

Canadian  
Forces  
College

Collège  
des  
Forces  
Canadiennes



## THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT TERMINATION AND TRANSITION IN CANADA: A CASE STUDY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR THE NORTH WEST REBELLION

Major Liam Cox

**JCSP 37**

**Master of Defence Studies**

**Disclaimer**

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the  
Minister of National Defence, 2011.

**PCEMI 37**

**Maîtrise en études de la défense**

**Avertissement**

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le  
ministre de la Défense nationale, 2011.



CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
JCSP 37 - PCEMI 37

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES - MAITRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

**The Roots of Conflict Termination and Transition in Canada: A Case Study of Conflict Resolution for the North West Rebellion.**

By Maj Liam Cox

*This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.*

*La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.*

## CONTENTS

Table of Contents	2
Abstract	3
Introduction: Termination and Transition (Re) Visited	4
North West Rebellion Background	11
Chapter One: Establishing Conflict Termination	15
Chapter Two: Post-conflict Stability and a Secure Transition	42
Chapter Three: Disengagement and Transition to Normalcy	69
Conclusion: Rebellion Resolved and End States Reached	87
Bibliography	90

## ABSTRACT

Peace operations, major combat and counter-insurgency operations, such as Canada's recent operations in Afghanistan, have refocused discussion about 'exit strategies', conflict termination planning and post conflict activities writ large. How does Canada's current doctrinal foundations and guidance (whether domestic or allied) for termination, transition activities and disengagement after armed conflicts of today differ or compare to the first crisis as a nascent Dominion of Canada some 125 years ago? In Afghanistan, similar to Iraq, achievement of end states has been frustrated despite some stunning military performances. This frustration and elusiveness of long term success following short term gain has been the genesis for much recent doctrinal re-examination. In contrast, events in North West Canada in 1885 quickly translated military victory into a reasonably successful end state. The deployed force's quelling of the NWR exhibited characteristics of conflict termination planning, post conflict transition and redeployment considerations common to modern doctrine and concepts learned from such conflicts as Afghanistan and Iraq, namely in the establishment of workable interagency relationships, identifiable end states, favourable post conflict security conditions, effective transition to civil authority and disengagement of military forces from the theatre of operations.

## INTRODUCTION

### Termination and Transition (Re)Visited

Wars and conflicts are typically simpler to get into than out of. Scholars agree that those decision-makers most responsible for the commencement of military operations fail to consider the question of how wars are brought to an end.<sup>1</sup> “Many wars in this century”, declares Fred Charles Ikle, “have been started with only the most nebulous expectations regarding the outcome, on the strength of plans that paid little if any attention to the ending.”<sup>2</sup> Both political and military goals underpin strategic end states. Exclusively military lines of activity will usually be insufficient to achieve complete end states. At some point, military actions, once the main effort, need to be replaced by other actions directed by civil authorities in order to accomplish the greater strategic plan. This transition, doctrinally termed ‘termination’, involves more than just cease fire settlements or declarations of victory. It encompasses thoughtful, early and detailed planning to ensure smooth, effective and efficient development of local security situations and hand-over of military responsibilities to civilian agencies (governmental or otherwise). Only once all transition activities are complete can military forces depart and commence ‘post termination activities’ which entail redeployment of forces, manpower

---

<sup>1</sup> William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 95-112." *PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly* 33, no.3 (2003), 95-112, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA486290&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed 12 Feb 2011), 95

<sup>2</sup> Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War must End (Columbia Classics)*, Revised ed. New York. Columbia University Press, 2005), 208.

and material out of the area of operation.<sup>3</sup> Successful accomplishment of desired or acceptable end states continues to be an elusive conclusion to conflicts today. This reality demands that political and military leaders must be ever mindful of considerations that shape the outcome of every war that they may wage.

Post-Cold War peace operations, major combat and counter-insurgency operations, such as Canada's recent operations in Afghanistan, have refocused discussion about 'exit strategies', conflict termination planning and post conflict activities generally. But how does Canada's current doctrinal foundations and guidance, whether domestic or allied, for termination of, transition activities post and disengagement after armed conflict of today differ or compare to the first crisis as a nascent Dominion of Canada some 125 years ago? Much writing deals with the commanders and leaders, battles and tactical engagements, as well as the political repercussions of the North West Rebellion (NWR). A missing perspective of 1885 is the nature and focus of plans and efforts dedicated to conflict termination and transitions. Once war became inevitable, did Middleton's military forces, the MacDonald Government and peripheral agencies and organizations effectively plan and set conditions for 'the' desired end state rather than simply an end. Recent American experiences in Iraq highlight that subtle difference. The declaration of 'mission accomplished' following swift force-on-force neutralization of Iraqi forces was later termed a 'catastrophic success' since incredulously seven years later American

---

<sup>3</sup> NATO, *Allied Joint Operations*, Vol. AJP-3(A) (Brussels: NATO, 2007)., section 4, p 20-22

forces were still embroiled in low intensity conflict.<sup>4</sup> ‘Mission accomplished’ signalled an end of something, but not the end of the conflict. In Afghanistan, similar to Iraq, achievement of end state has been frustrated despite some stunning military performances. This frustration and elusiveness of long term success following short term gain has been the genesis for much recent doctrinal reconsideration. In contrast, events in North West Canada in 1885 quickly translated military victory into a reasonably successful end state. The deployed force’s quelling of the NWR exhibited characteristics of conflict termination planning, post conflict transition and redeployment considerations common to modern doctrine and concepts learned from such conflicts as Afghanistan and Iraq, namely in the establishment of workable interagency relationships, identifiable end states, favourable post conflict security conditions, effective transition to civil authority and disengagement of military forces from the theatre of operations.

Conventional doctrine insists that considerations and planning for termination, transition and redeployment are as critical as the plan to engage in the operation itself. Recent stability operations both reinforce and justify these seemingly axiomatic conclusions. Doctrine, fundamentally an expression of positive lessons learned from past experiences, espouses that military commanders should coordinate their strategies with other agencies and organization involved to achieve best effect. Interagency coordination and cooperation ensures that the right conditions are set for the eventual, hopefully expedient, disengagement. Commanders and other leaders must also remain mutually aware of each others’ actions so that individual efforts are complementary between

---

<sup>4</sup> –Military victory coming much sooner than the plan anticipates, which throws off the overall strategic plan”, <http://www.jargondatabase.com/Category/Military/Iraq-Specific-Jargon/Catastrophic->



agencies and ultimately to overall mission success. The doctrine staidly matches a holistic approach to this complex problem, but does offer some practical guidance for the seemingly lofty, omniscient expectations placed on commanders. These considerations and planning guidance, specific to termination and transition doctrine, form an analytical framework wherein the principles and keys that guide commanders to analyse missions, identify or extract the correct end state and appreciate the prevailing political policies can be used as a template to compare the NWR with modern day approaches. Conflict resolution, the transfer of control to civilian authority and ultimately the successful conclusion of the North West campaign conformed in general terms to contemporary doctrine and concepts.

### *Concluding a Campaign and analytical frameworks*

Canadian doctrine for land operation states: “Knowing when to end a campaign and how to preserve the objectives achieved are vital aspects of operational art.”<sup>5</sup> Doctrine further stipulates that a favourable campaign concludes when the need for combat operations cease after having reached the military end-state, thereby allowing civilian or other governmental agencies to take over stability operations where the local security forces can effectively deal with current or apparent disruptions.<sup>6</sup> A campaign must be judged successful beyond the battlefields and in the larger sense of the conflict.

---

#### Success.

<sup>5</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000, Conduct of Land Operations - Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, 01 July 1998 ed. (Ottawa, ON: Director of Army Doctrine, 1998), 7-154

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-155.

To achieve that success it requires the political aims, objectives and end states to be identified, understood and achieved through sound planning and collaboration.

Before applying contemporary doctrine retrospectively to the North West Rebellion some fundamental shifts in military art since then should be explained. Current terminology and thought on levels of conflict delineate three hierarchical levels: strategic, operational and tactical. A hundred years ago, Middleton's art of war would have been divided into two levels, namely strategy and tactics. Tactics were concerned with the leading of soldiers in actual or imminent battle, whereas strategy generally encompassed all prior movements and preparations. In addition, strategy in Middleton's era aspired to those advantages beyond simple defeat of the enemy to position one's own forces to yield the greatest gains and effects.<sup>7</sup> Although today's doctrinal levels of conflict have evolved to include the operational level, no marked delineations existed between the levels and boundaries shift slightly depending on the campaign.<sup>8</sup> In order to compare termination, post-conflict and redeployment activities, the 'strategy' component within the art of war exhibited in 1885 will be compared to the contemporary strategic and operational levels of planning and conduct of military campaigns. Strategy (circa 1885) and the grouping of present strategic and operational level both represent the domain where national strategic objectives are translated in military objectives and then are subsequently achieved and sustained by the campaign planning and conduct. Conversely, this level

---

<sup>7</sup> Walter Hildebrandt, *The Battle of Batoche: British Small Warfare and the Entrenched Métis* (Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Environment Canada., 1985), 87.

<sup>8</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GJ-005-300/FP-001, CFJP 3.0 Operations*, Vol. July (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Warfare Centre, 2007), 1-2.

and grouping includes everything above the most tactical considerations of formations and units engaged in battle. It is at this level that Middleton exercised the contemporary notion of the operational art. The focus and comprehensive planning for conflict termination and transition by the government and other agencies is most evident here at this level.

Given the comprehensive, interagency character and national strategic influence on termination and transition, this campaign represented the first (and only) example of Canada's strategic expression and exercise of conflict and resolution independent of any external interference. In a whole of government approach and without British direction or military resources, Canada faced and resolved the internal armed struggle and determined the outcome of the conflict.<sup>9</sup> The applicability of the contemporary operational or military art to the NWR allows for division of activities into somewhat separate, but interconnected phases that correspond to the progression from engagement to disengagement of forces.

The phases of termination, transition and redeployment, although distinct, overlap considerably. This overlap is in part due to complexities or peculiarities within the same theatre of conflict. Transitions occur at different times and rates depending on specific locations and circumstances rather than occurring sequentially, orderly or theatre wide. The overlap is also inherent to the interdependencies and the comprehensiveness of the approach wherein conflict resolution can ultimately be a mixture of all phases at any time

---

in order to best adapt theory to reality and ‘win the best peace’ whose nature reflects the desired state. The North West Rebellion, like other conflicts, reflects contemporary complexity and interplay between termination, transition to civil authorities and withdrawal of military forces. Each chapter addresses the phases separately by dividing the campaign temporally and distinguishing the activities between the levels of conflict. The first chapter addresses the termination and focuses more on strategic-operational considerations, whereas post termination activities focused more on the operational-tactical considerations, are found in the next two chapters.

Drawing from contemporary doctrine, the three topics of conflict termination, post conflict transition and redeployment are addressed respectively. Key principles within contemporary planning for termination including the establishment of early interagency planning, workable end states, adequate intelligence and communication, unity and harmonization of civil and military efforts shaped the opening events of the NWR. Conditions for termination were established in the period that began just before the outbreak of the rebellion up until the cessation of major combat following the battle for Batoche. The stability operations commenced with the arrival of the Militia force in the North West, extended over the post conflict phase, and transitioned to force disengagement when Middleton declared he had attained his objectives in late June. Stability activities dominated the post conflict operations and incorporated principles of unity and integration of security forces, provision of territorial security, protection and assistance to populace, control of belligerents, and security sector reform. Post

---

<sup>9</sup> Donald Creighton, *John A. Macdonald - the Old Chieftain*, Centenary Edition ed. Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1955), 418.

termination activities at the conclusion of the campaign began when Middleton disengaged his forces, completed the transition to civil agencies and finally ended when the war claims were reconciled by the government some eight months later. This final transition for the militia and return to normalcy for the North West was evident in the key efforts that fostered sustainability in the region, reconciliation of financial accounts, demobilization and reconstitution of indigenous security forces and departing military forces. Specific military or civilian actions illustrated by experience in the NWR characterize a termination and transition process that is consistent with contemporary approaches and substantiated by the latest doctrine. A focus on strategic and operational foundations also shows relevance to contemporary planning processes that was inherent in the quelling of the North-West Rebellion of 1885.

### **North-West Rebellion background**


In 1885, in the Saskatchewan District of the North-West territories, grievances and unrest culminated in armed conflict between the Dominion Government of Canada, the Métis and the aboriginal First Nations. Although the Cree uprising of 1884-5 and the Métis resistance were separate for the purposes here they will be combined and addressed under the single military campaign for the 1885 North West Rebellion. In simple terms, the sides of the conflict were divided between the Métis and sympathetic first nation people, led by Louis Riel and principally the Cree First Nation, under Chief Poundmaker and Big Bear, pitted against the militias, volunteers, scouts and North West Mounted Police (NWMP) led by General Frederick Middleton.

Chronologically, the first significant opening engagement occurred on March 26, 1885 when Métis forces successfully defeated Prince Albert Volunteer and NWMP at Duck Lake. Within days the community of Battleford, feeling threatened by the local Cree, abandoned the town and sought refuge in the NWMP fort. Further west, at Frog Lake, the ‘massacre’ of white settlers (including the Indian Agent) on April 1 signalled the start of the Cree Uprising followed quickly by the seizure of Fort Pitt settlement, which the NWMP abandoned on the night of 13 April. The government forces responded by advancing North in three columns: one against the Métis of the Saskatchewan valley, one in relief of Battleford and another in pursuit of Big Bear’s Cree Band. At Fish Creek, on April 24, the Métis forces ambushed and exacted another defeat over General Middleton’s column, which he had further split, on the east side of the Saskatchewan River. Following a pause and reinforcement, Middleton continued to press north and on 9 March commenced his attack on Batoche, location of the Métis headquarters and Riel, finally overcoming the town on 12 March and capturing Louis Riel a few days later. Meanwhile, the column sent to Battleford reached the town on 23 April, and without direct orders from Middleton sent a flying column out after Poundmaker’s Cree that had threatened the area. The flying column under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Otter attacked an outnumbered Cree force on May 2 but was forced to retreat following seven hours of fighting. In fact, Otter’s force was lucky to survive the engagement relatively unscathed and was not seriously pursued by the Cree fighters who had outmanoeuvred the troops. Otter returned to Battleford where he was joined by Middleton’s forces that had since advanced from Batoche. Having heard that

Batoche, and effectively the main resistance had ceased, Riel's Métis agent abandoned Poundmaker's camp to head home leaving the Indians to entrust their future to Chief Poundmaker. In a ceremony, Poundmaker surrendered to Middleton at Battleford on May 25.<sup>10</sup> To the West, the Alberta field force set out from Calgary under the command of Major General Strange. The Alberta field force headed north by way of Edmonton and Fort Pitt continuing to the Frog Lake area where Big Bear had remained. At Frenchman's Butte, on 28 May, the Alberta field force skirmished with the Cree led by Warrior chief Wandering Spirit only to break off for want of reinforcements and supplies. Shortly after, additional forces under Middleton forces joined Strange's force, but were unable to achieve any further conclusive action. A brief engagement was led by Major Sam Steele and his scouts near Loon Lake (at Rat Foot Creek, now Steele's Narrows) on June 3, against the elusive and disintegrating forces of Big Bear. After chasing Big Bear for almost another month, he surrendered to the NWMP at Fort Carlton on July 2, 1885. Armed resistance in the North West came to an end.

---

<sup>10</sup> Blair Stonechild and W. A. Waiser, *Loyal Till Death: Indians and the Northwest Rebellion* (Calgary, AB: Fifth House LTD, 1997), 308 & 165.



Troop movement and battles, 1885 Rebellion.  
*Canadian Plains Research Center Mapping Division*<sup>11</sup>

Reference will be made to Indians, Métis and occasionally half breeds only to be representative of the terms used in the dated primary and secondary source material. These terms have been more appropriately replaced by aboriginal First Nation and Métis people to reflect contemporary preferences and viewpoints.

<sup>11</sup> Stewart Mein, "North-West Resistance," University of Regina and Canadian Plains Research Center, [http://esask.uregina.ca/entry/north-west\\_resistance.html](http://esask.uregina.ca/entry/north-west_resistance.html) (accessed February 10, 2011).



## CHAPTER ONE

### Establishing Conflict Termination

The object in war is to attain a better peace – even if only from your own point of view...If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect...it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war. – Liddell Hart<sup>12</sup>

In order to achieve success, military operations should keep in mind the strategic end state or objectives that are in accordance with the national aims and strategy. While military strategy focuses on winning in war, or at least trying to persuade an enemy to stop fighting and/or capitulate, the notion of conflict termination entails more than simply an end to hostilities. The manner, the time, and the reasons for concluding hostilities need to be related to the political objectives and the “kind of peace [to be] achieved”.<sup>13</sup> Recent experience suggests that modern democracies strive for an overwhelming decisive victory brought about by quick action and minimal casualties without much thoughtful consideration about the end. War termination planning in such a scenario was not needed because the follow up would (or hoped to) “take care of itself”.<sup>14</sup> This simplistic approach ignores the complexity of war termination and the sophistication required such setting conditions for other alternative outcomes such as a negotiated termination. Contemporary doctrine suggests that only value-based wars fought along ideological,

---

<sup>12</sup> B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian)*, 2nd Revised ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 448,, 366.

