





IMPROVING ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THE CANADIAN ARMY THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECTORS' HEADQUARTERS

Maj M.J. Draho

JCSP 37

Master Of Defence Studies

PCEMI 37

Maîtrise en Études de la Défense

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2015.

Avertissement

Les opinons exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2015.



CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 37 – PCEMI 37

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

IMPROVING ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THE CANADIAN ARMY THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECTORS' HEADQUARTERS

Maj M.J. Draho

"This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author considered appropriate alone and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the of Canada Government and the Canadian Department of National This paper may not be Defence. released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence."

Word Count: 14 253

"La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale."

Compte de mots : 14 253

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the role and mandate of the Director of Artillery (D Arty) and the tools currently available and used by D Arty to fulfill his role and achieve his mandate. Subsequently, the paper identifies the short-comings of the current structures and highlights the consequences of those deficiencies. It then proposes a new model wherein D Arty is a full time position with a dedicated staff vice a secondary duty appointment reliant upon an array of informal, fractured, ad hoc structures. Finally it demonstrates the increased organizational benefits that accrue to the CA and by extension the CAF and DND in the form of improved responsibility, accountability and coordination through the creation of an appropriately staffed headquarters led by a full time Director.

In summary this paper demonstrates that the current appointment of D Arty does not possess the requisite staff or resources to effectively fulfill his assigned mandate and that the creation of a full time D Arty position along with a sufficiently resourced and empowered staff will improve the organizational effectiveness of the CA.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents	iii
List of Figures	iv
Prologue	1
Caveat	1
Introduction	2
Mandate, Role and Responsibilities of the Director of Artillery	6
Execution of the Director of Artillery Function	13
Challenges of the Director of Artillery Function	19
An Historical Perspective	22
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Current Model	27
A New (Old) Model	34
Organizational Benefits of the New Model	42
Conclusion	50
Bibliography	54

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Graphical Representation of Current Model	18
Figure 2: Canadian Army HQ Structure	37
Figure 3: Proposed Model – CA HQ	39
Figure 4: Proposed Model – D Arty HQ	42
Figure 5: Army Capability Development Continuum	47
Figure 6: Modified Army Capability Development Continuum	48

PROLOGUE

"Work smarter, not harder" is a familiar, often used catch-phrase that is frustratingly difficult to adequately achieve for many. Typing it into an online search engine generates almost eleven million results spanning a variety of how-to tips, efficiency and improvement books, motivational posters, and blogs on the subject. And while undertaking an examination of the nearly eleven million results would contravene, in the strongest possible way, the intent of the phrase, a cursory examination of those results reveals that the large majority focus on individuals working smarter. A far smaller selection focuses on organizations, and generally discusses how individuals or groups should seek to change behaviors, routines, and practices in order to improve their efficiency and thereby that of their organization. So how does a component of a larger and complex organization bound by an equally large and complex set of rules and regulations work smarter, not harder? A satisfactory answer would be well received by many.

CAVEAT

Within this paper some regulations and orders may not reflect the most recent and evolving organizational and associated name changes within the Canadian Army or Canadian Armed Forces; however, while they may not wholly reflect the current nomenclature, they are current and accurate as at the time of writing. Further, every effort has been made to ensure consistency in the use of organizational names and abbreviations, but occasionally they are purposefully different, most likely to draw attention to a particular period of time or context.

INTRODUCTION

It is generally accepted that governments are bureaucratic by nature and perhaps even by necessity. Today *bureaucracy* is a charged word that carries with it a decidedly negative connotation of excessive complexity, inefficiency, and inflexibility.¹ Nonetheless, it often carries with it a simultaneous, if grudging acceptance of its inevitability and even necessity to some degree given the varied and complex systems involved with the enterprise of governing – particularly a nation.

However, the definition of bureaucracy is not pejorative but rather a noncritical term that means "the administrative system governing any large institution."² Further it is recognized that: "[1]arge administrative staffs are most common in large organizations that need standardized rules and procedures or consistency across a wide range of business activities," and that: "[s]ome form of bureaucracy is necessary...in [organizations] that are subject to heavy regulatory scrutiny, since a loss of policy or oversight control could have dire consequences."³ In Canada National Defence, as one of many departments that comprise the Federal Government of Canada, is inextricably bound by the rules and regulations, and by extension the bureaucracy, surrounding the functioning of Canada's Federal Government.⁴ As a result, the three subordinate services of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) – the Royal Canadian Air Force, Royal Canadian Navy, and Canadian Army (CA) – are equally bound by these rules and regulations; this bureaucracy.

¹Wikipedia contributors, "Bureaucracy," *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,* accessed June 21, 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Bureaucracy&oldid=669463982.

²Ibid.

³Investopedia, "Bureaucracy," *Investopedia*, accessed June 21, 2015, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bureaucracy.asp.

⁴Government of Canada, *Departments and Agencies*, accessed June 22, 2015, http://www.canada.ca/en/gov/dept/index.html?utm_medium=decommissioned+site&utm_campaign=Canada+Site+ Redirect+Tracking&utm_source=canada.gc.ca/depts/major/depind-eng.html&utm_content=Launch+Tracking.

So how does the CA work smarter, not harder, within such an environment? Embracing the notion of the phrase demands that one first demonstrate a *need* to work smarter prior to expending much effort to answer the question of how it can be accomplished. An examination of the CA's recent assessment of its own governance model provides that foundation. As part of a June 4, 2014 briefing on CA Governance, one of the key findings was that "governance within the CA is not aligned with governance at the Centre, therefore leaving the CA dislocated."⁵ The associated recommendation was to, "conduct a review of the [CA] DM [decision making] process…in order to: [c]onfirm it meets the needs of the Canadian Army [and e]liminate/create/refine the committees/boards to make them relevant to the DM process."⁶ As part of an update on CA governance delivered on September 3, 2014 it was noted that, "[f]ollowing several meetings of ASPT [Army Strategic Planning Team] last year, it was suggested there is still lacking an alignment of governance – with the centre, and by extension, across the army."⁷ So it is clear that the CA recognizes a requirement to work smarter within the federal bureaucracy.

Similarly, The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery (The RCA) is bound to CA imposed bureaucracy, which is nested within that of the CAF and DND. The RCA has established a number of mechanisms in an attempt to meaningfully contribute to CA processes, inputs, and products particularly with regards to force development (FD), capability development (CD), and personnel management, all in an effort to inform CA decisions. This suggests a confluence of the desire for improvement between the CA and The RCA. It also suggests that

⁵Canadian Army Staff, *Canadian Army Governance*, PowerPoint briefing, 4 June 2014, slide 4. ⁶*Ibid.*, slide 9.

⁷Canadian Army Staff, *Canadian Army Governance Review: Update*, PowerPoint briefing, 3 Sep 2014, slide 3 notes.

improvements within either organization may have a positive corollary effect on the other, and therefore would be mutually beneficial.

This paper will demonstrate that the establishment of an entity, which the author has termed Director Artillery Headquarters (D Arty HQ), will allow both The RCA and the CA to work smarter across a number of fronts – in short, improve their organizational effectiveness. It may seem counterintuitive that an additional HQ will improve efficiency and effectiveness rather than simply adding an additional layer of complexity to an existing expansive bureaucracy. The name is less important than the function of the organization, where and how it interacts and integrates with existing structures and processes – how it improves organizational effectiveness. The term provides a common point of reference within this paper and is chosen for its historical provenance. So one should focus not on the term but rather on how the proposed entity improves organizational effectiveness. The name itself is of secondary import to the argument.

As the paper's argument evolves it will demonstrate that within large complex organizations like the CA bound by processes, rules and regulations largely imposed from above, working smarter as an organization is achieved principally through recognizing and understanding the environment, and then structuring itself to work efficiently and effectively within it. To validate this premise, this paper focuses primarily on the function of the Director of Artillery (D Arty) and the artillery's associated structures and mechanisms emplaced to assist with the execution of that function; however, the CA will be touched on as required to highlight connections and relationships when appropriate.

To establish a baseline of understanding from which to proceed, the paper will first articulate the mandate, role and responsibilities of D Arty contained within the various regulations and orders associated with the establishment of the appointment. Subsequently the paper is separated into two basic components. First, a body of evidence is accumulated that demonstrates the inadequacies of the current model including the consequences of those inadequacies. Second a new model is proposed followed by a summary of the principal benefits that accrue to the CA with particular emphasis on governance and CD.

This is achieved by first exploring how the function of D Arty is currently performed. This will begin to expose some of the limitations associated with the current model. Next the paper highlights the more prevalent challenges associated with the execution of the function of D Arty including inter- as well as intra-organizational relationships. Of particular concern are the volume of work, its significance, and the number of personnel who perform that work as secondary duties. An historical review serves the dual purpose of identifying the route to the current model as well as reinforcing some of its inherent problems. The paper then offers a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the current model including the impact to CA decision making. Next the paper will outline a new model including its mandate and role, a general construct, as well as organizational relationships. Finally it will conclude with the benefits that accrue to the CA through the establishment of this entity.

In summary, this paper will demonstrate that the establishment of an entity within the CA, termed Director Artillery Headquarters, will allow the Army to work smarter, not harder across a wide spectrum of activities. I have used The RCA as an illustrative example given my familiarity with the artillery as a Branch. As well, despite the inevitable (and welcome) differences in culture between Branches, there are likely sufficiently similar difficulties associated with the effective execution of their Directors' duties that the conclusions of this paper may have some degree of relevance and applicability beyond The RCA.

Finally, within this paper there are two distinct but important connotations to The RCA as an entity. Firstly, from a DND organizational perspective the artillery is considered a Branch within the personnel structure of the CAF.⁸ Secondly, The RCA is also considered a *corps* as it is "a separate branch or department of the armed forces having a specialized function".⁹ However, Gunners consider themselves a *regiment* (corps) of regiments (units), and are loath to use the word corps to refer to themselves. This dual meaning of the word obviously increases the chances for confusion, even when a context is provided. Therefore, at the risk of alienating Gunners, within the paper the term corps is used when appropriate to ensure clarity of meaning or context. The terms artillery, Regiment, and The RCA are used interchangeably and do note connote any distinction in meaning or context.

MANDATE, ROLE, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF ARTILLERY

The overall mandate of D Arty emanates from three principal sources: the CAF, the CA, and The RCA. As a result, the totality of the function of D Arty is an amalgam of various governing or guiding documents originating from separate entities within the CAF. Aside from the source document that formally establishes the position the remaining documents, while subordinate, as a collective are best viewed as complimentary *vice* hierarchical.

