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THE AWAY GAME:
AN ANALYSIS OF CANADA'S FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY

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The Away Game:
An Analysis of Canada's Foreign Security Policy

By/par Maj T.M. Arsenault

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ABSTRACT

Appropriating a modified Strange Analysis framework, the author argues that Canada's foreign security policy does not significantly reduce the capabilities of groups who use terrorism as a means to achieve their ends. The difficulties related to defining terrorism are discussed, six enduring components of terrorism are highlighted, and the enabling effects of globalization on the use of terrorism are considered. Within this context, Canada's role in the global "War on Terror" is explained through its liberal foreign policy traditions. Employing al-Qaeda as a case study, Canadian foreign security policy is examined through the discussion of al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities and within a Diplomacy-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) format. The author ultimately concludes that Canada's foreign security policy does not aim to reduce al-Qaeda's ability to conduct operations, but rather seeks to establish security for its citizens through its traditional relationship with the United States and the fulfillment of its multilateral engagements.

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INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that contemporary terrorism has roots that extend well into the 1970s, the attacks against the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001 brought it home to Canadians in a way that they had not experienced in the past. Twenty-four Canadians were killed and suddenly, from a geographical perspective, North America was no longer impervious to attacks. As borders with the United States closed and air travel halted, Canadian policy makers were forced to consider measures necessary to protect the country's citizens and interests at home, while meeting threats far from Canada's borders.

There are no clear lines separating Canada's "Home Game" from its "Away Game," as they are inextricably linked by the nature of the transnational terrorist threat. However, one could conclude that in general terms the former predominantly involves a series of defensive and reactionary measures, while the latter is more offensive, pro-active, pre-emptive and disruptive. The defensive measures are necessary and unavoidable to ensure homegrown terrorism is disrupted and to reduce the effects of any future attacks. Nonetheless, while these measures may reduce the effects of the threat, they will never reduce the threat itself. As the best defence is often considered to be the adoption of offensive measures, this paper will concentrate its analysis on Canada's "Away Game:" it will discuss the pro-active application of various forms of state power abroad that are aimed at reducing the threat of terrorism at home.

Despite not being a direct target of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, there are clear strategic objectives for Canada to engage in the global "War on Terror." Specifically, Canada has four reasons for reducing al-Qaeda's ability to conduct its operations. First, Canada has been identified in Osama bin Laden's discourse as a target because of the support it is providing to the United States in the global War on Terror. Second, Canada has the obligation to carry its share of the burden in defending North America, and therefore must take the necessary measures to ensure that the staging of a terrorist attack on Canadian territory never happens. Third, Canada must fulfill its multilateral engagements as a means to continue to "punch above its weight" in international politics.[1] Finally, peace and security abroad means good business at home; therefore, Canada is inherently interested in global stability in the pursuit of its economic interests. While there are many more justifications, these are important to establish Canada's interest in the "Away Game".

In the War on Terror, Canadian foreign security policy has essentially prioritized the deployment of military force to one failed state: Afghanistan. Regarding the looming withdrawal from a military combat role in Kandahar, there are generally two schools of thought within Canadian borders. The first, and most popular in political discourse, is that Canada has done its fair share and that it is time to pass on the responsibility of establishing peace and security in Kandahar province to other NATO allies. The second is that the mission is not complete and that withdrawal is essentially accepting defeat. However, in both cases, it is generally common knowledge that little progress has been

[1] Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How we lost our place in the world* (Toronto: The Canadian Publishers, 2003), 7.

made in Afghanistan since the beginning of Canada's mission.[2] This is clearly demonstrated by how the insurgency has consistently gained momentum since 2002. With this in mind, the pertinence of the mission can be analyzed in relation to the hefty cost of human and financial resources associated with it. Considering the limited success of the mission, one could wonder whether a broader strategic vision should have been employed to better understand the problem and to creatively apply various forms of state soft power to reduce the threat of terrorism to Canadian citizens.

Utilizing an analysis model developed by Joe Strange, this paper will argue that Canada's foreign security policy does not significantly reduce the capabilities of groups who use terrorism as a means to achieve their ends. Prior to conducting the analysis, in chapter 2, the difficulties related to defining terrorism will be discussed whereas six enduring components of it will be highlighted for the purposes of this discussion. It will be argued that terrorism is a tactic: a means to achieve political objectives, vice an ideology or an end in itself. In preparation for the analysis, the enabling effects of globalization on the use of terrorism as a tactic will be considered in chapter 3. Canadian foreign security policy will be discussed in chapter 4 while considering Canada's liberal foreign policy tradition as a means of explaining its participation in the global "War on Terror." Then, using al-Qaeda as a case study within a modified Strange analysis framework, chapter 5 will deduce critical vulnerabilities from some of the organization's capabilities. Finally, in chapter 6, Canadian foreign security policy will be examined through the discussion of al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities and within a diplomacy-

[2] Statement based off of enemy initiated attacks in Afghanistan from March 2004 to March 2010. See Charles Michael Johnson Jr., *Afghanistan's Security Environment* (Washington: United States Government Accountability Office, 2010), 3.

information-military-economic format. This paper will ultimately conclude that Canada's foreign security policy does not aim to reduce al-Qaeda's ability to conduct operations, but rather seeks to establish security for its citizens through its traditional relationship with the United States and through the maintenance of its multilateral engagements.

CHAPTER 2 – WHAT IS TERRORISM?

Defining terrorism is impossible, yet to effectively examine Canada's foreign security policy regarding terrorism, a conceptual understanding of it must be established. The misunderstanding of what it is and what it means in domestic and international contexts would inevitably lead to false assumptions and inappropriate courses of action. With a view of isolating what terrorism is in a physical sense and to minimize its pejorative nature, this chapter will identify a six enduring characteristics that best describe 21st century terrorism. These characteristics will be useful in the analysis of al-Qaeda's vulnerabilities and will serve as the foundation to explore the means and ways contemporary terrorist organizations have to achieve their political ends. The difficulties in defining terrorism will be briefly discussed before the roots of contemporary terrorism are defined. Noting that this paper aims to discuss the pro-active application of various forms of state power abroad to reduce the threat at home, six enduring and fundamental components of terrorism will be identified.

DIFFICULTIES IN DEFINITION

While there have been many attempts at establishing a universal definition to describe terrorism in both political and legal realms, one could argue that it is a constantly evolving and pejorative term that is impossible to define with enough accuracy and precision to be analytically useful. From a political standpoint, the term must be broad enough to serve as a means to describe the strong condemnation that targeted

governments have regarding terror in general.[3] At the same time, legally, terrorism must be defined with enough precision to ensure that legitimate acts are not wrongfully condemned.[4] This contradiction is the essence of the inherent conflict between domestic and international counter-terror efforts. While they both seek to protect its citizens from the same threat, both means are very different.

The meaning of the word "terrorism" varies with perception; therefore, legal definitions are difficult to establish. The term is generally very subjective as human interpretations and points of view vary depending on one's position: "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."[5] States tend to modify its definition in accordance with their own political objectives and will generally use it to their advantage to "stigmatize, delegitimize, denigrate and dehumanize" their opponents in the eyes of the general population.[6] Osama bin Laden, for example, was considered a freedom fighter and was aided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when he participated in the fight against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in the 90s.[7] Today, he is at the top of the

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[3] C.F. Diaz-Paniagua, *Negotiating terrorism: The negotiation dynamics of four UN counter-terrorism treaties* (New York: City University of New York, 2008), 47.

[4] *Ibid.*, 47.

[5] David Hannay (former UK ambassador): quoted in Paul Reynolds, "UN Staggers on Road to Reform," *BBC News* (14 September 2005) [online news]; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4244842.stm; Internet; accessed 22 April 2011.

[6] Ben Saul, *Defining Terrorism in International Law*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3.

[7] CBC News, "Who Is Osama Bin Laden," *CBC News Online* (19 January 2006) [online news]; available from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/osamabinladen/; Internet; accessed 22 April 2011.

Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Most Wanted List and is one of the US's most infamous enemies.[8]

Terrorists typically do not refer to themselves as terrorists, and this alone is a crucial factor that is quickly discounted or ignored by governments when faced with a supposed "terrorist" threat. Individuals or groups who resort to the use of terrorism often consider themselves as freedom fighters or revolutionaries who are using the means available to them in the pursuit of political objectives against a superior state or military power. From their point of view, their enemy's state law is illegitimate and merely provides a list of crimes that may be committed against them by "legitimate" states.[9] The fact of the matter is that most terrorists have what they consider to be tangible objectives that they believe are worth fighting for. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), for example, was established to represent their people in the struggle to establish a Palestinian state on land that was occupied by Israel.[10] Another example is the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which fought for separation from the United-Kingdom.[11] These organizations fought for objectives that they believed could not be achieved by means other than violence. From this perspective, the word terrorism could be viewed in a more objective light if it is considered as a physical means to achieve some sort of an objective, such as guerilla warfare and insurgency. Its use as a tactic is discussed further below. Understanding the pejorative aspect of terrorism is the foundation to establishing its

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[8] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Most Wanted Terrorists," http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists; Internet; accessed 15 February 2011.

[9] Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*, (Toronto, Nelson Thompson Learning, 2002), 8.

[10] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 65.

[11] *Ibid*., 233.

enduring components, regardless of contestation over specific definitions, and to understanding the contemporary threat. To set the stage for determining the enduring components of terrorism, a mapping of the roots of contemporary terror must be conducted.

PROPAGANDA BY DEED

Historically, there have been many drivers behind the use of terrorism. Causes and motivations such as ideology, grievance, separatism and activism have all fueled the application of violence in the form of terrorism by individuals or groups who found themselves disadvantaged in a struggle for power.[12] This section will argue that contemporary terrorism was not born of the events of 9/11, but rather has roots that extend back to the 18th century. This historical contextualization of terror will then serve to discuss the enduring components of terrorism in general.

In both the pejorative and physical senses, terrorism has consistently evolved within social and historical contexts. Despite the presence of terrorist-like acts in ancient history, terrorism was first articulated as a concept in 1795 during the French revolution to protect the government from counter-revolutionaries.[13] From a state and societal perspective, the original meaning of terrorism initially had a positive connotation within

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[12] Allen Sens and Peter Stoett, *Global Politics: Origins, Currents, Directions,* (Toronto: Nelson, 2005), 221.

[13] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, ed. Russell D. Howard et al., 57-78 (New York: McGraw Hill, 2009), 59.

the context of the "Reign of Terror," as it was a term used by the newly established revolutionary government to maintain order in the midst of the 1789 uprisings.[14] However, with end of the Reign of Terror and the assassination of its architect, Maximilien Robespierre, in 1794, the term became associated with criminal acts and the abuse of office and power.[15] With the Industrial Revolution came massive socioeconomic change, which in turn fostered a new era of violence labeled as terrorism that possessed many of the fundamental characteristics that are still found in terrorism today.[16] Hence, during the 1800s terrorism was used to describe the acts of violent revolutionaries or groups, such as anarchists and nationalists, who revolted against government to achieve various political objectives.[17]

By the 19th century, terrorism had become a revolutionary tactic. The Italian patriot and socialist thinker Carlo Pisacane is considered as being an early advocate of "propaganda by deed,"[18] arguing that "…ideas spring from deeds and not the other way around… The use of the bayonet in Milan has produced a more effective propaganda than a thousand books."[19] In a general sense, this notion of "propaganda by deed" represents the evolution of terrorism very well. As new ideologies such as Marxism and Fascism

[14] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*…, 3.

[15] *Ibid*., 4.

[16] *Ibid*., 3.

[17] Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*…, 5.

[18] Paul Brousse, "La propagande par le fait," *Bulletin de la Federation Jurassienne* (5 August 1877): quoted in Martin A. Miller, "The Intellectual Origins of Modern Terrorism in Europe," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw, 27-62 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 42.

[19] Carlo Pisacane, "On Revolution," in *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas, Volume 1*, ed. Robert Graham, 65-68 (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2004), 68.

were born of 19th century capitalism, nationalism and social change, violence in the form of terrorism was advocated for revolutionaries, nationalist-separatists and violent activists to generate publicity and to rally the masses behind their cause.[20] The Narodnaya Volya, for example, used terrorist tactics to achieve communal self-government in Russia in the late 1870s.[21] Despite fluctuations in tactics and political objectives, for the most part non-state terrorist groups have conducted operations to achieve specific ends, and have used "propaganda by deed" as the means to rally the support of the masses and force governments to respond to their demands. The characteristics that distinguish terrorism from other forms of irregular warfare will be discussed under the following section on enduring components.

In an attempt to compartmentalize terrorism, several typologies have been identified over the years according to ideological motivations. Brynjar Lia provides one of the simplest categorization methods by identifying four general typologies that summarize terrorism in the 20th century effectively: socio-revolutionary terrorism (including left and right wing terrorism), separatist terrorism (ethnic-minorities seeking autonomy or independence), single-issue terrorism (anti-abortion activists, environmental militants, animal-rights defendants, etc.) and religious terrorism.[22] While it is not within the scope of this paper to discuss these typologies and their historical contexts in detail, it is important to consider them as this paper argues that the fundamental characteristics mentioned below span across all of these typologies. From a counter-terrorism

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[20] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*…, 5.

[21] Clifford E. Simonsen and Jeremy R. Spindlove, *Terrorism Today: The Past, The Players, The Future* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000), 118.

[22] Brynjar Lia, *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 11.

perspective, it is of the utmost importance to have a clear understanding of the opponent's objectives. However, while objectives, tactics and contexts vary greatly, the core characteristics of terrorism, as a means to achieve political objectives, remain very similar.

ENDURING COMPONENTS

Since the meaning of the word terrorism is pejorative, contextually determined and historically fraught, no attempts will be made to define terrorism as an overarching ideology. Alternatively, the approach to be employed is to consider terrorism as a series of interconnected factors. Six enduring components can be identified: 1) terrorism is a tactic; 2) terrorism is deliberate; 3) violence or the threat of violence is essential; 4) non-combatants are usually targeted; 5) terrorists are non-state actors; and, 6) terrorism is used to achieve political goals. Through the study of dozens of definitions that have been established by various state organizations and leading scholars, these six components were those that surfaced in nearly all attempts to define terrorism. It should be noted that to be considered as fundamental components of terrorism, they must be considered together. When considered individually, none of these components apply exclusively to terrorism. Nonetheless, the identification of these components will serve to demonstrate that in the interest of reducing the threat of terrorism, targeting the groups using the tactic is more effective than targeting the tactic itself.

The first component of terrorism is that it is a tactic used to achieve objectives within a larger campaign. This can be demonstrated by examining the "spectrum of

conflict". This spectrum is essentially a scale that "reflects the environment in which operations occur."[23] Unfortunately, the new version of Canadian Forces operations doctrine no longer makes reference to the spectrum of conflict as it did prior to 2010; however, one can consider the spectrum at Figure 2.1, which was created by Richard H. Schultz in 1986. Within this model, terrorism is situated in the low intensity conflict range between peacekeeping and insurgency.[24] In addition, Figure 2.2 provides a more recent version of the spectrum and again situates terrorism, or from this perspective counter-terrorism, at the low intensity end of the spectrum of combat.[25]



Figure 2.1 – Spectrum of Low Intensity Conflicts
Source: Schultz, *Low-Intensity Conflict and US Policy*, 77.