<sup>13</sup> Bruce C. Bade, "War Termination: Why Don't we Plan for it?" in *Essays on Strategy*, ed. John N. Petrie, Vol. XII (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), 205-232., 207.

ethnic, religious or cultural lines result in outcomes with limited negotiable alternatives.<sup>15</sup> However, as military theorist Liddell Hart suggests, a better peace, even in the interest of the stronger opponent, is arrived at by negotiation rather than decisive military action.<sup>16</sup> The present state of reflection on ‘peaceable’ end states and the required sophisticated process of deriving complementary strategic and military objectives requires creating a campaign plan that captures and articulates termination planning considerations at the strategic and operational level.

Planning for conflict termination is vital. Practical means of aligning military action to strategic objectives, or the end states, ensure a ‘better peace’. A commander’s operations may ultimately result in achieving uniquely military or tactical conclusions, but only through termination planning can conditions and actions required for larger national security goals and objective be achieved. In some circumstances, termination planning may limit the character of the military actions or the degree of military aggressiveness allowed. The use of force or aggressiveness of military operations can affect or prejudice the end state achieved leading to either alienation of the populace, contributing to refugee problems or extensive reconstruction due to excessive collateral damage to infrastructure. The actions of the Canadian military and other agencies were aligned in practice by conflict termination planning to achieve strategic objectives.

---

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 205.

<sup>15</sup> United States, *JP3-0, Joint Operations*, Vol. 17 Sep 2007 (Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, 2007), III-30.

<sup>16</sup> Hart, *Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian)*, 448 & 371.

The Canadian militia's quelling of the North West Rebellion (NWR) exhibited characteristics of conflict termination planning considerations common to the modern doctrine and concepts learned from such conflicts as Afghanistan and Iraq, namely in the unification of interagency action and workable end states. The conflict termination considerations of the NWR from the initial mobilization phase of the NWR (including some of the existent and latent pre-conditions prior to the battle at Duck Lake), through the main portions of the combat operations and up until the cessation of major combat operations at Batoche reflect a period focused on conflict termination. Successful termination and transition involves early interagency planning, workable objectives, goals, and end states, adequate intelligence and communications, unity of effort, and harmony of civil with military effort.<sup>17</sup> The actions of the militia and supporting agencies demonstrated successful efforts in these key areas and quickly overcame initial shortcoming in staffing by forming ad hoc interagency planning relationships.

### *Early interagency planning*

In order to frame a successful or positive transition, planning for termination and post-conflict operations should be conducted at the onset of conflict or as soon as possible prior to end of conflict. Recent conflict experiences trend toward widening requirements to include host nation, international organizations and non-government organizations in the planning and solution process. The interagency character of early integrated planning aims to achieve conditions for comprehensive follow on activities

---

<sup>17</sup> NATO, *Allied Joint Operations*, 4-21.

and leverage for governments to act. An outcome based on a military victory at any cost' may not allow for such effects. Even when an exit strategy' has been identified, to assume that its conditions and applicability will remain constant regardless of military performance in battles is unrealistic and too rigid. The termination plan conceived early or in favourable conflict environments may no longer be applicable if the military is unable to reach expected objectives or is set back because planning fails to match expectations with capabilities.

In any planning process, tasks and responsibilities can be married up to capabilities and agencies. Conflict resolution planning performs the same assessment amongst the many agencies involved but in doing so considers the end of the conflict as important as the conduct of the missions. The initial interagency planning of the NWR on the surface was tactically focused on the logistic and intelligence support to the military conduct of the operation. However, from the larger interagency perspective it also focused on the higher order nation building objectives that contributed to the peace at the end of conflict. For government departments trying to further the agenda to settle the west, early briefings to Middleton on the adversaries' eventually led to better control of those persons opposing western expansion. For the Canadian companies involved, the immediate planning for the needs of the military was good for business' but also complemented longer term interests and business plans in a peaceful' North West.

The needs of the Canadian militia were extensive and could not be considered an army since it was ~~w~~without cohesion, without staff, and without those military

departments by which an army is moved, fed, or ministered to in sickness”.<sup>18</sup> The observations in General Officer Commanding Hutton’s report despite being 14 years later, still accurately summarized deficiencies in the militia that Middleton faced in 1885. Given the rudimentary nature of the small permanent force at the outbreak of the rebellion, the immediate interagency planning between minister of militia and defence Caron and commercial companies such as the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and the Hudson Bay Company (HBC) though ad hoc in nature was crucial and a prominent reality of the campaign. Early engagement of William Van Horne, general manager of the CPR ensured that the entire militia arrived in the territories in a timely fashion. At the outbreak of hostilities, the CPR line was not completed and required arduous overland portions to be traversed by the first three thousand troops. Van Horne sensed the importance and significance of the operation to his fledgling (and floundering) railway so he successfully conveyed and feed the troops along the route. Despite hardship, the early planning with Van Horne ensured troops moved west; delay would have jeopardized movement during the imminent spring thaw when travel would become much harder. Beyond the immediate advantage to the military operation, the CPR represented a significant element of nation building. Completion of the transcontinental railway was eventually supported. Van Horne later said that the rebellion and the consequences of getting exclusive rights to transport the troops to fight Riel meant —the company ought to erect a monument to Riel as its greatest benefactor”<sup>19</sup> The other

---

<sup>18</sup> Colonel C. P. Stacey, ed., *Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students*, Sixth Edition, 4th Revision ed. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), 164, [http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/docs/Intro\\_MilHist\\_e.pdf](http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/docs/Intro_MilHist_e.pdf) (accessed Feb 11, 2011)., 32.

<sup>19</sup> J. Lorne McDougall, *Canadian Pacific: A Brief History*, First English Edition ed. (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1968)., 61.

institutional presence in western Canada at the time, the HBC, made similar near term contribution and realised positive post conflict conditions by their inclusion in early interagency planning.

Joseph Wrigley, the HBC commissioner in Winnipeg, became the lead for all supplies for the government forces in the theatre. Wrigley quickly realized the magnitude of the effort and understood that stores in the region approaching a low point following the previous winter, would need to be restocked. His early and aggressive inquiries into the nature and number of provision required, although met with some suspicion by Caron, helped ensure that the government expedition did not falter due to a lack of provisions. Wrigley was also keenly aware of the impact the rebellion would have on the company's current and future business prospects in the North West. He manoeuvred quickly to support the government resolution of the troubles while reasserting HBC's dominance in local trade and strengthening her holdings. The early establishment of these select business men as planners instantly gave the government access to an "unrivalled network of trading posts", telegraph lines, and transportation ships in the North West.<sup>20</sup> Although some further political patronage would spread the government money amongst other merchants in the area, the CPR and HBC retained a monopoly that they had established in the early interagency planning.

Beyond the support leveraged by the department of militia by using non-government organization in early interagency planning during the NWR also included

---

other government departments (OGDs). As much as the military conduct of logistic operations relied on outside support, the Militia in fact had no resident source of cultural or enemy intelligence. The OGDs most able to provide this information were incorporated almost immediately during the planning. From the first conference between Middleton and Dewdney (Lt-Governor of the North-West Provinces), comprehensive and effective interagency planning was established. Middleton wrote that Dewdney “assisted me to the full extent of his power in every way during the whole campaign”<sup>21</sup> Similar to Wrigley and Van Horne, Dewdney’s contribution and effect on the interagency planning are apparent in the immediate support to the conduct of operation. His ability to shape the outcome to suit his and the government’s design for the North West of increased immigration and settlement was also significant. Dewdney may have privately seen the threat of general uprising exaggerated, but he did take advantage of the large presence of force and his influence over it to conclude his own campaign to neutralize what he thought were “troublesome Indian leaders and their nagging call for revision of the treaties”.<sup>22</sup> Harmonizing his efforts with the military progressed Dewdney’s governance objectives made possible by involvement in early interagency planning. The integration of the Indian Department, represented by Dewdney, initially filled a gap in Middleton’s intelligence planning and provided the foundation for effective coordinated and cooperative interagency action and efforts between the military and local government.

---

<sup>20</sup> Desmond Morton and Reginald H. Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885* (Toronto, ON: The Champlain Society, 1972), 44-45.

<sup>21</sup> General Sir Fred Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885.*, ed. G. H. Needler (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948), 6.

<sup>22</sup> Stonechild and Waiser, *Loyal Till Death: Indians and the Northwest Rebellion*, 308., 195.

Significant deficiencies in almost every combat support services necessitated early interagency participation and planning in order for the Canadian militia to reach its objectives, let alone the theatre of operations. Given the predominance of civilian resources applied to the planning effort of the NWR campaign, it is more accurate to say that the resolution of the conflict was a civilian problem that received some military support and show of force. The early and interagency character of the NWR set the stage for effective unity and harmonization of effort once the government articulated a workable end state.

*Establishing workable objectives, goals, and end states*

No one starts a war...without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. - Clausewitz<sup>23</sup>

Canadian doctrine emphasises the necessity and importance for military planning to work toward a clearly described end state, one that is expressed and committed to by the Government of Canada. Failure to receive adequate direction should prompt the commander to request guidance and clarification. Despite the merits and key function of a clear end state to work towards, in reality this represents more an ideal than a given. Often the political objectives remain too vague and, according to some, can never truly be clearly expressed due to the nature of the political system that provides them. American General Maxwell Taylor opined that high level politicians are usually otherwise

---



occupied, unable to dedicate serious consideration far out into the future, or else unwilling to risk a public identification of specific goals that could fail to be realised. Rather, Taylor expected goals at the political level to remain “broad generalities of peace, prosperity, cooperation and good will”.<sup>24</sup> Although vague and well meaning, such goals are safe assertions for any politician, but remain of limited utility to commanders trying to refine objectives in the field. Recognition by military and civil leaders that the end of the conflict is as important as how the conflict is conducted is crucial in reaching a successful termination and clear expression of that end state is so fundamental.

Establishing ‘exit strategies’ or maintaining workable objectives differs from early interagency planning in that planning can begin before hostilities. But, end states have to be managed during the dynamic and unpredictable period of conflict. Some might argue that ‘exit strategy road maps’ are futile, criticising their failing as being planned once, in advance of military action, and followed faithfully in the belief in of some enduring applicability. However, accurate as the failing would be if allowed to occur, this argument misses the implied fluidity of the doctrine to overcome such irrelevance.<sup>25</sup> Policy, expressed in objectives, goals, and/or end states, must be adjusted to accommodate military successes or failure, and variable domestic and international circumstances. Ultimately once force is used, the end state conceived in previous benign

---

<sup>23</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, *On War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 732., 579.

<sup>24</sup> Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn, *Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), 196, 8.

<sup>25</sup> Jeffrey Record, "Exit Strategy Delusions," *PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly*, no. Winter 2001-2 (2001), 21-27, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/01winter/record.htm> (accessed 2/14/2011), 21.

interagency discussions may no longer be sustainable. Therefore, as much as it is key to plan early for termination and have an exit strategy as a guide, it remains fundamental to advance the strategy during the course of the fighting to adjust any preconceived notions accordingly.

The MacDonald government maintained a clear and updated political objective throughout the campaign and effectively translated their desired end state into workable and clear objectives for Dewdney and Middleton to achieve. The expansion of Canada in the North West remained the overarching destiny being sought by the MacDonald government. This expansion was unwelcome by many of the Métis and Indians who felt threatened by the intrusion of an imposing, incompatible white civilization that would effectively erase them.<sup>26</sup> MacDonald, who typically liked to wait problems out, displayed some urgency to Dewdney by saying “this insurrection is a bad business”.<sup>27</sup> Around the same time as tensions in the North West began to spiral out of control with the murder of settlers at Frog Lake, MacDonald ordered the mobilization of the militia. On 23 March, Middleton was sent out to Winnipeg with the expectation of military action but with little more direction from Caron than to be “governed by circumstances, and if necessary take the field against the insurgents in the North West”.<sup>28</sup> Middleton did not

---

<sup>26</sup> George Edward Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 475., viii.

<sup>27</sup> Creighton, *John A. Macdonald - the Old Chieftain* , 418.

<sup>28</sup> Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885*, 4.

have to wait long for clearer direction to be issued. MacDonald wrote on 29 March describing his “~~wide~~ ideas” that provided his formal strategic direction to Middleton.<sup>29</sup>

The first thing to be done is to localize the insurrection. The C.P.R. must of course be guarded...parties should be sent to watch the people and stores coming in at Emerson by rail. The different trails across the border should also be watched...A forces should be placed at Battleford, and, if possible, a line of communication from [there] to the railway...to prevent the flame from spreading westwards...the [NWMP] officers...have been authorized to swear in the inhabitants as Police Constables. This will give them the right to act with the Police force...<sup>30</sup>

MacDonald’s ideas articulated the government’s objectives, goals and end states from the main termination goal of isolating the insurrection to ensuring key post conflict enablers of the containment of conflict, stability operations with indigenous security forces, and protected population and infrastructure. These strategic objectives and end states proved workable because Middleton easily translated them into operational objectives. Broadly, the objectives of the government could be expressed in sequential military objectives of first localizing the rebellion followed by neutralization of the armed Métis and Indian resistance.<sup>31</sup> Many implied tasks simply required an immediate show of force which echoed previously identified requirement for additional forces. Once committed to quelling the revolt, the influx of men and material and specifically their transportation in the theatre would be of critical importance. The ‘transport’ center of gravity for the military operations was in crisis as the floundering transcontinental railway had just

---

<sup>29</sup> Desmond Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885* (Toronto: Hakkert, 1972), 193., 55; Creighton, *John A. Macdonald - the Old Chieftain* , 418.

<sup>30</sup> Donald E. Graves, ed., *More Fighting for Canada: Five Battles, 1760-1944* Jaguar Book Group, 2004), 363,

failed to negotiate a relief to prevent its financial collapse. MacDonald was able to marry the recovery of the CPR with the recovery of law and order since ~~he~~ could use the railway to defend the west. He could use the west to justify the railway".<sup>32</sup> Although the railway completion was not a specific operational objective for Middleton, it was an enabler to the strategic objective of the campaign because it played prominently in the mobilization and demobilization efforts.

The government's strategic end states and objective for the NWR were expressed clearly at the outset and changed little over the course of operations. Overall, the direction and consistency were positive and remained workable. Middleton sometimes complained that his problems at the battle of Fish Creek were attributable to the government goal of fiscal restraint and maintaining positive perceptions: ~~I~~am trying to do with as few troops as possible not only to save you money but to prevent the outside world thinking too much of it and thus injure emigration".<sup>33</sup> However, the early defeat suffered by Middleton was likely more due to his own decisions to press north and split his small force and not any deficiency with his issued objectives and goals. It was the change in Middleton's caution and amassing of forces that was required to advance the campaign rather than alteration to the end states. The objectives remained justifiable and ultimately led to lasting peace in part because they were well supported by the available intelligence that lay behind their creation in the first place.

---

<sup>31</sup> Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions* , 475, 313-4.

<sup>32</sup> Creighton, *John A. Macdonald - the Old Chieftain* , 417.

<sup>33</sup> Middleton to Caron, April 27, 1885, Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885* , 193, 71.

*Providing for adequate intelligence and communications (signalling)*

Intelligence, in the military context, has always been considered essential to capabilities and is required at all levels of decision making. Campaign successes are tempered by the timeliness and quality of meaningful intelligence rendered from accurate information on the adversary and environment.<sup>34</sup> Contemporary practise and doctrine continue to emphasis the importance of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) as a fundamental enabler to the planning process writ large and effective war termination. Information and predictions offered by the intelligence community include specific factors that might affect the termination. Resolution of the conflict must be properly focused since the considerations may be quite different than what is required for simple warfare. Descriptions of the enemy forces, weapons and terrain, however relevant to obtaining victory in battle, are not likely as relevant to winning the long term peace.

Intelligence doctrine today expands factors to be addressed during the IPB to include areas such as the human dimension of friendly and adversary populace and leadership (sociological, cultural, demographic, psychological, religious, etc), history, political, and legal factors. In support of such of factors is a equally large cast of informants, stretching to non traditional sources including; commercial entities, clergy and other governmental organizations. The availability of good actionable intelligence

---

<sup>34</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, Joint Intelligence Doctrine*, 21 May 2003 ed. (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Defence Staff, 2003), 1-1

is fundamental to all capabilities and if correctly employed by the strategic or operational leader can indicate what leverage is possible or when the situation will afford successful conflict termination and resolution to begin.

At MacDonald's strategic level, a substantial amount of indication and warnings (I&W), the contemporary terms for information that reflects intention or capability of potential enemy, existed and intensified before the rebellion.<sup>35</sup> During the 'peacetime' proceeding the outbreak of violence at Duck Lake, varied sources informed MacDonald on different 'triggers' including political, social and economic vital to contemporary I&W systems.. MacDonald was kept informed of the growing dissatisfaction caused by mismanaged grievances and fiscal restriction, warned of impending threats, and appraised of the capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities of the 'adversary' from varied sources including government agencies, police, private enterprise, media and clergy.

Government agencies, although at times conflicting, provided MacDonald and subsequently his Militia Department and forces adequate intelligence for conflict termination. Only Vankoughnet, the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs,<sup>36</sup> thought the situation in the NWT was exaggerated stating "... too much reliance placed...upon agent's reports...", and advised further cuts on Indian expenditures; "...there has been much needless expenditure which works detrimentally in more ways than the intrinsic

---

<sup>35</sup> United States, *JP 2-01.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, ed. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 May 2000 ed. (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000), GL-7.

