National Defence, *Contemporary Perspectives on Performance Appraisal: Towards Resolving the Paradox*, (Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation), E.K. Kelloway and V.M. Catano, March 2003, 7-11.

conscientiousness can also result in skewed ratings, as can the method by which the supervisor uses to track and recall performance information. Stereotypes, most often based on gender and ethnicity, and finally, the nature and type of performance being reviewed (i.e., productive or counter productive) also impact the ratings.⁵⁹ In recognition of some of these inherent problems, a recent Canadian Forces general message reiterated the responsibility of supervisors at all levels to provide members with a “fair, accurate and timely evaluation report.”⁶⁰ These problems not only impact the effectiveness of the PER as an individual development tool, but they also impact its utility as an administrative tool. As with all human endeavours, there is an element of subjectivity with the CF PER process and some challenges cannot be mitigated; however, its overall efficacy is further diminished by a competing process that appears to intentionally undermine the very principles upon which it is based.

Succession planning process and its impact on meritocracy

The environmental succession planning processes previously mentioned further degrade the effectiveness of the PER as an objective assessment tool in two ways. First, the environmental succession planning boards employ assessment (and by extension selection) criteria that are outside those captured in the PER. These criteria are so varied that none is common to all environments; they are often intangible and ill-defined, such as ‘presence,’ ‘willingness,’ and ‘client-focused’; and there is no objective or even formally defined method of assessing these criteria, all of which results in an inconsistent

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 7-11.

⁶⁰ Department of National Defence, “CFPAS 2010-11 – Personnel Evaluation Reports,” Canadian Forces General (message) 043/11 CMP 022/11 281915Z FEB 11, paragraph 8.

assessment and selection standard.⁶¹ Of note, ethical conduct and integrity are used only by the Air Force as a succession planning criterion.⁶² Secondly, environmental succession planning boards normally occur prior to the end of the PER assessment year, so supervisors can be required to write a PER which justifies the succession planning board results, regardless of the individual's demonstrated performance and potential throughout the entire assessment period.⁶³ In addition, succession planning board results have a remarkable organizational resilience and longevity in that individuals can be identified as potential general officers while still only captains.⁶⁴ As a result, once identified as a 'streamer,' an officer can be fast tracked for rapid successive promotion to meet environmental objectives, regardless of actual reported performance. Given the succession planning impact on selection for key positions, many of which are 'tiered' (i.e., designed to produce higher PER ratings) the board results become self-fulfilling prophecies. With essentially the tail wagging the dog, the environmental succession planning processes can be seen to effectively invalidate the entire CF PER process. Possibly in recognition of these challenges, Armed Forces Council noted that the "current

⁶¹ Department of National Defence, "Joint Retention Strategy Action Team (JRSAT) Working Group Meeting," presentation by Directorate Military Personnel Strategy and Coordination, 13 Nov 09.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Department of National Defence, "Joint Retention Strategy Action Team (JRSAT) Working Group Meeting," presentation by the Directorate Military Personnel Strategy and Coordination, 13 Nov 09; and LCol M. Villeneuve, DMPSC, discussion with author, 10 November 2009.

⁶⁴ Of note, the Air Force environmental succession planning process specifically identifies captains who they believe have demonstrated the potential to be a general. Department of National Defence, "Joint Retention Strategy Action Team (JRSAT) Working Group Meeting," presentation by the Directorate Military Personnel Strategy and Coordination, 13 Nov 09.

PER system [was] not necessarily a useful tool to support the proposed [CF] Succession Planning framework.”⁶⁵

Despite the positive development of a new CF succession planning model, in which defined competencies and a formalized assessment mechanism are key elements, no changes were introduced or even proposed to the existing environmental succession planning processes. In fact, it can be argued that the new model was ultimately accepted by the environmental chiefs at Armed Forces Council and approved for further development precisely because it did not interfere with the existing succession planning processes, each designed and managed by senior environmental leaders. Keeping in mind that these environmental processes will provide nominations to the new CF model for promotion and appointment to the most senior command and institutional positions, the impact is that the environmental processes will continue to function as they always have, with inconsistent criteria, no defined assessment mechanism, and ultimately inconsistent standards. It also means the likelihood that ethics will continue to be assessed by only one environmental board as a criterion for senior officer selection is high.⁶⁶ Therefore, it would appear that the PER process has become a flawed system, by virtue of individual supervisors using it to suit their own objectives, and possibly even an insignificant system, as environmental succession planning boards usurp its intended objectiveness in order to justify their deliberations. Either way, it would appear that the PER has become a less than effective method of assessing individual performance and future potential in

⁶⁵ Department of National Defence, “Armed Forces Council Meeting 05/09 held on 15 Apr 09 – Record of Decisions.” (NDHQ Secretariat: file 1180-1 (D NDHQ Sec) dated 19 May 2009), paragraph 13.

⁶⁶ Department of National Defence, “Joint Retention Strategy Action Team (JRSAT) Working Group Meeting,” presentation by the Directorate Military Personnel Strategy and Coordination, 13 Nov 09.

several environments and, by extension, an ineffective tool for assessing ethics. In addition, the gravitation of the environmental succession planning processes toward other, more inconsistent assessment criteria, and in particular away from ethics, would seem to indicate that the issue of ethics and integrity is not seen by the most senior environmental leaders as a priority quality for senior and executive officers.

In addition to these assessment and environmental succession planning challenges, it would seem that the Williams tiger team may have stopped abruptly short of where it could have gone relative to assessing the efficacy of the senior officer selection process.⁶⁷ Certainly cases of violent psychopathy in Canadian society are rare. The leading expert on psychopathy, Robert Hare, estimates that there are approximately 300,000 psychopaths in Canada, essentially 1% of the population, only a fraction of which are violent. The remainder live among us as “sub-clinical” or “successful” psychopaths; they are charming predators who can be our neighbours, associates, co-workers, and supervisors.⁶⁸ The case of Christophe Rocancourt is a striking example of this.⁶⁹ However, if one accepts that the CF Regular Force is a 69,000 strong cross-section of Canadian society, simple math leads one to the conclusion that there may be as many

⁶⁷ Department of National Defence “CF Personnel Selection Screening and Psychological testing,” Briefing Note for the CDS, 12 February 2010, 1.

⁶⁸ Robert Hercz, “Psychopaths Among Us,” 3; <http://www.hare.org/links/Saturday.html>; Internet; accessed 6 April 2011; and Robert Hare, *Psychopaths Among Us*, (New York: The Guilford Press, 1993), 113.

⁶⁹ Christophe Rocancourt is a French-born impostor who used at least a dozen aliases, including passing himself off as the son of Sophia Loren, and the nephew of Oscar de la Renta, and finally a Celtic relative of the US Rockefeller family, eventually using the name Christopher Rockefeller in order to ingratiate himself with rich and famous people. During his many ruses, he presented himself as a movie producer, then an ex-boxing champ, and even a venture capitalist, among others. Finally arrested in 2001, Rocancourt pleaded guilty to theft, grand larceny, smuggling, bribery, perjury and fraud. He was fined \$9 million, ordered to pay \$1.2 million in restitution, and was sentenced to five years in prison in the US. As

as 690 psychopaths in the CF – not just the one that came to national attention in 2010.⁷⁰ However, it is a fact that psychopathy is difficult to detect and, given the manipulative tendencies of these individuals, even skilled psychologists can be tricked by psychopaths who are, for example, faking good. The Hare Psychopathy Checklist - Revised (PCL-R) is the internationally recognized screening tool used to screen for psychopathy. Although originally designed for adult male prison populations, where approximately 20% satisfy the PCL-R definition of psychopath, the PCL-R has evolved over the years and has been redeveloped for the screening of other specific populations.⁷¹ Of particular interest, Hare has developed the PCL-SV (screening version) for use in screening psychopathology in the general population.⁷² It should be noted that clinical assessments such as these are not based on a single test or interview. Instead, by using two or more types of appropriate psychometric screening/testing tools and by concurrently conducting an individual history check, all of which is validated through a confirmatory clinical interview, the risk of false positive or false negatives can be greatly mitigated. Tests and

of 2006, Rocancourt had repaid only \$5,000.00 in restitution. While in prison he wrote a biography in which he ridiculed his 19 victims and after his release during a Dateline interview bragged that he had stolen at least \$40 million dollars. A second book deal was signed and he sold the rights to his name on a clothing line. Rocancourt “found God” in prison and insisted that he had learned from his mistakes. He intended to turn his biography into a Hollywood movie. Mike Taibbi, “Catch him if you can,” MSNBC News, 12 March 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11770944/ns/dateline_nbc/; Internet; accessed 6 April 2011; and Emily Sheridan, “Naomi causes more controversy as she brings convicted con artist as her date to Cannes,” *The Daily Mail*, 22 May 2008, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1021074/Naomi-causes-controversy-brings-convicted-artist-date-Cannes.html>; Internet; accessed 6 March 2011.

⁷⁰ The 16 September 2010 quarterly update to the Project Management Board (PMB) indicated that the Regular Force strength was 68,558. Department of National Defence, “Reg F Recruiting and Retention: Putting the Brakes on Success,” Quarterly update presentation for PMB, 16 Sep 2010.

⁷¹ Robert Hercz, “Psychopaths Among Us,” 3; <http://www.hare.org/links/Saturday.html>; Internet; accessed 6 April 2011.

⁷² Patricia B. Sutker and Albert N. Allain, Jr, ‘Anti-Social Personality Disorder’ in *Comprehensive Handbook of Psychology*, eds. Henry E. Adams and Patricia B. Sutker, 445-488 (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, Inc, 2004), 477.

assessments that are repeated over a period of time further increase the validity of the clinical assessment. This type of triangulation is precisely the process used for conducting psychological assessments in support of the CF specialty and high-risk selection processes noted above, thereby allowing for the effective screening in of positive attributes and the screening out of negative attributes, as well as an objective prediction of future behaviour in that specialty occupation.

Therefore, one could suggest that in the context of the CF population psychopathy is not that rare and, as a result, it would be appropriate for the CF to take action to screen it out during the senior officer selection process, indeed all officer selection processes. Furthermore, there are psychometrically sound tools available to assist in screening general populations and, when used appropriately, can not only assist in the assessment of current behaviour, but an assessment regarding future behaviour; all of which have built in mechanisms which can help mitigate false positives and false negatives. However of greater concern than a lack of screening for psychopathy, is that the Williams tiger team also failed to address, or even consider, the many mental health issues other than psychopathy which can affect up to 20% of the Canadian population.⁷³ Specifically within the military context, the Ombudsman has identified that a “significant number of soldiers are returning from overseas deployments suffering [from] mental health issues.”⁷⁴ Given the range of potential mental health and other issues which could result in embarrassment or risk to the organization, many of which are identifiable

⁷³ Health Canada Statistics indicates that 20% of the population is estimated to have some form of mental illness, and 6% to 9% of the population is estimated to have some form of personality disorder. Health Canada, *A Report on Mental Illnesses in Canada*, October 2002, 15.

⁷⁴ Department of National Defence, *A Long Road to Recovery: Battling Operational Stress Injuries*, Office of the Ombudsman, Special Report to the Minister of National Defence, December 2008, 4.

through appropriate psychometric testing and screening mechanisms, the lack of screening outside of specialty employment is tantamount to adopting the ostrich approach to a significant problem. If no screening measures are implemented, the problems will not disappear; they will only be exacerbated.

To summarize, these examples demonstrate that having an organizational Ethics Program and an Ethics Implementation Plan alone is not enough to guarantee that an appropriate ethical climate will exist or that ethical decision-making will always occur. Strong leadership engagement is the “key to creating and implementing a successful ethics programme in any organization.”⁷⁵ Therefore, Commanders at all levels must be engaged on a daily basis in ensuring that ethics, ethical discussions, and ethical decision-making form an inherent and natural component of individual and collective behaviour. Unfortunately, despite the positive advancements in areas such as policy and doctrine, it is clear that there remain several institutional challenges to the effective implementation of an ethical climate, ethical decision-making, and ethical responsibilities at the senior level. Inattention, non-compliance, or even poor compliance, particularly at the senior levels, “sends a message that ethics are not a priority and [it] encourages people to devote their attention to other tasks.”⁷⁶ Indeed, the latest DND research indicates that the “current implementation of the DEP in the disparate Level 1 organizations is at a level that is much too low for a program that was established in 1997 and is therefore far from

⁷⁵ Colonel Yvon Desjardins, “Canada’s Defence Ethics Programme and Ethics Training,” in *Ethics Education in the Military*, eds. Paul Robinson, Nigel De Lee, and Don Carrick, 67-78 (Burlington, VT, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 67.

