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FUTURE CHAOS: HOW THE CANADIAN MILITARY CAN CONTINUE MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL SECURITY INTO 2040

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Master of Defence Studies

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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
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MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES - MAITRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

**Future Chaos: How the Canadian Military can Continue Meaningful Contribution to
Global Security into 2040**

By / Par Maj Ryan Jurkowski

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Abstract

To remain a viable global actor through the future chaos of the world as it continually shifts power balances, Canada must recognize itself as a middle power and capitalize on all that has to offer. Specifically, Canada must act in a manner that is responsive to the majority of her allies while concurrently ensuring her own security – this must be achieved through applying government resources to a region or regions that have the greatest potential to negatively affect Canada and her allies in the decades to come while also ensuring Canada does so through appropriate institutions available to middle powers. Through establishing set criteria to examine regions that will present the greatest threat to Canada and her allies, those regions most prone to violence and instability will be examined in greater detail. From that study, one region will present itself as most likely to present a threat to Canada and her allies – Sub-Saharan Africa. Through an additional level of analysis, regional and extra-regional actors operating in Sub-Saharan Africa will be looked at to see how Canada can best apply herself to remain a viable actor through the future security environment.

List of Abbreviations

ASEAN	Aisa's Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
ASF	African Standby Force.
AFRICOM	Africa Command, one of six US Regional Combatant Commands.
AU	African Union.
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency.
CF	The Canadian Forces.
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration.
DFAIT	Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DFS	The UN's Department of Field Support.
DMILAD	Deputy Military Advisor.
DoS	US Department of State.
DoD	US Department of Defence.
DPKO	The UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
EU	The European Union.
EUMS	Europe's European Union Military Staff.
EUFOR	Europe's European Force.
ECOMOG	ECOWAS's security arm, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group.
ECOWAS	West Africa's regional Economic Community, the Economic Community of West Africa States.
HDI	The UN's Human Development Index.
ISAF	NATO's mission to Afghanistan, the International Security Force.
MERCOSUR	South America's Southern Common Market.

MILAD	Military Advisor.
MilObs	The UN's Military Observers, also known as UNMOs.
MONUC	United Nations Mission to the Congo.
MTAP	Canada's Military Training Assistance Program.
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
OAS	Organization of American States.
OAU	The now defunct Organization of African Unity.
OECD	The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
OGDs	Other Governmental Departments.
P5	The UN's Permanent Five on the Security Council – the US, the UK, Russia, China and France.
PBC	The UN's Peacebuilding Commission.
PSO	Peace Support Operations, a generic term to describe all manners of Peace-related operations ranging from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding.
R2P	Responsibility to Protect.
SSR	Security Sector Reform.
UN	The United Nations.
UNCLOS	The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas.
UNMEE	United Nations Mission Ethiopia Eritrea.
UNNY	United Nations New York, also known as United Nations Headquarters, which is also known as UNHQ.
UNSC	United Nations Security Council.
USAID	The United States Agency for International Development.
WoG	Whole of Government, also know as the comprehensive approach.

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Introduction

In general...Canadian governments prefer to act in an *ad hoc* manner and are reluctant to enter into permanent and highly institutionalized security arrangements...Ironically then, Canadian identity and security culture represent an obstacle to security cooperation...

– Osvaldo Croci, Professor of International Politics,
Memorial University.¹

The world today is in a period of transition whose globalization is unprecedented. Although events in one part of the world have impacted other parts of the world in the past, the reality is that this now occurs much more rapidly through our globalized world. It is in this environment where one state's instability, whether it be through any factor ranging from porous borders to poor human development, can not only threaten its neighbours, but has the potential to threaten states far removed from them. Further, these changes can occur very rapidly with little-to-no warning. In a best case scenario, such an imbalance may only create a small increase in gas or food prices, but in more dire circumstances, transnational terrorism or global recession can occur.

With such alacrity and the close nature of the world, security challenges become more complex than previously experienced. Nations are now faced with herculean tasks of not only protecting their own borders, but also in engaging the world through so called pre-emptive security, which can manifest itself in anything from diplomacy, aid or engagement in multilateral security organizations. It is therefore crucial that modern states have comprehensive, robust and flexible plans and strategy to protect their citizens while respecting the values and interests of their people.

¹ O. Croci, "Canada: facing up to regional security challenges" in *National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance* ed Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 127 – 151 (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 145.

Canada is no different. Canada must endeavour to create lucid and realistic security policies that address three critical components: addressing the security of her people; the interests of her people; and the interest of her allies so long as they do not conflict with the aforementioned. To do so, there are some fundamental facts that must be respected – Canada cannot look after her security alone given her size, Canada cannot have a contingency for every possibility given the reality of finite resources and Canada cannot fail in her task of protecting her citizens. Therefore, Canada must look to regions in the world where her comprehensive approach to security can be meaningfully engaged while also continuing to be a positive influence to the international community.

Therefore, Canada must look to regions that can have the greatest impact to their security. Although more challenging to investigate regions rather than individual states, this approach is important to ensure a holistic approach to security, even more so with the interwoven nature of the world today. Although single, or multiple states, may be a key contributor to one region's stability or instability, a comprehensive analytical approach must be undertaken to best understand impacts of actions taken, or not taken, to address underlying regional issues. Although simplistic, gas prices represent this requirement. Issues in one state or region can impact the global or regional cost of gas. Another example is that of the social issues surrounding North American drug use. Through a US and Canadian insatiable drug appetite, an entire network originating in Latin America transiting through Central America and the Caribbean creating violent and imbalanced governance, security and social issues along its path. Indeed, it is through studying a region's stability and its impact on localized and consequent global governance and security where plans can be drawn to protect ones nation through managing issues within the troubled region, or regions – in essence, undertaking pre-emptive security measures.

Myriad factors contribute to why and how a state or a region's instability can impact others. However, three critical factors emerge as a commonality: issues that lead to violence; regional history of violence; and the impact of external influences to any given region. Although violence is in itself as old as humankind, through studying the manner conditions that create violence and how that violence manifests itself is the first critical step in determining where a region may become, or remain, unstable. Indicators, such as low median age of populations, poverty and lifespan become the first warnings of instability. Such datasets are easily attainable and have been collected by numerous organizations for the past decades such as the United Nations (UN) with their Human Development Index (HDI). Indeed, it is through these manner of factors whereby individual and collective human security fail. With that failure often comes rectification to fix those wrongs or become a tool for a proxy state or organization to do their bidding. The critical component to assist in determining the status of a regions stability who may be suffering from such issues, a history of violence must be considered to best predict if that violence will remain contained as intrastate violence or permeate across borders or regions into interstate violence. If a region is indeed prone to violence, and indicators are present that violence may erupt, or not wane, a final study must be conducted to determine what external actors are engaged in the region and why they are there – for good or for bad.

These factors have developed into three areas recently gaining much momentum with regards state, regional and global security that will remain themes for the remainder of this paper. First is the concept of collective security, which has existed in the past and is routinely reinforced through various security such as The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), political, such as Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and

hybrid political-security organizations such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Next is a concept only being used by a few organizations to date – Security Sector Reform (SSR). Although this will be dealt with in Chapter 4 in greater detail, it is essentially the concept that security and stability comes not only from the military, but from collection of political, military, economic and social agencies designed to address human security.² Finally is the methodology to actually conduct SSR – the comprehensive approach that sees numerous actors from various backgrounds engaged to solve the root cause of issues within failed or failing states. Within the UN, this is referred to as the integrated mission model while in Canada, it is the Whole of Government (WoG) approach.

Therefore, by using these three salient factors, Canada can then examine regions to determine what, if any, actual threats will violate her security apparatus, which includes that of her allies and, most critically, her citizens. It is acknowledged to establish a comprehensive and detailed account of all factors involved in establishing a nation's security agenda is a challenge and certainly beyond the purview of any single author, let alone a single paper. However, this paper will endeavour to provide a baseline analysis covering the critical components and requirements to establish and sustain Canadian security interests through a world that is in transition during a time of unprecedented globalization.

² Ebo Adedeji and Kristiana Powell, "From the Multilateralism of States to the Multilateralism of Peoples: The Roles of the African Union and the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform" in *Crafting and African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century*. Ed Hany Besada, 57 – 72 (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), 57, 59 and Maxwell O Chinubu, "Assessing the High-Level Panel Report: Rethinking the Causes and Consequences of Threats to Collective Security," in *United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security*, ed Peter G. Danchin and Horst Fischer, 117 – 154 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 152.

Starting with an analysis of the future security environment, the paper will establish key criteria where threats can be examined to determine regions that present the greatest threat to Canada. Using those criteria, the paper will then examine three regions most likely to negatively influence Canada's security: Latin America and the Caribbean; South Asia and the Pacific; finally Sub-Saharan Africa. What will emerge from this study will be a specific region that will most likely provide the greatest threat to Canada through the future security environment. The paper will then specifically examine that region and provide solutions on how Canada can remain a viable global actor through the future chaos of the world as its power balances shift over the decades to come.

Establishing the Framework – Analytical Tools for Assessing Future Threats

Since the end of the Cold War, global instability has risen sharply. Although global instability is not new, its nature has changed. The smallest ripple of instability has the potential to affect far more people far more rapidly than could have occurred in the past. This is not to hubristically state that the modern world is more dangerous or more complex; it is simply to state that the nature of conflict and violence must now be looked at differently given its viral and global nature.

Two critical factors have created this environment. First is the phenomenon of accelerated and unprecedented globalization. Second is the ongoing shift of global powers from bi-polar, through uni-polar and into what we are now experiencing – a global power transition into a multi-polar world. Within this milieu, threats to Canada will present themselves that are far removed from her borders having the potential to impact the security of her population.³ Although such threats simplistically can be stated as emanating from poor or failed states,⁴ it is prudent to analyse the myriad factors and subsequent threats within those states and regions.⁵ Through determining those threats, Canada, with her allies, can better prepare for the future chaos of a world in transition.

³ Contemporary threats to Canada can manifest themselves through political, military, economic and social issues. It is recognized that these threats may require singular or collective response to counter those threats. By way of example, economic threats may be dealt with politically or through trade, but in the extreme may also require a military response. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, threats will refer to those actions affecting Canadian security, which may include social and economic factors.

⁴ Henri Boshoff, “The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment,” in *Promoting Peace and Security in Africa: Is the European Union Up to the Challenge?*, ed Tommi Koivula and Heidi Kauppinen, 13 – 20 (Helsinki: National Defence College, 2006), 15.

⁵ Indeed, “the security of individual states is contingent upon the situation in their neighbourhoods”. Kristian Berg Harpviken, “Troubled Regions and Failing States: Introduction” in

The chapter will start with a specific examination of the future global milieu and how Canada sees herself and functioning within it. The chapter will then identify specific conditions for regional violence followed by an analysis of specific threats that can present themselves to Canada and her allies. With these criteria established, the paper will transition to the next chapter where specific regions will be examined against these criteria to determine what region, or regions, are the greatest threat to Canada.

The Future Environment

Predicting the future security environment is inherently challenging and can be horribly inaccurate. However, state and non-state actors with vested interest in policy related to state and regional stability have developed myriad criteria to assist their predictions. It is through this analysis where baseline policy, which leads to strategy, evolve. Prior to investigating the specific criteria, it is important to understand the context of the present situation and how that may evolve over time. Therefore, through first analysing current global power structures and how they interact, we can then better appreciate how Canada defines herself and functions within the world. Using this analysis as the conceptual framework for future discussion, we can then look to specific conditions that create violence and subsequent pervasive threats to Canada.

We are currently experiencing a shift in global power. Politically, this relates to the polarity of our world where power, regional or otherwise, coalesce to establish

political balance. Using the Cold War as a start point, the world was considered bi-polar, which essentially meant East versus West. This period provided a tremendous amount of stability for those directly associated in those regions despite conflict and turmoil still occurring throughout various other parts of the world.⁶

With the end of the Cold War, the US emerged as a sole superpower, or indeed as some would call it, a hyperpower.⁷ What is now broadly recognized as a period of a uni-polar US hegemony that followed, the world began to fragment as state and non-state actors attempted to bring equilibrium to the imbalance.⁸ During this turmoil, states or regions that were able to suppress violence could no longer do so. Mechanisms that were in place during the Cold War largely withdrew from those regions as is most evident in Tito's Balkan enterprise and throughout sub-Saharan Africa.⁹ However, over time, that hegemony was continually challenged by numerous state and non-state actors to where we find ourselves today. It was therefore in the initial fragmentation of world order that we saw the genesis of what we are experiencing today – a world shifting from a uni-polar power balance into a multi-polar world.¹⁰ Within this transition therefore is the

⁶ For example, Europe saw 50 years of peace, which had never occurred within written history, while Africa and portions of Asia were seemingly perpetually engaged in proxy wars associated with the bi-polar regions.

⁷ Popularly attributed to the French Foreign Minister Hubert Vederine in 1998.

⁸ Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 10 and Harpviken, "Troubled Regions...", 2.

⁹ Boshoff, "The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment", 13 and Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 183, 483 and Annan, "The Causes of Conflict...", 21.

¹⁰ Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment, 2008-2030* (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2010), 3 and Paul Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2010), 119, 173 and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040*, 4th Edition (London: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 12 January 2010), 10, 15, 72.

notion of unstable international anarchy.¹¹ This transition is expected to last for the decades to follow.¹²

Transition periods are prone to violence. Although violence most assuredly exists when poles are settled, as experienced through the various wars fought during the Cold War, it is during transition periods where issues that could have been contained or rationalized can more readily lead to violent action and conflict. One of the leading causes for violence during transitions is uncertainty.¹³ Within uncertainty, state and non-state actors naturally gravitate towards protecting or projecting existing interests and power.¹⁴ This is not to be alarmist and state that a maelstrom of violence will occur. Rather, it is to state that violent activity and conflict is more likely during periods of transition; a period where we now find ourselves.

Given the potentially violent nature of transitioning power, security becomes paramount. During such times, leveraging the inherent power within multilateral organizations greatly assists in providing economic and physical security.¹⁵ Simplistically, this approach creates a series of strong points throughout the shifting

¹¹ Although the concept of anarchy is more aligned with a realist approach to international relations theory, the term simplifies a complex process for the sake of the paper.

¹² Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 10, 39.

¹³ Bruno Charbonneau, and Wayne S. Cox, "Conclusion: Relocating Global Order," in *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security After 9/11*. Eds Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, 276 – 291 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 285 and Laurie Nathan, "Power, Security and Regional Conflict Management in Southern Africa and South Asia" in *Troubled Regions and Failing States: The Clustering and Contagion of Armed Conflict*, ed Kristian Berg Harpviken, 309 – 332 (United Kingdom, Bingley: Emerald Groups Publishing Limited, 2010), 322.

¹⁴ W. Charles Kegly Jr, and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics. Trend and Transformation*. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), 362, 417, 459 and Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 4 and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 10, 14-15, 72-3.

¹⁵ Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 10, 15 and Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 19, 118, 149.

power balance that can be used during, and after, a shift. It is therefore in this sea of instability that Canada will find herself engaged over the decades to come as global powers shift and eventually find polarity – a process that has become complicated given another component of global interaction.

Globalization has exacerbated our unstable anarchy. Although globalization has existed since antiquity,¹⁶ it now has a markedly different character. What originally began as intricately woven economic ties throughout the world has developed into innumerable state and non-state interaction that now deeply integrates political, social and military components.¹⁷ This new depth in interaction has created political, economic and military interdependency within the international community that not only provides diversification for any given state, but at times state survival.¹⁸ The new deeply rooted exchange is now affected by the ability for information action to rapidly spread from one region to another, which is incorporated in the concept of contemporary globalizations.¹⁹ Therefore, modern globalization has rendered the world flat – that is to say that borders are now ever closer and political, economic, social and military components of society are now tightly integrated throughout and between regions where what once took months to rationalize and plan can now weeks, days or even hours.

¹⁶ Although there are numerous examples, those most critical to the West was Alexander the Great's exploits into Asia, Marco Polo's expeditions, Columbus's voyage in 1492 and de Gama's in 1498 and the partitioning of the world into colonies, to name only a few.

¹⁷ Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement. A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence* (Ottawa: ADM(PA), 2005), 5 and Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 9 and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 91.

¹⁸ Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 91. Further, in an extreme case, Japan requires economics over security as their existence depends on imports. Long, "Great Power Politics...", 231.

¹⁹ Indeed, "globalization will ensure that these effects will be felt around the world". Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 1, 14.

From our flat world, significantly empowered non-state actors have emerged. Again, although not new, they are most certainly more prolific.²⁰ The alacrity for such actors to react to, or change regional issues is profound. Endeavours ranging from the altruistic to the insidious can more rapidly spread and influence regions in a significantly shorter period of time.²¹ This alone has created different breeds of conflict.

Although much could be written on the future nature of warfare, suffice it to state that the increased probability of irregular warfare, at times mixed with conventional warfare, will be the norm.²² This is not to surmise that total war will be impossible, rather, that it will be improbable. What is clear, however, is the changed nature in conflict.

During the Cold War, conflict was characterized as being relatively conventional state-on-state violence with ability to mediate.²³ Since the end of the Cold War, violence now manifests itself differently where inter-state warfare nearly ceased while intra-state warfare dramatically increased, often involving non-state actors.²⁴ In this new form of conflict, civilians, often in the most brutal of ways, were specifically targeted and killed

²⁰ By means of simplistic comparison, one can look to the various colonial trading agencies such as the Hudson's Bay Company compared to the estimated 40,000 NGOs that exist today, let alone the United Nations, the World Bank, al Qaeda, etc.

²¹ Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 1, 10, 34.

²² Amongst many others, for a detailed comparison, see "Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict". *Strategic Forum*, No 240 (April 2009): 1-8.