<sup>36</sup> The superintendent-general of Indian affairs was Macdonald himself from 1878 to 1887. He left the administration largely in the hands of Vankoughnet who was deemed "narrow and niggling" and

money value involved”.<sup>37</sup> In contrast, the subordinate Indian agents shared the near unanimous condemnation of his policy and voiced their concerns. Agents reported deplorable living conditions. Some frustrated by unresponsive bureaucracy wrote private letters to MacDonald.<sup>38</sup> Medical inspectors reported starvation, and HBC merchants agreed that the “vexatious delay”, “endless procrastination” attributed to Government conduct was “dangerous and unsatisfactory”.<sup>39</sup> The lieutenant-governor for the area and Indian Commissioner, Dewdney, regularly updated MacDonald with first hand accounts detailing the growing discontent, despair, and political agitation. At times he made dire predictions of the rebellious intentions of the disaffected Métis and Indian groups. Dewdney also noted that the Indians were not only growing hostile to the settlers and the government, but they were increasingly bold toward the NWMP. Dewdney wrote to MacDonald in early 1885 that the Indian’s defiance and attitude toward the police was “...changing so rapidly that no arrest should be made unless it could be enforced by an efficient force”.<sup>40</sup> This information helped shape the government’s response to how best achieve successful conflict termination that was underlined by further intelligence provided by his police force.

---

“...imaginative in policy” by many. Peter B. Waite, *CANADA 1874-1896: ARDUOUS DESTINY: THE CANADIAN CENTENARY SERIES*. McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 340.

<sup>37</sup> Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions* , 270.

<sup>38</sup> John Rae the Indian agent at Battleford wrote in despair to Macdonald over the head of Vankoughnet, his proper senior authority stating that Vankoughnet had nearly precipitated an Indian outbreak by his handling of Big Bear whom he ordered him to take his reservation within a month or get no rations...” Waite, *CANADA 1874-1896: ARDUOUS DESTINY: THE CANADIAN CENTENARY SERIES*. , 340., 148.

<sup>39</sup> Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions.*, 271.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 277.

The NWMP, though limited in actual ability to take action, were succinct and accurate when providing the government with recommendations as to how to set conditions for conflict resolution if not outright avoidance. Aware of Riel's arrival back into the North West, the NWMP had maintained watch and Superintendent Crozier informed the government regularly on him, his followers, and the status of the agitation. Crozier, similar to Dewdney, stressed redressing outstanding grievances and requested additional manpower based on his analysis similar to the IPB. For Crozier, the immediate presence of additional security forces, be they police or otherwise, was the only way the government could prevent in the short term an immediate and eminent collapse of control in the territory, however tenuous it was at present.<sup>41</sup> Crozier also anticipated that failure to manifest a show of force would not only result in Métis disobedience but general revolt: "If matters are allowed to drift...we shall have the Manitoba difficulties of 1869 re-enacted with the addition of the Indian population as allies to the half-breeds".<sup>42</sup> At the strategic level, MacDonald had received sufficient predictive intelligence on the intent of the potential adversary to shape his broad approach and decide where best to focus his efforts. Further intelligence, more specific to the adversaries' capabilities and weakness would be required for Middleton to formulate the military objectives.

At Middleton's operational level, there was little if any prior military intelligence available at mobilization and he would rely on information provided by the OGDs.

---

<sup>41</sup> Crozier informed to his superiors: "Nothing but seeing a large force in the country will prevent very serious trouble before long." Donald J. Klancher, *The North West Mounted Police and the North West Rebellion* (Goss Publishing, Kamloops, BC, Canada, 1999), 16; Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions.*, 321



Middleton had never visited the region and professed little awareness of the situation that he was about to meet. In a letter to his future chief of staff Lord Meglund sent prior to his departure, Middleton felt “inclined to think that there must be something serious or Sir John would not have consented to my being sent up”.<sup>43</sup> It was not until his second stop in the North West at Troy (CPR station at Qu’Appelle) did he receive a complete intelligence brief from Dewdney on the enemy and terrain, but more importantly some predictive intelligence that allowed Middleton to understand those considerations that could terminate the conflict quickly and bring about a lasting peace. The Lieutenant-Governor prioritized which settlements were in the gravest danger requiring assistance, the disposition of the Métis and Indians, the pivotal importance of Riel to the rebel enterprise and stressed that it was gaining momentum in the absence of government action. Dewdney concluded that “affairs were in a critical state”, and he advised Middleton that “if...defeated, the consequences would be most disastrous to the country... [resulting in a] general rising of the Indians”.<sup>44</sup> Middleton accepted Dewdney’s recommendation and immediately set out for Louis Riel at Batoche.<sup>45</sup> The available intelligence was effectively used to shape the military campaign in order to set the conditions for termination. Equally, the ability to communicate or signal the same to the adversaries through information operations (IO) so that they recognized the conflict termination eased the post conflict transition.

---

<sup>42</sup> Klancher, *The North West Mounted Police and the North West Rebellion*, 16; Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions*, 321.

<sup>43</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, xxii.

<sup>44</sup> Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885*, 7.

The dominion government and Middleton used an information operations (IO) campaign to communicate and signal conditions for successful termination and post-conflict. Early IO was also used to minimize the impact of the rebellion on the overall end state of expanded western settlement and development. Prospective immigrants and railway investors were worried about Riel's opening acts of looting, telegraph line cutting and taking of hostages. These precipitous actions were minimized as petty criminal behaviour in the *Montreal Gazette*, a conservative newspaper, which described the incidents as "of no more consequence than a petty riot..."<sup>46</sup> Even when Middleton embarked on his trip to the west, he attempted to convince a newspaper reporter that he was simply going on a routine inspection.<sup>47</sup> Out in the North West, the messaging was a little more desperate but targeted those possibly not taking sides. Rather than marginalizing the dissenting behaviour, the government proclamation looked to shore up the defences of a population seemingly under siege.<sup>48</sup> When military forces were committed and in strength for an advance on Batoche, Middleton despatched via an Indian prisoner to the village offering protection and pardon to all mistaken or otherwise coerced Métis and Indians if they returned to their homes or reserves. Middleton encouraged all others to abandon Riel as he, the council and principle accomplices were

---

<sup>45</sup> Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885*, 193, 56.

<sup>46</sup> Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions*, 475, 350; Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885*, 193., 33.

<sup>47</sup> Bob Beal and Roderick Charles Macleod, *Prairie Fire: The 1885 North-West Rebellion* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1984, 1994), 168.

<sup>48</sup> Proclamation – All persons who have been forced into rebellion against our sovereign lady the Queen, of who are held by the rebels against their will, will receive protection on presenting themselves to the Officers Commanding at Carlton or Prince Albert. (May 24) Rudy Henry Wiebe and Bob Beal, *War in the West: Voices of the 1885 Rebellion* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), 192, 24.

solely the object of the war.<sup>49</sup> Once the battle for Batoche seemed to be turning for the government forces and the general attack was to be made, Riel and Middleton exchanged letters ensuring the safety of prisoner, women and children in advance of the final push.<sup>50</sup> Riel was able to escape capture when Batoche fell, but Middleton sent out a Catholic Priest with a letter that “guaranteed his life, if he surrendered” and led to his quiet capture a few days later.<sup>51</sup> Although it is hard to know how many Métis and Indians abandoned Riel for the protection of government troops, such communication and signalling were effective setting the conditions for conflict termination at Batoche.

Once rebellion in the west broke out, some historians suggest by a failure to reverse maligned government policies, MacDonal had been made aware of the necessary leverage required to resolve the conflict and set conditions required for the enduring peace post conflict.<sup>52</sup> Consistent with contemporary doctrinal guidance, both MacDonal and Middleton used varied intelligence sources and predictive analysis to determine the necessary or sufficient conditions required to terminate the conflict and shape successful post-conflict efforts. Even with the correct factors and the required conditions identified the required interagency effort had to be harmonized and unified to achieve the desired outcome.

---

<sup>49</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 241; Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885*, 27.

<sup>50</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 271; Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885*, 51.

<sup>51</sup> “Mr. Riel: -I am ready to receive you and your council and to protect you until your case has been decided upon by the Dominion Government. Signed Fred Middleton, Major-General Commanding North-West field Forces”, Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 278 ; Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885*, 56.

### *Ensuring unity of effort*

When faced with delays and hesitation, Minister Caron countered by declaring “I want to show what the Canadian Militia can do”.<sup>53</sup> He insisted that the collective effort concentrate on getting the militia in theatre. Unity of effort is both a principle of joint operations in general and so identified as a specific key to successful transition. Canadian keystone joint doctrine groups unity of effort amongst other specific principles and highlights that its relative emphasis over the other principles depends on the operational situation or nature of the campaign.<sup>54</sup> In broad terms, unity of effort is the product of successful unified action amongst many different agencies. In uniquely military operations, the imposition of unity of command leverages the power of position and authority to impose cooperation and coordination in order to maximize effect. In contemporary circumstances of multinational or interagency organizations when authority for all assets cannot be vested in a single commander unlike purely military organizations, unity of command does not exist to provide cohesion and singular direction. This situation generally pertains when considering conflict termination, as participants are not necessarily part of the same command structure.<sup>55</sup> Failure to achieve unity or the rational development of the termination plan allows stereotypes, institutional biases, personal agendas or emotions, and political (domestic or external) pressures to

---

<sup>52</sup> Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions*, 475, 354.

<sup>53</sup> Creighton, *John A. Macdonald - the Old Chieftain*, 419.

<sup>54</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GJ-005-300/FP-001, CFJP 3.0 Operations*, 1-2.

corrupt the process and may result in an exit strategy with limited tactical focus.<sup>56</sup>

Unity of effort, when achieved in conflict termination, can transform otherwise disparate groups with uncoordinated actions and uncomplimentary effects into a unified achievement of critical elements necessary for success in the overall campaign. The cooperation and coordination exercised jointly by Middleton and Caron over the various governmental, civilian and military forces during the NWR reflected strong unity of effort and positive unity of command elements.

From the initiation of mobilization, Middleton and Caron divided the responsibilities of commanding, calling out, supplying and transporting the troops and maintained the unity of effort over integrated agencies. Prior to leaving for Winnipeg, Middleton quickly gave notice for the eastern permanent units but essentially left the rest of preparations for Caron to coordinate.<sup>57</sup> At the time of the rebellion, no logistic, supply or transport staff existed within the Canadian militia. Absent or defective military support functions were met by the Hudson's Bay Company and the Canadian Pacific Railway but coordinated by Caron and his small staff. They formed the nucleus of the command and control operating from his parliamentary 'war' office equipped with no more than a telegraph to effect coordination over the business men and newly appointed staff officers flung out across the country. Caron provided the cohesion and singular direction, although frequently in consultation with Middleton, since in practice all decisions on

---

<sup>55</sup> United States, *JP3-0, Joint Operations*, GL-29.

<sup>56</sup> Flavin, *Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 95-112., 95-112., 103.

<sup>57</sup> Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885*, 193, 28.

–even the most routine and trivial matters” fell within the sole purview of the Cabinet Minister.<sup>58</sup> By the very nature of his position as Minister of Militia and Defence, everyone seeking employment, contracts or even adventure in the west called upon him or were re-directed to him by the Prime Minister.<sup>59</sup> Middleton may have been the face of the North West Field force but Caron was the focal point for the entire effort. The operational level (in contrast to Middleton’s tactical execution of the battles) was centralized in Caron and from that unity of effort and in effect a unity of command type relationship was realized. Caron was able to organize and coordinate the campaign requirements despite the relative magnitude of the task and the available resources to great effect and praise. He was awarded one of the few and coveted KCMG following the conflict.<sup>60</sup> This honour was an acknowledgement not only of Caron’s successful unifying the actions over all the personalities and agencies involved but also an indication of how as the central coordinator he was able to harmonize the civil with the military effort.

### ***Harmonizing the civil with the military effort***

Harmonizing, or ensuring opinions, actions, and efforts of various agencies are compatible or consistent with the overall objective is essential for positive conflict termination. Just as it is important to integrate and synchronize effort within the same

---

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>59</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, xxvii.

<sup>60</sup> Knight commander of the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Hildebrandt, *The Battle of Batoche: British Small Warfare and the Entrenched Métis*, 120, 14.

organization, conflict termination requires that same approach across the various agencies and levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) both vertically and horizontally.

Termination planning necessitates interrelationships at all these levels and since military operations or civil programs affect and impact one another it is vital to ensure everyone is supporting the same effort and outcome to ensure the overall results remain positive.<sup>61</sup>

Recent experiences with civil military operations emphasize the importance of developing relationships prior to actual operations, and also identify the mechanisms and principles to enhance coordination. However nascent the relationships may have been, the conduct of the civil and military agencies during the NWR reflect many of these contemporary considerations and mechanisms to harmonize effort including, early assignment of lead agencies with commensurate responsibilities and objectives, —central coordination”, —compatible or shared communication equipment”, and committed political influence.<sup>62</sup> MacDonald, and later Caron acting on behalf of the government, provided committed political influence by providing early direction and aligning all effort toward termination.

From the onset, MacDonald established a clear framework for the coordination of the military and civilian efforts. Even prior to the opening battle between the NWMP and Métis at Duck Lake, Lieutenant-Governor Dewdney was confirmed as the forward lead

---

<sup>61</sup> Flavin, *Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success Parameters 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 95-112., 95-112., 105-106.*

<sup>62</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *CIMIC G-GJ-005-900 FP-000 Civil Military Cooperation CIMIC*, 01 Jan 2008 ed. (Ottawa, ON: Director of Army Doctrine, 2008)., I – 20-24; Flavin, *Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success Parameters 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 95-112., 95-112., 106.*

civil agency by MacDonald via telegraph: “You must assume responsibility for peace as governor”.<sup>63</sup> With mobilization inevitable, MacDonald turned the affair over to his Cabinet Minister Caron who effectively acting in isolation became the central coordination for the effort.<sup>64</sup> MacDonald also centralized the security forces (both militia and police) under Middleton by directing the Commissioner of the Mounted Police “when in concert with militia...to take orders from General Middleton...”<sup>65</sup> Indian agents and clergy who had the most influence on the disaffected groups, were also included within the framework and their efforts were coordinated by MacDonald’s government (through Caron) or by Dewdney directly.

Concurrent with the flourish of military mobilization, the civilian effort began setting their own conditions in harmony with the military efforts. In order to secure the allegiance or at least neutrality of various Indians bands, both the Indian commissioner and clergy were sent to talk to the tribes and their chiefs. In southern Alberta, Father Lacombe was dispatched and obtained the Blackfoot’s promise of support.<sup>66</sup> Further north ahead of General Strange’s troop advance, the Methodist reverend John McDougall, scouted ahead and made first contact with the local Indians. McDougall, like the other missionaries used knowledge of the land, the people, and their language to facilitate the movement of the militia through the region and even organized the construction of barges by the Indians at Battle River for the troops to use. Both Lacombe

---

<sup>63</sup> Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions*, 475, 350.

<sup>64</sup> Creighton, *John A. Macdonald - the Old Chieftain*, 419.

<sup>65</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 3.

<sup>66</sup> Creighton, *John A. Macdonald - the Old Chieftain*, 418.



and McDougall also went ahead to reassure the panicked citizens of Edmonton and encouraged some to return to their farms to continue spring seeding.<sup>67</sup> An Anglican reverend George McKay, notably effective in obtaining Chief Crowfoot's (of the Blackfoot confederation) neutrality by reminding him that Canada could "produce as many soldiers as blades of grass", also tried repeatedly, while under fire, to entice some Cree to surrender during the skirmish at Loon Lake.<sup>68</sup> At times working in concert with the clergy, the Indian agents and Dewdney also set about to establish the proper consultations with the Indians. Lacombe and Dewdney had a "pow-wow" with an Albertan Blackfoot tribe only two weeks after the Duck Lake battle and secured their loyalty.<sup>69</sup> Elsewhere, Dewdney acted quickly and focused his efforts and those of the Indian agents to secure allegiance and settle Indians not already engaged in the uprising. Dewdney reported his official understanding that "it is essential that the Indians be kept busy and contented, and it would be false economy to be too sparing of provision and other articles that tend to that end."<sup>70</sup> The immediate focus was to win over the Indians by quickly placating the sense of grievances and affirm their loyalties. Dewdney directed extras ration be issued to irresolute Indians bands as well as rewarding working Indians with tea and tobacco.<sup>71</sup> A policy of appeasement and assistance, once discouraged, was now consistent with government coordinating instructions.

---

<sup>67</sup> Jack F. Dunn, *The Alberta Field Force of 1885* (Calgary: J. Dunn, 1994), 293., 106.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 28, 62, 177-8.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>70</sup> Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions* , 475., 354.

Furthermore, the politically imposed coordination framework and the lead agencies making efforts toward compatible objective communication was another key mechanism that facilitated harmonization of action. Communication between the lead agencies during the NWR was almost uniquely handled by the shared telegraph line and here again Minister Caron was the central point of coordination for most of the correspondence. Despite the physical vulnerability of the line stretched across the theatre of operation, it remained reliable and secure, and when complemented with runners even the most remote fronts of the battlefield were tied into this central dissemination of information. The telegraph served as a common mechanism for all parties and agencies to coordinate efforts and for the government to affect necessary control and direction.

