

Canadian
Forces
College

Collège
des
Forces
Canadiennes



THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA: CANADA'S BRIDGEHEAD INTO AFRICA OR A POTENTIAL MINEFIELD?

Major D.C.D. Hilton

JCSP 37

Master of Defence Studies

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2011.

PCEMI 37

Maîtrise en études de la défense

Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2011.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
JCSP 37/ PCEMI 37

MASTERS OF DEFENCE STUDIES RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA: CANADA'S BRIDGEHEAD INTO AFRICA OR
A POTENTIAL MINEFIELD?**

By/par Maj D.C.D. Hilton

9 May 2011

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Word Count: 14407

CONTENTS

Table of Contents	i
Acronyms	ii
Abstract	iii
Chapter	
1. Introduction	1
2. South Africa an Emerging Middle Power	5
3. South African Development	9
4. South African Trade Relations	18
5. South Africa's Foreign Affairs Policy and Practices	26
6. South African Defence Policy and the Force	36
7. What Does It All Mean?	56
Bibliography	63

ACRONYMS

APLA	Azanian Peoples Liberation Army
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
ANC	African National Congress
CISA	China India and South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
ECOWAS	Economic Organization of West African States
IBSA	India Brazil and South Africa
NIC	Newly Industrialized Countries
NSF	Non Statutory Forces
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe
OAU	Organization of African Unity
SACU	Southern Africa Customs and Trade Union
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADCBRIG	Southern Africa Development Community Brigade
SADF	South African Defence Force
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SOE	State Owned Entity
TBVC	Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
TNC	Trans national corporation
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UN	United Nations

ABSTRACT

Increased awareness of the plight of African peoples and changed attitudes concerning the causes of conflict have changed the way the West looks at Africa. Certainly there is a belief among certain groups and governments that more needs to be done to address the lack of development in Africa that often manifests itself as conflict. Unfortunately, when conflict arises a credible defence force is often the only mechanism to confront the threat head on. That said, for a variety of reasons, defence forces from the West are not always the best equipped to handle these missions. It has, therefore, been suggested that Western defence forces might be well advised to establish a partnership with one of Africa's larger defence forces. This research project seeks to determine if South Africa would make a suitable partner for Canada in establishing closer defence relations, with the goal of leveraging that potential relationship, should Canada feel it needs to get involved in a future 3-D mission in Africa. The paper concludes that Canada should proceed cautiously in furthering the relationship, given South Africa's own developmental concerns, the orientation of its foreign policy, the status of real versus symbolic regional and continent cooperation, and finally the capacity of South Africa's National Defence Force.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

When the phrase ‘African solutions to African problems’¹ was coined in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide, the West’s political leaders embraced it. Although the phrase was intended to inspire African leaders to do better, western leaders, in contrast, used it as an excuse to accelerate the pace of disengagement from Africa. This marked a withdrawal that began as soon as the West had won the Cold War and had shifted its attention to consolidating potential gains in the former Soviet bloc. Canada, struggling under a mounting deficit and record debt and smarting from its recent experiences in Somalia and Rwanda, needed little encouragement to join the disengagement movement. The Liberal government of the day focused its attention inwards, cutting back on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and slashing the defence budget. For Canada, it seemed there was much more to be gained by cutting ties to Africa than there was to be lost.

It has been suggested that the West had two options for its disengagement. It could choose to share the burden for African development and security with Africa’s emerging middle powers or to shift the responsibility to them outright.² It seems in retrospect that shifting the burden to Africa’s emerging middle powers, in this case, became the preferred course of action. Unfortunately, looking at Africa today, it is evident that this strategy has backfired. Throughout Africa, development efforts are

¹ Yassin El-Ayouti, "An OAU for the Future: An Assessment," in *The Organization of African Unity After Thirty Years* (Prager Publishers, 1993), 179.

² David O'Brien, "The Search for Subsidiary: The UN, African Regional Organizations and Humanitarian Action," *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 3 (2000), 58.

flagging, inequities are growing, and Africa's regional organizations seem to lack the will and the capacity to intervene where their mandates clearly provide them the latitude to do so.³

Given this reality, it is hard to imagine that Canada, currently one of richest countries in the world, will be able to resist calls from both its citizens and world bodies, to re-engage with Africa particularly in the peace support realm much longer. Furthermore, recognizing that the Canadian Forces commitment to Afghanistan will be cut by up to two-thirds this summer, Canada will no longer be in a position to cite its contribution to NATO as an excuse for non-participation in ongoing UN operations in Africa. In this context, it is only prudent that the Department of National Defence should also consider what role a future Canadian Forces role might have in the African operating environment. As part of this process, the Canadian Forces needs to ask itself if there are African defence forces with whom it might collaborate in such a contingency. As such, it was appropriate that in the fall of 2010 the Associate Deputy Minister Policy (ADM Pol) questioned whether there was a role for the Canadian Forces (CF) in establishing better relations with a regional leader as a means of furthering the African development and security agendas. Given our "shared values in support of democracy, peace, security and prosperity"⁴ and its emerging middle power status one country worthy of consideration is South Africa. However, as recent events in Egypt, Cote D'Ivoire, and Libya have shown, the "Dark Continent" continues to live up to its name and shows that nothing can be

³ Wayne E. Nafziger, "Development, Inequality, and War in Africa," *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal* 1, no. 1 (2006), 1, http://www.epsjournal.org.uk/pdfs/eps_v1n1_nafziger.pdf.

⁴ "Canada South Africa Relations," http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/southafrica-afriquedesud/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada_sa-as.aspx?menu_id=7 (accessed 04/28, 2011).

assumed at face value. As such, before any steps are taken to establish a relationship, it is logical and prudent to conduct a holistic and unbiased examination of South Africa's policy, its actions since the end of apartheid and its defence force. A failure to do so would risk the CF expending significant resources of time, money and human capital in a relationship unlikely to be satisfactory or effectual. The paper argues that while South Africa is an emerging middle power and has all the appearance of being a suitable partner, Canada should proceed cautiously in developing closer ties between the Canadian Forces and the South African Nation Defence Force. There are several important reasons for this caution. Among them South Africa's lagging development, which it appears is largely caused by its political instability. For the political environment is not conducive to investment upon which the development plan is based. Additionally, trade relationships with other African nations, which are more important than those with the West, limit the West's influence. Furthermore, South Africa's foreign policy interests are not aligned with those of Canada owing to its belief in the need for a rebalancing of the world order, its desire to build solidarity within Africa and, finally, a renewed emphasis on taking care of its needs. Lastly, on the defence front it appears that South Africa's stated defence policy has left it little room for it to manoeuvre independent of regional and continental partners and demilitarization has compromised the effectiveness of its fighting force.

Organization of the Paper

This paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter examines whether South Africa is an emerging middle power given that it shares many of the same characteristics as recognised middle powers, it is more developed than the rest of Africa and it has

demonstrated leadership in a number of world forums. Chapter two looks at how political instability and a lack of skilled labor limit the investment needed to grow the economy and address its development issues. Chapter three examines South Africa's trade relations, establishing that it follows accepted trade regulations, before analysing its trade relationships with non-African and African trading partners. In the fourth chapter, South Africa's foreign policy is reviewed from the moment the African National Congress came to power to the present day. After demonstrating that South Africa's foreign policy initially enjoyed the support of the developed world, the reasons for it pursuing its interest and what is referred to as the 'Mbeki doctrine' are examined. The fifth chapter examines the change in defence policy that was pursued after the transition to power in 1994. The role of South Africa's continental and regional defence partnerships and the progress of the African Stand-by Force are considered in this new context. Finally the South African National Defence Force is examined to see how budget cuts, the integration of the SADF with non-statutory forces and a number of South Africa's socio-economic issues are affecting its readiness. The final chapter presents key deductions and makes recommendations for Canada's use of the Canadian Forces in Africa in the future.

CHAPTER 2 SOUTH AFRICA AN EMERGING MIDDLE POWER

South Africa may arguably be considered an emergent middle power. Certainly, when the West looks to South Africa to assume a representational or leadership role, it appears that there is an acknowledgement of its emergent middle power status. Moreover, when recognised emergent powers like Brazil or India choose to engage with South Africa rather than regional organizations like the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) it would seem this too is recognition of its status. The academic Maxi Schoeman has suggested that the term ‘emergent middle power’ actually represents two distinctly different ideas. The first, he argues, conjures up the image of present day middle powers like Canada, Sweden, and the Netherlands. These stable democracies use multilateral forums to voice their concerns and ensure their interests are considered, and occasionally they have an opportunity to punch above their weight in these same forums.

In other instances, a nation may be considered an ‘emergent middle power’ by virtue of its size, population, and economy relative to its neighbouring states. India and Brazil fit this definition well.⁵ The interesting thing about South Africa is that it seems to fit into both categories. Its leadership in the nuclear disarmament arena and its use of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to voice the southern hemisphere’s concerns with the global trading order are characteristic of it belonging to the first group. While its position, as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and it being the sole African nation in the G20 suggests membership in the second group.

⁵ Maxi Schoeman, "South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003," in *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, eds. John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall (Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003), 349.

Equally representative of its 'emerging middle power status', is its ranking in the United Nations Human Development Index. Relative to the rest of sub-Saharan states, it is one of the highest ranked. Whereas most African countries fall into the Low Human Development category, South Africa is one of a select few countries, including Botswana, Egypt, and Namibia that is categorised as being in the Medium Human Development range. Even more telling is the fact that if it were not for its low ranking in the area of life expectancy South Africa, by virtue of its Gross National Income, would actually place squarely within the High Human Development Category. Viewed through this lens, the HDI data suggests that South Africa is unique among African nations.⁶ Furthermore, the 2010 Cohort Model of Human Development study suggests that South Africa has an almost intractable developmental advantage over the rest of Africa.⁷

Canada's international development spending in South Africa appears to be consistent with this view since the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

⁶ "United Nations Development Program HDI Statistics 2010," UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Table1_reprint.pdf (accessed 04/25, 2011).

⁷Jana Asher and Beth Osborne Daponte, *A Hypothetical Cohort Model of Human Development* (New York, New York: United Nations,[2010]), http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/papers/HDRP_2010_40.pdf (accessed 25 April 2011). Interestingly, a study using HDI data done in 2010 for the UN, titled "A Hypothetical Cohort Model of Human Development" suggests that South Africa and Botswana are the sole members of sub-Saharan Africa that are not part of what they term as Cohort 1 or among the least developed countries of the world. Rather, South Africa and Botswana display the characteristics of countries the study deemed to be Cohort 2. The study suggests that development in the most advanced countries or Cohort 4 began in 1865. Development in the Cohort 3 countries is estimated to have begun around 1895 while in Cohort 2 and 1 the development began about 1925 and 1970 respectively.⁷ Given South Africa's position in Cohort 2 with the likes of China and Brazil, ahead of India and the majority of African nations, this study suggests that South Africa has an almost intractable development advantage over the remaining nations in Africa and at least one of the BRIC economies. As such, barring conflict, which the report suggests is the chief hindrance to development, more so than even disease or vagaries of climate, South Africa is unlikely to forfeit its leadership position among sub-Saharan African states.

has not categorized it to be one of its *Countries of Focus*.⁸ Instead, Canada's official development assistance to South Africa is limited to reducing the impact and incidence of HIV/AIDS, improving access to social services, improving services for small-scale rural farmers and supporting South African initiatives aimed at contributing to regional stability.⁹

Data aside, it is clear that South Africa has assumed a number of key leadership positions in pan-African affairs. President Mandela, for one, was involved in mediating peace agreements to end the conflict in Angola in 1994, Zaire in 1997, and Burundi in 2001. He also held the post of vice president of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). His successor President Mbeki held the chair of the OUA until it was disbanded in 2002, at which time he assumed the chair of the newly created African Union (AU). More importantly, his leadership contributed to the inclusion of a provision for member states to intervene in the affairs of other member states in the African Union's Constitutive Act. This was a much-needed addition, to ensure that human security concerns could not be trumped by sovereignty arguments.¹⁰ Further, President Mbeki was instrumental in the development and establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) that calls on African leaders to take responsibility for improving the conditions for their peoples and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

⁸ "CIDA Sub Saharan Africa Countries of Focus," CIDA, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NIC-5595719-JDD> (accessed 25 April, 2011). The sub-Saharan countries of focus are Mali, Ghana, Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania. They were chosen not only on the basis of developmental need but on the Canadian government impression of the likelihood the investment will reap benefits. This assessment is often tied to the countries governance.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, "International Security and African Regional Security: Perspectives from South Africa," in *Global Security in a Multipolar World*, ed. Luis Peral, Vol. 118 (France: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 90.

Development (OECD) to provide increased funding for development activities.

Certainly, in the post-apartheid era there is evidence that South Africa has emerged as a middle power owing to the characteristics it shares with other middle powers, its level of development compared to its region and its demonstrated leadership in world and continental bodies.

CHAPTER 3 SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

While the evidence suggests that South Africa is more highly developed than its neighboring states, it is clear there remain a number of developmental challenges in the areas of health care, education, and governance. It is also clear that the government strategy to address development challenges has always relied on economic growth to increase revenues in order to fund these initiatives.¹¹ That said, while growth in the South African economy post transition was initially significant, more recently it has fallen off and this puts the development agenda at risk.¹² Closer examination suggests that the causes of this decreased investment are likely political instability and a shortage of human capital. The dilemma facing South Africa, however, is that both the political instability and labor shortage are linked to areas in need of development including health care, education and governance.

Health Care

From a developmental standpoint health care is one of the greatest areas of concern in South Africa since predicted life expectancy at birth is very low in comparison with other measures of its development. One of the chief reasons for this is the high incidence of HIV/AIDS, as South Africa is second only to Brazil in the total number of reported cases of the disease. AIDS as a result, continues to place an enormous strain on

¹¹ *Final Report Poverty and Inequality in South Africa - Chapter Three Macroeconomic Context* (Government of South Africa, [13/05/1998]), <http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/1998/poverty/chap3.pdf> (accessed 07/05/2011).