[23] Department of Nation Defence, B-GL-300-001-FP-001 *Land Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008), 3-9.

[24] Richard H. Schultz, "Low-Intensity Conflict and US Policy: Regional Threats, Soviet Involvement, and the American Response," in *Low Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology*, ed. David J. Dean (Maxwell AFB, Ala: Air University Press, 1986), 77.

[25] John Hillen, "Peacekeeping at the Speed of Sound: The Relevancy of Airpower Doctrine in Operations Other than War," *Airpower Journal* 7, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 8.



Figure 2.2 – The Military Spectrum of Conflict
Source: Hillen, *Peacekeeping at the Speed of Sound*, 8.

According to the figures above, terrorism fits within the spectrum of conflict and is a tactic used with a view of achieving some sort of a tactical, operational or strategic end state. Hence, groups seeking political change may resort to violence if political means are ineffective. If these groups had the physical means and the context required, they could choose to conduct insurgency or even low-intensity conventional warfare to achieve their objectives. Authors such as Jane Corbin and Michael Scheuer argue that al-Qaeda is a perfect example. While al-Qaeda is considered by the US and their allies as a terrorist organization, terrorism has *not* been the only tactic it has employed in its struggle to achieve its objectives. For instance, it attempted, in support of its Taliban allies, to fight NATO forces with conventional combat in the Pashmul area of Kandahar, Afghanistan in September of 2006.[26] Vis-a-vis an obvious imbalance of military power, al-Qaeda was forced to resort to insurgency. Other such examples include al-Qaeda in

[26] Peter Pigott, *Canada in Afghanistan* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007), 188.

Iraq (AQI) and the Irish Revolutionary Army (IRA); "terrorist organizations" that appropriated insurgency tactics in the pursuit of their objectives. "Terrorists" use insurgency when operating within the borders of their sanctuary or state. Therefore, one can conclude that organizations such as AQ are not solely terrorist organizations, but that terrorism is a pragmatic tool for them to use internationally.

Due primarily to an imbalance of power and to the difficulties related to conducting guerrilla warfare or insurgency tactics on the international stage, the logical means to achieving the desired ends is to seek propaganda by deed through terrorism. Figure 2.3 demonstrates the dissociation of terrorism from motivations and objectives. Non-state organizations, which can be motivated by various ideologies, seek to achieve political objectives through the use of various tactics. The appropriate tactic will be selected based on context and available means, such as people, weapons and money.



Figure 2.3 – The Relations Between Motivations, Tactics and Ends

In the visual depiction above, group A may be motivated by socio-revolutionary change and/or separatism. However, depending on the circumstances and resources available, it may choose to use more than terrorism to achieve its ends. It is important to consider this distinction when contemplating what "fighting terrorism" really means. To reduce the threat of terrorist acts, the capabilities of the groups who use terrorism, as a tactic, must be reduced. Defending against the tactic may be possible, however attacking the tactic is not.

The second fundamental characteristic of terrorism is that it is deliberate. That is to say, it is a premeditated and pre-planned application of violence.[27] Terrorist acts are not random acts of violence, but rather tactical level operations that are key components within a larger context. This characteristic is tightly linked to the fact that it is a tactical means to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Scholarly literature, UN organizations and various state agencies are consistent in saying that terrorism involves the use or the threatened use of fear provoking force or violence. This use of violence, and perhaps more importantly its threatened use, is usually intended to influence an audience in some way or to force the hand of state governance to achieve specific political change.[28] As Bruce Hoffman suggests, this violence is "designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the

[27] Department of State, *Patterns of terrorism 2003* (Washington: US Department of State, 2004), vii.

[28] *Ibid.,* vii.

immediate victim or target", which is reminiscent of Pisacane's "propaganda by deed".[29] In a more legal sense, the UN provides an additionally detailed perspective: terrorists use violence "…with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act…"[30] The US Department of Defence (DoD) is more blunt in stating that the aim of terrorist violence is "… to instill fear and coerce governments or societies."[31] This fear is instilled through the targeting of the "innocent." Essentially, anyone could be a potential victim.

The indiscriminate targeting of innocent noncombatants is the fourth fundamental characteristic of terrorism.[32] Some, such as Boaz Ganor, use the word "civilian" in their definition.[33] Laqueur and the DoD use the term "innocent."[34] In the end, terrorism entails violence that is carried out against targets that may not have been demonstrating aggressive behavior when they were attacked. In essence, the term noncombatant may be

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[29] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*…, 41.

[30] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1566: Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts*, 8 October 2004, 2; available from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/542/82/PDF/n0454282.pdf?OpenElement; Internet; Accessed 2 March 2011.

[31] Department of Defence, Joint Pub 3-07.2 *Antiterrorism* (Washington: US Department of Defence, 2010), I-1.

[32] Daniel D. Novotny, "What is Terrorism?," in *Focus on Terrorism*, ed. Edward V. Linden (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007), 8.

[33] Boaz Ganor, "The Relationship Between International and Localized Terrorism," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 4, no. 26 (28 June 2005); http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=379&PID=1859&IID=557&TTL=The_Relationship_Between_International_and_Localized_Terrorism; Internet; accessed 2 March 2011.

[34] Department of Defence, Joint Pub 3-07.2 *Antiterrorism* (Washington: US Department of Defence, 2010), I-1.

a more useful term to use, as it includes law enforcement and military service people who may be attacked while conducting operations or tasks which are not directly associated with violent acts of war.

Sub-national or non-state actors employ terrorism as a means. Despite attempts to add precision to the term, the indiscriminate targeting of noncombatants could be used in a very pejorative sense. States can be accused of targeting the innocent and can instill terror into the hearts of populations or their enemies; however, their acts would not be considered as terrorism. The non-state nature of terrorism is the fifth fundamental characteristic that differentiates it from other forms of violence.[35] States conduct acts of war, or use terror domestically through law enforcement and oppression, however they are not considered to be terrorists.[36] With this characteristic, though, comes the discussion of legitimacy, or at least the perception of it. Generally speaking, terrorist groups do not abide by international laws and do not typically enjoy the legitimacy of a recognized state.[37] In 1987, Walter Laqueur defined the use of violence by terrorists as the "illegitimate use of force", while in 1983 Martha Crenshaw used the term "socially and politically unacceptable" in her definition.[38] These descriptions are again pejorative, as what is illegitimate to one will undoubtedly be justified in the eyes of the other. Furthermore, true legal definitions, such as the ones found in the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act, provide detailed lists of what are considered to be criminal activity under

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[35] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,"…, 59.

[36] *Ibid.,* 59.

[37] Daniel D. Novotny, "What is Terrorism?,"…, 8.

[38] Laqueur and Crenshaw in White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*…, 8-9.

existing legislation.[39] David Rodin argues that terrorist acts are conducted in the absence of "a substantively just legal process."[40] This is clearly a more quantitative way of measuring legitimacy. Consequently, the FBI, the DoD and the UN make reference to the unlawful use of force in their definitions of terrorism (DoD website, UN Resolution 1566).[41]

Finally, most definitions of terrorism mention the achievement of a political goal. Terrorism seeks to achieve some form of a political objective and, as a tactic, is strategically designed to trigger political change or to achieve something politically relevant.[42] In a report presented to the British Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department in March of 2007, terrorist acts were defined as having the "…purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause."[43] In contrast, the UN Resolution 1566 states that acts or terror "…are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature."[44] Perhaps the all encompassing version of this is provided by the DoD: "Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and

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[39] House of Commons of Canada, *Bill C-36, Part II.1: Terrorism; Interpretation* (As reported to the House of Commons on November 22, 2001), art. 83.01.

[40] David Rodin, "Terrorism Without Intention," Ethics Vol. 114, no. 4 (July 2004): 753.

[41] Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Terrorism*; http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism; Internet; Accessed 2 March 2011.

[42] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*…, 41.

[43] Lord Carlile, *The Definition of Terrorism: A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation*. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, March 2007, 5.

[44] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1566*…, 2.

committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political".[45] When considering Figure 2.3, this particular description is important as it speaks to the argument that while terrorism may be motivated by ideology, it is conducted for the purpose of achieving political objectives.

Regardless of definitional difficulties, it is suggested here that enduring components of terrorism exist, which have roots that extend into the 19th century. The separation of terrorism as a physical tactic from common motivations and drivers was demonstrated while its importance in the understanding of counter-terror strategy was briefly touched upon. To reduce the capabilities of the groups who use terrorism today, one must consider motivations and enablers. With a view of using al-Qaeda as a case study in chapter 5, the following chapter will consider globalization and its various effects on contemporary terrorism.

[45] Department of Defence, Joint Pub 3-07.2 *Antiterrorism*…, I-1.

CHAPTER 3 – GLOBALISATION: CAUSE AND ENABLER

With the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11th 2001, terrorism had taken on an increased lethality and had affected entire populations on a scale that has never been seen throughout history.[46] Not since the Munich events of 1972 had the world witnessed terrorist attacks, and deaths caused by terrorism, live and broadcasted internationally. To counter it, policy makers have the obligation of understanding enablers and motivations to effectively address the key vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations. Many consider the emergence of extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda who claims to have legitimate religious motivations, as the overarching reason for why terrorism has become so indiscriminate, lethal and global.[47] This misunderstanding has created empty and irrelevant political discourse, such as: "they detest democracy" or "this is a war of freedom-loving people against evil barbarians."[48] A complete and useful understanding of international terrorism must see past the superficial and varying ideologies, and the effects of globalization must be considered as the primary enabler behind what is considered to be contemporary terrorism. This section will demonstrate that globalization is both a cause of and an enabler to contemporary international terror.

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[46] W. Andy Knight and Tom Keating, *Global Politics: Emerging Networks, Trends, and Challenges*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 302.

[47] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,"…, 63.

[48] Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 9.

THE 21st CENTURY

International terrorism is not new and was not born of the Cold War or of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11th, 2001. Terrorism became a means of projecting violence on an international scale in the 1970s and 1980s, partly because of technological advances, but also because of the internationalization of the media and its influence.[49] The internationalization of the media helped capitalize the return of propaganda versus deed by taking small operations such as hijackings and turning them into large international incidents. Terrorists began travelling from one country to another in order to target innocent civilians with the intent of creating shock and attracting international attention. Bruce Hoffman argues that international terrorism was born with the Palestinian hijacking of the Israeli El Al commercial airliner in 1971.[50] Given the speed with which news and images of the hijacking could be broadcasted around the globe, the event produced worldwide publicity for their cause. The ratio of propaganda versus deed became powerfully demonstrative of a symbiotic relationship between "terrorism" and the media. International publicity attracted the attention of other groups who found themselves on the losing side of a struggle for power. The media coverage surrounding the hostage taking of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics also demonstrates the large-scale internationalism of terror in the early 70s.[51] The early effects of technology and globalization enabled these events.

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[49] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,"…, 61.

[50] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*…, 64.

[51] *Ibid.,* 68.

During the Cold War, the world was divided into two main camps: the Soviet-Communist dominated world and the American-led Western alliance. Despite frequent "proxy wars," neither super power would dare encroach on the other's sphere of influence or vital interests as to avoid possible global conflict.[52] Terrorism was further enabled following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the consequential uninhibited growth of Western globalization. The somewhat stable power struggle that had existed during the Cold War disappeared and the United States, with its allies, were free to project an uncoordinated and enormous amount of economic, political and social power around the world.[53] Hence, globalization is essentially the projection of Western economic interests, political interests and social culture. Thomas Friedman has described globalization as the integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree that has never been seen in the past.[54] It is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world "faster, deeper and cheaper" than ever before, and provides these same capabilities to non-state actors who seek to achieve political objectives on the international stage.[55] Globalization enables individuals and non-state organizations to weigh into international politics. International travel, the Internet and social media are giving ordinary citizens the ability to achieve the same political importance as state leaders, despite their lack of economical resources, physical power and legitimacy. With globalization comes a paradigm: globalization is a cause of resentment and an enabler of non-state political action.

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[52] Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*…., 20.

[53] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism"…, 66.

[54] Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*…., 9.

[55] *Ibid*., 9.

CAUSE OF RESENTMENT

Globalization could be considered a causal variable of resentment which fuels international terrorism. Economically, it has allowed certain states to develop and modernize at a substantial rate, while many developing countries have been left behind. For example, the human development trends in Yemen are approximately 30% lower than the world average.[56] This has fostered economic inequality and has widened the economic gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots."[57] By leaving the "have-nots" behind, countries such as the US indirectly create breeding grounds for international terrorists by fostering resentment.[58] Furthermore, the dependence of many Middle Eastern countries on oil trade draws attention from heavy oil consumers, again such as the US.[59] National interests are intertwined with economic interests, and the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia is a prime example of how pervasive foreign policy can create the resentment required for extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda, to take action.

In recent years, the impact of globalization has greatly affected developing Arab countries, which has led to contemporary terrorism being construed as solely religious in nature. However, the phenomenon is much broader than that of a specific religion.

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[56] United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Index* [online website]: Available from http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/YEM.html; Internet; accessed April 19, 2011.

[57] W. Andy Knight and Tom Keating, *Global Politics: Emerging Networks, Trends, and Challenges*…, 319.

[58] Jamal R. Nassar, *Globalization and Terrorism*, (Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 104.

[59] Brynjar Lia, *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism*…, 188.

Globalization enables the spread of "Western" culture into the far reaches of the world. This spread is created as a bi-product of things such as affordable air travel, trade agreements, the internationalization of business, the export of cultural media and literature. This cultural homogenization greatly threatens traditional cultures that may feel the need to defend their way of life from the secular and Western-led future that is forced upon them.[60] In the fight against terrorism, this is a fundamental aspect of the threat that cannot be over-estimated and must be understood by Western policy makers.

ENABLER OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

Globalization provides terrorists with means of travel and communications. Developing countries who resent the US, their allies and homogenization, understand their situation thanks to the globalization of technology.[61] Of all the technological advances that have been made readily available worldwide, means of communications and publicity are perhaps the most obvious. The internet, mobile phones and instant messaging give terrorist organizations the ability to plan, coordinate and conduct operations with greater ease and for much less money.[62] Terrorists have the ability to advertise recruitment and project messaging to an immense audience. In a business that strives on publicity and that seeks to reach the largest audience possible, the internet is a substantial enabler. It also facilitates the proliferation of simple, inexpensive yet deadly

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[60] W. Andy Knight and Tom Keating, *Global Politics: Emerging Networks, Trends, and Challenges*…, 319.

[61] Jamal R. Nassar, *Globalization and Terrorism*…, 104.

[62] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism"…, 66.

technology that can easily be acquired by terrorist organizations for the conduct of their operations.[63] This large-scale spread of information is putting destructive powers that were once reserved for states into the hands of individuals and non-state organizations.[64] Technology gives terrorists the opportunity to plan, shoot, edit and broadcast their own propaganda videos, extreme power to individuals or non-state groups who, in theory, have no power.[65] It gives non-state actors the opportunity to participate in global politics. Furthermore, technology facilitates international coordination and the administration of terrorist organizations. [66] These are all capabilities that would not be made available to contemporary terrorists without globalization.