These 'soft' effects were consistent with the overall objective to quell a general uprising by preventing further Indian tribes from becoming cohorts while at the same time pursuing the ultimate objective of the government of reserving all Indians to facilitate long term expansion and settling of the west. The efforts of both the civilian and military agencies had been effectively harmonized toward termination of the North West Rebellion which culminated in the defeat of Louis Riel and pacification of Batoche, the seat of the uprising and center of the organized discontent.

### ***Conflict Terminated***

Middleton concluded his major combat operation at Batoche within two months of mobilizing. On 13 May, confident in his success, he wrote to Caron: "By this you will

---

<sup>71</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, lxxv.

have received the good news of my victory. The half-breeds are giving themselves up, about twenty have done so already.”<sup>72</sup> Despite the underwhelming unpreparedness of the Canadian militia to mount major operations, the planning and execution of the North West campaign was deliberate and considered many principles key to successful conflict termination. By necessity OGDs and NGOs were embedded early to provide basic necessities and functions for Middleton’s force but ultimately their coordination and cooperation enabled the positive conditions for conflict termination at Batoche and the subsequent transition back to civilian control. Overall, the national strategic level had effective intelligence to enable it to determine accurately the necessary and sufficient conditions to terminate the conflict and communicated for a successful post conflict transition. All the efforts of the country, united toward supporting the expedition remained coordinated and harmonized toward the strategic objectives and end states that framed the military operation. Successful offensive operations or at least the cessation of major combat allowed Middleton to transition to stability operations in the North West. The employment of security forces was effective in providing a secure and stable environment that achieved the desired strategic end state by reducing antagonism and preventing the re-emergence of hostilities.

---

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, 294.

## CHAPTER TWO

### Post-conflict Stability and a Secure Transition

Military doctrine situates post-conflict activities between the immediate cessation of conflict and the realisation of national strategic aims or objectives. This period can be marked by either an absence or residual amount of violence wherein the military's primacy over control and coordination of operations becomes less critical and transition to civilian agencies can begin. Depending on the circumstances, both isolated combat operations and non-combat operations may exist concurrently for the military within the theatre. Peace-building at the end of conflict aims to consolidate peace by identifying and strengthening supporting structures and ultimately preventing a return to violence.<sup>73</sup> The primary aim of military activities during post-conflict is to stabilize the area to facilitate transfer of responsibility to non-governmental, international, or national agencies.

Although transfer or transition to civil authorities should be as quick as possible, doctrine recognizes that military forces may be the only source of stability. Combat forces may have to conduct multiple tasks in order to establish the necessary degree of basic services in addition to security to permit stability. Traditional military stability tasks can range from handling prisoner to helping refugees, provision of emergency medical or humanitarian assistance, re-establishing infrastructure or essential services,

---

<sup>73</sup> Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, eds., *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* Tokyo ; United Nations University Press, c2005., 2005), 329, Table of contents <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0518/2005024342.html>, 2.

and even possibly initial governance. Governance tasks can be immediate such as negotiating with belligerent leaders the initial cease fire or surrender.<sup>74</sup> Among the four distinct areas attributed to post-conflict reconstruction by the United States State Department, security is primary and facilitates –social and economic well being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation”.<sup>75</sup> Without a stable and secure environment, the re-emergence of violence or other threats prevent resolution and improvement of the security situation.

Ultimately, stability operations seek to establish a favourable environment for indigenous population and security forces to create conditions that allow the host nation to resolve the root causes of the conflict or state failure, reconcile local or regional adversaries, and (re) establish governance, functional society and the market economy.<sup>76</sup> Despite the dedicated pursuit of well defined military end-states, conflict termination or surrender can occur ‘prematurely’ and the post-conflict period then becomes a bridge to reach otherwise unrealised national strategic aims or objectives. The post conflict period during the NWR completed a similar connection to unrealised objectives when the overall military campaign did not immediately stop following the relatively swift capitulation of Riel at Batoche. Considerations in this transition period are of critical

---

<sup>74</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GJ-005-300/FP-001, CFJP 3.0 Operations*, 5-6.

<sup>75</sup> Scott Feil, "Building Better Foundation: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction," *Washington Quarterly* Autumn, no. 22 (2002), 97-109, <http://www.twq.com/02autumn/feil.pdf> (accessed 02/07/2011)., 98.

<sup>76</sup> United States, *FM 3-07 Stability Operations*, Vol. October (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2008)., 3-2.

importance at the operational and tactical levels because the success of the war (or nature of the peace), instead of the mere the outcome of the battles, becomes the object.

The post conflict period of the NWR considered similar doctrine and concepts learned from such conflicts as Afghanistan and Iraq, namely the stability operations that established secure and favourable conditions for transition to peace. Post-conflict reconstruction or stability operations were characteristic of operations conducted in the NWR during the period following the arrival of militia forces in the North West until Middleton declared the “object of the campaign...attained” on July 5, 1885.<sup>77</sup> This transition period saw Middleton’s field forces conduct the majority of the stabilization activities and was punctuated by the pursuit and elimination of isolated resistance, release of hostages, and capture of remaining belligerents. The stability operations of the North West field force that contributed to overall security needs are found in the key areas of unity / integration of security forces, territorial security, protection of the populace, humanitarian assistance, control of belligerents and security sector reform.<sup>78</sup> Middleton shaped his application of force and employment of available forces using these principles and ensured that all elements remained unified in their action toward meeting the security requirements.

---

<sup>77</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 374.

<sup>78</sup> Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction : Task Framework* Association of the U.S Army and Center for Strategi and International Studies,[2002]), 5-8; Feil, *Building Better Foundation: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction*, 97-109. , 101.

### *Unity of security effort*

Unity of effort is an axiomatic principle for general success in operations and has specific importance when concentrating capabilities in order to meet security needs. Doctrine presents —unity of purpose and coherency of action” between military and non-military agents fundamental to stability operations to ensure that the approach toward the objectives can be comprehensive and ultimately successful.<sup>79</sup> Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation of multiple and diverse groups toward common objectives. Typically, in military organizations, unity of command helps to provide a guiding overall focus through direction rather than consensus building among interagency groups. Ultimately, whatever the mechanism all agencies must receive some direction to ensure effective and efficient action. Throughout the NWR, the most significant security effort and most important relationship was that between the militia and the NWMP.

To most officials, it seemed obvious that for the sake of unifying the actions in the North West something akin to unity of command should be established. On March 23<sup>rd</sup>, days before the defeat at Duck Lake, Middleton received word that upon his arrival, command authority of the local mounted police and their special constables would be transferred to him for all military operations. Both MacDonald and Caron seemed to temper the unification of command under Middleton by advising him to be cooperative and establish a peer approach with the NWMP. In MacDonald’s message to Caron concerning the assignment of mounted police to Middleton, he wished the general to be

---

<sup>79</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-001, Land Operations*, 01 Jan 2008 ed. (Ottawa, ON: Director of Army Doctrine, 2008), 7-87.

reminded and respectful of their abilities. In addition to being magistrates, the police officers were “well acquainted with the character” of the adversaries.<sup>80</sup> MacDonald emphasised the importance of the NWMP’s judgement on how best to proceed or “the best mode of dealing with them [Half-breeds and Indians] and inducing them to lay down their arms and submit to legal authority”.<sup>81</sup> Caron added to MacDonald’s instruction by emphasizing to Middleton the police’s primacy in cultural intelligence: “You will find the mounted policemen useful from their knowledge of the country, the people and the law”.<sup>82</sup> Both politicians concluded their instructions for interagency coordination, with parting guidance hoping that “the two forces will act satisfactorily together” and that the General’s “act” would “get them [NWMP] to work harmoniously with you”.<sup>83</sup> This decision was further amplification and guidance on the unique command relationship the Prime Minister had authorized for Middleton.

Such higher guidance combined the principle of unity of effort with potential advantages of unity of command. Middleton’s formal response seemed to promise a desirable intention to create cooperation and coordination in the security effort: “You may depend on my acting judiciously and carefully.”<sup>84</sup> Throughout the campaign, he was noted by some whom for his contempt of the NWMP and efforts to marginalize, even

---

<sup>80</sup> Prime Minister Macdonald to Minister of Militia Caron, Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885*, 193, 3.

<sup>81</sup> Prime Minister Macdonald to Minister of Militia Caron, Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 3.

<sup>82</sup> Caron to Middleton, *Ibid*, 3

<sup>83</sup> Caron to Middleton, *Ibid*, 3.



disband the police (a drastic suggestion analysed later under reform of security sector section). Some media reporters who staunchly supported the NWMP accused Middleton of arriving in the North West already prejudiced and dismissive of the police.<sup>85</sup> Although in Middleton's official report to Parliament, he limited his main criticisms to the police's inability to construct proper defensive positions, noting that Prince Albert was —. hastily and imperfectly put in a state of defence”, and the police barracks at Battleford were also —. hastily and imperfectly strengthened”.<sup>86</sup> He suspected some of the commanding officer among the police of exaggerating threats. Middleton dismissed their ‘pessimism’ but was in general complimentary toward their comportment and professionalism. Upon his ‘relief’ of Prince Albert Middleton noted the police “looked smart and well, and were a fine body of men.”<sup>87</sup> The General acknowledged the utility of the police, employed them throughout the force and relied on their contributions.

Despite the limited involvement of formed units of mounted police in Middleton's column, or his alleged unwillingness to understand them or their situation, the campaign was characterized by a unity of the security efforts. Following the NWR, the endless vying by both the Militia and the NWMP for the claim of being the pivotal element of the overall success would suggest more an insatiable need for recognition and praise than an indication that their individual efforts were not directed toward the same ends. Despite Middleton's perceived non conciliatory approach to the NWMP around Batoche and

---

<sup>84</sup> Middleton to Caron, *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>85</sup> Klancher, *The North West Mounted Police and the North West Rebellion*, 78-80.

<sup>86</sup> Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885*. Needler, 58, 60.

Prince Albert, he did establish the conditions and mind set for unity of purpose of the security forces from the outset by his commander's intent and overall theme of unifying the effort of the militia and police. All forces, especially the columns led by General Strange and Lt. Col Otter, had seamless integration and unity of actions and effort between the police and Militia.<sup>88</sup> In all actions taken by the other two columns the contribution of the integrated police was critical to their ability to accomplish both combat and stability operations.

### *Integrated Security Forces*

Military forces are generally equipped and trained for high-intensity conventional combat. Even before the conflict reaches a point where major violence or combat engagements cease, security situations require the military forces to adapt roles and force levels to meet varied requirements of offensive and defensive operations. In modern conflicts, the military force may operate in isolation struggling to address both combat and security in the absence of properly trained or capable indigenous security forces. A capability or security gap can develop between relatively incapable police forces or armed forces accustomed and equipped solely for high-intensity combat. Within this gap fall the various stability activities such as border patrol, crowd control, as well as the pursuit, arrest and disarmament of belligerents. Contemporary concepts and doctrine attempt to address the shortcoming of both extremes by establishing "medium-weight forces" or integrating the security forces to best bridge during the post-conflict

---

<sup>87</sup> Ibid. Needler, 58.

transition.<sup>89</sup> The fielded forces of the NWR were from the outset an integrated security force comprised of permanent force, volunteer militia, local scouts, and NWMP.

The security force fielded under Middleton and his subordinate commanders had the necessary organization, manning, and equipment to act as an integrated security force and cover any capability gap. A mixture of militia, scouts, rangers and NWMP were dispersed throughout the theatre and within each of the fighting columns to operate nearly interchangeably in the conduct of stability operations as well as offensive actions. Both Otter's and Strange's column had significant police integration and their contribution was indispensable while the NWMP in Prince Albert provided containment and patrols in support of Middleton's force around Batoche.<sup>90</sup> In most cases, the police provided capabilities such as mounted skills and repeating rifles not present in the militia units and helped balance the forces within the columns.

Otter's column was effectively balanced when the then superintendent Herchmer of the NWMP was made Colonel and following Middleton's wishes served as chief of staff to be –consult[ed]...on all points”<sup>91</sup> In addition to having the experienced police officer as a chief advisor, the column was also assigned two police 7 pdr. mountain guns and once at Battleford a total of 75 troops. The assigned mounted police and scouts were fully integrated and patrolled the surrounding area while the militia, predominately

---

<sup>88</sup> Stacey, *Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students*, 164., 117.

<sup>89</sup> Feil, *Building Better Foundation: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction*, 97-109., 103.

<sup>90</sup> Hildebrandt, *The Battle of Batoche: British Small Warfare and the Entrenched Métis*, 120., 66.

<sup>91</sup> Graves, *More Fighting for Canada: Five Battles, 1760-1944*, 363., 94.

‘marching infantry’ garrisoned the town. The most significant action taken by Otter’s column was the punitive attack on Poundmaker who according to Otter was —“hesitating between war and peace” and action was necessary to —“settle matters”.<sup>92</sup> The flying column sent to Poundmaker’s reserve included select police and Herchmer who Otter later noted in official dispatches —“proved themselves as invaluable to my force.”<sup>93</sup> Otter had relied on the experienced constables and additional firepower both during the offensive actions against the Cree and in order to provide the local security patrols within his area of responsibility around Battleford.

Strange’s column also benefited from close integration with the police and former police. Inspectors Steele and Perry were gazetted majors to lead the cavalry and the second echelon (including the left wing of the 65<sup>th</sup> battalion) respectively. Strange and his senior policeman Steele were said to have —work[ed] together in closest harmony throughout the campaign.”<sup>94</sup> Two units of mounted police and a police field gun (the sole artillery piece) accompanied the militia in Strange’s Alberta Field Force. Some of the police were part of ‘Steele’s Scouts’ and played the vital role of vanguard. Well into the campaign the positive relationship and effective integration was noted by Strange who reflected: —“.why were we not destroyed 100 times over?...[because of] a most splendid body of scout cowboy cavalry – under Steele, a rare combination of caution and daring”.<sup>95</sup> When General Strange relinquished command of Perry and the detachment of

---

<sup>92</sup> Beal and Macleod, *Prairie Fire: The 1885 North-West Rebellion*, 384., 243.

<sup>93</sup> Klancher, *The North West Mounted Police and the North West Rebellion*, 48.

<sup>94</sup> James C. Lamb, *Jingo* (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992), 284., 183.

police his complements summarized the effective contribution to the organization by thanking them for “...their valuable service and invariably excellent conduct”.<sup>96</sup> Late in the campaign after the same police had been used to good effect in pursuing Big Bear’s party, Middleton even praised the successes of the integration: “Major Steele and his men were useful to him [Strange] and they did excellent service with me.”<sup>97</sup> The police in Strange’s column had been critical to his pursuit of Big Bear and were consistently the only elements of his column that could maintain contact with the retreating enemy.

Middleton’s column did not initially have attached police units (although some key individuals like Captain French were ex-NWMP). However, Middleton had overall command of Canadian forces and in his operations he integrated the security forces. Despite his contemptuous attitude and pompous approach toward the NWMP and some of their officers (a similar snobbish attitude was accorded to the colonial (Canadian) soldiers and officers under his command), Middleton nonetheless depended upon an integrated security force to conduct stability operations.<sup>98</sup> Commissioner (gazetted a Colonel) Irvine’s discontent about the small role his police played in the battle for Batoche (and the subsequent criticism and derision) faithfully followed Middleton’s orders to protect Prince Albert. Beyond the controversy and contradictory orders surrounding the question why Irvine’s force did not join Middleton at Batoche, the combined efforts of the police and the militia in the upper Saskatchewan valley

---

<sup>95</sup> Dunn, *The Alberta Field Force of 1885*, 293, 63.

<sup>96</sup> Klancher, *The North West Mounted Police and the North West Rebellion*, 60.

<sup>97</sup> Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885*, 65.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, xvii.

ultimately supported the main effort. Irvine's force made certain that the Métis at Batoche were contained in the north, the settlement of Prince Albert remained unscathed, and the surrounding area remained relatively safe from threat. Lord Melgund, Middleton's chief of staff, was perhaps more objective than his general when he later highlighted the value of the integrated force: —The fact of Col. Irvine's forces at Prince Albert afforded a safe refuge to many outlying settlers, and, if it had not been there, the task General Middleton had to solve would have been quite a different one."<sup>99</sup> Middleton was able to concentrate his small force on Batoche and focus on Riel while Irvine's patrols protected the loyal settlers and threatened the Métis' northern flank.

Following the battle at Batoche, Irvine's mounted police, being more mobile and familiar with the country and belligerents were sent by Middleton to help find Big Bear band and his hostages. Big Bear managed to escape to the south only to be arrested by another police patrol outside Fort Carlton. Amongst the patrol that came upon a group of three Indians was a constable who recognized the Chief immediately from a warrant that he had carried out a year prior. Many individuals seeking the last fugitive hundreds of miles to the north bemoaned the fact that the arresting police Sergeant was —...about the only man in the Force who had never gone after him..."and far removed from the centre of action but vigilantly providing area security.<sup>100</sup> A final testament to the integrated nature of the security forces where a seemingly remote police patrol utterly removed from the main force in pursuit would successfully bring to a close the North West

---

<sup>99</sup> Klancher, *The North West Mounted Police and the North West Rebellion*, 52 & 66.

campaign for Middleton. The coordination and synchronization demonstrated at the tactical level amongst the security forces and the resultant lasting legitimacy won for the NWMP, who retained a sense of ownership for the security tasks, encapsulates contemporary fundamentals to stability operations.<sup>101</sup> Middleton's deployment of his integrated security forces also reflected an appreciation of the limit of the local forces' capabilities which shaped his approach for security and control tasks throughout his stability operations.