¹² "World Bank Data- GDP Growth South Africa," <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/ZA?display=graph> (accessed 04/26, 2011).

the country's medical infrastructure and social systems. Early resistance and ignorance of the problem, on the part of South Africa's leaders, did nothing to help the situation. President Mbeki railed against Western calls to address the problem calling it a plot by the West to keep African men down and insisted that traditional remedies could treat the disease rather than ensuring anti-retrovirals were available.¹³ President Zuma for his part was not much better allegedly stating that after having had intercourse with an infected woman he took a shower to wash the virus away.¹⁴ If it had not been for former President Mandela's actions to openly acknowledge the link between HIV and AIDS, at the urging of numerous activist groups, it is unclear whether any governmental action would have been taken.¹⁵ Thankfully, it appears that despite the ignorance apparent in his previous statement, President Zuma has now supported new measures to address the crisis.¹⁶

Aside from HIV/AIDS; also contributing to the low life expectancy of South Africans is the fact that its public health care system is poorly managed, chronically underfunded and as a result under immense strain.¹⁷ The situation is so grave that in certain areas doctors have taken to the streets to protest the conditions which contribute to

¹³ Matthew Kaminski, "State of Play: How South Africa Became South Africa," *World Affairs* (July-August 2010) 32, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-JulyAugust/full-Kaminski-JA-2010.html> (accessed 04/25/2011).

¹⁴ *Ibid.* pg 32

¹⁵ *Ibid.* pg 32

¹⁶ "SAMA Commends the Government on the Change in HIV Policy," South African Medical Association, <http://www.samedical.org/newsroom/media-releases/archived-media-releases/sama-commends-the-government-on-the-change-in-hiv-policy-2-dec-2009.html> (accessed 05/07, 2011).

¹⁷ "Cape Town Doctors to March on Health Issues," South African Medical Association, <http://www.samedical.org/newsroom/media-releases/archived-media-releases/cape-town-doctors-to-march-on-health-issues.html> (accessed 05/07, 2011).

there being "...many unfortunate and preventable deaths..." in the public hospitals.¹⁸ In addition the public system is hemorrhaging doctors to South Africa's private medical system where doctors do not have to handle the same number of patients, do not have the same fears for their safety and the management of facilities is better.¹⁹ Indicative of the underfunding and poor management of the system, last year the public health care workers went on strike and it seems that doctors are routinely not paid salaries owing to poor administration.²⁰ To address these and many other pressing issues the South African Medical Association (SAMA) is calling for implementation of the Ten Point Plan.

...the revitalization of all public health care facilities, the appointment of appropriately qualified managers, adequate funding of academic training institutions with appropriate curriculum review, implementing quality assurance and improving morale, appropriate remuneration, attitudes and efficiency.²¹

While the Ten Point Plan speaks directly to the medical infrastructure, administration of the system and pay and benefits for its practitioners, there are also plans to implement a National Hospitalization Insurance (NHI) plan. A

¹⁸ "Doctors March in Limpopo," South African Medical Association, http://www.samedical.org/newsroom/media-releases/archived-media-releases/doctors-march-in-limpopo-12-august-2010.html?searched=limpopo&advsearch=oneword&highlight=ajaxSearch_highlight+ajaxSearch_highlight1 (accessed 05/07, 2011).

¹⁹ "Doctors Quit Public Service," South African Medical Association, <http://www.samedical.org/assets/files/old-sitecontent/Downloads/intheNews/1300%20doctors%20quit%20public%20service.pdf> (accessed 05/07, 2011).

²⁰ Sapa, "Health Minister: Doctors should be Paid," *Times Live* 02/02/2011, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/article888503.ece/Health-minister--Doctors-should-be-paid> (accessed 05/07/2011).

²¹ "2010 SAMA Conference Declaration - 11 Oct 2010," South African Medical Association, http://www.samedical.org/newsroom/media-releases/archived-media-releases/2010-sama-conference-declaration-11-oct-2010.html?searched=NHI&advsearch=oneword&highlight=ajaxSearch_highlight+ajaxSearch_highlight1 (accessed 05/07, 2011).

concept the ANC reinvigorated in 2007 that is intended to provide “Access to Health for All”²² and “conform as a minimum to the following guiding principles: Right to Health, Social Solidarity; Universality; Vertical Equity; and Universal Access to Health Care and Efficiency in Resource use.”²³ This plan, as envisioned would not eliminate the private system but would demand that all persons must first pay into the public system to assure its viability. Thereafter, those persons with sufficient resources could pursue treatment under a private scheme. The lack of progress, however, in implementing both these plans suggests the government has neither the human nor the financial resources to make either a reality.

Education

Among the biggest problems for South Africa today is a generally low level of education. Linda Chisholm admits there has been much progress since the end of apartheid, but both she and Miriam Altman contend that structures from that era are still in place today, which result in unequal access to quality education. The problem is even more acute in the apartheid era settlement areas where still today there are not enough teachers and the teachers themselves are often improperly qualified to teach.

But the quality of schooling overall, and in the rural areas particularly, still leaves much to be desired. The high percentage of un- and under qualified teachers in the system is a cause for concern. The persistent and unresolved language issues that continue to hamper learning also require decisive action. . . . Improvements are highly unevenly spread, and the provinces that suffered greatest neglect in the apartheid period still show

²² "A National Health System- Opportunities and Challenges for South Africa," Human Science Research Council, <http://www.hsrc.ac.za/Document-2319.phtml> (accessed 05/07, 2011).

²³ *Ibid.*

the greatest difficulties in overcoming the legacy of apartheid. They are the provinces that incorporated the previous homelands, namely Limpopo, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal.²⁴

Altman also points out that insufficient emphasis in maths and sciences is one of the quality issues and access to post secondary institutions is another. With the unfortunate outcome being there are not enough skilled workers to drive economic growth.

A third labour market problem relates to skills availability. The concern stretches back into primary and secondary education, especially in relation to maths and science education. Then there is concern about whether tertiary education institutions are delivering sufficient numbers of the quality required. The particular constraint refers to the availability of black commerce and science graduates.²⁵

The corollary of the shortage of skilled labor and limited investment is a high level of unemployment, particularly among young black South Africans. This is troubling for it puts significant pressure on a social system that is already straining to meet the need. Academics and development agencies alike have suggested that the government should establish a basic income grant or BIG program to improve the situation for the country's most disadvantaged, since they argue that increased spending would create demand that is needed to encourage investment.²⁶ The increased investment would then improve job prospects. The government; however, has to date resisted these calls. Most likely because they know the only means to increase government spending is to increase taxation, which

²⁴ Linda Chisholm, "The State of South Africa's Schools," in *State of the Nation South Africa 2004-2005*, eds. John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman (Cape Town South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council, 2005), 222.

²⁵ Miriam Altman, "The State of Employment," in *State of the Nation South Africa 2004-2005*, eds. John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman (Cape town South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council, 2005), 444.

²⁶ Ravi Naidoo, *The Basic Income Grant Poverty, Politics and Policy Making*, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000151/P135_Ravi_Naidoo.pdf ed. University of Natal, 1-7.

could have an unintended consequence of encouraging businesses to go elsewhere, and only exacerbate the current difficulties.

Governance

While the transition from the apartheid era National Party government to that of the ANC represents a significant step forward for democracy. The failure, over the preceding fifteen plus years, for Western styled democracy to have taken hold troubles investors. Their concern originates from the fact that no credible opposition has emerged to check the ANC's power and hold the government to account for its actions. Faced with such a situation, investors consider governmental corruption and unpredictability more likely, neither of which contributes to investment. Thankfully citizen groups and the church have assumed some of the responsibility of holding the government to account; however, this does not address the underlying issue or inspire investors with the confidence needed to increase investment.²⁷ Unfortunately this is not the only issue in the governance realm concerning investors.

Beside the fear of corruption, what concerns investors the most are government actions that are seemingly inconsistent with neo-liberal economic policy. Of note, investors interpret the about-face with regard to the privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOE) in South Africa, as indicative of a move towards a less friendly business environment. These SOEs have been a defining characteristic of the South African economy for many years, ever since the Afrikaans dominated National Party government built them during the apartheid era. Today these entities dominate the energy, transportation, defence, and telecommunications sectors while in the West, including Canada, there has generally been a move away from the government owned

²⁷ Kaminski, *State of Play: How South Africa Became South Africa*, 27-37.

enterprises to a private enterprise free market system. The socialist support of SOEs in South Africa, however, has a long history. In fact, upon his release in 1990, President Mandela, in keeping with the tenants of the Freedom Act of 1956, initially called for greater nationalization of private enterprises. It was only after convincing by both his advisors and even other communist leaders, that the ANC discarded the nationalization agenda and embraced a policy of privatization as a means of raising the country's poor masses out of poverty.²⁸ The GEAR or Growth Employment and Restructuring program that followed, concealed the idea of privatization behind the term 'restructuring' so as not to raise the ire of its support base the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the Communist Party. However, in contrast to the privatisation tenant of that programme, more recently, the government has introduced the concept of a 'development state' where privatization is no longer the number one priority.²⁹

This reversal of its stated policy, it appears, is a result of a number of factors. The first, it seems, is reluctance on the part of the South African government to privatize any industry that might fall into foreign hands. For, as the case of the former state owned telecommunications firm Telkom's sale demonstrates, jobs cuts ensued and the loss of state control jeopardized the South Africa government's parallel efforts to increase black ownership and management of corporations through the Black Economic Empowerment initiatives.³⁰ Second, South Africans generally, and more specifically the unions, have

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ "The Developmental State," Education and Training Unit For Democracy and Development, <http://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/govern/state.html> (accessed 05/07, 2011).

³⁰ S. R. Ponelis and J. J. Britz, "To Talk Or Not to Talk? from Telkom to Hellkom: A Critical Reflection on the Current Telecommunication Policy in South Africa from a Social Justice Perspective," *The*

been reluctant to subject themselves to foreign competition or have their job security put in the hands of foreign firms. So much so, that South African Airways took great pains to prevent a British Airways owned subsidiary from gaining a foothold in the domestic market.³¹ These examples suggest that despite the ANC's avowed commitment to the privatisation of its SOEs, socialist tendencies have re-emerged at the insistence of its constituents. The unfortunate side effect of not privatising however is lower productivity, which results in higher prices for services and this makes the country less attractive to investment. Arguably, a failure to privatise also makes operating a business from South Africa more costly.

Even more troubling for investors than the government's failure to pursue its stated privatization policy, is the fact that the ruling party derives much of its support from the left. Specifically, the ANC derives its support from both the Communist party and the COSATU as part of a tri-partite alliance. Given this reality, investors fear that South Africa's commitment to neo-liberal economic policy could be at risk if the ANC no longer has sufficient support necessary to continue with the aggressive neo-liberal economic policy.

Herein lies the greatest threat to South Africa's longer-term stability: risk that the tripartite alliance will splinter as the ANC's coalition partners withdraw their support from the party, still the only political institution in the country that has the capital and credibility to create a national consensus around ambitious policy initiative.³²

International Information and Library Review 40, no. 4 (December 2008), 219-225. After selling a substantial share of Telkom to a Malaysian Telecom company, the newly privatised entity cut nearly half its workforce between 2000 and 2005 or nearly 34,000 jobs.

³¹Roger Southall, "The State of Party Politics: Struggles within the Tripartite Alliance and the Decline of Opposition," in *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, eds. John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall (Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003), 53-77.

³²Ian Bremmer and Sebastian Spio-Garbrah, "South Africa's Troubled Success Story," *Survival* 49, no. 1 (Spring 2007), 12-14.

The unpredictable nature of what could result, if such a scenario were to arise, scares investors who are concerned that actions could be taken to nationalize private businesses and seize land holdings. Unfortunately, the election of President Zuma has done nothing to allay these fears. For his election is considered the first clear signal of the ANC's "popular expression more of its socialist roots than of a continuance of the path that was initially forged."³³ That said, counter arguments suggest that it is unlikely President Zuma will pursue a more aggressive redistribution policy than is already in place even though he draws his support from the trade unions and communists within the alliance. They argue that President Zuma recognises that he must work with business leaders as he appreciates that the economy depends on their investment.³⁴ It might even be speculated that Zuma's election has in fact been a stabilizing influence, since he secured the support of the leftist elements within the ANC alliance. Thanks to this, support for less progressive leftist parties like the Inkatha Freedom Party has fallen off and they have effectively dissolved.

This all suggests that South Africa has some significant developmental challenges ahead. The health and education challenges, while significant, can be addressed through increased funding by the government; however, the government needs economic growth to increase the tax base to do so and that is ultimately dependent on investment. Unfortunately, investment is unlikely to grow significantly until there is credible opposition to check the power of the ANC and the government has demonstrated

³³ Jeffrey Herbst, "South Africa After the Age of Heroes," *Current History* 107 (2008), 164-165. See as well Patrick Bond, "Reconciliation and Economic Reaction: Flaws in South Africa's Elite Transition," *Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 1 (2006), 153.

³⁴ Kaminski, *State of Play: How South Africa Became South Africa*, 36.

unequivocal support for neo-liberal policy. That said, for both credible opposition to emerge and investor fears to subside, arguably the electorate's views must also change and this will only occur once the masses are better educated and can consider how their interests may be better addressed. Given the interdependence of all these issues, there appears to be no quick fix to the problem. It will only be through sustained effort to improve education and governance that the investment needed to grow the economy will pick-up, which will subsequently allow for increased spending in the areas of health and education. It also suggests that the Government of South Africa is likely to be focused inward for the foreseeable future.

CHAPTER 4 TRADE

Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has embraced the international world order with regard to trade, developed trade relationships outside Africa, and built up an advantageous trade relationships with most African nations. In doing so, certain trade relationships have clearly assumed increased importance for South Africa. Among them relations within its region and the developing world, which suggests the Western world's influence has waned.

Acceptance of the International Trading Model

When the transition from the apartheid era occurred, South Africa hoped that for the first time in many years, its economy would benefit from its adoption of trade policy consistent with the rules established by the World Trade Organization and the ideals of the 'Washington Consensus'.³⁵ While the moves marked a radical change for South Africa, these actions were also consistent with those of other developing economies. Many of whom, thanks to the end of the cold war were abandoning state-directed command economy models³⁶ that focused on "import substitution strategies".³⁷ South Africa hoped these moves would increase trade substantially. Unfortunately, in the ensuing 15 years, South Africa's progress has not matched that of other newly

³⁵"Washington Consensus," Global Trade Negotiations Center for International Development at Harvard University, <http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html> (accessed 03/18, 2011).

³⁶John Daniel, Varusha Naidoo and Sanusha Naidu, "The South Africans have Arrived: Post-Apartheid Corporate Expansion into Africa," in *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, eds. John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall (Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003), 373.

³⁷ Michele Alessandrini and Michael Enowbi Batuo, "The Trade Specialization of SANE: Evidence from Manufacturing Industries," *The European Journal of Comparative Economics* 7, no. 1 (June 2008), 148, <http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/pramprapa/13216.htm> (accessed 25 April 2011).Ibid.

industrialized countries (NICs).³⁸ While South Africa has managed to shift its economic production somewhat from traditional products to ones more sought after in the global economy, data suggests that South Africa's mobility, a measure of its transformation from traditional areas of production to newer more specialized ones, is approximately half that of other developing economies such as India. A lack of skilled labour, owing largely to insufficient access to quality education, seems to be the primary reason for the slower progress.³⁹

Nonetheless, despite it having not enjoyed the success once promised, South Africa has assumed a leadership position with respect to trade and trade relations. It both encourages developing nations to support open and free trade and uses its position in world bodies to present the views and interests of developing nations.