⁷⁶ The Conference Board of Canada, Briefing July 2004, “Measuring the Performance of Corporate Ethics Programs: Creating an Ethics Performance Story,” <http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.aspx?did=750>; Internet; accessed March 2011, 2.

meeting the institutional requirements of fostering an ethical climate.”⁷⁷ By extension, and of more import to this research, it is clear that there remain institutional, attitudinal, procedural, and cultural challenges to the effective assessment of individual and collective ethical responsibilities of senior officers by way of the PER, and to the incorporation of ethics in the senior officer selection process by way of the environmental succession planning processes. Furthermore, the senior officer selection process does not include any additional screening measures for those individuals who have been selected for high risk command and leadership positions within the organization and the department. This raises the question, if the institutional initiatives are ineffective in shaping ethical behaviour, the codified assessment and selection processes are ineffective in assessing ethical behaviour, and no mechanisms are in place to identify potential ethical risk factors, what can be done to ensure professional and ethic performance at the senior level and how can this be incorporated into the senior officer selection process?

RELEVANT ETHICS RESEARCH

*“The starting point for the understanding of war is the understanding of human nature”
- S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire⁷⁸*

Most researchers concur that moral functioning involves more than just moral action, and that there are indeed several factors at play which influence the ethical decision making process. James Rest proposed a framework for understanding the

⁷⁷ Mr Denis Beauchamp, Defence Ethics Program staff, email correspondence with author, 6 April 2011.

⁷⁸ S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire*, quoted in Lt Col Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, 2nd ed. (New York: Back Bay Books/Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 139.

complexity of moral functioning (i.e., moral competency) in which the moral decision-making process consisted of moral sensitivity (awareness or recognition), moral judgment (evaluation), moral motivation (intention), and moral character (personality and behaviour).⁷⁹ The theory is that moral evaluation leads to moral intention, and moral intention is thought to predict moral behaviour.⁸⁰ Based on his experience with the now famous 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment, Zimbardo argues that it is not necessarily what the individual actor brings to the situation, but rather what situational forces bring out of the actor and what systemic (or organizational) forces create and maintain that situation that can predict moral behaviour. Others argue that individual personality characteristics can be strong predictors of ethical and unethical behaviour. Whatever the framework used, it is important to understand that there are several, often inter-related and not always easily observable factors which can influence moral functioning and moral decision-making. In order to better evaluate how improvements can be made to the senior officer selection process as it relates to professional and ethical performance, it is important to consider these internal and external factors (categorized as individual, situational, and systemic factors) and how they can impact ethical decision-making. In some detail, each will be examined within the CF context with a view to identifying recommendations to improve the senior officer selection process.

⁷⁹ J.P. Bradley (in press), "Psychological Foundations of Unethical Decisions in Military Operations" in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. J. Wolfendale and P. Tripodi (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 3.

⁸⁰ T.M. Jones, "Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An Issue-contingent model," *Academy of Management Review* 16, no. 2 (1991): 372, 374-380.

Individual factors affecting ethical decision-making

Values and beliefs. Socio-economic forces, ethnicity, and religion can all shape values and beliefs acquired in childhood and even into adulthood, and ultimately influence the way in which one lives. Values and beliefs are generally associated with actions which are considered appropriate or inappropriate, which in turn guide decisions and behaviours.⁸¹ The development of an organizational code of ethics, such as the Statement of Defence Ethics and the CF military ethos, is essentially an attempt to capitalize on Canadian society's common values and beliefs and to subsequently shape organizational culture and conduct toward them. This can be effective in general; however, two points are worth noting. First, the development of a code of conduct alone is not sufficient to ensure or enforce ethical behaviour. Second, espousing a specific set of values and beliefs does not always result in the associated behaviour (i.e., moral motivation) because not everyone is motivated to behave morally. For example, a 1965 U.S. study identified that 98% of the respondents believed in equal opportunity yet only 60% acknowledged that they would be willing to accept a black supervisor. Similarly, 97% agreed that people should be judged according to their worth yet only 29% indicated that they would be willing to invite a black family for dinner.⁸² Although the study is dated, others have since confirmed the concept that an individual may profess to adhere

⁸¹ Department of National Defence, *Baseline Assessment of Ethical Values in DND, Phase 1 Report, Ethical Decision-Making in DND: The Development of a Measurement Instrument* (Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation Sponsor Research Report 99-14), 6.

⁸² F.R. Westie (1965) study referred to in Alan L. Lockwood, "Moral Reasoning and Public Policy Debate," in *Moral Development and Behaviour: Theory, Research, and Social Issues*, ed. Thomas Luckona, 317-325 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 317-318.

to a set of values and beliefs, yet the appropriate and associated behaviour does not always follow.⁸³ Sociopaths and psychopaths best demonstrate the disconnect between moral judgement and moral motivation, as they are “capable of complex and correct moral reasoning but never form any intention, or even feel a sense of obligation, to act in accordance with that reasoning.”⁸⁴

Culture and ideology. Differences in culture and ideology can also impact ethical decision-making, particularly in a military environment. For example, when Canadian soldiers are conducting international military operations it can occur that the host nation population does not understand, or even welcome, foreign assistance. Perceiving it as interference, the reception can be further aggravated by the type of mission (i.e., peacekeeping or peacemaking) and the effect that the operation has had on the local population, such as the number of civilian casualties. A negative reaction by the local population could create the perception among soldiers that their efforts, risks, and sacrifices are unappreciated thereby contributing to confusion and frustration. Furthermore, when soldiers are unfamiliar with local culture and customs, particularly those which are very different from their own, they can become prejudiced against the local population. The sense of commitment to the local population, and by extension the mission, can be significantly degraded, the result of which is an increased risk of unethical decisions and actions. It has been suggested that the differences in culture and

⁸³ R.T. LaPiere (1970) study referred to in Edward Lonky, Jacqueline M. Reihman and Ronald C. Serlin, “Political Values and Moral Judgment in Adolescence,” *Youth & Society* 12 (1981): 427; and G. Myrdal (1944) study referred to in Scott Cummings and Charles Wellford Pinnel III, “Racial Double Standards of Morality in a Small Southern Community: Another Look at Myrdal’s American Dilemma,” *Journal of Black Studies* 9, no. 1 (September 1978): 67.

⁸⁴ Linda K. Trevino, Gary R. Weaver and Scott J. Reynolds, “Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review,” *Journal of Management*, 32 (2006): 960.

ideology may have contributed to the failure of the Canadian Forces mission to Somalia, where Canadian soldiers killed four Somalis under questionable circumstances, including the torture and murder of Shidane Arone, a Somali teenager.⁸⁵ This example supports the position that the development and maintenance of an ethical construct is paramount for effectiveness.

Moral Development. Another aspect in understanding how ethical and unethical behaviour occurs is the concept of moral development. There is considerable academic support for the theory that a higher level of individual moral reasoning (through moral development) leads to greater instances of moral behaviour. Simply put, a high level of moral behaviour requires a high level of moral reasoning, because one cannot “follow moral principles if one does not understand or believe in them.”⁸⁶ Based on Kohlberg’s theory, individual moral development is divided into three levels, incorporating six stages. The concept is that people transition from one stage to the next as they mature, with each stage representative of a separate philosophy on how ethical problems should be resolved. Kohlberg also notes that people can generally only comprehend a level of moral reasoning one stage above their own.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ J.P. Bradley (in press), “Psychological Foundations of Unethical Decisions in Military Operations” in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. J. Wolfendale and P. Tripodi (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 7-8; and Department of National Defence, *Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry*, Executive Summary, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/somaliae.html>; Internet; accessed, 10 April 2011.

⁸⁶ Lawrence Kohlberg, “Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive Developmental Approach”, in *Moral Development and Behaviour: Theory, Research, and Social Issues*, ed. Thomas Lickona, 31-53 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 32.

⁸⁷ Department of National Defence, *Baseline Assessment of Ethical Values in DND, Phase 1 Report, Ethical Decision-Making in DND: The Development of a Measurement Instrument*, (Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation Sponsor Research Report 99-14), 6.

Kohlberg's Level 1 (pre-conventional) is generally reflective of the moral development of young children, some adolescents, and many adolescent and adult criminals. Within Level 1, Stage 1 sees moral judgment based on avoiding punishment and Stage 2 the need to satisfy individual desires. In a survey of university students it was identified that 46% reasoned at Stage 2. Level 2 (conventional) is generally reflective of the moral development of most adolescents and adults. Here individuals are conforming to the rules, expectations, conventions, and authorities of society simply because they are the rules, expectations, conventions and authorities of society. A high level of external influence is therefore apparent. At Stage 3, moral development is motivated by the avoidance of rejection, disaffection or disapproval from others. Generally people act in order to gain moral approval and will actually depend on the opinion of their group to reach ethical decisions. At Stage 4, moral development is motivated by ensuring societal obligations are met, thus people will act based on the perceived wishes of others and a desire to comply with those wishes. The same survey of university students identified that 28% reasoned at Stage 3 and 21% reasoned at Stage 4. A study of CF personnel also indicated that the average individual reasoned at level 2 – conforming to rules.⁸⁸ Level 3 (post-conventional) is reflective of a minority of the adult population. At this level, understanding and acceptance of society's rules occurs not because they exist but because there is an acceptance of the underlying moral principles upon which they are based. If there is a conflict between societal rules and the principles, individuals at Level 3 make moral judgements based on the principles and not on societal

⁸⁸ Study conducted by James R. Rest (1994), referred to in J.P. Bradley (in press), "Psychological Foundations of Unethical Decisions in Military Operations" in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. J. Wolfendale and P. Tripodi (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 5.

conventions. At Stage 5, moral reasoning is based on the social contract and at Stage 6 it is based on conscience. The university survey identified that only 1.6% of the students reasoned at Stage 5 while none reasoned at Stage 6.⁸⁹

It is important to note that understanding the relevant moral principle does not always guarantee that it will be correctly applied. Kohlberg argued that moral development went hand in hand with logical reasoning and that in order to have advanced moral reasoning, one required advanced logical reasoning. In fact, an individual can exhibit a higher level of logical reasoning than moral development but not a higher level of moral development than logical reasoning. Thus it is possible that an individual can “reason in terms of principles [but] not live up to them.”⁹⁰ In certain situations, moral judgment can also be motivated by a desire to reach a particular moral conclusion. For example, if an individual has a stake in perceiving a specific act or person as either moral or immoral, they can alter the reasoning process in order to adjust the moral assessment so that it is in line with the desired conclusion.⁹¹

Moral Philosophy. In setting the parameters by which one makes decisions, individual moral philosophy can also shape moral judgment. Some moral philosophies

⁸⁹ Lawrence Kohlberg, “Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive Developmental Approach”, in *Moral Development and Behaviour: Theory, Research, and Social Issues*, ed. Thomas Lickona, 31-53 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 34-35; and Department of National Defence, Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation, *Baseline Assessment of Ethical Values in DND, Phase 1 Report, Ethical Decision-Making in DND: The Development of a Measurement Instrument* (Sponsor Research Report 99-14), 5-6, 9.

⁹⁰ Lawrence Kohlberg, “Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive Developmental Approach”, in *Moral Development and Behaviour: Theory, Research, and Social Issues*, ed. Thomas Lickona, 31-53 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 31-32.

⁹¹ Peter Ditto (et al) study referred to in Valerie F. Reyna and Wanda Casillas, “Development and Dual Processes in Moral Reasoning: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach,” in *The Psychology of Learning and Motivation Vol 50: Moral Judgment and Decision Making*, eds. D. Bartels, D. Bauman, L. Skitka and D Medin, 207-236 (New York: Elsevier Inc, 2009), 210-211.

focus on the consequence of the action while others focus on obligations. For example, utilitarian philosophy supports the idea that decision-making should be based on the consequences which maximize the greatest value for the greatest number of people. Circumstances are taken into consideration and a cost-benefit analysis determines which course of action achieves the greater good. Conversely, Kantian ethics defines right and wrong independently of the good produced. By setting aside consequences, Kant suggests that a course of action is moral if it follows the moral law, even if this leads to bad effects.⁹² Therefore, different philosophies actually result in differing abilities to identify ethical issues and to develop moral conclusions.⁹³

Personality characteristics. In addition to values, culture, moral development and philosophy, there is a significant amount of research that suggests specific individual personality characteristics can also impact ethical functioning. Broadly defined, personality refers to “traits, states, needs, motives, goals, attitudes, interests, determining tendencies, and generalized dispositions of a personal-social character.”⁹⁴ It is generally well known that personality traits are stable and consistent and have a strong influence on how people act. Therefore, it follows that knowledge of personality is critical to understanding why some individuals join the military and some do not, who will succeed and who will not, or who can handle stress and who can not. Some personality traits are

⁹² Julia Driver, *Ethics: The Fundamentals*, (Maine: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 40-41, 80.