### *(Territorial) Security and Control*

Provision of a security framework has the important effect of instilling the sense amongst the population of being secure or protected from violence. Security in post conflict reconstruction needs to be more not simply the imposition of a laws, — the absence of conflict is not Peace, the imposition of order is not security” and is the primary objective and responsibility of military forces.<sup>102</sup> The scale of the initial effort can be large in order to stabilize effectively and avoid a return to violence. The concept of security in post conflict includes many considerations for public safety and specifically establishes safe and secure conditions by providing collective and individual security. In immediate practical terms, ‘security and control’ determines who or what must be

---

<sup>100</sup> As described by General Strange; Jim Wallace, *A Trying Time: The North-West Mounted Police in the 1885 Rebellion* (Winnipeg, MB: Bunker to Bunker Pub., 1998), 181.

<sup>101</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-001, Land Operations*, 7-88.

<sup>102</sup> Feil, *Building Better Foundation: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction*, 97-109., 99; Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-001, Land Operations*, 7-90.

protected and from whom while restoring territorial integrity.<sup>103</sup> The provisions for security and control made during the NWR stability operations addressed territorial security, public order and safety, and protection of the populace.

The initial post conflict territorial security doctrinal response is to establish and control the borders, freedom of movement, and checks on personal identification documents. These tasks require high level coordination with regional actors to gain their cooperation or prevent their interference. Among the initial concerns during the NWR was possible interference of sympathetic Indians or half-breeds from the United States. The immediate threats were the vulnerable lines of communication and illicit supply of arms and combatants to the rebels. Upon mobilization, the Canadian Governor-General secured the cooperation of the Americans and they in turn pledged to “take all available precautions to prevent the dispatch of hostile expeditions or of arms and ammunition...from...the United States to aid the insurgents in the North-West Provinces.”<sup>104</sup> The cooperation of the American authorities ensured that Canada’s southern border was secure and despite some sensational rumours and speculations no significant incursion occurred. In addition to controlling the potential movement of ‘hostile’ Indians from the south, measures were taken within the North West to regulate the movement and establish an identification regime for the Canadian natives.

---

<sup>103</sup> Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction : Task Framework*, 4; Feil, *Building Better Foundation: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction*, 97-109., 99; Michael Brzoska and David Law, eds., *Security Sector Reconstruction and Reform in Peace Support Operations* (New York,: Routledge, 2007), 122., ii.

<sup>104</sup> Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions* , 475., 353.



To further establish a safe and secure territory after controlling the border, rules concerning movement and personal identification were established. A proclamation was issued by Indian Commissioner Dewdney that was somewhat controversial even at the time, ordering all Indians to return to their reserve and remain there or else be considered rebels. The notice warned the Indians that if the troops met them off reserve they might be attacked since the troops may take them for hostile rather than friendly. At the very least, they would be arrested on suspicion of being involved with Riel. The notice concluded with some nuanced messaging that “all good and loyal Indians should remain quietly on their reserves”, where the same troops who might otherwise shoot or arrest wandering Indians would nevertheless protect them. In the same proclamation, an identification regime was proposed where by only “special permission in writing from some authorized person” would ensure that wandering Indians would not be punished as being rebels.<sup>105</sup> Justification for the policy focused on keeping Indians safe from the enthusiastic “trigger-happy” volunteer soldiers, who might mistake or assume any suspicious person as enemy.<sup>106</sup> Confinement of the Indians to their reserve likely did not make them feel any safer but there were no significant incidents between the Indians and security forces beyond the immediate areas of the conflict nor were there any disastrous confrontation between the volunteer home guard or eastern militiamen and the otherwise innocent. A concern that was raised by Indian agents like Cecil Denny, who criticized the sanctioning of reckless “cowboy” behaviour by general orders “authorizing sentries to

---

<sup>105</sup> Douglas W. Light, *Footprints in the Dust* (Turner Warwick Pubns, 1989), 433.

<sup>106</sup> Stonechild and Waiser, *Loyal Till Death: Indians and the Northwest Rebellion*, 160.

shoot on sight Indians running off horses”.<sup>107</sup> The controversial confinement order offered some indirect protection for the population, even if for some vigilantes it was protection against themselves.

### ***Protection of Populace, infrastructure and assistance***

The establishment of home guards and local garrisons of troops were Middleton’s main efforts to establish public order and restore the immediate sense of safety and security. Protection of non-combatants and ensuring that humanitarian aid reaches those in need is part of the doctrinal initial post-conflict response. Providing the necessary security framework to control routes and areas requires extensive forces and resources.<sup>108</sup> Neither Middleton, nor the Department of Militia, had either advantage available in any great quantity at the outset. Middleton was initially reticent (to some bordering on stubborn) to devote much attention or precious arms and ammunition to stabilisation efforts until its significance competed with his focus on offensive operations.<sup>109</sup> In his account written after the rebellion, Middleton explained that although at first he took the perilous reports and local request for aid seriously, he dismissed the majority as being mostly unfounded. He suspected the propensity to exaggerate in a crisis to be a “prairie peculiarity” and jokingly referred to the melodramatic pleas as “Nor’-Westers”.<sup>110</sup> Despite dismissive bravado, he did respond to the “siege mentality” of many isolated communities in the Alberta, Saskatchewan and Assiniboia territories. As the government

---

<sup>107</sup> Dunn, *The Alberta Field Force of 1885*, 293., 25.

expected, Middleton relieved their sense of vulnerability and ensured access for humanitarian aid.

Throughout the North West territories from Brandon to the district of Alberta, people were in a panicked state and demanded arms and protection. Although most westerners supported the mobilization and deployment of local troops to the front, they remained fearful of leaving towns unprotected.<sup>111</sup> Desperate calls for assistance from almost every town flooded into Caron's office who turned to Middleton for action. In reply, Middleton insisted that rather than send out the requested arms, of which he had none to spare, the best defence was to let him get on with his business and focus on ~~the~~ center of the revolt, to envelope it and deliver a knock-out blow."<sup>112</sup> Middleton, however, addressed the most pressing request for security and despite his desire to concentrate his forces for Batoche he partitioned elements of his force to garrison communities, saw that home guards were provided for and most notably dispatched Otter's column to relieve Battleford.<sup>113</sup> Middleton balanced his efforts to best address minimum stability requirements while maintaining his primary offensive aim of defeating Riel at Batoche. The safety of the population remained an essential task but Riel's

---

<sup>108</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-001, Land Operations*, 7-90.

<sup>109</sup> Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885.*, xiv.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>111</sup> Ken Coates, "Western Manitoba and the 1885 Rebellion," *Manitoba History* Number 20, no. Autumn (1990), [http://www.mhs.mb.ca/docs/mb\\_history/20/1885rebellion.shtml](http://www.mhs.mb.ca/docs/mb_history/20/1885rebellion.shtml) (accessed 1/20/2011)., 6.

<sup>112</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885* Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885.*, xli.

<sup>113</sup> Graves, *More Fighting for Canada: Five Battles, 1760-1944*, 363., 94.

council at Batoche was the center of gravity of the Métis resistance and key to conflict termination.

The most threatened populations, following abandonment of Fort Carlton and Fort Pitt, were located closest to the rebels around the communities of Prince Albert and Battleford. After the rebel victory at Duck Lake, the NWMP in the area conducted a full retreat and refugees from the surrounding area fled to the relative safety of the largest white settlements. In Battleford, the citizens abandoned their homes on one side of the river to seek refuge in the police stockade on the other side.<sup>114</sup> The sight of Otter's column approaching Battleford brought instant relief to that population.<sup>115</sup> The arriving militia and troops represented a visible sign of central authority and their presence encouraged the beleaguered citizen to return to their homes and daily routine. In Alberta, only a total of 75 mounted police were stationed in the whole district. People anxiously waited for reinforcements and the arrival of the militia and subsequent garrisoning of towns by the Voltigeurs also allayed fears and removed the "air of panic" in Calgary.<sup>116</sup> On his march north, General Strange's column built three forts and dug earthworks at old HBC posts.<sup>117</sup> The effect was so significant in Alberta that as Strange's column continued north the Indians surrounding Edmonton displayed welcoming flags from their tepees suggesting that the recent arrival of such a large force had won their cooperation. Across

---

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 94.

<sup>115</sup> Battleford resident recalled "—Howas an advance scout from Herchomer's [sic] force, informed us a relieving force was only a few miles away...townfolks very happy" Beal and Macleod, *Prairie Fire: The 1885 North-West Rebellion*, 384., 240.

<sup>116</sup> Dunn, *The Alberta Field Force of 1885*, 293., 70; Lamb, *Jingo*, 182.

the districts, the militia brought stability by providing a sense of personal and collective security which afforded the return to normalcy and provision of assistance to those in need. Arguably the provision of security and assistance along the path of the military movement was more important and significant than the impact generated by the localized and relatively minor combat operations conducted by the field force.

In addition to the security and control tasks, the advancing militia provided some humanitarian assistance and support. Following the victory of Batoche, Middleton sent foodstuff to the local clergy to distribute to those people most in need specifically the women and children.<sup>118</sup> There were many instances of privation amongst the Métis and Indians that required both medical care and basic necessities. Following the siege of Batoche, many Métis women and children were found hiding in caves down by the riverbank. The battle and subsequent rampage of the victorious troops left little in the village or personal effects despite Middleton's official order against looting.<sup>119</sup> Although it was the militia that had laid much of the waste, subsequent immediate and follow on assistance of food and a medical assistance did more to help the Métis cope.<sup>120</sup> Later, doctors Thomas Roddick and Voyd attended to the Métis camps around Fish Creek and Batoche and left all that they could in terms of bandages, medicine and some money

---

<sup>117</sup> Dunn, *The Alberta Field Force of 1885*, 293., 92-3.

<sup>118</sup> "I sent two teams loaded with flour, bacon, tea, etc., to the Roman Catholic priests at Batoche, to enable them to relieve any distress among the women and children that might arise" – General Middleton report, Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885.*, 58.

<sup>119</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 361.

<sup>120</sup> "... women and children left by the enemy were very well treated and food given to them by my orders. We had five wounded men of the enemy brought into our hospital – all carried by the soldiers themselves", Middleton to Caron, *Ibid.*, 383.

before handing the provision of care over to NWMP surgeons.<sup>121</sup> In cases where local needs exceeded the militia's capability or mandate, Middleton alerted Caron to take further action where necessary.<sup>122</sup> Middleton also warned Caron that measures taken to disarm local Indians must be followed up with food relief since he felt they would be forced to either starve or plunder to survive.<sup>123</sup> Lack of basic necessities in the districts was in part due to the heavy demand placed on the limited supply by the militia itself. However, considerable stockpiles of provisions generated during the hundred days of campaigning were subsequently left throughout the North West or transferred to the local HBC.<sup>124</sup> Although indirect, the influx of government money provided assistance and contributed to the general economic conditions. The greatest boon to the struggling local population likely came from the presence of the militia, the resultant service jobs, and financial opportunities found in the wake of the war effort.

Contemporary doctrine advises that the commander must identify the essential task to be successful during stabilization. Middleton's considerations reflect those highlighted by the doctrine when he prioritized and sequenced protection tasks within the capabilities of his available forces and the diversity of its composition. He also

---

<sup>121</sup> Gordon E. Tolton, *Prairie Warships: River Navigation in the Northwest Rebellion*, 1st ed. Heritage House Publishing Co. Ltd., (2007), 285; Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 376.

<sup>122</sup> "I would recommend your government to think of public works up here. I fear there will be a something like a famine, and very few may be expected, hardly any sowing having been done yet." Middleton to Caron, *Ibid.*, 216.

<sup>123</sup> "Farmers are now going out to seed, will be great distress here – some can't go having no food or seed; shall try to spare some on payment by notes of hand, no money here" Middleton to Caron 20<sup>th</sup> May 1885, *Ibid.*, 311

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 365.

demonstrated “cultural astuteness” and a sufficient understanding of which protection tasks were essential.<sup>125</sup> However, in order to better ensure success and reach desired effects in preventing a return to violence, protection must be complemented by efforts to remove the threats or capability of adversaries to conduct illegitimate or violent acts by controlling belligerent groups.<sup>126</sup> Immediately following surrenders at Batoche and Battleford, Middleton’s forces had to take charge of the former combatants and managing their release became an additional essential stability task.

### *Control of Belligerents*

Following his involvement in the campaign, Major Boulton summarized the positive impact of the field force in terms of reach, “The most remote districts had been penetrated by the soldiers and guns...”, and lasting effect —...showed the Indians that they must in future become obedient to the government and laws of the country.”<sup>127</sup> The control of belligerents during the initial post conflict response helps to establish a safe and secure environment and begins to develop stable and legitimate indigenous security institutions. Stability tasks conducted to control belligerents can begin with enforcing ceasefires agreements or building confidence amongst belligerents in the lead up to agreements. Once ceasefires are in place, belligerent cooperation in disengagement and withdrawal must be supervised to enable “potential spoilers” to be isolated or eliminated

---

<sup>125</sup> United States, *FM 3-07 Stability Operations*, 3-1.

<sup>126</sup> Feil, *Building Better Foundation: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction*, 97-109., 99.

<sup>127</sup> Charles Arkoll Boulton, *Reminiscences of the North-West Rebellions* (Toronto: Grip Printing & Publishing, 1886)., 395.

and continue remaining negotiations for prisoner exchange. Control of belligerents also involves their demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) back into civil society.<sup>128</sup> Middleton's militia force assisted and secured the process of DDR as well as managed many of the surrender agreements with the belligerents, notably with the Métis at Batoche and with Chief Poundmaker and Big Bear.

Following the breakthrough at Batoche, Middleton's forces transitioned to supporting DDR in order to control the belligerents following the ceasefire. Leading up to the final government push, Middleton and Riel had sent one another cease-fire messages which led to the eventual agreement of Riel's surrender to Middleton's forces. Initially, both men were confident enough to request each others surrender. Middleton's final exchanges extended assurances to disillusioned Métis and Indians to lay down their arms and promise protective custody to Riel if he gave himself up. The clemency no doubt encouraged the subsequent surrender of scattered Métis rather than a pitched and bitter ending or vigorous counter attack. For two days following the taking of Batoche, Middleton reported that the ~~half-breeds~~ continued to come in in great numbers with their white flags"<sup>129</sup> Surrendering Métis were checked against the list of most wanted rebels and if not deemed of interest were disarmed and told to return to their homes.<sup>130</sup> Although some Métis, including Riel's military commander Gabriel Dumont and other

---

<sup>128</sup> Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction : Task Framework*; Feil, *Building Better Foundation: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction*, 97-109., 99; Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-001, Land Operations*, 7-86.

<sup>129</sup> Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885.*, 55-6.

<sup>130</sup> Stonechild and Waiser, *Loyal Till Death: Indians and the Northwest Rebellion*, 308., 164; Middleton, *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885.*, 56.



notorious captains, took flight, most individuals including members of the council and Louis Riel surrendered within a few days. Riel presented himself, with the letter from Middleton that guaranteed his life, to a patrol and was sent with twenty-four other prisoners to Regina for trial. Middleton took care to protect the belligerents in his custody, especially Riel whom he placed in a tent beside his own and had him under constant watch until handed over to the police. From Batoche, Middleton's forces continued on to Battleford to confront Poundmaker who had since learned of Riel's surrender.

Following the battle of Cut Knife Hill, some of Poundmaker's Cree had ventured toward Batoche but stopped short after attacking and capturing a supply train on 14<sup>th</sup> May. That date marked the last act of aggression and Poundmaker sent a letter to Middleton requesting a pow-wow to which Middleton threatened his destruction if he did not accept unconditional surrender.<sup>131</sup> Middleton and his troops met with Poundmaker and some of his tribe at Battleford. Middleton admonished the Indians for their disobedience and demanded that Poundmaker and four other accused of murder surrender in exchange for release of all others back to their reserve. With Poundmaker's arrest, the submission of his tribe was complete. Other local chiefs like Beardy, One Arrow, and Whitecap met similar ends when reporting to Middleton in line with government instructions.<sup>132</sup> While some Indians fled south to the United States, those persons that

---

<sup>131</sup> I and my people wish you to send us the terms of peace in writing, so that we may be under no misunderstanding, from which so much trouble arises. – Excerpt letter from Chief Poundmaker to Middleton, May 19<sup>th</sup>, 1885, *Ibid.*, 59; I have enough men to destroy you and your people or, at least to drive you away to starve. – Excerpt from Middleton's unconditional surrender demand to Poundmaker May 28<sup>th</sup>, 1885, Stonechild and Waiser, *Loyal Till Death: Indians and the Northwest Rebellion.*, 166.

remained were sent back to their reserves, some having to surrender first what arms they possessed or else have them stamped as government property of the government.<sup>133</sup> The final belligerent was Big Bear who was pursued northward by the remainder of the North West field force. Middleton sent Big Bear a summons similar to Poundmaker stressing the futility of further resistance and threatened his destruction if government terms were not met.<sup>134</sup> Big Bear continued to evade the forces that chased him but soon after his band broke up and released the hostage taken at Fort Pitt, he surrendered peacefully and was taken into custody by a patrol of mounted police.<sup>135</sup> With the support to DDR complete those prisoners held by the Militia were handed over to the North West Mounted Police. Some were released while many faced trial and afterwards some faced prison sentences or worse, the hangman's noose.