It is credited with encouraging its Southern hemispheric nations to embrace this neo-liberal view. At the same time it has lobbied for "...greater debt relief and investment in developing countries" and "At the IMF it has pushed for increased voting power for developing countries."⁴⁰

This is significant, for it suggests that South Africa recognizes its long-term stability is tied to both the developed and the developing worlds. It needs developed markets to sell its products to but also recognises that its own development will suffer if developing nations do not succeed in increasing their share of the world's wealth. Lobbying on behalf of the developing world has arguably caused some consternation between South

³⁸ Herbst, *South Africa After the Age of Heroes*, 164. See also Timothy M. Shaw, Andrew F. Cooper and Agata Antkiewicz, "Global and /or Regional Development at the Start of the 21st Century? China, India and (South) Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (2007), 1255-1270. for a good comparison of South Africa position compared to that of many other newly industrialized countries (NICs).

³⁹ Alessandrini and Batuo, *The Trade Specialization of SANE: Evidence from Manufacturing Industries*, 156.

⁴⁰ Eduard Jordaan, "Fall from Grace: South Africa and the Changing International Order," *Politics* 30, no. 1 (2010), 88.

Africa and the OECD countries. Nevertheless, it enjoys a good trading relationship with the West.

Trade with the World

South Africa's acceptance of the world order has enabled it, along with its regional partners, to establish trading partnerships with the European Union (EU), and the Americas.⁴¹ South Africa's most important trading relationship, however, exists with Asia which accounts for 37.8% of its exports and 44.5% of its imports. Europe is next in importance, accounting for 30.9% of South African exports and 34.1% of its imports. Finally, trade with the Americas only accounts for 13% of exports and 12% of imports. In effect, trade with Europe and North America are neither significantly advantageous nor disadvantageous for South Africa, which suggests that the developed world is unlikely to leverage these trade relationships to influence South African actions.⁴²

Increasingly important to South Africa is the growing trade relationship it enjoys with the economies of the developing world, the southern hemisphere, and the BRIC countries. In fact, South Africa has already established important trade pacts with India and Brazil through the India Brazil South Africa (IBSA)⁴³ trade initiative, and it very recently joined the BRIC.⁴⁴ An examination of trade data over the past five years

⁴¹ Chris Alden and Mills Soko, "South Africa's Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and its Discontents," in , Vol. 43 (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 367-392.

⁴² "South African Trade by Continents," <http://www.thedti.gov.za/econdb/raportt/rapcont.html> (accessed April/26, 2011). Trade figures were calculated using the data provided by the republic of South Africa Department of Trade and Industry data.

⁴³ Gladys Lechini, "Middle Powers: IBSA and the New South-South Cooperation," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 40, no. 5 (2007), 5.

⁴⁴ Felicity Duncan, "South Africa Vs. the World," <http://moneyweb.co.za/mw/view/mw/en/page292678?oid=536248&sn=2009+Detail&pid=287226> (accessed 05/03, 2011).

indicates that the growth in its annual exports with Asia has been to the order of 20% per year, while those with Europe and the Americas have been less than 5% annually. Imports have risen significantly, nearly 7% and 10% from Asia and Africa respectively, whereas imports from the rest of the world have averaged about 3%.⁴⁵ These imports from Asia in particular are significant to South Africa's domestic economy, for they are the sources of cheaper goods produced by low paid and low skilled labour, which puts even greater pressure on industries like textile manufacturing in South Africa. While at the same time, South Africa benefits from being a key node for the import of these goods into other African markets. As such, it is likely that these relationships will garner more and more of the South African government's attention.

Furthermore, the West can expect that the growing solidarity between the emerging economies of Brazil, India, China and South Africa will be leveraged to take back some of the advantages the developing economies perceive the West enjoys in trade relations under the rules of the WTO.⁴⁶ While these trade relationships are important South Africa's most advantageous trade relationships are with its regional neighbours.

Trade Surplus with Africa

It is remarkable the rate with which South Africa has established durable trading and investment in sub-Saharan Africa. Trade with African countries accounts for 16.8% of its exports and just 7.5% of its imports.⁴⁷ These trade numbers with Africa, however,

⁴⁵ *South African Trade by Continents*

⁴⁶ James Barber, "The New South Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Practice," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944)* 81, no. 5 (2005), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569076> (accessed 25 April 2011). See as well Jordaan, *Fall from Grace: South Africa and the Changing International Order*, 82-90.

⁴⁷ *South African Trade by Continents*

believe the truth since nearly 70% of those imports come from just two countries, Nigeria and Angola, two of the continent's chief oil exporters. When trade is considered in the context of its region, the numbers are even more dramatic. In 2003, Daniels, Naidoo and Naidu provided statistical proof, obtained from the Business Day, of the massive trade imbalance South Africa enjoyed with its fellow members of the South African Development Community (SADC).⁴⁸ Data provided by the Department of Trade and Industry in 2010 showed the trend to be intact: with three of the SADC states, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia, alone accounting for nearly 50% (46.5%) of South African exports within Africa, and SADC member states taking in more than 70% of South Africa's exports to Africa.⁴⁹ Given this situation, it is clear that maintenance of these trade relationships provides significant motivation for South Africa to maintain its diplomatic relationships with African nations, even at the expense of those with the West.

South Africa has also benefitted from an historical trade union with its landlocked neighbours through the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU). It should however be noted that the ANC, under President Mandela's leadership, made it a priority to re-negotiate the Southern Africa Customs Union agreement it shares with Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland, which was seen to be skewed in South Africa's favour. Under the new arrangement, South Africa has agreed to distribute a proportion of the excise tax it collects on imports destined for its neighbouring countries.⁵⁰ This act, in

⁴⁸ Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu, *The South Africans have Arrived: Post-Apartheid Corporate Expansion into Africa*, 376. Vinothan Naidoo and Paula Jackson, "Reviewing South Africa's Efforts to Combat Corruption in its Bureaucracy: 1994-2009," in *South African Governance in Review: Anti-Corruption, Local Government, Traditional Leadership*, ed. Peter Lague (Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2009), 1-20.

⁴⁹ *South African Trade by Continents*

particular, is significant, for it demonstrates again that South Africa wants to be recognised as a partner in the region and not simply the dominant state in an unbalanced regional relationship. This all suggests that South Africa is seeking to establish itself as a credible partner in the region and that it has a stake in maintaining productive relations.

It is clear from the examination of South African trade policy that South Africa has embraced the neo-liberal trade order but also assumed a leadership role in representing the interests of the developing world in trade talk and negotiation. Furthermore, in practice it has established balanced trade relationships outside its immediate region with the Americas and the EU, while its trade with Asia is in deficit. The examination of its relationship with neighbouring countries suggest it enjoys a large trade surplus with them, in part owing to its role as an intermediary between many of the world economies and its neighbours. All suggesting that South Africa has more to lose currently by alienating its neighbours than it does in angering the West.

⁵⁰ Alden and Soko, *South Africa's Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and its Discontents*, 372.

CHAPTER 5 SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS POLICY AND PRACTICES

At the outset, it was intimated that South Africa was an emergent middle power in that, in niche areas, it occasionally demonstrated global leadership, while it was also a regional and continental leader. Interestingly enough, immediately following the transition to power, President Mandela's government policy actions appeared to be consistent with this view. Its actions more recently, however, call into question both its regional and global leadership. Especially when these deeds are considered against the relatively short period of time that has transpired since the transition to representational government and the fact that South Africa has been under one party rule for the entire period. It is perplexing then why the government's actions of late are so drastically different than those under Mandela.⁵¹ The examination that follows implies that what the West views as South Africa's foreign policy missteps can be better understood if considered in the context of its regional dynamics, its opposition to the global status quo, and its need to consider its interests, as well as its values, in the pursuit of foreign policy.

South Africa's Promising Start

It is clear that since 1995 South Africa has enjoyed some significant foreign policy successes, particularly for a nation that was in large part a global pariah for a generation beforehand. According to Jennings, it is in the area of foreign policy that South Africa has restored its image to the greatest extent since the apartheid era. He points to its membership in the African Union, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the United Nations, the New Partnership for Africa's Development

⁵¹ Barber, *The New South Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Practice*, 1079-1096.

(NEPAD) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as examples of how South Africa has embraced multilateralism to accomplish its policy goals. Including efforts on the part of President Mbeki to push for democratic reforms in Swaziland, to help with the re-establishment of responsible government in Somalia, to restore order and end the genocide in the Sudan, and to help with the implementation plan for elections in the Cote D'Ivoire. Furthermore, he indicates that Mbeki has embraced support from the West through the NEPAD initiative to address some of Africa's most pressing concerns like education, reproductive health, and sustainable development. Mbeki is also much-admired by the West for his endorsement of the African Peer Review Mechanism intended to encourage his counterparts to improve conditions for their citizens under a voluntary mechanism of review not unlike the UNHCR review mechanisms now in place.⁵²

Schoeman cites South Africa's destruction of its nuclear arsenal, its brokering of an extension to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995, its chairmanship of the negotiations surrounding the international ban on anti-personnel landmines, and its efforts among others to halt the trade of illegal diamonds as proof it has changed course since apartheid.⁵³ The West credits President Mandela for having been a vocal proponent for sanctions against the Nigerian government after the Abacha's regime assassinated the leader of the ethnic Ogonis movement and eight others, following calls for self-determination and oil royalties.⁵⁴ In addition, it has increasingly taken a leadership

⁵²William Jennings, "From International Pariah to Africa's Messiah: Dynamics of South Africa's Paradigm Shift," in *The African Search for Stable Forms of Statehood Essays in Political Criticism*, ed. Shadrack Wanjala Nasong'o (USA: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), 229-263.

⁵³ Schoeman, *South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003*, 355.

position with respect to North-South Hemisphere relations and in representing African concerns with the Northern hemisphere.⁵⁵ Perhaps one of the most symbolic actions taken by South Africa was its advocating for the inclusion of the human security agenda in the African Union framework.

Together with Nigeria, Algeria, Mozambique, and Senegal, South Africa was instrumental in pushing for the inclusion in the AU Constitutive Act of the right to intervene in the affairs of member states in grave circumstances.⁵⁶

This was extremely important, for it marked the first time that postcolonial African nations formally recognised that human security concerns needed to trump sovereignty concerns. Finally, in the most vivid expression of its foreign policy, South Africa has chosen to involve its military in peacekeeping missions in the hopes of addressing the human security issues that plague the continent. It would seem that the West has little to criticize South Africa for on its foreign policy in light of its aforementioned contributions to regional and global security. Unfortunately, this however is not the case, as South Africa has also taken some actions that have raised the ire of the West.

South Africa - An Undependable Western Partner

Despite the initial fanfare, closer examination of South African foreign policy reveals that it has not always been as dependable a global partner as the West had hoped. Bond has even suggested, "... , dangerous illusions have emerged regarding South

⁵⁴ "Nigerian Democracy Support Group Statement on the Situation in Nigeria," ANC Nigerian Democracy Support Group, <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/34a/014.html> (accessed 25 April, 2011). See as well Jordaan, *Fall from Grace: South Africa and the Changing International Order*, 82-90.

⁵⁵ Schoeman, *South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003*, 356.

⁵⁶ Sidiropoulos, *International Security and African Regional Security: Perspectives from South Africa*, 90.

Africa's standing on the continental and global stages."⁵⁷ Evidence suggests that owing to its business interests, the company it keeps and its failure to put human rights before other considerations it can no longer be considered a reputable global citizen.

One of the more disturbing attributes of a number of South African foreign policy actions have been their ties to South African business interests. South Africa's actions to broker a peace deal in the Democratic Republic of the Congo turned out to involve not only the fighting factions but also South African mining interests looking to gain a leg up on foreign competition.⁵⁸ Further, it appears that South Africa has done little to rein in its corporations even after a 2002 UN report was released highlighting a number of unscrupulous practices by South African corporations throughout Africa.

There is however, a less positive side to this picture as involvement in the region has not been without its difficulties and setbacks, while some South African corporates have been accused of some unsavoury practices. A 2002 UN report to the General Assembly named 12 South African companies in a list of firms accused of looting mineral resources in the DRC during its recent civil war. They included such 'blue-chip' names as Anglo American, Anglovaal Mining (Avmin), De Beers and Iscor.⁵⁹

It has also been argued that since the end of apartheid, South Africa continues to export arms at an alarming rate without regard for the instability these dealings may create.⁶⁰ In some instances, it would appear that even the South African government has been implicit in either dealing or allowing for the transportation of arms to regimes of

⁵⁷ Bond, *Reconciliation and Economic Reaction: Flaws in South Africa's Elite Transition*, 141-156.

⁵⁸"Business at War for Zaire's Wealth," *Mail & Guardian* April 25 1997, <http://mg.co.za/article/1997-04-25-business-at-war-for-zaires-wealth> (accessed 25 April 2011). For the concept of triangular diplomacy see John Stopford and Susan Strange *Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991)

⁵⁹ Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu, *The South Africans have Arrived: Post-Apartheid Corporate Expansion into Africa*, 368-391.

⁶⁰Centre de recherches pour le developpement internationale, 9 December 2004. See as well <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-06-27-sa-arms-flow-to-zimbabwe>

questionable merit and this despite its commitment to the much-heralded National Conventional Arms Control Act of 2002.⁶¹ Finally, Bond argues that seemingly altruistic actions to forgive loans have in fact been solely about obtaining preferential treatment for South Africa's Trans National Corporations (TNC).⁶²

Troubling, as well, has been South Africa's continued diplomatic relations with rogue states and those nations that demonstrate a blatant disregard for human rights. According to Jordan, South African foreign policy has in effect regressed, such that it more recently has taken to challenging the West and protecting despots from international actions.⁶³ Among these actions were those it was responsible for while a non-permanent member of the UNSC, to defend Iran's right to pursue a nuclear program and its refusal to support a UN resolution to stop human rights abuses in Belorussia, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe. Further, it failed to support the General Assembly's resolution to condemn the use of rape and sexual abuse as a military or political tactic. Even more inexcusable, South Africa backed the use of Russian and Chinese vetoes to oppose increased UN sanctions against Zimbabwe.⁶⁴ Bond cites Daniel and Lutchman with stating that the ANC has abandoned the ethical and human rights and principles that it previously said would guide its foreign policy.⁶⁵ For South African policy to be so diametrically opposed to many of its own stated policies suggests there must be other factors at play. The

⁶¹ Schoeman, *South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003*, 357.