⁹³ Department of National Defence, *Influence of Personal Moral Philosophies and Moral Intensity Dimensions on Ethical Decision Making in DND/CF* (Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation Sponsor Research Report 2005-09), S. Dursun, June 2005, 6.

⁹⁴ Norman A. Milgram, “Personality Factors in Military Psychology” *Handbook of Military Psychology*, eds. Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff, 559-572 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991): 559.

admirable and therefore valued. For example, Rest suggested that a high level of empathy for others was related to a higher level of moral sensitivity and ultimately ethical functioning.⁹⁵ Forte and Trevino both discussed the issue of locus of control. The theory is that those who are motivated by an internal local of control (i.e., job satisfaction, self-esteem) are more creative, believe their skills are being utilized to good effect in the organization, and tend to act more ethically. Those who are motivated by an external locus of control (i.e., promotions) believe they are having little impact on the organization, often leave the organization earlier than expected, and are more susceptible to external influences and unethical behaviour.⁹⁶ Finally, Aronson suggested that individuals with a high sense of responsibility and self-efficacy were more confident, action-oriented and therefore more likely to behave ethically, while those with less confidence and self-esteem were more likely to become followers in “ethically-charged situations.”⁹⁷

Conversely, some personality characteristics are less admirable and can lead to instances of unethical behaviour. Examples include social dominance orientation (SDO), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), narcissism, Machiavellianism, and impression

⁹⁵ James R. Rest, “Background: Theory and Research” in *Moral Development in the professions: Psychology and Applied Ethics*, eds. James R. Rest and Darcia Narvaez (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994), 60; and J.P. Bradley (in press), “Psychological Foundations of Unethical Decisions in Military Operations” in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. J. Wolfendale and P. Tripodi (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 5.

⁹⁶ Almerinda Forte, “Locus of Control and the Moral Reasoning of Managers,” *Journal of Business Ethics* 58 (Springer 2005): 65; Linda K. Trevino, Gary R. Weaver and Scott J. Reynolds, “Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review,” *Journal of Management*, 32 (2006): 965; and J.P. Bradley (in press), “Psychological Foundations of Unethical Decisions in Military Operations” in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. J. Wolfendale and P. Tripodi (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 6.

⁹⁷ J.P. Bradley (in press), “Psychological Foundations of Unethical Decisions in Military Operations” in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. J. Wolfendale and P. Tripodi (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 6.

management. Not easily observable, and if they are observed not easily discernable as strong predictors of unethical behaviour, it is important to recognize that these personality traits can flourish within the military environment and can have a significant and deleterious effect on the ethical climate of the CF.⁹⁸

Social dominance theory is the study of how humans tend to organize themselves as group-based hierarchies. The theory integrates elements of several other theories but focuses on the individual (i.e., cultural, ideological and political) factors, as well as the structural (i.e., organizational) factors which effectively drive group-based oppression, most often manifested as discrimination, racism, ethnocentrism, classism, and sexism.⁹⁹ Systemic group discrimination occurs when social ideologies shape the actions of individuals and thus institutions, which in turn legitimize discrimination. The privileged group then behaves as if they endorse the ideology and act more in their own interest than those of the less powerful group. The result is that institutions and powerful individuals disproportionately allocate resources associated with privilege, wealth, and power to the dominant and privileged group, while directing less resources and even undesirable things to the less privileged group.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Dev K. Dalal and Kevin P. Nolan, "Using Dark Side Personality Traits to Identify Potential Failure," *Industrial and Organizational Psychology* 2 (2009): 435.

⁹⁹ According to Pratto, social dominance theory incorporates elements of elite theory, social identity theory, downward comparison theory, realistic group conflict theory, descriptions of colonial and racial dominance in Africa, sexual selection theory, numerous findings in political attitude, and evidence of institutional discrimination in order to explain how such societies create and perpetuate social dominance. Felicia Pratto, *et al*, "The Gender Gap in Occupational Role Attainment: A Social Dominance Approach," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72, no. 1 (1997): 37.

¹⁰⁰ Jim Sidanius, *et al*, "Social Dominance Theory: Its Agenda and Method," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 6 (Dec 2004): 846-847; and Felicia Pratto, *et al*, "The Gender Gap in Occupational Role Attainment: A Social Dominance Approach," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72, no. 1 (1997): 37.

SDO is the individual aspect of social dominance theory, and refers to the extent to which a person desires both intergroup and interpersonal dominance.¹⁰¹ High SDO oriented people have a preference for, and indeed are often drawn to, hierarchical-based organizations rather than equality-based organizations. They are also more likely to be competitive and will place a high level of emphasis on achieving economic and social status, personal prestige, and on negotiating themselves into a position of power. Less concerned with others than themselves, they are often cold and unsympathetic, will manipulate others for personal gain, endorse winning over everything else (i.e., ends over means), and promote ideologies and policies which benefit them personally but perpetuate inequality and discrimination. Ultimately, this serves to justify the social superiority of those who are dominant, referred to as hierarchical-enhancing legitimizing myths.¹⁰² Conversely, individuals with a low SDO orientation display the opposite characteristics and tend to favour the less hierarchical-type organizations, ideologies and policies.

Of particular interest to this research is that several studies have also shown that high SDO oriented people can also display little moral restraint. In fact, the higher an individual scores on the SDO scale, the higher they score on Machiavellianism and

¹⁰¹ Felicia Pratto, *et al.*, "Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Political Attitudes," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67, no. 4 (1994): 741-742; and Leanne S. Son Hing, D. Ramona Bobocel and Mark P. Zanna, "Authoritarian Dynamics and Unethical Decision Making: High Social Dominance Orientation Leaders and High Right-Wing Authoritarianism Followers," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92, no. 1 (2007): 68.

¹⁰² Felicia Pratto, *et al.*, "Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Political Attitudes," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67, no. 4 (1994): 742; and International Military Testing Association, 48th Conference held in Kingston, Ontario, 2006, "Assessing the moderating effects of ethical climate on the relation between social dominance orientation and ethical decision making," Major Damian O'Keefe and Dr Leanne Son Hing, <http://www.imta.info/PastConferences/Presentations.aspx?Show=2006>; Internet; accessed March 2011.

psychoticism, and the lower they score on measures of morality.¹⁰³ The link between SDO and morality has also been studied within a military sample, the conclusions of which confirmed a causal link between SDO and self-reported instances of unethical behaviour and that SDO levels predicted past discriminatory and self-serving behaviour.¹⁰⁴ This suggests that those with a high SDO tendency were more unethical than those with lower SDO tendencies. Separate research on SDO and leadership identified that when in a leadership position, those who scored higher in SDO also made more unethical decisions, particularly if they stood to gain in personal power and profit.¹⁰⁵ In essence, those with a high SDO orientation “see the world as a dog eat dog place and – compared with most people – are determined to do the eating.”¹⁰⁶ Of note, a study of Canadian military personnel found that “social dominance was a better predictor of promotion than

¹⁰³ Damian O’Keefe, “Ethical Climate and Leadership: Can Leaders Really Make a Difference?” *Ethical Decision-making in the New Security Environment* (Proceedings from the 7th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership held at Royal Military College of Canada 28-29 November, 2006), eds., Dr Emily J. Spencer and Dr Daniel Lagace-Roy, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 116; and Leanne S. Son Hing, D. Ramona Bobocel and Mark P. Zanna, “Authoritarian Dynamics and Unethical Decision Making: High Social Dominance Orientation Leaders and High Right-Wing Authoritarianism Followers,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92, no. 1 (2007): 68.

¹⁰⁴ Damian F.W. O’Keefe, “Assessing the Moderating Effects of Ethical Climate on the Relation Between Social Dominance Orientation / Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Self-reported Unethical Behaviour,” (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2006), 17-19.

¹⁰⁵ Leanne S. Son Hing, D. Ramona Bobocel and Mark P. Zanna, “Authoritarian Dynamics and Unethical Decision Making: High Social Dominance Orientation Leaders and High Right-Wing Authoritarianism Followers,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92, no. 1 (2007): 67; and Damian O’Keefe, “Ethical Climate and Leadership: Can Leaders Really Make a Difference?” *Ethical Decision-making in the New Security Environment* (Proceedings from the 7th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership held at Royal Military College of Canada 28-29 November, 2006), eds., Dr Emily J. Spencer and Dr Daniel Lagace-Roy, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 117.

¹⁰⁶ Damian O’Keefe, “Assessing the Moderating Effects of Ethical Climate on the Relation between Social Dominance Orientation / Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Self-reported Unethical Behaviour,” (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2006), 81.

[other] traits...”¹⁰⁷ It follows then that leaders, who have a high level of social dominance, and therefore a dispositional tendency to be unethical, can have a significant and negative impact on the ethical climate of the organization. If these personality variables are present in senior and executive officers, the impact on the ethical climate can be even more destructive.

Studies of military populations also confirmed that organizations can actually contribute to the SDO levels either by rewarding or reinforcing certain behaviours and attitudes. For example, a study of cadets at the Royal Military College found that SDO levels increased from year 1, each year, until year 4, and that SDO levels were higher in senior personnel and those with previous military experience than those who had little or no military experience. The deduction here are that the longer an individual is exposed to the military environment, the higher the level of SDO. Together, this supports a key conclusion of social dominance theory that institutional discrimination is a key factor in creating, maintaining, and re-creating systems of group-based hierarchy.¹⁰⁸

RWA is another personality variable which is associated with unethical behaviour. Individuals with a high RWA orientation have personalities which feature a high degree of submissiveness and a high level of aggressiveness in support of authority

¹⁰⁷ Lisa Noonan, “Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as Predictors of Tolerance and Ethical Behaviour in Military Police Applicants and Job Incumbents,” (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2010), 21.

¹⁰⁸ Adelheid A.M. Nicol, Danielle Charbonneau and Kathleen Boies, “Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation in a Canadian Military Sample,” *Military Psychology* 19, no. 4 (2007): 239 ; and Lisa Noonan, “Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as Predictors of Tolerance and Ethical Behaviour in Military Police Applicants and Job Incumbents,” (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2010), 21.

figures and institutions.¹⁰⁹ As a result, several characteristics of the high RWA individual have been identified. First, those who score high on RWA are highly dutiful and deferent to authority. This means they will follow directions, even if those directions are discriminatory or unethical, simply because they have been directed to do so by an authority figure. They will also staunchly defend the authority figure, even if they engage in illegal or unethical behaviour. Second, the high RWA is extremely ethnocentric, with an additional intolerance for women and homosexuals. This alone causes them to shape their world view in terms of in-groups and out-groups, and can leave them highly vulnerable to unscrupulous manipulators. Third, RWAs are very conservative, self-righteous, and lack self-awareness. They see themselves as having a very high level of integrity, no faults, and believe their attitudes and behaviour are morally justified.¹¹⁰ The high RWA thinking process has also been described as illogical. For example, the high RWA uncritically accepts conclusions which support their beliefs, and indeed believe anything the authority figure tells them. They also compartmentalize information so that their own ideas and those essentially copied from authority figures

¹⁰⁹ Bob Altemeyer, *The Authoritarians*, (2006), 9. E-book sourced at http://members.shaw.ca/jeanalatemery/drbob/The_Authoritarians.pdf; Internet; accessed 11 March 2011.