²³ By way of example, during the Cold War, there were 13 UN Peacekeeping missions. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been over 45 UN Peacekeeping missions, most focused on intra-state violence. Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 107.

²⁴ Indeed, in the past 65 years there has been forty million deaths resulting from conflict with only one-quarter of those being state-on-state conflict. Further, combat-related fatalities have dropped 98% from a 1950 figure of 38,000 to the 2002 figure of 600. Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game*, 107 and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 72 and Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 3.

in numbers that were unprecedented over the past centuries.²⁵ Further, modern conflict is born of sundry factors raging from ideology, racism and power struggles where traditional forms of mediation simply do not work.²⁶ Finally, a growth industry in violence emerged – terrorism. Although terrorism existed previously, the rate it has been embraced and used as a weapon increased in frequency, lethality and mass over the past decade (see Figure 2.1). Again, the primary targets were civilians. Mixed within this construct is the evolution of information technology – both for good and bad. Nations must now amass greater levels of cultural intelligence than before to not only fully understand any given region, but to protect itself against rampant disinformation. In the struggle to amass such levels of intelligence with modern information technologies, cyber warfare has emerged as a threat to many nations. A true child of irregular warfare, cyber warfare can, and is believed to have been, waged in our globalized unstable anarchy arguably causing yet another threat and factor in considering a state’s security.²⁷ It is this form of civilian-focused irregular warfare ranging from terrorism to cyber warfare that

²⁵ Kofi Annan, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa,” in *Violent Conflicts, Fragile Peace: Perspectives on Africa’s Security Problems*, ed Norman Mlambo, 19 – 62 (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, Ltd, 2008), 19-20 and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 72. Indeed, “at the beginning of the previous century, military casualties constituted 85-90 percent of casualties during war; by the end of the previous century the proportions have been almost exactly reversed with almost 80 percent of all casualties being civilians”. Andreopoulos, “Collective Security...”, 159.

²⁶ Indeed, “[m]ediation produced settlement in only about 25 per cent of civil wars and only some of those attracted the political and material resources necessary for successful implementation”. Kari Kranko, “African Crisis – Challenges for International Community and Local Actors,” in *Promoting Peace and Security in Africa: Is the European Union Up to the Challenge?*, ed Tommi Koivula and Heidi Kauppinen, 7 – 12 (Helsinki: National Defence College, 2006), 7.

²⁷ The most recent suspected example of cyber warfare having been used was a series of computer-related attacks made against Estonia, reportedly by Russia. Further, most states now have dedicated cyber warfare capabilities and military units dedicated to defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. Dunningan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 48-9.

predominates our current world and is expected to remain as such for the decades to follow.²⁸



Figure 2.1 – Terrorist Attacks Over Time.

Source: Global Terrorism Database. Terrorist Attacks Over Time, 1970 – 2008. Available from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=1970&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2008&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&ctp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max; Internet; accessed, 15 March 2011.

To manage this emerging style of conflict, it has become evident that military solution alone cannot penetrate or prevent violence. It is now widely accepted that a comprehensive approach is required – a state’s harnessing of political, economic, social and military resources to address the issues.²⁹ It is through this WoG approach, typically integrated within a multilateral security or economic organizations such as NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or ASEAN, where success will most likely come.

²⁸ Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 3 and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 15.

²⁹ Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 19, 22 and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 13, 15, 81.

With an appreciation of the global unstable anarchy, coupled with the impacts of our tightly woven globalization and the current nature of conflict, it is now important to understand how Canada presents herself within the global community and functions as one of its members.

Canada is in the enviable position of being a middle power. Although rhetoric will continually define or re-define the power classes, specifically that of middle power given its relatively ambiguous context, Canada demonstrates the classic characteristics as defined over a broad spectrum of analysts over the past decades.³⁰ Middle powers can be defined through analysis of their GDP, military spending, population, etc that place them in what amounts to the upper third of the international community.³¹ Another shared commonality is that middle powers rely on others within the international community to both maintain their power while also influencing other states or regions.³² In other words, middle powers rely more on multilateral interaction than necessarily do other powers.

Therefore, recognizing that Canada is a middle power, there are certain components to foreign policy and trade that must be considered to ensure state protection. First, as stated above, Canada must rely on the international community and multiple alliances, treaties and organizations to prosper and, in some instances, survive.³³ Second,

³⁰ For full range of debate as it applies to Canada, see Chapnick's "The Middle Power" and the introduction to *Canada's Foreign & Security Policy. Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*.

³¹ David Bosold and Nik Hynek, editors, *Canada's Foreign & Security Policy. Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), xxii.

³² Bosold and Hynek, *Canada's Foreign & Security Policy...*, xxii.

³³ Croci, "Canada: facing up to regional security challenges", 144-5 and Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game*, 19, 37 and Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 51 and Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement...*, 24. Further, recent history has demonstrated that unilateral action and global ultimatums can have serious negative consequence. Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 149.

if Canada wishes to influence the international community, it must do so through the very same multilateral and bilateral organizations that provides her stability. This requirement becomes more acute in a state of unstable anarchy within the context of modern globalization. Therefore, acknowledging middle power status and acting accordingly becomes more closely linked to state survival during unstable anarchy than when power balances are established.

As we have seen, the world is in a state of transition where uncertainty and violence can be expected. When coupled with modern globalization and the nature of modern warfare, the concoction for instability becomes more pronounced. Through understating the nature of the world, while also recognizing the nature of Canada within this environment, we can now indentify threats to Canada and her allies that can lead to instability.

Future Threats

Throughout the various natures of conflict since the end of the Cold War, significant data and indicators on the origins of conflict have emerged. Both state and non-state actors have vested interest in determining the future security environment for reasons ranging from trade to human security and have developed exhaustive studies to assist their analysis. Within these studies arguably lie three critical commonalities: likely conditions that create violence; historical propensity for a region to use violence as a tool for mitigating conflict or gaining power; and identifying regions that are easily influence by external factors.

The study of state fragility and violence occupies many facets of our globalized community. Numerous models exist that investigate holistic or specific issues that may lead to imbalance or upheaval in attempts to properly forecast current and future involvement with states or regions. Although not in detail, nations such as the UK routinely publish their *Strategic Trends Programme* to monitor such issues. The UN, through the Department of Peacekeeping's Human Development Index, maintain a comprehensive list covering some 40 datum broadly categorized through topics ranging from demographics, economics and quality of life.³⁴ Even more comprehensive is the World Bank's World Development Indicators that sees five categories – people, environment, economy, states and markets, and global links –further subdivided into over 200 datum.³⁵ Throughout all of these models there are definitive commonalities.

First, is good governance. Although seemingly ambiguous, good governance captures some critical sub-categories within. First, it refers to rule of law, which is noted through levels of corruption and the existence of a functioning justice system. Second, this captures a state's ability to protect its citizens from any range of issues such as health and education. Within this broad category are the most visible signs of distress where indicators such as human rights violations, number of prisoners, capital punishment, legal representations, child mortality rates and life expectancy are monitored and closely followed.³⁶

³⁴ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, *International Human Development Indicator* (available from <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/default.html>; Internet; accessed 16 December 2010).

³⁵ The World Bank. Development Data Group, *2010 World Development Indicators*. (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, April 2010), vii-xi.

³⁶ Kranko, "African Crisis...", 8.

Next, which is closely linked to rule of law, is the nature of the state's economy. This factor is not necessarily tied to how well off an economy is. Rather, it identifies issues such as the trade cycle and the diversity of trading partners and commodities. Indicators within this category can be comparing outgoing resources to those that are coming in, such as refined materials being exported and weapons being imported. Further, this also captures what the country is producing internally for food and what the country is importing to sustain itself.

Finally, demographics play a critical roll in analysing the creation of violence. Numerous studies have linked some crucial factors demonstrating a state's propensity towards violence. Although numerous, there are three critical components to this. First is the median age of the population. Generally speaking, the younger the population, the less stable it is as there is little experience within that state to properly, or effectively, manage affairs. These are the so called youth bulges. This in turn leads to higher unemployment within a larger, and often, disaffected and created conditions for higher levels of intrastate violence.³⁷ Second, is monitoring Diaspora, which is at times linked directly to lower ages within any given state. With large populations removed from a state, a further drain on the intellectual and physical capital of state exists.³⁸ Next is the location of a state's population – rural or urban. This becomes critical in weakened states where urbanization has dramatically grown and will continue to do so over the decades to

³⁷ Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 30, 31 and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 12.

³⁸ Kranko, "African Crisis...", 8 and Boshoff, "The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment", 17 and Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 1, 22 and Croci, "Canada: facing up to regional security challenges", 130.

follow.³⁹ Rapid urbanization in such locations can become problematic for myriad reasons, but principally is an issue given improper social, political and economic infrastructure in place to manage large populations.⁴⁰

A regions history of violence must be considered when determining when and where future threats may arise. Certain regions have natural, or indeed cultural, impetus to use violence as a means to resolve issues, perceived or real. To be clear, this is not aligned along ethnicity rather, it is aligned along the regional conditions that have created this mindset. As noted in Jarred Diamonds *Guns, Germs and Steel*, it is through a combination of factors where certain cultures find themselves in relative prosperity or poverty with others.⁴¹ There are three areas where a history of violence may become evident. First, and most obvious, is the historical data for any state or region in using violence to resolve issues. Second is looking to those states whose distribution of power and well being are manifestly imbalanced, which may lead to insurgency, rebellion or riot to bring about balance or equality.⁴² Finally, and closely related to the second point, is looking to states whose governance maintain a culture of impunity – that is to state where leaders feel law, domestic or otherwise, and the respect of human rights does not apply to

³⁹ The world has just passed the 50% threshold of global urbanization and is expected to be at 65% by 2040. Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 12.

⁴⁰ Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 1, 24 and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 12.

⁴¹ Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 9.

⁴² Josef Bucher, "A Sociological Perspective," in *Promoting Peace and Security in Africa: Is the European Union Up to the Challenge?*, ed Tommi Koivula and Heidi Kauppinen, 21 – 28 (Helsinki: National Defence College, 2006), 21.

them.⁴³ With these very basic criteria in mind, let us now see more tangible and specific criteria that create violence.

After considering a region's history of violence, coupled with conditions that create violence, it is prudent see what outside actors influence regions – for good and bad. Numerous actors ranging from state, through state-sanctioned, to non-state will be engaged in regions of instability. Their reasons will range from the altruistic to the ambivalent to the malevolent.⁴⁴ What remains critical is determining the motives for those engaged in these areas to ascertain if they are working to resolve the root causes of instability as described above or are simply exacerbating the instability. From here, best methods to engage that region can be developed.

Although numerous, the most dangerous external influences are: extremist politics or religion; the perpetration of corruption; weaponization;⁴⁵ and not establishing or making attempts to establish, Responsibility to Protect (R2P).⁴⁶ These actions could be stand alone or combined and can manifest themselves in any category such as

⁴³ UN Economic Social Resolution 2005/81 (available from http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id=11104).

⁴⁴ By way of example: for the altruistic, one could see an NGO working to improve quality of life; for the ambivalent, one could see security forces involved in some manner of stabilization operation who may or may not have vested interest in stability or have an appropriate mandate to bring true stability; and for the malevolent, one could see state and non-state alike exploiting a regions resources through either force or disingenuous deals.

⁴⁵ Although this term is broad in nature and was originally developed to describe placing weapons in space, it is being used to cover: the provision of arms to state or non-states; being a part of the WMD chain (ie, cultivation of resources that directly supply components to WMD capabilities); and placing weapons in an state or region for use against an adversary.

⁴⁶ R2P was a landmark 2006 UN Resolution directing members of the council to protect civilians during armed conflict captured in UN/SC 1674 (available from <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/331/99/PDF/N0633199.pdf?OpenElement>). Although further elaborated in Chapter 5, R2P essentially permits nations to intervene in other nations where gross human rights violations are occurring to ensure stability prior to open conflict. Major Craig Landry, "The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Viable Canadian Policy Option or Altruistic Idea?" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Joint Command Staff Program, 2009), 39.

transnational crime, insurgent movements within regions and states operating in a region who do not respect R2P.⁴⁷

With these three criteria – a history of violence, conditions that create violence and external influences – set against the back drop of the future security environment, we can now turn our attention to pervasive issues that that may directly, or indirectly, threaten Canada and her allies.

Threats to Canada

Although not exhaustive, there are four critical pervasive threats that Canada must be aware of while considering her future security. Building on the factors for consideration as already described, these issues act as specific threat indicators that must be considered. As with the other factors, this list is not holistic but draws on the most common and dangerous issues that can face Canada and her allies.

Prior to examining those four pervasive threats, it must be noted that there are three fundamental factors that underpin all considerations in determining threats to Canada. First, national interests must be considered. Historically, these national interests are security, prosperity, stable world order and finally a projection of Canadian values (see Table 2.1 for threat levels as they apply to national interests).⁴⁸ Second, given her

⁴⁷ Boshoff, “The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment”, 14 and Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 30. A clear example to be discussed later in the paper is that of China who, despite being an economic, political and military powerhouse, rates extremely low on the UN’s HDI. Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game*, 174.

⁴⁸ Macnamara, Brigadier General (retired) Don, “Canada’s National and International Security Interests” (lecture, Air Force Honourary Colonel’s Conference, Yellowknife, NWT, 11 June 2009), with permission.

geography and relationship with her close allies, Canada must consider not only physical threats, but also threats removed from her border that may affect her citizenry. Therefore, national values must be considered when assessing external and internal threats to Canada. Such values traditionally range from accepted rule of law, individual liberty and placing value on human life.⁴⁹ Finally, Canada must be engaged in collective security.⁵⁰ Within collective security therefore, threats to the collective must also be factored when considering a state's specific security concerns.⁵¹ Therefore, the remainder of the chapter will identify threats to Canada's national interests and values that must be considered within the context of the national interests and values of her closest allies, namely the US, the UK, Australia, New Zealand and the majority of continental Europe, thereby contributing to the goal of collective security.

Table 2.1 – National Interest Matrix for Canada

Intensity of Interest Basic National Interest	Survival Level (Critical)	Vital Level (Dangerous)	Human Level (Serious)	Peripheral Level (Bothersome)
Security-Defence of Canada/N.A.				
Economic Well-Being- Prosperity				
Stable World Order Internatnl Security				
Promotion of Canadian Values				

Source: Macnamara, "Canada's National and International Security Interests", 2009.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Collective security is reinforced through numerous Canadian documents, but most notably in the 1994 White Paper as well as routine explanation for Canadian involvement in Afghanistan. Canada, "Our Mission in Afghanistan: Why Are We There?" available from <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/approach-approche/wawt-psna.aspx>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2011.

⁵¹ Kegly Jr, and Wittkopf, *World Politics...*, 21, 149-50.

First, Canada must not lose engagement with regions that are economically, politically, socially and militarily important to her. As a middle power within unstable anarchy, Canada can risk unbalancing her global ties if those regions are no longer engaged. Although some of those areas may not be of immediate importance or influence, economic or otherwise, by remaining engaged multilaterally or bilaterally through various organizations, Canada can retain her economic and political redundancy that, if not bearing fruit at this time, may in the longer term. This is not to argue that Canada use conflict should a region fall out of influence nor is it to suggest that Canada should remain blindly engaged in a region in the event the nation may or may not benefit from it in the future. Rather, it is to state that Canada must ensure effective political, economic and social ties to regions of interest while, if required, use military alliances to further influence those regions. This latter component may require military intervention as occurred in Kosovo 1999 but would most likely manifest itself in the provision of military training teams, ensuring Defence Attaches are accredited to relevant regions or even with actual military exchanges or combined exercises.

Second, Canada must identify those regions rich in what is arguably the most important resource – human resources. Human resources can greatly increase regional stability if properly respected and empowered. This is more so critical within unstable anarchy where nations are more vulnerable. It is under this auspice that the UN approved the Responsibility to Protect as a universal standard. By protecting human resources, appropriate influence can occur that maintains or creates regional stability, whether it is through improved security apparatus or economic development while also preventing

maligned actors from disrupting a region.⁵² Further, appropriate controls and mindset can be shaped to steer fragile areas prone to violence away from using violence as a means to resolve issues. This would ostensibly deny regions as a location for maligned actors to mass for insurgency, conflict, terrorism or cyber warfare.⁵³

Third, Canada must identify strategic resources that are not only important to her, but that can also be used against Canada. Identifying strategic resources is ambiguous. Defined as those resources a state identifies as critical for their economy or security, the list can change and indeed at times not even be recognized or articulated as being a strategic resource.⁵⁴ By way of example, poor states in environmentally fragile regions may consider food and water as a strategic resource – without it, there will be failure or grave consequence.⁵⁵ During unstable anarchy, a middle power maintains its strategic resources to both retain a strong interdependent economy while also working to deny resources that may be used against Canada through weaponization programs.⁵⁶ For the latter, this can be done through international law or physical intervention if something was deemed important enough.

The wild card within these three pervasive issues is the notion of strategic shock. Strategic shock is an event, or series of events, that occur with regional or global ramification. Two recent examples of strategic shock was 9/11 and the 2008-2009 global

⁵² Annan, “The Causes of Conflict...”, 5.

⁵³ Croci, “Canada: facing up to regional security challenges”, 131.

⁵⁴ Even within Canada, it is at times difficult to discern what exactly constitutes a strategic resource for. See <http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2010/12/09/sk-foreign-investment-potash-uranium.html> for an example.

⁵⁵ Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 44 and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 11.

⁵⁶ Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment...*, 47.

economic crisis.⁵⁷ Two examples of a future strategic shock could be dramatic climate change or the establishment of a new energy source. As with the above themes, it is largely recognized that governments must be aware of these and have enough redundancy in capabilities to respond to an incident or have appropriate support mechanisms to assist others through such crisis.⁵⁸ Two examples of such measures and action could be the European Union's (EU) recent economic support to certain member states during the 2008 financial crisis and the global response to the humanitarian crisis caused by the 2004 Tsunami. In any case, the critical issue is that these truly un-forecasted events must be considered and there must be enough resilience established within a state or a region to reasonably deal with the shock. For a middle power within unstable anarchy, such resilience is achievable through multilateral and bilateral organizations.