From a moral and economic perspective, globalization can provide hope. In situations where populations are denied a voice against oppressive state power, communications and media provide hope to the uneducated and can provide concrete evidence that it is possible to take action. [67] Therefore, given the far-reaching characteristics of terrorist organizations over the internet, the media is now capable of mobilizing a far larger number of fighters and supporters than ever before. Globalization and uneven economic development encourages the migration of youth from the countryside to large city centers. This urbanization of the youth in developing countries often exposes them to extremist ideologies and makes them vulnerable to recruitment,

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[63] Brynjar Lia, *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism*…, 188.

[64] Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Longman, 2003), 226.

[65] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*…, 198.

[66] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism"…, 67.

[67] Jamal R. Nassar, *Globalization and Terrorism*…, 103.

which, in turn, creates a lucrative pool of potential recruits for terrorist organizations.[68] Globalization provides diverse means of support, which give terrorists the means to carry out attacks far away from the base of their organization. This distinction between where a terrorist organization lives and where an attack is launched not only globalizes the threat but makes dealing with it much more difficult than before.[69]

TERROR: A THREAT TO GLOBALIZATION

While globalization enables terrorism, terrorism, in turn, threatens globalization by forcing states to take expensive measures to defend their populations. The contemporary multi-polar security environment is characterized by far reaching non-state threats to innocent civilians around the world. Terrorism is proving to be far more successful in this context than counter-terror efforts. The threat of terrorism alone is forcing governments to spend large amounts of resources in an attempt to counter the threat that can be posed by one individual with a twenty-dollar weapon, such as a homemade bomb.[70] Terrorism has transformed state decision-making and has affected the way states conduct business internationally.[71] It has forced governments to tighten border control policies and has adversely affected trade patterns and financial markets.[72] For example, the mere threat of terrorism has affected commercial insurance policies and

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[68] Brynjar Lia, *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism*…, 188.

[69] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism"…, 66.

[70] Allen Sens and Peter Stoett, *Global Politics: Origins, Currents, Directions…*, 229.

[71] *Ibid.,* 229.

[72] National Intelligence Council, *Mapping of the Global Future: Report on the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project* (Pittsburg: Government Printing Office, 2004), 93.

loan management, as clauses regarding terrorist activities are now common practice.[73] Terrorism has also increased the cost of international shipping as a result of supply chain disruption.[74] As such, it could be argued globalization is indirectly threatening the security and prosperity of those who benefit from it. The long-term effects of such a huge financial burden could have catastrophic results for affected states. A historical example can be drawn from the decade long Soviet counter-insurgency in Afghanistan during which the Mujahedeen validated the tactic of "death by a thousand cuts" with great success.[75] While there are limitless conclusions regarding the USSR's demise, it is clear that the war in Afghanistan was an important factor.[76] Similarly, the role globalization plays in exporting terrorism to the far reaches of the globe is clear, and the cost to the countries affected by it is not negligible.

Globalization will continue to provide terrorist organizations with opportunities to carry out their activities and means to convey their cause internationally.[77] Unless Western states consider the often unintended and disruptive effects of westernization, of secularization and of globalized capitalism, less privileged citizens of developing states around the world will continue to be frustrated by the radical changes that will be forced

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[73] Dwight Jaffee and Thomas Russell, "NBCR Terrorism: Who should bear the risks?," in *Global Business and the Terrorist Threat*, ed. Harry W. Richardson et al., 74-91 (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2009), 74.

[74] *Ibid.*, 74.

[75] Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, *Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters* (St-Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Company, 2001), iv.

[76] George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 488.

[77] Brynjar Lia, *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism*…, 188.

into their lives.[78] Therefore, while one must consider motivation behind terrorist acts, the effects of globalization must first be considered as the primary enabler behind what is considered to be contemporary terrorism. If globalization is both a cause and an enabler to international terrorism, then it is also a fundamental part of the solution.

[78] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism"…, 68.

CHAPTER 4 – CANADA'S "AWAY GAME" POLICY

Canadian politicians are faced with the dilemma of establishing what balance between domestic and foreign security needs to be achieved to best protect their citizens. As described in the 2005 International Policy Statement, "an increasingly interdependent world has tightened the links between international and domestic security, and developments abroad can affect the safety of Canadians in unprecedented ways."[79] With this in mind, this chapter will explain how Canada's liberal international foreign policy tradition affects Canada's participation in the so-called "War on Terror." This will be done through the discussion of traditional Canadian foreign policy. The establishment of this tradition will then serve to demonstrate that dealing with failed or failing states through military intervention within a comprehensive approach is the basis for Canada's foreign security and defence policy. In turn, these conclusions will support the argument that Canada's foreign security policy derives from tradition and national interests and will ultimately serve in the analysis of Canadian foreign security policy.

In theory, foreign security and defence policy are embedded in and derived from an analysis of threats. Once such threats are identified and understood, government establishes priorities to facilitate the allocation of appropriate resources to counter them. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) concludes that the greatest threat to the security of Canadians is international terrorism, yet uncovering Canada's foreign

[79] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 2005), 6.

counter-terrorism policy is challenging.[80] The 2004 National Security Policy (NSP) and the IPS were both drafted under the Liberal Paul Martin Government and provide broad and repetitive policy guidance regarding foreign security. This is also the case for the *Canada First* Defence Strategy, published in 2008 and created under the Stephen Harper Conservative Government, which is built upon the foundations of the NSP and IPS.[81] However, foreign security policy is generally "revealed" through actions under the Harper Government rather than in written documents.[82] To mitigate the lack of documentation, as Kim Nossal argues, one should consider that there has not been any major shift in Canadian foreign policy following the events of September 11th, 2001. If anything, the events of 9/11 have merely re-enforced Canada's liberal foreign policy tradition rather than trigger any fundamental changes.[83] Indeed, this fact facilitates the identification of the principal tenets of Canada's "Away Game".

LIBERAL TRADITION

Historical trends can typically be found at the root of any democratic state's foreign policy, and Canada is no exception. Over the past 60 years, Canada has maintained a predominantly liberal internationalist foreign policy that has kept many, if

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[80] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 38.

[81] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2008), 9.

[82] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era*…, 28.

[83] Kim Nossal, "Canadian Foreign Policy After 9/11: Realignment, Reorientation or Reinforcement," in *Foreign Policy Realignment in the Age of Terror,* ed. Lenard Cohen et al., 20-34 (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003), 21.

not all, of the fundamental principles that Louis St-Laurent described in his Gray Lecture at the University of Toronto in 1947. Of these principles, CAN-US relations, multilateralism and human values are predominant in the lecture.[84] Today, Canada is still heavily involved in a myriad of international organizations, continues to play an important leadership role on the international stage, strives to impose order in the world and maintains peacekeeping as a hallmark of its diplomacy.[85] Although it can be argued that some of these values have eroded over time and to varying degrees, applying principles such as these in foreign policy has given Canada the ability to exercise influence that has far surpassed its real stature on the international stage.[86] This section will demonstrate that Canada has diverged from its specialized roles to meet its obligations regarding its relationship with the United States, that multilateralism remains a mandatory component of foreign policy and that the traditionally Canadian principle of human values has been set aside in favor of the other two. This analysis will contextualize Canada's involvement in the War on Terror and will begin with the examination of Canada's traditional relationship with the United States.

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[84] Louis St-Laurent, *Les bases de la politique canadienne dans les affaires internationales* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Fondation Duncan et John Gray, 1947), 25.

[85] Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How we lost our place in the world* (Toronto: The Canadian Publishers, 2003), 21.

[86] *Ibid*., 11.

Canada-US Relations

Canada's relationship with the United States has always been one of the major historical centerpieces of Canadian foreign policy.[87] At the conclusion of the Second World War, geography made it such that Canada and the US shared certain purposes and ambitions related to economics and security. The defense of North America on the eve of the Cold War and the overwhelming predominance of trade with the US became fundamental reasons for Canada's dependence on its southern neighbor.[88] While Canada's partnership with the US was paramount, Canada needed to assert itself as an autonomous and credible actor within an international system composed of sovereign states. Thus, foreign policy makers needed to find the appropriate balance between affiliation that gave Canada leverage and independence that tended to give it credibility on the world stage.[89] According to Patrick Lennox, the balance between the two resulted in the adoption of a set of specialized and distinct roles specially suited to Canada that would allow it to act as an honest broker and a sovereign state in the eyes of its citizens and the international community, while reinforcing its cooperative relationship with the US.[90] Therefore, Canada's traditional roles as mediator, peacekeeper and problem solver, to name only a few, stemmed from this paradox between affiliation and autonomy.[91] As

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[87] John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Toronto: Nelson, 2007), 21.

[88] Kim Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1996), 57.

[89] Patrick Lennox, "The Illusion of Independence", in *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 45.

[90] *Ibid*., 45.

[91] *Ibid*., 45.

Louis St-Laurent describes Canada's relationship with the United States, this very dilemma is quite evident and would serve as the foundation for the future of Canadian foreign policy.

From a contemporary perspective, the continued importance of the United States is demonstrated by the fact that most Canadian foreign policy decisions are made based on the degree to which the issue will "impinge" on relations between the two countries.[92] Canada's decision regarding its participation in Iraq and its involvement in Afghanistan are clear examples. However, official discourse continues to depict the image of a mutually beneficial relationship based on equality as it discusses the importance of bilateral trade, energy and the defense of the continent.[93] Prime Minister Harper has openly commented on the true nature of the relationship: "…This relationship, …, only works if it is governed by mutual respect, and the way to earn that respect is to ensure Canada shoulders its fair share of the burden of defending North America…."[94] To shoulder its "share of the burden," Canada is required to uphold its 1938 security pledge and assure the US that Canada will not allow threats to reach the US via Canadian territory.[95]

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[92] Kim Nossal, The *Politics of Canadian Foreign* Policy…, 33.

[93] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Canada and the United States: No Two Nations Closer* (February 2009) [on-line]; available from http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/can-am/Closer-etroites.aspx; Internet; accessed 2 November 2010.

[94] Prime Minister of Canada, "PM Unveils Canada First Defence Strategy – 12 May 2008"; http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&featureId=6&pageId=46&id=2098; Internet; accessed 8 March 2011.

[95] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era*…, 93.

The dilemma of independence and affiliation continues to be a reality. On the one hand, Canada seems to be using its privileged relationship with the United States as leverage to demonstrate its importance relative to other states; "Little wonder, then, that the first foreign visit a newly elected U.S. president makes is very often to Canada. (…) It reflects the significance and durability of a relationship that has spanned more than a century."[96] On the other, a discourse persists depicting Canada's autonomy and how the two countries may not always agree:

> As sovereign nations, with at times divergent interests, the two countries are sometimes confronted by difficult issues. (…) But on every occasion, because they are good neighbours and have so much in common, solutions have been found.[97]

The reality is that Canada is very dependent on the US for economic prosperity and security. This reality greatly affects Canada's interests and the roles it is able to play internationally.

Despite Canada's attempts at diversifying trade, roughly 80% of its exports go to American markets, while 60% of imports are received from them.[98] Considering that economics are key determinants of national interests and that these, in turn, determine foreign policy, it can be argued that this type of an economic arrangement would not necessarily give Canada leverage when it happens to disagree with the US. In fact, as Roy Rempel suggests, Canada would be in a position in that the rules would be dictated

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[96] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Canada and the United States: No Two Nations Closer* … ; Internet; accessed 2 November 2010.

[97] *Ibid.*

[98] Patrick Lennox, "The Illusion of Independence", in *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future*…, 47.

to it.[99] Another example of this divergence from discourse is the actual structure of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).[100] Today, over 94% of NORAD's personnel are American and more than 84% of its budget is generated by American money.[101] Contrary to the partnership advertised in official discourse, the existence of a natural continental hierarchy is evident.[102]

With regards to Canada's specialized role in international politics, its position regarding the US deployment to Iraq was considered by many to be the manifestation of its autonomy and unfaltering commitment to the United Nations. While this is partially true, Canada made great efforts to support its southern ally in other ways. For example, it attempted to gain the UN Security Council's support for the invasion of Iraq and nonetheless deployed a relatively large number of troops to Afghanistan to participate in the War on Terror.[103] Considering the specialized tradition that it has prided itself with for the past 60 years, the mission in Afghanistan would be considered an odd fit "as it contrasts sharply with the country's reputation for serving in other more specialized capacities."[104] Despite the odd fit, one of the main reasons for the deployment to

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[99] Roy Rempel, "Canada's National Interests", *in Dreamland: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 152.

[100] NORAD is the bi-national command established in 1958 by Canada and the US to defend North American airspace. NORAD has now expanded to encompass the defense of air, space, and sea.

[101] Patrick Lennox, "The Illusion of Independence", in *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future*…, 47.

[102] *Ibid*., 47.

[103] *Ibid*., 55.

[104] *Ibid*., 56.

Afghanistan was to maintain good relations with the US; Canada sought the image of autonomy, but knew that affiliation was important.

Multilateralism

If Canada's relationship with the United States can be considered as a constant historical centerpiece to Canadian foreign policy, then Canada's commitment to multilateralism since the Second World War is most certainly a cornerstone. Understanding the importance of multilateralism for Canada, Louis St-Laurent linked it to national security: "If there is one conclusion that our common experience has led us to accept, it is that security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international organization."[105] Given the geography, ambition and power of its southern neighbor, multilateralism was, and still is, a way in which Canada could counter-balance American interests when its own were not aligned. Furthermore, the fact that security abroad meant prosperity at home was well understood, which was exemplified by Canada's participation in a multitude of defense and economic organizations in the post-World War era, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[106] Over a decade later, the results of Canada's heavy reliance on multilateralism became evident as Lester B. Pearson expressed his opinion that a robust military was unnecessary since, as he chimed, "alliancemanship would do

[105] Louis St-Laurent, *Les bases de la politique canadienne dans les affaires internationales*…, 25.

[106] John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*..., 113-114.

just fine".[107] This is arguably still true to this day considering Canada's dependence on the US for its own security.

Undeniably, multilateralism remains a key principle in Canadian foreign policy. Demonstrating how policy makers envision the importance of international organizations in the future, the 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) describes how Canada needs to play an innovative leadership role to reform these various entities so that they reflect the realities of today.[108] Canada is still associating itself with states, such as the US, who share similar interests and has been able to "punch over its weight" in many instances because of these relationships.[109] The IPS describes how Canada "…must therefore continue to seek ways to engage current and emerging superpowers in mechanisms for global governance."[110] Today, Canadians continue to prefer autonomy when it comes to the US, as they did sixty years ago, and fulfilling the various specialized roles mentioned earlier in a multilateral context around the globe has proven to be an effective way of maintaining that distance.[111] Therefore, Canada's efforts in multilateralism are more than simply methods of projecting its identity and attaining its interests. As was the case in

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[107] Douglas Bland, "Everything Military Officers Need to Know about Defence Policy-Making in Canada," in *Canadian Strategic Forecast 2000: Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century*, ed. David Rudd, Jim Hansen, and Jessica Blitt (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), 20.

[108] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*…, 26.

[109] Nelson Michaud, "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 347.

[110] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*…, 27.