Canadian Forces Military Personnel Instruction (CF Mil Pers Instr) 02/028 is the source document establishing Branch Advisors within the CAF.¹⁰ Section 4.2 of that instruction indicates that "Branch Advisors are appointed by CMP [Chief Military Personnel] on the advice

⁸Department of National Defence, A-AD-267-000/AF-003, *Official Lineages, Volume 3, Part 1, Armour, Artillery, and Field Engineer Regiments – Artillery Regiments* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2010), 3-1-3, accessed June 23, 2015, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/ol-lo/vol-tom-3/par1/art/doc/rrca.pdf.

⁹The Free Dictionary, "Corps," *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition,* accessed June 23, 2015, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/corps.

¹⁰Department of National Defence, *CF Mil Pers Instr* 02/028 – *Branch Advisors* – *Roles and Responsibilities* (Ottawa: Chief Military Personnel, 2008), 3.

of the appropriate Force Generation authority, in consultation with appropriate Branch

Councils."¹¹ Section 4.3 states:

Branch Advisors provide advice to CMP as required and will normally be required to provide at least an annual Branch update in the form of a written review of the past fiscal year, identifying Branch issues that were resolved, those that remain outstanding and future issues and trends of interest.¹²

Of particular relevance to this paper is the note accompanying that section, which states:

Branch Advisor Roles are generally assumed to be Secondary Duties. However, the duties may consume a considerable amount of personal and work time including liaison visits, Branch business and technical input.¹³

Also relevant is section 4.3 which notes that: "Branch Advisors of large branches may

appoint co-advisors and other assistants as required."¹⁴ Section 4.5 indicates that: "[a] Branch

Advisor will be an officer of the rank of Col/Capt (N) or LCol/Cdr in the case of small branches

not having a senior representative."¹⁵ The artillery is considered a large branch and therefore has

a colonel as its Director.

The responsibilities articulated in this instruction are broken into three components: those

associated with the personnel system; those associated with the branch itself, and those

associated with the Military Employment Structure (MES):each is listed below.

Branch Advisor Responsibilities General – In the overall Personnel System the Branch Advisor will...

• **Coordinate required activities** in liaison/communication with the appropriate Career Field & Occupation Advisor appointed by the Career Field & Occupation Authority as per Annex A, e.g., Dental and Medical Branch Advisors will coordinate with Health Services Career Field & Occupation Advisor.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 4.

 $^{13}Ibid.$

¹⁴Ibid. ¹⁵Ibid.

 $^{^{12}}Ibid.$

- Assist with AMORs by providing advice during AMOR [Annual Military Occupation Review] meetings.
- Attraction and Applicant Processing Branch Advisors may be asked to provide advice on attraction and promotional materials.
- Advise on Personnel Selection issues by providing advice concerning professional and/or certification requirements needed to meet CF and occupation selection.
- Assist Career Management by providing advice and contextual background information to Selection Boards and, on request, annual posting plots.
- Assist IT&E Training Authorities by validating and or advising on CF equivalency and accreditation programs by providing advice on the suitability and/or acceptability of specific IT&E [Individual Training and Education] events and their alignment with established certification and/or professional requirements.
- **Participate in Support Branch Advisor Council** (where applicable) Support Branch Advisors will participate in the Support Branch Advisor Council chaired by Assistant CMP, to provide a pan-CF approach to common issues; a forum to raise issues; provide collective advice to CMP, other Level 1 Advisors and Operational Commanders; and to receive guidance and direction.
- **Report to CMP** as required/at least an annual Branch update/ written review of the past fiscal year, identifying Branch issues and/or trends resolved, outstanding and likely in the future.

Branch Advisor Responsibilities Internal – Within each Branch the Branch Advisor will...

- be familiar with personnel requirements/competencies required for the Career Fields/Occupations within the Branch;
- coordinate the activities and consolidate the advice of co-advisors and assistants;
- disseminate relevant information to members of the Branch;
- serve as the focal point for issues of ethos, esprit de corps and overall professional identity;
- prepare or assist in the preparation of Problem Definition Papers, e.g., for MES job/functional analyses and/or other Branch Issues; and
- advise on personnel matters, as requested by CMP.

Branch Advisor MES Link – In terms of the Military Employment Structure, the Branch Advisor will...

- assist in the development of MES Change Proposals, including providing advice on:
 - evolving Career Field/Occupation work composition and scope of work requirement;
 - evolving Career Fields/Occupation structure and career paths;
 - professional, technical, educational and experiential components of career paths;
 - Career Field/Occupation/Sub-occupation specifications;
 - qualification requirements;
- Participate with Military Employment Structure analysis, and overall MES change management activities, as potential co-chair sponsor, or associated role(s); and
- Assist in the development of Military Employment Structure Implementation Plans (MESIPs) (previously OSIPs).¹⁶

From these responsibilities it is evident that the CAF expects the primary focus of D Arty as the Branch Advisor for the artillery to be personnel and personnel management, including recruiting, selection, training, education, and career structures. However, two responsibilities of a catch-all nature allow for an expanded D Arty mandate: serve as the focal point for issues of ethos, esprit-de-corps and overall professional identity; and prepare or assist in the preparation of Problem Definition Papers...and/or other Branch Issues. In the former case this allows D Arty to be the focal point for artillery Regimental affairs – The RCA as a corps; while the latter case allows D Arty to be the focal point for a range of other more operationally focused matters – The RCA as a functional branch within the CA.

The CA guidance with respect to Branch Advisor duties and responsibilities is established through Canadian Army Order (CAO) 11-93. It articulates their roles and

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 5-7.

responsibilities under the nomenclature of Director - in the case of the artillery, Director

Artillery or D Arty for short.¹⁷ The overview portion of that order indicates:

The Branch Director is the focal point for Branch identity. Their role and responsibilities are important. Their role is to assist and complement the Army chain of command by providing specialist advice to the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) [now Commander Canadian Army (CCA)] on Branch issues and policies. The Director supports and enhances the decision-making process by providing advice on issues related to strategic policy, *force development* [emphasis added], training and personnel. It is understood that due to manning pressures within the Army that the Branch Director/Advisor appointment is fulfilled as a secondary duty.¹⁸

Within this order responsibilities are broken into two areas: branch responsibilities and

corporate responsibilities. Branch responsibilities require D Arty to:

- be familiar with personnel and training matters within the Branch;
- coordinate the activities and consolidating the inputs from advisors;
- disseminate relevant information to members of the Branch;
- participate in the development of Branch structure, composition and size; and
- participate in the Branch annual promotion board.

Corporate responsibilities require D Arty to:

- provide specialist advice to the CLS [CCA] and its chain of command on Branch issues and policies;
- develop the Branch Succession Plan;
- assist in the development of Change Proposals including advice on qualification requirements, occupation specifications;
- participate with the Director General Personnel Generation Policy (DGPGP), as co-chair sponsor of Occupations Analysis;

¹⁷Department of National Defence, *CAO 11-93 Army Branch Director/Advisor Responsibilities* (Ottawa; Canadian Army, 2007), 2.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 1.

- assist in the development of Occupation Structure Implementation Plans (OSIP);
- participate, as co-chair, in the Annual Military Occupation Reviews (AMORs); and
- advise on Professional Development, Terms of Service and promotion forecasting.¹⁹

From a personnel management perspective, the CA expanded D Arty's task list to include attendance at annual promotion boards as well as the development of the Army-mandated Branch Succession Plan.

The additional requirement to provide advice on FD translates into the task of participating in the development of the artillery's structure, composition, and size. As a result, D Arty also sits as a member on the Army Capability Development Board (ACDB), which is responsible for the first three of the four CD pillars within the CA – Conceive, Design, and Build.²⁰ The Commandant (Cmdt) of The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery School (RCAS), in his capacity as Deputy Director Artillery (D D Arty), also attends as an observer and represents D Arty in his absence.

Once a capability is built or generated, it must be managed, and hence "Manage" is the fourth pillar of CA CD. Therefore, while extant capabilities fall beyond the remit of the ACDB, the management of current artillery capabilities clearly involves D Arty. So in very real and practical terms D Arty's mandate spans all four CD pillars including the termination or retirement of those capabilities – the entire through-life of capability.

Finally, to round out D Arty's mandate one must explore his role within The RCA. D Arty's terms of reference regarding the Regiment are contained in two principal documents: The RCA Standing Orders, and the recently updated RCA Family Strategy. RCA Standing Orders reiterate many of the duties and responsibilities articulated in the CAF and CA documents

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 1-2.

²⁰Department of National Defence, Army Capability Development Board Terms of Reference (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 1 Aug 15), 1.

including being *the focal point for Artillery Branch identity* as well as his responsibilities with respect to career management, and FD and management.²¹ He is intimately involved with the governance of The RCA; chairing, sitting on, or advising all committees, boards, and senate of The RCA. Of particular relevance is the paragraph which states: "[t]he Director of Artillery, while having overall responsibility for the Artillery Branch, is primarily focused on the operational aspects of The RCA Family Strategy. To assist the Director, the Regimental Colonel will manage the non-operational aspects of the Family Strategy."²²

The RCA Family Strategy seeks to be a touchstone, inclusive of all elements of the Regimental Family under an umbrella document. Where the Regiment as a Branch consists of regular and reserve force units and members, the family extends to retired members, honorary appointments, and friends of the Regiment. Within that strategy, The RCA has identified five Lines of Effort (LoE), the first two are associated with the operational aspects of The RCA and therefore the responsibility of D Arty, and the remaining three with its familial aspects and therefore the responsibility of the Regimental Colonel.²³

LoE 1 – Develop and generate the capabilities that will sustain The RCA in operations

- LoE 2 Assure excellence in leadership through succession planning
- LoE 3 Nurture the family institution
- LoE 4 Connect with Canadians
- LoE 5 Celebrate our heritage

²¹The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, *RCA Standing Orders, Vol 1* (August 2011), 2-7/15 – 2-9/15. ²²*Ibid.*, 2-7/15.

²³The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, *The RCA Family Strategy* (23 March, 2015), 5.

Through this division of responsibilities The RCA acknowledges the capacity limitations of the appointment of D Arty and purposefully ties his regimental duties to those directed by the CAF and CA, thereby eliminating the possible perception of exceeding his mandate.

In summary, D Arty is responsible to assist the CA with looking into the future with regards to CD and FD, the management of extant capabilities including personnel management, and, by extension, the overall well-being of the Regiment, both as a functional branch within the CA and as a corps or family. By all accounts this translates into a particularly full brief given that this is a secondary duty of a colonel who also possesses a full-time "day job" within the CAF.