⁶² Bond, *Reconciliation and Economic Reaction: Flaws in South Africa's Elite Transition*, 151.

⁶³ Jordaan, *Fall from Grace: South Africa and the Changing International Order*, 82-90.

⁶⁴ James Hamill and John Hoffman, "'Quiet Diplomacy' Or Appeasement? South African Policy Towards Zimbabwe," *The Round Table* 98, no. 402 (2009), 375.

⁶⁵ Bond, *Reconciliation and Economic Reaction: Flaws in South Africa's Elite Transition*, 141.

explanation may lie in the dynamics of its region, South Africa's association with the non aligned movement (NAM) and the pursuit of its interests to the detriment of its values.

Understanding the Poor Behaviour

To appreciate the change in its behaviour it is essential to understand the factors motivating these actions. The first of these factors is the regional dynamic, since it appears many of its foreign policy actions have been taken in order to build regional solidarity and legitimize its leadership position. It is important to note that while many nations view South Africa as the defacto regional hegemony a few of its neighbours do not necessarily hold this to be true since, "Leadership, such as that provided by South Africa, to a lesser extent Nigeria or disjointly...- is more by default than by the active acclaim of other AU member states."⁶⁶ The reluctance of its neighbours to support South Africa in assuming a regional leadership position include it lacking the liberationist credentials that other leaders and their nations are seen to have, including Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.⁶⁷ There are also ongoing suspicions that South Africa harbours imperialistic ambition. Some of this suspicion may be the result of the 'total strategy' pursued under the apartheid era government.⁶⁸ Regardless of the reason or reasons, a

⁶⁶ Francis A. Kornegay and Chris Landsberg, "Engaging Emerging Powers," *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Science* vol. 36, no. 1 (2009), 2, <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a916739531> (accessed 25 April 2011).

⁶⁷ Jennings, *From International Pariah to Africa's Messiah: Dynamics of South Africa's Paradigm Shift*, 252. During Nelson Mandel's incarceration, Robert Mugabe was leading the struggle in Rhodesia, modern day Zimbabwe, while Thabo Mbeki was overseas being educated and soliciting international support for the ANC's struggle in South Africa. For this reason, some observers speculate that Mbeki, while President of South Africa, lacked the credibility as a leader within the Southern African region that President Mugabe was afforded, since he was seen as having been a active member of the struggle and Mbeki was not.

⁶⁸ Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu, *The South Africans have Arrived: Post-Apartheid Corporate Expansion into Africa*, 371. It is important to note that during the apartheid era, the South African government used its neighbouring nations as buffer states to combat the growing rise of African nationalism spreading throughout the continent. As part of its 'total strategy' South Africa waged a number of insurgency

desire to counter these perceptions explains what Jordaan has termed “liberationist” actions taken by South Africa to build solidarity.⁶⁹ It also explains South Africa’s heavy reliance on multilateral forums as it attempts to allay fear of imperialistic ambition.⁷⁰ For South Africa “to act unilaterally, not to mention forcibly, would confirm lingering suspicions in the continent that South Africa had hegemonic ambitions and, worse still, was an agent of Western “imperial’ interest in Africa.”⁷¹

Critics argue, however, that although Mbeki’s multilateral approach, has been largely successful at developing regional links, it is unfortunate that South Africa’s “... new-found loyalty has unhinged the ability of its leaders to recognise the home-grown causes of Africa’s problems and accept legitimate criticism from the West.”⁷² The starkest example of this has been South Africa’s refusal to condemn the actions of President Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Mills for his part suggests that Mbeki put too much faith in a multilateral approach, since the situation in Zimbabwe, was not akin to the ANC’s in which they successfully sued for a transition to power with the ruling National Party.⁷³ Some have again cited sovereignty as the underlying issue. Hamill and Hoffman

campaigns in its neighbouring states, including Zimbabwe, to fight the progress of this nationalism that it saw as a direct threat.

⁶⁹ Jordaan, *Fall from Grace: South Africa and the Changing International Order*, 82-90.

⁷⁰ Schoeman, *South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003*, 358. see, as well, Hamill and Hoffman, *‘Quiet Diplomacy’ Or Appeasement? South African Policy Towards Zimbabwe*, 376. and Andrew F. Cooper, “The Multiple Faces of South African Foreign Policy,” *International Journal* 53, no. 4 (1998), 6.

⁷¹ Hamill and Hoffman, *‘Quiet Diplomacy’ Or Appeasement? South African Policy Towards Zimbabwe*, 377.

⁷² Jordaan, *Fall from Grace: South Africa and the Changing International Order*, 82-90.

⁷³ Mills Greg 2005 ‘Overview of Zimbabwe Elections,’ Hearings before the U.S. House International Relations committee, April 21. Retrieved from www.cq.com as quoted in Jennings, *From International Pariah to Africa's Messiah: Dynamics of South Africa's Paradigm Shift*, 253.

conclude that South African foreign policy toward its neighbour, Zimbabwe, was in the end tied to a misguided sense of Africanism since its actions have failed to

...make it clear that the defence of the democratic values embodied in the NEPAD was paramount, that the democratically expressed will of the Zimbabwean people must be upheld, and that a free and fair elections were indispensable to the construction of a new Africa. Instead, all of this was sacrificed in the name of 'liberation solidarity', to 'SADC unity' and 'governments of national unity' ...⁷⁴

That said there is no definitive explanation for Mbeki's actions vis-à-vis Zimbabwe. Nonetheless, as perplexing as these actions are for the West to comprehend, there is evidence that South African foreign policy has focused on rebuilding the trust of its region and of being seen as a continental team player. That being said, some of its deeds as a non-permanent UNSC member, including failures to support the West's calls for action against Iran, might best be explained by its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Membership in the Non-Aligned Movement

Foreign to Western thinking are the beliefs shared by the Non-Aligned Movement to which South Africa's belongs. Loyalty to the stated aims of this association may partly explain South Africa's unwillingness to support the West's calls to action for intervention in the developing world. Inclusion in the NAM during the Cold War signalled a nation's unwillingness to side with either the East or the West in the Cold War struggle. However, since its end, the movement has evolved to represent a grouping of nations with common 'interests relating to strategic world political and economic

⁷⁴Hamill and Hoffman, *'Quiet Diplomacy' Or Appeasement? South African Policy Towards Zimbabwe*, 382.

issues.”⁷⁵ South Africa joined the organization, because it supports the new aim of increased North-South dialogue, and more specifically it supports their goal of UN reform.⁷⁶ As such, this association may have contributed to South Africa’s refusal to allow human rights abuses in Burma, the Sudan and Zimbabwe to be included on the Agenda, while it was a member of the UNSC. While Edward Jordaan does not explicitly list the NAM as the reason for South Africa’s policy actions, his observations reinforce Strydom’s premise that what guides South Africa’s foreign policy is its loyalty to the governments of the developing world.

Rather than defend victims of human rights abuses, as democratic South Africa set out to do, or defend other liberation movements, as South Africa still does for Robert Mugabe and his ruling ZANU-PF, the principle at work seems to be that South Africa reserves its solidarity for the incumbent rulers of all developing countries, no matter how they rule, a sentiment that is even stronger towards other African regimes.⁷⁷

While these actions by South Africa often times anger the West, as they complicate efforts to fulfill stated human security initiatives the reasons for them is not so much that South Africa values have changed. Rather, it appears the underlying cause of this loyalty, is more likely South Africa’s recognition following a few years of predominantly values based diplomacy that its foreign policy interests must by necessity also be met.

South Africa’s Values No Longer Trump its Interests

In Cooper’s examination of South African foreign policy, he argues that while South Africa initially sought to be seen as a responsible global citizen and break any associations with the old South Africa, it could not sustain such a practice. Inevitably,

⁷⁵ Hennie Strydom, "The Context and Determinants of South Africa's New Role in the United Nations," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* (Institute for Strategic Studies, 1 May 2007), 1-37.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 13

⁷⁷ Jordaan, *Fall from Grace: South Africa and the Changing International Order*, 82-90.

South Africa would have to subordinate its values for its interest. In other words, an external validation based foreign policy would not last, for eventually material concerns would be more important than being seen to be doing and saying the right things. The basis of this argument is that South Africa's material wants could only be met through either external or internal extraction methodologies and as such, its foreign diplomacy would likely be refocused to these ends. Adding to the likelihood that policies aimed at obtaining external validation would be subordinated was the fact that South Africa's reputation was already diminished and therefore it no longer had to pretend to be guided solely by altruism.⁷⁸

Evidence that material interests have taken the place of South Africa's values is abundant. According to Cooper, when a South African mining firm took a seat at the negotiating table alongside the rival factions in the second stage of the Congolese peace talks it was clear that South Africa's interests had trumped all other considerations. He also argues that the continued sale of arms by South Africa is demonstrative of an internal extraction strategy trumping its desire for external validation, in that, even if the sale of the arms is strictly controlled, profiting in this manner is simply an interest-based proposition. Arguably, President Mbeki's refusal to address human rights concerns in Zimbabwe had less to do with Africanism, or regional solidarity, and more to do with South Africa trying to avoid a mass exodus of Zimbabwean refugees into South Africa.⁷⁹ Therefore, it is hardly surprising that this pattern is unlikely to change with President Zuma in office.

⁷⁸ Cooper, *The Multiple Faces of South African Foreign Policy*, 714.

⁷⁹ Hamill and Hoffman, *'Quiet Diplomacy' Or Appeasement? South African Policy Towards Zimbabwe*, 376.

The Zuma administration's foreign policy will be determined to a greater extent by the struggle to satisfy national needs and demands. South Africa's internal needs and demands for improved living standards, creation and distribution of wealth, reduction of poverty will be some of the socio-economic issues constituting key challenges for the administration. These can best be understood if we take into account not only the country's increasing level of corruption and violent crime, but also a high level of expectations from the urban and rural unemployed, the poor and the working class expecting the qualitative improvement in their material conditions.⁸⁰

Given the evidence, it appears South Africa's values based foreign policy has in many respects given way to the pursuits of national interests. This arguably was inevitable given the pressing developmental challenges.

Nevertheless, understanding South African foreign policy is no simple task and it is unclear if the "Mbeki doctrine", founded on an African Renaissance and building African consensus to challenge the West, particularly through the African Union" will continue to drive the agenda.⁸¹ If it does, it is likely that South Africa's actions will often be inconsistent with western views. Furthermore, the West cannot assume that the continent or the region for that matter can be influence by convincing South Africa alone, since it does not enjoy an uncontested leadership position in its region or the continent. It is likely, as well, that South Africa will play the West off against its region when it needs to save face or wishes to prevent being caught up in a situation that may jeopardize its own development or risk a significant expenditure of funds.

⁸⁰ Sehlare Makgetlangeng, "The Zuma Administration Foreign Policy Continuity and Change," (2008), http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/21330__foreign_policy_.pdf (accessed 25 April 2011). See as well Stephen Gruzd, "Foreign Policy Under Zuma: Change of Style Or Substance?" (21 December 2009), <http://www.saiia.org.za/governance-and-aprm-opinion/foreign-policy-under-zuma-change-of-style-or-substance.html> (accessed 25 April 2011).

⁸¹ Dr Nomfundo Ngwenya as quoted in *Ibid.*, 1

CHAPTER 6 SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE POLICY

As the Cold War came to an abrupt end and South Africa's apartheid government transferred power to the African National Congress in South Africa, the new South Africa adopted a radically different view of the region, the world, and its place within each that translated into a vastly different defence policy. In fact, due to the change in its outlook, both South African defence policy and its defence force were to be fundamentally altered.⁸² Under the leadership of President Mandela, the new defence policy embraced progressive thinking on defence and security, emphasized regional and pan African coordination of defence matters, and moved to establish a new SANDF representative of both the new policy and South African society. Unfortunately, it appears that these policies have contributed little to continental security in the short-term and most definitely have resulted in degraded SANDF capability.

New Defence Architecture - A Fundamental Policy Shift

The release of a number of policy documents during the ANC's first five years in office formalised the new government's thinking on defence and security. Among the beliefs that underpinned them was the concept of 'human security'. The doctrine recognised that it was underlying socio-economic, political, and environmental factors

⁸² Amy Truesdell, "Achieving Political Objectives: South African Defense Priorities from the Apartheid to the Postapartheid Era," *African Studies Review* 52, no. 3 (2009), 107-125. During the apartheid era, South Africa had possessed a singularly focused defence policy owing broadly to two considerations. The first was the regimes need to protect the state against the internal security threats that arose because of the unequal status afforded to the majority of its citizens and the second from its belief that it had to protect itself from the forces of communism that were enabling the liberalisation of sub-Saharan African states to the north. As South Africa was precluded from buying arms from foreign suppliers, due to the sanctions imposed upon them, it developed its own defence industry to supply the defence and security apparatus with the arms and equipment needed to fulfill these missions. However, with the end of apartheid, this singularly focused defence strategy came to an abrupt end.

that more often than not were the cause of conflict. The White Paper's subsequent identification of the country's internal and external security threats was consistent with this thinking in that it identified poverty, unemployment, and the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic as some of the potential causes of South Africa's internal instability. The White Paper on Defence was also noteworthy for its position to cut back on defence spending and support to the defence industry. The subsequent 1998 Defence review made it clear the government's intention not to use military forces outside their traditional role, with the paper announcing that the ANC government was disinclined to employ the military in the socio-economic development sphere.⁸³ The White paper also clearly identified the chief external considerations to be the country's sovereignty and the promotion of regional security.⁸⁴

In 1999, the government released its White Paper on Peace Missions. The paper had initially been drafted by the Department of Defence and was consistent with traditionally defined UN peacekeeping missions or in other words, a military response to conflict under the auspices of a UN mandate. The draft, however, was subsequently revised after considerable intra-governmental review and consultation with NGOs. The final paper suggested the "Peace Mission" versus "Peace Support" strategy was to be founded upon five "normative, conceptual, and strategic pillars"⁸⁵. The first was the idea that "Peace Missions" in the government's view not only included military but also diplomatic and development responses to conflict. Consistent with the tenants of the

⁸³ Sidiropoulos, *International Security and African Regional Security: Perspectives from South Africa*, 88.

⁸⁴ *South African White Paper on Defence 1996* Department of Defence, [1996]), <http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1996/defencwp.htm> (accessed 25 April 2011).

⁸⁵ Rocky Williams, "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding? South African Policy and Practice in Peace Missions," *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 3 (2000), 88.