[111] Nelson Michaud, "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*…, 349.

the late forties, it is also a means by which Canada is able to distinguish itself from the US and by which it can deal with states that have more power on a mutually beneficial playing field.[112] Prime Minister Paul Martin attempted to revive Canada's multilateral and international principles through the establishment of new important institutions, such as the G20, and peacemaking initiatives, and Prime Minister Steven Harper has arguably followed suit.[113] In the terms of the global War on Terror, Canada's participation is reflective of its multilateral tendencies. As clearly articulated on the DFAIT website, Canada is committed to fulfilling its international responsibilities and to demonstrating reliability to its allies. As a clear indication of multilateralism vis-à-vis terrorism, it states that:

> Because counter-terrorism requires effective international co-operation and co-ordination, Canada works to develop legal instruments, best practices and international standards to combat terrorism in international, regional and functional fora...[114]

Multilateralism remains an important component to Canada's foreign policy; therefore, Canada's participation within multilateral organizations remains paramount.

Human Values

Canada's foreign policy has not only been influenced by national interests, but has also been greatly influenced by human values. These values have influenced how Canada deals with the US and have driven many important multilateral engagements

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[112] Stéphane Roussel et Chantal Robichaud, "L'État postmoderne par excellence? Internationalisme et promotion de l'identité internationale du Canada." *Études internationales* 35, no. 1 (mars 2004): 6.

[113] Nelson Michaud, "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*…, 350.

[114] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Terrorism* [on-line]; available from http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx; Internet; accessed 15 February 2011.

since World War II. During the post-WWII years, the idea of protecting the individual demonstrated how policy makers envisioned the way Canada would apply human values in world affairs, as they were the foundation upon which the country was built.[115] As Louis St-Laurent stated, "No foreign policy is consistent nor coherent over a period of years unless it is based upon some conception of human values."[116] Human values contributed to forging Canada's national identity as Canadians felt the need "to do something" on the world stage, whether it be through peacekeeping, development or conflict prevention.[117]

Today, the fundamental national interest remains to protect and promote well being at home and abroad.[118] Beyond the fact that discourse places human rights as "a central theme of Canadian foreign policy," Canada has included important human rights issues, such as gender equality, the protection of children and indigenous peoples, within its foreign policy.[119] The Foreign Affairs and International Trade website states that "Canada stands up for human rights and takes principled positions on important issues to ensure that freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, values that define this

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[115] Nelson Michaud, "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*…, 350.

[116] Louis St-Laurent, *Les bases de la politique canadienne dans les affaires internationales*…, 25.

[117] Stéphane Roussel et Chantal Robichaud, "L'État postmoderne par excellence? Internationalisme et promotion de l'identité internationale du Canada."…, 2.

[118] Roy Rempel, "Canada's National Interests", *in Dreamland: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined* Sovereignty…, 154.

[119] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Human Rights* (February 2009) [on-line]; available from http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/human-rights_droits-personne.aspx; Internet; accessed 2 November 2010.

country, are enjoyed around the world."[120] Keeping our world safe and contributing to the well being of others are still seen as major objectives for foreign policy makers.[121] A contemporary example of this is Prime Minister Harper's assertion that Canada's objective in Afghanistan is to "improve the lives of Afghanistan's most vulnerable citizens."[122] This was recenty re-enforced by Peter McKay as he explained why the Canadian military is in Afghanistan: "This isn't the first time Canadians have been called on to help defend the basic principles we all believe in; freedom, democracy, rule of law, Respect for basic human rights…"[123] Discourse demonstrates the continued importance of human values in Canadian foreign policy, although it may not be reflected in reality on the ground.

Canada has arguably diverged from its traditional value-based practices since the terrorist attacks against the US on September 11th, 2001. Canada's mission in Afghanistan is one that is almost purely based on CAN-US relations and multilateralism, vice human values, despite contradictory discourse. Pushing it even further from its value-based tradition, Canada's heavy involvement in Afghanistan is precluding it from being able to conduct other traditional value-based engagements. This is exemplified by Canada's quasi-symbolic deployment in January 2010 to provide humanitarian assistance

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[120] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Human Rights*...

[121] Nelson Michaud, "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*…, 347.

[122] Prime Minister of Canada, "PM Highlights Canada's Role on the World Stage – 23 September 2010"; http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&featureId=6&pageId=46&id-3672; Internet; accessed 8 November 2010.

[123] Peter McKay, "Munich Security Conference: The Future of the Alliance and the Mission in Afghanistan – February 7, 2009"; http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=2875; Internet; accessed 8 November 2010.

following a devastating earthquake in Haiti. While the deployment was in fact "humanitarian," it was far too short lived to provide any lasting effect.[124] Human values still exist in discourse, however politicians may have been forced to diverge from them in order to satisfy foreign policy principles of greater importance.

To conclude, Canada has diverged from its traditional specialized roles because its government has understood that the parameters for security at home include maintaining its relations with the US. To maintain these relations, Canada needs to participate, in some capacity, in the War on Terror and must take all necessary measures to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack against the United States being staged in Canada. To maintain it autonomy, it must also maintain its multilateral engagements in order to continue its attempts at "punching over its weight" on the international stage. Finally, Canada has diverged from its traditional human values principle of foreign policy in order to meet its obligations regarding the other two principles. It is the dynamic between these three principles of Canadian foreign policy that has set the parameters for Canada's foreign security and defence policy.

MEETING THREATS ABROAD

Policy and discourse make it clear that the Canadian government has chosen to focus its international counter-terrorism efforts on failed or failing states. The NSP states that "failed and failing states can provide a haven for terrorists, which can pose risks to

[124] Prime Minister Harper directed the deployment of Canadian Forces to conduct humanitarian relief operations in Haiti for 30 to 60 days.

the security of Canadians."[125] Similarly, the IPS places failed or failing states squarely at the center of Canada's international security policy, as they "…dot the international landscape, creating despair and regional instability and providing a haven for those who would attack us directly."[126] The document also weighs the importance of gaining the initiative by meeting the terrorist threat outside of Canada's borders: "The Government also recognizes the importance of meeting threats to our security as far away from our borders as possible, wherever they may arise. Security in Canada ultimately begins with stability abroad."[127]

Unable to govern effectively, a handful of states provide sanctuary to terrorist organizations and allow them to breed within their borders, causing instability not only regionally, but also within the international system. According to Canadian policy makers, by helping to stabilize these states, terrorist cells are denied their use as safe havens and logistical nodes, hence reducing the threat of terrorist attacks on Canadian soil. Prime Minister Harper verbalized this when he stated "…if we [Canada] abandon our fellow human beings to lives of poverty, brutality and ignorance, in today's global village their misery will eventually and inevitably become our own."[128] Therefore, from

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[125] Privy Counsel Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2004), 50.

[126] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*…, 1.

[127] *Ibid.,* 2.

[128] Prime Minister of Canada, "Prime Minister Harper addresses Australian parliament in Canberra, Australia – 11 September 2007"; http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&featureId=6&pageId=46&id=1818; Internet; accessed 8 March 2011.

a Canadian perspective, failed states are considered as being the single most important enablers for terrorist organizations.

If failed and failing states are the focus of Canada's foreign security and defence policy, then the political priority given to global security on the world stage is confusing. This confusion lies between discourse and reality. For example, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) website addresses the importance of international stability and further describes how failed and failing states should be managed from a capacity building perspective:

> Our security is inextricably linked to that of other states. When they lack resources or expertise to prevent and respond to terrorist activity, the security of Canadians and Canadian interests at home and abroad is at risk. Counter-terrorism capacity building (CTCB) assists other states with training, funding, equipment, technical and legal assistance so threat they can prevent and respond to terrorist activity, within international counter-terrorism and human rights norms, standards and obligations.[129]

Despite the clarity of this explanation, it does not transcend across all policy documents, which suggests a lack of synchronization amongst government departments. For example, the IPS clearly states that Canada needs to focus on where its interests are at stake and where a meaningful contribution can be made:

> The fluid nature of the international security environment makes it difficult to predict the precise threats that we might face even five years from now… Nevertheless, in order to concentrate our efforts in areas where Canada can make a difference, the Government has decided to focus on failed and failing states.[130]

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[129] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Terrorism* [on-line]; available from http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx; Internet; accessed 15 February 2011.

[130] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*…, 5.

In other words, the focus needs to be placed on areas that Canada can influence with the capabilities available to it, and not necessarily on areas where the threat to Canadian citizens can be significantly reduced. The NSP also mentions the issue of capacity in Canada's response: "Assisting failed and failing states is one area where the links with both our national security and our capacity to contribute are clear."[131] Therefore, if Canada's policy is limited by capacity and by poor inter-departmental synchronization, so too are the potential courses of action that could result from comprehensive threat analysis.

Another example that demonstrates the divergence between discourse and reality concerns the prioritization of counter-terror efforts. This divergence is related to the imbalance between domestic and international aspects of counter-terrorism policy.[132] "Contributing to international security" is the last of three security priorities put forth by the Government of Canada in the National Security Policy (NSP), and the Prime Minister himself has confirmed this in his speeches.[133] Yet, the document contradicts itself by stating that the government has placed "the highest priority on countering international terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, assisting failed and failing states, and defusing intra and interstate conflicts."[134] Given the complex nature of the terrorist threat and the limited means Canada has to counter it, this

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[131] Privy Counsel Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*…, 50.

[132] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era*…, 30.

[133] Privy Counsel Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*…, 5.

[134] *Ibid.*, 48.

confusion may be diverting power from key sources within other government departments.

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The last component of Canadian foreign security policy relating to the stabilization of failed and failing states is the requirement to conduct operations within an interdepartmental framework. The whole-of-government approach, more commonly known today as the Comprehensive Approach (CA) to stability operations, is evident throughout written policy and verbal discourse, but the DFAIT website provides the most useful explanation:

> The multi-pronged fight against terrorism must include diplomacy, intelligence, security and law enforcement, customs and immigration, transportation, justice and finance expertise. All of these branches of government must work together to: identify and arrest terrorists; to stop their operations; to protect and defend people, societies, and economies from terrorist attack; and to mitigate effects of an attack.[135]

It is interesting to note that many of the functions mentioned by DFAIT have domestic connotations, although many can also be applied in a foreign context. In Afghanistan, the Canadian Forces' should theoretically be playing a supporting, albeit essential role of establishing security for the application of other forms of state power."[136] In reality, Canada's contribution to Afghanistan is predominantly military in nature.

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[135] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Terrorism* [on-line]; available from http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx; Internet; accessed 15 February 2011.

[136] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2008), 9.

Stabilizing failed states are complex operations that inherently require complex desirable outcomes, such as establishing host-nation government, building host-nation security forces, revitalizing the economy and re-establishing public institutions. These outcomes entail enduring solutions that are shaped not by military action, but by social, economic and political change.[137] Failed and failing states have problems across the entire spectrum of their national organization; therefore, a comprehensive approach to harness a multitude of diverse initiatives is required to address the issues of each discipline effectively.[138] The CA involves supporting military operations that will allow for a permissive environment in which the rebuilding of fragile and failed states can occur.

THE REALITY

Internationally, the Canadian government's approach to terrorism has been fundamentally military. However, as Prime Minister Harper explains, there is logic behind this approach: "The successful pursuit of all of Canada's interests around the world – trade, investment, diplomatic and humanitarian – ultimately depends on security…."[139] With a view of establishing security, the government has placed considerable importance on the Canadian military, as clearly defined by the CFDS

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[137] Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2010), 154.

[138] Craig Leslie Mantle, *How Do We Go About Building Peace While We're Still At War?: Canada, Afghanistan and the Whole of Government Concept…,* 3.

[139] Prime Minister of Canada, "PM unveils revised motion on the future of Canada's mission in Afghanistan - 21 February 2008"; http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&featureId=6&pageId=46&id=1995; Internet; accessed 8 March 2011.

through the means of procurement and increased human resources. The weight placed on the Department of National Defence in relation with other departments is quite evident. In the IPS, it is the Canadian Forces that have been given the prioritized roles of "protecting Canadians, defending North America in cooperation with the United-States, and contributing to international peace and security."[140] The CFDS suggests that the Canadian Forces need to be able to address issues such as terrorism, which is arguably difficult to accomplish with military resources.[141] It is clear that the Canadian government has chosen military force as the principal tool to be used for counter-terrorism on the international stage.

SUMMARY

This chapter has demonstrated that Canada's contemporary foreign and security policy is driven by traditional liberal principles that have existed since the end of the WWII. While the protection of Canadian citizen's is certainly a priority, it is clear that Canada's involvement abroad speaks to its need to maintain a functional relationship with the US for both reasons of security and trade. It is also a result of Canada's traditionally strong commitment to multilateralism; maintaining credibility with NATO allies and maintaining the perception of Canada as a values based co-founder of the UN.

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[140] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*…, 2.

[141] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Policy*…, 7.



Figure 4.1 – Canadian Foreign Security Policy.

The analysis of policy and discourse indicates that Canada understands its role as a middle power. American influence has forced Canada to diverge from its specialized roles and has strongly encouraged Canada's military participation in the Global War on Terror. It has also greatly influenced its "Home Game" as it struggles to ensure that terrorists don't use Canada to stage an attack on the US.

In the end, Canada's foreign and security policy is not specifically directed at reducing the terrorist threat to Canada, although the principles of multilateralism and CAN-US relations may achieve this aim indirectly. The roots of the terrorist threat are identified as failed and failing states, yet Canada's policy to counter it prioritizes a defensive posture and domestic counter-terror measures. The *Canada First* Defense

Strategy clearly prioritizes the defence of Canada and of North America above "contributing to international peace and security" for the military, but the bulk of the military's operations since the events of 9/11 have been carried out overseas, and primarily in Afghanistan. Despite its understanding of the threat, priorities and the allocation of resources derive from traditional foreign policy principals and limitations related to capabilities. To effectively counter the threat, critical vulnerabilities must be identified and targeted with all forms of state power. Chapter 5 will address the issue of al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities with the help of the Strange model.

CHAPTER 5 – CASE ANALYSIS – AL-QAEDA'S CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES

Thus far, this paper has established that from a non-pejorative perspective, terrorism is a tactic used by non-state extremist groups in the pursuit of political objectives vice an ideology or motivation. This distinction is critical, as one must target the group that utilizes terrorism as a tactic as opposed to fighting the tactic itself. The conditions that encourage terrorism have also been considered through the discussion of globalization as both a cause and an enabler of terrorism. Ultimately, Canadian counter-terror policy makers need to consider these factors and accept the role Canada has chosen to play in the globalizing international system. The effects of the traditionally Canadian principles of multilateralism and CAN-US relations have also been discussed to establish an understanding of the scope of Canada's participation in the global War on Terror.

With a view to arguing that Canada's foreign security policy is ineffective at concretely reducing the threat of terrorism to Canadian citizens, this chapter will use a modified Strange analysis model to deduce al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities (CVs). Al-Qaeda has been chosen as the focus of this case study for three reasons. First, having named Canada as a potential target, al-Qaeda is clearly a threat to Canadian security. Second, while Canada has made great efforts to stabilize Afghanistan during the last decade, it has essentially been fighting al-Qaeda, or at the very least al-Qaeda enabled groups such as the Taliban. Third, terrorism has been a key component of the vast majority of CSIS reports and governmental policy documents since 9/11. Considering these points, it is reasonable to consider al-Qaeda as a major threat to the security of the

Canadian population. Prior to conducting the analysis, the modified Strange Analysis model will be explained before the origins of al-Qaeda as a "terrorist" organization are briefly described. The Strange analysis will start with the consideration of al-Qaeda's strategic objectives. Critical capabilities (CCs) will then be examined in detail to identify targetable CVs.