### *Support to Security sector reform*

Before handing over his responsibilities for stability, Middleton was concerned about shortcomings in the existing local security institutions, "...everybody is scared and is losing their senses...There has been an awful lot of mismanagement somewhere."<sup>136</sup>

---

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 193.

<sup>133</sup> Some 210 arms and 5 revolvers taken from Poundmaker's Cree, Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 320.

<sup>134</sup> "I have defeated Riel and his force of Half-Breeds and Indians and made him and most of his Councillors, prisoner. Beardy has surrendered and Poundmaker and three of his principal men and two murderers have surrendered and are my prisoners. I expect you to come to my camp as soon as possible with your principal men: to bring in your arms and plunder and all your prisoners and give up the men who committed the murders at Frog Lake; if you do not do all this, I will attack you and destroy your band and hunt you into the woods" Summons Middleton to Big Bear, 28 May 1885, Ibid., 322.

<sup>135</sup> Wallace, *A Trying Time: The North-West Mounted Police in the 1885 Rebellion*, 180.

Depending on the circumstance leading to the post conflict situation, a security gap can exist requiring outside intervention. This vacuum can be created either when the indigenous security forces have reduced effectiveness or have been eliminated, or if present are operating illegitimately and prone to corruption or abuse.<sup>137</sup> Ensuring that the provision of physical security and supporting security institutions observe good governance, rule of law and key societal norms have in the past decade been grouped and termed security sector reform or reconstruction (SSR).<sup>138</sup> The security sector can be narrowed to the organizations that provide public security and can threaten or use violence as authorized by the state”<sup>139</sup> Doctrine defines SSR as —the set of policies, plans... a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security and justice.”<sup>140</sup> While supporting SSR, the military’s tasks can include tasks to screen and recruit security personnel, provide equipment and training and transfer of responsibility.<sup>141</sup> Specific to the NWR, the efforts of Middleton, spurred by some strategic direction to reform the training and organization of the NWMP illustrate this type of SSR. Middleton was critical of the personnel, conduct, equipment, and control of the mounted police and sought to change their training and organization.

---

<sup>136</sup> Middleton in a letter to Major General Strange, T. B. Strange, *Gunner Jingo's Jubilee* (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1988), 406.

<sup>137</sup> Feil, *Building Better Foundation: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction*, 97-109, 97.

<sup>138</sup> Brzoska and Law, *Security Sector Reconstruction and Reform in Peace Support Operations*, 122., ii.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., iii.

<sup>140</sup> United States, *FM 3-07 Stability Operations*, 6-1.

<sup>141</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-001, Land Operations*, 7-92.

Middleton's critical examination of the indigenous security force provoked some persons to react defensively: "The Mounted Police emerged from the Rebellion with their reputation badly damaged... [by] the unwarranted criticism of leaders such as Middleton."<sup>142</sup> Proponents of the NWMP dismissed Middleton's enthusiasm for deriding the forces as personal vendetta but ultimately his criticism, if only to put the force on the defensive, did prompt introspection and some meaningful changes. After being in the North West for little over a month, Middleton detailed to Caron his criticism of the present NWMP and his recommendations for establishing a new mounted force. Middleton advised forming under military organisation and command a force of not less than a thousand permanent mounted infantry to be dressed in khaki not red coats, equipped with Winchester rifles and sword bayonets. He also insisted that the new organization completely supersede the present NWMP since he believed that the police had forever lost their influence and authority amongst all groups in the North West. Obviously frustrated with the present leadership of the NWMP, Middleton also insisted on carefully choosing men in order to exclude some individuals currently in the ranks adding that the "real commander" of the force should be stationed in the North West.<sup>143</sup> Months into the campaign, Middleton still recommended a force of a thousand mounted men and reiterated to Caron that if kept under present leadership and called police that people would remain "uneasy" and wrote "the Police as a body have lost prestige".<sup>144</sup> Caron agreed with his senior general's proposed organizational changes and suggested

---

<sup>142</sup> Wallace, *A Trying Time: The North-West Mounted Police in the 1885 Rebellion*, 181.

<sup>143</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 231.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid*, 357.

they wait until his return to decide. Others like Senator Masson, former Minister of Militia and Defence, agreed with his militia colleagues and also petitioned that the force fall under Militia control based on a French gendarmerie model.<sup>145</sup> However, the Indian Department did not see any advantage to abolishing the existing police force in favour of soldiers since the positive relationships and influence slowly built up over the last fifteen years of their existence in the west would be lost. In the end, the NWMP increased in numbers to approximately a thousand, but MacDonald never turned them over to the Department of Militia and they remained under separate police control.

The reform efforts and criticism levelled at the NWMP accomplished the overall aim of SSR. Some of Middleton's suggestions, such as disbanding the force completely and placing the role under the Department of Militia, were extreme but on the whole pulled government decisions in the right direction. It forced some discussion and consideration on how best Canada could protect the people of the North West territories within the constraints of policy and budget while remaining in line with the national goal to develop the west. The capabilities of the NWMP was subsequently maximized allowing a transition from military enforced security and ensured that social, economic and political development in the region was positive as the North West returned to normalcy and civil control.<sup>146</sup>

---

<sup>145</sup> Wallace, *A Trying Time: The North-West Mounted Police in the 1885 Rebellion*, 201.

<sup>146</sup> Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, eds., *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, c2005., 2005), 329, Table of contents <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0518/2005024342.html>, 316.

### *Post Conflict Transitioned*

The militia was able to provide a general security framework which allowed the civilian population and local government to resume free and safe normal activities and continue to settle and build the institutions required for lasting stability in the North West. This achievement was due to the effective application of principles and concepts advocated by modern doctrine such as cooperation, unifying the security effort, and employing appropriate control and domination of the field forces in the area of operations. As well, many considerations required by contemporary reasoning for security sector reform such as, budget and size of indigenous security forces, positive transition from military to civilian police, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of belligerents were clearly important to address deficiencies identified by Middleton. Re-emergence of violence had been made unlikely and recovery efforts had been firmly set in motion. The stage was set meaning sustainability and the final phase of the post conflict reconstruction could begin where the society began to normalise and the military forces started to withdraw and/or redeploy.<sup>147</sup> Middleton's field force completed stability operations and reformed the security sector so that military presence was no longer required allowing the North West's transition back to local civil control and a normal routine.

---

<sup>147</sup> Ibid. 316.

## CHAPTER THREE

### Disengagement and Transition to Normalcy

...from the east to the far west, the warmest of welcomes was accorded to Canada's citizen soldiery – Major Boulton of the Boulton Scouts<sup>148</sup>

Across Canada, jubilant crowds welcomed both their triumphant militia and a return to pre-conflict peace and routine. At the end of the campaign when military operations terminate or higher authority directs removal of forces, the military commander must begin redeployment and disengagement from the theatre. Contemporary doctrine admonishes that complexity, force protection, follow on deployments and other considerations warrant a well planned and distinct operation beyond simple retrograde or reversal of the deployment process. A hasty or poorly conceived withdrawal can undermine previous gains in positive opinion and degrade the force's overall readiness for follow-on operations. Fundamentally, redeployment is the preparation and movement or transfer of forces (units), men and material. To be successful, redeployment must be viewed as a new deployment rather than a final activity in order to best preserve the force's ability to transition to future operations. Effective redeployment activities accomplish this end by reinforcing the cohesiveness of the forces by maintaining units or formation integrity whenever possible during the move and reconstitution process. Doctrine guides commanders to look further beyond the simple

---

<sup>148</sup> Boulton, 393.

solving of the logistical problem of moving men and material (simple retrograde action) because redeployment must be more than disengagement from one operation but also a transition to something else. Transition to 'something else' includes completion of after action reports and lessons learned, but, probably most important is reintroduction of released soldiers into a post-conflict routine or civilian society after their active service.<sup>149</sup> Evidently, the detailed planning carried through transition from conflict termination to post conflict activities is a key contributor to this concluded phase of campaign. However, early planning for redeployment is difficult to time correctly since it should not pre-empt the definite attainment of the operational end state. As with post-conflict activities even though a rapid withdrawal of forces and return to normal is ideal, a poor plan or hasty and awkward execution can diminish any praise or accomplishment won during the conflict.<sup>150</sup>

The post conflict transition following the conclusion of NWR effectively disengaged the military forces and transitioned the theatre to 'normal' and civil authority commensurate with modern doctrine and concepts learned from such conflicts as Afghanistan and Iraq. The disengagement or redeployment phase of the NWR commenced following Middleton's declaration that "the object of the campaign has been obtained" on June 26<sup>th</sup> until the Report of the Commission of war claims in late February 1886 which signalled a final reconciliation. The redeployment and transition operations

---

<sup>149</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000, Conduct of Land Operations - Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, 86; Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GJ-005-300/FP-001, CFJP 3.0 Operations*, 5-6.

<sup>150</sup> NATO, *Allied Joint Operations*, 4-22.



of the North West field force contributed to the return to normalcy. Military disengagement involved the “fostering [of] sustainability”, reconciliation, demobilization, decompression and reconstitution of intervention and indigenous security force.<sup>151</sup> Middleton effectively transitioned from his military victories and provision of stability to conditions where the people could independently sustain their security, governance and order allowing him to remove his intervening military force.

### *Fostering sustainability*

Fostering sustainability is the third and final conceptual phase of post conflict reconstruction within contemporary American frameworks that begins with an initial response (military intervention) followed by transformation (indigenous capability development).<sup>152</sup> This phase is characterized by the withdrawal of the whole or majority of external military forces and the consolidation of recovery efforts and indigenous capacity such that the ground work is laid to prevent conflict or recurrence of violence. Essentially, fostering sustainability is “the path toward normalization” and progresses the (re) establishment of strengthened institutions, development programs, legal systems and security sector that were being transformed following the initial reconstruction of the post-conflict activities. From the point of view of post-conflict activities, reconstruction is complete when the area of operation returns to ‘normal’ in that intervention forces

---

<sup>151</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000, Conduct of Land Operations - Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, 86; Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction : Task Framework*, 2; United States Air Force, *Operations and Organization*, 3 April ed., Vol. Air Force Doctrine Document 2 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defence, 2007), 33;

depart, the self-governance and local economy is independently sustained, and all relations and behaviour within the area and outside interactions follow generally accepted norms and practices.<sup>153</sup> As a part of the disengagement process, Middleton's forces fostered sustainability by transferring tasks to the indigenous actors including the courts, NWMP, and Indian agents who in turn consolidated their positions.

Immediately following the break up of Big Bear's band in late June, Middleton began transfer of security, governance and law enforcement back to the local NWMP, Indian commissioners and magistrates. From Fort Pitt, where the field force had concentrated in the final weeks, Middleton released the attached police and sent them back to their own autonomous command authority. Almost immediately following their release, members that had been apart of Steele's Scouts reasserted law and order. They quickly resumed their constabulary duties when they stopped and arrested pillaging teamsters on nearby Indian reserves.<sup>154</sup> Elsewhere, the militia units transferred 'war' prisoners arrested for participation in the insurrection to the NWMP who assumed custody and escorted them to courts in either Battleford or Regina.<sup>155</sup> While the majority of the eastern militia units redeployed home, some remaining units accompanied Indian agents and the commissioner as they reasserted government policy amongst many of the Indian bands. Colonel Osborne Smith and a couple hundred Winnipeg light infantry (in

---

<sup>152</sup> Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction : Task Framework*, 2.

<sup>153</sup>Ibid, 3.

<sup>154</sup>Dunn, *The Alberta Field Force of 1885* , 237.

<sup>155</sup>Wallace, *A Trying Time: The North-West Mounted Police in the 1885 Rebellion*, 183.

scarlet tunics easily mistaken to be NWMP by the average Indian)<sup>156</sup> provided an intimidating force for Hayter Reed to oversee the break up of Big Bear's band and enforce government policies by surrendering arms and going to reservation.<sup>157</sup> General Middleton also accompanied Dewdney on similar 'handover' encounters with western Blackfoot and Stoney Indians where ceremonies took place honouring the bands loyalty to the government.<sup>158</sup> By late July, the few token troops who went to Regina to augment the NWMP during the trial of Riel became the last military role in the North West. The remaining garrison of permanent artillery left in Battleford and Qu'Appelle, who stayed over the winter of 1885-6, returned east in the spring without ever forming the 'flying column' Middleton thought might be required.<sup>159</sup> They were not required since the close to the rebellion had been brought on by the courts and the finality of the sentences handed out the previous fall. The trials were an eventuality that Middleton and Caron had been careful not to undermine during the conduct of the campaign. Caron directed that no immunity or other promises should be issued by the general during peace negotiation thereby ensuring that nothing would prejudice or hinder future legal proceedings.<sup>160</sup> The return to normalcy and 'self-governance', in so much that Middleton's forces of

---

<sup>156</sup> Soldiers in the Winnipeg light infantry in Edmonton, May 1885 photo caption "In key situations, General Strange choose this battalion to impress the Indians as they had red tunics like the Mounted Police" Dunn, *The Alberta Field Force of 1885*, 166.

<sup>157</sup> Reed was Dewdney's assistant Indian commissioner who had accompanied General Middleton on his push north. —Reed had accompanied the general to [Fort] Pitt to be present when the fleeing Indians returned from the north and, more important, to see that the department's ideas were put in place", Stonechild and Waiser, *Loyal Till Death: Indians and the Northwest Rebellion*, 215.

<sup>158</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 392.

<sup>159</sup> Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885*, 166.

intervention were no longer needed, was complete and normal relations, pinned on maintenance of law and order returned to the North West. The restoration of order, in concert with the completion of the railway and efforts of the Militia Department to reconcile war claims, also increased the sustainability of the local economy.

### ***Reconciliation***

The hasty mobilization and sustainment of the field force was essentially bought on the spot. Later, Colonel E.A. Whitehead, responsible for settling claim payment commented to Caron that “everybody must take advantage of this unfortunate rebellion and make all they can.”<sup>161</sup> Financial support remains a critical element to any military endeavour and among the last post termination activities is the final financial reconciliation. As soon as possible, contracts need to be terminated and accounts settled to make sure that any financial obligations are met by the government and in turn that transaction records match the services and goods received. Contemporary doctrine highlights the necessity to follow appropriate accounting procedures as they will most certainly undergo close examination from auditors later on.<sup>162</sup> The financial support to the NWR was substantial and cost approximately \$5 million with much of that money ending up in the North West for services and goods provided.<sup>163</sup> Settlement of claims by

---

<sup>160</sup> “Be careful not to grant any terms which might interfere with the ends of justice. Indians guilty of murder must be tried and punished” Caron to Middleton, Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 316.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid*, 316.

<sup>162</sup> NATO, *Allied Joint Operations*, 4-23.

Caron and his staff following the NWR reflected today's contemporary doctrinal practices in that it was done by appropriate national specialists and was timely.

Similar to modern conflicts, the financial accounts of the NWR were complex and required careful examination to reconcile effectively. In the preamble of the final war claims report, the commissioners judged the claimants' to be self serving, "...the people generally in that part of the country adhered to the time-honored practice of getting all they possibly could out of the Government."<sup>164</sup> Accusations of profiteering and extravagances, which were levelled by the media and participants alike, were difficult to resolve during the campaign owing to the disorder of accounts generated by numerous officers who had submitted requisitions.<sup>165</sup> Some outspoken critics blamed individual officers for lavish service contracts and mismanagement: "...for far more money got into the country through him [Middleton] than would have been spent had the control of affairs been in the hands of a more efficient commander..."<sup>166</sup> As the conflict transitioned to disengagement, Caron began preparing financial reconciliation by terminating all contracts and instructed the remaining transport officers to delay payment on claims until reviewed and sanctioned.<sup>167</sup> By 21<sup>st</sup> August, realising the magnitude of the accounting endeavour, Caron appointed a three member commission to investigate all claims

---

<sup>163</sup> Thomas D. Rambaut, "The Hudson's Bay Half-Breeds and Louis Riel's Rebellions," *Political Science Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (Mar., 1887), pp. 135-167, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2139321>, 155.

<sup>164</sup> William Jackson, Edward Whitehead and William Forrest, *Preliminary Report of the Commission on War Claims* (Ottawa, ON: Canadian Parliament, [1886]), 69.

<sup>165</sup> Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885.*, 147.

<sup>166</sup> Roderick Charles Macleod, ed., *The Reminiscences of a Bungle by One of the Bunglers: And Two Other Northwest Rebellion Diaries*, Reprint ed. The University of Alberta Press, 1983), 97.

associated with the rebellion. Caron instructed the commission to investigate every claim and “cut down without mercy” assuring them that the country would support their decision regardless of the complaints that might result.<sup>168</sup> Given a strong mandate, the commission members reviewed more than 1,600 claims which totalled \$4,265,564 and saved the government \$501,491 by exposing duplicates and frauds. The largest payments were to the CPR and the HBC; the remainder involved numerous small amounts spread amongst westerners who had provided goods and services. Although some remained unsatisfied and no doubt others were falsely rewarded, the final report on war claims rationalized that the money could be considered well spent if only because it had gone to fellow Canadians and was likely already re-invested in the local economy.<sup>169</sup> The wealth had been spread out amongst the people and bought improvement that provided modest increases in the value of their homes, farms, and lives. In addition to the financial boost of paid local contractors and teamsters, the government also granted each soldier 320 acres of land. Despite the incentive to become settlers after demobilization, most soldiers opted for the scrip which the government would accept for \$80 in exchange for the offered land title.<sup>170</sup> Although some would be attracted to return in later years, the initial overwhelming sentiment among the volunteer militia was for demobilization and home.