EXECUTION OF THE DIRECTOR OF ARTILLERY FUNCTION

Accomplishing such an expansive mandate requires significant effort and ingenuity as this secondary duty appointment officially carries with it no dedicated staff. The most apt description of the solution is the phrase "many hands make light work."²⁴ Leveraging the CF Mil Pers Instr 02/028's allowance for co-advisors and assistants the Director enjoins, enlists, and entreats an array of Gunners to assist him. Indeed The RCA as a whole embodies the phrase; harnessing a variety of individuals, organizations and processes to facilitate the execution of the D Arty function.

As noted the Cmdt of RCAS is appointed D D Arty. To mitigate the impact of this secondary duty on his primary responsibility of commanding the school the Cmdt has assigned the School's Chief Instructor-in-Gunnery (CIG) and the Master Gunner (Mr Gnr) as full-time dedicated staff supporting the Director and Deputy Director. This relationship is, in large measure, the result of a coalescence of the need to assist D Arty fulfill his mandate with the

²⁴ Dictionary.com. Many Hands Make Light Work, *The American Heritage New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), accessed 27 June, 2015, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/many hands make light work.

RCAS being designated by the CA as the Centre of Excellence (CoE) for a variety of capabilities.²⁵ It was considered sensible that the Cmdt and his staff become the focal point for staff work associated with these related mandates.

To assist with matters related to the Reserve component of the artillery, the appointments of D D Arty Reserves (Res) and Regimental Sergeant-Major (RSM) RCA Res exist. Director Military Careers 3 (D Mil C 3), the artillery career management section within CMP, works intimately with D Arty regarding career management and succession planning. Unit Commanding Officers (COs), RSMs and Artillery Council are also engaged as required and appropriate, either for input, advice or endorsement of various personnel plans.²⁶ As previously noted, the appointment of Regimental Colonel exists to shepherd the non-operational aspects of The RCA, and has at his disposal the staff of Regimental Headquarters (RHQ) RCA to assist him in this endeavor.

Coordinating these various individuals and organizations is critical and achieved via The RCA Campaign Plan.²⁷ That plan identifies three operational LoEs that relate to LoE 1 and 2 of The RCA Family Strategy.²⁸ These operational LoEs are: Personnel and Structures; Doctrine and Training; and Equipment. While the issues and tasks associated with each of these LoEs change over time, the current plan contains approximately thirty tasks and is indicative of the body of work involved in any given period of time. Further the majority of these tasks are significant, both in effort and consequence. While beyond the scope of this paper to examine all of these in

²⁵Department of National Defence, *Army Operating Plan FY 2015/2016v2*, (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2015), 3-D-2-4/4.

²⁶ The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, *RCA Standing Orders, Vol 1* (August 2011), 2-6/15 – 2-7/15.

 ²⁷Timothy J. Bishop, Col, *The RCA Campaign Plan 2015/2016* (RCAS: file 1901-1 (CIG)), 31 March 2015.
²⁸Initially The RCA Family Strategy and The RCA Campaign Plan were developed in isolation resulting in both documents separately identifying LoEs using the same numerical format but with different headings. It is

anticipated that these LoEs will be reconciled to avoid confusion and ensure consistency throughout all documents in the near future.

detail, a sampling of them serves to demonstrate the scope of work and the significance of that work to both the artillery and the CA. Also, it is important to note that while the tasks associated with these three LoEs are artillery related, they are not generated by The RCA to advance an RCA agenda. Rather, they are derived from CA institutions, most of which contain a cross section of branches. However, due to staffing limitations they often lack the capacity to deal with the volume of work and so rely on Branch support.

Within the Personnel and Structures LoE tasks include: analysis of artillery related roles, missions and tasks in support of the Army's Line of Operation 3 (LoO 3), which is a major sustained international operation under the auspices of Mission 5 of the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS);²⁹ tasks associated with supporting the execution of the Artillery Reserve Establishment Master Implementation Plan (ARE MIP); refining the Artillery Career Progression Model; proposing [artillery] Force Generation (FG) and Force Employment (FE) concepts; supporting equipment and vehicle distribution plans; modification and codification of structures and command and control relationships; and completion of the RCA structure including its accurate reflection in CA personnel management software.

Within the Doctrine and Training LoE tasks include: artillery individual training rationalization and implementation; assisting in the development and delivery of targeting doctrine, training and TTPs [Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures]; aligning The RCA's approach to targeting with the Strategic Targeting Directive; the revitalization of artillery doctrine including its review and prioritization of work; and supporting CD work associated with Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA), Ground Based Air and Munitions Defence (GBAMD), and Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF).

²⁹Department of National Defence, B-GL-005-000/AC-001, *Advancing with Purpose: the Army Strategy* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2014), 5.

Finally, within the Equipment LoE tasks include: supporting Army CD work including defining the short and long term objectives of the Indirect Fire Modernization Project (IFM); generating Statement of Capability Deficiencies (SOCD) for artillery digitization and STA; producing a PRICIE+G for each new capability; and redefining the digitization problem at division, brigade and below and create a Capability Deficiency Record (CDR).³⁰

It is evident that the scope of these tasks in terms of quantity, complexity and weight exceed the capacity of the two staff members dedicated to support D Arty and the associated operational Branch business. Therefore, an array of individuals and agencies has been enlisted to assist the CIG and Mr Gnr. In this regard the CIG might be best viewed as both a principal staff officer to D Arty and D D Arty, as well as a Chief of Staff (COS) responsible for coordinating staff effort across a variety of fronts.

No less than ten different agencies (or more correctly individuals within these agencies) have multiple primary and supporting tasks associated with this Campaign Plan including all regular force artillery units (1st Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (1 RCHA), 2 RCHA, 5^e Régiment d'artillerie légère du Canada (5 RALC), 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support) (4 RCA (GS)), and RCAS); the Canadian Forces Land Forces Warfare Centre (CFLWC); the Canadian Army Command and Staff College (CACSC); Directorate Army Doctrine (DAD); Directorate Land Requirements 2 (DLR 2); D D Arty Res; and RSM RCA Res. Notable for its absence is Directorate Army Training (DAT), a section within the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (CADTC), which is not currently staffed with artillery personnel. In the case of

³⁰PRICIE+G is the acronym associated with capability development within the CA and stands for: **P**ersonnel; **R**esearch and development/operational research; **In**frastructure and organization; **C**oncepts, doctrine and collective training; **In**dividual training infrastructure; **E**quipment, supplies and services; and **G**eneration.

the regular force units, their COs have engaged their staffs and subordinate commanders to assist them with the execution of their respective tasks.


To manage and coordinate the three operational LoEs of The RCA's Campaign Plan D Arty makes use of the Artillery Advisory Board (AAB). This board sits virtually twice or thrice annually to discuss, update and advance the various agenda items as identified within the Campaign Plan. A review of the minutes of the 24th of May 2015 meeting reveals that 43 people attended that session representing all of the agencies noted in the preceding paragraph as well as a number attending as interested and affected parties.³¹

In terms of division of responsibility, inasmuch as D Arty chairs the AAB, he generally leaves force development and the day-to-day oversight of its associated LoEs to D D Arty to superintend on his behalf, particularly since the meetings generally require travel, are not forecast far enough in advance to effectively de-conflict with his day job schedule, and require substantial preparation to attend suitably informed to be able to meaningfully contribute.³² In turn D D Arty relies on the CIG to manage the Campaign Plan, which is largely delegated to unit COs and Battery Commanders (BCs) to execute. The non-operational aspects of The RCA, articulated in LoE 3 through 5 of The RCA Family Strategy including The RCA's non-public finances, heritage, history and traditions are the remit of the Regimental Colonel enabled by RHQ RCA. The majority of D Arty's effort is aimed at career management and succession planning. D Arty formally briefs CCA once annually on The RCA Campaign Plan, in accordance with the CAF and CA direction regarding Branch Advisors. He also engages the Deputy CCA

³¹Timothy J. Bishop, Col, *Minutes – Artillery Advisory Board – 24 May 2015* (RCAS: file 1180-1 (BC HQ Bty)), May 2015, 1-2.

³²Col T.J. Bishop, e-mail to author, 17 June 2015.

(DCCA) more regularly due to the latter's control of the post-command and Joint Command and Staff Programme (JCSP) plot.³³ Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of this model.



Graphical Representation of Current Model

To summarize, a generally mutually beneficial, symbiotic relationship has been created amongst Gunners and with the CA whereby artillery staff within CA establishments benefit from the assistance of The RCA collective, under the guidance of D Arty, to complete necessary staff work that ultimately benefits jointly The RCA and the CA. The Director and his Deputy focus on the operational aspects of the artillery – The RCA as a functional branch within the CA, leaving the Regimental Colonel to focus on the non-operational aspects of the artillery – The RCA as a Regiment or corps.

³³*Ibid.*, 24 June 2015.

CHALLENGES OF THE DIRECTOR OF ARTILLERY FUNCTION

Given the level of complexity associated with the execution of the D Arty function as articulated above, challenges inevitably exist, some more apparent than others. Further, the challenges will differ from Director to Director based on a number of factors including but not limited to their primary job, its location and demands, their background and familiarity with artillery related issues, and the availability and capacity of a supporting cast including the challenges associated with their respective primary jobs. To organize this broad range of challenges, they have been divided into four headings, each of which will be examined separately but are often interrelated: geography; capacity; prioritization, and synchronization.

Geography

Even in the connected world of today, being physically separated from staff poses challenges, the effects of which should not be underestimated. Generally D Arty is geographically disconnected from his principal staff, which is based in Gagetown, New Brunswick. Aside from one Director whose primary job was co-located in Gagetown, all others have been based in Ontario. This is a less than optimal arrangement particularly when dealing with complicated, complex, or time sensitive issues. Based on the sampling of items within the RCA Campaign Plan, it is evident most fall into one of those categories. Further, those agents contributing to the Campaign Plan are spread practically across Canada, or at least principally from Manitoba through Ontario and Quebec, and into New Brunswick.

Despite today's technology allowing one to connect over distance, physical separation, particularly of staff, increases the risk of working in isolation and that work becoming "stovepiped" or deviating from an intended course. It also significantly increases the risk of failing to appropriately connect various work strands, identifying connections between work strands, or adequately understanding their impacts on each other. In this regard, the recognition of these elements rests principally with the CIG in his day-to-day management of the Campaign Plan, and with the members of the AAB when it assembles every four to six months. In the latter case, the ability to "course-correct" may prove difficult depending on externally imposed time constraints. In short, geographic separation increases the difficulty associated with achieving unity of thought, purpose, and action amongst staff and between staff and commanders.