THE STRANGE ANALYSIS

The Strange analysis is an appropriate analytical model; however, altering its process is considered to be necessary to maximize its effectiveness. While using the idea of a center of gravity (CoG) as the starting point for his analysis, Joe Strange aims to identify targetable CVs that, if denied, interdicted or destroyed, would cause the defeat of the enemy. According to Canadian doctrine, CoGs are "characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight".[142] However, according to Clausewitz' definition, a CoG is the source of moral and physical power. Therefore, it would be difficult to argue that "characteristics" and "localities" could be CoGs.[143] A CoG can be a physical, political or moral entity. Moral and political CoGs influence the outcome of events by virtue of their determination, influence and leadership.[144] On the physical plane, they can be armed forces, national economic and industrial power or

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[142] Department of National Defence, CFJP 5.0 *Operation* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008), GL-1.

[143] Dr Joe Strange, *Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language* (Quantico: Defense Automated Printing Service Center, 1996), 43.

[144] *Ibid*., 44.

power stemming from large populations.[145] The CoG does not merely contribute to strength because in theory it is the strength.[146] Therefore, successfully neutralizing the CoG can lead to the defeat of the enemy through the use of minimal resources, hence minimizing casualties and avoiding an attritionist conflict.

Unfortunately, a center of gravity in a particular conflict is sometimes difficult to determine accurately and can evolve throughout the various phases of any given conflict. There are many examples in history that clearly demonstrate, with the advantage of hindsight, how CoGs have been wrongfully chosen. For example, Saddam Hussein was identified as the enemy CoG during Operation Iraqi Freedom. This CoG was shortsighted and was clearly inappropriate given the intensity of the hostilities that ensued following his removal.[147] The risk is that if planners concentrate their efforts on an irrelevant CoG, the end result could be nearsighted strategic plans, the inappropriate attribution of the various means of state power and regrettable second and third order effects.

Addressing this risk related to CoG identification, the Canadian Forces College acknowledges that the determination of the CoG is not always possible, and that there

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[145] Dr Joe Strange, *Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language…,* 44.

[146] Joe Strange and Richard Iron. "Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship Between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities." In *Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities* (Quantico: Marine Corps War College, 2001), 7.

[147] Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iraq: Trends in Violence and Civilian Casualties: 2005-2009* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 16.

may be more than one CoG depending on the circumstances.[148] Therefore, in the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CFOPP), the primary purpose of the Strange Analysis is to identify targetable critical vulnerabilities with a view of establishing effective courses of action for friendly forces to take against the enemy. From this perspective, the importance of the CoG becomes debatable and in some cases negligible. Understanding the difficulties entailed with determining the CoG, Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier of the U.S. Army developed an "Ends, Ways and Means" framework, which is in effect a modified Strange analysis. It serves as a tool in CV identification, but can also be used to determine the CoG. Within this modified version of the model, friendly or enemy "critical capabilities" (CC) are the start point for the analysis in the stead of the CoG. As the "critical requirements" (CR) are elaborated from the CCs and, subsequently, the CVs are identified, a pattern may become apparent which could assist in the identification of the CoG. Essentially, the analysis seeks to answer three questions: what is the desired end state, how can it be achieved and what resources are required?[149] Considering the risks and limited benefits associated with the determination of a CoG, the modified Strange Analysis will be used here solely to determine al-Qaeda's CVs in this case study.

Prior to commencing the analysis, the six steps of the framework require elaboration. Contrary to the original Strange analysis model, the first step in the modified framework is to clearly identify the desired ends. In effect, al-Qaeda's desired political

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[148] Canadian Forces College, "CFC Guide to CF Operational Planning Process" (Joint Command and Staff Program Handout CFC 230), II-9/17.

[149] Dale C. Eikmeier, "A Logical Method for Center of Gravity Analysis," *Military Review* (September-October 2007): 62.

outcomes need to be identified. For example, the expulsion of US military forces from the Middle East can be considered as a desired political outcome. In step two, ways to achieve the desired ends will be explored while those that are most likely to be successful are highlighted. Ways are actions; therefore, they will be expressed as verbs. The most essential of them will be expressed as critical capabilities. For instance, al-Qaeda's ability to sustain itself logistically is one of its CCs. In step three, the means required to enable and execute the CC will be identified. These means are critical requirements, which are essential conditions and resources necessary to possess a critical capability. Gaining access to foreign countries, for example, could be one of many CRs that would allow al-Qaeda to achieve the above-mentioned CC. Step four will see the selection of the critical items from the CR list that are the most vulnerable and valuable. These will be identified as critical vulnerabilities: critical requirements that are vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack in a manner that achieves decisive results.[150] Regardless of whether the CoG has been identified or not, the targeting of these CVs would inevitably neutralize CRs and deny CCs to the enemy, while minimizing the resources, effort and cost required to defeat him. Prior to discussing al-Qaeda's desired political outcomes, the organization's origins will be briefly set into context.

[150] Dale C. Eikmeier, "A Logical Method for Center of Gravity Analysis"…, 65.

AL-QAEDA

Origins

Al-Qaeda has been successful at forcing itself into international politics over the course of the last two decades. Although many refer to it is as a "terrorist" organization, AQ is in essence a political movement, possessing limited military abilities, which seeks to achieve political objectives by whatever means necessary.[151] According to Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, AQ was "…born as a result of the failure of discredited Arab governments to defend their countries" and is the consequence of a dual realization on the part of private actors, such as Osama bin Laden.[152] First, according to AQ, certain Arab states were too weak to defend their citizenry against globalization and secularization. While bin Laden has been clear in his discourse that the enemies of Islam were imposing themselves in the Muslim world through "colonization, imperialism, economic exploitation, and repressive governance," he blames weak Muslim governments.[153] Second, these weak governments were also too strong to be overtaken.[154] However, as Michael Scheuer argues, AQ was primarily created to ensure the survival of the global Islamist movement, which would have been threatened by the

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[151] Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 44.

[152] *Ibid*., 45.

[153] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 77.

[154] Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War*…, 45.

end of the jihad against the Soviets in the late 90s.[155] It was to serve as a base to support the global jihad through organization, training and money.

AQ's origins can be traced back to Abdallah Azzam, a university lecturer and leader of the Arabs who travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to help resist the Soviet invasion and established an office to facilitate the preparation, training and movement of fighters.[156] Based off of the successes of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, and in partnership with Osama bin Laden, the elements of an international, all Muslim army were put in place.[157] The purpose of this force was to wage war against the US and its allies to achieve a variety of political objectives. Initially, AQ was a hierarchical organization that was characterized by a command structure and consultative council. Since 9/11, it has pragmatically morphed into a loose confederation of terrorist groups with members living and operating in over 40 countries. While AQ's strength is unknown, it is estimated to be at roughly seventy thousand worldwide with thousands attending training camps in Sudan, Yemen and Afghanistan.[158] As will be discussed below, it has become a movement sustained by a common ideology, charismatic leadership and political objectives. These factors render AQ extremely difficult to defeat with military force.

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[155] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden*…, 72.

[156] Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War*…, 46.

[157] *Ibid*., 46.

[158] Jack Boureston and Charles Mahaffey, "Al-Qaeda and Mass Casualty Terrorism: Assessing the Threat," in *Al-Qaeda: An Organization to be Reckoned With*, ed. Lawrence J. Bevy, 29-40 (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2006), 30.

As an organization, AQ resorted to the use of terrorism as a tactic in its overall strategy for pragmatic reasons. Primarily, following 9/11, its members knew that they could not fight the US directly without suffering heavy casualties and defeat on the battlefield.[159] Even attempts at using the guerrilla tactics that the Mujahedeen had used in Afghanistan against the Soviets had proven to be costly given modern military technology. Bin Laden himself acknowledged this disparity and described the measures AQ needed to take in order to counter it:

> Due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, namely using fast-moving forces that work under complete secrecy…. It is wise in the present circumstances for the armed military forces not to be engaged in conventional fighting with the forces of the… enemy… unless a big advantage is likely to be achieved; and the great losses induced on the enemy side that would shake and destroy his foundations and infrastructure… spread rumors, fear, and discouragement among the members of the enemy forces.[160]

Thus, the strategy employed by AQ was to delay the Allies, to inflict casualties, to force the commitment of vast amounts of treasure and to slowly degrade public support for their mission. Secondly, terror is the simplest tactic to use on the international stage. The weapons can be made with local materials and the operations require minimum personnel to be executed. The use of the tactic is further facilitated by the creation of independent and regional franchises that, while loosely connected to AQ central, are encouraged to attack targets of opportunity as they see fit and in accordance with the parameters that are set by Allah and his Prophet.[161] The Strange analysis demonstrates

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[159] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era*…, 158.

[160] Osama bin Laden, *Declaration of Jihad: August 23, 1996*, http://www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/declaration_of_jihad2.html; Internet; accessed 20 March 2011.

[161] Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War*…, 54.

that these affiliations could in fact be considered as a vulnerability, among several others. Given the international expansion of AQ since 9/11, the requirement to examine Canadian foreign security policy, which prioritizes military stability operations in one failed state, is certainly required.

Ends

Appropriating the modified Strange analysis model, al-Qaeda's political objectives will be examined. It is commonly understood that al-Qaeda's movement is based on three basic foundations: the full political representation of a specific interpretation of Sharia law; the liberation of the homelands; and the liberation of the human being.[162] While considering these foundations, it will be argued that AQ's end state is composed of three overarching objectives: the removal of weak or corrupt Islamic governments in the Middle-East; the removal of military forces belonging to the US or its allies from the Middle East; and the end of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. All three of these objectives will be briefly described before considering the critical capabilities that al-Qaeda has to achieve them.

Governments and the media have tended to ignore al-Qaeda's objectives, citing the hatred of freedom or the radicalization of Islam as the driving factors behind its operations. These misconceptions are surprising considering the clarity and consistency with which AQ has always expressed its objectives in discourse. Bin Laden alone has

[162] Christopher M. Blanchard, *Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology*, ed. Lawrence J. Bevy, 11-28 (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2006), 18.

broadcasted twenty-three messages in the five years following 9/11, and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has produced just as many. Even before the attacks against the World Trade Center in September of 2001, Bin Laden had made his frustrations, particularly with the US (and its allies), very clear:

> We believe the US is responsible directly for those who were killed in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq… This American government abandoned humanitarian feelings by these hideous crimes. It transgressed all bounds and behaved in a way not witnessed before by any power or any imperialist power in the world. The United States today has set a double standard, calling whoever goes against its injustice a terrorist. It wants to occupy our countries, steal our resources, impose on us agents to rule us… and wants us to agree to all this. If we refuse to do so, it will say, "you are terrorists."[163]

In a broad sense, AQ is seeking to establish a new world order in which negative and secular influence from the US no longer threatens Muslims. To establish this order the old order needs to be removed. As such, Canada has arguably become an AQ target solely because of the support it provides to the US in its fight against "terrorism." Shortly after Canada deployed troops to Afghanistan, bin Laden issued a taped statement mentioning it as a new AQ target; "Why did your governments ally themselves with America to attack us in Afghanistan, and I cite in particular Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Germany and Australia? As you kill, you will be killed…"[164] It is not Canadian foreign policy in and of itself that frustrates al-Qaeda, it is its relationship with the US.

Al-Qaeda being, in a sense, a movement of religious motivation, the corruption of Islam is its primary cause of frustration. This has been clear in AQ discourse since the

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[163] Osama bin Laden in Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 183.

[164] Osama bin Laden, Taped Voice, *Bin Laden Speeches*, November 12, 1993, http://www.niu.edu/phil/~kapitan/Bin%20Laden%20Speaks.html; Internet; accessed 12 Jan 2011.

early 90s as bin Laden expressed that "No one can be unaware of the tremendous spread of corruption, which has penetrated all aspects of life. It can no longer be a secret to anyone that various evils have spread…"[165] The source of this corruption, according to AQ discourse, is weak, secular and corrupt Middle Eastern governments that allow themselves to be influenced by intrusive American foreign policies. By disposing of non-believers and bad influences, Al-Qaeda believes that a true Islamic society could be revived across all Muslim states through the creation of a new Caliphate. In a statement from 1995/1996, while discussing the corruption of Islam in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden stated that "… [The] main problem is the US government, while the Saudi regime is but a branch or an agent of the US. By being loyal to the US regime, the Saudi regime has committed an act against Islam."[166] Bin Laden has clearly and repeatedly stated the requirement to dispose of weak governance and to establish an Islamic Caliphate that protects its citizens from the secular and intrusive world, primarily by abstaining from being part of it. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the complexities related to the possibility of establishing a Caliphate given the numerous differences and divides within Islam. However, as will be discussed below, these divisions could be considered as vulnerabilities for al-Qaeda if they were to be exploited effectively.

As understood by al-Qaeda, weak governance at home is only part of the problem. While this weak governance is, according to bin Laden, responsible for allowing the corruption of Islam, it is also setting the conditions for the exploitation of the holy lands

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[165] Osama bin Laden in Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden* (New York: Verso, 2005), 6.

[166] *Ibid*., 45.

by the Christian (US) and Jewish (Israel) crusaders. Therefore, AQ has a near enemy and a far enemy, and the far enemy must be fought simultaneously with the near one.[167] Hence, the second objective that is the withdrawal of US military forces from the "Holy Lands." In a message addressed to the Saudi Arabian government in 1996, bin Laden explained the degree of "degradation and corruption" to which the Islamic motherland had sunk by referring to weak governance and to the "feebleness and cowardice" of Muslim scholars: "This is because of their neglect of religion and weakness of faith which allowed the enemy to attack. The enemy invaded the land of our umma [community], violated her honor, shed her blood and occupied her sanctuaries."[168] Later, he described the US presence in Saudi Arabia as the "greatest disaster to befall on Muslims since the death of the Prophet".[169] This discourse clearly demonstrates how the withdrawal of US forces in the Middle East is a political objective.

The last objective that will be used for the purposes of this paper will be the end of the US support that is provided to Israel in its "oppression" of the Palestinians. From AQ's perspective, the US, among others, is providing political and military support to help Israel in its illegal occupation of Palestinian territories.[170] According to bin Laden:

> We declared jihad against the US government, because the US government is unjust, criminal, and tyrannical. It has committed acts that are extremely unjust, hideous, and criminal, whether directly or through its support of the Israeli

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[167] Lawrence J. Bevy, *Al-Qaeda: An Organization to be Reckoned With* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2006), 1.

[168] Osama bin Laden in Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden…*, 15.

[169] *Ibid*., 25.

[170] Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War…*, 70.

> occupation of the Land of the Prophet's Night Journey. And we believe the US is directly responsible for those who were killed in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq.[171]

Peace with the Jews is perceived as being nothing but betrayal to Islam. Therefore, stopping US support to Israel, through its pervasive foreign policy, is an objective.