¹¹⁰ Adelheid A.M. Nicol, Danielle Charbonneau and Kathleen Boies, "Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation in a Canadian Military Sample," *Military Psychology* 19, no. 4 (2007): 240-241; Chris G. Sibley, Andrew Robertson and Marc S. Wilson, "Social Dominance Orientation and Right-Wing Authoritarianism: Additive and Interactive Effects," *Political Psychology* 27, no. 5 (2006): 756; Leanne S. Son Hing, D. Ramona Bobocel and Mark P. Zanna, "Authoritarian Dynamics and Unethical Decision Making: High Social Dominance Orientation Leaders and High Right-Wing Authoritarianism Followers," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92, no. 1 (2007): 68-69; Bob Altemeyer, *The Authoritarians*, (2006), 9. E-book sourced at http://members.shaw.ca/jeanalatemery/drbob/The_Authoritarians.pdf; Internet: accessed 11 March 2011; and Lisa Noonan, "Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as Predictors of Tolerance and Ethical Behaviour in Military Police Applicants and Job Incumbents," (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2010). 13.

remain separated, which can lead to inconsistency, double standards and hypocrisy on a particular issue, without the high RWA individual even realizing it.¹¹¹

A correlation between RWA and the military environment has also been identified. Specifically, military cadets scored higher on the RWA scale than civilian university students, and higher levels of RWA were also found in members of the Canadian Army than in the Navy and Air environments, but on average 25% of all CF members surveyed held negative views on diversity.¹¹² The study of Royal Military College cadets previously mentioned also identified that over their four-year course of studies the cadets became more negative toward immigrants and other out-groups as a result of group socialization. This internalization of the attitudes and beliefs of the senior cadets was achieved primarily through the promotion of junior cadets to positions of authority by the senior cadets. This in turn shaped their understanding of the institutional norms – effectively institutional discrimination.¹¹³ What these studies demonstrate is that the military culture of enforcing obedience to authority and established rules, and subsequently rewarding that behaviour with promotions, may be inadvertently laying the foundation for unethical behaviour.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Bob Altemeyer, *The Authoritarians*, (2006), 75-95. Ebook sourced at http://members.shaw.ca/jeanalatemery/drBob/The_Authoritarians.pdf; Internet: accessed 11 March 2011; and Lisa Noonan, “Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as Predictors of Tolerance and Ethical Behaviour in Military Police Applicants and Job Incumbents,” (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2010), 13.

¹¹² Adelheid A.M. Nicol, Danielle Charbonneau and Kathleen Boies, “Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation in a Canadian Military Sample,” *Military Psychology* 19, no. 4 (2007): 241; and Lisa Noonan, “Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as Predictors of Tolerance and Ethical Behaviour in Military Police Applicants and Job Incumbents,” (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2010), 14.

¹¹³ Lisa Noonan, “Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as Predictors of Tolerance and Ethical Behaviour in Military Police Applicants and Job Incumbents,” (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2010), 21-22.

Although SDO and RWA are two separate personality variables, the existence of both variables in one individual, referred to as a ‘double high’, or in a supervisor-subordinate combination, can create a “lethal union” for unethical behaviour.¹¹⁵ Individuals identified as ‘double high’ express the worst of both variables, in that they show even higher levels of ethnocentrism, racism, and homosexual prejudice than those simply high in SDO or RWA. Therefore, the ‘double high’ individual is not only power hungry, unsupportive of equality, manipulative, and amoral (essentially the SDO qualities), but is also religiously ethnocentric and dogmatic (the RWA qualities). Several studies also identified a significant connection with unethical behaviour when SDO and RWA personality variables are present in a supervisor-subordinate relationship.¹¹⁶ Specifically, the acquiescence of the high RWA to authority was actually context-dependent, in that when the RWA was in a leadership role or in partnership with another high or low RWA, or even a low SDO, more (but not all) ethical decisions were made. However, when a high RWA subordinate was partnered with a high SDO supervisor, *significantly* higher instances of unethical decision-making were reported.¹¹⁷

In a study designed to assess if the existence of an ethical climate, through supervisor behaviour and the enforcement of rules, could mitigate instances of unethical behaviour in high SDO and high RWA military personnel, it was determined that the

¹¹⁴ Adelheid A.M. Nicol, Danielle Charbonneau and Kathleen Boies, “Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation in a Canadian Military Sample,” *Military Psychology* 19, no. 4 (2007): 241.

¹¹⁵ Leanne S. Son Hing, D. Ramona Bobocel and Mark P. Zanna, “Authoritarian Dynamics and Unethical Decision Making: High Social Dominance Orientation Leaders and High Right-Wing Authoritarianism Followers,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92, no. 1 (2007): 68-69.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 79.

perception of a strong ethical climate resulted in fewer instances of unethical behaviour in low SDO and low RWA individuals. The perception of a weak ethical climate in low SDO and low RWA individuals resulted in only slightly more instances of unethical behaviour; however, the perception of a weak or strong ethical climate had no impact on the behaviour of high SDO and high RWA individuals. Therefore, high SDO and high RWA individuals are likely to behave unethically regardless of their perception of the ethical climate.¹¹⁸ This tendency has ominous implications for the CF senior officer selection process and its lack of psychometric testing.

All of the studies assessing SDO and RWA within a military environment are important when considering how improvements can be made to the senior officer selection process, particularly since SDO and RWA individuals are drawn to the hierarchical nature of the military environment and, as has been shown, that the military environment can actually nurture levels of SDO and RWA thereby contributing to increased instances of unethical behaviour. However, this study is particularly concerning given the importance of senior officer responsibilities in developing and maintaining an ethical climate. If, regardless of the level of ethical climate, high SDO and high RWA individuals continue to participate in a significantly higher level of unethical behaviour, it would seem prudent that there should exist a mechanism to identify these personality attributes and to screen them out.

¹¹⁸ Damian O’Keefe, “Assessing the Moderating Effects of Ethical Climate on the Relation between Social Dominance Orientation / Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Self-reported Unethical Behaviour,” (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2006), 78-79; and Major Damian O’Keefe and Dr Leanne Son Hing, “Assessing the moderating effects of ethical climate on the relation between social dominance orientation and ethical decision making,” International Military Testing Association, 48th Conference held in Kingston, Ontario, 2006; <http://www.imta.info/PastConferences/Presentations.aspx?Show=2006>; Internet; accessed March 2011.

Narcissism is another personality variable which has been linked to unethical behaviour. Narcissists are extremely self-centered, exploitative, and have a superiority complex, as well as a strong drive for success, power and recognition. They also believe that they are highly intelligent and unique, and have high levels of confidence, arrogance, and optimism.¹¹⁹ Psychologists suggest that a certain level of narcissism is necessary for success and to function as a leader; indeed a healthy dose of narcissism creates confidence in an organization and provides opportunity for subordinates to learn and advance. However, some situations can over-stimulate the narcissistic processes, which results in situations where leaders effect change and implement programs and policies that are self-promoting, but do nothing for the organization. In large organizations, the danger signs of narcissism are often missed until the narcissist crashes, often in a spectacular and public fashion.¹²⁰

Narcissism has also been associated with charisma, wherein the combination can lead to greater instances of manipulation and abuse of power. Charisma is generally perceived as the ability of superiors to communicate, inspire and interact with their subordinates – effectively a gift found in only a few extraordinary leaders. However, charismatic leadership can take two different orientations: a socialized orientation, where the charismatic leader acts with altruistic motives and serves the best interests of the group (i.e., transformational leadership), or a personalized orientation, where the charismatic leader acts in their own self-interest (i.e., pseudo-transformational

¹¹⁹ Benjamin M. Galvin, David A. Waldman and Pierre Balthazard, “Visionary Communication Qualities as Mediators of the Relationship Between Narcissism and Attributions of Leader Charisma” *Personnel Psychology* 63, (2010): 510.

¹²⁰ Manfred F.R. Kets De Vries, *Leaders, fools and impostors: Essays on the Psychology of Leadership* (California: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1993), 33-36.

leadership).¹²¹ Joseph Stalin, Adolph Hitler and Saddam Hussein are excellent historical examples of charismatic leaders who were unhealthy narcissists. Given the importance placed on transformational leadership in the CF as the standard of professionalism, an element of which is charismatic leadership, as well as the organizational importance placed on the reward systems, one could argue that the military environment can actually perpetuate narcissistic behaviour and influence charismatic orientation.¹²²

Before concluding this section on personality characteristics, a short comment on Machiavellianism and impression management and the link to SDO and RWA is necessary. Machiavellianism is a personality variable characterized by cynicism, a lack of concern for others, and use of manipulation, deception and opportunism to gain power. While it has already been mentioned that those who score high in SDO also score high in Machiavellianism, it is important to note that a moderate link has also been identified in a military population study.¹²³ Impression Management is presenting one's actions in a more positive manner than they actually are. For example, if competing for a highly attractive position, impression management responses can override the predisposition of the individual to respond truthfully. The same study of a military population noted that impression management scales predicted a greater likelihood of obeying an unlawful

¹²¹ Benjamin M. Galvin, David A. Waldman and Pierre Balthazard, "Visionary Communication Qualities as Mediators of the Relationship Between Narcissism and Attributions of Leader Charisma," *Personnel Psychology* 63, (2010): 510-512

¹²² Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy-Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 67-71.

¹²³ Lisa Noonan, "Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as Predictors of Tolerance and Ethical Behaviour in Military Police Applicants and Job Incumbents," (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2010), 17; and Damian O'Keefe, "Assessing the Moderating Effects of Ethical Climate on the Relation between Social Dominance Orientation / Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Self-reported Unethical Behaviour," (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2006), 16.

command, discrimination, and acting in one's self-interest.¹²⁴ The link between impression management and SDO was also significant, in that impression management moderated SDO and levels of discrimination, favouritism, and acting in one's self-interest; suggesting that high SDO and high impression management people are aware of their discriminatory attitudes and self-serving attitudes and wish to hide them.¹²⁵ From this we can conclude that the hierarchical and rewards-based nature of the military environment could also promote Machiavellianism and impression management personality variables, both of which have been linked to SDO and increased unethical behaviour.

To summarize, there are many individual factors which can effect ethical decision-making. Moral philosophy, moral development, individual personality characteristics, and personal values and beliefs are just a few of the more studied aspects and which are known to have an impact on moral reasoning. Of particular interest to this research is the impact that individual factors, and in particular personality variables, can have on moral reasoning. Relatively stable and consistent over time, admirable personality variables, such as empathy and a sense of responsibility can have a positive influence on ethical behaviour. However, less admirable personality variables, such as Machiavellianism, impression management, narcissism and charisma, have all been directly linked to greater instances of unethical behaviour and decision-making.

Furthermore, studies regarding SDO and RWA have demonstrated that there exists a

¹²⁴ Lisa Noonan, "Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as Predictors of Tolerance and Ethical Behaviour in Military Police Applicants and Job Incumbents," (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2010), 68-69.

¹²⁵ Lisa Noonan, "Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as Predictors of Tolerance and Ethical Behaviour in Military Police Applicants and Job Incumbents," (PhD thesis, University of Guelph, 2010), 77-78.

significant link between these personality variables and instances of unethical behaviour and decision-making in a military environment. On a positive note, personality variables can be identified through appropriate psychometric screening mechanisms thereby providing insight into individual character aspects, particularly those which may lead to unethical behaviour. Therefore, it is possible for an organization to reduce individual and organizational risk by taking steps to identify those variables in individuals and leaders.

Situational factors affecting ethical decision-making

In 1991, Jones proposed an ethical decision-making model which suggested that it was not individual characteristics, values and beliefs, or the moral philosophy of the individual which predicted ethical decision making, but rather it was the moral dimensions of the situation. According to Jones, a moral decision was based on the level of moral intensity, as determined by six characteristics: magnitude of the consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity of the issue to the individual, and the concentration of effects.¹²⁶ Of the six characteristics, social consensus, that being what society deems as good or bad, has been identified as the

¹²⁶ Jones further explained these characteristics: magnitude of consequences refers to the level of harm, in either scale or scope (i.e., death over injury) in comparison to the benefit. Social consensus refers to the level at which society deemed the act or behaviour good or bad. Probability of effect is the level of probability that the act and consequence will actually occur, while temporal immediacy is the length of time between the act and the consequence. Proximity refers to the social, cultural, psychological or physical proximity of the decision-maker to the consequence and finally, concentration of effect refers to the scale and scope of the consequence (i.e., 10 people lose \$10,000.00 each or 10,000 people lose \$10.00 each. T.M. Jones, "Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An Issue-contingent model," *Academy of Management Review* 16, no. 2 (1991): 372, 374-380; and Department of National Defence, *Baseline Assessment of Ethical Values in DND, Phase 1 Report, Ethical Decision-Making in DND: The Development of a Measurement Instrument* (Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation Sponsor Research Report 99-14), 7-8.

soundest predictor of ethical judgement.¹²⁷ Jones also argued that as each of these characteristics increased so did the level of moral intensity. He also confirmed that there was a direct relation between the level of moral intensity and each of the first three steps of Rest's moral decision-making process - moral recognition, moral evaluation and moral intention.¹²⁸

Zimbardo also argued that the power of situational forces, in certain settings, could transform good people into unethical and even evil perpetrators. His experience with the Stanford Prison Experiment demonstrated that good people could be seduced into behaving in ways that led to irrational, stupid, self-destructive, and even immoral behaviour. In fact, he argued that “any deed that any human being has ever committed, however horrible, is possible for any of us – under the right or wrong situational circumstances.”¹²⁹ History is rife with examples which demonstrate how powerful the situation can be in influencing an individual to act in way they might not otherwise - the successful take over of Germany by Nazi ideologists may be the best historical example of this. It could even be argued that the Canadian case of Capt Robert Semrau, who killed an unarmed and severely wounded Taliban fighter during a patrol in Afghanistan, demonstrates how situational factors can influence ethical decision-making.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Department of National Defence, Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation, *Influence of Personal Moral Philosophies and Moral Intensity Dimensions on Ethical Decision Making in DND/CF* (Sponsor Research Report 2005-09), S. Dursun, June 2005, 6.