1996 Defence White paper, the second pillar suggested that the root causes of conflict had to be addressed as part of any peace mission. The lack of representational government, gross inequities, and weak institutional capacity to manage conflict were all given as examples of the causes that needed to be addressed. The third pillar specified that South Africa's involvement had to be consistent with both its values and its interests, and among its interests were its security, its development, and the security of the region. The fourth pillar indicated that, when appropriate, South Africa was prepared to use military force, and finally, the fifth addressed the need for an international UN mandate that was also supported both regionally and domestically. The numerous changes to the defence architecture clearly indicated the ANC's break from past defence policy. Among these changes, South Africa would only consider the use of its defence force in cooperation with its continental and regional security and defence partners.

Continental and Regional Security Framework

Consistent with its new defence policy framework, South Africa proposed that the continent embark on a new continental defence strategy. With partners, like Nigeria, it work diligently to replace the OAU with the new AU construct, and as part of it pushed for the inclusion of progressive security policy obligating intervention in "grave" situations.

In fact South Africa along with Nigeria were key proponents of the establishment of the AU and the inclusion of doctrine in its Constitutive Act obligating AU interference, including military action, in the affairs of sovereign nations where the AU deemed grave violations of human rights had been or were about to be committed.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Adekeye Adebajo and Christopher Landsberg, "South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons," in *From Cape to Congo Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*, eds. Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003), 171-204.

The subsequent establishment of the African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) was viewed as a step in the right direction for ensuring the AU met its obligations under the Constitutive Act. The PSC was established as part of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) under the auspices of the January 2004 PSC Protocol. The PSC mandate included the anticipation and prevention of disputes, undertaking peacemaking and peace building activities, authorizing the mounting and deployment of peace support missions to intervene in "grave circumstances" and, finally, to "support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters." To assist in the identification of situations requiring intervention, a Panel of the Wise, was also established as an impartial advisory body to provide advice on all issues relating to the promotion and maintenance of security. It was envisioned that the Panel could work both independently or at the behest of the AU Commission or the PSC.⁸⁷ Further, recognizing that a credible military force was required to undertake these missions, South Africa was instrumental in getting the AU governing body to commit to the establishment of an African Stand-by Force (ASF) under Article 2 of the PSC Protocol.⁸⁸

The two leaders have argued that the AU Constitutive Act should recognize certain pretexts for intervention. They championed the idea of military intervention by regional bodies in four specific cases: first, to reverse an unconstitutional change of regime; second, to prevent genocide; third, in cases of instability that threaten to spread to engulf other states; and fourth, under gross violations of human rights.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Jamila El Abdellaoui, "The Panel of the Wise: A Comprehensive Introduction to the Critical Pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture," *ISS*, no. 193 (2009), 2, <http://www.issafrica.org> (accessed 25 April 2011).

⁸⁸ Solomon A. Dersso Dr., "The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture," *ISS*, no. 209 (2010), 5-6.

⁸⁹ Adebajo and Landsberg, *South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons*, 181.

Besides conforming to the African Union's desire to have a force ready to prevent a situation like Rwanda reoccurring, the incorporation of the ASF is consistent with the international view that the "AU can and should deploy in advance of the UN...". By taking on this role, the ASF would "help to create the conditions on the ground that would lead to a comprehensive peace agreement and enable the deployment of follow-on UN forces."⁹⁰

The efficacy of the African leader's approach has been called into question. Specifically the suitability of adopting the EU model has been questioned, given that the ties that bind the EU are not found between all the nations of the AU.⁹¹ While arguably there has been progress with the establishment of the AU, the PSC and the ASF there continue to be a number of obstacles to the AU being capable of credibly intervening in a sovereign nation. Unfortunately, the cooperation that was apparent in the negotiation of this continental framework has however not been the common place in response to incidents.

In South Africa's case, one of these obstacles is clearly that of its regions defence architecture and its regional relations. According to Wulf even though the SADC established the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security as early as 1994, it has a dismal record of response despite the numerous conflicts in the region in the ensuing years.⁹²

⁹⁰ Jakkie Cilliers, "The African Standby Force," *ISS 160* (2008), http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ISS_Africanstandbyforce.pdf (accessed 04/25/2011).

⁹¹ Administrator, "The AU: The Good, the Bad, and the Unpleasant," <http://www.currentanalyst.com/index.php/opeds/106-in-search-of-the-aus-moral-foundations> (accessed 12 March, 25 April 2011).

⁹² Herbert Wulf, "South Africa: From Pariah to Regional Cop," in *Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace* (Great Britain: Antony Rowe Ltd, 2005), 90.

Nathan believes there are three issues preventing the SADC from forming a credible force to respond to contingencies. First, the SADC nations do not have the same fundamental values. Specifically the SADC nations do not all enjoy the same governance structures. Some are free, others partly free and some are not free at all. Second, that sovereignty concerns still preclude involvement, as these predominately-weak states in the organization are insecure about outside interventions. Third, there are simply not enough resources either economic or human to take on these missions.⁹³ Rocky Williams also believes that the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security itself needs to be restructured. He feels the decision-making chains should be clearly articulated. Specifically, the legal mandates for participation must be clarified since it seems any action requires both UN and AU approval, even with SADC membership agreement. To ensure the mandates are clear, the SADC secretariat must also be reinvigorated and proposed solutions require a whole of government approach.⁹⁴ David O'Brien argues that in this context, "the new role South Africa carves for itself, the speed that South Africa and Zimbabwe settle their differences, the tenor of public opinion (a variable that only applies to SADC democratic states) are several determinants that will influence the operational future of SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security."⁹⁵ The above all suggests that there is much work to do to address the will on the part of countries to work

⁹³Laurie Nathan, *The Absence of Common Values and Failure of Common Security in Southern Africa, 1992-2003* Crisis States Research Centre LSE,[2003]), <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/wp/wpSeries1/wp50.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2011).

⁹⁴ Williams, *From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding? South African Policy and Practice in Peace Missions*, 100-101.

⁹⁵ O'Brien, *The Search for Subsidiary: The UN, African Regional Organizations and Humanitarian Action*, 70.

together and intervene for the good of humanity as is stated in both of the organizations goals. Equally important, the AU and SADC need credible forces to put the boots on the ground.

The African Security Force

The highly touted African Standby Force (ASF) is seen as the mechanism by which the AU will intervene militarily if the council were to determine that grave conditions existed which necessitated its involvement. The ASF construct, calls on Africa's five regional organizations, including the Southern African Development Community, to which South Africa belongs, to train and equip a brigade-sized force that can be deployed rapidly when the need arises.⁹⁶ Each regional brigade is expected to have approximately 4000 personnel, 500 light vehicles, 15 armoured vehicles, 15 reconnaissance vehicles, and 4 helicopters.

Unfortunately, while the ASF holds significant promise, some significant obstacles must be overcome before it will be a credible force. Among them, the need for regular collective training by the forces identified to ensure the stand-by brigades are prepared for the complex missions they are likely to undertake. In the Southern region, South Africa has been a leader in conducting joint exercises with the troops from the SADC. However, even these exercises cannot overcome the fact that the identified troops are not stationed together in a centralised location but rather are retained by the national defence forces and continue to train and operate as part of these entities until they are deemed to be needed. As such it will be difficult to generate the unity of purpose

⁹⁶ Dersso, *The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture*, 7.

critical to the effectiveness of a military organisation. In addition, it is likely there will be challenges finding sufficient numbers and equipment for deployment despite commitments on partnering nation to supply formations.⁹⁷ Furthermore, without having trained and lived alongside each other, there are likely to be significant growing pains when the forces come together for the first time in the conflict zone, not to mention impediments to operational effectiveness due to the language barriers that may exist. Given that each of the regions has vastly different capabilities, it will also remain a challenge for the ASF to find employment for all the assigned forces for which they will truly be prepared. This is likely to be taxing for both South Africa and Nigeria, as arguably they each have the largest and most capable defence forces, and as such, there will be a disproportionate call for them to supply troops.

Equipping and sustaining the AU forces is another part of the problem. There is a real reluctance on the part of international donor nations to supply many African nations with arms needed to conduct these missions using development funds.⁹⁸ Jakkie Cilliers suggested in 2008 that there has been progress on “training, development of doctrine, SOPs, command and control concepts and the like...” but logistics remain the Achilles heel of the force. In her assessment there is no clear way forward on what type of logistics support network is required, to include numbers and types of hubs or their locations, as well as, what equipment should be held at each hub. To address the equipment shortfalls that each of the contingents forces have to contend with, Herbert Wulf suggests that commercial enterprises may be a means of meeting the logistics needs

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 7

⁹⁸ Rory Keane, "The EU's African Peace Facility Uncovered: Better Late than Never?" *European Security Review*, no. no. 24 (October 2004), http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/esr_25.pdf (accessed 26 April 2011).

of the ASF. He cites the use of Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) and ICI-Oregon, to provide logistic support to UN sanctioned ECOWAS troops operating in Liberia as evidence that it has worked in the past.⁹⁹

Perhaps the most pressing problem of the force becoming a reality is planning capacity. According to Dersso the UNSC report *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the UN September 2009*, AU missions have also been hampered due to resource constraints because the AU and the military forces lack the capacity to “plan, manage, deploy and liquidate operations.”¹⁰⁰ Cilliers regards addressing this planning capacity shortfall within the AU as essential to the effectiveness of the ASF.¹⁰¹ The need for credible planning is crucial when it considers that donor nations are unlikely to fund any organization or activities that cannot provide, justify and account for expenditures. That all being said, it is clear that greater human and financial resources are required if the ASF is to become a reality. However, donor funding arguably is contingent on the force having the required planning and administrative capacity to both estimate and account for expenditures. Further it is incumbent on African leaders to demonstrate the will to meet their security and defence obligations under the framework arrangement they have signed, as well as training and equipping their forces to fulfill these collective security arrangements. The inability to move the ASF forward, and in

⁹⁹Micheal O'Hanlon and Peter W. Singer, "The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity." *Survival* 46, no. 1 (Spring) (2004), 86.

¹⁰⁰ *Support to AU Peacekeeping Operations Authorized by the UN, Report of UN Secretary* (New York: UN, [18 September, 2009]), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/510/12/PDF/N0951012.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 25 April 2011).

¹⁰¹Cilliers, *The African Standby Force*, 17.

particular the SADC Brigade, can arguably be attributed to the South African governments stated policy of demilitarization.

Demilitarization

On taking power, the ANC quickly set about its stated objective of demilitarization. The ANC's stated policy is said to have been borne from a belief that negotiated settlement rather than force projection was the preferred means of diplomacy. Government officials have even been credited with espousing the idea that since the ANC successfully negotiated its transition to power in South Africa it was ideally suited to embrace such a strategy. Nonetheless, faith in this stated belief also provided the onus to derive a substantial peace dividend from reduced defence expenditures. Savings that could then be applied to the ANC's stated development objectives. It was clear, as well, that the demilitarization policy also provided the rationale to integrate the former Non-statutory (NSF) forces including Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) or the militant wing of the ANC, the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA) of the Pan African Congress and the TBVC (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) Defence into the newly formed SANDF.

Integration, however, has contributed to a loss of expertise owing in part to cuts to the forces numbers and in large part the stated policy objective of creating a force representative of the population. It should be noted that the SADF was never a homogeneous white force, however, as with most aspects of the South African civil service in the apartheid era the positions of authority that is to say the officers and non-commissioned officers were held by those of Afrikaans decent. However, between 1992 and 2000, nearly 31,000 members of the near 41,000 strong SADF have either resigned,

taken their severance or been discharged. This represents a 75% loss of trained military troops and suggests that in attaining the preferred manning levels and representational percentages the effectiveness of the newly created force has been compromised in the short to mid-term. To replace this expertise is arguably a generational task and one that will draw heavily on the already diminished resources of the defence force.

Besides integration of the force, the demilitarization policy was responsible for significant budget cuts. With spending as a percentage of GDP decreasing from nearly 3.2% of GDP in 1991 to 1.3% of GDP in 1999 where it has remained relatively steady ever since.¹⁰² With the most noticeable decline occurring during the transition period, as the Cold War ended. Spending as a percentage of GDP has remained relatively steady at the new levels ever since.¹⁰³ On the surface, it might seem reasonable that South Africa spends between 1-2% of its GDP on defence, since this percentage falls in line with a number of other countries around the world, including Canada. However when one considers that South Africa, like it or not, is a regional hegemon one could argue that it must maintain a credible force if it hopes that its regional partners will do the same. Its need to maintain credible forces is much like the situation the United States is in as part of the NATO alliance whereby any spending cuts by the United States can be perceived as an excuse by NATO partners to also cut their spending. It also needs to maintain a credible force if it wants to be taken seriously in the region on the continent and within world bodies like the UNSC and G20. Even if its stated policy is heavily weighted

¹⁰² Noel Stott, "From the SADF to the SANDF: Safeguarding South Africa for a Better Life for all?" *Violence and Transition Series 7* (2002), 26-28, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&size582=10&id=103420> (accessed 25 April 2011).

¹⁰³ *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure Database*, [2011], <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010> (accessed 25 April 2011).

towards multilateral negotiation, membership in these organizations, and the influence that comes with it, is commensurate with a country paying its way so to speak. A failure to do so results in a loss of influence.

As the regional hegemon and the largest beneficiary of trade in the region, there is arguably an onus on the part of South Africa, perhaps even an obligation, for it to maintain military capabilities that neighbouring states cannot afford. A navy that can counter piracy, enforce economic exclusion zones and conduct search and rescue, both off its coasts and in the region, is one example of a requirement its neighbours can ill afford to provide. An air force that can support ground and naval operations and project and sustain land forces is another since these capabilities are very expensive to both procure and subsequently maintain. Another argument for the need for increased spending involves how the South African government uses the SANDF. Given the extensive constabulary type tasks assigned the SANDF, including the onerous task of protecting the border, the force needs additional manpower and funding if it is to also maintain its expeditionary competency or the skills needed to work as part of the ASF or a UN force.

From another perspective, if the actual expenditure in dollars is compared against the expenditure of say Canada or the Netherlands it becomes clear that while South Africa is attempting to maintain many of the same capabilities, it cannot realistically hope to do so when its actual expenditures are arguably half those of comparable emerging middle powers. Lastly, given its significant expenditures on personnel, near 57% in the Army, a failure to increase spending will inevitably detract from operational capability.