By analyzing and connecting these political objectives, an end-state can be determined. AQ seeks to remove weak and secular governments that are tolerant of US Middle Eastern foreign policy, to force the withdrawal of US forces and to stop US support of Israel. The common denominator of these three objectives is US foreign policy. Therefore, if these three objectives were to be achieved, it is clear that the end state would involve the disappearance of pervasive US foreign policy in the Middle East. Furthermore, bin Laden has often justified the actions of 9/11 as defensive measures stating the need to protect Muslims from US foreign policy. The end state would also involve the security of Muslims. Thus, it is argued that AQ's desired strategic end state is the following: the US no longer applying influential foreign policy in the Middle East; the security of Muslims no longer threatened by external secular threats; and governance based on Sharia law established. The establishment of this tentative end state has set the conditions for the next step, which demands the identification of the critical capabilities possessed by AQ that may allow them to achieve.

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[171] Osama bin Laden in Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden…*, 46.

CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

The capabilities that are necessary for Al-Qaeda to achieve its objectives and, ultimately, its end state are numerous. The capabilities and requirements that will be mentioned below derive from the most recent works from leadings authors such as Steve Coll, Bruce Hoffman and Michael Scheuer. While it is not within the scope of this paper to provide an exhaustive list and to describe each of them in detail, five CCs will be highlighted with the specific purpose of identifying useful CRs and CVs for the analysis of Canadian foreign policy in the next chapter. It is deemed by the author that these capabilities are absolutely necessary for AQ to achieve its objectives. It should be noted that AQ possesses far more than five CCs, but that the following are perhaps the most pertinent for this discussion. Each CC will be briefly described before the related CRs and CVs are deduced from it.

Establish Sanctuary

Al-Qaeda's ability to establish sanctuary is a critical capability because without it, command and control, sustainment and training would be rendered extremely difficult. As Jim Arkedis argues, the only opportunity for al-Qaeda to stage large scale and devastating terrorist attacks against its enemies is under the umbrella of sanctuary similar to that which was once provided by the Taliban in Afghanistan.[172] It is true that some attacks have been largely planned and coordinated via the internet since 9/11, however

[172] Jim Arkedis, "Why Al Qaeda Wants a Safe Haven," *Foreign Policy* (23 October, 2009) [on-line]; available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/got_safe_haven?page=full; Internet; accessed 28 March 2011.

chat rooms and social media do not support the building of the trust, the confidence and the cohesion created by physically meeting to plan and train for a mission. Furthermore, some successful and comparatively smaller attacks, such as the London mass transit bombings of July 2005, were homegrown, AQ inspired attacks that did not need international sanctuary to be planned and executed. [173] However, significant international attacks on the scale of 9/11 require sanctuary. This requirement is demonstrated by how the assumed 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed put his operatives through a series of training programs to develop their proficiency with firearms, unarmed combat, Western culture and even the English language.[174] The preparation of these operatives was key to the success of the operation and would have been impossible to do over the Internet or without significant space to conduct training. Hence, the sanctuary provided by the Taliban and the Pashto areas bordering on Afghanistan and Pakistan was key to the mission's success.

The importance of sanctuary has proven to be the source of much debate. Arkedis speaks to the argument that denying sanctuary to AQ is pointless given the organization's ability to relocate to another sympathetic country.[175] It would prove to be extremely difficult for bin Laden and his senior leadership to conduct international travel, as they are well known by law enforcement agencies around the globe. Relocation would also mean that AQ would need to re-establish its smuggling networks and underground financial arrangements. Given how Osama bin Laden has claimed responsibility for

[173] Jim Arkedis, "Why Al Qaeda Wants a Safe Haven"…

[174] *Ibid.*

[175] *Ibid.*

attacks that were not his to claim, it is also arguable that al-Qaeda is now decentralized and incapable of providing command and control because its senior leadership is on the run. However, as Michael Scheuer warns, this may be all part of bin Laden's plan. [176] It would be dangerous to assume that al-Qaeda is no longer a functional organization. Vis-à-vis this possibility, the US and its allies should maintain its efforts to deny sanctuary through the application of all means of state power.

If AQ's ability to establish sanctuary could be denied to them, operations would undoubtedly be hindered. By focusing on failed and failing states, Canada is partly addressing the issue of sanctuary. Notwithstanding Canada's efforts in Afghanistan, an analysis of critical vulnerabilities related to AQ's ability to establish sanctuary is worthy. Through the analysis of what is necessary for al-Qaeda to have the capability of establishing sanctuary, three critical requirements can be brought forth. First, AQ must have some form of state backing. It would be extremely difficult for it to establish bases, training institutions and logistical facilities without its host being aware of the situation. With state backing, there must also be a degree of public support that would make co-existence of al-Qaeda members and countrymen possible. Second, it requires the ability to ship weapons and equipment internationally while moving a fair number of fighters in and out of the host country. The ability to travel internationally, as will be discussed in further detail below, is a third and repetitive critical requirement that would be difficult to achieve without the cooperation and support of state governance. These were the conditions that were in place in Afghanistan under Taliban rule, and these are conditions

[176] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden*…, 130.

that would be difficult to reproduce elsewhere given the unique set of circumstances that had made them possible.

The examination of these CRs reveals an important vulnerability – moderate governments of Muslim countries. Moderate governments, such as Saudi-Arabia's, who tend to establish economic relationships with AQ's enemies, will tend to want to maintain those relationships. Moderate governments would also prefer avoiding being the focus of US attention if they were to "harbor terrorists." Furthermore, governments that would tend towards more secular foreign interests would not necessarily choose to support al-Qaeda in its cause. Therefore, foreign policy, diplomacy and information operations that seek to influence these governments and their populations would have a negative impact on AQ's ability to establish sanctuary, which would in turn limit the scope and scale of their operations. For these reasons, moderate Muslim governments are considered as a targetable vulnerability for al-Qaeda because of their ability to disrupt the AQ message.

Exploit Vulnerabilities

Considering the obvious "imbalance of power" as described by bin Laden, AQ is incapable of attacking conventional forces on a battlefield. As mentioned above, AQ uses terrorist tactics against its enemy's critical vulnerabilities to achieve its objectives with minimal resources and effort. [177] Population centers, symbols of power or installations of economic significance are targets that have proven to be effective at

[177] Jack Boureston and Charles Mahaffey, "Al-Qaeda and Mass Casualty Terrorism: Assessing the Threat"…, 37.

achieving propaganda by deed. The attacks on 9/11 resulted from AQ's exploitation of lax border and airport security in the US. The secondary effects of these attacks enabled AQ to exploit larger vulnerabilities, such as American paranoia and its hard charging nationalism. According to Scheuer, it was through the exploitation of these vulnerabilities that bin Laden lured the US, and its allies, into a war in Afghanistan.[178] This exploitation has also forced the US and its allies to spend billions on security measures designed to ensure that another 9/11 will not happen, while the organization has since attacked suitable targets with comparatively minuscule budgets. When considering the enemy's limitless exploitable vulnerabilities, the opportunities for al-Qaeda to attack significant targets are also limitless.

As an example of obvious economic vulnerabilities, there are thousands of kilometers of oil pipeline that are of critical economic importance to the United States and Canada. In total, it is estimated that in the US there are approx 56,000 kilometers of gathering lines, 88,000 kilometers of trunk lines (crude) and 152,000 kilometers of refined product lines that crisscross the country, with another 100,000 kilometers of various lines in Canada.[179] It is physically and economically impossible to secure all of these lines. Sea shipping containers are another important vulnerability. Every day, nearly 17,000 shipping containers arrive at one of the US's 300 ports. Of these, only 2% are inspected.[180] These are just two examples of critical vulnerabilities that AQ has the

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[178] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden*…, 130.

[179] "How Many Pipelines are there?," *Pipeline 101*, [internet site]; available from http://www.pipeline101.com/Overview/energy-pl.html; Internet; accessed 16 March 2011.

[180] J.F. Fritelli et al., *Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues* (New York: Novinka Books, 2003), 34.

ability to exploit with relative ease. Given Canada's economic dependence on the US, any disruption to trade in the US would have a significant impact on the Canadian economy as well. The will of the American population is another vulnerability that AQ is capable of exploiting. In Afghanistan and Iraq, AQ and its affiliates inflict casualties on allied forces to target the will of their enemy's population and to cause economic strain. This "death by a thousand cuts" tactic has been successful given the decline of US public support to the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.[181] The ability to attack US vulnerabilities is certainly a critical capability that facilitates the achievement of all three of AQ's political objectives.

The analysis of the means required for AQ to retain this capability has highlighted four critical requirements. Once again, the list is not exhaustive but will provide the data required to identify the most obvious of vulnerabilities for the purposes of this discussion. First, for al-Qaeda to attack its enemy's vulnerabilities, it needs weapons. Some form of power is necessary to achieve propaganda by deed and to force the hands of opposing state governance. Therefore, AQ needs the ability to acquire various types of weapons or to build them from readily available materials. While the related logistical challenges will be discussed below, it can be noted here that without weapons, AQ would not be capable of using or threatening the use of force on a scale that would allow it to achieve its objectives.

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[181] Jennifer Agiesta, "Public Supportive of Iraq, Afghanistan Drawdowns," *The Washington Post* (16 July 2010) [newspaper online]; available from http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind –the-numbers/2010/07/public_supportive_of_iraq_afgh.html; Internet; accessed 20 March 2011.

Secondly, unlike a conventional military force, AQ is hunted by law enforcement agencies worldwide. If some of the organization's members lack discipline or are inexperienced, they risk detection, which would in turn lead to cells being dismantled and operations disrupted. For example, an investigation triggered by the discovery of ricin, a highly toxic protein obtained from the pressed seeds of the castor-oil plant, in a London apartment led to the arrest of sixteen AQ operatives in Spain who were plotting a major European attack.[182] Therefore, it can be said that in order for AQ to successfully attack its enemy's vulnerabilities, its ability to avoid detection is a Critical Requirement.

In the pursuit of its objectives, AQ has operated and attacked targets in North America, in Europe, in Africa, across the Middle East and elsewhere around the world. To have a global effect, al-Qaeda needs the ability to successfully travel from one country to the next. As an example which speaks to the challenges that international travel may pose on AQ operatives, the arrest of a German citizen traveling from Afghanistan to Europe led to the disruption of a terrorist plot to attack several locations in Britain, France and Germany in 2010.[183] Once again, considering how detection leads to disruption, the ability for operatives to gain unimpeded access to foreign countries through various means is a CR.

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[182] "Major Al-Qaeda Attack Foiled," *BBC News* (24 Jan 2003) [online news]; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2690629.stm; Internet; accessed 15 March 2011.

[183] "Terror Plot Foiled," Al Jazeera and Agencies, Europe (29 Sept 2010) [online news]; available from http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2010/09/201092923819317720.html; Internet; accessed 15 March 2011.

Finally, AQ leadership requires the ability to communicate direction to the organization. Considering the decentralization of AQ since the 9/11 attacks and the emergence of various officially and unofficially affiliated groups, it is difficult to identify the degree to which communications are essential.[184] However, if AQ hopes to achieve its objectives, its leadership would needs to continue communicating guidance, intent and direction to its followers. This communication is facilitated by the globalization of media technologies. Senior AQ leadership is still capable of broadcasting encrypted messages through various forms of discourse, if ever it needed to do so. It is more probable that the organization as a whole is able to communicate with very little risk of detection over the internet. Furthermore, given these technologies, it is also capable of conducting its information operations campaign to gain the support of the masses, to instill fear into its enemy's populations and to encourage recruitment with little or no obstruction. Without these means of communications, it would be extremely difficult for AQ to attack its enemy's vulnerabilities in an international context.

Through the consideration of these critical requirements, several critical vulnerabilities can be identified. The most obvious are perhaps the difficulties associated with obtaining and moving weapons or their critical components, such as detonators, chemicals and explosives. Another vulnerability that can be considered is the use of weapons of mass destruction. In discourse, AQ has clearly voiced its intent of acquiring or building nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. While there is little evidence that indicates they may be successful, the use of such a weapon may in fact become a

[184] The decentralization of al-Qaeda will be discussed in further detail below.

vulnerability rather than a capability.[185] An attack of such magnitude may breath new life into American resolve, as with their allies, to continue fighting, rather than achieving the desired end state.

When considering the necessity to avoid detection and to gain access to foreign countries, the requirement to travel becomes a critical vulnerability that is targetable through various means of state power. AQ operatives are also vulnerable when they communicate with each other because the means that are used, namely the Internet and cellular telephones, are not secure means for the transmission of information. Communication can lead to detection and disruption. It would be difficult to envision the targeting of these vulnerabilities with military power, as is the case with the vulnerabilities associated with AQ's decentralized and clandestine methods of sustaining its operations.

Sustain Operations

The ability to sustain operations is another of AQ's critical capabilities, as operations on the scale of 9/11 would not be possible without it.[186] Similar to any military or civilian organization, the structure of AQ includes a logistical division that is charged with the provision of funds for buying weapons, paying salaries, compensating

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185 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, "Al Qaeda's Nuclear Ambitions," *Foreign Policy* (16 November, 2010) [on-line]; available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/16/al_qaedas_nuclear_ambitions?page=full; Internet; accessed 28 March 2011.

[186] Jack Boureston and Charles Mahaffey, "Al-Qaeda and Mass Casualty Terrorism: Assessing the Threat"…, 31.

families and handing out bribes.[187] They can also assist with travel arrangements and the shipment of weapons and equipment. In the execution of their most successful attacks, the sustainment piece of the planning and execution phases has been critical. Based on his Afghan experience, bin Laden built al-Qaeda as an organization that was fully capable of providing itself with the required "money and souls" to conduct global jihad.[188] While one could argue that since 9/11 a centralized logistical system is no longer possible, logistical support is still necessary even if it is decentralized amongst al-Qaeda affiliates.[189] Therefore, the ability to move money, people, weapons and equipment remains a critical capability. There are five critical requirements for sustainment that will be considered.

First, sanctuary and some form of state backing are again necessary. While there are examples of home grown attacks or attacks that have been planed and coordinated over the Internet, such as the Madrid train bombings in March of 2004, the reality is that large scale and relevant attacks of greater logistical complexity require space to reduce the risk of being detected and disrupted.[190] Given that the requirement for sanctuary has been discussed with sufficient detail above, it will not be elaborated on here.

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[187] Daniel Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy," *Foreign Policy* (7 December, 2010) [on-line]; available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/07/al_qaedas_m_and_a_strategy?page=full; Internet; accessed 28 March 2011.

[188] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden*…, 69.

[189] Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 134.

[190] Jim Arkedis, "Why Al Qaeda Wants a Safe Haven"…

Money is the second critical requirement that enables al-Qaeda to sustain its operations. Given the transnational nature of the organization, it is dependent on contributions from international donors for sources of funding.[191] This reality makes the international transfer of funds necessary. This was relatively easy to do through various legitimate businesses and banks in the 90s. [192] However, following the attacks of 9/11, many of AQ's assets were frozen and subsequent heavily tracked by various state counter-terror organizations. Despite this set-back, AQ has demonstrated remarkable flexibility and has managed to devise alternate methods to fund its operations. While sometimes aligning itself closely to international criminal organizations, it created legitimate and illegitimate institutions, charities and banks to allow for the undetected and unhindered movement of funds for its operatives around the world.[193] The ability for AQ to finance its operations is key, however targeting it is difficult and would not yield enough success to degrade AQ's capability of sustaining itself.