¹²⁸ T.M. Jones, “Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An Issue-contingent model,” *Academy of Management Review* 16, no. 2 (1991): 372, 374-380.

¹²⁹ Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, (New York: Random House Trade Paperback Edition, 2008), 211.

¹³⁰ Capt Robert Semrau was acquitted of murder after an alleged mercy killing of an unarmed and severely wounded Taliban fighter during a patrol in Afghanistan in October 2008. Capt Semrau was found guilty of disgraceful conduct and released from the CF. Michael Friscolanti and John Geddes, “Capt.

Systemic factors affecting ethical decision-making

The “bad apples – bad barrels” theory alluded to earlier suggests that organizations most often credit mistakes and unethical behaviour to a few ‘bad apples’ in order to isolate the incident and deflect blame. Instead, organizations should look internally and identify those systemic aspects which contribute to the ‘bad barrel’ which, when coupled with individual or situational factors, can affect ethical decision-making.¹³¹ Other research supports this theory that inherent organizational characteristics and social processes can actually raise the risk of unethical behaviour, thereby negatively impacting the overall ethical climate. When applied in the context of a military culture, it could be argued that some of the most valued organizational characteristics are actually those which pose the highest risk for unethical behaviour. For example, the hierarchical and rules-based construct, the nature of the reward system, and the focus on rapid-decision making and mission success are all necessary for organizational and operational success, but if not managed appropriately through effective role modelling can impact decisions and actions to the point where there is a risk of unethical behaviour. Furthermore, the importance placed on teamwork and group cohesion, also necessary for operational success, can perpetuate group processes which undermine ethical decision-making.¹³²

Robert Semrau, ethics, and the ‘soldier’s pact,” *Macleans*, July 26, 2010; <http://www2.macleans.ca/2010/07/26/a-stern-message/>; Internet; accessed 2 March 2011.

¹³¹ Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*,” (New York: Random House Trade Paperback Edition, 2008), 10.

¹³² J.P. Bradley (in press), “Psychological Foundations of Unethical Decisions in Military Operations” in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. J. Wolfendale and P. Tripodi (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 6.

Hierarchical and rules-based structure. Probably the most obvious characteristic of any military organization is its hierarchical nature. Based on a strict rank structure, the military separates individuals by officers and non-commissioned members and by rank within each of these categories. The hierarchical structure is then used to define authority and responsibility, enforce discipline, enable organizational effectiveness, and manage the complex array of systems representative of the defence organization. Inherent in this construct is the expectation that the rules, regulations and directions will be applied without question. Obedience and deference to regulations and orders is also extended to obedience and loyalty to the chain of command through the CF military ethos. Wolfendale argued that this type of military culture actually promoted totalitarianism, authoritarianism, conservatism, and was anti-individualistic, all of which are counter to the societal values represented in the ethos and which could result in the development of traits “that could be highly problematic in everyday life.”¹³³ Therefore, instead of promoting a culture of moral reflection and moral autonomy, the structure appears to demand moral deference. Furthermore, there is a concern that enforcing a strict rules-based construct may result in individuals habitually looking for a rule to apply to a specific situation instead of engaging in moral reflection. Given that research supports the theory that “moral reflection is a precursor to moral action,” it follows then

¹³³ Jessica Wolfendale, *Torture and the Military Profession*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 128-129; and J.P. Bradley (in press), “Psychological Foundations of Unethical Decisions in Military Operations” in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. J. Wolfendale and P. Tripodi (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 12.

that an organization which does not promote moral reflection risks an increase in unethical behaviour.¹³⁴

Another important aspect to consider regarding the impact of a rules-based system is the ability of the organization to deal with mistakes. Studies show that in large bureaucratic systems, such as the military, mistakes are not often corrected because the feedback process functions poorly.¹³⁵ As an example, any member of the CF who believes they have been “aggrieved by a decision, act or omission in the administration of the affairs of the CF” has the right to submit the issue for adjudication.¹³⁶ Despite changes instituted in 1998 to improve this process, the CF Grievance Process may still take up to three months to resolve an issue on behalf of a member or, with no upper time limit defined, years. Unfortunately, when a rules-based organization does respond, it often includes increased organizational rigidity, thereby perpetuating the inappropriate behaviour which originally created the problem.¹³⁷

Finally, rules-based systems can spiral into “error-amplifying decision traps.” Here, a single error is transformed into a much larger problem and any action taken to “correct and cover up [the situation] involves more participants and more actions [which] increase both the amount of deviation and the possibility of discovery. These responses

¹³⁴ J.P. Bradley (in press), “Psychological Foundations of Unethical Decisions in Military Operations” in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. J. Wolfendale and P. Tripodi (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 13–15.

¹³⁵ Diane Vaughan, “The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 25 (1999): 278.

¹³⁶ Department of National Defence, “The Canadian Forces Grievance Process” <http://www.cfga-agfc.forces.gc.ca/gri/gp-rg/index-eng.asp#gtl-dpp>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2011.

¹³⁷ Diane Vaughan, “The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 25 (1999): 278.

to errors are systemic in origin and defeat the goals they are intended to achieve.”¹³⁸ The death of US Ranger Pat Tillman highlights this well. Tillman, a professional football player who gave up his lucrative career to join the US Army, was killed by friendly fire in April 2004; however, given his high profile nature, a cover up was perpetuated by several levels of the chain of command. His family was advised that he had died as a result of enemy fire while charging up a hill in an attempt to force the enemy to withdraw. Because he had ostensibly saved the lives of several of his fellow soldiers in this daring feat, the cover up also included the posthumous awarding of the Silver Star, the third highest US honour for valour. Five weeks later, after significant media attention and several leaks, information was released which confirmed that he had been killed by friendly fire and that an extensive cover-up had been perpetrated.¹³⁹

Reward-based systems. Perhaps ironically, reward systems are another systemic factor which can promote unethical behaviour. Certainly most organizations, including the military, use reward systems to promote good performance. On the surface this might seem effective; however, when there is a perception that getting promoted equates to success and not getting promoted equates to failure, or there is an expectation that a solid performance in an operational environment such as Afghanistan will automatically result in a prestigious commendation, unhealthy competition and rivalry can result. A careerist who is ambitious, dedicated, and focused on personal advancement is not intrinsically

¹³⁸*Ibid.*

¹³⁹ MSNBC News, Associated Press, “Rumsfeld defends himself in Tillman testimony: Ex-defense chief admits missteps after Ranger’s death, denies cover-up,” 1 August 2007; http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20056399/ns/us_news-military/; accessed 16 March 2011; and CBS News, 16 Aug 2010; “Pat Tillman’s Mom: McChrystal Helped in Cover-Up,” 16 August 2010; <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/08/16/earlyshow/main6777262.shtml>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2011.

immoral or flawed. In fact the desire to develop professionally and assume greater levels of responsibility is perfectly normal and even admirable. What is not admirable is the use of immoral means to achieve those career goals and aspirations – often referred to as careerism. Therefore, when the emphasis is placed on the outcome (i.e., the promotion or commendation) and not on the means, people may be more susceptible to unethical behaviour in order to reach their goals.¹⁴⁰ Obvious examples include lying and cover-up activity, improper contracting, sabotaging another's work, and even cultivating disingenuous personal relationships in order to advance one's career. The more complex examples include "ticket-punching" or positioning oneself for career advancing courses and jobs, not for the good of the organization but for personal gain.¹⁴¹ The existing CF environmental succession planning processes can be seen to reinforce this by attempting to ensure that captains and majors who have been identified as potential senior and executive officers get all the professional boxes ticked in the right order. Careerism has become endemic within the Canadian Forces. In fact, the 2007 Defence Ethics Survey identified that leadership was the third most concerning issue and part of that was the strong perception that careerism had replaced the traditional leadership values of care for subordinates.¹⁴² English added to the argument when he stated that the explosion of

¹⁴⁰ Linda K. Trevino, Gary R. Weaver and Scott J. Reynolds, "Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review," *Journal of Management*, 32 (2006): 966; and Joseph C. Ficarrotta, "Careerism in the Military Services: A Moral Analysis of its Nature, Types, and Contributing Causes," *Ethics and National Defense: The Timeless Issues*, eds. James C. Gaston and Janis Bren Hietala, 35-55 (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1993), 46.

¹⁴¹ Joseph C. Ficarrotta, "Careerism in the Military Services: A Moral Analysis of its Nature, Types, and Contributing Causes," *Ethics and National Defense: The Timeless Issues*, eds. James C. Gaston and Janis Bren Hietala, 35-55 (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1993), 37, 40-43.

¹⁴² Department of National Defence, *The 2007 Defence Ethics Survey Analysis: Findings for the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence*, (Defence R&D Canada, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis and Director General Military Personnel Research & Analysis, December 2008), Kyle Fraser, 28.

careerism had “transmitted the message throughout the CF that the armed services [existed]...to provide jobs rather than a vocation or calling.”¹⁴³ It follows then that people who are more invested in themselves than in the organization are also less likely to be committed to the other aspects of the institution, such as the CF military ethos.

A rewards-based system must be managed effectively and fairly. Otherwise, in addition to creating unhealthy rivalry, competition, and careerism, it can also result in two other unintended consequences: first, reward systems used to specifically promote ethical behaviour may in fact undermine it; and second, if only weak disciplinary measures are used to thwart unethical behaviour, the impact can be worse than imposing no disciplinary measures at all.¹⁴⁴ By way of example, the author was privy to a situation where a general officer drafted a nomination for himself for the Order of Military Merit and then asked a former supervisor to submit it on his behalf. One of several honours within the Canadian honour system, the Order of Military Merit is issued by the Chancellor, the Governor General, on behalf of Queen Elizabeth II, in a prestigious ceremony at Rideau Hall. Founded in 1972, the Order of Military Merit recognizes “distinct merit and exceptional service displayed by the men and women of the Canadian Forces, both Regular and Reserve...[and] honours them for their commitment to Canada.”¹⁴⁵ The prestige associated with receiving the Order of Military Merit cannot be

¹⁴³ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*, (Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 109.

¹⁴⁴ Linda K. Trevino, Gary R. Weaver and Scott J. Reynolds, “Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review,” *Journal of Management*, 32 (2006): 966.

¹⁴⁵ The Canadian Honours system recognizes achievement and remarkable service. Canadian Orders include the Order of Merit, the Order of Canada, Order of Military Merit, Order of the Merit of Police Forces, the Royal Victorian Order, The Most Venerable Order of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem, and provincial orders. There are three levels to the Order of Military Merit: Commander -

overstated. Unfortunately, the overwhelming desire of some individuals to be so recognized can outweigh not only the intent of the honour, but also one's leadership responsibilities as a role model and ethical steward. In 2008, the above mentioned general officer was invested as an Officer in the Order of Military Merit.

Finally, when an organization appears to reward unethical behaviour it calls into question the entire ethical standard. The promotion of U.S. Army Captain Carolyn Wood and the subsequent awarding of the Bronze Star for valour and a second for her leadership of the US 519th Military Intelligence Brigade in Iraq is an example of this. Capt Wood authorized the new interrogation guidelines used at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq where, under her leadership, Afghan detainees were beaten, sexually assaulted, and even killed.¹⁴⁶ One could also argue that the promotion of Canadian Colonel Serge Labbe is another example. Colonel Labbe was quietly (and retroactively) promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General eight years after the Somalia Inquiry found that he had failed in his duty as a commander when the Task Force Commander to the Canadian mission in Somalia.¹⁴⁷ Under his overall leadership, two Somalis were shot in the back when they breached the Canadian compound after being baited with food and water, and a 16-year old boy was tortured and killed. These examples send a confusing message

recognizing outstanding meritorious service and demonstrated leadership in duties of great responsibility; Officer – recognizing meritorious service in duties of great responsibility; and Member – recognizing exceptional service or performance of duty; <http://www.gg.ca/document.aspx?id=72>; Internet; accessed 14 April 2011.

¹⁴⁶ Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, (New York: Random House Trade Paperback Edition, 2008), 396.