Although impossible to accurately predict the future, best efforts must be made to better understand the current international environment while looking to past experience in assisting to shape the future. As we have seen, the future milieu will be one characterised by a non-permissive period of transition where increased violence may be used more readily given the nature of global power transition and the pressures of localized factors creating violence. It is in this very concoction of instability where political indifference may lead to dire consequences. Indeed, it is within these conditions where policy and strategy must be created to establish as much stability as possible during times of transition. This notion is more so amplified for a middle power that simply cannot function without the support of others. To adequately function within this milieu,

⁵⁷ Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 91.

⁵⁸ Documents such as the UK's *Global Strategic Trends* (Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 91-92) and Canada's forthcoming *The Future Security Environment Part 2: Future Shocks* deal with these issues and contingencies.

nations are realizing that issues must be resolved across the broad spectrum of government. As noted in this chapter, very few issues require military engagement – but if a direct threat goes unchecked, a military response will most likely be required. With the foregoing established criteria for potential violence and pervasive threats to Canada as summarized in Table 2.2, let us now explore various regions within the world where Canada can focus her attention in attempts to play a positive role in maintaining stability in the face of future chaos.

Table 2.2 – List of Violence Indicators and Threats to Canada

Violence Indicators	Threats to Canada
History of Violence	Loss of Regional Influence
Historical Propensity for Violence	Human Resources Most Vulnerable
State Distribution of Power	Strategic Resources
Culture of Impunity	Ability to sustain Strategic Shock
Good Governance	
Rule of Law	
Health Protection	
Human Security	
Economy	
Main Exports	
Main Imports	
Demographics	
Median Age	
Diaspora	
Urbanization	
External Influence	
Extremist Political / Religious Influence	
Perpetration of Corruption	
Weaponization	
R2P Engagement	

The Hot Zones – Analysing Areas of Concern

Using the criteria established in Chapter 2 for determining root cause for regional violence and consequent threats to Canada, this chapter will identify regions where violence may be most acute.⁵⁹ From this initial analysis, specific hot zones will be identified that have the greatest factors in creating regional, and potential intra-regional, instability. After identifying those hot zones, a more detailed analysis will follow to determine which of these areas has the greatest potential to impact Canadian security.

To focus analysis towards specific areas of examination, three indexes used to determine unstable states and regions will be examined – *Foreign Policy Magazine's* 2010 Failed State Index (see Figure 3.1); the UN's 2010 HDI (see Figure 3.2); and Canada's Future Security Environment's Convergence of Destabilization Trends model (see Figure 3.3). All models use some of the selected criteria in determining the potential for violence as discussed in Chapter 2.

Although all models use differing criteria, the three datasets demonstrate some remarkable commonalities and overlap. Specifically, four regions stand out as being worse off than the remainder of the world: Latin America and the Caribbean; South Asia; the Pacific; and Sub-Saharan Africa. Each region has its unique reason for its low standings. However, there is one discernable commonality – all have the criteria associated with the potential for regional violence. Therefore, the remainder of the

⁵⁹ Although regions have many definitions based on criteria ranging from anthropological to security based, this paper will use the UN identified regions of the Arab States, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.




Figure 3.1 – The Failed State Index 2010⁶⁰

Source: Foreign Policy, *The 2010 Failed State Index*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings; Internet; accessed 15 January 2011.




Figure 3.2 –World Map of International Human Development Indicators⁶¹

Source: The United Nations, *Human Development Index – 2010 Rankings*, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/map/>; Internet; accessed 21 November 2010.

⁶⁰ Specific criteria used to establish this data are: Demographic Pressures; Refugees / IDPs; Group Grievance; Uneven Development; Economic Decline; De-legitimization of the State; Public Services; Human Rights; Security Apparatus; External Intervention. Full details are found at link.

⁶¹ Specific criteria used to establish this data are: Health; Education; Income; Inequality; Poverty; Gender; Sustainability; and Human Security. Full details are found at link.




Figure 2.3 – Convergence of Destabilization Trends

Source: Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment, 2008-2030* (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2010), 39.

chapter will use Table 2.2 as an analytical tool to examine issues within Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia and the Pacific⁶² and Sub-Saharan Africa.

During the analysis, the UN's Regional HDI analysis will be used as a start point in determining factors that could create violence. As each region is varied, not all of the specific criteria within Table 2.2 will be analysed, however, those factors contributing the most, or counterbalancing criteria for violence, will be examined. Each region will then be looked at from an historical perspective to assist in determining if a history of violence exists. Finally, external influences will be examined to further ascertain if any one specific region offers a threat to Canadian security.

⁶² Although the Pacific is traditionally grouped with East Asia, given that it's similar standings with South Asia and other regional commonalities, both will be grouped into one region for the purpose of further analysis.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean have recently come to Canada's diplomatic forefront as a region to further strengthen her economy while also enhancing regional security.⁶³ At face value, such a move to strengthen Pan-American WoG ties would not only help Canada, but would also arguably foster relations with the US given their focus on pervasive regional drug issues. Simplistically characterised as a region inundated with intrastate violence,⁶⁴ plagued by a seeming perpetual South-North drug corridor and prone to intrastate criminal enterprise, it is no wonder Canada has re-focused her attention to Latin America and the Caribbean as a means to further enhance domestic security. However, using the criteria established in Chapter 2, the actual threat to regional instability, and thus to Canada, remains relatively low.

Using the HDI data to determine violence indicators (see Table 3.1 for regional HDI breakdown), the region looks relatively well off holding the mid-ground between the OECD countries and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, looking at the trends within this data, there are certainly conditions for violence.



Good governance varies throughout the region. The sub-region of South America enjoys good governance while the Caribbean is slightly degraded with Central America faring the worst. The trend is seemingly ironic as this the reverse order of regional US

⁶³ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the Americas: Priorities & Progress," http://www.international.gc.ca/americas-ameriques/priorities_progress-rriorites_progres.aspx?lang=eng; Internet; accessed 7 Feb 11.

⁶⁴ James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide to War*. 4th Ed. (Colorado: Paladin Press, 2008), 505.



Table 3.1 – HDI Value, Latin America and the Caribbean⁶⁵
 Hybrid: HDI value (Latin America and the Caribbean (RB))



Source: The United Nations, *Human Development Index...*

⁶⁵ In the background colours, blue is largely OECD states, yellow is largely South Asia and red is largely Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the bold colours, blue is largely South America while green is largely Central America and the Caribbean. Nicaragua is the lowest within the region.

influence. Although the external influences will be dealt with later in the chapter, it is worth noting at this point given the impact on governance practices within the region.

Generally speaking, the biggest factor in regional violence is the ability for states to assert control over their borders. Two factors directly contribute to this within Latin America – low population density outside of urban areas and a relatively small, but at times vocal, indigenous grievance.⁶⁶ Within the Caribbean, this is largely due to inadequate security forces.⁶⁷ The results of the border issues manifest themselves into four general categories of inter- and intrastate violence: drugs and their spin-offs;⁶⁸ transnational crime;⁶⁹ the potential for intrastate terrorism;⁷⁰ and border dispute.⁷¹

However, with the exception of drugs and the potential for transnational terrorism, violence rarely develops beyond the borders where it begins.⁷² Although the reasons for this are vast, they are principally accredited to the Latin American phenomenon of conflict avoidance and a desire to organize along multilateral trade and security

⁶⁶ Arie M Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), 68 and Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 509-510.

⁶⁷ Arelene B. Tickner, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Domestic and Transnational Insecurity*. Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series (New York: IPA Publications, February 2007), 2.

⁶⁸ Lt Col Desmond T. Edwards, “My Neighbours’ Keeper? Canada’s Role in Enhancing Security within the Caribbean Community.” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College National Security Program Course Paper, May 2009), 13 and Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 509-510. The main regional and transnational spin-offs from drugs are weapons proliferation, corruption murder and turf wars. Edwards, “My Neighbours’ Keeper?...”, 15 and 19.

⁶⁹ Tickner, *Latin America and the Caribbean...*, 4.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, *Latin America and the Caribbean...*, 6-7.

⁷¹ Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 510.

⁷² Cdr Andrés Lopez Sierra, “Security Analysis in South America: Regional Complex Theory Application,” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Joint Command Staff Program, 2007), 35 and Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 69.

organizations where discourse becomes the first weapon in disagreement.⁷³ Indeed, what emerges is a regional “pluralistic society” determined to prosper through stability.⁷⁴

Through this pluralistic society, two reasons for regional stability emerge: the existence of historical regional superpowers;⁷⁵ and numerous economically-oriented multilateral organizations, which will be dealt with later in the chapter. Although the regional superpowers at times confront one another or engage in unilateral action, they maintain general stability through shared security interests. In Central America, this is primarily the US, which has ironically retarded good governance given the sub-region’s reliance on US engagement should instability occur.⁷⁶ Within the Caribbean, the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) was established in 2009 for regional humanitarian assistance with Antigua, Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago taking regional leads.⁷⁷ Within South America, Brazil and Argentina have naturally risen to the job of regional superpower, but not without controversy.⁷⁸

So, although specific Latin American and Caribbean states experience various degrees of weak governance, the resultant intrastate conflict is largely contained through pluralistic mechanisms that permit overall regional stability. Further, sub-regional

⁷³ Sierra, “Security Analysis in South America...”, 35.

⁷⁴ Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 84.

⁷⁵ A distinction is made with regional superpowers and actual superpowers where the former are relative to those states surrounding them while the former is in relation to the world.

⁷⁶ Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 67.

⁷⁷ Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency Webpage. Available from <http://www.cdema.org/>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2011.

⁷⁸ Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 540 and 549. Venezuela contests Brazil’s power within the sub-region drawing heavily on anti-Brazilian and anti-US rhetoric in attempts to gain domestic strength and international credentials with other nations also sharing anti-US views. Edwards, “My Neighbours’ Keeper?...”, 21 - 2.

superpowers ensure a balance of power that assists in maintaining regional stability. The three principle exceptions to this stability are the ongoing issues with drugs, transnational crime and the potential for transnational terrorism.

Notwithstanding the endemic drug issues, the regional economy is relatively well balanced and experiences a high degree of regional and global integration. In South America, the MERCOSUR is the third largest global trading block following only after the EU and the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and is accredited with sustaining sub-regional stability.⁷⁹ In addition to this South American economic powerhouse, there also exists the Organization of American States (OAS) and a plethora of other similar organizations that create integrated regional economic policy and shared energy resources that interacts with the world.⁸⁰ The critical component to these myriad organizations is a history of economic compromise which translates to regional stability.⁸¹

Central America and the Caribbean do not enjoy the same strength as South America. Although some regional economic organizations exist, they are largely less effective and rely on regional organizations, such as OAS.⁸² A critical component in this condition is drug-related. These two sub-regions act as a trafficking corridor from South to North America. Within this corridor, a false economy exists that is based on the drug industry and it is having challenges ridding itself of the lucrative drug market to create a

⁷⁹ Sierra, "Security Analysis in South America...", 44-5. MERCOSUR comprises of five member states (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and most recently, Venezuela) and five associate member states (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru), all within South America. More details are available at: <http://www.mercosur.int/>.

⁸⁰ Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 79.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² This includes the Central American Integration System (SICA) and Caribbean Community (CARIBCOM). Although strong within their own rights, they are not as strong as MERCOSUR.

stable economic environment.⁸³ Regardless, it is Central America and the Caribbean that are the proverbial innocent bystanders as the drug business is caused through North American appetite and South American production. Indeed, the issue is social in nature despite the clear security and political ramifications.⁸⁴ As with good governance, these two sub-regions remain the weakest.

So although the region's economy is not as solid as the OECD, South America most assuredly enjoys strong economic policy and is well positioned to continued growth. However, both Central America and the Caribbean are weak in this regard requiring continued assistance and interaction to bring these sub-regions forward.

From a demographics perspective, the region is relatively well off. First, the median age of the region is around 28 years old with the notable exceptions of Guatemala and Haiti.⁸⁵ Further, although there is a large Caribbean and Central American Diaspora in the US and Canada, it is not necessarily a drain as elsewhere in the world, with the notable exception of Haiti.⁸⁶ The sole issue with this Diaspora is indeed the reverse of elsewhere – not a removal of human capital from the region, but the insertion of criminal activity into the new countries where the immigrants have arrived. In the case of Canada and the US, this translates to significant domestic gang-related violence associated with the countries of origin.⁸⁷ Although these issues could arguably be stemmed from the

⁸³ Tickner, *Latin America and the Caribbean...*, 4.

⁸⁴ Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 509, 539.

⁸⁵ Kaiser Family Foundation, "U.S. Global Health Policy: An online gateway for the latest data and information on the U.S. role in global health," <http://www.globalhealthfacts.org/topic.jsp?i=81>; Internet; accessed 7 Feb 11.

⁸⁶ Abrams, Elliot. "What Haiti Needs: A Haitian Diaspora," *Washington Post*, 22 January 2010.

⁸⁷ Edwards, "My Neighbours' Keeper?...", 30-1.

country of origin, they remain social and immigration policy issues for the nations taking on these populations.

As alluded to earlier in the chapter, the greatest strength to regional stability within Latin America and the Caribbean is the use of dialogue to achieve stability rather than interstate violence. Indeed, the region is noted for its historical interstate stability with only two wars fought in 20th Century South America.⁸⁸ An interesting factor in this phenomenon, which relates to current violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, is the timeframes involved. Latin America experienced a far bloodier de-colonization period than Sub-Saharan Africa. However, it was done over 150 years ago and conducted in relative isolation where the impact of the then-Latin American violence was not as far reaching as it is in today's globalized community.⁸⁹ Further, once borders were established, a wave of Cold War-era democratization put down numerous populist movements and, despite the varying degrees of successful and true democracy, naturally led the region to avoid conflict.⁹⁰ However, intrastate violence is much more common given weak governance practices as already described with the majority of violence associated to criminal activity.⁹¹ Despite intrastate violence, there is a history of containing instability as states

⁸⁸ Despite there being numerous territorial conflicts, the only two wars fought were the Chaco War, 1932-1935, and Ecuadorian-Peruvian War, 1941, which was very short. Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 179.

⁸⁹ Sierra, "Security Analysis in South America...", 30. Further, Latin America experienced 15 years of violent independence followed by 50 years of civil and interstate warfare as regional power balances adjusted, which ended in its relative current configuration in 1919. Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 71-2.

⁹⁰ Sierra, "Security Analysis in South America...", 33-4, 37 and Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 69.

⁹¹ Edwards, "My Neighbours' Keeper?...", 12.

will either manage their own affairs or lean on their neighbours to assist. What emerges is a culture of sharing regional security issues.⁹²

In the Caribbean, there is also a marked lack of interstate conflict with the region having never fought a war amongst itself despite numerous foreign conflicts and, more recently, US involvement over the past century.⁹³ However, the region is most assuredly prone to piracy and criminal enterprise that, in turn, lends itself to a higher propensity for intrastate violence.⁹⁴ However, the so-called Pax Americana, which will be dealt with below, lends itself to largely containing intrastate conflict and dealing with issues when most acute.

With growing globalization, the region is garnering more interest from external actors along multilateral and bilateral lines. Generally speaking, most are positive influences aimed at creating and or maintaining regional stability.

The largest contribution to Pax Americana is that of the US. Historically tied to the region with their extended Monroe Doctrine, the US simply would not, and will not, permit insecurity on their border.⁹⁵ Despite this being the most notable case with Cold War Communism⁹⁶ and the current fight against narcotic and human trafficking,⁹⁷

⁹² Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 67.

⁹³ Although the US has been involved, it has largely been to bring about regional democratic practices.

⁹⁴ Edwards, "My Neighbours' Keeper?...", 11 – 13.

⁹⁵ Sierra, "Security Analysis in South America...", 31.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁹⁷ The US exerts a formidable presence ranging from counter-narcotics activities to stability operations through all facets of their security apparatus including their Drug Enforcement Agency and the CIA, let alone SOUTHCOM. Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 509, 511 and Edwards, "My Neighbours' Keeper?...", 24, 60.

complete stability has eluded the region. However, as previously described, US presence in Central America and the Caribbean has had a general negative impact in establishing sub-regional good governance. Further, some states, most notably Cuba and Venezuela, despise US interests with Chavez going as far as soliciting support from nations who are recognized threats to the US.⁹⁸ Regardless, the US exerts immense presence in the region and continues steadily working towards maintaining stability along her borders.⁹⁹

Other nations are also actively engaged in the region both from a security and economic perspective. Canada has joined various counter-narcotics operations such as Operation CARRIBE and continues involvement through her Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP) to further develop regional leadership where required.¹⁰⁰ Further, Canada has been economically engaged with the Caribbean since 1929.¹⁰¹ The UK and Dutch also maintain a presence in the area and at times bring in their own WoG assets to specifically deal with the narcotics problems in conjunction with other navies operating in the region.¹⁰² Although China has growing interest in the region, it is, thus far, for benign reasons linked to Chinese economic prosperity with potential political

⁹⁸ Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 527. External threats sympathetic to the so called *Chavismo* are Iran, Cuba, Safists and Serbian ethnic radicals.

⁹⁹ Although numerous, the major players in the area are the US Coast Guard (they alone have 22 bilateral regional agreements), US Customs, US Border Protection Agency, SOUTHCOM, the DEA, the FBI and the CIA. Further, it is common for other nations to also operate in the area in combined operations, such as Canada, the UK, the Dutch and the French. Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 509,511, Edwards, “My Neighbours’ Keeper?...”, 24, 60.