Capacity

An individual's capacity to work is not limitless. Indeed, an implicit reason the function of D Arty is as extensive as it is stems from the reality faced by personnel in artillery sections within Army staffs that their workloads exceed their capacity – not in terms of aptitude or ability, but in terms of volume. As well, un-staffed artillery sections in institutions such as CADTC and DAT result in almost no capacity to address artillery matters within those institutions.

Indeed the volume and complexity of work associated with the execution of the D Arty function exceeds the capacity of D Arty as an individual as well as the two individuals assigned as principal staff, and is why the work is broadcast throughout The RCA. Those individuals who have acquired supporting roles in this arrangement also have limited capacity as they all have demanding primary jobs, many of which involve command either at unit or sub-unit level. Therefore the solution to capacity limitations has been to spread the body of work as widely as possible in an effort to minimize disruption to these individuals and their primary duties. While pragmatic, this solution does not necessarily constitute the most effective or efficient distribution of work but rather the most manageable one.

Prioritization

This section might equally be called time management or competing priorities. The challenge associated with balancing primary and secondary duties exists for most within the CAF. D Arty must balance the exigencies of a very full day job against those of the Branch. When a conflict exists he must perform a particularly fine balancing act in an effort to compromise neither. As the current Director noted: "…when my day job conflicts directly with my duties as D Arty, the default to date has been Recruiting [day job] first and everything else fills in behind."³⁴ Front line commanders face similar friction, with supporting the development of key staff products as part of The RCA Campaign Plan competing directly with commanding and training a front line unit or sub-unit. This reality begs the question that despite the importance of the work, how much energy can reasonably be expected to be devoted to it and by extension how sound are the decisions and outputs?

Synchronization

Competing priorities are also heavily related to the challenge of synchronization or coordination. Synchronizing staff effort so that deadlines can be achieved with suitably informed and considered products is the key overarching challenge. However, even identifying times when appropriate entities can meet, even virtually, to discuss matters and formulate options can prove difficult. Interestingly, the Army's managed readiness model, which seeks in part to synchronize Army FG efforts, is a contributing factor to this issue. Synchronizing contributions to The RCA Campaign Plan across an Army in various stages of managed readiness, each bound by the schedules, tasks, and battle-rhythm of their respective unit and formation adds an additional level

²¹

³⁴*Ibid.*, 17 June 2015.

of complexity to this task.³⁵ In short, synchronization must occur not only amongst contributors to The RCA Campaign Plan but also with each respective unit's place within the managed readiness model.

It is clear that D Arty and his varied and dispersed supporting cast must overcome an array of challenges in order to successfully advance The RCA Campaign Plan, which forms a key element of the D Arty function. While a testament to the determination and dedication of the individuals and the Branch as a whole to work through those challenges, it should also raise the question of whether there is a better, more effective and efficient way to conduct this important business, which is undertaken in support of CA business.

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

With an understanding of the current paradigm complete an historical review, focusing particularly on the last 20 years, allows one to understand the evolution of the function of D Arty towards its current construct. An officer has been appointed as the head of the Artillery Branch under one title or another since 1919.³⁶ Since the title of Director of Artillery first appeared in 1942 it has remained in use uninterrupted, save a five year period between1965 to 1970 when the appointment was designated Chief of Artillery.³⁷ Additionally, it is noteworthy that the appointment, regardless of title, was a full time position with a dedicated staff until 1996, coincident with the closure of Force Mobile Command (FMC) HQ as part of a larger transformation initiative of the Canadian Forces (CF).³⁸

³⁵Department of National Defence, *Army Operating Plan FY 2015/2016v2*, (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2015), 3-B-2-1/4.

³⁶The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, *RCA Standing Orders, Vol II* (August 2011), 2-2/7 – 2-4/7. ³⁷*Ibid.*, 2-3/7.

³⁸Dave W. Read, Col, "Message from the Director," *The Canadian Gunner* 32, (1996): 5-6, http://www.artillery.net/beta/files/Canadian%20Gunner%201996.pdf.

A constituent part of that transformation saw the appointment of D Arty become a secondary duty linked to the position of Director of Personnel (of the Land Staff), which was designated as a "hard" artillery colonel position within the recently established Land Staff as part of a restructured National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ).³⁹ Similar secondary duty relationships were established by other branches throughout the Land Staff to ensure the continuation their respective directors' functions, duties and responsibilities. This was an explicit acknowledgement by the chain of command of the merits of Branch Advisors/Directors and of the need to retain them and their functions somewhere within this transformed organization.

Specific staff functions previously resident within the office of D Arty were assigned as secondary duties to two distinct entities within the artillery. The Commander Home Station (i.e. the Base Commander of Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Shilo), a hard artillery colonel position, "assumed all duties associated with Regimental Affairs."⁴⁰ In practical terms these affairs related to the Regiment as a corps and focused on the non-operational, non-public components associated with the Regimental family, its history, heritage, communications, and finances. Commensurate with this responsibility was the requirement to staff RHQ RCA. This was done by reorganizing the duties and responsibilities of base staff to either free up individuals to work at RHQ RCA directly or alternately to assume duties associated with RHQ RCA has ebbed and flowed over time, it has averaged twelve to fifteen individuals generally consisting of a major filling the post of Regimental Major RCA; a captain filling the post of Regimental Adjutant

³⁹In this context "hard" is a colloquialism meaning a position to be filled by a specific branch. It is most often used in association with positions that could be filled by a variety of branches given their generalist nature but are allocated to specific branches usually to facility career management and posting plots.

⁴⁰n.d., "Regimental Headquarters RCA," *The Canadian Gunner* 32, (1996): 7, http://www.artillery.net/beta/files/Canadian%20Gunner%201996.pdf.

RCA; a master-warrant officer filling the post of RHQ Sergeant-Major; and a range of nine to twelve senior and junior non-commissioned members (NCMs) and other ranks (ORs) working within the RCA kit shop and work shop.

Director Land Requirements 2 (DLR 2), a hard artillery lieutenant-colonel position possessing an associated artillery staff, was appointed D D Arty and continued to be responsible for "the staffing of artillery projects in the Army's Capital Equipment Plan;"⁴¹ however, the task of articulating and advancing, indeed championing, The RCA's views within the Land Staff with regards to artillery equipment programs was added to his portfolio. This subtle but important addition as well as its implication will be examined in more detail below.

This division of responsibilities continued until these appointments were no longer able to fulfill these secondary duties adequately. In the case of Commander Home Station, the post had been held by an artillery officer from 1940 through to 2003 save a single three year period between 1962 and 1965 where it was staffed by a RCEME colonel.⁴² So it was reasonable for The RCA to expect the practice, including the associated support to RHQ RCA to continue. However, beginning in 2003 the Base Commander of CFB Shilo has been filled by non-artillery personnel,⁴³ making the appointment of Commander Home Station honorary in nature.⁴⁴ Beyond a personal commitment to continue to promote the history and tradition of the appointment of Commander Home Station there remained no Branch impetus for a Base Commander to support the Regimental affairs of The RCA and indeed there was increasing pressure not to.

⁴¹n.d., "Directorate of Land Requirements (DLR)," *The Canadian Gunner* 32, (1996): 94, http://www.artillery.net/beta/files/Canadian%20Gunner%201996.pdf.

⁴²The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, *RCA Standing Orders*, Vol II (August 2011), 2-4/7 – 2-6/7.

⁴³This was likely done in part to avoid the perception of favouritism towards the artillery given the impending arrival of 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry to Shilo in the fall of 2004. Prior to that CFB Shilo was very much an artillery-centric base.

⁴⁴The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, *RCA Standing Orders, Vol 1* (August 2011), 2-10/15 – 2-12/15.

The most visible manifestation of that reality was the erosion in staff support to RHO RCA. Successive Base Commanders faced with personnel and staffing challenges questioned the value and utility of supporting RHQ RCA at the expense of his own headquarters and staff functions. Consequently, over time, the staffing of RHQ RCA positions, less one remaining hold-out, have been removed from the mandate of the Base Commander. The Regimental Major and RHQ Sergeant-Major positions are now staffed via Military Manning Overhead (MMO) linked to the artillery regiment located at CFB Shilo –1 RCHA.⁴⁵ Additionally, all senior and junior NCM and OR positions of RHQ RCA are now also supported by 1 RCHA; however, unlike the previously mentioned MMO positions, these nine to twelve RHQ positions are staffed by 1 RCHA personnel at the expense of their positions within the Regiment proper. These types of positions are sometimes referred to euphemistically as "black-economy posts". Indeed, the last remnant of a Base Commander's more intimate association with the affairs of the Regiment can be found in the post of Regimental Adjutant RCA, which is still officially a CFB Shilo position; a position that will likely be eliminated in 2016 as part of a position rationalization exercise by the CA. However, the Commander Home Station continues to support the affairs of The RCA through the provision of infrastructure to house RHQ RCA operations as well as a small operating budget.

In response to the loss of a guaranteed custodian of Regimental affairs at CFB Shilo, the RCA established the position of Regimental Colonel in 2011 as part of a larger RCA Family Strategy initiative.⁴⁶ Similar to D Arty and D D Arty, this appointment is a secondary duty,

⁴⁵An officially recognized process whereby an established position (in this case artillery) somewhere within the CF remains unfilled to allow another unit (in this case 1 RCHA) to be overborne.

⁴⁶ The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, *RCA Standing Orders, Vol 1* (August 2011), 2-10/15.

currently associated to an artillery colonel generally located somewhere in Ottawa within one of the CAF's HQs.

In the case of DLR 2, as intimated above, while the task of *championing* artillery equipment projects might be viewed as compatible and sympathetic with the task of *staffing* artillery equipment projects, that was not always the case. The generation, from the same office, of documents in support of D Arty as well as documents in support of DLR served to confuse matters and blur if not merge these two tasks for all but the most perceptive and astute. This distinction was ultimately lost on the majority. Further, the articulation of parochial artillery views risked undermining the credibility of DLR 2 both as an individual as well as a section within the pan-army organization of DLR, and at times those views ran counter to those of DLR 2's functional chain of command.⁴⁷ This risked placing DLR 2, both individually and collectively, in the difficult and unenviable position of having to choose between supporting one's corps and one's functional chain of command.