¹⁴⁷ The Ottawa Citizen, "Canadian colonel tainted by Somalia scandal promoted," 25 July 2008; <http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=e3e70b8a-838d-4940-817d-2b768a27ef6d>; Internet; accessed 18 March 2011; and Department of National Defence, *Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry*, The Chain of Command, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/somaliae.html>; Internet; accessed, 10 April 2011.

regarding the ethical responsibilities and expectations of senior officers, the impact of which inadvertently reshapes the ethical climate of an organization.

Mission-oriented focus. The mission-oriented style of the military culture is another systemic factor that needs to be considered, and which extends the careerism ‘ends over means’ conundrum into an operational setting. Identified as one of the four key pillars of organizational success, the concern is that the emphasis placed on mission success may actually increase the risk of unethical behaviour. Specifically, an individual or organization may end up rationalizing any means necessary to achieve the mission. A good example of this is the misconduct at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq where, counter to the Geneva Convention, American interrogators justified the torture and abuse of prisoners as

necessary in order to gain actionable intelligence and save American lives in combat.¹⁴⁸

Coupled with this is the issue of rapid decision-making. A core element of mission success, the concern is that the requirement for rapid decision-making in operations may become the norm even in non-operational settings. This has the potential to result in

¹⁴⁸ J.P. Bradley (in press), “Psychological Foundations of Unethical Decisions in Military Operations” in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. J. Wolfendale and P. Tripodi (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 13; Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy-Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 19-20.

quick decisions in situations where additional thought and moral reflection might be more appropriate.¹⁴⁹

Group processes. Not to be underestimated, group processes can also significantly and negatively impact the ethical decision-making process. Teamwork is used to build cohesion, and both are recurring and important aspects of military effectiveness and the CF military ethos.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, a great deal of emphasis is placed on team building and group cohesion at all levels of the organization. Unfortunately, studies have shown that in the process of building teams and enhancing cohesion, group dynamics can occur which actually increase the risk of unethical behaviour. For example, group dynamics can create specific sub-cultures of elitism, particularly in highly specialized units. Admittedly necessary on some level to enable soldiers to perform to the extreme levels necessary to be effective in their duties; however, the pressure to fit in to these elite and even other military organizations can also cause deindividuation, conformity, groupthink, moral disengagement, and the bystander effect; all of which can increase the risk of unethical behaviour. The leadership challenge and key to mitigating these negative effects is to foster an ethical climate within elite units which does not contribute to them becoming elitist.

¹⁴⁹ J.P. Bradley (in press), "Psychological Foundations of Unethical Decisions in Military Operations" in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. J. Wolfendale and P. Tripodi (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 13; Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy-Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 19.

¹⁵⁰ Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy-Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 48; and Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), 27.

Deindividuation is the process in which an individual suspends their beliefs, inhibitions and behaviours within the anonymity of the group. Any sense of responsibility and accountability for inappropriate or unethical behaviour is effectively dispersed amongst the group, thereby mitigating individual responsibility.¹⁵¹ Conformity occurs when people change their individual behaviour to meet the behavioural norms of the group. More prevalent in specialized groups where cohesion and commitment is already high, the pressure to conform can lead to in-group and out-group distinctions, as well as ethnocentric and xenophobic tendencies.¹⁵² Groupthink is outwardly agreeing with group decisions even though one does not personally support them. It is particularly prevalent when the group thinks it is superior to other groups, people assume that everyone else concurs with a group decision so they feel pressured to concur as well, or when members feel so pressured to conform that they are unable to suggest an alternate view or recommendation. The desired end state of a group in this situation is to preserve the stability of the group and not necessarily to make effective decisions.¹⁵³ Moral disengagement is the suspension of the self-regulating mechanism. This occurs when a person develops a justification for acting in a particular way by recasting it as a moral obligation, a minor behaviour in comparison to others, or by applying labels which remove the moral implication. Deflecting or diffusing the responsibility for a certain consequence, distorting, discrediting or ignoring the destructiveness of the consequences,

¹⁵¹ J.P. Bradley (in press), "Psychological Foundations of Unethical Decisions in Military Operations" in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. J. Wolfendale and P. Tripodi (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 10.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 11.

or dehumanizing the victims are also examples of moral disengagement.¹⁵⁴ Finally, when people fail to intervene in a situation where someone needs help or the behaviour is clearly inappropriate, the bystander effect is at work.¹⁵⁵

In each of these group processes, the individual desire, coupled with the group pressure to fit in and stay within the group is so strong that it can cause an individual to set aside their own moral beliefs and values. When this occurs, the individual becomes willing to watch, participate in, and even justify unethical behaviour that they know to be fundamentally wrong. Furthermore, the desire to maintain the cohesion and stability of the group can also diminish an individual's ability to stop overt and blatantly unethical behaviour, or to speak up before it occurs. One only need to be reminded of the Canadian Airborne Regiment's graphic and racist hazing rituals, the burning of the Duty Officer's car after he chastised them for a loud party in the barracks, and the torture and killing of Somalis to see the power of group dynamics in perpetuating unethical behaviour.¹⁵⁶

To summarize, the hierarchical, rules-based, mission-oriented, and rapid decision-making characteristics of the military structure and operating environment are important aspects that are necessary to ensuring that the Canadian Forces achieves its mission in the defence of Canada and Canadians. The reward system is a necessary element of personal and professional development and is designed to recognize individual and organizational

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁵⁶ Donna Winslow, "Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Two Peace Operations," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 6, no. 3 (Winter 2004): 6, 10; and Department of National Defence, *Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry*, Executive Summary, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/somaliae.html>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2011.

service to Canada and the Canadian Forces. And finally, teamwork and group cohesion are critical elements for organizational cohesion and for mission success. Unfortunately, unless monitored and managed by competent and professional role models and stewards of ethics, these systemic organizational characteristics and group dynamics can eliminate the positive and exacerbate the negative aspects of each, ultimately becoming insidious and destructive to the organization. This will invariably increase the risk of unethical behaviour and contribute to a reshaping of the military ethos.

A review of the activities of the German Reserve Police Battalion 101 in World War II is illustrative of how the interactive nature of the internal (i.e., individual) and external (i.e., situational and systemic) factors discussed in this chapter can impact ethical behaviour. In July 1942, 5000 German soldiers of the Polizei Battalion 101 were ordered to move the men from the Jewish town of Jozefow to concentration camps and to kill the remaining 1800 Jewish women, children, and elderly. When offered the opportunity to be excused from the task, a number of men initially stepped forward and immediately refused to participate in the killings, others apparently hid in the village or in the woods in order to avoid becoming involved; however, the killings proceeded.¹⁵⁷ Reports indicate that over time, more than 90 percent of the men eventually participated in the killings, and some even posed for trophy photos. Eventually, the unit killed more than 35,000 Jews and assisted in the deportation of another 45,000 to death camps.¹⁵⁸ Not selected for any specific characteristic (i.e. self-interest, careerism, Nazism), these men

¹⁵⁷ Bob Altemeyer, *The Authoritarians*, (2006), 231-235. E-book sourced at http://members.shaw.ca/jeanalatemery/drbob/The_Authoritarians.pdf; Internet: accessed 11 March 2011; and Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil* (New York: Random House Trade Paperback Edition, 2008), 285-286;

¹⁵⁸ Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitlers Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1996), 233.

were simply were too old to be drafted into the regular armed forces. When asked later why they had participated in the killing of several thousand Jews, they provided three reasons: one, they had little regard for Jews (moral disengagement); two, they were expected to do the job assigned (high RWA); and three, they stayed out of loyalty and to avoid being seen as weak or cowardly within the group (situational, conformity).¹⁵⁹ Even those who did not participate were bystanders to the events. Ordinary men, not ideological Nazis, chose to become murderers because of the pressure of the situation, individual personality and the power of group processes. By understanding how internal factors, such as personality variables, can be risk factors to ethical decision-making and how external factors, such as situational pressures or the inherent organizational structure and processes, can contribute to unethical decision-making, recommendations can now be made on what steps can be taken to improve the senior officer selection process, thereby mitigating those aspects which pose the greatest risk to the individual and to the organization.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE WAY AHEAD

*“The most virtuous person is [he] who exhibits harmonious psychological functioning”
- Aristotle¹⁶⁰*

¹⁵⁹ Bob Altemeyer, *The Authoritarians*, (2006), 231-235. E-book sourced at http://members.shaw.ca/jeanalatemery/drBob/The_Authoritarians.pdf; Internet: accessed 11 March 2011; and Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, (New York: Random House Trade Paperback Edition, 2008), 285-286.

¹⁶⁰ Julia Driver, *Ethics: The Fundamentals*, (Maine: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 83.

The Defence Ethics Surveys of 2003 and 2007 confirm that the initiatives implemented in the past decade to develop a normative guide to professional conduct and to enforce a standard of personal and professional conduct, have resulted in some improvements in the ethical climate of the Canadian Forces. Despite this progress, recent events and a review of these initiatives reveal that some institutional challenges to the achievement of this objective remain. For example, the Defence Ethics Program is not being fully or wholeheartedly implemented, thus creating the impression that ethics is not an institutional priority; the PER process is being subverted as a valid method of assessing ethics by ineffective supervisors and the environmental succession planning processes; and finally, inherent individual, situational and systemic factors often unintentionally converge in a toxic amalgam to negatively influence desired ethical behaviour.

In this final section, recommendations will be provided as to what can be done to raise the level of emphasis and importance being placed on ethics, and thus contribute to the improvement of the overall ethical climate, particularly at the senior level. Recommendations will also be provided on how to improve the senior officer assessment processes, with a particular focus on professional and ethical performance, and finally on how to improve the senior officer selection process, thus ensuring that only those with the highest moral standards are chosen for the most senior command and institutional positions. Although these appear to be separate issues, they are in reality inextricably linked and must be addressed simultaneously if tangible and timely improvements are to be realized.

Development and maintenance of a strong ethical climate

The importance of a strong ethical climate in organizational success cannot be overemphasized. Organizations which make the mistake of assuming that its members are ethical until an incident occurs which proves otherwise, or assume the existence of policies and programs will naturally result in an ethical organizational climate may be talking the talk but not necessarily walking the walk. Leadership, through role modeling and stewardship, is the key to “creating and implementing a successful ethics programme” and to ultimately achieving a strong ethical climate.¹⁶¹ Leadership is also the key to mitigating many of the systemic organizational processes which are necessary for success but which can also lead to unethical behaviour. Unfortunately, when only a peripheral level of interest or emphasis is placed on ethics at the senior levels, either through the half-hearted implementation of policies and programs or through unacceptable personal behaviour, it sends a message that ethics is not an organizational priority; policies and programs essentially become meaningless. Because, the existence of a strong ethical climate can mitigate many of the influences contributing to unethical behaviour, the continued development of a strong ethical climate must be the first recommendation.

The new measures and initiatives which are currently under development in CRS will be extremely important toward enhancing the overall ethical climate. Not only will they enhance the ability of CRS to “become more demanding” regarding DEP implementation, they will enable CRS to direct wider and more comprehensive substance

¹⁶¹ Colonel Yvon Desjardins, “Canada’s Defence Ethics Programme and Ethics Training,” in *Ethics Education in the Military*, eds. Paul Robinson, Nigel De Lee, and Don Carrick, 67-78 (Burlington, VT, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 67; and Eileen P. Kelly, Alka Bramhandkar, and Hormoz

to Level 1 ethics plans, increase partnering opportunities, enforce the inclusion of ethics in all training courses, and conduct new initiatives.¹⁶² CRS will also gain greater visibility on the ethics-related activities being conducted by Level 1 organizations, as opposed to those activities that have been reported to have been conducted. By enhancing education opportunities, these initiatives will also help members incorporate ethics into the day to day decision-making process both in garrison and operational environments, ideally mitigating the significant effect that situational forces can have on ethical decision-making. Ultimately, these initiatives will serve to ensure that the DEP message is reaching all members of the DND and CF, that there are an increased number of opportunities for individuals to participate in case-based ethical dialogue, and that ethics becomes an integral part of every activity and decision.¹⁶³

Had enforcement initiatives relative to the DEP not already been underway, it would have constituted a larger portion of these recommendations. Indeed a positive step forward; however, it is recommended that a review occurs as soon as practicable in order to determine if these initiatives have been effective in improving the implementation levels of the DEP, or whether even stronger measures are necessary. Furthermore, it is recommended that these initiatives include a tangible method of measuring implementation and that repercussions occur should whole-hearted DEP implementation not materialize. Leadership is the key, and only through a concentrated, comprehensive, and consistent effort that is targeted at the Level 1 role models and stewards of the

Movassaghi, "A Case Study of Ethics and Mutual Funds Mismanagement at Putnam," *Ethics & Behavior* 19, no. 1 (2009): 34.