¹⁰⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence, “Navy Assists in Counter-Narcotics Operation,” available from http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/3/3-a_eng.asp?id=842; Internet; accesses 15 March 2011. Further, 20 of the 62 MTAP nations are from this region. Department of National Defence, “Directorate Military Training and Cooperation: Active MTCP Member Countries,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/MTCPmembers-eng.html>; Internet; accessed 4 Feb 11.

¹⁰¹ Edwards, “My Neighbours’ Keeper?...”, 4-5.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 15, 60, 62.

benefits through so-called Third World solidarity possessing little threat to the region or Canada.¹⁰³ The only negative external influences in the area are the relatively ill-defined transnational criminal organizations¹⁰⁴ and the maligned actors engaged in the Venezuelan-led anti-US rhetoric. Finally, although the Caribbean has exported terrorists for attacks against the West, no credible transnational terrorist threat, other than crime, has emanated from the region.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, there have been more Canadian-borne terrorist threats than from Latin America and the Caribbean with domestic police agencies already engaged in combating the issues at home.¹⁰⁶

So, in general terms, external influences remain positive in nature with the exception of crime-related activity and the potential for terrorist activities. Despite these latter issues, the US, through allies and regional agreements, retains relatively tight control over issues that could create credible insecurity to her borders,¹⁰⁷ and by extension for Canada as well.

¹⁰³ Florencia Jubany and Daniel Poon, *Recent Chinese Engagements in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Canadian Perspective*. Canadian Foundation for the Americas Research Report. (Ottawa: Canadian Foundation for the Americas, March 2006), 12-13.

¹⁰⁴ Tickner, *Latin America and the Caribbean...*, 4.

¹⁰⁵ Edwards, "My Neighbours' Keeper?...", 5-6.

¹⁰⁶ There are only three identified terrorists from this region engaged in transnational terrorism – Sheik Abdullah el-Faisal, Richard Reid ("Shoe Bomber") and one of the London suicide bombers. Edwards, "My Neighbours' Keeper?...", 23. By contrast, thwarted one plot with the Toronto 18. Further, Canadian policing agencies, as well as the UK and US, are actively engaged in managing these issues within their border. Edwards, "My Neighbours' Keeper?...", 32-2.

¹⁰⁷ "...dominated economically, militarily and diplomatically by the United States, the Americas keep the peace partially because it's obvious that if anyone gets too rambunctious, the "Colossus of the North" will, as it has often done in the past, intervene", Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 505 and "If a Bolivarian[-style] attack ...[was] launched against U.S. allies in the Caribbean basin, expect the U.S. Navy, Army, and Marines to get involved." Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 539.

Although there are definitive threats to Canadian domestic security, they are largely the purview of domestic security agencies and joint The Canadian Forces (CF) counter-narcotic operations that already exist. Further, as described above, there has yet to manifest credible terrorist threat from the region – indeed, with the Toronto 18, more Canadians have been engaged in terrorist activity or planning than the three identified from Latin America and the Caribbean. However, Canada must continue to be ready to assist the region with any humanitarian assistance missions as has occurred in Haiti and

Table 3.2 – List of Violence Indicators, Latin America and the Caribbean

Violence Indicators	Threats to Canada
Good Governance. Good to Mediocre. Rule of Law. Poor. Health Protection. Mediocre. Human Security. Good to Poor. Border Issues. Good to Poor. Regional Interaction. Excellent. Economy. Good. Main Exports. Poor (drug-related) Main Imports. Good. Demographics. Mediocre. Median Age. Good to Poor. Diaspora. Mediocre. Urbanization. Poor. History of Violence Historical Propensity for Violence. Excellent. State Distribution of Power. Good. Culture of Impunity. Low to High. External Influence Extremist Political / Religious Influence. Low. Perpetration of Corruption. Poor. Weaponization. Poor (drug-related) Right to Peace Engagement. Excellent to Mediocre.	Loss of Regional Influence. Low. Human Resources Most Vulnerable. Low. Strategic Resources. Medium. Ability to sustain Strategic Shock. Medium

Honduras in the past while also encouraging continued economic ties through Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the various bi-lateral and multilateral agreements with the region.

Given the generally effective regional governance provided through its pluralistic nature and natural propensity to self-resolve conflict, coupled with positive external influences, Latin America and the Caribbean remain relatively stable and capable of managing its own affairs (see Table 3.2 for summary). Despite the serious issues with intrastate violence and drugs in the region, there is no requirement for additional Canadian attention to the region with the exception of continued WoG engagements as has traditionally occurred. The chapter will now focus attention on another recognized hot zone – South Asia and the Pacific.


South Asia and the Pacific

South Asia and the Pacific remain extremely volatile for two critical reasons – nuclear states and transnational terrorism. Together, or combined, the resultant global or regional results could be catastrophic. Indeed, this is one reason why Canada is currently engaged in Afghanistan and continues to engage the region through numerous organizations. Despite these evident threats, a detailed analysis is required to determine what, if any, threats emanating from this region can affect Canadian security, and to what degree.

Other than the Middle East, this region is the most varied on the HDI (see Table 3.3 for regional HDI breakdown). Those scoring higher on the index are largely within

Table 3.3 – HDI Value, South Asia and the Pacific¹⁰⁸

Hybrid: HDI value

Source: The United Nations, *Human Development Index...*

¹⁰⁸ In the background colours, blue is largely OECD states and red is largely Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the bold colours, green is largely the Pacific, with the exception of Iran, while the yellow states are largely South Asia. Afghanistan is the lowest within the region.

the Pacific while those scoring lower are largely within South Asia. A little lower on the scale than Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Asia and Pacific regions are still relatively better off than Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the violence in this region is different than any other being studied as it has nuclear weapons and is the home of some of the most lethal transnational terrorist organizations.

Although good governance has not necessarily taken root in all parts of the region, great improvements in both the Pacific and South Asia have occurred with resultant regional stability. In South Asia, the most contentious issue is that of border disputes in the Kashmir region.¹⁰⁹ Although this issue will remain problematic for years to come, both Pakistan and India have commenced the embryonic process of securing regional stability. First, the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons has, to date, stopped war despite border skirmishes occurring.¹¹⁰ Second, Pakistan has been engaged with its own intrastate violence and terrorism as associated with the war in Afghanistan and has not been positioned to directly deal with the issue.¹¹¹ Third, while Pakistan removed itself from the Kashmir issue to deal with their domestic issues, India enjoyed an economic upsurge and consequent prosperity and stability, which in turn is driving efforts for continued regional stability.¹¹² This in turn led to greater trade with Pakistan, which has

¹⁰⁹ Although Afghanistan is critical on numerous good governance factors, it will not be dealt with as it is largely contained and has the attention of the international community.

¹¹⁰ The term crisis stability, which is “the incentives on both sides to initiate war are outweighed by the disincentives”, is used to describe this phenomenon. Rajesh, M. Basrur, “Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Stability in South Asia,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies*, ed Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell and Joseph Chingyong Liow, 115 – 125. (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 115.

¹¹¹ Paul S Kapur, “The Kashmir Dispute: past, present, and future,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies*, ed Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell and Joseph Chingyong Liow, 103 – 114. (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 111.

acted as a calming effect over the Kashmir issue.¹¹³ Finally, both sides are seemingly engaged in a wait-out phase so the issue can be managed diplomatically while India retains “hundred of thousands” of soldiers in the region to maintain localized counter-terrorist activities.¹¹⁴ So, despite the very real threat of nuclear war given traditionally weak border security, containment through bilateral interaction has recently diminished this threat and has brought strength to regional governance.

Within the Pacific, ASEAN has established a new era of security and prosperity. With no ASEAN security arm, this feat is ever more interesting as it has relied on a political-security organization to maintain economic strength, general regional stability and a super-ordinate identity.¹¹⁵ Although there is still much debate on the effectiveness of ASEAN,¹¹⁶ the results of the political-security apparatus established in 1967 has created increased economic development and has acted as a bulwark against regional terrorism. It has also renewed the democratic process in the traditionally weaker states of the Philippines and Indonesia.¹¹⁷ Most recently, ASEAN, in concert with the UN, played

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 111. Additionally, India and China are now in talks to find resolution to their 1962 Sino-Indian War, which was also based on frontier issues. Dunningan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 374-5.

¹¹³ Basrur, “Nuclear Weapons...”, 120.

¹¹⁴ Kapur, “The Kashmir Dispute...”, 103, 111-2.

¹¹⁵ Alice D Ba, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies*, ed Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell and Joseph Chingyong Liow, 205 – 216 (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 205 and RSIS-MacArthur Conference on Regional Security Cooperation. *Building Institutional Coherence in Asia’s Security Architecture: The Role of ASEAN. Conference Report*. Organized by the Multilateralism & Regionalism Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 19-20 July 2010, Singapore. (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University, 2010), 10. ASEAN’s slogan is “one vision, one identity, one community.” Association of Southeast Asian Nations Homepage., <http://www.asean.sec.org/>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2011.

¹¹⁶ Ba, “The Association...”, 214 and RSIS, *Building Institutional Coherence...*, 6, 8.

a key role in maintaining stability between Thailand and Cambodia.¹¹⁸ Further, ASEAN has numerous sub-groups designed to address specific issues, such as HIV/Aids (ATFOA) and Regional Reform (ARF).¹¹⁹

So, despite the potential for catastrophic conflict in South Asia and the threat of transnational terrorism, the region has set about measures to create regional containment of their issues. Most notably is ASEAN's efforts to significantly diminish the Pacific's terrorist threat while bilateral efforts between Pakistan and India have, to date, reduced the potential for open war.

Economically, the region remains relatively engaged both globally and regionally. Within the Pacific, ASEAN specifically acts as an enormous trading mechanism that has peace dividends. Further, Pakistan and Indian trade has blossomed in recent years, which in itself has created stability dividends.¹²⁰ This is not to argue that the region's economies are well off or individually diverse. However, it is to indicate that development is

¹¹⁷ Amy L Freedman, "Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia," in *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies*, ed Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell and Joseph Chingyong Liow, 263 – 273. (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 263, 269, 271 and Ba, "The Association...", 212. Furthermore, the "we-ness" of ASEAN has resulted in a pluralistic security region assist design was to permit regional growth without necessarily being directed by external influences, both Communism and the US. Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 189-90 and Ba, "The Association...", 209.

¹¹⁸ Association of Southeast Asian Nations Homepage, "ASEAN Chair Invited to UNSC Meeting on Cambodian-Thai Border Dispute," available from <http://www.asean.sec.org/25832.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2011.

¹¹⁹ Joey Long, "Great Power Politics and Southeast Asian Security," in *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies*, ed Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell and Joseph Chingyong Liow, 230 – 240. (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 232-3 and Ba, "The Association...", 210 and RSIS, *Building Institutional Coherence...*, 7.

¹²⁰ Since negotiations between Pakistan and India began over Kashmir, trade has sharply risen from 521 million USD a year to 2 Billion USD a year. Basrur, "Nuclear Weapons...", 120.

underway and positive indicators demonstrate a strengthened regional economy that links directly to regional stability.¹²¹

The most problematic regional issues is that of natural resources, specifically of oil.¹²² The most likely regional flashpoint over oil would be the discovery of large oil reserves in the heavily disputed South China Sea.¹²³ However, the demarcation of the South China Sea is underway with most states, China included, accepting ongoing The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) findings while being generally committed to debate over interstate conflict.¹²⁴ Further, China has recently diversified their energy imports to cover their growing demand, specifically from Africa.¹²⁵ Despite this, regional instability could still emerge if states not only become oil-centric, but if continued dispute erupt into international violence.

Demographically, South Asia is worse off than the Pacific Region on two fronts: median age and Diaspora. The majority of South Asia is under the 25 year old threshold with Afghanistan at a shocking 17 years old.¹²⁶ Further, the region is wrought with Diaspora, specifically Afghanistan, which is arguably draining the region of its human capital. However, South Asia is faring relatively well with a median age of just over 25

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, “Nuclear Weapons...”, 119-20.

¹²² Long, “Great Power Politics...”, 235, 238-9.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 236.

¹²⁴ Despite routine clashes between fishermen in the seas around Vietnam and ongoing issues surrounding Taiwan, ASEAN and the UN have been successful in keeping discourse moving towards non-violent solutions. Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations...*, 222-3.

¹²⁵ An estimated 30% of Chinese energy is derived through Africa. Clarence J. Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach, The Letort Papers*. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2010), 4.

¹²⁶ Kaiser Family Foundation, “U.S. Global Health Policy...”

with Indonesia, the traditional state causing regional instability, at 27.6.¹²⁷ Therefore, demographically speaking, the region, although far from OECD standards, is not critical.

Although the region is historically prone to interstate violence, recent trends seem to be moving away from this fact. The areas most likely to go to war, Pakistan and India, nuclear or otherwise, have recently eschewed outright war as means to mediate dispute.¹²⁸ Further, significantly weak regional states in the 1990s and early 2000s have gained enough internal credibility that violence is not necessarily the means to resolve disputes.¹²⁹ Additionally, ASEAN has always acted as bulwark to security by first stemming the flow of communism then shifting post-Cold War efforts onto the prevention of interstate violence.¹³⁰ As with South America, intrastate violence still exists, but it is relatively contained. Finally, the concept of soft power has emerged as the weapon of choice in securing state security throughout the regions, and at times, the world.¹³¹

South Asia and the Pacific have always held the interest of external actors, which became more pronounced over the past 200 years of colonization and resource grabs.¹³² Further, the US has always sought attention in this region to ensure open seas and general

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Indeed, the phenomenon of nuclear pacification has brought regional stability. Pre-nuclear, both nations fought three wars (1947-8, 1965 and 1971) while during their nuclear age, no wars have been fought despite confrontations having occurred (1990, 1999, 2001-2 and 2008-9). Indeed, "...the advent of nuclear weapons has produced crises, but not wars". Basrur, "Nuclear Weapons...", 115.

¹²⁹ Freedman, "Islamic Extremism, 264.

¹³⁰ Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 189 and Ba, "The Association...", 209.

¹³¹ Long, "Great Power Politics...", 236-8.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 230.

regional stability.¹³³ Although this has caused conflict in the past, namely the various Afghan Wars and the Vietnam War, the external influences have largely acted in a positive manner to maintain and bring about regional stability.

Of particular interest is China's pacific role in the region. Although a challenge to discern actual Chinese intentions,¹³⁴ Chinese rhetoric of peaceful expansion is seemingly taking root. Indeed, the ASEAN community, traditionally cautious with China and communism in general, has reacted positively to China's growing regional involvements.¹³⁵ However, caution towards China must still be maintained as her interests are not fully understood while also noting her significant economic and strategic interests in the region.¹³⁶ Regardless, it is recognized that China itself is fighting its own instability and, at least for the near term, will be focused on her internal issues as much as her external ones.¹³⁷

Further, ASEAN shrewdly uses the interests of the external actors to further regional improvement.¹³⁸ Although they will not necessarily commit to one external actor over another, they will ensure a balanced approach is taken to secure the

¹³³ In 2007, the US invested 99 billion USD in the region while trading 41.6 billion USD. Long, "Great Power Politics...", 230-1.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 231.

¹³⁵ Robert G Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations. Power and Policy Since the Cold War*. 2nd Edition (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), 87, 100 and Gupta, "Australia and Strategic Stability...", 150.

¹³⁶ Despite the peaceful rhetoric, China has nonetheless recently built a new submarine base in the region at Hainan. Long, "Great Power Politics...", 236.

¹³⁷ Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 359.

¹³⁸ Long, "Great Power Politics...", 234.

organizations overall political-security objective.¹³⁹ This relationship in turn generates leverage from the great powers interacting with ASEAN states.¹⁴⁰ From this, ASEAN continues to act as regional instrument for harmonization.¹⁴¹

Interwoven in the globalized nature of the Pacific Region are Japanese interests, which are in turn tightly linked to Chinese and North Korean interests. Japan remains cautious of Chinese and North Korean influence, but also recognizes that economic prosperity brings stability.¹⁴² This is further manifested in the fact that Japan relies on imports for survival.¹⁴³ Therefore, they too remain keenly interested in assuring regional stability for their own survival.

Finally, Australia plays a key, and recognizable, role in the region. Although a part of the region, they deserve separate consideration given their unique regional OECD status. Taking on numerous security roles in the region aligned with Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand and the US to name a few,¹⁴⁴ Australia has acute regional security concerns given their proximity to China and Indonesia.¹⁴⁵ Recently, Australia has engaged with Japan and Indonesia directly in regional dialogue ensuring democratization and regional stability. Further, they remain keenly interested in both US and Chinese tensions

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ RSIS, Building Institutional Coherence..., 14.

¹⁴² Long, "Great Power Politics...", 231.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Endeavours range from the 1951 ANZUS treaty, continued bilateral security operations with Indonesia and the more recent Japan-Australia security arrangement. Amit Gupta, "Australia and Strategic Stability in Asia," in *Strategic Stability in Asia*, ed Amit Gupta, 143-160. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), 144, 146, 148, 153.

¹⁴⁵ Gupta, "Australia and Strategic Stability...", 146, 159.

surrounding Taiwan and are actively seeking diplomatic resolution given the potential for regional imbalance should conflict arise.¹⁴⁶ In short, Australia acts as a strong, and credible, counterbalance to Pacific instability.¹⁴⁷

Although threats exist to Canada from regional instability in South Asia and the Pacific, the majority of issues that were seemingly critical just a few years ago have contained the potential for instability. Canada will continue engagement in Afghanistan to further assist in bringing stability to that state while Pakistan and India are seemingly on the road to peaceful resolution over Kashmir. Further, the transnational terrorist threat that once emanated from Indonesia has dispersed and continues being managed through regional and external actors. Regardless, Canada must be prepared to assist with any future stability or humanitarian assistance missions in the region should the requirement present itself. Other than continued diplomatic efforts, there is no clear requirement for direct military engagement in the region other than continuing with the International Security Force (ISAF), which will continue post-2011, albeit in smaller numbers and in a training mission based out of Kabul rather than around Kandahar where the Canadians have been operating continuously since 2005.