This reality, coupled with the recent loss of a previously thought-to-be guaranteed artillery position (and proponent) in form of Commander Home Station, caused The RCA to search elsewhere for this task to reside – somewhere that could reasonably be expected to espouse a parochial artillery view and not be judged (too) harshly; somewhere that possessed sufficient guaranteed artillery staff horse-power to support D Arty; somewhere that could reasonably be expected to contribute to the function of D Arty as part of its primary function. The Cmdt of RCAS as well as RCAS itself seemed to be the only artillery appointment and organization that could reasonably tick all of these boxes, particularly with its related mandate as

⁴⁷LCol C.S. Landry, e-mail to author, 6 July 2015.

CoE for artillery matters.⁴⁸ As such the Cmdt of RCAS became D D Arty. The structure of RCAS to support this task has changed over time and seems to have stabilized to the current state of the CIG and Mr Gnr, with a newly created post of Technical Adjutant (Tech Adjt) that will be filled for the first time in 2015, all whose primary duties consist of supporting D Arty and D D Arty in the fulfillment of their Branch responsibilities.

Finally, even the position of Director of Personnel (now Army G1) did not survive organizational change unscathed. In 2002 this "hard" artillery post was staffed by a RCEME colonel resulting in DLR, at the time an artillery colonel, assuming the appointment of D Arty. Since then the secondary duty of D Arty has not been linked to any specific position. Rather it is allocated to an artillery colonel based on suitability and availability to perform the function.

In summary, with the closure of FMC HQ, Land Staff recognized the value of Branch Directors and sought to preserve them in the form of secondary duties linked to staff positions within its new HQ. Quasi-formal, quasi-official structures were created, and migrated as required to support D Arty and D D Arty in the execution of their duties. As such, the evolution of the Director function and supporting structures since 1996 could be viewed as the organizationally pragmatic equivalent of making lemonade out of lemons. The value of the function was evident, hence the decision to preserve it despite organizational obstacles.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE CURRENT MODEL

No organizational model is perfect; each possesses a range of challenges, merits and demerits. Additionally advantages and disadvantages, or strengths and weaknesses are not often categorical or unconditional, but rather relative based upon the weighting of a variety of factors to derive a point of view. A strength to one may be considered a weakness by another. As such,

⁴⁸Similar solutions were found across all branches with schools at Combat Training Centre in Gagetown.

absolutes are difficult to achieve when discussing the benefits and limitations of any organizational model. With regards to the function of D Arty as a Branch Advisor, there are three principle constituent points of view to consider: the CAF, the CA, and The RCA. The advantages and disadvantages of the current paradigm are explored from these three perspectives.

For the CAF the most readily apparent benefit of this model is the absence of dedicated Person Years (PYs) and formal structures to support it (setting aside the CIG and Mr Gnr for the moment). The size of the CAF is not limitless; its size and structure authorized by the Governor in Council and Minister of National Defence respectively.⁴⁹ With its finite size, generating new capabilities or enhancing extant ones with additional PYs usually means a commensurate reduction in PYs elsewhere within the institution; an organizational concept referred to as being PY neutral. This is the principle reason that the RCA Adjutant position will likely be eliminated in 2016; that PY will be reallocated elsewhere within the CAF. Indeed, the requirement for PY neutral reorganization was one of the factors associated with the demise of Branch Advisors and associated staff in the mid-1990s. The merit of the positions was not questioned; however, in an era of significant transformation, these PYs were sacrificed to generate capability and capacity elsewhere. Despite the size of the CAF, there is always a paucity of surplus PYs, therefore any opportunity to generate capability and capacity without the use of PYs is beneficial to both the CAF and the CA. Enshrining the duties and responsibilities of D Arty as a secondary duty following the closure of FMC HQ allowed that to occur.

However The RCA considers the lack of PYs allocated to the function of D Arty a weakness. The absence of full time positions allocated to D Arty and supporting staff simply translates into the requirement for a number of Gunners throughout the CAF to assume

⁴⁹National Defence Act, R.S.C., c. N-5, s. 15, 16, 17.

secondary duties that detract, at times significantly, from their primary duties. This applies also to the two (soon to be three) positions assigned to work full-time on operational Branch business within RCAS. From the CAF's and CA's outlook the positions of CIG and Mr Gnr are part of the RCAS establishment. So while presentationally and practically these positions primarily support D Arty and D D Arty, in organizational terms they are secondary duties that simply have assumed primacy at the expense of their primary duties; those either being distributed elsewhere amongst other staff or lapsing outright.⁵⁰ In many regards this is a continuation of the process started with the closure of FMC HQ in the mid-1990s. The CAF and CA assigned the responsibility of Branch Advisor as a secondary duty. The absence of staff to support that function has resulted in The RCA, through the Cmdt of RCAS, assigning secondary duties to the CIG and Mr Gnr of RCAS which have become, for all intents and purposes, primary duties.

Also, even if one was to argue that RCAS is primarily executing its CoE duties from which products D Arty and D D Arty benefit, there is ample evidence to indicate RCAS is not adequately resourced to fulfill that mandate. In March 2011 Chief Review Services (CRS) released a report following its evaluation of CF land readiness, with particular emphasis on training. The report found in part that:

A number of problems have arisen in the execution of this CoE concept. The main issue is one of "unfunded mandates" in that responsibility has been delegated without attendant resources to fulfill that mandate. Members of every principal Land Force training institution interviewed by the evaluation team voiced their professional concern that they were generally unable to totally fulfill expectations as CoEs.⁵¹

⁵⁰Erik Deneau, Maj, CIG, telephone conversation with author, 25 June 2015. Cmdt RCAS has directed that 95% of the CIG's time be spent on Branch business and 5% spent on individual training (IT) within RCAS.

⁵¹Chief Review Services, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness Training*, CRS: file 1258-169 (CRS)), March 2011, http://www.crs.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/2011/167P0861-eng.aspx#excel, Centres of Excellence link.

The resultant finding indicated that: "[t]he CoE concept, while admirable in theory, has been executed poorly across the Land Forces. CoE responsibilities have been assigned to many training organizations that are not staffed, trained or equipped to maintain these responsibilities."⁵² Further the report recommended that all CoE responsibilities be reviewed: "...to ensure adequate resources have been assigned to achieve training and operational expectations. In those cases where harmonizing CoE responsibilities and resources is [sic] not feasible, consider removing the additional CoE burden from those affected."⁵³ In the case of the RCAS the resource deficit extends beyond equipment and funding to include staff.

The strength of this model for The RCA is its division of labour. Despite inherent limitations, once the necessity to support D Arty and D D Arty in the execution of their functions is accepted, the pragmatic solution of spreading the work load amongst a wide contingent has merit. However, as noted previously, this division of labour is not necessarily based upon suitability or familiarity with the subject matter, but rather on availability of personnel. As such it is best viewed as a mitigation strategy associated with managing the task as best as possible within authorized establishments.

Positively, this model also subordinates Branch views to those of various functional areas such as CD and FD. This is a subtle but important distinction. The work done through The RCA Campaign Plan is fed to CA and CAF staffs, where it becomes formalized. This ensures parochial Branch-centric views inform CA and CAF processes, inputs, products and decisions without usurping them. This allows CAF and CA staffs and commanders to take decisions in the best interest of the organization writ large rather than any single Branch within it.

⁵²Ibid. ⁵³Ibid. Despite these advantages, and noting The RCA's contrary opinion with regards to PYs, this model also carries with it a variety of disadvantages. The first, while hard to quantify, remains valid. What is the institutional impact of these secondary duties? Or put another way, what is not being done or being done less well in the fulfillment of these secondary duties? These questions apply equally to both one's primary and secondary duties. What is the impact on one's primary duties while executing one's secondary duties, and vice versa?

In the case of D Arty, balancing these duties has resulted in delegating the management of CD and FD to Cmdt RCAS in his capacity as D D Arty while he (D Arty) focuses primarily on career management and succession planning. Despite this division of responsibilities D Arty duties occupy significant time. The RCA Senate, of which D Arty is a member, sits quarterly. Each meeting last approximately four hours and requires significant preparation to say nothing of the time required to address the tasks that arise from the meeting. The AAB, which D Arty chairs, sits two or three times a year and also lasts approximately four hours and requires significant preparation. D Arty also has a host of other commitments throughout the year ranging from attendance at changes of command and other parades, to graduations and participation in the annual ranking boards.

In the case of Cmdt RCAS, it is estimated that fully 50% of his time is consumed with D D Arty duties. A corollary is that 50% of his time is not spent commanding RCAS, whose institutional mission is, "[t]o plan, deliver, sustain and evaluate Artillery individual training as well as related Maintenance individual training."⁵⁴ As such it is the principle training institution of The RCA responsible for the delivery of senior and advanced courses for officers and NCMs. Similarly, the CIG, previously primarily responsible for the standard of training across all

⁵⁴RCAS Intranet Site Welcome Page, accessed 21 June 2015, http://lfcms.kingston.mil.ca/Default.aspx?sectionID=143000440010128&type=S.

sections of RCAS, now devotes 95% of his time to operational Branch business. The question extends equally to all regular force COs, which, in all cases, involve their staffs and subordinate commanders. Even accepting that they devote less time to this secondary duty, what is not being done or being done less well while they engage in the not insignificant tasks of contributing to The RCA Campaign Plan?

A related issue is the intellectual energy brought to bear on any issue. It is the difference between being fully engaged in an issue as opposed to being sufficiently engaged to allow one to return to one's primary duty. Those engaged in support of the D Arty function might be inclined to ask themselves "how much time and effort can reasonably be expended to allow me to return to my primary job?" In short there is little vested interest in a solution beyond the minimum effort required to allow one to return to one's primary duty. So while effort is made to generate informed decisions, how informed and considered are they since the intellectual energy expended is in support of a secondary duty?

The current model also suffers from a discrepancy between the significance of the work and the resources assigned to it by the CA. In very general terms, in order to fulfill its assigned roles and missions, the CA is responsible for FD and FG, and contributes to the FE concept associated with various scenarios. The body of work undertaken via the AAB and The RCA Campaign Plan demonstrates that the artillery contributes significant Branch input into each of those areas, all through secondary duties, due to the absence of a full time staff.

A fundamental flaw in this model is the belief, or at least assumption, that D Arty is able to fulfill his mandate without significant staff assistance and effort. While the original intent may have been to leverage artillery staffs already resident within CA and CAF HQs the assumption has proven untenable. That staff capacity needed to be found and over time has become resident in artillery organizations that are best able to absorb the additional burden due to their size more than their suitability. As a result, critical FD, FG, and FE concept work is done in the margins of people's day jobs. Additionally, the challenges of geography, capacity, prioritization and synchronization associated with the function of D Arty articulated early should also be considered disadvantages with the current model.