¹⁶² Mr. Denis Beauchamp, Director Defence Ethics, conversation with author, 1 April 2011.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

organization will the CF ensure that ethics, as an integral part of the culture and attitude of the organization at every level, becomes actualized.

Strengthening the senior officer assessment processes

It is also clear that improvements to the senior officer PER assessment process are necessary. Given the sheer scope and scale of the PER process as it relates to the more than 300 colonels and 89 generals currently serving, and the inherent supervisor characteristics which impact assessment, it is recognized that it is an extremely difficult task to ensure that each and every supervisor employs the PER in a fair and equitable manner. Perhaps a more rigorous application of the CFPAS guidelines by Level 1 PER monitors and a more rigorous review of PERs by the merit boards would force supervisors to comply more closely with the CFPAS guidelines and thus eliminate some of the more common faults. Regular reminders by the CMP staff highlighting these errors and reminding supervisors of the correct procedures will also continue to be required and may remain the most effective method of mitigating some of these challenges.

Despite these inherent challenges with the PER system it remains the only formal method of assessment of senior and executive officers. As such, it could be enhanced to achieve greater efficiency regarding the assessment of professional and ethical conduct with the inclusion of an additional assessment factor which directly measures implementation of the DEP. Or, more practically, refinement of the existing word pictures relative to 'ethics and value' and 'integrity' might suffice. Examples could include, 'conducted 100% annual ethics training in accordance with the Defence Ethics

Program’ or ‘provided regular and comprehensive opportunities for ethics-related dialogue.’ On the positive side, it is a truism that “what gets measured gets done.”¹⁶⁴ When this occurs, as when the merit boards allocated additional points toward promotion for the achievement of a higher fitness level and a higher second language capability, individuals become highly motivated to ensure that they meet the higher assigned standard. Similarly, if senior and executives officers are awarded additional points toward promotion based on how well the DEP is implemented within their area of responsibility, they would become highly motivated to fully implement their Level 1 Ethics Programs. Although this might assist in achieving a higher DEP implementation rate, there is the risk that instead of inculcating ethics as a natural element of day to day activities and decisions, it simply becomes just another task that has to be done but which has no tangible impact on the individual, and by extension the organizational attitude toward ethics.

Just as important as making improvements to the PER system where possible and practicable is ensuring that the existing system is used as intended - and this implies the requirement for a first principles review of the environmental succession planning processes. These environmental processes must be redeveloped so that they are defensible, transparent, consistent, and effective and meet not only the perceived environmental needs, but also the institutional needs. They must also be based on well-defined and bona fide assessment criteria, which are assessed using a valid and defined methodology, and that work in tandem with the PER process to ensure that the CF is a

¹⁶⁴ The Conference Board of Canada, Briefing July 2004, “Measuring the Performance of Corporate Ethics Programs: Creating an Ethics Performance Story,” <http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.aspx?did=750>; Internet; accessed March 2011, 2.

bona fide meritocracy. Furthermore, the new CF succession planning model must not be the only senior officer development mechanism which incorporates ethics as an assessment and selection criterion. Indeed, ethics must also become an inherent element of every environmental succession planning board, at every level.

Clearly the biggest challenge to achieving this objective will be the perceived loss of control by the environmental succession planning boards. To combat this, senior environmental leaders must be made aware that the current processes effectively contribute to several factors which have been shown to undermine ethical behaviour. First, flawed or not, the PER is the mechanism by which officers are assessed, including ethical behaviour. The *ex post facto* use of the PER to ratify succession planning board results is counter to the intent of the entire performance appraisal system. This foments a great deal of frustration and dissatisfaction, which in turn can systematically erode one's individual sense of responsibility, loyalty and duty to the organization, and eventually one's integrity – essentially the CF military ethos. Second, it serves to negatively emphasize several organizational factors associated with unethical behaviour. For example, it promotes careerism through 'ticket-punching' as environmental boards ensure that captains and majors who have been identified as having the potential to reach the rank of general are tagged for command and leadership opportunities several years and ranks ahead of these opportunities. It can also embolden unethical decision-making as a result of the protection (or conversely the lack of protection) of the senior succession planning board members, can negatively contribute to aspects of external locus of control, and can impede moral autonomy in favour of moral deference in order to retain the protection of the board. Finally, the lack of ethics in all but the Air Force

environmental succession planning board perpetuates the attitude that ethics is neither an organizational priority, nor is it a fundamental attribute of a senior officer. Without a comprehensive re-evaluation and transformation of the environmental succession planning processes, the CF succession planning model is essentially a band aid solution to the senior officer selection challenges, in particular regarding the assessment of professional and ethical performance.

Enhancing the CF senior officer selection process

In addressing the issue of ethics and self-regulation among Canadian generals, Major-General (now retired) K.G. Penney noted four ways in which the general officer cadre could self-regulate regarding CF values and obligations: networking, peer support, the use of case studies, and the selection process. Noting that the selection process was “strongly influenced” by serving generals who themselves were products of the current succession planning and selection processes, he argued that individuals should be evaluated on their stewardship of the CF.¹⁶⁵ This meant not only judging an individual based on their ability to get the job done, but also assessing an individual based on the “degree to which one’s methodology [reflected] the values and ethics of the military.”¹⁶⁶ His comment is particularly relevant for the purposes of this research as it speaks to two points: first, based on his experience at the highest levels of the organization there was a need to assess the level of ethical behaviour in senior officers, and second, that general officer performance methodology was not already being assessed on the degree to which

¹⁶⁵ Major-General K.G. Penney, “A Matter of Trust: Ethics and Self-Regulation Among Canadian Generals” in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, eds. Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 155-166 (St Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 162.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

it reflected the values and ethics of the military. Given that the current institutional assessment and succession planning processes appear to be inefficiently and ineffectively assessing ethics, it follows then that any proposed method to assess the level of ethical behaviour in senior officers must be able to measure those aspects which impact moral action. Therefore, contrary to the Williams tiger team conclusion, the final, and perhaps most controversial recommendation, is the incorporation of psychometric testing as part of the CF senior and executive officer selection process. The main purpose would be to identify personality variables which are known risk factors for unethical behaviour. This recommendation will be elaborated upon in some detail.

The use of psychometric tools for the purpose of selection is not new and can be dated as early as 2200 B.C., when the Chinese emperor conducted psychological testing to determine fitness for public office. The idea spread to Europe by the late 18th century and by WWI was being used by the US to in the rapid selection and classification of personnel, in the German Army post WWI to assess and select officers and specialists, and in WWII in Britain and Canada for officer screening and selection processes.¹⁶⁷

Psychological assessments were also used to develop assessment procedures to deal with absenteeism, to screen for individuals who could learn advanced technology, and to identify individuals who could conduct unusual or dangerous assignments, such as

¹⁶⁷ Frank H. Rath Jr and James E. McCarroll, "Clinical Psychological Assessment" in *Handbook of Military Psychology*, eds. Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff, 579-592 (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), 580; Scott Highhouse, "Assessing the Candidate as a Whole: A Historical and Critical Analysis of Individual Psychological Assessment for Personnel Decision Making," *Personnel Psychology* 55 (2002): 364-367; and Geoffrey W. Hayes, "The Development of the Canadian Army Officer Corps 1939-1945" (PhD thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1992), 135-137.

submarine warfare and espionage.¹⁶⁸ The US Office of Strategic Services (the precursor to the CIA) also used psychological testing to “[reveal] aspects of the unconscious that would not be revealed otherwise” in order to identify men and women who would be effective agents.¹⁶⁹

Today, psychometric testing provides organizational, individual and research benefits by attempting to “improve performance by better understanding how people think and behave”¹⁷⁰ Outside of a medical context, psychometric testing is used only in the CF as part of the screening and selection process for individuals in specialty and high-risk employment areas. For more than a decade, it has been recognized that a clinical component through psychometric testing has complemented the other screening and selection tools in assessing competencies for specialty employment. They have also been successfully used in identifying positive personality attributes which will contribute to success and negative attributes which will contribute to failure relative to that specialty employment. Identifying these attributes before training and employment effectively mitigates the risk, not only to the individual but to the organization, of ineffective, inappropriate, or unethical behaviour. In partial recognition of the value of psychometric

¹⁶⁸ Richard Klimoski and Lori B. Zudin, “Psychological Assessment in Industrial/Organizational Settings” in *Handbook of Psychology: Volume 10 Assessment Psychology*, eds. John R. Graham, Jack A. Naglieri, and Irving B. Weiner, 317-339 (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), 318.

¹⁶⁹ Scott Highhouse, “Assessing the Candidate as a Whole: A Historical and Critical Analysis of Individual Psychological Assessment for Personnel Decision Making,” *Personnel Psychology* 55 (2002):368; and Frank H. Rath Jr and James E. McCarroll, “Clinical Psychological Assessment” in *Handbook of Military Psychology*, eds. Ruuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff, 579-592 (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), 369, 371, 581.

¹⁷⁰ Jack A. Naglieri and John R. Graham, “Current Status and Future Directions of Assessment Psychology” in *Handbook of Psychology: Volume 10 Assessment Psychology*, eds. John R. Graham, Jack A. Naglieri, and Irving B. Weiner, 579-591 (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), 582; and Richard Klimoski and Lori B. Zudin, “Psychological Assessment in Industrial/Organizational Settings” in *Handbook of Psychology: Volume 10 Assessment Psychology*, eds. John R. Graham, Jack A. Naglieri, and Irving B. Weiner, 317-339 (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), 319-320.

testing, the Chief Military Personnel has proposed instituting the Trait Self-Descriptive Inventory (TSD) as part of the CF selection process at recruiting centres in 2011. The TSD is designed to assess two key personality factors, conscientiousness and neuroticism, in order to better predict performance in basic training, occupational training and in job performance.¹⁷¹

Several standard psychometric tools have been shown to be reliable and valid tools for the screening of personality, including the Hogan Personality Inventory, the Gordon Personal Profile-Inventory, and the 16 PF (personality factors).¹⁷² However, the most recognized personality assessment tools are based on the dominant trait model of human personality - Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Openness - referred to as the Five-Factor Model (FFM).¹⁷³ Testing and assessing each of these main personality factors and their associated facets individually is important; however, understanding the combinations of factors and facets provides greater insight into personality and behaviour. The Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness Personality Inventory – Revised (NEO-PI-R), and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2

¹⁷¹ Department of National Defence, “Revised Canadian Forces Selection Process,” Director General Military Personnel Research & Analysis, Presentation to Armed Forces Council, 22 January 2010.

¹⁷² Colin M. Gill and Gerard P. Hodgkinson, “Development and Validation of the Five-Factor Model Questionnaire (FFMQ): An Adjectival-based Personality Inventory for use in Occupational Settings,” *Personnel Psychology*, 60 (2007): 735.

¹⁷³ The FFM factors and facets include: Conscientiousness (competence, achievement, self-discipline, and dependability), Agreeableness (trusting, compliance, caring, and gentleness), Neuroticism (the tendency of poor emotional adjustment, and to experience negative affects such as anxiety, insecurity and hostility), Openness (imaginative, nonconforming, unconventional, autonomous), and Extroversion (sociable, assertive, active, positive affects, energy and zeal). John M. Digman, “Personality Structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model,” *Annual Review of Psychology*, 41 (1990): 425-426; and Timothy A. Judge, *et al*, “Personality and Leadership: A Qualitative and Quantitative Review,” *Journal of Applied Psychology* 87, no. 4 (2002): 767.

(MMPI-2) are two of the most commonly used psychometric tools for personnel selection and are regularly used in CF specialty selection processes, each validating the concept that there is a correlation between personality and behaviour. When coupled with a personal history review and a confirmatory clinical interview, the triangulation needed to develop a valid assessment of an individual's personality is achieved. Furthermore, both the NEO-PI-R and the MMPI-2 have embedded scales which can detect random responses, malingering, as well as attempts to present (i.e., fake or impression management) in an overly positive or negative manner.¹⁷⁴ Psychometric scales exist which can test and assess a wide-range of personality variable, including SDO, RWA, Machiavellianism, and impression management – all of which are known risk factors for unethical behaviour. This is significant in that individuals with higher levels of SDO and RWA are known to be drawn to the hierarchical nature of the military, they are prone to significantly higher levels of unethical behaviour, the level of ethical climate has no impact on their behaviour, and the military environment itself can further foment these personality characteristics. The most important aspect of incorporating psychometric testing into the selection process is to identify the competencies or personality variables that require assessment and then allow the subject matter experts to identify the most appropriate screening tools.