---

<sup>167</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 398.

<sup>168</sup> Letter to Colonel Jackson from Caron, *Ibid*, 399.

<sup>169</sup> Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885*, 150.

<sup>170</sup> Boulton, *Reminiscences of the North-West Rebellions*, 403.

## *Demobilization*

The final dismissal for most returning militiamen occurred in the same locations that they had formed-up for mobilization a short time before, –We could scarcely realize the fact we were home again...we were then marched to the Drill Shed, the same that we marched out of...Our arms returned, we fell in and dismissed”<sup>171</sup> Following the crisis they were raised for, large volunteer armies usually disband and citizen soldiers are demobilized back to civilian jobs and responsibilities. The process of demobilization following the NWR that stood down the militia from being combat-ready followed contemporary principles of careful and early planning as well as a coherent and smooth withdrawal of forces.<sup>172</sup> The militia had successfully completed the campaign and reintegration of its members back into the civilian workforce became of primary importance to the Department of Militia. Disbanding the field force quickly also helped reduce cost as each returning militiaman ceased to be on the government payroll upon dismissal from his home unit.

The demobilization plan for the NWR was initiated early and was effective in returning coherent formations back to their home units while ensuring adequate force protection during the disengagement. Doctrine emphasises that demobilization planning must occur as soon as the outcome of the conflict allows. A month prior to finally declaring that his end state was reached, but correctly anticipating its denouement,

---

<sup>171</sup>Robert Sherlock and Donald H. Graves, *Experiences of the Halifax Battalion in the North-West* (Bloomfield, Ont.: Museum Restoration Service, 1985), 28., 27.

Middleton began preliminary discussions with Caron for the disengagement of militia units and subsequent requirements for protection forces. By May 25<sup>th</sup>, Middleton concluded that the campaign was coming to a close (Batoche had been won a week earlier) and sensing that many of the troops wanted to return home began moving units and prioritized the garrisons until a new local security force could be available.<sup>173</sup>

Middleton's drawdown of some forces began by the end of May when the 91<sup>st</sup> relieved the 90<sup>th</sup> Battalion (Winnipeg) and some artillery units in Prince Albert so that they could return to Winnipeg and disband.<sup>174</sup> Middleton and Caron discussed what forces would be left in the North-West and if volunteers from within the militia could be found to join the new security force it would leave others to return to their previous civilian lives.<sup>175</sup> The demand for the return of the labour force had become more vocal from business and local media as seasonal business demands and trade went unsatisfied.<sup>176</sup> Some business bluntly warned the government that if the part-time soldiers did not return to their jobs they would be lost to whoever was hired to fill it.<sup>177</sup> Another incentive to rush the demobilization was to curtail the ongoing expense of keeping the militia deployed. Despite the pressures, Middleton's movement planning prevailed and in coordination with Caron a methodical demobilization of coherent and formed units followed.

---

<sup>172</sup>United States Air Force, *Operations and Organization*, 34.

<sup>173</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 317.

<sup>174</sup>*Ibid.*, 319.

<sup>175</sup>*Ibid.*, 320.

<sup>176</sup> Illustrated War News wrote —“It would be an outrage for men to be detailed from their professional or profitable business avocations for a longer period than the exigences of the public service demand”, Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885*, 193., 136.



By the end of June, demobilization planning that had started in earnest a month earlier quickly broadened and shifted to theatre wide redeployment of forces back to home units commensurate with the phasing out of military operations.<sup>178</sup> Middleton first sent direction for the drawdown of the supply depot and staff in Qu'Appelle and Moose Jaw leaving only one transport officer at Saskatchewan Landing. Middleton also began the process of disengaging General Strange's force and logistic train. By 21<sup>st</sup> June, Middleton had advised the staff in Winnipeg to make arrangements to move troops eastward and a few days later an auctioneer was appointed in Moose Jaw to sell off stockpiled government supplies.<sup>179</sup> A week later, redeployment of all units but the regular infantry, artillery and some Winnipeg Light Infantry was underway.<sup>180</sup> Repeatedly, Caron requested that units be broken up to rush the ~~un~~married men, clerks and Civil servants" to relieve some of the financial burden incurred by their prolonged absence.<sup>181</sup> Middleton insisted on the lost efficiency of such an action and prevailed to keep units intact and moved rear guard units around to ensure that others could go intact.<sup>182</sup> Middleton continually updated his removal of forces and adjusted his forces posture according to the decreasing requirements. When the security situation stabilized in the north, remaining troops from Winnipeg stationed in Battleford began to redeploy

---

<sup>177</sup> Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, lxxxv.

<sup>178</sup> —. .shall go on reducing everything as hard as I can" Middleton to Caron, June 21<sup>st</sup>, *Telegrams*, 355.

<sup>179</sup> *Telegrams*, 355-6.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid*, 367-8.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid*, 365, 368, 372.

<sup>182</sup> ~~Have~~ ordered one hundred men from the 91<sup>st</sup> at Fort Qu'appelle to go to Regina so that all the Montreal Brigade can go home together", Middleton to Carron, *Ibid*, 373.

followed by the regular cavalry school in the last weeks of July.<sup>183</sup> Within weeks from the first movement, the demobilization plan and execution had smoothly drawn down forces in response to the contracting military responsibilities allowing all eastern militia units to be released back to their homes by the end of July. Middleton's decisions had taken into account the doctrinal consideration for redeployment in his troop movement. Disengagement and eventual demobilization of these former combat soldiers back to civilian society and 'normal' routines was also considerate of psychological difficulties that they might have been experienced during operational duties.

### *Decompression*

The soldiers returning from the North West were eager to leave the hard days of campaigning behind and anxious for a heroes welcome. Many personal diaries, like Lt Cassels from Toronto epitomize the sentiments and stress of returning combatants facing the first contact with home: "...our eyes fill fast at the roar of welcome that meets us, our labours, our dangers, our hardships, are all forgotten and gratitude and enthusiasm alone remains behind."<sup>184</sup> Recent experiences in Afghanistan have led to various measures being taken to mitigate operational stress injuries (OSI) of returning soldiers. OSI is a non-medical term currently used by the Canadian Forces that encompasses psychological difficulties like anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress that can occur amongst soldiers. Contemporary mitigation for stress injuries is the third location decompression

---

<sup>183</sup> Ibid, 388, 392.

process which addresses the difficulties experienced when soldiers suddenly reintegrate back to families and daily routine of home life. One of the main purposes is to allow for a more gradual transition from the stressful situation to allow the soldiers to better cope with psychological trauma.<sup>185</sup> The demobilization process of the NWR afforded some mitigation for OSI by gradually transitioning soldiers back to society.

During the disengagement of forces following the NWR, gradual transition and third location decompression gave the returning soldier time to rest, relax and train (or at least parade) in locations removed from the theatre of operations before returning to their normal civil and family life. Modern air travel does in hours what the CPR trains would have done in days but relative to their era they would have been considered rapid movement. Uninterrupted rail travel may not have provided a sufficient break to allow soldiers to prepare for the social reintegration and the return journey for most troops was punctuated by decompression periods. The decompression periods included pauses for social engagements, river boat cruises and trips to see the Rocky Mountains.

For most of the troops who ended up chasing Big Bear in the final phases of the campaign, the journey eastward started with trips aboard the many steamboats and side-wheelers that leisurely plied their way to the railhead at Selkirk. Troops wandered the decks enjoying the passing scenery of the rivers freed from the previous grinding routine

---

<sup>184</sup> Macleod, *The Reminiscences of a Bungler by One of the Bunglers: And Two Other Northwest Rebellion Diaries*, 370., 235.

<sup>185</sup> Michel Rossignol, "Afghanistan: Military Personnel and Operational Stress Injuries," *Parliamentary Information and Research Service* PRB-07-20E (2007), [http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection\\_2007/lop-bdp/prb/PRB0720-e.pdf](http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2007/lop-bdp/prb/PRB0720-e.pdf) (accessed 3/30/2011).

and dreary camp cuisine.<sup>186</sup> Stops in Prince Albert were made and troops were heartily welcomed by the community and allowed to do some sightseeing and shopping. Further on their journey at Le Pas, the troops were again allowed ashore to rest and decompress while social functions aboard the steamboats fostered a kinship amongst members of the various units who until then had been fighting the same war in isolated parts of the North West. Similar to today offered by the peer support during contemporary decompression, the troops had senior officers like General Strange pay tribute to them and their patriotism imparting kind and reassuring words delivered with informality not characteristic at that time amongst British officers.<sup>187</sup> The peer support nurtured during their decompression continued for years after the rebellion as many units regularly organised reunions. The arrival back to ‘civilization’ in such places like Selkirk and Winnipeg, where huge crowds were the first to welcome, cheer and feed the returning troops, were experiences that repeated along the journey eastward to home units. At every stop, some very brief, the positive reinforcement and acceptance as conquering heroes and saviours by Canadians continued for the troops.

Other troops located closer to railway lines marched and entrained eastward to Winnipeg by the CPR. Van horne, the CPR’s general manager had offered to send the entire force to see the Rocky Mountains as a way of affording the troops some decompression (and some increased revenue for the company), but only the 9<sup>th</sup>

---

<sup>186</sup> A soldiers diary noted –We are so far enjoying our sail immensely; the scenery is not wonderful but there is always something pleasant to look at and the process of navigating the vessels affords ground for much amusement”, Macleod, *The Reminiscences of a Bungle by One of the Bunglers: And Two Other Northwest Rebellion Diaries*, 370., 218.

<sup>187</sup>Tolton, *Prairie Warships: River Navigation in the Northwest Rebellion* , 288., 277.

Voltigeurs, who did not initially go east by river took the trip.<sup>188</sup> At most stops, there was a social event prepared for the soldiers who paraded for the jubilant crowds, enjoyed a short rest, and visited. Through the relative hub of Winnipeg, the majority of the militia passed through to be collectively welcomed by the city before taking the various railways or steamships to return them as far away as Halifax to be demobilized or in the case of the permanent units to be reconstituted.

### ***Reconstitution of the Militia and NWMP***

The reconstitution process following operations involves both restoration of combat capabilities or readiness and the documentation or capture of post deployment reports and lessons learned.<sup>189</sup> Current sustainment doctrine details steps required for the rehabilitation or regeneration of reconstituted units before they can be prepared for subsequent tasks. Steps in reconstitution operation follow from the disengagement of units, support for repair or replenishment of equipment and supplies as well as to personnel replacement and retraining.<sup>190</sup> Both the permanent Militia and the NWMP underwent modest rehabilitation and regeneration following the NWR with some material improvements with slight increases in capabilities.

---

<sup>188</sup>Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885*, 193., 143; Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 377-8.

<sup>189</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-001, Land Operations*, 7-156.

<sup>190</sup> Directorate of Army Doctrine, "Sustainment Doctrine," *Canadian Army Journal* Vol.2, No. 2, no. May (1999), 9-11, [http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol\\_02/iss\\_2/CAJ\\_vol2.2\\_04\\_e.pdf](http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_02/iss_2/CAJ_vol2.2_04_e.pdf) (accessed April 5, 2011)., 11.

During the redeployment phase of the NWR, reconstitution of the NWMP and militia was conducted to improve readiness and capability for future operations, specifically to guard against future rebellions. For the majority of militia destined for demobilization, the replenishment of combat supplies was limited to the provision of new clothing at the end of the campaign to replace their ragged equipment and overall replacement of small quantities of obsolete and useless items that had been found in stock at the start of mobilization.<sup>191</sup> The Department of Militia also rushed the purchase of 10,000 Martini Henry rifles with two and a half million rounds of ammunition to replace the obsolete Snider Enfield that had been carried by many of the soldiers (although most remained held in stock).<sup>192</sup> Significant improvements were made to the strength and efficiency of the permanent militia that was raised to 1,000 from 750 by Parliament and saw the establishment of additional infantry and a mounted infantry schools.<sup>193</sup> The NWMP was authorized to increase to an effective strength of over a 1000, essentially doubling its number within a year of the campaign with an inflow of new recruits.<sup>194</sup> Some 300 fresh recruits were already in training at the depot in Regina by the end of June and many that followed were drawn from Middleton's disbanded scout corps.<sup>195</sup> In addition to troops, the NWMP also benefited from having large stockpiles of accumulated forage transferred to their holdings and had the pick of the best horses

---

<sup>192</sup>Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 146.

<sup>193</sup>Stacey, *Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students*, 164., 29;Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885* , 193., 147.

<sup>194</sup>Wallace, *A Trying Time: The North-West Mounted Police in the 1885 Rebellion*, 209;Dunn, *The Alberta Field Force of 1885* , 293., 237..

<sup>195</sup>Morton and Roy, *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*, 365, 367.

released by the departing militia.<sup>196</sup> The NWMP that had left many of the southern communities to be an integral part of the Field Force were ‘demobilized’ and in turn returned en masse to their previous posts to resume duties and restored police posts to pre-conflict strength. The hard one experience gained during the difficult months of the campaign would be re-invested into the NWMP by the returning policeman who had become seasoned soldiers and leaders.

The remaining element in the doctrinal reconstitution process is the capture of lessons learned and post action reports. Many official and unofficial reports were produced by officers and individual following the NWR. Detailed reports by senior officers were released by the government that contained eye-witness accounts of the battles complemented by maps and sketches. These reports and accounts offered some substance, although lacked modern objectiveness required to identify lessons. Unofficial accounts offered contrasting views but were not part of the formal process. The commissioner of the NWMP released a succession of reports to Parliament on police activities that detailed many after action observations and resultant lessons learned.<sup>197</sup> Despite the informal or self aggrandising tone of the discourse, the rebellion prompted considerable and vigorous discussion of military affairs within Canada. Discussions that otherwise would not have occurred and helped reinvigorated the militia’s standing in public opinion and advocated the fitness of Canadian-born officers to command their own

---

<sup>196</sup> Ibid, 390.

<sup>197</sup> Reports of the Commissioner of the North-West Mounted Police Force included; ‘Settlers and Rebels’; being the official report to Parliament of the activities of the Royal North-West Mounted Police force from 1882-5 (1885 report), and ‘Law and Order’: being the official report to Parliament of the activities of the Royal North-West Mounted Police force from 1886-7(1887 report).

army. More significant, that 14 years later many of the former militia and NWMP would take their experiences and skills learned in the NWR to form a vital cadre within the Canadian contingent of volunteers committed to the Boer War in 1899.

### *Transition to normalcy*

Middleton had proved efficient and effective in transitioning back to civilian control and normalcy following completion of his stabilization operations. The change over process was swift and helped reinforce the standings of Indian agents and Police amongst the Indian and Métis. The disengagement and subsequent demobilization of the North West Field force allowed for a smooth and well executed withdrawal of forces from the North West which maintained the positive momentum of the victory in the West. The quick redeployment back to home units, with considerations for decompression, made for a successful re-integration of the volunteer militia back into society. Although modest, the redeployed permanent militia and NWMP were regenerated and their capability and strength were improved in order to accomplish their follow-on assignments. Years later, men from both organizations would distinguish themselves and provide Canada with competent forces to fight abroad. In the wake of the departing intervention force, the North West returned to a sustainable and self sufficient district, within the scope of its status within the dominion of Canada and in accordance with the goals of the final phases of post conflict reconstruction. Normalcy prevailed in the North West and the re-emergence of violence was prevented allowing Canadian expansion to continue in the west.



## CONCLUSION

### **Rebellion Resolved and End States Reached**

In 1885, the modern nation of Canada fought its first and only war on Canadian soil. Resolution of the Métis and Cree Indian rebellion followed a well-planned and coordinated process that involved military, civilian and whole of government actors in a concerted approach to termination and peaceful transition. The Macdonald government gave clear directions down to the Departments of Militia and Indian Affairs based on workable end states. These directions were turned into military objectives by General Middleton and supported by compatible efforts by Lieutenant-Governor Dewdney. The military campaign and the Indian agent's policies and practices remained in harmony with the goals of both preventing a general uprising and setting conditions for post conflict administration of Indian affairs. Throughout the campaign, Minister Caron remained the center for coordination and unified actions of corporate partners like the Hudson's Bay Company and the Canadian Pacific Railway, while organizing support for the military effort. Efforts to support the logistical needs of the militia were managed to both swiftly resolve the conflict and maintain, if not promote, the business interests and security of the key nation building institutions. The progress and conduct of both the combat and stability operations drew the outcome of the conflict quickly toward the desired military and strategic end states by establishing safe and secure conditions required for post conflict reconstruction.