Therefore, despite the grave potential consequences of violence manifesting itself in interstate warfare, adequate containment exists (see Table 3.4 for summary). Within South Asia, it is the vision of prosperity and nuclear weapons while in the Pacific its pluralistic society and use of external actors to maintain crisis stability¹⁴⁸ with both

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 150, 152.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 146, 152, 154-9.

¹⁴⁸ Crisis Stability is where "...the incentives on both sides to initiate war are outweighed by the disincentives". Basrur, "Nuclear Weapons...", 115.

regions engaged in their “rising economic interdependence.”¹⁴⁹ The chapter will now examine Sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 3.4 – List of Violence Indicators, South Asia and the Pacific

Violence Indicators	Threats to Canada
Good Governance. Excellent to Mediocre. Rule of Law. Excellent to Poor. Health Protection. Mediocre to Poor. Human Security. Good to Poor. Border Issues. Good. Regional Interaction. Excellent. Economy. Good to Mediocre. Main Exports. Mediocre. Main Imports. Mediocre. Demographics. Mediocre to Poor. Median Age. Good to Poor. Diaspora. Mediocre to Poor. Urbanization. Mediocre. History of Violence Historical Propensity for Violence. Excellent. State Distribution of Power. Mediocre to Poor. Culture of Impunity. Medium. External Influence Extremist Political / Religious Influence. Low. Perpetration of Corruption. Good to Poor. Weaponization. Good. Right to Peace Engagement. Mediocre to Poor.	Loss of Regional Influence. Low. Human Resources Most Vulnerable. Medium. Strategic Resources. Medium. Ability to sustain Strategic Shock. Medium

Sub-Sahara Africa

Sub-Sahara Africa is perhaps the most complex regions on earth. With an unforgiving climate, a tightly interwoven and delicate cultural system, rich with untapped natural resources and teeming with human capital, it is wrought with seemingly never

¹⁴⁹ Long, “Great Power Politics...”, 236.

ending conflict, extreme poverty and nearly synonymous with corruption.¹⁵⁰ The remainder of the chapter will explore if this region holds any threats that can affect CA security, and, if any, to what degree.

With the exception of only a few states, good governance simply does not exist in Sub-Saharan Africa. The reasons for this are multiple and run very deep in the regional cultural and political psyche. Historically, Africa has long been of interest to external actors interested in her natural resources lines, human or otherwise. Pre-colonization, the Arab states' aggressive slave trade along the East coast initiated a Diaspora that unnaturally shifted ethnic and cultural borders that still exist today.¹⁵¹ During colonization, the region was artificially partitioned for European convenience ignoring cultural borders.¹⁵² Although this was not unique to colonization, it was done in a region that has one of the most varied and codified tribal structures on the planet.¹⁵³ Throughout this process, good governance was forsaken. Government structures were focused on resource extraction while only educating the few elites as those in power exploited, rather than develop, regional human capital.¹⁵⁴ This imbalanced approach was, and continues to

¹⁵⁰ Donovan C Chau, *U.S. Counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs, Cultures and Conflicts*, The Letort Papers. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2008), 26 and Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 408 and Nicolas Richoux, "Africa as an Operational Environment," in *Promoting Peace and Security in Africa: Is the European Union Up to the Challenge?* ed Tommi Koivula and Heidi Kauppinen, 29 – 40. (Helsinki: National Defence College, 2006), 29 – 30.

¹⁵¹ Although Africa had kingdoms for thousands of years prior, their sense of borders was vague in comparison to Arab and Western definition and always remained fluid. Nonetheless, tribal lands shifted more rapidly in this time frame and then were essentially suspended with colonization. Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 478-9.

¹⁵² Chau, *U.S. Counterterrorism...*, 27 and Kranko, "African Crisis...", 8.

¹⁵³ Indeed, there are over 1800 identified tribes in the region. Richoux, "Africa as an Operational Environment", 29 – 30.

be, further exacerbated by the cultural obligation to share wealth with one's family and tribe when acquired.¹⁵⁵ The result of these historical and cultural norms was the creation of a series of states with oppressive forms of government not habituated to properly looking after its people while seeking nepotistic power to sustain individual security.¹⁵⁶ These conditions continue to exist today (see Table 3.5 for regional HDI breakdown).

Despite these conditions underpinning the retardation of regional good governance, some regional efforts have been made to address these underlying issues. Most prominent is the creation of the African Union (AU). Born most recently in 2002 from the 1963 Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU has made best efforts to establish regional norms and a pan-African identity to create and establish regional good governance.¹⁵⁷ However, the results have been mixed and have been inconsistent.¹⁵⁸ Regardless, the root cause for regional instability is arguably directly attributed to poor governance practices.

¹⁵⁴ Annan, "The Causes of Conflict...", 20-1 and Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 479-80.

¹⁵⁵ Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 408-9 and Annan, "The Causes of Conflict...", 23.



¹⁵⁶ Annan, "The Causes of Conflict...", 21, 23, 45 and Boshoff, "The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment", 14 and Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 408 and Norman Mlambo, *Violent Conflicts, Fragile Peace: Perspectives on Africa's Security Problems* (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, Ltd, 2008), xi. Indeed, "[i]n extreme cases, rival communities may perceive that their security, perhaps their very survival, can be ensured only through control of State power". Annan, "The Causes of Conflict...", 23.

¹⁵⁷ The AU's motto is: "Towards Greater Unity and Integration through Shared Values". African Union Homepage, <http://www.au.int/en/>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2011.

¹⁵⁸ Indeed, although proxy wars have ended with the advent of the AU, "...conflicts and the use of force have continued." Boshoff, "The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment", 16. Further, although ECOWAS was deemed a tremendous success in West Africa for its initial decades, it failed to contain regional violence in the post-Cold War years with the collapse of several of its states, most notably Sierra Leone and currently Cote D'Ivoire. Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 138-40.

Table 3.5 – HDI Value, Sub-Saharan Africa¹⁵⁹

Hybrid: HDI value (Sub-Saharan Africa (RB))



Source: The United Nations, *Human Development Index...*

¹⁵⁹ In the background colours, blue is largely OECD states, green is largely Latin America and the Pacific. Of the bold colours, there is no discernable pattern between the lowest and highest states identified. Zimbabwe is the lowest within the region, and indeed the world.

The Sub-Saharan economy is very weak, not entirely integrated and prone to external influence.¹⁶⁰ First, it is largely based on natural resource extraction with little emphasis placed on developing human capital,¹⁶¹ the latter of which is crucial for any positive economic growth. Second, it is based on weak governance where corruption is rampant and education is poor.¹⁶² Third, despite the rich resources, the region has scarce land and water resources that only amplify tensions.¹⁶³ Finally, much of the trade is based on an imbalanced commodity exchange where, simplistically speaking, natural resources are exported in exchange for weapons and ammunition,¹⁶⁴ rather than imports addressing the lack of water and food. Despite the clear connection made between Sub-Saharan stability and economic growth,¹⁶⁵ the region remains wrought with violence. Although attempts have been made to address these shortcomings, very little progress has been made.¹⁶⁶

Demographically, Sub-Saharan Africa is by far the worst region in the world. First, almost the entire region is below the median age of 25.¹⁶⁷ Second, Diaspora,

¹⁶⁰ Boshoff, “The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment”, 13.

¹⁶¹ Jakkie Cilliers, Barry Hughes and Jonathan Moyer. *African Futures 2050: The Next Forty Years*. Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 175 (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Strategic Studies, January 2011), 45 and Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa...*, 5.

¹⁶² Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 479-80 and Cilliers et al, *African Futures 2050...*, 85-6.

¹⁶³ Annan, “The Causes of Conflict...”, 24.

¹⁶⁴ Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa...*, 5.

¹⁶⁵ Kranko, “African Crisis...”, 7.

¹⁶⁶ The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Ottawa: The Senate, 2007), 88 and Boshoff, “The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment”, 86.

predominantly within the same region, is rampant with an estimated 15 – 17 million people living in some form of exile.¹⁶⁸ This situation exacerbates states that are already weakened as there is little human experience or capital to adequately build functioning states. Finally, Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing some of the most rapid urbanization on the planet¹⁶⁹ – without the necessary infrastructure to support this transition. In short, Sub-Saharan Africa is a region devoid of employable human capital, other than raw numbers, which is easier to exploit than it is to develop.

In addition to the historical context for weak governance and propensity for violence as described above, intrastate and interstate violence is the norm throughout the Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite West Africa enjoying some decades of no interstate violence during the Cold War, this ceased in the 1990s with the imbalanced growth of Nigeria and her rise as an unsolicited regional hegemony.¹⁷⁰ Most notably was the more recent war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where eleven nations fought for five years throughout the Congo. The conflict is yet to be resolved despite the presence of an unprecedented 26,000 UN personnel under the auspice of United Nations Mission to the

¹⁶⁷ The lowest two countries in the region, which are also the two lowest in the world, are Niger and Uganda at a shocking 15 and 15.2 respectively. The highest, South Africa, is only at 24.4 and ranks 93rd globally. Kaiser Family Foundation, “U.S. Global Health Policy...”

¹⁶⁸ Boshoff, “The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment”, 17 and Karin Dokken, “State Responses to Transnational Challenges: The Evolution of Regional Security Organizations in Africa” in *Troubled Regions and Failing States: The Clustering and Contagion of Armed Conflict*, ed Kristian Berg Harpviken, 333 – 354 (United Kingdom, Bingley: Emerald Groups Publishing Limited, 2010), 335.

¹⁶⁹ Cilliers et al, *African Futures 2050...*, 16 and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme...*, 99.

¹⁷⁰ Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 33, 135, 144.

Congo (MONUC) who have operated in the area since 2000.¹⁷¹ In East Africa, violence has been the norm for generations and has directly led to current acute piracy in the region and is wrought with terrorism.¹⁷² Perhaps the more disturbing history of Sub-Saharan African violence is that of the victims. Largely civilian, and specifically targeted as a means to establish intrastate and at times interstate dominance.¹⁷³ Although there have been notable “islands of peace” such as Tanzania and Senegal, those are anomalies within the region and themselves precariously balanced on the brink of violence at times.¹⁷⁴

There are numerous external influences in Africa ranging from robust multilateral organizations to maligned bilateral arrangements. Much attention is paid to the region given the root cause of modern instability as described above – poor governance. Given this precondition, organizations either make attempts to stabilize weak regimes or operate to exploit those weak regimes for political or economic gain. Although exploitation would naturally encourage continued destabilization, there is mounting evidence that those engaged to help, such as the UN and foreign resource companies, are also contributing to delaying proper economic and political development and subsequent growth.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ The United Nations. “MONUC Facts and Figures,” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml>; Internet; accessed 11 Feb 11.

¹⁷² Chau, *U.S. Counterterrorism...*, 35-7.

¹⁷³ Annan, “The Causes of Conflict...”, 19-20, 37 and Boshoff, “The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment”, 13. Indeed, this is the very notion of the rise for many so-called Death Squads found in numerous intrastate conflict whose sole purpose is to kill and terrorize civilians. Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 85.

¹⁷⁴ Mlambo, *Violent Conflicts...*, xi.

Within the international community, two specific states stand out as maligned actors who have contributed to continued instability – France and China. France, despite her best intentions, has at times directly exacerbated violence at the expense of seeking what they perceived to be regional or state stability.¹⁷⁶ Although at its most acute, France’s involvement in the Rwandan crisis in 1992 was arguably a critical enabler to the ensuing genocides.¹⁷⁷ This is not to state that Canada is clear of regional wrongdoings given some of her controversial engagements with regional resource extraction companies;¹⁷⁸ however, France in particular continues to meddle in regional politics.

China has seen dramatic growth in engagement throughout the region over the past decade ranging from military training teams to resource acquisition.¹⁷⁹ Although this is being done by more countries than China, it is occurring unilaterally without the

¹⁷⁵ Annan, “The Causes of Conflict...”, and the Honourable Hugh Segal and The Honourable Peter A Stollery, *Overcoming 40 Years of Failure: A New Road Map for Sub-Sahara Africa*. The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Ottawa: The Senate, 2007), 15.

¹⁷⁶ Stale Ulriksen, “Webs of War: Managing Regional Conflict Formations in West Africa and Central Africa”. In *Troubled Regions and Failing States: The Clustering and Contagion of Armed Conflict*, ed Kristian Berg Harpviken, 355 – 380 (United Kingdom, Bingley: Emerald Groups Publishing Limited, 2010), 373 and Issaka Souare, “France in the Ivorian Civil War: A Genuine Peace Broker or Part of the Problem?” in *Violent Conflicts, Fragile Peace: Perspectives on Africa’s Security Problems*, ed Norman Mlambo, 237 – 252 (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, Ltd, 2008), 238, 244-5. Indeed, “...frequently tutelary, often intrusive, and sometimes interventionist,” France has had a largely negative effect enabling international relations with non-francophone states. Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace...*, 147.

¹⁷⁷ Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd., 2006), 494-5, 519-21, 533-4 and Souare, “France in the Ivorian Civil War...”, 246.

¹⁷⁸ “Talisman Oil Operations Prolong Sudan Civil War,” *CBC*, available from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2000/02/14/talisman000214.html>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2011 and Shawn McCarthy, “Canada a Quiet Powerhouse in Africa’s Mining Sector,” *The Globe and Mail*, 20 February 2011. Of interest, by 2005, Canadian companies paid for 22% of regional mineral exploration “placing Canada second behind only South Africa”. David Black and Malcolm Savage, “Mainstreaming Investment: Foreign and Security Policy Implications of Canadian Extractive Industries in Africa,” in *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security After 9/11*. Eds Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, 235 – 259 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 241.

¹⁷⁹ Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 413. Of note, China depends on 30% of her oil from Africa. Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa...*, 4.

international community's oversight. This is worrisome for the region as China openly disavows human rights and environmental concerns not only within its own state, but also when operating with other nations.¹⁸⁰ Through acting in such a manner, China is not addressing root causes of regional instability and has arguably exacerbated instability as they grab strategic resources for their own growth without providing appropriate political, economic or even social mechanisms in place to permit the region to be able to begin taking care of itself.¹⁸¹ Further, China will engage with maligned states specifically to have access to their resources.¹⁸²

Finally, despite historical anti-Arab sentiment,¹⁸³ Islamification has taken root in many states. Although the spread of Islam is not seen as a negative factor, the associative negative influences that some forms of contemporary Islam condone, or seek, is of concern, namely transnational terrorism. Indeed, it is through the process of Islamification in Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically in East Africa, where terrorist organizations use the regional human capital and dishonest domestic power balances to

¹⁸⁰ Christine Hackenesch, *China and the EU's Engagement in Africa: Setting the Stage for Cooperation, Competition or Conflict*. DIE Research Project 'European Policy for Global Development' (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2009), 2 and Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2008), 118-9 and Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations...*, 101, 103. A perfect example of this was a World Bank plan to provide 5 billion USD for a train system in Nigeria with specific caveats on anti-corruption activity and general good governance in place to support the program. China offered 9 billion USD for the program with no such caveats. Nigeria declined the World Bank program and readily took the Chinese aid. Zakaria, *The Post-American World ...*, 116.

¹⁸¹ Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations...*, 83-4 and Segal and Stollery, *Overcoming 40 Years of Failure...*, 88.

¹⁸² Zakaria, *The Post-American World ...*, 118 and Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations...*, 106.

¹⁸³ Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 477.

further their aims.¹⁸⁴ It is for this very reason that the US established Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 to specifically combat growing regional terrorism.¹⁸⁵

However, numerous external influences operate in the area and make significant differences to the root cause of instability. Organizations such as the EU and numerous UN agencies are prime examples of this, which will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 4. Notwithstanding these herculean efforts, negative influences seemingly outweigh the positive efforts in assuring regional stability. So it is through endemic weak governance and a myriad of largely negative external influences with mixed results where we find a region prone to inter- and intrastate violence and subsequent regionally instability.

The threats to Canada from Sub-Saharan Africa exist. First, the actual politics and economics within the region, coupled with a history of regional violence, creates conditions that can negatively impact Canada far more than the other regions. Specifically, transnational terrorism and imbalanced economic trade exasperate regional instability. Although far removed from Canadian borders, many of Canada's close allies are keenly interested in Sub-Sahara African stability making the requirement for collective security highest in this region.¹⁸⁶ In addition to instability caused by regional issues, external actors are contributing to the seemingly chronic state of violence. Without state and regional good governance, the region will not be positioned to look after its own affairs as specifically noted in the other regions through the likes of

¹⁸⁴ Chau, *U.S. Counterterrorism...*, 34, 35 and Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 487 and Segal and Stollery, *Overcoming 40 Years of Failure...*, 119.

¹⁸⁵ Further, it is asses by some that the Horn of Africa within East Africa is of great strategic importance for transitional terrorism. Chau, *U.S. Counterterrorism...*, 38.

¹⁸⁶ Specifically the EU and the US, which will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 4.

MERCOSUR and ASEAN. Although this solution would seemingly lend itself to diplomatic and economic influences, the reality is that Sub-Saharan African politics, economics and security are so tightly intertwined that a WoG approach is required to not only break single-party and militaristic governance, but to develop all components of WoG towards a stable region.