Cumulatively the current model can be examined in terms of its efficiency and its effectiveness. Again, points of view likely generate different responses. The RCA considers the current model to be neither very effective nor very efficient. But it is as effective and as efficient as it can be given the constraints within which the work must be accomplished. This fact does not diminish the work being done by The RCA in support of the D Arty function. Indeed without the outputs of the AAB, CA staff would be at a stand-still on many fronts. Therefore, while CA staff considers The RCA outputs useful, often their usefulness is measured against the alternative, which is nothing, or at least less than current outputs. So there is a level of effectiveness and efficiency with the current model; however, it does not achieve the levels required given the significance of the work, and the problems faced by CA staff of integrating more effectively and efficiently with NDHQ. In very general terms, when contemplating a need to improve, sometimes *better* is the enemy of *good enough*. In short, the benefits of improvement outweigh the cost(s) of achieving them. This author suggests this is not one of those times. Given the importance of the work being done by The RCA, largely on behalf of the CA, the current good enough model is in fact the enemy of a better model.

It is clear that perspective plays a significant factor when assessing the merits and demerits of the current model. Superficially there are benefits to the CAF and the CA with the current model. An important function is being executed at no cost to the institution in terms of PYs and formalized establishments. Most of the overt disadvantages rest with the Branch.

Further the difficulty in quantifying the negative impacts of some of the disadvantages allows

them to be more easily dismissed or unnoticed, particularly by the CAF and CA. The RCA,

which feels the brunt of these less obvious disadvantages, must generally accept them as it gets on with the job at hand. However, difficulty in quantifying the impacts of these disadvantages

should not be a reason to avoid or ignore them.

A NEW (OLD) MODEL

The personal and institutional limitations of the D Arty function associated with the inplace model suggest that simply tweaking the current model will not address its shortfalls adequately. As the current D Arty notes:

...some jobs are more conducive to such secondary duties than others – [however] there is likely no Colonels [sic] job in the Army that is suited to doing this function as a secondary duty without spending significant time and energy outside the normal office hours working on the duties that are associated with the post.⁵⁵

Reinforcing and expanding on this view, the previous D Arty's summary of the issues

connected with the current model with respect to CD is as incisive as it is concise and eloquent:

I found it extremely difficult for the Regiment to provide sound, thoughtful and timely inputs to an Army capability development process that seems designed to limit corps/regimental influence.... In my view it can partially be attributed to the part-time nature of how Regimental matters of import are managed. Directors rely on their Deputies (Cmdts of Schools) and their staffs to stay virtually engaged with the army staff to ensure that Regimental inputs are credible and considered.... [T]he part-time nature of the Director's job meant that I was not able to stay on top of capability development issues to the degree that I would have liked or to the degree I thought necessary. In addition, we rely on a virtual Regimental team to champion and manage our capability development efforts across a variety of Army and CF organizations – our reps in DLR, DLFD, CPROG and Force Development, CFWC etc, if we are lucky to

⁵⁵Col T.J. Bishop, e-mail to author, 17 June 2015.

have reps in all these organizations. Consequently, our inputs are at times somewhat random and personalized. 56

These insights reveal that successive Directors of Artillery feel it is very difficult to adequately fulfill their CA assigned mandate of assisting and complimenting the Army chain of command, and supporting and enhancing decision-making through the provision of specialist advice on artillery issues and policies, when it is undertaken as a secondary duty. Colonel Dalton identifies that The RCA was not able to wholly or satisfactorily contribute to CA CD efforts due to the limitations of extant structures and processes that are designed to support and inform that process.

While it is not evident that the CA felt or recognized this deficiency in the artillery's support and contributions, it is clear the CA is wrestling with its governance, processes and structures in an effort to improve its interaction with and inputs into NDHQ. Based on the data at hand it seems that exercise is primarily focused on an examination of CA HQ staff, structures and processes as opposed to a more expansive, holistic pan-army solution.⁵⁷ This suggests the CA is looking inward and upward, rather than perhaps recognizing that an element of the solution can be found by looking downward and outward. A new model optimally should seek to address deficiencies identified within both the artillery and the CA.

The issues associated with the secondary duty nature of the function of D Arty are addressed by making the appointment of Branch Advisor/Director a formal, established, full time duty. Consequently, some amount of dedicated staff is needed to support the Director in fulfilling his or her assigned mandate. The exact size and composition of that staff and its organizational relationship within the CA is dependent largely upon the mandate assigned to D Arty. As with

⁵⁶Col (ret'd) L.C. Dalton, e-mail to author, 2 July, 2015.

⁵⁷Canadian Army Staff, *Canadian Army Governance*, PowerPoint briefing, 4 June 2014, slide 4, 6.

most things, a range of options exist, from small and austere, to large and elaborate. This paper takes a middle approach in an effort to ground it in a degree of realism, as well as provide a degree of flexibility or margin of error right and left of the mark.

The roles and responsibilities as articulated in CAO 11-93 of: "...assist[ing] and complement[ing] the Army chain of command by providing specialist advice to the [CCA] on Branch issues and policies," and "...support[ing] and enhance[ing] the decision-making process by providing advice on issues related to strategic policy, force development, training and personnel," are quite extensive and comprehensive.⁵⁸ They allow scope for the D Arty and staff to engage in an array of issues. However, the current mandate or role of being *the focal point for Branch issues* does not adequately reflect the range of those duties and responsibilities. Therefore it is proposed that the Director's mandate be modified to become the *professional head of arm* for the artillery. Being recognized as such increases the legitimacy and gravitas to the appointment and results in the appointment and staff becoming the default source for the CA and CAF with regards to opinions and advice regarding the artillery, as both a functional branch and as a corps.

Examining the role of D Arty and the spectrum of issues he or she is expected to comment on against the current structure of the CA HQ is useful in determining where D Arty and staff should best reside. The requirement to assist and complement the CA chain of command by providing specialist artillery advice suggests strongly that D Arty and staff perform an enabling and supporting function to the CCA and staff. Further, given that the Director must be able to provide advice on things such as strategic policy, force development, training and personnel, D Arty and supporting staff must be able to span those functional areas and by

⁵⁸Department of National Defence, *CAO 11-93 Army Branch Director/Advisor Responsibilities* (Ottawa; Canadian Army, 2007), 1.

extension should not be resident within any particular one. With these in mind an examination of the current structure of the CA HQ is instructional.

The CA HQ contains four functional lines below the CCA, which are depicted at figure 2.⁵⁹ First is the Assistant Chief of Army Staff, also known as the DCCA, which contains two subordinate organizations: Director Army Staff; and the Army Comptroller. Next, the Director General (DG) Army Staff contains three subordinate organizations: Director Army Force Readiness; Director Army Personnel Management; and Director Army Force Sustainment. The DG Army Reserves contains two subordinate organizations: Director Land Reserve Mobilization and Personnel Planning; and Director Land Reserve Management. Finally, DG Army Capability Development contains two subordinate organizations: Director Land Requirements; and Director Land Command and Information.

Canadian Army HQ Structure




Figure 2: Canadian Army HQ Structure

⁵⁹NDHQ Organizational Chart, accessed 7 July 2015,

http://vcds.mil.ca/sites/CProg/Resources/DDFP%20files/NDHQ%20Approved%2022June2015.pdf.


These functional areas are generally congruent with the CA's current governance model which consists of Training and Professional Development (Trg and PD), CD, and Force Management (FM).⁶⁰ These are expanded upon in great detail in Annex A of the current Army Operating Plan, containing no less than 50 substantial tasks assigned to six separate Offices of Primary Interest (OPIs).⁶¹

Based on the above it is evident that D Arty should not be subordinated to DG Army Staff, DG Army Reserve, or DG Army Capability Development as a Branch Advisor's duties span all of these. Therefore two organizational options remain. The first option sees a third organization, tentatively named either Branch Advisors or Branch Directors, established under the DCCA. This allows the DCCA, likely assisted by DAS, to manage, direct, and coordinate the activities of these Directors and their staffs, while placing them outside of the functional control of any one DG. Alternately, these Directors might fall under the immediate control of the CCA, who already has access to a number of advisors such as legal, political, public affairs, etc., within his executive office. While this option increases D Arty's access to the CCA, it also risks overwhelming the CCA with Branch Advisors/Directors who are rightly pursuing vested Branch interests. Therefore the preferred option, depicted at figure 3, sees D Arty head an entity called D Arty HQ within an organization called Branch Advisors/Branch Directors, which is subordinated to the DCCA as part of CA HQ. This relationship accomplishes two aims. As an integral component of the CA HQ it imparts an increased degree of legitimacy to anything emanating from the Director's office. Second it allows Directors to enhance and contribute to CA business without usurping it. As advisors, enablers, and supporters their inputs are fed into CA processes


⁶⁰Canadian Army Staff, Army Governance, PowerPoint briefing, 1 August 2015, slide 2.

⁶¹Department of National Defence, *Army Operating Plan FY 2015/2016v2*, (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2015), 1-A-1/6 – 1-A-6/6.

and products while remaining subservient to the legitimate authority of the functional chain of command resident within the CA.








In terms of the size and composition of D Arty HQ, optimally it should be able to manage both the operational and non-operational aspects of the artillery; the artillery as a Branch and the artillery as a corps. This suggests that RHQ RCA, which supports the Regimental Colonel in his management of the non-operational aspects of the Regiment, should form a constituent part of D Arty HQ. However, pragmatically, RHQ RCA may continue to reside at the Home Station in Shilo, with a functional line drawn between it and D Arty HQ – in essence a satellite element of D Arty HQ. This ensures that D Arty, as the professional head of arm for the artillery, remains the single entity responsible for all aspects of The RCA, allowing the Regimental Colonel to continue to act as D Arty's co-advisor or assistant in accordance with the extant CAF and CA orders. Similarly, it is estimated that the career management and succession planning function can continue to be reasonably supported through the efforts of D Mil C 3 working in conjunction with this newly formed D Arty HQ. In the arena of career management and succession planning, the staff capacity already exists and is intimately tied to that staff's primary duty. The limiting factor was the availability of D Arty. The establishment of a full time D Arty and HQ therefore removes that difficulty.