Canadian expansion was possible due to conditions set in the post conflict North West. Western Canadian development was assured and the return to normalcy of the North West was marked by enduring peace with previous belligerents, further settlement, and economic growth. The relative prosperity and prevention of the re-emergence of violence was possible following disengagement of Middleton's intervening force because of the transfer of security back to the reconstituted North West Mounted Police, consolidation of local governance, and completion of the transcontinental railway. Grievances about land surveys and submitted claims were settled and both the police and permanent militia received modest capability improvements. Key principles were followed to terminate and resolve the conflict. The lasting test was that a riposte of violence or insurgency did not occur in the area in the years afterward. The termination was effective in achieving the end states of opening up the west and making it a safe place for settlers. Although the specific policies and treatment of the Métis and Indians may appear illiberal or intolerant by contemporary standards, the principles that guided and methods used to quell the rebellion would align with modern doctrine and concepts.

The level of interagency planning, coordination and unification of effort obtained amongst the military, government and civil agencies was congruent to that demanded by doctrine and ultimately resulted in the effective and positive resolution of the rebellion. The campaign's success has been substantiated by applying the analytical framework demonstrating relevance of the concepts to the NWR case. The relevance in turn validates the applicability of contemporary doctrine and concepts on termination and post

conflict transition for ongoing and future wars. However, it remains prudent to caution that every circumstance requires adaptations and careful balance of termination and stability operations. The speed or lasting 'quality' of the victory in the North West could have been predicated as much on specific elements of luck and the character of those involved as attributable to rigid adherence of the doctrinal processes. Despite the inability to predict accurately exit strategy timings, even when faithful to the process, the fundamentals advocated by doctrine remain valuable and are critical to eventually reaching the right exit. In applying this validated doctrine and concepts for termination and transition for future conflicts the Canadian Forces must be cognisant of previous experience quelling the North West Rebellion. End states must be clearly identified and updated as required from the political level to ensure that the objectives remain workable. The results of interagency planning rely upon a cohesive and coordinated approach by all agencies involved. Cooperation must exist during combat and stability operations to ensure that all steps and efforts aim toward a timely transfer back to civilian control. Unity of action and harmony of effort, rather than unity of command, better ensure that the whole effect is greater than the sum of its parts. Fred Charles Iklé reasoned that every war will end even if those involved have no plans or undefined expectations for its outcome. When properly applied, the principles of termination and transition are the essential guide to detail specific tasks and provoke focused considerations. Future Canadian operations should be conducted with the intent of reaching strategic objectives that enable political leverage and precipitate the cessation of violence that best embodies the desired states of peace and normalcy. Ends that are reached by design rather than by

chance or circumstance are always preferable. The peace achieved with effort will be better and dedicated termination planning can win the best peace possible.

## Bibliography

- Adam, G. M. "The Canadian North-West: Its History and its Troubles, from the Early Days of the Fur-Trade to the Era of the Railway and the Settler: With Incidents of Travel in the Region, and the Narrative of Three Insurrections."  
<http://www.archive.org/details/canadiannorthwes00adam> (accessed 2/13/2011, 2011).
- Bade, Bruce C. "War Termination: Why Don't we Plan for it?" In *Essays on Strategy*, edited by John N. Petrie. Vol. XII, 205-232. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.
- Bar-Tal, Daniel. "From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis." *Political Psychology* 21, no. 2 (Jun., 2000): pp. 351-365.
- Bar-Tal, Daniel, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Yechiel Klar. "Conflict Termination: An Epistemological Analysis of International Cases." *Political Psychology* 10, no. 2 (Jun., 1989): pp. 233-255.
- Beal, Bob and Roderick Charles Macleod. *Prairie Fire: The 1885 North-West Rebellion*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1984, 1994.
- Boulé, John R. II. "Operational Planning and Conflict Termination" *Joint Force Quarterly* no.29 (Autumn/Winter 2001-2001, (2001): 97-102,  
[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\\_pubs/1929.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1929.pdf) (accessed 14 Feb 2011).
- Boulton, Charles Arkoll. *Reminiscences of the North-West Rebellions*. Toronto: Grip Printing & Publishing, 1886.
- Brzoska, Michael and David Law, eds. *Security Sector Reconstruction and Reform in Peace Support Operations*. New York,: Routledge, 2007.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, Joint Intelligence Doctrine*. 21 May 2003 ed. Ottawa, ON: Chief of Defence Staff, 2003.
- . *B-GJ-005-300/FP-001, CFJP 3.0 Operations*. Vol. July. Ottawa: Canadian Forces Warfare Centre, 2007.
- . *B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process, Change 2*. Vol. April. Ottawa: Chief of the Defence Staff, 2008.
- . *B-GL-300-001/FP-000, Conduct of Land Operations - Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*. 01 July 1998 ed. Ottawa, ON: Director of Army Doctrine, 1998.
- . *B-GL-300-001/FP-001, Land Operations*. 01 Jan 2008 ed. Ottawa, ON: Director of Army Doctrine, 2008.

- . *CIMIC G-GJ-005-900 FP-000 Civil Military Cooperation CIMIC*. 01 Jan 2008 ed. Ottawa, ON: Director of Army Doctrine, 2008.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. *Post-Conflict Reconstruction : Task Framework*: Washington. Association of the U.S Army and Center for Strategi and International Studies, 2002.
- Chambers, Ernest J. *The Governor-General's Body Guard : A History of the Origin, Development and Services of the Senior Cavalry Regiment in the Militia Service of the Dominion of Canada : With some Information about the Martial Ancestry and Military Spirit of the Loyal Founders of Canada's Defensive Force*. Toronto: E.L. Ruddy, 1902, <http://www.archive.org/details/bodyguard00chamuoft> (accessed 3/1/2011).
- Cimbala, Stephen J. and Keith A. Dunn. *Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War* . Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987.
- Clausewitz, Carl von, Michael Eliot Howard, and Peter Paret. *On War* . Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Coates, Ken. "Western Manitoba and the 1885 Rebellion." *Manitoba History* Number 20, no. Autumn (1990).
- Cordesman, Anthony H. "Iraq and Conflict Termination: The Road to Guerilla War?." *Centre for Strategic and International Studies* (2003): 1-24.
- Creighton, Donald. *John A. Macdonald - the Old Chieftain* . Centenary Edition ed. Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1955.
- Directorate of Army Doctrine. "Sustainment Doctrine." *Canadian Army Journal* Vol.2, No. 2, no. May (1999): 9-11, [http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol\\_02/iss\\_2/CAJ\\_vol2.2\\_04\\_e.pdf](http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_02/iss_2/CAJ_vol2.2_04_e.pdf) (accessed April 5, 2011).
- Dunn, Jack F. *The Alberta Field Force of 1885* . Calgary: J. Dunn, 1994.
- English, Allan D., Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Laurence M. Hickey, eds. *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts*. Winnipeg: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005.
- Feil, Scott. "Building Better Foundation: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction." *Washington Quarterly* Autumn, no. 22 (2002): 97-109, <http://www.twq.com/02autumn/feil.pdf> (accessed 02/07/2011).
- Flanagan, Thomas. *Riel and the Rebellion: 1885 Reconsidered* . Second edition ed. University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division, 2000.
- Flanagan, Tom. "Are we really quite Certain we Want to Sanctify Louis Riel?" *Alberta Report / Newsmagazine* 25, no. 6 (01/26, 1998): 12.

- Flavin, William. "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." *PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly* 33, no.3, (2003): 95-112, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA486290&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed 12 Feb 2011).
- Fortin, Steve. From a Theatre of Operations to Home: Time to Decompress. *The Maple Leaf*, 31 October 2007, 2007. , <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=3862> (accessed 3/29/2011).
- Garrard, Col Mark USAF. "War Termination in the Persian Gulf: Problems and Prospects." *Aerospace Power Journal* Fall, no. 2001 (2001): 14 Feb 2011, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/fal01/garrard.html>.
- Gideon Rose. "The Exit Strategy Delusion." *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1998): pp. 56-67.
- Granatstein, J. L. and Dean F. Oliver. *The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History* Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Graves, Donald E., ed. *More Fighting for Canada: Five Battles, 1760-1944*: Jaguar Book Group, 2004.
- Gray, Colin S. . *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=272> ed. Vol. 2011. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Insitute, Army War College, 2002, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=272> (accessed 2/22/2011).
- Halliday, Hugh A. "Medals for the Volunteers." *Beaver* 77, no. 3 (June, 1997): 4.
- Hart, B. H. Liddell. *Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian)*. 2nd Revised ed. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
- Haultain, T. Arnold and Arnold Haultain. *A History of Riel's Second Rebellion and how it was Quelled*. Toronto: Grip Print. and Pub. Co., 1885, [http://www.archive.org/stream/cihm\\_30721#page/n5/mode/2up](http://www.archive.org/stream/cihm_30721#page/n5/mode/2up).
- Higgit, W. L. *Settlers and Rebels: Being the Official Reports to Parliament of the Activities of the Royal North-West Mounted Police Force from 1882-1885 by the Commissioners of the Royal North-West Mounted Police*. Toronto: Coles Publishing Company, 1973, [www.amazon.com](http://www.amazon.com).
- Hildebrandt, Walter. *The Battle of Batoche: British Small Warfare and the Entrenched Métis*. Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Environment Canada 1985., 1985.
- Ikle, Fred Charles. *Every War must End (Columbia Classics)*. Revised ed. Columbia University Press, 2005.

- Jackson, William, Edward Whitehead, and William Forrest. *Preliminary Report of the Commission on War Claims*. Ottawa, ON: Canadian Parliament, 1886.
- Jamieson, F. C. *The Alberta Field Force of 1885 (Canadian North-West Historical Society. Publications)* Canadian North-West Historical Society, 1931.
- Klancher, Donald J. *The North West Mounted Police and the North West Rebellion* Goss Publishing, Kamloops, BC, Canada, 1999.
- Knight, Mark and Alpaslan Özerdem. "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace." *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 4 (Jul., 2004): pp. 499-516.
- Lamb, James C. *Jingo*. Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992.
- Laurie, John Wimburn. *Report of Major General Laurie : Commanding Base and Lines of Communication upon Matters in Connection with the Suppression of the Rebellion in the North-West Territories in 1885*. Ottawa: Maclean, Roger and Company, 1887, [http://www.archive.org/stream/cihm\\_32298#page/n4/mode/1up](http://www.archive.org/stream/cihm_32298#page/n4/mode/1up) (accessed 2/13/2011).
- Legget, Robert F. *Railroads of Canada*. First Edition ed. Vancouver: Douglas, David & Charles, 1973.
- Light, Douglas W. *Footprints in the Dust* Turner Warwick Pubns, 1989.
- MacDonald, Sir J. A. "Macdonald-Speeches-House of Commons, July 6, 1885-First among Equals." Library and Archives Canada. <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/2/4/h4-4090-e.html> (accessed 3/2/2011, .
- Macleod, Roderick Charles, ed. *The Reminiscences of a Bungler by One of the Bunglers: And Two Other Northwest Rebellion Diaries*. Reprint ed.: The University of Alberta Press, 1983.
- Mcdougall, J. Lorne. *Canadian Pacific: A Brief History*. First English Edition ed. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1968.
- McKercher, B. J. C. and Micheal A. Hennessy, eds. *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996.
- Mein, Stewart. "North-West Resitance." University of Regina and Canadian Plains Reserch Center. [http://esask.uregina.ca/entry/north-west\\_resistance.html](http://esask.uregina.ca/entry/north-west_resistance.html) (accessed February 10, 2011, 2011).
- Middleton, General Sir Fred. *Suppression of the Rebellion in the North West Territories of Canada, 1885.*, edited by G. H. Needler. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948.
- Morton, Desmond. *The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885*. Toronto: Hakkert, 1972.



- Morton, Desmond and Reginald H. Roy. *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign 1885*. Toronto, ON: The Champlain Society, 1972.
- Mulvaney, Charles Pelham. *The History of the North-West Rebellion of 1885*. Toronto: A.H Hovey, 1885,  
[http://openlibrary.org/books/OL7145423M/The\\_history\\_of\\_the\\_North-West\\_rebellion\\_of\\_1885](http://openlibrary.org/books/OL7145423M/The_history_of_the_North-West_rebellion_of_1885) (accessed 2/13/2011).
- NATO. *Allied Joint Operations*. Vol. AJP-3(A). Brussels: NATO, 2007.
- . . *POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. THE CHALLENGE IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN*. Brussels: NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2004, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?CAT2=471&CAT1=16&CAT0=2&COM=492&MOD=0&SMD=0&SSMD=0&STA=&ID=0&PAR=0&PRINT=1> (accessed 2/7/2011).
- Natsios, Andrew S. "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development." *PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly* Autumn, (2005): 4-20, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/05autumn/natsios.htm> (accessed 3/8/2011).
- Ndulo, Muna. *Security, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation: When the Wars End*, edited by Muna Ndulo. New York, NY: UCL Press, 2007.
- One Who Knows. *The Gibbet of Regina: The Truth about Riel: Sir John A. Macdonald and His Cabinet before Public Opinion*. New York: Thompson & Moreau, 1886, <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/sir-john-a-macdonald/023013-7030.1-e.html>.
- Ord, Lewis Craven and Harold Penryn Rusden. *Reminiscences of a Bungle* . Edmonton, Alta.: University of Alberta Press, 1983.
- Peabody, David. "The Challenge of Doing Good Work: The Development of Canadian Forces in CIMIC Capabilities and NGOs." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 8, no. 3 (2006): 1-53, <http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/130/146> (accessed 1/21/2011).
- Rambaut, Thomas D. "The Hudson's Bay Half-Breeds and Louis Riel's Rebellions." *Political Science Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (Mar., 1887): pp. 135-167.
- Record, Jeffrey. "Exit Strategy Delusions." *PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly* no. Winter 2001-2 (2001): 21-27, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/01winter/record.htm> (accessed 2/14/2011).
- Rossignol, Michel. "Afghanistan: Military Personnel and Operational Stress Injuries." *Parliamentary Information and Research* PRB-07-20E, (2007), [http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection\\_2007/lop-bdp/prb/PRB0720-e.pdf](http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2007/lop-bdp/prb/PRB0720-e.pdf) (accessed 3/30/2011).
- Salloum, Habeeb. "Louis Riel's Last Stand." *Military History* 23, no. 3 (05, 2006): 22-28.

- Schnabel, Albrecht and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, eds. *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, c2005., 2005.
- Sherlock, Robert and Donald H. Graves. *Experiences of the Halifax Battalion in the North-West*. Bloomfield, Ont.: Museum Restoration Service, 1985.
- Smith, Alastair and Allan C. Stam. "Bargaining and the Nature of War." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (Dec., 2004): pp. 783-813.
- Stacey, Colonel C. P., ed. *Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students*. Sixth Edition, 4th Revision ed. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967, [http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/docs/Intro\\_MilHist\\_e.pdf](http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/docs/Intro_MilHist_e.pdf) (accessed Feb 11, 2011).
- Stanley, George Edward. *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961.
- Stonechild, Blair and W. A. Waiser. *Loyal Till Death: Indians and the Northwest Rebellion*. Calgary, AB: Fifth House LTD, 1997.
- Strange, T. B. *Gunner Jingo's Jubilee*. Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1988.
- Swainson, Donald. "Loyal Till Death: Indians and the North-West Rebellion." *Canadian Historical Review* 79, no. 4 (12, 1998): 762-764.
- Terril, Dr W. Andrew and Dr Conrad C. Crane. . *Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq*. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=627> ed. U.S. Army War college: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=627> (accessed 3/8/2011).
- The Royal Canadian Regiment Museum. "The North West Rebellion of 1885." Education Program Manager. [http://www.theroyalcanadianregiment.ca/education\\_program/education\\_012\\_regt\\_in\\_nw\\_rebellion.htm](http://www.theroyalcanadianregiment.ca/education_program/education_012_regt_in_nw_rebellion.htm) (accessed 2/12/2011, 2011).
- Tolton, Gordon E. *Prairie Warships: River Navigation in the Northwest Rebellion*. 1st ed. Heritage House Publishing Co. Ltd., 2007.
- United States. *FM 3-07 Stability Operations*. Vol. October. Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2008.
- . *JP 2-01.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, edited by Joint Chiefs of Staff. 24 May 2000 ed. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000.
- . *JP3-0, Joint Operations*. Vol. 17 Sep 2007. Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, 2007.

- United States Air Force. *Operations and Organization*. 3 April ed. Vol. Air Force Doctrine Document 2. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defence, 2007.
- Van Opdorp, LtCol Harold USMC. "The Joint Interagency Coordination Group: The Operationalization of DIME." *Small Wars Journal* 2, no. July (2005): 15 Feb 2011, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v2/odie.htm> (accessed 3/2/2011).
- Waite, Peter B. *CANADA 1874-1896: ARDUOUS DESTINY: THE CANADIAN CENTENARY SERIES*. McClelland and Stewart, 1971.
- Wallace, Carl, Robert M. Bray, and Angus Gilbert. *Reappraisals in Canadian History, Post Confederation*. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice Hall Canada, 1996.
- Wallace, Jim. *A Trying Time: The North-West Mounted Police in the 1885 Rebellion*. Winnipeg, MB: Bunker to Bunker Pub., 1998.
- Warwick, Jason. "Northwest Resitance - Province Commemorates 125th Anniversary." *The Saskatoon StarPhoenix*, Thrusday, May 13, 2010, 2010, sec. D, <http://www.trailsof1885.com/files/spspecialsection.pdf> (accessed February 10, 2011).
- Wiebe, Rudy Henry and Bob Beal. *War in the West: Voices of the 1885 Rebellion*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985.