Table 3.6 – List of Violence Indicators, Sub-Saharan Africa

Violence Indicators	Threats to Canada
Good Governance. Poor.	Loss of Regional Influence. High.
Rule of Law. Poor to Mediocre.	Human Resources Most Vulnerable. High.
Health Protection. Poor.	Strategic Resources. High.
Human Security. Poor.	Ability to sustain Strategic Shock. Poor
Border Issues. Poor.	
Regional Interaction. Mediocre.	
Economy. Poor.	
Main Exports. Mediocre.	
Main Imports. Poor.	
Demographics. Poor.	
Median Age. Poor.	
Diaspora. Poor.	
Urbanization. Mediocre.	
History of Violence	
Historical Propensity for Violence. Poor.	
State Distribution of Power. Poor.	
Culture of Impunity. High.	
External Influence	
Extremist Political / Religious Influence. High.	
Perpetration of Corruption. Poor.	
Weaponization. Poor.	
Right to Peace Engagement. Poor to Mediocre.	

So it is with the issues in Sub-Saharan Africa where we are most likely to see the greatest levels of instability with very few mechanisms in place when compared to Latin America, the Caribbean, South Asia and the Pacific (see Table 3.6 for Sub-Saharan Africa summary). Further, it is in Sub-Saharan Africa where there is the largest overlap of Canadian allies' security interests, as well as her own. Finally, with continued gross

violations of human security, there are little internal mechanisms to properly manage them despite a substantial commitment from external actors. Using this as the start point for detailed analysis, Chapter 4 will now further dissect the issues within Sub-Saharan Africa and see who is actually operating in the area, and why. From there, a workable solution for Canada's inclusion in the area can be formulated.

Examining Africa – Who is Doing What, and Why?

Sub-Saharan Africa has presented itself as a complex region requiring comprehensive and credible actors to assist it with stability. While some violence indicators leading to instability, such as median age, have no near-term solutions, long-term regional assistance through social and economic programs can address root causes of issues and assist long-term stability. Near-term efforts therefore should focus on the more malleable violence indicators, such as good governance, to create the backbone for requisite stability. This is precisely what many organizations continue doing – setting conditions for good governance, respecting human security issues while making attempts in marginalizing or removing maligned actors.

This chapter will examine the positive actors operating in Sub-Saharan Africa – and why they are there. From this analysis, determinations can then be made on how Canada can continue meaningful regional engagement. As myriad organizations operate in Sub-Saharan Africa conducting near-infinite combinations of aid, assistance and security, the chapter will focus on those external actors with whom Canada can work closest to ensure regional stability – the US, the EU, the AU and the UN.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ Although NGOs are recognized as being positive influences, they will not be examined separately given the over 3800 operating in the region. Suffice to state that they are a critical component to stability and are assumed to be apart of any activity undertaken. For more details on NGOs, see <http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/ngodirectory/index.htm>. Further, Private Security Companies, a growing Sub-Saharan phenomenon, will not be examined as they are deemed to be counterproductive to the requisite gains in establishing robust, coherent and reliable public security apparatus. Boshoff, “The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment”, 15.

The United States

The US is examined for two critical reasons – she is an important ally to Canada and she has recently invested greater attention to Sub-Sahara Africa. Historically, the US has been openly apathetic towards the region despite her constant financial support to UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁸⁸ With the changing future security environment, specifically issues of transnational terrorism, energy resource and Chinese regional influence, the US has decidedly become more overt in their regional support.¹⁸⁹ Through adhering to the US belief that stability can be obtained through preventative democracy, as well as recognizing positive political and financial gains in seeing a stable Africa, the US has established Africa Command (AFRICOM) to bring a US WoG security solution to the region.¹⁹⁰

Engaged in what the US describes as regional “constructive disengagement,”¹⁹¹ the US is looking at maximizing “peace and security to Africa by promoting health,

¹⁸⁸ Of interest however is that the US is, and has been, a key UN peacekeeping budget contributor currently responsible for 26% of the entire budget with the EU at 43% and Japan at 19%. Cedric de Coning, “Peacekeeping in Africa: The Next Decade” In *Violent Conflicts, Fragile Peace: Perspectives on Africa’s Security Problems*, ed Norman Mlambo, 253 – 264 (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, Ltd, 2008), 254. Further, until AFRICOM, the US had only conducted two meaningful regional engagement – Somalia in 1992 and Liberia in 2003. Africa Command, “FACT SHEET: History of U.S. Military Involvement in Africa,” available from <http://www.africom.mil/get Article.asp?art=1796>; Internet; accessed, 27 Feb 2011.

¹⁸⁹ Chau, *U.S. Counterterrorism...*, iii and Cyril I Obi, “Terrorism in West Africa: Real, Emerging or Imagined Threats?” in *Terrorism in Africa. The Evolving Front in the War on Terror*, ed John Davis, 57-72 (United Kingdom: Lexington Books, 2010), 65 and Zakaria, *The Post-American World ...*, 246.

¹⁹⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Pope, “U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement.” (Alabama: Air University, Air Force Fellows Program. April 2010), 3 and Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa...*, 88-9, 102 and de Coning, “Peacekeeping in Africa...”, 255 and Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick & Dirty Guide...*, 30-1.

¹⁹¹ Ulriksen, “Webs of War...”, 372.

education, democracy, and economic growth.”¹⁹² Although the US has many Other Governmental Departments (OGDs) operating in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is through their controversial AFRICOM where these efforts are strongest. Specifically mandated to sustain progress in creating professional armed forces as a means for conflict prevention, AFRICOM is further tasked to continue strengthening unity of effort within their OGDs and any other regional actors while promoting regional cooperation military-to-military, including through the African Standby Force (ASF).¹⁹³ Although the intent is very well managed and articulated, AFRICOM has met with both US and regional scepticism.

First, debate within the US continues on who should be in charge of such a WoG organization – US Department of Defence (DoD), US Department of State (DoS) or even the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Although all are still working together, the schism has not set AFRICOM up for immediate success.¹⁹⁴ Consequently, AFRICOM remains relatively powerless to actually affect its mandate.¹⁹⁵ Second, AFRICOM has yet to gain regional credibility given the appearance of a larger effort to maintain US hegemonic dominance.¹⁹⁶ This has resulted in a critical setback for the

¹⁹² Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa...*, 101-2.

¹⁹³ Africa Command, “Commander’s Intent 2011,” available from <http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/Commander's%20Intent%20January%202011.pdf>; Internet; accessed, 21 Feb 2011.

¹⁹⁴ Pope, “U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy...”, 40, 44 and Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa...*, 111.

¹⁹⁵ Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa...*, 99-100.

¹⁹⁶ Zakaria, *The Post-American World ...*, 245-6 and Pope, “U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy...”, 90.

organization – AFRICOM remains headquartered in Germany as no Sub-Saharan African nation will house them.¹⁹⁷

Finally is the implication of a military-led organization attempting to maintain stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. As previously described, one of the root causes of regional violence and consequent chronic instability is poor governance specifically associated with typically corrupt and inadequate regional military forces. Therefore, using a military lead to bring stability undermines the progress AFRICOM is attempting to achieve.¹⁹⁸ However, in the permissive Sub-Sahara African environment, a military component is most assuredly required – it's simply a matter of finding the correct balance.¹⁹⁹

So, although a seeming viable actor for Canada to either join through military personnel exchanges or engage bilaterally, AFRICOM's mandate is very much US-centric and remains, at least from a regional perspective, a biased actor with little regional credibility. Therefore, in its current form, Canada should not engage with AFRICOM in force.

The European Union

The EU has recently refocused its attention to Sub-Saharan Africa. Much like the US, albeit with a values-based agenda, the EU is working on strengthening Sub-Saharan

¹⁹⁷ Ulriksen, "Webs of War...", 373.

¹⁹⁸ Zakaria, *The Post-American World ...*, 245-6 and Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa...*, 112.

¹⁹⁹ Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa...*, 103.

African stability to address such issues as Chinese engagements, transnational terrorism and resource security.²⁰⁰ Unlike the US however, the EU also has another dimension of concern given the regions' proximity, that of criminal activity and immigration.²⁰¹ Therefore, the EU's interests are arguably more pragmatic for their immediate security vice over the horizon security issues confronting North America. Despite this, its current activities that run the gambit of individual WoG engagements is arguably better designed to deal with acute issues rather than pan-Sub-Saharan African stability. These EU-Sub-Saharan Africa engagements will now be examined in greater detail.

From a security perspective, the EU established the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) in 2003. Within Africa, EUMS operations ranged from direct UN assistance through the likes of their 2003 Operation Artemis through to the European Force's (EUFOR) UN-sanctioned deployment to Chad in 2008.²⁰² Further, some member states, the UK and France in particular, have had long-standing military-oriented training programs ranging from the Sierra Leone to the DRC focused on creating and maintaining stable governance through component militaries with very much success.²⁰³ Additionally,

²⁰⁰ de Coning, "Peacekeeping in Africa...", 254-5 and Kranko, "African Crisis...", 10-11 and Hackenesch, *China and the EU's Engagement...*, 1-3.

²⁰¹ 3rd Africa-EU Summit, "Tripoli Declaration. Tripoli, 30 November 2010," available from http://staging.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/doc_tripoli_declaration_en.pdf; Internet; accessed, 27 Feb 2011, 2-3 and Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa...*, 3 and Kranko, "African Crisis...", 11-10 and Stefan Ganzle and Sven Grimm, "The European Union (EU) and the Emerging African Peace and Security Architecture," in *Crafting and African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century*. Ed Hany Besada, 73 – 88 (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), 77.

²⁰² European Union. European Union Military Staff, available from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=1039&lang=en>; Internet; accessed, 27 Feb 2011. Over half of their missions have since been to Africa. Ganzle and Grimm, "The European Union...", 77-8.

²⁰³ France has used its RECAMP while the UK uses their IMATT programs with the former having been placed under the auspice of UN training. Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa...*, and

the EU is very much committed to the AU and its success, specifically through the ASF.²⁰⁴ Finally, although NATO has yet to formulate a concrete Africa strategy, the EU solicits NATO to support AU operations.²⁰⁵ Therefore, the EU is actively engaged in Sub-Saharan security matters and operates either within a UN context or directly assisting the UN where they cannot operate.²⁰⁶

From a WoG perspective, although the EU engages on numerous diplomatic and trade fronts, it still does so independent of one another and has yet to merge the comprehensive model into their operations.²⁰⁷ Using the UN's 2000 Millennium Development Goal as guidelines for assistance, the EU recognizes that all goals cannot be achieved and has therefore adroitly selected those regions most in need to focus their efforts.²⁰⁸ Further, although much trade is conducted between the EU and Africa, it remains small, specifically when compared to that of China.²⁰⁹ Therefore, the EU, although active in Sub-Sahara Africa, has yet to combine its efforts into a WoG approach that will serve to strengthen their capabilities.²¹⁰

France, "RECAMP," available from http://www.un.int/france/frame_anglais/france_and_un/france_and_peace_keeping/recamp_eng.htm; Internet; accessed 27 February 2011.

²⁰⁴ Ulriksen, "Webs of War...", 373.

²⁰⁵ Ganzle and Grimm, "The European Union...", 75 and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the UN: A Peculiar Relationship* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2010), 208-9.

²⁰⁶ Kranko, "African Crisis...", 11-10 and "Tripoli Declaration", 2.

²⁰⁷ Of the 24 EUMS missions conducted since 2003, only one has been WoG – their UN assistance mission to the Sudan in 2006. European Union Military Staff, available from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=1039&lang=en>; Internet; accessed, 27 Feb 2011.

²⁰⁸ "Tripoli Declaration", 1-2 and Hackenesch, *China and the EU's Engagement...*, 2.

²⁰⁹ Hackenesch, *China and the EU's Engagement...*, 2.

²¹⁰ Specifically, looking to engage national and regional governance while working along three principles: equality, partnership and ownership. Of interest, security is not mentioned. European Union,

As with the US, some credibility issues exist both within the EU and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although not insurmountable, they remain issues. First, France, as previously described in Chapter 3, has questionable motives within the region. Further, some member states within the EU are wary of France's motives given their history in the region.²¹¹ Ironically, given France's activity in throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, the EU nonetheless relies on France to take the lead on many EU-Africa issues.²¹² However, with time, and continued economic support to the region, the EU will no doubt provide great positive influence over time.

So, despite its regional gains and influence, the EU has some credibility issues both from within Sub-Saharan Africa and within its own organization. To offset this, the EU has most recently ensured their operations function with either UN legitimacy or directly involved with UN or AU operations. Regardless, the EU is a very strong positive regional actor. Potential Canadian engagement with the EU in Africa then remains a strong possibility. However, such an engagement must be balanced against larger Canadian foreign policy considerations such as wedding her resources to EU efforts in the region or to the global community through the likes of the UN. Regardless, there is no doubt much credibility in Canada maintaining bilateral engagements with the EU to continue assisting with Sub-Sahara African stability.

"Summaries of EU Legislation," available from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/african_caribbean_pacific_states/r12540_en.htm; Internet; accessed, 27 Feb 2011.

²¹¹ Souare, "France in the Ivorian Civil War...", 250. Indeed, "Many in the EU are still highly critical of France's African engagements post-colonization and are therefore enaged to ensure France does not dominate the African agenda." Ulriksen, "Webs of War...", 373.

²¹² Ulriksen, "Webs of War...", 373.

The African Union

Mandated to maintain regional stability,²¹³ the AU would seem to be the best organization to empower and engage within Sub-Saharan Africa. Born from the failed OAU in 2000, the AU modelled itself after other successful regional organizations such as the UN and ASEAN.²¹⁴ Although the nascent organization has certainly made some recent gains in achieving their mandate, they remain stymied for various reasons.

First, regional politics continue to divide the AU.²¹⁵ As with the UN, the AU relies on numerous sub-regional organizations to maintain regional stability.²¹⁶ However, the majority of those organizations preceded the AU and all have their own character, and at times, motives, that may or may not align with the AU. Therefore, a coherent AU image and mandate has yet to manifest itself.²¹⁷ A lack of unity is not germane to the AU but is a regional issue where other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have similar issues.²¹⁸

²¹³ African Union, “The AU in a Nutshell,” available from <http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell>; Internet; accessed, 27 Feb 2011.

²¹⁴ Samuel Moki, “From Blueprint to Implementation: Assessing the Progress of the African Union in the Fight Against Terrorism,” in *Terrorism in Africa. The Evolving Front in the War on Terror*, ed John Davis, 265-280 (United Kingdom: Lexington Books, 2010), 270-1 and the similar nature of ASEAN’s success in creating a Pan-Regional identity as per the AU’s motto “Towards Greater Unity and Integrating Through Shared Values”.

²¹⁵ Indeed, “...divergent values and philosophies rather than competing interests” remains the largest obstacle in establishing regional stability. Nathan, “Power, Security and Regional Conflict Management...”, 315.

²¹⁶ The AU relies on eight RECs to support them with ECOWAS being one of the principle sub-regional organizations. Dokken, “State Responses...”, 339 and African Union, “Regional Economic Commissions,” available from <http://www.au.int/en/recs>; Internet; accessed, 27 Feb 2011.

²¹⁷ Dokken, “State Responses...”, 335-6, 351.

Second, the AU sorely lacks two critical components – appropriate financing and the means to move its forces. Although funding is an issue for any organization, the AU simply cannot sustain itself without massive injects of money.²¹⁹ This is by no means a reason for Canada to turn her back on the problem. However, as a medium power with her own similar issues, assisting the AU bilaterally with transport and financing, other than small packages, is not reasonable. However, as NATO has assisted the AU in the past with transportation,²²⁰ Canada can continue the AU through NATO rather than directly.

Third, and closely linked to the second issue, the AU currently has an inability to maintain fielded forces for any length of time. The Economic Community of West Africa States' (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which is considered to be the best sub-regional security organization in the AU, views itself as only an interim force able to maintain near-term stability. After no more than six months, ECOMOG requires the inflow of robust multidimensional Peace Support Operations (PSO) organizations like the UN and the EU to sustain their initial efforts.²²¹ Finally, the much anticipated ASF, which was originally designed to be active in 2010, is not expected to be operational until

²¹⁸ Ulriksen, “Webs of War...”, 371.

²¹⁹ de Coning, “Peacekeeping in Africa...”, 259 and Ulriksen, “Webs of War...”, 374 and Dallaire, “Meeting the Demand for Intervention: The Promise of African Security Architecture” In *Crafting and African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century*. Ed Hany Besada, xvii – xxvi (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), xx.

²²⁰ Ganzle and Grimm, “The European Union...”, 75 and Kaplan, *NATO and the UN...*, 208-9.

²²¹ Dokken, “State Responses...”, 340-1, 257, 344.

at least 2015 and possibly into 2020.²²² In other words, the AU currently has little-to-no staying power for the challenges it faces.

Fourth, like AFRICOM, the AU is a military-led organization.²²³ Although the UN has recently evolved to include a WoG approach, the AU has yet to develop beyond this structure.²²⁴ So, although the AU is structured to cover one component of stability issues within Sub-Saharan Africa, it is not comprehensive enough to address the root cause of issues it is confronted with. However, as security tool, it remains a viable, and indeed meaningful, organization to assist with regional stability.

The AU does however act as a block against maligned regional actors.²²⁵ Further, the AU is without a doubt in its nascent stage and requires much attention from other organizations committed to support it. So, although Canada must remain engaged with the AU to ensure its success through exchanges, training missions and materiel and financial aid, both its military-centric mandate and its nascent nature denies this is a viable organization to fully invest in. In short, the AU and other regional organizations are good, but they are not the UN.²²⁶

²²² Dallaire, "Meeting the Demand for Intervention...", xxi.

²²³ Dokken, "State Responses...", 336-7.

²²⁴ Ulriksen, "Webs of War...", 361.

²²⁵ Although the OAU was relatively capable in stopping interstate conflict, it failed at stopping significant intrastate violence. By way of example, between 1991-2001 there were 23 coups in Africa. By contrast, the AU has suspended membership to member states when they are not acting in accordance with AU norms as noted through Madagascar and Guinea. Ulriksen, "Webs of War...", 361.