Regardless of the comparison, it is clear that spending based on 1.3% of GDP is currently not sufficient to meet the requirements of the SANDF. This explains, in part, the reticence of the Minister of Defence to release both the Interim and Final reports made by the Interim Defence Force Service Commission. As the briefing on the report suggests many of the problems, the SANDF faces are budgetary in nature including concerns about infrastructure, capital acquisition, and health care. The commission was reportedly set up to address the place of trade unions in the SANDF however, the mandate of the Committee changed early in the process and the committee was directed to have no further interaction with the union representatives. This followed the release of the Interim Report by the committee and an announcement by President Zuma of a pay increase of up to 65% for some ranks to bring the SANDF pay in line with that of the South African Police Force (SAPS).¹⁰⁴ According to the Parliamentary Monitor Group, the Interim Report by the Interim Defence Force Service Committee suggested that the conditions within the SANDF were dire, with a large percentages of the force's soldiers living either in deplorable barracks or in improvised settlements off the bases as they could not afford to get a mortgage nor were they entitled to welfare housing. This may partly explain why soldiers felt it was necessary to take their protest to the streets.

The Interim National Defence Force Service Commission (the commission) gave an interim report on its findings to the Committee. It had also given an interim report to the Minister, prompted by the dreadful conditions that it found in the military services, and had advised the Minister that this was a situation akin to a ticking time bomb. The main problems related to the salaries, deployment issues, failure of command and control, infrastructure, since the conditions under which the soldiers were living and working in the barracks were poor and "sub-human", the

¹⁰⁴ Sapa, "DA: Sisulu should Release Report," *Times Live* 26 July 2010, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/article570772.ece/DA--Sisulu-should-release-report> (accessed 25 April 2011).

fact that many were living in informal settlements, with very low morale, because they fell into the cracks between earning too much to qualify for Reconstruction and Development Programme housing and earning too little to take out a housing loan. The state of hospitals and healthcare was poor, as many health personnel did not wish to work under these conditions. The relationship between the Department of Defence, which had a budget for repairs, and the Department of Public Works, which maintained that it did not have the personnel to affect any repairs, was poor.¹⁰⁵

What the pay increase conceals, however, is that the Army funded the much needed pay increases out of its capital acquisition budget meaning it now no longer has the money to replace much needed equipment.¹⁰⁶ Given the spending pressures, in part, the South African government has also cancelled the acquisition of eight strategic lift aircraft from the European consortium Airbus and has yet to tender contracts for new land vehicles that are desperately needed.¹⁰⁷

There is clearly some utility in the SANDF, as the pre-eminent military power Southern Africa, having a robust capacity to both project and sustain its forces by air wherever they may need to deploy. Further, its land forces, currently operating from 30-year-old equipment, needs to have both the mobility and the force protection that can only be provided by a modern combat vehicle. Particularly since, pressures to supply peacekeeping forces have not abated and the government more recently transferred the

¹⁰⁵ *Interim National Defence Force Service Commission Progress Report*, [2009], <http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091118-interim-national-defence-force-service-commission-progress-report> (accessed 25 April 2011). Parliamentary Monitoring Group Web page accessed 2 April 2011

¹⁰⁶ Anton Kruger, "South Africa's Underspending on Defence - A Final Reality Check," *ISS* (6 January 2011), http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1188 (accessed 25 April 2011).

¹⁰⁷ Cabinet, *Government Terminates A400 Airbus Contract*, [5 November 2009], <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71656?oid=149858&sn=Detail> (accessed 25 April 2011).

task of border protection back to the SANDF from the SAPS owing to the ineffectiveness of the latter in fulfilling that mandate.¹⁰⁸

These cuts to SANDF funding have likely also compromised South Africa's credibility both in and outside Africa. For one, the developed world was optimistic that South Africa would take a leadership role in addressing conflict in Africa. However, if South Africa cannot back up SADC and AU rhetoric with credible military action then the international community may decide to seek other partners or take matters into their own hands. Arguably, the advent of AFRICOM by the US forces, may partly be seen as a failure on the part of both Africa's middle power, including South Africa, to credibly equip, man and train their forces. Hence, the US feels it has no option but to establish a presence in Africa so that it will be better prepared to respond to a potential crisis.

In addition, despite the divide in the SADC, its region indeed depends on South Africa in many ways to address the regions security concerns. The threat of piracy comes to mind in this regard and if South Africa lacks the capacity to respond credibly to threats such as these, the region will have little choice but to allow outside powers to intervene on their behalf. The SADC community undoubtedly will see this as a failure on the part of South Africa, which will erode its credibility. Unfortunately, funding pressures and the consequences of these pressures are not the only issues plaguing the SANDF. It unfortunately also shares a number of characteristics with greater South African society from health concerns to corruption.

¹⁰⁸ Sapa, "SANDF Border Posting a Challenge:Sinsulu," *Times Live* April 29 2010, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/article425809.ece/SANDF-border-posting-a-challenge--Sisulu> (accessed 25 April 2011). See as well Henri Boshoff, "SANDF Back to the Borders," *ISS* (26 Novemeber 2009), http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1093 (accessed 25 April 2011).

The SANDF - A Reflection of South African Society

Beside budgetary restraints and the loss of expertise, there are a number of other troubling issues present in the SANDF. Among them are the health and age of the forces, since both are factors currently reducing the effective strength of the force. Observers have commented that up to 25% of the force is obese or deaf.¹⁰⁹ Further complicating matters is the issue of HIV/AIDS, which is a national catastrophe in South Africa and one with which the SANDF is also contending. It has been suggested that the defence force has nearly a 20% reported case of HIV infection and in the army; it could be as high as 40%. These health and age concerns are serious for the force given that it seriously degrades capacity to undertake operations and it represents a significant drain on resources that are already strained.

The issue of race continues to be problematic within the force. Legislation prevents its outward expression of racism, however, at the officer level, many black officers are reticent to bring the matter forward for fear of “fomenting racism” while their white counterparts, it is suggested, do not want to admit that there is a problem.¹¹⁰ The interesting aspect of the racism in the force today is that the shoe is often times now on the other foot with incidents of outward displays of disdain by blacks of the white minority. It has also been suggested that the high rate of discharge among former members of the SADF is representative of one of two issues. Either the vast majority of white South Africans in the force were unprepared to work under black commanders that

¹⁰⁹ William Saunderson-Meyer, "Pirates to make the SANDF Walk the Plank?" *The Witness* 5 March 2011, http://www.witness.co.za/index.php?showcontent&global%5B_id%5D=56518 (accessed 25 April 2011).

¹¹⁰ Philip Frankel, "Caesarian Section: The Birth of the South African National Defence Force," in *Soldiers in a Storm the Armed Forces in South Africa's Democratic Transition* (Colorado, USA: Westview Press, 2000), 92-94.

were being integrated into the force, or they perceived their future career progression would be severely limited by employment equity legislation.¹¹¹ Many observers have commented that employment equity schemes have created a situation where it is both hard to recruit or retain white youth into the SANDF. This is setting up the conditions whereby the force will not be representative of South African society, the stated goal of the legislation.¹¹²

Most disturbing, however, are the incidents of sexual abuse and violence against women that should be inconsistent with military culture even if they are present in society. In one of the most recent and shocking developments a young Naval cadet was allegedly murdered within hours of her simply launching a complaint against her commanding officer.¹¹³ Problems of sexual misconduct and violence have also been attributed to the SANDF on African peacekeeping missions in the DRC and Burundi.¹¹⁴ The problem was so pronounced on the missions at the turn of the millennium that the UN felt compelled to address the issue in 2005.¹¹⁵ Numerous reports suggest that upwards of 50 SANDF personnel were charged criminally for incidents that occurred during these peacekeeping missions. Unfortunately, it is likely that these numbers

¹¹¹ Stott, *From the SADF to the SANDF: Safeguarding South Africa for a Better Life for all?*, 28.

¹¹² "SANDF Finds it Hard to Recruit from Minority Groups: Report," *Business Day* 2010, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10459:sandf-finds-it-hard-to-recruit-from-minority-groups-report&catid=55:SANDF&Itemid=108 (accessed 25 April 2011).

¹¹³ "SA Women: Hard Time in Military," *Peace Woman* 2010, http://www.peacewomen.org/news_article.php?id=2454&type=news (accessed 25 April 2011).

¹¹⁴ "Tough UN Line on Peacekeeping Abuses," *Africa Renewal*, April 2005, 16, <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol19no1/191peacekeep.htm> (accessed 25 April 2011).

¹¹⁵ *Press Release: Security Council Condemns in the Strongest Terms all Acts of Sexual Abuse, Exploitation by UN Peacekeeping Personnel*, 31/05/2005)

represent but the tip of the iceberg, since defence officials acknowledge the majority of cases lack the evidence required to lay charges or go unreported.¹¹⁶

There appears, as well, to be at best inept mismanagement and at worst overt corruption of the force at the political-strategic level. Academic Butler contends that the “coercive machinery is becoming an increasing politicized and unproductive burden on public finances”. He purports that cronies of the ANC have been given positions within the Department of Defence in order to further their private interests. He argues that corruption is rampant which may explain the department’s three year running audit operation.

The DOD has made reasonable progress in its financial management and accountability. This was marked by the reduction of the audit qualifications from 16 to seven. During the latter part of the financial year under review, the DOD enlisted the services of a reputable consortium as part of “*Project Clean Audit*”. This was done for the purposes of augmenting the DOD’s limited capacity in that area. It is anticipated that these efforts will improve the DOD’s accountability, financial management, risk management and state of internal controls.¹¹⁷

Concerning, as well, was the Minister of Defence’s recent decision to forbid defence industry sponsorship of military activities.¹¹⁸ The two actions by the Minister intimate there are significant irregularities in the procurement and securing of military equipment.¹¹⁹ The acquisition of numerous defence platforms under the auspices of the

¹¹⁶ Defence south africa, 5 November 2006.

¹¹⁷ *Department of Defence Annual Report FY 2008-2009*, [2009], <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=122249> (accessed 25 April 2011).

¹¹⁸ Wyndham Hartley, "Sisulu Pulls Plug on Defence Indaba 'Sponsors'," *Business Day* 26 July 2010, <http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=115947> (accessed 25 April 2011).

Strategic Defence Program also calls into question the priorities being set for a force that is unable to pay and train its personnel. According to Frankel, given the sheer size of South Africa's littorals and the importance of air power to success in military operations, the SANDF's aging equipment needed to be replaced. Thus, he determined the spending was justified. Nonetheless, Elizabeth Sidiropoulos questions the utility of the purchases, given that the majority of the equipment purchased was applicable to fighting conventional wars and not much use to the SANDF in response to regional conflicts. She points out, as well, that it appears the SANDF was coerced by the South African government to purchase the foreign suites of equipment, as part of a government designed reciprocal economic agreement, which as it turns out was not honoured and has proven to be unenforceable.¹²⁰ Almost as troubling, there are reports that the SANDF now lacks the technical expertise to maintain some of the systems.¹²¹ This all suggests that management of the SANDF is in crisis, partly due to a lack of skill at the lower management levels and either ineptitude or corruption at the highest levels.

It was clear through its pronouncements between 1995 and 1999 that South African defence policy had fundamentally changed under the ANC as a matter of both a change in philosophy and recognition of the factors that contributed to conflict. This focus was in part responsible for the positive changes to the continental security approach

¹¹⁹ *Department of Defence Annual Report 2009/10* (Pretoria: DoD,[2010]), <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=133140> (accessed 25 April 2011). See as well *Department of Defence Annual Report FY 2008-2009* and Bond, *Reconciliation and Economic Reaction: Flaws in South Africa's Elite Transition*, 151.

¹²⁰ Sidiropoulos, *International Security and African Regional Security: Perspectives from South Africa*, 85-102.

¹²¹ Bobby Jordan, "Air Force Boss Slams Poor State of Affairs," *Times Live* 4 April 2010, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/article385064.ece/Air-force-boss-slams-poor-state-of-affairs> (accessed 25 April 2011).

adopted by the AU. At the regional level, however, division within the SADC and the Organs on Politics and Defence structures, continue to be an obstacle to any credible response to conflict and security concerns. It is unfortunate, as well, that the implementation of the ASF, the concrete means of demonstrating commitment to human security and the R2P has been retarded by capacity constraints resulting from a lack of political will.

Significant, as well, has been the pursuit of an aggressive demilitarization strategy, one that included both cuts to defence spending and the integration of the SADF and non-statutory forces into the newly created SANDF. While the latter has administratively succeeded, the rapid change in culture combined with the cuts to defence spending have significantly compromised South Africa's ability to back up its words with action. Finally, the SANDF is also a reflection of South African society writ large. As such, it is hardly surprising that the force is struggling to deal with many of the issues that South African society is dealing with, including corruption and mismanagement, the inequitable treatment of women, racism, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Each of these issues in its own right presents a significant challenge to overcome, in combination; they present a most pessimistic picture in the short-term. Determining the best means of proceeding in light of these realizations will be the subject of the final chapter.

CHAPETR 7 WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

With the examination of South Africa's development, trade, foreign policy and defence policy and force now complete, there are a number of interesting conclusions that may be inferred. These will be considered in the order that they were introduced before stating some conclusions on the suitability of collaboration between the CF and the SANDF.

Development

The examination of the South African development revealed a number of salient insights, among them, the fragility of the neo-liberal economic expansion as long as development continues to falter and inequalities between rich and poor grow. Specifically, there is investor concern that the ANC's populist base, frustrated with the lack of improvements to living standards, may influence President Zuma to stray from strict adherence to stated neo-liberal economic policy. There appears to be little the CF can do to address this specific area of concern. However, the takeaway for the CF and the Canadian government is that South Africa's pressing development concerns are likely to influence all political decisions. Spending, therefore, will likely be focused on development efforts at the expense of military spending. As such, Canada can expect that South Africa's willingness to participate in security and defence missions on the continent will be linked to the quantity of financial assistance there is available for any given endeavour. Again, the CF is not the appropriate government agency with which to address these issues. However, one area where the CF could assist is through the provision of training support to the SANDF. Training assistance could potentially

increase capacity while at the same time free-up the SANDF defence budget to be used for pay, benefits, and education. This, in theory, could enhance the SANDF's ability to assume a greater proportion of the defence and security burden on the African continent.

Trade

South Africa is cognizant that its long-term economic prosperity is tied both to increased trade, as well as to developing nations gaining an increased share of the world's wealth. Its trade with countries outside Africa is relatively balanced with the exception of Asia from which it imports more than it exports. Further, it is beginning to develop its relationship with other regional hegemonies such as Brazil, India, and China. It also enjoys a significant trade surplus with the rest of Africa owing to its developed infrastructure and geography.

With regard to its trade relationships and policy, the essential deduction to be drawn is that it appears any trading partner with whom it has a surplus is likely to have more influence than those who do not. Given that Canada does not fall into this category it should be recognised that its ability to influence South Africa to take specific foreign policy action contrary to the wishes of a state with which it enjoys a trade surplus, in sub-Saharan Africa, will be limited. As such, even if the CF trains and equips the SANDF and it has the military capacity to take on a mission this alone will not necessarily translate into South African willingness to address concerns in neighbouring countries.