The new CF succession planning process will be used to select individual for the most senior command and institutional positions, where one could argue there is the greatest risk to the organization. Unfortunately, despite a previous CF sponsored study

¹⁷⁴ Benjamin J. Morasco, Jeffrey D. Gfeller, and Katherine A. Elder, "The Utility of the NEO-PI-R Validity Scales to Detect Response Distortion: A Comparison with the MMPI-2," *Journal of Personality Assessment* 88, no. 3 (2007): 277.

which identified that the CF selection processes “[fell] short of the standards of other foreign militaries” and that “selection into certain high-risk positions at higher ranks could involve more rigorous procedures,” no additional measures have been incorporated and no corresponding risk mitigation strategy has been applied.¹⁷⁵ Instead, it was essentially recommended away. However, if one considers that the current and future operational environments will continue to generate myriad ethical issues – particularly in a counter-insurgency or irregular warfare environment – and by extension command and institutional leadership challenges, it would seem prudent that the CF would want to take every step possible to ensure that the commanders and institutional leaders who are chosen to lead the organization through this period of complexity are those who are the most ethically fit at the individual and collective level. Given that research consistently indicates that the “most salient predictors of leader derailment... appear to exist in the realm of personality,” the incorporation of psychometric testing in the senior officer selection process that is designed to identify personality variables which could lead to unethical behaviour would appear to provide several advantages.¹⁷⁶

First, it helps mitigate the challenges associated with the assessment of ethics in the annual PER process, as well as the lack (or ineffective method) of assessment of ethics by the environmental succession planning boards. Psychometric testing would provide an empirical approach, as opposed to a subjective observation, to assessing those

¹⁷⁵ Department of National Defence, *An Evaluation of a Competency-Based Approach to Canadian Forces Human Resources*, (Defence R&D Canada and Chief Military Personnel DRDC CORA TN 2008-33, August 2008), 22.

¹⁷⁶ Hege Kornor and Hilmar Nordvik, “Personality traits in leadership behavior,” *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology*, no. 45 (2004): 49; and Matthew J. Del Giudice, “What Might This Be? Rediscovering the Rorschach as a Tool for Personnel Selection in Organizations” *Journal of Personality Assessment* 92, no. 1 (2010): 78.

personality factors which are not as obvious or as well understood, particularly as they relate to the ethical behaviour and integrity. By studying the five-factor model of Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Neuroticism, Openness and Extraversion independently, but more importantly in combination, a clinical psychologist could develop a hypothesis based on these factors and facets regarding the likelihood of ethical or unethical behaviour. Even if a review of the environmental succession planning processes occurs, the incorporation of psychometric testing as an element of selection would provide a more valid method of assessing ethics than the current style of using behavioural indicators captured in word pictures. Ideally, psychometric testing would occur on enrolment and at key stages throughout the officer professional development program, thus allowing for a baseline personality assessment, as well as an assessment of personality trends over a period of time. This is particularly important relative to the identification of personality variables such as SDO and RWA which are known to increase with exposure to the military environment and which pose a significant and increased risk of unethical behaviour.¹⁷⁷

Second, it is a realistic and achievable option, both in the shorter and longer term perspectives. Other than an inherent mistrust and reluctance based on a lack of understanding by the senior military leadership to include psychometric testing in the senior selection processes, there is no systemic or culture bias which must be overcome before proceeding. Education, as well as a demonstration of its usefulness at the lower

¹⁷⁷ Damian O’Keefe, “Ethical Climate and Leadership: Can Leaders Really Make a Difference?” *Ethical Decision-making in the New Security Environment* (Proceedings from the 7th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership held at Royal Military College of Canada 28-29 November, 2006), eds. Dr Emily J. Spencer and Dr Daniel Lagace-Roy, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 117.

ranks (as with the proposed enrolment procedure and specialty selection) will illustrate to the senior leadership that there is little threat to the inclusion of psychometric testing at the higher ranks.¹⁷⁸ Indeed psychometric testing would provide the CF Succession Planning Board with insight on the dispositional factors which might increase the risk of unprofessional or unethical conduct by the senior officer and, contrary to the current process, would actually empower the selection board by allowing it the option of accepting or mitigating the risk of placing a specific individual in a key institutional or command position.

There are also subsidiary advantages to the incorporation of psychometric testing in the senior officer selection process. First, it can identify competencies, as well as areas of personal deficiency upon which personal and professional training requirements can be based. If conducted over time, psychometric testing could also identify progress in these competencies and, in essence, provide the individual with a realistic assessment of their own potential.¹⁷⁹ In this context, psychometric testing directly supports two key components of the new CF Succession Planning model: (1) identifying individuals with the capacity to achieve the identified competencies, and (2) developing them professionally through the enhancement of knowledge, skills and abilities.

Finally, psychometric testing can not only provide an empirical approach to the assessment of competencies related to ethics, but it may also provide an objective approach to the assessment of several of the other 23 competencies identified for senior

¹⁷⁸ Norman A. Milgram, "Personality Factors in Military Psychology" *Handbook of Military Psychology*, eds. Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff, 559-572 (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), 569.

¹⁷⁹ Richard Klimoski and Lori B. Zuckin, "Psychological Assessment in Industrial/Organizational Settings" in *Handbook of Psychology: Volume 10 Assessment Psychology*, eds. John R. Graham, Jack A. Naglieri, and Irving B. Weiner, 317-339 (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), 319, 326-327.

officers. For example, Conscientiousness may provide insight to the competencies of results management (expertise); impact and influence, and action orientation (professional ideology); and initiative (professional ideology). Openness and Extraversion in combination may also provide insight to the competencies of visioning (expertise); creativity (cognitive capabilities); developing self and others, behavioural flexibility, stress tolerance and stress management, and change management (change capacities); and interpersonal relations, partnering, teamwork, communication, conflict management, and service orientation (social capacities).¹⁸⁰ Although additional research is necessary, psychometric testing could further increase the efficiency of several of the assessment mechanisms inherent within the CF succession planning process currently being measured by a competency dictionary. Therefore, as General Penney proposed, it is within the realm of the possible to assess the degree to which an individual's methodology, driven by personality and overall psychological make-up, is likely to reflect the values and ethics of the CF – or conversely, the risk that it will not.

To summarize these recommendations, it is clear that there needs to be a more proactive mechanism to ensure the whole-hearted implementation of the DEP by Level 1 advisors and commanders. The construct of a decentralized and voluntary ethics program is an ineffective way to ensure that one of the most important programs in the CF is implemented to the standards and expectations of the CF military ethos and the Statement of Defence Ethics. Mechanisms which measure implementation and deliver repercussions for non-implementation will also be a critical part of success. Second, it is recognized that eliminating the problems that are inherent in the PER process is difficult;

¹⁸⁰ Thomas A Widiger and Jennifer Ruth Lowe, "Five Factor Model Assessment of Personality Disorder,"

however, at a minimum it may be possible to reinforce existing mechanisms such as the Level 1 PER monitors and the merit boards, in order to ensure that supervisors are consistent, fair and accurate. An additional assessment factor, or even the refinement of an existing assessment factor that is aimed at specifically at assessing the level of compliance with the DEP is sure to improve the level of motivation towards implementing the Level 1 ethics plans. It may also help mitigate some of the challenges with the decentralized aspects of the program. Furthermore, by ensuring that the PER system is used as intended, it will be necessary to conduct a first-principles review of the environmental succession planning processes. Without a consistent, defensible, and transparent environmental succession planning system that is based on valid and well-defined criteria, the PER will continue to be an ineffective method of assessment, careerism and frustration may embolden unethical behaviour, and the new CF Succession Planning board will simply become a band aid solution to the senior and executive selection problems. Finally, the incorporation of psychometric testing in the senior and executive selection process is a realistic option that requires only the education of senior and executive officers as to the value and insight that it can provide to the CF Succession Planning process. This will not only help mitigate the challenges associated with assessing ethics as part of the PER system, but it will contribute to individual development and may increase the overall efficiency of the senior officer selection process. More importantly, the identification of personality variables will identify those personality variables at risk for unethical behaviour and will empower the CF succession planning board in selecting only those individuals who are ethically fit at the individual and collective level, thereby mitigating risk to the organization.

Conclusion

The Canadian Forces has made significant progress in the past decade to improve the overall ethical climate of the organization. New ethics programs, new training tools, and educational initiatives have all been established with a view to ensuring that each and every member of the CF has the opportunity to discuss ethical issues and to consider ethics in every day decision-making. Central to these initiatives is the responsibility of Level 1 commanders and advisors to ensure that a comprehensive ethical program is established and implemented, thereby promoting an ethical climate and providing the opportunity for every member to participate in ethics-related initiatives. However, despite myriad policies and programs, and the best efforts of the CF institutionally to promote ethics and a commitment to a military ethos, there remain several institutional challenges. These include a lack of whole-hearted implementation of the DEP, ineffective assessment mechanisms as part of individual performance evaluations, and an environment succession planning process which not only usurps the PER assessment mechanism, but it does not consistently assess ethics as a criterion for the selection of senior officers. Furthermore, the environmental succession planning process itself contributes, among other things, to careerism, external locus of control; the frustration of which may have a deleterious effect on integrity and embolden unethical behaviour. Finally, the lack of enhanced screening mechanisms to identify personality variables at high risk for unethical behaviour as part of the senior officer selection process was deemed too difficult to implement. The result is that in the absence of further egregious or embarrassing incidents, the CF will continue to proceed along a path where it assumes that its members are ethical and that existing programs are effective in developing and

maintaining an ethical climate. Inevitably, when another incident does occur, the natural, organizational instinct will be to pass it off as an isolated incident, or just another ‘bad-apple,’ thereby negating any institutional responsibility.

Improvements to the implementation aspect of the DEP are underway and are necessary in order to ensure that Level 1 advisors take a greater interest in and place a greater level of priority on ensuring that their ethics implementation plans and ethics programs are effected. Improvements to the annual PER assessment process are more difficult to achieve; however, refining the existing word pictures or including an assessment factor which specifically measures Level 1 compliance with the DEP is sure to improve compliance. A first-principles review of the environmental succession planning processes is critical to resolving many of the issues related to assessments and selection, not the least of which is ensuring common and well-defined criteria, including ethics, are used for the selection of senior officers. This alone is a crucial to reducing many organizational aspects which can contribute to unethical behaviour in the CF and to ensuring tangible, and not just patchwork, improvements are made to the senior officer selection process through the CF succession planning model.

Finally, the identification of individual, situational and systemic factors which can influence CF members to behave in an unethical manner is arguably the most important aspect of ensuring that concrete improvements are made regarding the selection of senior officers. Some factors are necessary and can not be changed, such as the hierarchical and rewards-based nature of the military environment, but the negative side effects can be mitigated through strong role models and stewardship of ethics. Some are unpredictable, such as the situational pressures of international operations, but can be militated against

through regular and effective ethical training programs. Yet other factors are predictable and measurable, such as the personality variables of SDO and RWA, but for which there are no current risk mitigation measures being implemented.

As with high-risk and specialty employment, where there is a known requirement to screen out negative attributes which could lead to inappropriate, unprofessional or unethical behaviour, the CF has the obligation to screen out negative attributes which would lead to inappropriate, unprofessional or unethical behaviour in senior officers. Those who are not ethically resilient enough to overcome the systemic or situation factors which could perpetuate unethical behaviour, and those who have an individual personality predisposition toward unethical behaviour must not be selected for the most senior command and institutional positions. The inclusion of psychometric testing as part of the senior officer selection process will empower the CF succession planning boards by identifying these risk factors, and then provide the opportunity to either accept the risk or mitigate the risk by choosing only those individuals with the ethical disposition commensurate with that senior position. If no enhanced selection measures are implemented, it will only be a matter of time before the individual, situational and systemic forces impacting the CF create another embarrassing situation as a result of ethical shortfalls.

It is inevitable that there will be instances of inappropriate or unethical behaviour in any large organization or bureaucracy. Indeed there is also no illusion that implementing the recommendations contained in this paper will guarantee that no senior officer ever behaves inappropriately again in the future. Rather, the implementation of these recommendations and in particular psychometric testing as part of the senior officer

selection process, will simply allow the CDS of the day to say that every possible precaution against selecting individuals for senior positions who are prone to unethical behaviour has been implemented. Given the cost in credibility, reputation and support that such behaviour incurs, not to mention the intrinsic negative organizational impact, the cost benefit analysis seems quite simple. Instead of rationalizing it as being too difficult or something that the CF cannot afford to do in terms of resources, time, and energy, it should be asserted forcefully that it is simply something that the CF can not afford *not* to do.

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