²²⁶ de Coning, "Peacekeeping in Africa...", 258.

The United Nations

For many, the image of the UN peacekeeper and Sub-Saharan Africa go hand-in-hand – for good or for bad. In the post-Cold War world, the UN seemed to grow into its own where its missions increased given the demands of a world in transition. Within a few short years, the UN seemed incapable of bringing about any modicum of stability in countries reeling the most from violence – Rwanda, Somalia and Croatia to name a few. However, since those failings, the UN experienced a number of victories and significant lessons learned as the organization developed into the new era of rapid globalization and, yet again, another shift in power.

The UN is seemingly everywhere in Africa. From economic-oriented programs such as the Food and Agricultural Organization to the largest UN peacekeeping operations ever conducted in the likes of the United Nations Mission to the Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the UN has focused its energies on Africa over the past decade while the West focused on the Middle East and South Asia.²²⁷ Originally created to stop interstate warfare, the challenges of contemporary operations, specifically in Sub-Saharan Africa, proved too much for the UN to bring about stability, let alone prevent atrocity.²²⁸ This has changed for two reasons: the realization that the majority of violence post-Cold War was intrastate;²²⁹ and learning

²²⁷ de Coning, “Peacekeeping in Africa...”, 254.

²²⁸ Earl Conteh-Morgan, *Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflict* (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 279.

²²⁹ de Coning, “Peacekeeping in Africa...”, 253 and Annan, “The Causes of Conflict...”, 19-20.

from past errors while remaining cognizant of the link between failed states and international terrorism.²³⁰ Both of these factors led to UN reformation.²³¹

What emerges today is a WoG-oriented UN operating in Sub-Saharan Africa focusing on solving the root cause of violence and instability rather than simply maintaining peace.²³² Indeed, with MONUC as an example, the UN now operates alongside indigenous security forces to enforce their mandate²³³ – something unheard of for the UN only a few years ago. Further, although not yet used, the UN has also been significantly empowered to intervene, without invitation, in states where human rights violations and human security are at risk through the 2006 R2P initiative.²³⁴

Despite these successes, regional economic and security blocks, such as ASEAN and an empowered EU, emerged throughout the world in this same period precisely given the seeming inadequacies of the UN to enforce their mandate²³⁵ – the AU included.²³⁶ Although a potential negative consequence of UN failures, the blocks have added strength

²³⁰ de Coning, “Peacekeeping in Africa...”, 253-4.

²³¹ As benign as it sounds today, this actually began when the UN started election monitoring, which was unprecedented at the time. Further, the UN has moved forward in securing Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, which no manifests itself in the 2006 R2P initiative. Conteh-Morgan, *Collective Political Violence...*, 279.

²³² This notion is best captured in the nomenclature now associated with PSO from peacekeeping to peacemaking. Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 108.

²³³ de Coning, “Peacekeeping in Africa...”, 256.

²³⁴ R2P will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

²³⁵ Harpviken, “Troubled Regions...”, 9. Further, the rise of the G-20 is also argued to be a direct reflection of a then-failing UN. Denis Stairs, *Being Rejected in the United Nations: The Causes and Implications of Canada’s Failure to Win a Seat in the UN Security Council*. A Policy Update Paper, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2011), 7.

²³⁶ Dokken, “State Responses...”, 337.

to many regions as already described in previous chapters while also reinforcing Article 52 of the UN Charter, which states that the UN must rely on regional and sub-regional organizations to assist with stability.²³⁷

Although the UN has seemingly improved itself within Sub-Saharan Africa, it is by no means a perfect solution for stability. As the EU and the US continue making inroads to assist with regional stability, there will no doubt continue to be positive interaction with them and the UN. In spite of its shortcomings, "...the UN is by far the most important external actor in the handling of conflicts in Africa".²³⁸ It is well respected within Sub-Saharan Africa, despite its challenges, as an appropriate organization to manage current issues within the region.²³⁹ Two reasons provide insight as to why this is the case. First, it is a natural WoG organization using a combination of security, governance and reconstruction that greatly assists in addressing root causes of violence through their "integrated mission model".²⁴⁰ By juxtaposition, although great in the security realm, AFRICOM, the EU and the AU currently rely on security as their main tool rather than using the WoG approach.²⁴¹ Second, as described above, is the

²³⁷ Harpviken, "Troubled Regions...", 15 and Nathan, "Power, Security and Regional Conflict Management...", 311, 326 and Conteh-Morgan, *Collective Political Violence...*, 283.

²³⁸ Ulriksen, "Webs of War...", 374. Further, the US sees the UN as the best means to conduct nation building with its relatively "...low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of international legitimacy." Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 108-9.

²³⁹ Sirpa Maenpaa, "The Future of the European Union Peace Support Operations in Africa" in *Promoting Peace and Security in Africa: Is the European Union Up to the Challenge?*, ed Tommi Koivula and Heidi Kauppinen, 113 – 115 (Helsinki: National Defence College, 2006), 113.

²⁴⁰ The integrated mission model is the UN's development and execution of the comprehensive approach described throughout this paper. de Coning, "Peacekeeping in Africa...", 255-6 and Maenpaa, "The Future...", 114. Further, there are over 22,000 civilians now employed on PSOs, constituting 20% of fielded forces. Cedric de Coning, *Civilian Capacity in United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Missions*. Policy Brief, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010), 1.

general trust and credibility placed in the UN despite its issues. Indeed, “[t]he UN’s capability to undertake such system-wide peace-building operations is what sets it apart from NATO and the AU.”²⁴² The only exception to this is the EU who can bring an additional aspect to regional security that the UN cannot – trade.²⁴³

Regardless, it is through a reforming UN that Canada can continue providing meaningful assistance to Sub-Sahara African regional security. Despite the UN’s issues, it retains a level of unparalleled global legitimacy while also embodying the much-needed WoG approach to properly address the root causes of Sub-Sahara African violence and consequent instability.²⁴⁴

As we have seen in Chapter 3, Sub-Saharan Africa is the greatest threat to Canada’s future security environment as it has the greatest potential for instability and gross violations of human security without appropriate mechanisms in place to properly address those issues. Within the region, numerous state and non-state actors are engaged in activities to bring about stability for reasons of their own – but attempting to bring about stability nonetheless. Of these organizations, the UN stands out as a unique organization capable of affecting stability at a far greater rate than the other herculean efforts being undertaken by the likes of the US, the EU and the AU. It is in the UN construct where a combination of credibility and an organic WoG structure have been

²⁴¹ However, there is growing evidence that the EU and AU will begin adopting a similar model. de Coning, “Peacekeeping in Africa...”, 255-6.

²⁴² de Coning, “Peacekeeping in Africa...”, 255.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ By way of example, UN Norms are largely accepted and lead the way in creating standards of international behaviour with over 500 multilateral treaties having been conducted under the auspice of the UN. Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 110.

redesigned to deal with the root cause of violence and subsequent instability. Ideally, Canada could move to a more direct Canada-Africa engagement as was suggested in the 2007 Senate report, *40 Years of Failure*.²⁴⁵ The reality is that Canada cannot undertake this effort alone and must work within the confines of being a middle power.

Therefore, the best way for Canada to properly engage Sub-Saharan Africa is through an organization that not only has credibility in their actions, but also enough credibility to Canada's allies to best serve her foreign policy on a larger scale rather than necessarily focusing efforts into a region or regions that are the purview of other states. In short, it is then with the UN where Canada must look to engage herself to provide stability to Sub-Saharan Africa. The next chapter will now explore how Canada can improve current interaction with the UN to permit her continuing to contribute meaningful input towards greater global stability through the future chaos.

²⁴⁵ Segal and Stollery, *Overcoming 40 Years of Failure...*, 98.

A Return to the UN

The UN has undergone dramatic change over the past decade as it struggled to remain a relevant global institution. At the end of Second World War, the UN was designed with specific goals in mind that did not necessarily naturally translate some 40 years later at with the end of the Cold War. These structural and operational flaws became acute in the 1990's to the point of a seeming end to the UN that culminated in the US 2003 invasion of Iraq. Coupled with seeming systemic failures to promote peace, specifically in Rwanda and Somalia, let alone in the Balkans, the UN seemed doomed for irrelevance. Yet, in the short years following 2003, the UN managed to rapidly transform itself into a viable and credible institution once again as it adapted to the contemporary security environment. Certainly not without its faults, the UN has nonetheless emerged as a positive influence, specifically within Sub-Sahara Africa.

It is in this environment where Canada as a middle power, unable to project her values and security alone, must reinsert herself into the very process she has shunned. By so doing, Canada can regain credibility within the UN and the IC to further shape and develop the very global security policies Canada needs to protect herself through any future chaos.

This chapter will first examine the specific UN transformation that has permitted it to continue positive influence into the future security environment. It will then quickly examine how Canada has ostensibly left the UN over the past decade. Finally, the chapter will make recommendations on how, and why, Canada can alter her policies and return to the UN as she once did thereby permitting Canada to continue meaningful engagement through the future chaos.

The United Nations Today

The UN has gone through substantial transformation since its inception over 60 years ago. What is more significant is the relative speed that some of these changes have occurred – all to adapt to the contemporary security environment. Specifically, the UN has matured its ability to conduct PSO through years of doubt and struggle. Before examining those changes, it is important to identify the context that change came about.

First, the UN was structured post-World War II to deal with universal justice rather than universal peace.²⁴⁶ Through focusing on justice in these years, the Permanent Five (P5) with their veto powers became a global oligarchy focusing on a collective balance of power rather than empowering the individual.²⁴⁷ Although this focus, and subsequent UN structure, worked relatively well through the Cold War, the UN was not prepared for the impending global insecurity that ensued after the Cold War. Indeed, immediately following the Cold War, with the exception of the UN's success in the 1991 Gulf War,²⁴⁸ the UN experienced a series of critical failings, most notably in Rwanda, Somalia and the Balkans, precisely because the Security Council was designed to maintain power balances rather than bring about stability. However, these failures would prove to strengthen the UN in their resolve to remain relevant.

²⁴⁶ Maxwell O. Chinubu, "Assessing the High-Level Panel Report: Rethinking the Causes and Consequences of Threats to Collective Security" in *United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security*, ed Peter G. Danchin and Horst Fischer, 117 – 154 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 142.

²⁴⁷ Chinubu, "Assessing the High-Level Panel Report...", 142 and George Andreopoulos, "Collective Security and the Responsibility to Protect" in *United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security*, ed Peter G. Danchin and Horst Fischer, 155 – 172 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 172.

²⁴⁸ Kaplan, *NATO and the UN...*, 1.

The UN soon identified the root cause of conflict and instability – violating the security and protection of the individual.²⁴⁹ This revelation led to a dramatic overhaul of how the UN would reconfigure themselves to prevent future genocides as with Rwanda, civil war as with the Balkans and abject anarchy as with Somalia. Specifically, the UN was now willing to engage in action that was politically unpalatable during the Cold War – Chapter VII missions.²⁵⁰ With this change also came a different perspective in PSO – building peace rather than then simply keeping the peace.

Through some significant internal restructuring, the UN now largely conducts Peace-building operations rather than their traditional peace-enforcement missions. Although there are many differences between the two forms of PSO, in general, peace-building is a WoG approach designed to prevent conflict and retain stability whereas peace-enforcement is simply preventing belligerents from returning to open conflict on cessation of hostilities.²⁵¹ A critical component permitting the change to peace-building was through the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which has become one of the most “important institutional innovation[s]” the UN has adopted – an undertaking

²⁴⁹ Chinubu, “Assessing the High-Level Panel Report...”, 144, 148 and Andreopoulos, “Collective Security...”, 156.

²⁵⁰ Chinubu, “Assessing the High-Level Panel Report...”, 127. Chapter VII missions are designed to impose, if required, military force within an operation to force positive outcomes for the mission. Chapter VI on the other hand simply encourages action to be taken to see the same positive outcomes. During the Cold War, only one Chapter VII mission was conducted, Korea under UNSCR 82. Since the end of the Cold War, Chapter VII has been invoked 13 times.

²⁵¹ Jonathan Sears, “Peace-Building between Canadian Values and Local Knowledge: Some Lessons from Timbuktu” in *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security After 9/11*. Eds Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, 260 – 275 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 263 and Ebo and Powell, “From the Multilateralism of States...”, 63. Indeed, “Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from essentially observing ceasefires and separating forces after inter-state wars, to complex interventions comprising the military, police, and civilians working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace. In fact, the term “peacekeeping” has become a misnomer”. Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 108.

that occurred with alacrity.²⁵² The PBC, created in 2005, is mandated to: bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on the proposed integrated strategies for post conflict peacebuilding and recovery; help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment over the medium to long-term; and develop best practices on issues in collaboration with political, security, humanitarian and development actors. The PBC is directly supported by the Peacebuilding Support Office, designed to marshal resources in support of PSO and the Peacebuilding Fund, designed to fund PSO.²⁵³ What emerged was a naturally aligned WoG apparatus at the strategic level.²⁵⁴ The irony for Canada is that, given her wide-ranging peacekeeping and peace enforcement experience, she was largely absent from its creation and currently has little influence on the PBC's activities.²⁵⁵

At the operational and tactical level, the PBC has manifested itself in SSR. Although in its nascent stage, SSR follows closely to the PCB as it applies a WoG apparatus to address the root cause of instability in the actual mission area. From a military perspective, this includes initiatives ranging from the training and mentoring of local security forces to the assistance in Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation,

²⁵² Ejeviome Eloho Oboto, "The New Peacebuilding Architecture: AN Institutional Innovation of the United Nations" in *United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security*, ed Peter G. Danchin and Horst Fischer, 212 – 234 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 212-3.

²⁵³ The United Nations. United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. *Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission*; available from <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml>; Internet; accessed 11 March 2011.

²⁵⁴ Indeed, "[t]he Peacebuilding Commission is an intergovernmental advisory body". Oboto, "The New Peacebuilding Architecture...", 214.

²⁵⁵ PBC membership is comprised of 31 member states that are drawn, amongst other criteria, for those who contribute the most personnel and money to UN mission, which Canada does. United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. *Mandate of the Peacebuilding...*

Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) activities.²⁵⁶ Although under a different name, Canada is very familiar with this approach as it is what has been recently adopted in Afghanistan.²⁵⁷ Regardless, to harness SSR initiatives at the operational level and below, the UN established the SSR Task Force in 2007 bringing together “11 [UN] departments, agencies, funds and programme” to ensure mission success.²⁵⁸ Of note, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) chairs the Task Force ensuring the provision of appropriate oversight and mission support.²⁵⁹ Again, Canada has been largely absent from DPKO activities over the past years. Regardless, SSR is far from perfect.

First, SSR is continuing to evolve as a concept as no single SSR mission is the same given the varied regional and sub-regional approaches requiring success.²⁶⁰ Second, SSR is “highly political and cuts to the core of sovereignty of the state and to the physical security of its people” while simultaneously it can appear to be a continued variation of past enterprises of Great Powers meddling in the affairs of others.²⁶¹ However, given these very notions, no other organization other than the UN is better qualified to conduct

²⁵⁶ Dallaire, “Meeting the Demand for Intervention...”, xxiv and Maenpaa, “The Future...”, 114.

²⁵⁷ Matthew Fisher, “U.S. lauds Canada's work in Afghanistan,” *National Post*, 1 November 2010 and Major Ryan Jurkowski, “Any Mission, Anywhere, Anytime,” *On Track* Volume 15, Number 3, Autumn 2010, 19-21.

²⁵⁸ Ebo and Powell, “From the Multilateralism of States...”, 67-8.

²⁵⁹ The United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “New International Roster of Security Sector Reform Experts is Launched”; available from <http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/portal/cache/offonce/home/pid/14009;jsessionid=276DC73745BF36F118D671043DFBCAB7>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2011.

²⁶⁰ Ebo and Powell, “From the Multilateralism of States...”, 64.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 66.

SSR given its relative neutrality and general global acceptance.²⁶² Therefore, it is, for the time being, the best solution that is seeing the most positive results.

The PBC and SSR initiatives are underpinned by another new, and just as controversial, endeavour – R2P. Although introduced in Chapter 2, R2P requires some additional attention here as it pertains to current issues within the UN. First, R2P, like SSR, is seen by some to be another self-interest tool the West can use to dominate others.²⁶³ Further, R2P openly questions the current concept of state sovereignty and their ability to function without external interference.²⁶⁴ Finally, with only one exception in Darfur, R2P has not been invoked despite ongoing human atrocities around the world. Regardless, it is through R2P that the PCB and SSR have developed, which have to date, proven more successful than now-antiquated forms of PSO. Indeed, it is through these very initiatives, reform and change in operational perspective where the UN, and NATO in some cases has regained much global and regional credibility – all within the past decade.

Throughout the Cold War, tension existed between the West, particularly the US and NATO, and the UN.²⁶⁵ Typically managed diplomatically, the UN's credibility was openly questioned when they were circumvented by NATO in 1999 and again by the US

²⁶² Indeed, through its "...global mandate, political neutrality and legitimacy... the United Nations uniquely positions the Organization as the most suitable partner to provide support to the AU, and other regional organizations, in this important but delicate area." Ebo and Powell, "From the Multilateralism of States...", 66-7.

²⁶³ Dallaire, "Meeting the Demand for Intervention...", xx. Further, both China and Russia are opposed to R2P given their fear that universal implementation may underscore their own ability to govern. Landry, "The Responsibility to Protect...", 23.

²⁶⁴ R2P brings into question the Westphalian model of sovereignty – that is, a state being defined as being positioned to handle issues within its own borders. Landry, "The Responsibility to Protect...", 19.