The physical movement of personnel and equipment requires, as do other critical capabilities, access to foreign countries. As previously mentioned, international travel and shipping create opportunities for detection and become critical vulnerabilities. As with the critical capability of targeting enemy vulnerabilities, methods of communications are also required for sustainment. Considering the complexity of AQ's logistical web, some method of communication, perhaps in the form of a legitimate enterprise, is absolutely required.

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[191] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden*…, 50.

[192] Angel Rabassa, *Beyond Al Qaeda: Part 1; The Global Jihadist Movement* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2006), 57.

[193] *Ibid*., 57.

The international movement of money, people, weapons and equipment theoretically requires international cooperation, which is the fifth CR that will be considered for sustainment. It would be extremely difficult for sustainment of this nature to be possible without the assistance of facilitators in destination countries. The requirement of this cooperation may be exploitable if effectively targeted by a comprehensive information operations campaign and/or by diplomacy. International cooperation is thus considered as a critical vulnerability that is targetable. While the use of commercial systems, such sea delivery systems and airlift, to sustain their operations is an example of how AQ is exploiting its enemy's vulnerabilities, it is also a vulnerability for the organization itself as it risks detection. Traceable funds also remain a vulnerability despite the fact that AQ has developed various clandestine means to move funds internationally with relative success. Considering the challenges related to tracing money underground, this particular means is not ideal for effective targeting and should not be considered as a critical vulnerability. However, as a viable means for the US and its allies to deny AQ its capability to sustain itself, attempts at intercepting funding, at denying its sanctuary and at prioritizing intelligence collection and sharing should be maintained.

Recruitment and Training

Without people, al-Qaeda would not be able to achieve its objectives; therefore the ability to recruit and train them is a critical capability.[194] The means with which AQ has been able to sustain itself with human resources have evolved considerably since 9/11. As the particular conditions that existed under Taliban sanctuary disappeared, the organization's structure decentralized, as did its methods of recruitment and training. As Jason Burke suggested in 2004, the best bin Laden could do following 9/11 was to provide broad strategic guidance aimed at autonomous cells that were able to function without him.[195] And as Daniel Byman chimed, "Maintaining effective command from remote parts of Pakistan was always difficult; the U.S. drone campaign has made it even harder."[196] However, based on his latest messages, it is also a known fact that bin Laden has access to the internet, which could provide him with the means to issue direction to subordinates. Scheuer makes a compelling argument as to how false assumptions have repeatedly resulted from bin Laden's "extended silences."[197] Bin Laden's inability to command the organization is one of those assumptions that have emerged from little more than wishful thinking.[198] Therefore, it can be assumed that bin Laden's ability to exercise control over al-Qaeda's operations are limited to some degree because he has

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[194] James A. Bliss, "Al Qaeda's Center of Gravity" (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 2004), 6.

[195] Jason Burke, "Think Again: Al Qaeda," *Foreign Policy* (1 May 2004) [on-line]; available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/05/01/think_again_al_qaeda?page=full; Internet; accessed 28 March 2011.

[196] Daniel Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy"…

[197] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden*…, 135.

[198] *Ibid*., 135.

been forced to go into hiding. Nonetheless, despite the perceived decentralization of al-Qaeda, it may be dangerous to assume that the organization is no longer capable of operating in a coordinated and hierarchical fashion.

In relation to recruitment, AQ's decentralization is reflected by the fact that it is creating or enabling franchises with the help of other terrorist organizations. For example, it received members of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which renamed itself the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[199] AQ is expanding much like organized crime in that smaller national level organizations are merging under its banner and are conducting operations internationally. In 2009 jihadists in Yemen and Saudi Arabia announced a merger under the AQ in the Arabian Peninsula and began conducting international operations such as the Detroit plot as well as a plan to blow up cargo planes as they approached US cities.[200] These affiliated organizations offer many practical rewards to AQ central, such as fighters and additional smuggling networks. For instance, AQ in Iraq (AQI), under Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi, managed recruits, money and public affairs independently of bin Laden. Affiliation with an already well-established organization precluded the need for AQ central to worry about recruiting, training and commanding entire units of fighters. However, these affiliated groups offer more than just practical rewards. In the case of the AQI, bin Laden had little or no influence over its operations in Iraq.[201] AQ central was unable to establish control over its Iraqi affiliate,

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[199] Daniel Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy"…

[200] "US Charges Nigerian Suspect Over Plane Bomb Plot," *BBC News* (6 January 2010) [online news]: available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8444694.stm: Internet; accessed 19 April 2011.

[201] Peter Bergen, *The Longest War* (New York: Free Press, 2011), 271.

who was essentially pursuing its own historical agenda by targeting Shiite Muslims and also killing Sunni civilians in the process. In the end, the AQI was to become a substantial liability for AQ because of its use of ruthless and indiscriminating violence, which in turn reduced support and respect for the organization as a whole. Therefore, the franchising of the AQ banner and the loose command structure that resulted from decentralization could be exploited as a vulnerability.

The study of the capability to recruit and train reveals six principal critical requirements. First, for AQ to have the ability to recruit and train its jihadists, sanctuary, as described above, is a critical requirement. Without sanctuary, it would not be possible to indoctrinate and train new members to the same degree as the men who participated in the September 11th attacks. Secondly, to encourage the young to leave their families and homes to fight and die there is a requirement for charismatic leadership. Bin Laden provides this leadership to jihadists across the Islamist world. He has become an icon of the struggle against globalization, secularism and the US, with his image being further glorified by the inability of the US and its allies to catch him. His removal would most probably not cause the collapse of the organization; it would suffice to say that the lasting effects of his influence as a martyr would fuel the participation of many individuals in the fight against the oppressors of Islam. Capturing bin Laden and, as Bruce Hoffman has stated, forcing him to endure treatment similar to the treatment endured by Saddam Hussein would humanize his image and would ultimately have a more lasting impact.[202] Nonetheless, bin Laden would eventually need to be replaced by a leader of equal significance. Considering that bin Laden's influence would increase if he was to become

[202] Peter Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 383.

a martyr and that the al-Qaeda would continue to exist without him, he is not a critical requirement and cannot be considered as a significant vulnerability to the organization.

The third CR for recruitment is its dependence on financing. Without money, it would not be possible for recruits to travel, nor would it be possible to house them and feed them. Money is required for advertising and for purchasing training equipment. Teachers and installations also require money. In the case of this CC, access to foreign countries and the inherent ability to conduct international travel are a fourth CR for recruiting and training as the movement of people is obviously necessary. As previously mentioned, means of communications are also necessary for al-Qaeda to conduct its recruiting campaign, to invite new fighters to training camps and to ensure the advertising necessary for canvassing the necessary funds and public support.

The last critical requirement for the conduct of recruitment and training are madrassas and Islamist teachers. International Madrassas, or schools, run by extreme Islamist Mullahs are necessary to promulgate the Islamist ideal and convince otherwise moderate individuals that it is their Muslim duty to fight the oppressors of Islam. Without these individuals, al-Qaeda would not have been able to grow into a serious global non-state actor. These extremist teachers could be considered as critical vulnerabilities, because they are reasonably few in numbers and are relatively easier to target in an international counter-terrorism context than al-Qaeda leadership would be. Generally speaking, it would be easier to collect information on them, as they would tend to live out in the open with the general population. The risk, however, would be to create the illusion of intolerance and oppression if they were to be targeted in any way other

than through information operations. The targeting of Islamist extremism at its source could easily become a double-edged sword and would be dangerous.

Three critical vulnerabilities can be deduced from these Critical Requirements. First, the franchising of al-Qaeda and the assumingly reduced central command structure is a vulnerability that could easily be leveraged by an effective information operations campaign or by other and various forms of state power. A degree of international cooperation is necessary for this particular situation to be effective. If that cooperation or dedication is lacking, such as it did in the case of the AQI, then it could hinder al-Qaeda in an important way. Therefore, attempts could be made to leverage those differences and to take advantage of that situation. Secondly, international travel appears once again as a targetable critical vulnerability as the movement of people from one country to another would be necessary to conduct the advanced training required for large-scale operations. Last, sanctuary is also and once again a critical vulnerability to conduct the advanced training required for complex terrorist attacks. The analysis of the requirements for recruiting and training lead to another logical and essential capability: the ability to establish public support.

Establish Public Support

The last critical capability that will be discussed is al-Qaeda's ability to establish public support. This capability has an overarching importance and effect on many of the critical requirements that give al-Qaeda the capabilities that will assist in the achievement of its political objectives. For example, public support will greatly influence the ability to

obtain weapons or their components. It will assist al-Qaeda operatives in avoiding detection. Public support is reflected through the assistance provided to operatives in gaining access to foreign countries. It is necessary to establish sanctuary and to obtain enough donations to allow for the financial survival of the organization. In many ways, public support is essential to recruitment and is a key component to the contemporary franchising of al-Qaeda. In this context, public support also greatly influences the degree to which the international cooperation required for success is effective. From a strategic perspective, public support is necessary for the achievement of propaganda by deed. Al-Qaeda needs the support of like-minded Islamists; otherwise its existence would be threatened. Public support is a key necessity for a transnational non-state terrorist organization like al-Qaeda.

There are four critical requirements for al-Qaeda to maintain the capability to establish public support. First, the Internet as described earlier provides the means necessary for al-Qaeda to issue its guidance and to broadcast its propaganda. If forced to employ traditional media to promulgate its messaging, it is doubtful that al-Qaeda would be able to achieve the success and influence that it currently has. Mass media facilitates the production of increasingly large propaganda with smaller deeds. The second requirement is charismatic leadership. As previously discussed, bin Laden and his super-human stature among extreme Islamists provide this leadership to disillusioned individuals around the globe.

The third requirement of public support is the perception of legitimacy. Bin Laden has generally used the Koran to justify al-Qaeda's reasons for jihad against its

various enemies and to legitimize the use of terror in the pursuit of his objectives. As was demonstrated by the AQI's exaggerated use of violence in Iraq, this perception of legitimacy is fragile and can be considered as an important vulnerability. The last critical requirement for al-Qaeda to establish public support is the absence of an effective information operations campaign to counter its own propaganda. Education is key and information could be used to reach the uneducated and disillusioned masses in a more convincing manner. Al-Qaeda's influence is possible only because there is no viable counter-argument.

All of these requirements are vulnerabilities; however, it is judged that the following two are of greater importance. First, the fragility of al-Qaeda's legitimacy could be exploited when considering its current decentralized organization. If one could convince its recruitment and support base that it is, in fact, an illegitimate organization that is corrupting Islam for its political interests, significant damage would be caused. This ties in very closely to the second vulnerability, which is the information operations campaign. If a counter-information-operations campaign that would target the less educated and disillusioned recruitment base for lower level al-Qaeda fighters could be successfully initiated, al-Qaeda's ability to gain public support would certainly be affected, as would the various critical requirements that are dependent on it. Therefore, al-Qaeda's information operations campaign is considered as an important critical vulnerability.

SUMMARY

This chapter has used a modified Strange analysis model to deduce al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities. The model has been explained before briefly touching on the origins of al-Qaeda as a "terrorist" organization. The Strange analysis was conducted in consideration of al-Qaeda's three main strategic objectives. While the deductions that were made are not exhaustive, it is believed that the critical requirements that have been identified are amongst the most important and the most pertinent for this discussion, which forms the context for evaluating Canadian foreign security policy. In the next chapter, these vulnerabilities will be used to determine how well Canada's foreign security policy is at directly reducing the threat that al-Qaeda poses to Canadian citizens.

CHAPTER 6 – EXAMINATION OF POLICY

The targeting of the most critical of al-Qaeda's vulnerabilities with the appropriate sources of state power is necessary to degrade the organization's capabilities and relevance on the global stage. This being said, the purpose of this analysis is to examine the pertinence of Canadian foreign security policy with respect to al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities. Through the modified Strange analysis, the examination of al-Qaeda's critical capabilities has revealed seven principal vulnerabilities: 1) moderate Muslim governments, 2) the requirement to move and acquire weapons and components, 3) the requirement to conduct international travel, 4) the requirement to communicate, 5) the requirement for international cooperation with other organizations or sympathizers, 6) AQ franchising and the associated risks to legitimacy and 7) the effects of a well planned and properly executed information operations campaign countering AQ discourse.

To appropriately frame the examination of Canadian foreign security policy, the comprehensive approach, a key tenet mentioned in chapter 4, will be used to categorize the means with which the above-mentioned CVs can be effectively targeted. To this end, the diplomacy – information – military – economic (DIME), a simple acronym representing a whole-of-government approach, will be appropriated. The American DIME format is preferred over its Canadian equivalent (defence – diplomacy – development (DDD)) for the simple fact that it possesses an "information" tenet, which is considered by the author to be of utmost importance in this particular study. Ultimately, this analysis will argue that Canada's heavy reliance on the military in its foreign security policy is not consistent with the means required to effectively target critical

vulnerabilities. This chapter will thus be divided into four parts: military, diplomacy, information and economic. The military tenet is purposefully being placed first as it will help contextualize further discussion. It will conclude with thoughts on how Canada might be able to improve its foreign security policy in a manner that would positively reflect its liberal foreign policy tradition and its national interests.

MILITARY

While conducting this analysis, it became surprisingly apparent that none of al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities as described could be effectively targeted solely by military sources of physical power. As previously established, the bulk of Canada's "Away Game" is its military involvement in Afghanistan, which has provided limited positive results during the last decade. The deployment of Canadian military assets to Afghanistan can be justified by the fact that Canadian foreign security policy focuses on failed and failing states, and Afghanistan is certainly one of them. For regional stability to exist, there must be effective governance. For the creation of new and effective governance to be possible in a failed state, a safe and secure environment must be established. Therefore, military capabilities are certainly necessary to maintain that environment until the host nation is strong enough to maintain it on its own. However, Afghanistan is not the only failed or failing state, yet Canada's efforts have been solely focused on a single country for a decade.

The reality for Canada as a middle power is simple: security for Canadians means relying on others. Therefore, the Canadian government is following its liberal foreign

policy tradition by maintaining its relationship with the US and by actively participating in its various multilateral engagements, and this despite the requirement to diverge from its human values based principles. The Canadian government is not focused on directly reducing al-Qaeda's capabilities so much as it is attempting to increase its credibility amongst its allies on the world stage. By doing so, as claimed in Canadian policy, the threat posed to Canada by al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization is indirectly being reduced.