Given the above pragmatism, this paper proposes that the D Arty HQ within CA HQ focuses on enabling and supporting the operational aspects of the CA under the auspices of its governance model consisting of Trg and PD, CD, and FM. Therefore sufficient staff needs to be allocated to support those efforts and obviously there are many ways one can organize the associated tasks. It is recommended that to assist in achieving consistency across as many areas as possible, staffs linked to Trg and PD, and CD are organized along CoE lines. With regards to FM, accepting that D Mil C 3 will contribute significantly to portions of that area, it is recommended that D Arty HQ staff focus on establishments, organization and equipment, and artillery sustainment. Therefore the following positions are recommended to exist within D Arty HQ:

- D Arty (colonel)
- D D Arty/COS (lieutenant-colonel)
- D Arty Coord (major)
- RSM RCA (CWO)
- Indirect Fire CD (captain / major)
- STA and Miniature Unmanned Aerial System (MUAS) CD (captain / major)
- Forward Air Controller (FAC) and Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Force (PSS-SOF) CD (captain / major)

- GBAMD/Air Space Coordination (ASC)/Air Defence System Integrator (ADSI) CD (captain / major)
- Indirect Fire Trg and PD (captain / major)
- STA and MUAS Trg and PD (captain / major)
- FAC and PSS-SOF Trg and PD (captain / major)
- GBAMD/ASC/ADSI Trg and PD (captain / major)
- Establishments, Organization and Equipment FM (captain / major)
- Artillery Combat Service Support (CSS) FM (captain / major)

This division of responsibilities provides each staff officer with manageable and defined terms of reference and portfolio, allowing each to meaningfully contribute to a broad range of activities, processes, and products across the CA within their respective area of expertise in a consistent fashion. Such an HQ, depicted at figure 4, is also sufficiently small to foster regular exchange of information, which assists in establishing a shared understanding of work, priorities of effort, as well as identifying linkages and issues between the CA's governance areas. Further, it should be noted that while the suggested rank is indicated in brackets, some positions, like Establishments, Organization and Equipment lend themselves to being staffed by civilians who would build an body of experience over time as opposed to a uniformed staff officer with a two or three year shelf life in their post.



From the above description it is clear that this proposed model is not new, but rather a refreshed version of a model that ceased to exist approximately twenty years ago with the closure of FMC HQ in the mid-1990s. That model existed in one form or another for far longer than it has not, suggesting a degree of merit in the concept regardless of how it has manifested itself over the years. A full time D Arty with sufficient staff would usefully inform CA processes and products as well as provide a useful azimuth check to the CCA and staff to ensure more considered decisions are taken on a variety of issues of import to both The RCA and the CA.

ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS OF A NEW MODEL

No organizational model is perfect; each carries with it an associated set of advantages and disadvantages. So the question that must be adequately addressed is how the proposed model is sufficiently better than the extant one to justify its existence? If that question cannot be sufficiently answered there is little impetus for its introduction. To use de rigueur vernacular, "Is the juice worth the squeeze?" If not this paper becomes simply another good idea to be shelved within an ever expanding library of good ideas. Therefore demonstrating the benefits of this model is central to validating this paper's thesis. This paper will limit its examination of the benefits of this new model to those that accrue to the CA and The RCA, as attempting to predict or anticipate the second and third order effects beyond those organizations is particularly difficult and enters into the realm of conjecture.

Initially, the elephant in the room will be tackled – the PY cost associated with this model. The difficulty of finding PYs from across the CA to resource this new entity can be neither understated nor simply dismissed. Therefore it must be demonstrated that there will be sufficient value added to the CA to justify such an action. Further, there is no single benefit that demonstrates that value. Rather it is the cumulative effect of a number of benefits that tip the balance in favour of this new model. These are explored below.

Obviously The RCA sees the formal establishment of D Arty HQ, with its associated PYs, as a distinct benefit since it removes a tremendous burden from a wide range of Gunners and RCA organizations that are currently required to expend significant time and effort to perform and support the D Arty function through secondary duties. This allows a significant portion of the artillery unit leadership to return to their primary duties of commanding units and sub-units; and in the case of staff, supporting commanders in the execution of those duties. Of particular note is the positive impact on the current D D Arty (Cmdt RCAS) and RCAS. He can now better focus his and his staff^{*}s efforts on running the school and managing the training and equipment aspects associated with assigned CoE responsibilities. Full time staff is also more likely to be more engaged in their staff work than those who undertake it as a secondary duty, particularly when that secondary duty is assigned as opposed to voluntary. This helps address the issue of being fully engaged in an issue as opposed to being only sufficiently engaged to be able

to return to one's primary duty. Overall the intellectual energy brought to bear on issues should be improved. Full time staff, both within and external to D Arty HQ will be better informed and connected to the stakeholders associated with their area of responsibility, which should result in an increased quantity and quality of work.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to trawl the CAF in an effort to identify potential sources of PYs to resource D Arty HQ. The author has purposely avoided the apparent "low hanging fruit" resident in RCAS in the guise of the CIG and Mr Gnr. While these would seem to be obvious excellent start points given their current focus on supporting D Arty and D D Arty, there is a very real probability that they will be required at RCAS as it begins to focus more of its energy on CoE tasks and training delivery. Further, the current paradigm exists in part due to the consequences of organizational changes, foreseen or not, which are now manifested across the CA. Without undertaking a deep-dive, first principles review of potential PY sources, there is a very real risk that a similar situation that negatively affects another component of the CA will be created elsewhere. Therefore, the author recommends that D Arty HQ is added to the CA priority list for PYs, and that it is sufficiently high on the priority list to ensure it is adequately resourced as part of the CA's overall PY reallocation and rebalance work, which should be based on a first principles assessment of PYs across the CA and the CAF.

Given Canada's size, geography will always be a factor to some degree. However, this model provides for a far more centralized point of contact for the wide majority of artillery matters, particularly policy, opinion and advice. This is a benefit realized by both The RCA and the CA. For D Arty, the staff is now co-located with him or her, with all of the attendant benefits that provides. Further CA staff and commanders have more immediate access to D Arty and staff, who perform their duties within CA HQ. This eliminates one of the key challenges faced

by the artillery and felt by the CA of having staff work spread out amongst organizations across Canada, each of which is in various stages of managed readiness.

Relatedly this model also allows for superior management and integration of priorities. While within this paper this challenge focuses primarily on the artillery, it is evident this benefit applies equally to the CA, which recognizes its difficulty in aligning its governance efforts with those of the Centre.⁶² This model better synchronizes RCA staff effort and by extension better supports the CA's efforts to synchronize and integrate its staff efforts.

Expanding upon a point made earlier with respect to CoE duties, this model also provides superior delineation of responsibilities associated with CoE and should partially address the concerns noted in the CRS report on the subject. Currently, CoE is very much focused at the level of schools through the Combat Training Centre (CTC) and CADTC. However, while the RCAS's focus on CoE is intended to be limited to training and equipment (in terms of skills and drills), by default RCAS inherited a far fuller compliment of duties that spills into capability development and management. This model allows D Arty HQ to either assume responsibility for or facilitate/coordinate the CD aspects of CoE tasks beyond training and equipment (the PRIC+G components of the PRICIE+G acronym of CD). This relieves the RCAS from the burden of those unassigned but important tasks allowing them to limit their focus to those CoE tasks formally assigned.

The benefits articulated so far redress the disadvantages of the current model described earlier. Next one must evaluate the advantages of the current model against this new model to determine if they still have merit. One of the advantages of the current model to The RCA is its division of labour. This paper concluded that while it was most definitely an advantage, it was

⁶²Canadian Army Staff, *Canadian Army Governance*, PowerPoint briefing, 4 June 2014, slide 4.

actually the best, most pragmatic mitigation strategy available given the circumstances. Within this new model, the division of labour still exists – it is now resident in an HQ with full time staff; however, there is a subtle but important distinction, which elevates the benefits of this new model beyond that of the current one. That distinction relates to the difference between division of labour, and the division or diffusion of responsibility. Accepting that according to the regulations and orders, D Arty is the sole recognized focal point for Branch issues, the reality is that responsibilities are carved up amongst a variety of agents. In practical terms the current model divided labour and responsibilities. This new model still divides labour, and indeed D Arty HQ staff will no doubt continue to seek technical input from Gunners and Gunner organizations as required, but without the attendant division of responsibility. So this model should be seen as an improvement over the current one in that it retains the ability to apportion labour but responsibility and accountability are retained centrally at D Arty HQ.

The current model also benefits from subordinating Branch views to those of the functional chain of command. This proposed model also does so; however, again there is a subtle distinction which elevates this model and is linked to the above point regarding division of labour and responsibility. This model better separates the responsibility and action of contributing to the formulation of a policy or plan with that of implementing or executing that policy or plan. Under the current model staff and commanders' work could be considered somewhat schizophrenic. Was their work being done to support D Arty, or their functional chains of command? While these might often intersect, this dual role often served to blur the distinction between the two. With this new model that problem is effectively eliminated. Branch advice, opinion and contribution to the formulation of policy are provided via D Arty HQ, and are separate and distinct from those who will be tasked with its execution or implementation.

Those so tasked can do so with the knowledge that their Branch HQ contributed to the policy and by extension endorses it.

The following benefits or advantages are based on how D Arty HQ is envisioned to function within CA HQ and therefore focus predominantly on the benefits that accrue to the CA, specifically its HQ. The current Army CD Continuum model, which is at figure 5, shows the four pillars of CD, the first three of which fall under CD with the fourth under FM.⁶³




Figure 5: Army Capability Development Continuum

That model also represents Corps and Branch contributions (along with DLFD) as a green wedge with its narrow end to the left of that continuum (suggesting limited input) and expanding as CD progresses right. As such the majority of Branch effort (in the form of secondary duties) is pictorially depicted as occurring under the FM pillar. With the establishment of D Arty HQ that CD Continuum model can be modified slightly. Figure 6 depicts that modification and represents in khaki-green a more uniform degree of Branch engagement across

⁶³Canadian Army Staff, Army Governance, PowerPoint briefing, 1 August 2015, slide 10.

all four CD pillars. This modification can equally be expanded to include the governance of the CA as well, with Branch contributions spanning Trg and PD, CD, and FM; with the latter two already covered under the auspices of the Army CD Continuum. This modification allows D Arty HQ staff to hold and provide a more holistic view of Branch issues across a spectrum of areas and time. In this regards, the D Arty HQ staff can better assist CA staff look into the future as well as assist with managing its current business.