²⁶⁵ Kaplan, *NATO and the UN...*, 1, 5.

in 2003. Both incidents, although markedly different in their reason, saw attempts at receiving UN authorization for action that never came thereby seeing unilateral action taken in response to their needs. In so doing, the actions brought into question the very existence of the UN with it seemingly on the brink of irrelevance.²⁶⁶ One of the critical issues resulting in the tension was the UN's inability to seek, or even use, enforceable and significantly robust mandates, namely by invoking Chapter VII in their United Nations Security Resolutions (UNSCRs).²⁶⁷ When coupled with their mission failures through the 1990s as previously described, the UN seemed incapable of keeping any peace. It is arguably through these two critical credibility issues where NATO and the US felt it necessary to undertake unilateral action in Kosovo in 1999 and in Iraq in 2003 respectively. However, it was not only the West who felt this way about the UN.

Following the Cold War, the UN lost legitimacy with the many developing nations given some of their policies. Specifically, the UN undertook two issues that undermined their credibility: used sanctions as a means to impose order; and applied seemingly biased resolutions against the so called have-not-nations by the so-called have-nations.²⁶⁸ However, against what doubtless seemed to be impossible odds in the early 2000s, the UN persevered and refocused its efforts to gain credibility.

²⁶⁶ Lauri Malksoo, "Great Powers Then and Now: Security Council Reform and Responses to Threats to Peace and Security" in *United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security*, ed Peter G. Danchin and Horst Fischer, 94 – 114 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 109. Indeed, John Bolton, the US Ambassador to the UN, stated, "There's no such thing as the United Nations. If the UN secretary building in New York lost 10 stories, it wouldn't make a bit of a difference". Malksoo, "Great Powers Then and Now...", 109.

²⁶⁷ Chinubu, "Assessing the High-Level Panel Report...", 127.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 129.

First, as described above at length, the UN focused its security efforts on the individual rather than necessarily ensuring a balance of power. Next, the UN turned again to empowering regional actors to work in concert with them to bring about necessary change.²⁶⁹ This also includes the UN's relationship with NATO, which has dramatically improved to the point where the two organizations recently signed a joint cooperation declaration in 2008.²⁷⁰ Through these two critical endeavours, the UN regained the much needed credibility it had outright lost in the 1990s. However, one critical issue still exists requiring attention to maintain this forward momentum – an actual restructure of the power apparatus within the UN.

A critical issue that still questions the UN's legitimacy is the veto powers of the P5 that is a voice from 1945 rather than today.²⁷¹ Further, it is through the current power arrangements where some member states not within the P5 view some UN policies as a double standard.²⁷² This arrangement creates a distraction for many as the UN continues to move towards its mandate – an arrangement that Canada has also tried to adjust but failed.²⁷³

²⁶⁹ Sears, "Peace-Building...", 261 and Kaplan, *NATO and the UN...*, 207 and Ebo and Powell, "From the Multilateralism of States...", 66, 67.

²⁷⁰ Kaplan, *NATO and the UN...*, 209. Indeed, "A symbiotic relationship exists between [the UN and NATO] prevails at this time (2009) in such critical areas as Afghanistan." Kaplan, *NATO and the UN...*, 2.

²⁷¹ Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 117, 248 and Chinubu, "Assessing the High-Level Panel Report...", 147.

²⁷² Malksoo, "Great Powers Then and Now...", 95 and Chinubu, "Assessing the High-Level Panel Report...", 150.

²⁷³ Allan Rock, "Speech to the UN: Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters," available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/200/41375.html>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2011.

Despite this issue, there are reasons and continual developments to address the seeming imbalance. First, there are various movements, Canada included, to adjust the power balance within the UN. However, given the politics involved, namely the reticence for the P5 to alter the current power model, this process will no doubt take much time, if at all.²⁷⁴ Second, the seeming double standards the UN applies are typically done judiciously, but may not be perceived to be transmitted as such. By way of example, there is much contention over the UN's lack of holding China accountable for human rights violations. Although this is true, the UN has always been committed to ensuring their action does not further imbalance regional stability. Therefore, with the case of China, inaction is a more prudent step to take at this time.²⁷⁵ Regardless, the problems persist and remain an issue that the UN must address to continue enhancing its universal credibility.

With regards Canadian engagement, although not necessarily inhibiting any actions Canada must undertake to protect herself in the future security environment, it is nonetheless an issue where Canada, with additional institutional credibility within the UN and internationally, could assist in legitimizing or reforming.²⁷⁶ Regrettably, Canada cannot do so at this time as she has lost clout within the UN, which is exemplified through her not being voted onto the recent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) rotation in 2011.²⁷⁷ Although the reasons for Canada having not gained a seat on the

²⁷⁴ Malksoo, "Great Powers Then and Now...", 96.

²⁷⁵ Andreopoulos, "Collective Security...", 162-3.

²⁷⁶ Paul Heinbecker, "What to do if Canada Wins a Seat at the Security Council Table," the Globe and Mail, 24 September 2010.

UNSC in 2010 are varied, two critical issues present themselves that are topical to this paper.

First, Canada has significantly reduced her contribution in both United Nations New York (UNNY) and in the UN's fielded missions (see Figure 5.1 for details on current and historical deployed military personnel), which has arguably reduced some of her credibility within the international community.²⁷⁷ Second, current Canadian foreign policy has stopped funding into Sub-Saharan Africa and has re-focused on policies that are arguably incongruent with the larger international community, specifically her attention to Israel and her seeming reliance on using combat operations in Afghanistan as a credible source of international prestige.²⁷⁸ Although there are other important factors to consider in Canada's not gaining a seat on the UNSC, the fact remains that this is the first time Canada has lobbied for a seat and lost, which is reflective of a dissatisfied international community towards Canadian foreign policy.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Although the reasons are not fully known, the loss of the seat nonetheless impedes Canada's ability to influence the UN and by extension her foreign policy. "Policy Cost Canada", *CBC News Canada*, available from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2010/10/13/policy-cost-canada-103.html>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2011.

²⁷⁸ Stairs, *Being Rejected...*, 5, 9. Indeed, "Louise Frechette, the Canadian Foreign Service officer who served as the UN's Deputy Secretary-General for six years, has argued further that the real problem is that [Canadians] don't seem to be [in the UN] anymore". Stairs, *Being Rejected...*, 9.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁸⁰ Adam Chapnick, "Canada's Failed Campaign for the UN Security Council: 10 Unanswered Questions," Institute for Research on Public Policy, Public Options (February 2011): 59, 62; <http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/feb11/chapnick.pdf>; Internet; accessed 8 April 2011.




Figure 5.1 – Canadian Contributions to UN Mission Compared to UN Deployed Personnel Over Time

Source: Peacebuild. Peace Operations Working Group. *Canada & UN Peacekeeping*; available from <http://www.peacebuild.ca/documents/POWGcanada&UNPK.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2011.

Although these actions may be a required turning point in Canada's international image, the reality is that that action, for good or bad, is argued to have significantly contributed to Canada's diplomatic failure in securing a seat on the UNSC. Despite the argumentation that not having gained the seat will have little impact on Canada's ability to influence the UN, the reality is that it is a clear sign that Canada does not receive the political or diplomatic support from the international community writ large²⁸¹ and therefore risks losing opportunity to shape global affairs through the UN has she has done in the past.

So, with a renewed and ambitious UN that has gained renewed credibility, and who is actively engaged in a stabilized Sub-Saharan Africa, Canada finds herself on the periphery of an organization she helped create. Recognizing that the UN is itself a highly politicized organization and that patience is required whenever a large organization,

²⁸¹ Indeed, “[i]f the European members of NATO think they owe Canada something for its vigorous contribution to the operation in Afghanistan, they didn’t see fit to return the favour here. The fact that they didn’t may tell us a lot”. Stairs, *Being Rejected...*, 11.

specifically the UN who attempts to represent all of its member states, is required.²⁸²

While also acknowledging that, in the words of the second Secretary General to the UN, Dag Hammarskjold, “The United Nations was created not to lead mankind to heaven, but to save mankind from hell”.²⁸³ Therefore, to ensure Canada can pragmatically address her own security concerns while using what has proven to be the best multilateral organization bringing stability within Sub-Saharan Africa, Canada can, and must, re-insert herself in the process through the UN.

Canada’s Return

Canada has much to offer the UN through the organization’s reform and into the future. Although Canada does contribute to the UN, it could do more – and certainly has in the past.²⁸⁴ The irony of Canada’s reduced contribution today and over the past years is that it precisely came at a time when the UN has undergone much change. Irony aside, Canada’s approach has cost her international credibility and in her ability to affect sound foreign policy.²⁸⁵ For some, this lack of international voice became most apparent in

²⁸² Oboto, “The New Peacebuilding Architecture...”, 231 and Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game...*, 109, 118 and 249.

²⁸³ His Excellency Sheika Haya Rashed Al Khalifa, “Speech to the United Nations General Assembly: The Final Meeting of the First Year of the Peacebuilding Commission, 27 June 2007,” available from <http://www.un.org/ga/president/61/statements/statement20070627.shtml>; Internet; accessed 11 March 2011.

²⁸⁴ Canada is currently engaged in UNDP, UNIDIR, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO (food and agricultural organization) and WFP. Sears, “Peace-Building...”, 266-7. Further, there are currently only 65 military personnel deployed with the UN. Canada. Department of National Defence, “International Operations,” available from <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2011.

2010 when Canada was not voted as a member of the rotating UNSC. Given the changes to the UN and their active engagement in a region that means much to Canada's security, the CF can return to the UN in three specific areas (see Figure 5.2 for UN Command and Control Arrangements): the Strategic level at UNNY; the operational level at the various mission headquarters forward deployed; and the tactical level with fielded forces.

To regain institutional credibility in the UN, the CF must increase its presence in UNNY. This can be done in three ways (see Table 5.2 for details): increased numbers of Staff Officers within DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS); and increased Military Advisor (MILAD) and Deputy Military Advisor (DMILAD) presence throughout key positions within the UN, including within DPKO and to the Secretary General. Within DPKO, there are numerous sections where Canada could contribute with three sections that specifically link to Canadian security: Office of Operations, Africa I and II divisions; Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions, SSR Unit and DDR Section; and anywhere within the Office of Military Affairs. Within the DFS, the CF could provide military technical expertise available within the department to share the work load and contribute to fielded missions.

²⁸⁵ Timothy M. Shaw, "Canada, Africa, and "New" Multilateralisms for Global Governance: Before and After the Harper Regime in Ottawa?" in *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security After 9/11*. Eds Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, 219 – 234 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 222. Further, Canadian "multilateral traditions [were] not only eroded by an increasingly close relationship with the American government but also complicated by the heterogeneous coalitions of state and non-state actors engaged in matters of African development, rights and security". In other words, by not engaging in the UN and other like-organizations, Canada lost international credibility and consequent the ability to shape issues of national interest. Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, "Conclusion: Relocating Global Order". In *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security After 9/11*. Eds Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, 276 – 291 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 283.




Figure 5.2 – UN Command and Control for Multidimensional Missions


Source: The United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, 2008, 66.

Specifically as it applies to DPKO engagement, the CF has much to offer given their substantial role SSR-like activities in Afghanistan, let alone general operational experience within and outside of the UN. Through this engagement, Canada could not only be a part of the department responsible for mission execution within the UN, but would also be a part of the larger global SSR efforts as they relate through the SSR Task Force and general PBC activities as previously described.

To continue contributing to fielded forces, which is currency within the UN, Canada can look to increasing her CF presence at the UN's operational level with Staff Officers into key positions throughout any given mission in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 5.1 – United Nations Peacekeeping Group

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING GROUP: CAPACITIES TO ENSURE INTEGRATION



Last updated: 31 January 2011

Source: The United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Group*; available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/dpkodfs_org_chart.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 Mar 11.

Although Canada currently does just that,²⁸⁶ the CF should look to fielding Regular Force officers who are identified as future possible commanders within the CF. This is not to state that the CF has sent sub-par officers in the past – this is hardly the case. Rather, it is to state that a rebalance of officers within the missions would not only augment the already herculean efforts put forth by the CF while also retaining those experiences within the CF for future benefit.

At the tactical level, Canada has been sorely underrepresented despite the efforts of military observers operating on various missions over the past few years. The reality is that the CF has not fielded a formed organization to a UN mission since 2001 with their 450 person contribution to United Nations Mission Ethiopia Eritrea (UNMEE).²⁸⁷ Further, as the UN is now engaged in training missions, let alone SSR-related tasks, some of these roles could be filled by Canadians in greater numbers.²⁸⁸ This is not to state that the CF is better than other nations currently contributing to deployed operations. Rather, it is a commentary on Canada's requirement to regain international credibility through the provision of forces to UN missions. Further, through robust engagements through the UN in the region most likely to impact Canada in the future security environment, the CF would be playing a direct role in protecting Canada, albeit through a multilateral organization, through provision of regional and sub-regional stability while also

²⁸⁶ Canada currently contributes 65 CF personnel to UN missions. Department of National Defence, "International Operations".

²⁸⁷ Department of National Defence, "International Operations".

²⁸⁸ The CF does contribute much to this component of Sub-Saharan Africa SSR as noted through its contributions to IMATT and the AU fielded forces and training missions. Department of National Defence, "International Operations" and Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. "Canadian Forces Provide Training to Build Capacity of African Union Peace Keepers in Sudan," available from http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/kenya/highlights-faits/TrainingPeaceKeepers_FormationMaintien_DeLaPaix.aspx?lang=en; Internet; accessed 12 March 2011 and Sears, "Peace-Building...", 267.

increasing the CF's regional cultural intelligence to assist with future operations, UN or otherwise. Therefore, Canada must provide formed units, Company-level or otherwise, to the UN while continuing to provide Military Observers (MilObs) and personnel to assist with ongoing training or SSR operations forward deployed.

Throughout these proposed adjustment to Canada's UN engagement, it must be emphasized that this cannot be done at the expense of reducing commitment to other critical regional security organizations, specifically that of NATO and the AU let alone her own domestic security requirements. Not only are these organizations a foundation for UN stability operations, they also assist with Canadian credibility within those regions those organizations serve. Indeed, to suggest otherwise would be foolhardy unto itself as Canada could risk losing crucial credibility already established through their commitment to other multilateral or bilateral security commitments. However, with drawdown of forces from Afghanistan, Canada will have additional forces available to provide just this level of support that the UN, and most critically, to meet Canada's own security to deal with the anticipated future chaos in the international system.

Therefore, through increasing personnel throughout the UN from the strategic through the operational and into the tactical level, Canada can continue meaningful contributions to the international community while also addressing some of her own security issues.²⁸⁹ In so doing, Canada stands only to gain additional international credibility and confidence as the world moves through its shift in global power relationships.

²⁸⁹ David Black and Malcolm Savage, "Mainstreaming Investment: Foreign and Security Policy Implications of Canadian Extractive Industries in Africa" in *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security After 9/11*. Eds Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, 235 – 259 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 240.

As this chapter has explored, the UN is a far different organization than it was even a decade ago. Adapting to its failures and the contemporary security environment, it has made best efforts to position itself for the future security environment. Having shifted its policy from a power-balance oriented approach to the newly established PCB focusing on individual security, while also making great strides engaging regional actors, the UN has emerged through the first decade of the turn of the century with significantly more credibility than it had entering the new century. Within this construct, and continued patience, Canada can essentially return to the UN and continue assisting the organization achieve its lofty mandate while also significantly assisting Canada in addressing her own security concerns. Specifically, Canada can reinsert herself into all levels of the UN to regain her own credibility and continue developing the UN from within while meeting her security requirements.

Conclusion

There is little doubt that the future international security environment will remain a challenge for the world as it transitions through its unstable anarchy. How that final stage of transition will look like years from now is difficult to predict. What is certain is that through any period of global transition, violence is most likely to occur as nations, both emerging and declining, struggle to protect their citizens and interests. It is therefore within this milieu that Canada must make best efforts to identify what that world will be like, how she sees herself functioning within that environment and then determine what threats exist to Canada and how best to manage them. This paper has attempted to do just that despite the enormity of the task.

Through first establishing that Canada must remain engaged in multilateral and bilateral arrangements also while remaining actively engaged in collective security, the paper established specific criteria to assist in analysing where the greatest threats may emerge. What emerged were issues largely based on human security as a means to prevent instability or either prior to occurring or to prevent ongoing stability relapsing into conflict, intrastate or otherwise. Using those criteria, the paper then examined those regions most likely to have significant issues over the years to come – Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia and the Pacific and finally Sub-Saharan Africa. From that study, one region stood out as the most likely to pose a threat to Canada and her allies – Sub-Saharan Africa given its instability and overlapping security interests between Canada and her allies.

Within Sub-Saharan Africa, the paper examined the key external and internal actors – namely the US, the EU, the AU and the UN – currently engaged in the region

attempting to provide a modicum of regional stability. All most assuredly have their challenges, but one organization presented itself as the best fit for Canada to continue meaningful engagement in a transitioning world – the UN as it is here where Canada, as a middle power, can support and work with the most credible regional actor in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, it must remain clear that Canada cannot forsake other fundamental organizations, such as NATO, to pursue a return to the UN.

The paper then transitioned into specific employment options Canada could engage within UNNY as well as within specific mission areas. By so doing, Canada can not only continue applying herself towards collective security and assisting with UN transformation, but would arguably benefit from renewed international clout to further enhance her ability to influence world affairs. Additional research into this component of a potential Canadian engagement – specifically SSR development within the UN context and continued UN transformation as it specifically applies to P5 adjustments – would serve to augment this study.

As argued throughout this paper, to remain a viable global actor during the future chaos of the world while respecting her status as a middle power, Canada must shift her focus back to Sub-Saharan Africa by returning to the UN at all levels of operations. In so doing, Canada will regain much needed international credibility above and beyond Europe and the US while continuing to be an active participant in global stability and consequently her own security and prosperity.

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