Foreign Affairs

On a number of occasions, South Africa has demonstrated values based foreign policy decisions. Of late however, it has not acted as responsibly in the eyes of the West as perhaps it should have, as evidenced by its actions, while a member of the UNSC, to

block a UN resolution to stop human rights abuses in Belorussia, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe. Arguably, South Africa finds itself between the proverbial rock and a hard place. On one hand the western world looks to it to assume a leadership role within Africa, but its neighbours, in part, are distrustful of its ambitions and resentful of its sanctimony. It also finds that, in many respects, it has more in common with the G77 than the G20 despite its membership in the latter. Finally, like all other countries, it must also be concerned with its own national interests and these have increasingly come into conflict with its stated values.

From the previous discussion of foreign affairs, the key deduction was drawn that currently South Africa has more to lose by aligning itself with the West than it has to gain. This is probably why it failed to endorse the West's calls for despots, like Mugabe, to step down. In the case of Zimbabwe, specifically, it seems clear that South Africa is walking on eggshells in its own backyard. As such, it is unlikely it will take any action that will retard its ability to gain consensus and exercise leadership in its region. It is also concerned that any support it provides to the idea of Mugabe, in Zimbabwe, being ousted is likely to increase the chances that it will be coerced by the international community into supplying forces and or it will cause a mass migration problem. The West, including Canada, must accept that it cannot depend on the support of South Africa in areas of its immediate area of interest, as it does not possess the legitimacy to influence the region in the short to medium-term. Given that, there is considerable reason to believe that as stated, Canadian and South African foreign policy are unlikely to be congruent on many issues; it is reasonable to assume that any resource expenditures by Canadian Forces are unlikely to provide Canada with any significant influence going forward.

Defence

An encouraging aspect of South Africa's transition from the apartheid regime to representational democracy has been its new defence policy. For one, the new policies have recognized the root causes of conflict and, in their approach, consider military, as well as, diplomatic and development actions. Unfortunately, as the regional military power its ability to respond to crisis appears to be constrained by a self-imposed policy commitment to act only within a wider regional or continental mandate. This arguably is a cop out, since securing regional consensus is problematic. Furthermore its stated policy that the forces are not to be used in development missions is short sighted for the defence force, if well trained, has many strength it can draw on in complex situations.

South Africa's support of the AU and the stand-up of the AU African Stand-by Force hold's promise, but closer examination of the concept reveals there are number of challenges that have yet to be resolved including its training, its equipping, its sustainment, and its institutional planning capacity. Given these challenges, an effective and responsive African Stand-by Force remains questionable. As such, in the short to mid-term it is likely that any situation that demands the deployment of the ASF will require significant enhancement of capability from the international community. Further, given the ASF training constraints, even if a Western force were commanding a UN mission and supplying logistical support, so long as the ASF is prosecuting the mission the force effectiveness is likely to be limited. Lastly, there is no reserve capacity or replacement mechanism identified in the ASF framework, and as such, once the force is committed, it will be difficult to reconstitute. This unfortunately, is likely to reduce any real appetite to deploy the force for fear of committing it to the wrong conflict.

The situation, however, does provide a number of opportunities for the CF. First, training cadres like the CF established Pearson Peacekeeping Centre could be used to great effect training SANDF and SADC Brigade for the future contingencies of working in a multi-national environment under a UN umbrella. CF expertise might be used to assist in planning and CF training establishments in Canada could assume a greater role in training foreign officers and non-commissioned members. The stated political objective, of demilitarization, that resulted in defence cuts and the integration of South Africa's defence force has been achieved, but force degradation has been an attendant consequence. Further degrading the force are the many socio-economic concerns that plague the state and, for which, there are no clear solutions.

This examination provided a number of deductions about the force. Among them, the fact that the SANDF is contending with significant socio-economic issues that pose both an opportunity and a risk for a CF partnership. It is unclear if the two forces, one a predominantly white force can effectively collaborate with a predominately black force whose soldiers have been wrestling continually with the issue of race. Further, can differences in gender equality in the two countries be overcome or is it a potential trouble area. The HIV/AIDS epidemic arguably presents a unique opportunity where the CF medical system's expertise might be used to great effect in collaborating with and educating the SANDF. The CF, however, must also appreciate that this issue is culturally sensitive particularly with the black population.

It is also clear that the operational effectiveness of the force is likely to be constrained by its budget going forward. Nevertheless, the CF could play a role in contributing to SANDF capability and professionalism. Certainly, the Navy could draw on its experience off Somalia to work with the SANDF Navy in combating the piracy threat. Not to mention the opportunities that exist for officer and NCO development that would significantly enhance the success of future missions. Further, fresh from Afghanistan, the land force has a wealth of knowledge working in both a counter insurgency and a Whole of Government environment that could be used to increase the professional competency of both the South African defence force and its partners in the SADC Brigade force that forms part of the ASF.

In light of these realities, however, a better strategy for Canada is perhaps a linkage with the region at large rather than with South Africa specifically. In line with this thinking, the CF could be used to establish and maintain a peace support operations training centre for all the forces of the SADC community, which, if successful, could be expanded. The challenge for Canadians in pursuing any strategy in Africa, whether it is with South Africa or the SADC, will rest in Canada accepting that in the short-term there are significant extenuating factors beyond its influence, and, accepting that these investments are unlikely in the short term to be in our national interests.

The Way Forward

In summary, the analysis suggests that there is significant opportunity for the CF to build capacity within the SANDF. That being said, there is little to no compelling evidence why Canada should commit the CF specifically to this task based on the other evidence. For there is neither reason to believe the SANDF or the ASF will, in the short-

term, possess the capabilities needed to meaningfully participate in future defence and security missions nor the evidence to suggest that regional and continental security organizations possess the will to overcome differences to deploy these force in the event they are needed. Considering South Africa's significant developmental challenges and the connection between the region and its trade and its trade and economy, it is very unlikely Canada could expect South Africa to demonstrate leadership in any situation that might jeopardize either its trade or economic development. Furthermore, it appears unlikely that defence spending will increase significantly or that South Africa will make a meaningful contribution to future missions in Africa unless these capacities are funded from outside sources. Finally, using the CF in this role is unlikely to contribute to any additional Canadian influence of South Africa's behaviour going forward and risks the investment of Canadian funds in a defence organization that appears to lack the capacity to manage its fiscal and capital resources. Therefore, it is advisable that Canada proceed with care in establishing any enduring relations with South Africa for the purposes of advancing a security and defence agenda. The analysis suggests that, at present, South Africa represents more of a minefield than a bridgehead to future Canadian Forces engagement with Africa.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "2010 SAMA Conference Declaration - 11 Oct 2010." South African Medical Association. http://www.samedical.org/newsroom/media-releases/archived-media-releases/2010-sama-conference-declaration-11-oct-2010.html?searched=NHI&advsearch=oneword&highlight=ajaxSearch_highlight+ajaxSearch_highlight1 (accessed 05/07, 2011).
- "About the G20." http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (accessed 25 April, 2011).
- "Business at War for Zaire's Wealth." 03/16 2011, <http://www.mg.co.za/article/1997-04-25-business-at-war-for-zaires-wealth> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- "Business at War for Zaire's Wealth." *Mail & Guardian*, April 25 1997, <http://mg.co.za/article/1997-04-25-business-at-war-for-zaires-wealth> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- "Canada South Africa Relations." http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/southafrica-afriquedusud/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada_sa-as.aspx?menu_id=7 (accessed 04/28, 2011).
- "Cape Town Doctors to March on Health Issues." South African Medical Association. <http://www.samedical.org/newsroom/media-releases/archived-media-releases/cape-town-doctors-to-march-on-health-issues.html> (accessed 05/07, 2011).
- "CIDA Sub Saharan Africa Countries of Focus." CIDA. <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NIC-5595719-JDD> (accessed 25 April, 2011).
- Department of Defence Annual Report 2009/10*. Pretoria: DoD, 2010, <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=133140> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Department of Defence Annual Report FY 2008-2009, 2009*, <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=122249> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- "The Developmental State." Education and Training Unit For Democracy and Development. <http://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/govern/state.html> (accessed 05/07, 2011).
- "Doctors March in Limpopo." South African Medical Association. <http://www.samedical.org/newsroom/media-releases/archived-media-releases/doctors-march-in-limpopo-12-august->

2010.html?searched=limpopo&advsearch=oneword&highlight=ajaxSearch_highlight+ajaxSearch_highlight1 (accessed 05/07, 2011).

"Doctors Quit Public Service." South African Medical Association.
<http://www.samedical.org/assets/files/old-sitecontent/Downloads/intheNews/1300%20doctors%20quit%20public%20service.pdf> (accessed 05/07, 2011).

Final Report Poverty and Inequality in South Africa - Chapter Three Macroeconomic Context: Government of South Africa, 13/05/1998,
<http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/1998/poverty/chap3.pdf> (accessed 07/05/2011).

Interim National Defence Force Service Commission Progress Report, 2009,
<http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091118-interim-national-defence-force-service-commission-progress-report> (accessed 25 April 2011).

"International Profile: South Africa." *Risk Management* 56, no. 2 (2009): 20-21.

International: Human Rights? what's that?; South Africa's Foreign Policy. *The Economist*, 14 Oct 2010. , <http://www.economist.com/node/17259138> (accessed 25 April 2011).

"Libya: Radebe Clarifies Libya Arms Sales." 03/15 2011,
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201102280778.html> (accessed 25 April 2011).

"A National Health System- Opportunities and Challenges for South Africa." Human Science Research Council. <http://www.hsrc.ac.za/Document-2319.phtml> (accessed 05/07, 2011).

"Nigerian Democracy Support Group Statement on the Situation in Nigeria." ANC Nigerian Democracy Support Group. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/34a/014.html> (accessed 25 April, 2011).

"Permanent Mission of South Africa." <http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/pmun/> (accessed 25 April, 2011).

"The Position of South Africa regarding Debt Relief." South African Department of Foreign Affairs. 25 April 2011).

Press Release: Security Council Condemns in the Strongest Terms all Acts of Sexual Abuse, Exploitation by UN Peacekeeping Personnel, 31/05/2005,
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8400.doc.htm> (accessed 25 April 2011).

"SA Defence Dept Silent Over Moz Piracy." *Times Live*, 12 January 2011,
<http://www.timeslive.co.za> (accessed <http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/pmun/>).

- "SA Women: Hard Time in Military." *Peace Woman*, 2010, http://www.peacewomen.org/news_article.php?id=2454&type=news (accessed 25 April 2011).
- "SAMA Commends the Government on the Change in HIV Policy." South African Medical Association. <http://www.samedical.org/newsroom/media-releases/archived-media-releases/sama-commends-the-government-on-the-change-in-hiv-policy-2-dec-2009.html> (accessed 05/07, 2011).
- "SANDF Finds it Hard to Recruit from Minority Groups: Report." *Business Day*, 2010, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10459:sandf-finds-it-hard-to-recruit-from-minority-groups-report&catid=55:SANDF&Itemid=108 (accessed 25 April 2011).
- "South African Trade by Continents." <http://www.thedti.gov.za/econdb/raportt/rapcont.html> (accessed April/26, 2011).
- South African White Paper on Defence 1996*: Department of Defence, 1996, <http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1996/defencwp.htm> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure Database*, 2011, <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Support to AU Peacekeeping Operations Authorized by the UN, Report of UN Secretary*. New York: UN, 18 September, 2009, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/510/12/PDF/N0951012.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Tough UN Line on Peacekeeping Abuses. *Africa Renewal*, April 2005. 16, <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol19no1/191peacekeep.htm> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- "United Nations Development Program HDI Statistics 2010." UNDP. http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Table1_reprint.pdf (accessed 04/25, 2011).
- "Washington Consensus." Global Trade Negotiations Center for International Development at Harvard University. <http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html> (accessed 03/18, 2011).
- "World Bank Data- GDP Growth South Africa." <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/ZA?display=graph> (accessed 04/26, 2011).
- "World Bank Data- South Africa Foreign Direct Investment." <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD/countries/ZA?display=graph> (accessed 04/26, 2011).

"World Bank Data- Zimbabwe GDP."

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries/ZW?display=graph> (accessed 04/26, 2011).

Adebajo, Adekeye and Christopher Landsberg. "South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons." Chap. 2:9, In *From Cape to Congo Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*, edited by Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg, 171-204. Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003.

Administrator. "The AU: The Good, the Bad, and the Unpleasant."

<http://www.currentanalyst.com/index.php/opeds/106-in-search-of-the-aus-moral-foundations> (accessed 12 March, 25 April 2011).

Alden, Chris and Mills Soko. "South Africa's Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and its Discontents." Chap. 3, In . Vol. 43, 367-392. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Alessandrini, Michele and Michael Enowbi Batuo. "The Trade Specialization of SANE: Evidence from Manufacturing Industries." *The European Journal of Comparative Economics* 7, no. 1 (June 2008): 145-178,
<http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/pramprapa/13216.htm> (accessed 25 April 2011).

Aliber, Michael and Reuben Mokoena. "The Land Question in Contemporary South Africa." In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 330-345. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.

Altman, M. "The State of Employment and Unemployment in South Africa." In *State of the Nation*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 158-182. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2004.

Altman, Miriam. "The State of Employment." Chap. 16, In *State of the Nation South Africa 2004-2005*, edited by John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman, 423-454. Cape town South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council, 2005.

Amoateng, Acheampong Yaw and Linda Richter. "The State of Families in South Africa." In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 243-267. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.

Asher, Jana and Beth Osborne Daponte. *A Hypothetical Cohort Model of Human Development*. New York, New York: United Nations, 2010,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/papers/HDRP_2010_40.pdf (accessed 25 April 2011).

Atkinson, Doreen. "The State of Local Government: Third-Generation Issues." Chap. 1:5, In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 118-137. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.