Figure 6: Modified Army Capability Development Continuum

Returning to the *many hands make light work* phrase quoted earlier, this model puts adequate resources within CA HQ to allow it to re-apportion work. Positively these many hands remain resident within CA HQ. This paper recommends that D Arty HQ is tasked with coordinating and synchronizing The RCA's efforts and inputs across these areas, a task currently the responsibility of various CA staff. In essence D Arty HQ becomes a key enabler responsible for capability integration. This will create some additional capacity for CA HQ staff to focus more on preparing the CCA for his engagements with NDHQ and support his efforts to better integrate with NDHQ. In short, a suitably tasked D Arty HQ will allow CA HQ staff to spend more time and effort looking upward and outward instead of downward.

The ability of D Arty HQ to better see across functional areas improves its ability to coordinate and synchronize efforts across these CD pillars and governance areas. It also improves the ability to identify cause and effect relationships as well as linkages between functional areas. As a consequence, D Arty HQ is better able to assist the CA HQ identify and articulate risk, and by extension manage it, including options for its mitigation or transfer.

As an illustrative example, a CADTC decision to generate savings within the formation might take the form of reducing ammunition consumption on courses run at CTC, and therefore RCAS. D Arty HQ is uniquely positioned to offer an RCA impact statement on that decision, unburdened by functional area influence. Further, D Arty HQ is best positioned to be able to recognize if and how that risk can be either mitigated or transferred. Perhaps a collective training event offers an opportunity for students to complete the course Performance Objective to the standard of the Training Plan. Or perhaps D Arty as the professional head of arm for the artillery endorses a proposed RCAS mitigation strategy of additional training in a simulator/emulator. Importantly, D Arty HQ is not in a position to undermine the CADTC decision, it simply assists the Army's functional chain of command to fully understand the impact of that decision and better manage its consequences.

Finally, D Arty HQ is better able to monitor risk over time. Returning to the ammunition example, successive iterations of fiscal savings through ammunition reductions at CADTC can be monitored and evaluated at D Arty HQ on behalf of the CA. This provides a valuable check and balance mechanism to the CCA to better understand the cumulative consequences of various

49

initiatives and policies over time. Being able to better articulate and manage risk will empower the CCA during his interactions with NDHQ.

Examining that ammunition example within the construct of the current model generates a slightly different outcome. When RCAS, despite being the de facto HQ of D D Arty, receives such direction, their staff work focuses on how to implement that direction. It is not best placed to offer comment on the merit of the direction being issued from its higher HQ. Additionally, despite being at the sharp end of successive cost saving exercises, the RCAS still has difficulty articulating the cumulative effect of those savings up its functional chain of command. It is also not in a position to be able to identify where that risk should be transferred beyond its walls.

The question that initiated this portion of the paper was if the proposed model is sufficiently better than the extant one to justify its existence? Is the juice worth the squeeze? This paper has demonstrated that the accrual of benefits to The RCA and more importantly to the CA reveal the utility of D Arty HQ and therefore justify its existence. This paper fully recognizes the challenges of allocating scarce PYs to the establishment of such an entity; however, its advantages are not in doubt. D Arty HQ will improve the functioning of the CA HQ through an improved distribution of work. Decisions will be more informed and considered, ultimately resulting in higher quality products emanating from CA HQ, regardless whether those are used internally to the CA or externally with superior organizations such as NDHQ.

CONCLUSION

When formulating a military plan one captures all the assumptions associated with that plan and seeks to confirm or refute their validity. An invalid assumption requires one to ask if its refutation changes the situation sufficiently to impact the plan. It very rarely invalidates the entire plan. Instead the plan usually only requires modification. This in essence is the underlying premise of this paper.

During the mid-1990s an era of transformation existed within the CF. The assumption associated with that transformation was that newly created staffs resident in Land Staff sections organized along functional lines would be able to perform, as part of their daily business, the Branch work previously associated with Directors' HQ. Initially, that may have been the case; however, over time as subsequent organizational changes were realized, the ability of Land Staff to support the Directors' function waned. This resulted in Branches taking up the mantle to ensure their self- interests were suitably represented. A mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship was established as the volume of staff work exceeded the capacity of the Land Staff who relied on Branch input for assistance, and Branches felt duty bound to contribute in an effort to protect their interests.

Over the last twenty years, it could be argued that changes in Army structures and relationships have caused the Army to come full circle. Army staffs once again require Branches to provide direct input into CA staff processes and products; the only difference being the ad hoc and fragmented nature of that input through the establishment of quasi-formal structures, organizations and relationships. Further there is a growing body of evidence that the current model, which sees increased reliance on Branch input via secondary duties spread across the depth and breadth of the CAF, is less than optimal and does not adequately support CA staff efforts and by extension the CCA.

This paper is simply the recognition of the invalidity of a planning assumption that informed the mid-1990's transformation efforts, and is the articulation of a strategy that best mitigates the issues associated with the current model. The creation of D Arty HQ is not a

panacea to all of the Army's organizational issues or heavy work load, but it offers significant improvements that cannot be dismissed easily despite the PY cost associated with its creation.

The CA is principally responsible for FD and FG and is intimately concerned with and involved in the conceptual framework of the FE of its members on operations. It manages these three areas through its governance model which consists of Trg and PD, CD and FM. These should therefore be viewed as core business for CA HQ, with sufficient resources allocated to ensure their effective management.

This paper has successfully argued that assigning responsibility to Branches to contribute to this core business through secondary duties is not conducive to their effective management. Further it successfully demonstrated that the creation of a full time D Arty HQ can improve the functioning of the CA HQ, which itself recognizes the need to better synchronize multiple staff processes both within the Army and with NDHQ. Inasmuch as CA staff realize this need, it must also realize the need to look further afield than itself for a viable solution. Efforts to work smarter within the existing structure will not generate sufficient additional capacity with CA HQ staff to effectively manage the volume and complexity of their work. D Arty HQ can be used effectively to help manage the Army's governance model and its CD. It will improve the functioning of the CA HQ through an improved distribution of work. Decisions will be more informed and considered, and will ultimately result in higher quality products emanating from CA HQ. Optimally, this new model would include elements that allow D Arty, as the professional head of arm for the artillery, to manage both the operational and non-operational aspects of The RCA – the Regiment as a Branch and as a corps. However, pragmatism dictates that D Arty HQ must focus on the operational aspects of the artillery in support of the CA and the CCA's efforts towards the effective governance of the CA.

The question which concluded the prologue of this paper was, "how does a component of a larger and complex organization bound by an equally large and complex set of rules and regulations work smarter, not harder?" This paper's answer to that question is that within large complex organizations like the CA, bound by processes, rules and regulations largely imposed from above, working smarter as an organization is achieved principally through recognizing and understanding the environment, and then structuring itself to work efficiently and effectively within it. It is less about asking individuals to work smarter and more about understanding how the organization can work smarter. This organizational model allows the CA to work smarter.

This paper's thesis is that the organizational effectiveness of the CA will be improved through the establishment of Directors' Headquarters. The cumulative effect of this paper has proven that despite the PYs associated with this new establishment there are significant organizational benefits that accrue to the CA and by extension the CAF and DND with the creation of an appropriately staffed D Arty HQ led by a full time Director charged with the mandate of being the professional head of arm for the artillery. Further, despite cultural differences amongst Branches, the conclusions of this paper may have merit beyond The RCA.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bishop, Timothy J., Col. *Minutes Artillery Advisory Board 24 May 2015*. RCAS: file 1180-1 (BC HQ Bty), May 2015.
- Bishop, Timothy J., Col. *The RCA Campaign Plan 2015/2016*. RCAS: file 1901-1 (CIG), 31 March 2015.
- Chief Review Services. *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness Training*. CRS: file 1258-169 (CRS)), March 2011, http://www.crs.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/2011/167P0861-eng.aspx#excel, Centres of Excellence link.
- Canada, Canadian Army Staff. Army Governance. PowerPoint briefing, 1 August 2015.
- Canada, Canadian Army Staff. Canadian Army Governance. PowerPoint briefing, 4 June 2014.
- Canada, Canadian Army Staff. *Canadian Army Governance Review: Update*. PowerPoint briefing, 3 Sep 2014.
- Canada, Department of National Defence. A-AD-267-000/AF-003. Official Lineages, Volume 3, Part 1, Armour, Artillery, and Field Engineer Regiments – Artillery Regiments. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2010. Accessed June 23, 2015. http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhhdhp/his/ol-lo/vol-tom-3/par1/art/doc/rrca.pdf.
- Canada, Department of National Defence. Army Capability Development Board Terms of Reference. Ottawa: Canadian Army, 1 Aug 15.
- Canada, Department of National Defence. *Army Operating Plan FY 2015/2016v2*. Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2015.
- Canada, Department of National Defence. B-GL-005-000/AC-001. Advancing with Purpose: the Army Strategy. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2014.
- Canada, Department of National Defence. CAO 11-93 Army Branch Director/Advisor Responsibilities. Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2007.
- Canada, Department of National Defence. CF Mil Pers Instr 02/028 Branch Advisors Roles and Responsibilities. Ottawa: Chief Military Personnel, 2008.
- Dictionary.com. Many Hands Make Light Work. *The American Heritage New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition*. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005. Accessed 27 June, 2015. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/many hands make light work.
- The Free Dictionary. "Corps." American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition. Accessed June 23, 2015. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/corps.

- Government of Canada. "Departments and Agencies." Accessed June 22, 2015. http://www.canada.ca/en/gov/dept/index.html?utm_medium=decommissioned+site&utm _campaign=Canada+Site+Redirect+Tracking&utm_source=canada.gc.ca/depts/major/de pind-eng.html&utm_content=Launch+Tracking.
- n.d. "Directorate of Land Requirements (DLR)." *The Canadian Gunner* 32, (1996): 94. http://www.artillery.net/beta/files/Canadian%20Gunner%201996.pdf.
- n.d. "Regimental Headquarters RCA." *The Canadian Gunner* 32, (1996): 7. http://www.artillery.net/beta/files/Canadian%20Gunner%201996.pdf.
- Read, Dave W., Col. "Message from the Director." *The Canadian Gunner* 32, (1996): 5-6. http://www.artillery.net/beta/files/Canadian%20Gunner%201996.pdf.
- The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. The RCA Family Strategy. 23 March, 2015.
- The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. RCA Standing Orders, Vol 1. August 2011.
- The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. RCA Standing Orders, Vol 11. August 2011.
- Wikipedia contributors. "Bureaucracy." *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia*. Accessed June 21, 2015. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Bureaucracy&oldid=669463982.