- Barber, James. "The New South Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Practice." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944)* 81, no. 5 (2005): 1079-1096, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569076> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Baregu, Mwesiga and Christopher Landsberg. "Southern Africa's Security Architecture: Challenges and Prospects." Chap. 4:16, In *From Cape to Congo Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*, edited by Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg, 345-354. Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003.
- Batchelor, Peter. . *Conversion the Case of Denel*. Centre De Recherches Pour Le Developpement Internationale, 9 December 2004, http://www.idrc.ca/fr/ev-68072-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html (accessed April 25 2011).
- Bischoff, Paul-Henri. "Reform in Defence of Sovereignty: South Africa in the UN Security Council 2001-2008." *Africa Spectrum* 2, (2009): 95-110.
- Bond, Patrick. "Reconciliation and Economic Reaction: Flaws in South Africa's Elite Transition." *Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 1 (2006): 141-156.
- Boshoff, Henri. "SANDF Back to the Borders." *ISS* (26 Novemeber 2009), http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1093 (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Boyle, Brendan. "Shock Report on SA's 'Military Time Bomb'." *Times Live*, 18 Novemeber 2009, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/news/article200098.ece> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Bremmer, Ian and Sebastian Spio-Garbrah. "South Africa's Troubled Success Story." *Survival* 49, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 7-14.
- Butler, Anthony. "BBC Monitoring Africa: Unsavoury Military Manoeuvres and SA's Coercive Disarray." *Business Day*, 2009, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1850003931&sid=117Fmt=3&clientid=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- . "Fragile Stability: State and Society in Democratic South Africa." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 31, no. 4 (2005): 719-736.
- Cabinet. *Government Terminates A400 Airbus Contract*, 5 November 2009, <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71656?oid=149858&sn=Detail> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Chisholm, Linda. "The State of Curriculum Reform in South Africa: The Issue of Curriculum 2005." In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 269-287. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.

- . "The State of South Africa's Schools." Chap. 8, In *State of the Nation South Africa 2004-2005*, edited by John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman, 201-222. Cape Town South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council, 2005.
- Cilliers, Jakkie. "The African Standby Force." *ISS* 160, (2008): 1-20, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ISS_Africanstandbyforce.pdf (accessed 04/25/2011).
- Coetzee, Ben. "Piracy in Southern Africa." *ISS* (14 January 2011).
- Cooper, Andrew F. "The Multiple Faces of South African Foreign Policy." *International Journal* 53, no. 4 (1998): 705.
- Daniel, John, Varusha Naidoo, and Sanusha Naidu. "The South Africans have Arrived: Post-Apartheid Corporate Expansion into Africa." In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 368-391. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.
- Dersso, Solomon A., Dr. "The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture." *ISS* no. 209 (2010): 1-21.
- Duncan, Felicity. "South Africa Vs. the World." <http://moneyweb.co.za/mw/view/mw/en/page292678?oid=536248&sn=2009+Detail&pid=287226> (accessed 05/03, 2011).
- El Abdellaoui, Jamila. "The Panel of the Wise: A Comprehensive Introduction to the Critical Pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture." *ISS* no. 193 (2009): 1-14, <http://www.issafrica.org> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- El-Ayouti, Yassin. "An OAU for the Future: An Assessment." In *The Organization of African Unity After Thirty Years*, 179: Prager Publishers, 1993.
- Fabricius, Peter. "Mbeki Will a Veteran at G8 Meeting; SA's President Will Probably Think He Missed His Vocation." *The Mercury*, 2008, sec. News.
- Feinstein, Andrew. *After the Party*. SA: Jonathan Ball, 23 Oct 2007.
- Fourie, Jopie. . *SANDF Peacekeepers Face Litenay of Sex Charges*. Defence South Africa, 5 November 2006, <http://zadefence.blogspot.com/2006/11/sandf-peacekeepers-face-litany-of-sex.html> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Frankel, Philip. "Caesarian Section: The Birth of the South African National Defence Force." Chap. 2, In *Soldiers in a Storm the Armed Forces in South Africa's Democratic Transition*, 47-100. Colorado, USA: Westview Press, 2000.
- . "Smoke and Mirrors: Transforming the Armed Forces." Chap. 3, In *Soldiers in a Storm the Armed Forces in South Africa's Democratic Transition*, 101-146. Colorado, USA: Westview Press, 2000.

- Fullard, Madeleine and Nicky Rousseau. "An Imperfect Past: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Transition." Chap. 1:3, In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 78-105. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.
- Godefroy, Andrew B. "The Canadian Armed Forces Advisory and Training Team Tanzania 1965-1970." *Canadian Military History* 11, no. 3 (2002): 31-47.
- Gruzd, Stephen. "Foreign Policy Under Zuma: Change of Style Or Substance?" (21 December 2009), <http://www.saiia.org.za/governance-and-aprm-opinion/foreign-policy-under-zuma-change-of-style-or-substance.html> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Habib, Adam. "State-Civil Society Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa." In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 227-241. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.
- Hamill, James and John Hoffman. "'Quiet Diplomacy' Or Appeasement? South African Policy Towards Zimbabwe." *The Round Table* 98, no. 402 (2009): 373-384.
- Hartley, Wyndham. "Sisulu Pulls Plug on Defence Indaba 'Sponsors'." *Business Day*, 26 July 2010, <http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=115947> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Herbst, Jeffrey. "South Africa After the Age of Heroes." *Current History* 107, (2008): 161-166.
- Iheduru, Okechukwu C. "Black Economic Power and Nation-Building in Post-Apartheid South Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 42, no. 1 (2004): 1-30.
- Jansen, Jonathan. "The State of Higher Education in South Africa: From Massification to Mergers." In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 291-310. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.
- Jennings, William. "From International Pariah to Africa's Messiah: Dynamics of South Africa's Paradigm Shift." Chap. 6, In *The African Search for Stable Forms of Statehood Essays in Political Criticism*, edited by Shadrack Wanjala Nasong'o, 229-263. USA: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008.
- Jordaan, Eduard. "Fall from Grace: South Africa and the Changing International Order." *Politics* 30, no. 1 (2010): 82-90.
- Jordan, Bobby. "Air Force Boss Slams Poor State of Affairs." *Times Live*, 4 April 2010, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/article385064.ece/Air-force-boss-slams-poor-state-of-affairs> (accessed 25 April 2011).

- Kaminski, Matthew. "State of Play: How South Africa Became South Africa." *World Affairs* (July-August 2010): 27-37, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-JulyAugust/full-Kaminski-JA-2010.html> (accessed 04/25/2011).
- Keane, Rory. "The EU's African Peace Facility Uncovered: Better Late than Never?" *European Security Review* no. no. 24 (October 2004), http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/esr_25.pdf (accessed 26 April 2011).
- Kornegay, Francis A. and Chris Landsberg. "Engaging Emerging Powers." *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Science* vol. 36, no. 1 (2009): 171-191, <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a916739531> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Kruger, Anton. "The South African Navy Facing Up to Reality." *ISS* (17 February 2011), http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1234 (accessed 25 April 2011).
- . "South Africa's Underspensing on Defence - A Final Reality Check." *ISS* (6 January 2011), http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1188 (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Lamb, Guy. "Reflections on Demilitarization: A Southern African Perspective." *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 3 (2000): 120-136.
- Lechini, Gladys. "Middle Powers: IBSA and the New South-South Cooperation." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 40, no. 5 (2007): 5.
- . "Middle Powers: IBSA and the New South-South Cooperation." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 40, no. 5 (2007): 28.
- Makgetlangeng, Sehlare. "The Zuma Administration Foreign Policy Continuity and Change." (2008).
- Mangu, Xolela. "The State of Race Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa." Chap. 1:4, In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 105-117. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.
- Mare, Gerhard. "The State of the State: Contestation and Race Re-Assertion in a Neoliberal Terrain." Chap. 1:1, In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 25-52. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.
- Mbali, Mandisa. "HIV/AIDS Policy-Making in Post-Apartheid South Africa." In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 313-329. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.
- Motumi, Tsepe and Penny Mckenzie. "After the War: Demobilisation in South Africa." Chap. 10, In *From Defence to Development Redirecting Military Resources in South*

- Africa*, edited by Jacklyn Cock and Penny Mckenzie, 181-207. Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 1998.
- Mwanasali, Musifiky. "From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union." Chap. 2:10, In *From Cape to Congo Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*, edited by Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg, 205-224. Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003.
- Nafziger, Wayne E. "Development, Inequality, and War in Africa." *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal* 1, no. 1 (2006),
http://www.epsjournal.org.uk/pdfs/eps_v1n1_nafziger.pdf.
- Naidoo, Ravi. . *The Basic Income Grant Poverty, Politics and Policy Making*.
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000151/P135_Ravi_Naidoo.pdf ed.:
 University of Natal (accessed 07/05/2011).
- Naidoo, Vinothan and Paula Jackson. "Reviewing South Africa's Efforts to Combat Corruption in it's Bureaucracy: 1994-2009." Chap. 1, In *South African Governance in Reveiw: Anti-Corruption, Local Government, Traditional Leadership*, edited by Peter Lague, 1-20. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2009.
- Nathan, Laurie. "The 1996 Defence White Paper: An Agenda for State Demilitarisation?" Chap. 3, In *From Defence to Development Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa*, edited by Jacklyn Cock and Penny Mckenzie, 41-59. Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 1998.
- . . *The Absence of Common Values and Failure of Common Security in Southern Africa, 1992-2003*: Crisis States Research Centre LSE, 2003,
<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/wp/wpSeries1/wp50.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Nattras, Nicoli. "The State of Economy: A Crisis of Employment." In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 141-157. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2004.
- Ndletyana, Mcebisi and James Muzondidya. "Reviewing Municipal Capacity in the Context of Local Government Reform: 1994-2009." Chap. 2, In *South African Governance in Review. Anti-Corruption, Local Government, Traditional Leadership*, edited by Peter Lague, 21-38. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2009.
- Nibishaka, Emmanuel. "South Africa's Peacekeeping Role in Africa: Motives and Challenges of Peacekeeping." *International Politics* no. 02 (2011): 1-7.
- Noon, Christopher R. "The use of Racial Preferences in Public Procurement for Social Stability." *Public Contract Law Journal* 38, no. 3 (2009): 611.
- O'Brien, David. "The Search for Subsidiary: The UN, African Regional Organizations and Humanitarian Action." *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 3 (2000): 57-83.

- O'Brien, Kevin A. "Regional Security in Southern Africa: South Africa's National Perspective." *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 3 (1996): 52-76, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533319608413623> (accessed 1 April 2011).
- O'Hanlon, Micheal and Peter W. Singer. "The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity." *Survival* 46, no. 1 (Spring) (2004): 77-100.
- Ordzhonikidze, Sergei and Theodor H. Winkler. *Security Sector Reform: Its Relevance for Conflict Prevention, Peace Building, and Development*. Geneva: United Nations Office at Geneva, 2003.
- Ponelis, S. R. and J. J. Britz. "To Talk Or Not to Talk? from Telkom to Hellkom: A Critical Reflection on the Current Telecommunication Policy in South Africa from a Social Justice Perspective." *The International Information and Library Review* 40, no. 4 (December 2008): 219-225.
- Prunier, Gerard. *Africa's World War Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*. USA: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Sapa. "Health Minister: Doctors should be Paid." *Times Live*, 02/02/2011, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/article888503.ece/Health-minister--Doctors-should-be-paid> (accessed 05/07/2011).
- . "Rioting Soldiers Not in the Clear Yet." *Times Live*, 2 December 2010, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/article794898.ece/Rioting-soldiers-not-in-the-clear-yet> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- . "Zuma: SANDF no Place for Lack of Discipline." *Times Live*, 16 Decemeber 2010, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/article819163.ece/Zuma--SANDF-no-place-for-lack-of-discipline> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Sapa, . "DA: Sisulu should Release Report." *Times Live*, 26 July 2010, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/article570772.ece/DA--Sisulu-should-release-report> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- . "SANDF Border Posting a Challenge:Sinsulu." *Times Live*, April 29 2010, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/article425809.ece/SANDF-border-posting-a-challenge--Sisulu> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Saunderson-Meyer, William. "Pirates to make the SANDF Walk the Plank?" *The Witness*, 5 March 2011, http://www.witness.co.za/index.php?showcontent&global%5B_id%5D=56518 (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Schoeman, Maxi. "South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003." In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 349-367. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.

- Shaw, Timothy M., Andrew F. Cooper, and Agata Antkiewicz. "Global and /or Regional Development at the Start of the 21st Century? China, India and (South) Africa." *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (2007): 1255-1270.
- Sidiropoulos, Elizabeth. "International Security and African Regional Security: Perspectives from South Africa." Chap. 6, In *Global Security in a Multipolar World*, edited by Luis Peral. Vol. 118, 85-102. France: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009.
- Sithole, Mpilo Pearl. "State Democracy Warming Up to Culture: An Ambivalent Integration of Traditional Leadership into the South African Governance System, 1994-2009." Chap. 3, In *South African Governance in Review. Anti-Corruption, Local Government, Traditional Leadership*, edited by Peter Lague, 39-52. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2009.
- South African Department of Defence. *Sisulu Meets Military Command, Defence Secretariat and Defence Force Service Commission to Fast Track Implementation of Recommendations*, 2011.
- Southall, Roger. "The State of Party Politics: Struggles within the Tripartite Alliance and the Decline of Opposition." Chap. 1:2, In *State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 53-77. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2003.
- Spies, Yolanda K., Dr. "The Multilateral Maze and (South) Africa's Quest for Permanent United Nations Security Council Representation." *Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria* (May 2008): 96-122, <https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/handle/2263/6308> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Steinberg, Donald. "Post-Apartheid South Africa and the World: A Bridge Over Troubled Waters?" Crisis Group. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/southern-africa/post-apartheid-south-africa-and-the-world-a-bridge-over-troubled-waters.aspx> (25 April 2011).
- Stott, Noel. "From the SADF to the SANDF: Safeguarding South Africa for a Better Life for all?" *Violence and Transition Series* 7, (2002), <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&size582=10&id=103420> (accessed 25 April 2011).
- Strydom, Hennie. "The Context and Determinants of South Africa's New Role in the United Nations." *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* (Institute for Strategic Studies, 1 May 2007): 1-37.
- . "Transfer of Arms to Conflict Areas: South Africa's Responsibilities." *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* (2008): 1-3.

- Titus, Danny. "Human Rights in Foreign Policy and Practice: The South African Case Considered." *South African Institute of International Affairs* no. 52 (2009): 5-18.
- Truesdell, Amy. "Achieving Political Objectives: South African Defense Priorities from the Apartheid to the Postapartheid Era." *African Studies Review* 52, no. 3 (2009): 107-125.
- Venter, Albert. "Reform of the United Nations Security Council: A Comment on the South African Position." *International Journal on World Peace* XX, no. 4 (2003): 29-47.
- Williams, Rocky. "Demobilisation and Reintegration in Society." Chap. 11, In *From Defence to Development Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa*, edited by Jacklyn Cock and Penny Mckenzie, 208-221. Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 1998.
- . "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding? South African Policy and Practice in Peace Missions." *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 3 (2000): 84-104.
- Wulf, Herbert. "South Africa: From Pariah to Regional Cop." Chap. II:4, In *Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace*, 86-102. Great Britain: Antony Rowe Ltd, 2005.