DIPLOMACY

When considering the Global War on Terror, most people envision conventional armies fighting insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan, when in fact defence diplomacy is a tool that is of far greater importance. As an alternative to military power, defence diplomacy via multilateralism is proving to be a viable method in applying soft power in order to achieve political objectives. Unprecedented levels of economic interdependence and mutual reliance on the global commons have created new vulnerabilities for states, as many recognize they cannot adequately address these challenges on their own. Moreover, vis-à-vis non-traditional security threats, such as terrorism, which increasingly transcend borders and criss-cross regionally, states are relying more on multilateral approaches to international defence and security relations. Canada's abilities with regards to defence diplomacy are enabled by the multilateralism that it has traditionally adhered to since the end of the Second World War. For example, Canada's heavy involvement with the United Nations (UN) includes its membership in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), based in Montreal, which aims to maintain civil aviation security. It also enables its membership in the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which

similarly upholds maritime security.[203] Canada's involvement in the UN is also reflected by its response to the counter-terrorism measures implemented by United Nations resolutions and by the Counter-Terrorism Committee.[204] Canada's partnership with the European Union, as reflected by the EU-Canada Partnership Agenda, is also testament to Canadian multilateralism and the importance it places on diplomacy to "tackle" global security issues.[205] This partnership has helped to establish important international norms that increase international security in the domains of money laundering, document security and travel security.[206] Canada's membership in the G8 is another important tool that allows it to apply soft power in the form of diplomacy in a manner that gives it additional leverage on the international stage. In all, Canada is a member in over fifty international organizations and twelve conventions.[207] Diplomacy, through multilateralism, presents Canada with the opportunity to retain influence on the international stage and shape outcomes from a military and defence perspective.

Diplomacy does not only apply to inter-state relations and can be used to affect terrorism. Arguably, diplomacy can be effectively employed to address four of the eight

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[203] Wyn Rees, *Transatlantic-Counter Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 132.

[204] Letter dated 23 March 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/297/90/PDF/N0629790.pdf?OpenElement, 4 May 2006.

[205] European Union, *EU-Canada Partnership Agenda*, EU-Canada Summit (Ottawa, 18 March 2004); Available from http://eeas.europa.eu/canada/docs/partnership_agenda_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 March 2011.

[206] Wyn Rees, *Transatlantic-Counter Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative*…, 132.

[207] Margaret Purdy, "Canada's Counterterrorism Policy," in *How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West*, ed. Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, 105-128 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 126.

critical vulnerabilities mentioned above. For instance, moderate Muslim governments could be swayed through various forms of diplomacy. The careful application of cooperation agreements, deterrence measures and diplomatic partnerships, while taking consideration of cultural issues, is an effective way for Canada to affect this CV. The second and third CVs that are already affected by diplomatic measures are the movement of weapons and international travel. Canada's participation in various international organizations renders the placing of international counter-terror measures possible, which in turn makes the shipments of weapons and the international movement of people extremely challenging. Finally, diplomacy could indirectly influence AQ affiliates or other forms of international cooperation through the states within which they operate. Diplomacy is a powerful tool among states in the pursuit of international stability and of national interests. When leveraged with its participation in various international organizations, Canada is capable of applying effective diplomacy to reduce the threat of non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda, despite its middle-power status.

INFORMATION

For the purposes of this discussion, "information" will not only consider the sharing of information with international partners, but will also include other important sources of soft power such as intelligence and Information Operations (IO). The former is of critical importance when attempting to counter an asymmetrical threat. Terrorism cannot be detected by radars or unmanned aerial vehicles. Much like organized crime, information on organizations such as al-Qaeda need to be collected through a host of clandestine means such as electronic warfare and infiltration. Failure to collect

actionable intelligence on its enemy would place Canada on the defensive and force it to adopt reactionary measures to possible threats. Recognizing the importance of intelligence, Canada has increased the budget of its CSIS by 32% since 9/11.[208] However, a foreign intelligence agency comparable to the CIA has yet to be established; therefore, Canada is dependent on its allies in this respect. In terms of foreign security policy, IO seems to have been left unconsidered.

The single most important force multiplier available to military commanders and policy makers at all levels is information operations (IO). Unfortunately, it is often misunderstood and rarely used with any effectiveness. While the related Canadian Forces doctrine is in dire need of being re-written, IO encompasses various essential means to influence populations, governments and opponents alike. First, there is electronic warfare (EW), which is capable of disrupting or delaying through the use of electronic attack measures, but which is also capable of electronic protection as well as the identification and localization of potential threats.[209] EW is one of the most effective means to gather information on terrorist organizations. Second, IO is capable of conducting computer attack, defence and exploitation, the latter of which applies more specifically to information collection in an asymmetric environment. Third, IO includes the conduct of psychological operations (PSY OPS), which is a key capability that governments and militaries can use in support of a variety, if not all, of their operations. As defined by the US Department of Defence, PSY OPS involve:

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[208] Margaret Purdy, "Canada's Counterterrorism Policy"…, 124.

[209] Department of Defence, Joint Pub 3-13 *Info Ops* (Washington: US Department of Defence, 2006), I-7.

> (…) planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.[210]

Finally, IO entails the application of operations security measures that aim to deny critical information to potential opponents.[211] There are also various supporting and related capabilities within IO that could be used to one's advantage, such as public affairs. While the importance of IO has come to light over the last decade with the counter-insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is very little doctrine or policy that has been produced and implemented to be effectively applied against al-Qaeda on an international and strategic scale. IO is a war winning capability that requires greater attention.

That said, intelligence and IO could affect all seven of the identified CVs to varying degrees depending on their priority and on the limited capabilities available to the Canadian government. For instance, various forms of IO could be used in a supporting role to diplomacy in Canada's efforts to affect moderate Muslim governments in the Middle East. IO could also be used with diplomacy, or in its stead, to negatively affect al-Qaeda's international cooperation net. The sharing of intelligence through multilateral engagements facilitates the denial of international travel to al-Qaeda operatives and makes the movement of weapons and their components difficult in an international context. The various EW measures could either hinder communications between AQ members or could facilitate the collection of information and actionable

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[210] Department of Defence, Joint Pub 3-13 *Info Ops* (Washington: US Department of Defence, 2006), II-1.

[211] *Ibid*., I-7.

intelligence on their whereabouts, their intent or the conduct of their operations. The benefits of IO within this context are limitless and are essential to succeed in reducing the threats posed by organizations such as al-Qaeda.

A characteristic that renders al-Qaeda difficult to target is its decentralized structure. IO, and more specifically PSY OPS, could be used by Canada and its allies to either dissociate the franchises or to apply important blows to al-Qaeda's legitimacy in the Middle Eastern community and on the world stage. So far, this capability has not been used to its full potential in this area. Furthermore, a counter-IO campaign should be put into place in order to affect public opinion and to discredit or invalidate AQ discourse. Political discourse, while perhaps partially useful at home, is of little use to influence populations in the Middle East. Alternative measures, whether they be clandestine or not, need to be taken. From a military perspective, IO does not merely support military operations, but is an integral part of them from the planning phases all the way to execution. From a DIME perspective, the same should be considered. All diplomatic, military or economic measures should have an IO component to them. Furthermore, foreign security policy should include IO measures instead of uniquely concentrating all efforts on military resources when considering security abroad.

ECONOMIC

Economic development is used to both encourage international stability and to uphold Canada's traditional human values based foreign policy. In 2009, Canada had invested $616.5 million in foreign economic development, although most of it was spent

in Afghanistan and in Iraq.[212] Economic development is also an important tool that can be used in conjunction with defence diplomacy and information operations to entice international cooperation in the struggle to prevent terrorism. The creation of economic ties, as previously mentioned, also encourages governments to maintain good and peaceful relationships. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has the primary responsibility of ensuring this function within the government. However, its effectiveness at contributing to global security within the Comprehensive Approach is debatable.

CIDA's mission is to help people in poverty and to realize Canada's development objectives.[213] These development objectives originate from a parallel mandate and only marginally support other government departments in their efforts to influence global security. This is demonstrated by a misalignment of priorities between CIDA and DFAIT. For example, CIDA prioritizes development in twenty countries, only three of which, Afghanistan, Haiti and Honduras, can be found in DFAIT's engagement strategy.[214] This is in contrast to CIDA's American counterpart, the USAID, which furthers the US' foreign policy interests in "expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world."[215] Unlike CIDA, USAID

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[212] Margaret Purdy, "Canada's Counterterrorism Policy"…, 126.

[213] Canadian International Development Agency, *Mission and Mandate*, [website]; available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NIC-5493749-HZK; Internet; accessed 18 April 2011.

[214] Canadian International Development Agency, *Regions and Countries*, [website]; available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NIC-5482847-GN3 and http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/priorities-priorites.aspx; Internet; accessed 24 March 2011.

[215] USAID, *This is USAID*, [website]; available from http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/; Internet; accessed 24 March 2011.

does not do "development for the sake of development", but rather plays an important role in supporting larger strategic objectives. This is an important area of improvement for foreign security policy that would strengthen the effectiveness of Canada's CA toolbox.

Other than maintaining the CAN-US relationship and fulfilling multilateral responsibilities, Canada has not reaped many concrete benefits from its military participation in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Canada's image of being a leader in specialized roles, such as diplomacy, peacekeeping and multilateralism, has eroded. This erosion was a contributing factor to Canada losing its bid for a seat in the United Nations Security Counsel in October 2010. As described by Michael Ignatieff, "…It's part of the general pattern of disappointing results for Canada on the international stage."[216] However, it may be possible for Canada to redeem its international reputation while continuing to adhere to its foreign policy tradition.

A REVISED CANADIAN APPROACH

As the world system transformed at the end of the Cold War, so did Canada's application of its foreign policy tradition. While it has maintained CAN-US relations and multilateralism as key foreign policy tenets, it has diverged from its traditional human values based principles, as demonstrated by its involvement in combat operations in

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[216] CBC News, "Cannon Blames Ignatieff for Canada's UN Vote Loss," CBC News, 12 October 2010, available from http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/10/12/un-vote012.html; Internet; accessed 3 November 2010.

Afghanistan. If Canada is to improve its foreign security policy in a way that would tangibly reduce the threat that al-Qaeda poses to its citizens, four critical improvements need to be made: 1) educate and change discourse on terrorism; 2) embrace traditional specialized roles while leveraging the effects of globalization; 3) refine the comprehensive approach; and 4) determine and define the end state.

Firstly, Canadians need to understand their opponents: know your enemy. To this end, leaders need to inform Canadians on the nature of the threat. False impressions in discourse contribute to the establishment of inappropriate measures to deal with the problem. As such, an acknowledgement of what AQ is as an organization and what its members are fighting for would be a considerable step forward. This understanding at the strategic level would undoubtedly have an effect on how the government deals with issues related to the threat.

Terrorism is often a term used by targeted states to delegitimize the actions of a given group, as describe in chapter 2. Terms such as the "War on Terror" amplify the misunderstanding of what a group that uses terrorism is trying to achieve. Therefore, Canada should halt discourse related to fighting "terrorism." Hoffman and Kilcullen both refer to the contemporary terrorist phenomenon as "Global Insurgency," and perhaps this could also be considered as a new perception of the global situation from a Canadian perspective as well. Referring to terrorists as insurgents may dissociate their use of terrorism from the political objectives they are attempting to achieve. A commonly shared understanding of what these political objectives are, paired with a respect for

cultural differences, would undoubtedly enable policy makers to target their capabilities more effectively and efficiently.

The second suggested improvement relates to Canada reverting back to its traditional specialized roles. This is not to say that it should avoid participating in combat operations when the situation dictates, but rather that it should exploit other sources of state power to maximize its effects on the opponent. As mentioned above, the conditions exist for Canada to excel as a leader in the establishment of innovative diplomatic measures to counter al-Qaeda's capabilities. Its respected position in various multilateral organizations would easily give it the leverage required to take these initiatives, while carefully allowing it to dissociate itself from its American ally. For example, Canada has the multicultural and historically tolerant background required to devise an information operations campaign that could educate the general Middle Eastern population while simultaneously countering AQ discourse. It could achieve this by rallying the help and support of its allies while applying its traditionally peaceful diplomatic pressure on targeted governments to gain their cooperation.

Third, there is a clear need for Canada to improve its strategic comprehensive approach to stability operations. The CA currently applies to the conduct of operational level activities within Afghanistan. This whole-of-government approach needs to be brought up to the strategic level and applied to reduce the global risk that organizations such as al-Qaeda pose to Canada at an international level. By placing greater importance on the CA, while at the same time understanding the military's supporting role within it, the application of the correct form of state power would be facilitated. In theory, through

this approach, Canada would have greater success in reducing al-Qaeda's critical capabilities.

Finally, Canada should consider its own desired end state. It is clear that Canada will want to protect its citizens and ensure that no terrorist plot is staged within its borders. Beyond this, it is important to determine what Canada wants to achieve with groups such as al-Qaeda that pose threats to its citizens. It would not be realistic to think that Canada and its NATO allies could dismantle or neutralize al-Qaeda completely. Through the study of Cronin's depiction of how terrorist organizations end, it becomes quite clear that military dominance is not one of them.[217] However, Canada is able to influence the outcome of this conflict through other means. Cronin describes two ways in which terrorist organizations cease to exist that could potentially apply to al-Qaeda, if one is to assume that "achievement of the cause" will not occur.[218] First, there is the failure to effectively transfer the cause from one generation to the next. This could be greatly influenced through a Canadian drafted information operations campaign that aims to influence and educate the follow on generation. The second way is through the loss of popular support, which again could be influenced through effective information operations. In both cases, Canada could leverage the effects of globalization to its benefit to promulgate information. It is clear that failed and failing states cannot be ignored and that robust military capabilities will be required for Canada into the

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[217] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, edited by Russell D. Howard et al., 592-624 (New York: McGraw Hill, 2009), 599.

[218] *Ibid., 599.*

foreseeable future. However, other forms of state soft power need to be used to complement the military efforts and to achieve long lasting effects.

Revising the Canadian approach to foreign security policy is a necessity it to effectively address the critical vulnerabilities of groups who employ terrorism. It has been argued here that four critical improvements need to be made: 1) educate and change discourse on terrorism; 2) embrace traditional specialized roles while leveraging the effects of globalization; 3) refine the comprehensive approach; and 4) determine and define the end state. Canada possesses the potential to develop and perfect alternate means of state power. By opting for its traditional specialized roles, it could increase its influence on the world stage while reducing the threat posed by non-state actors to Canadian citizens.

CONCLUSION

Appropriating a modified Strange analysis model, this paper has demonstrated that Canada's current foreign and security policy does not significantly reduce the capabilities of groups, such as al-Qaeda, who use terrorism as a means to achieve their ends. Through the establishment of six enduring components of contemporary terrorism, it has been shown that terrorism is in fact a tactic used by non-state actors in the pursuit of political objectives. The enabling factors associated with globalization have been highlighted, the most significant of which are the advances in media technology that give non-state actors the capability to act on the world stage. The frustrations that can be caused by globalization have also been discussed and should be taken into consideration by policy makers when attempting to deal with global threats such as terrorism. Ultimately, the effects of globalization must not be ignored and should even be leveraged and used to Canada's advantage.

Despite a lack of clear policy documentation, it has been established that Canada's foreign security policy consists of addressing failed and failing states through a comprehensive approach while using primarily military resources. While this approach is arguably aligned with Canada's traditional liberal foreign policy tenets of CAN-US relations and multilateralism, Canada has diverged from its traditional human values based specialized roles because of its heavy military contribution to the War on Terror. Through the modified Strange analysis, the examination of al-Qaeda's critical capabilities has revealed seven principal vulnerabilities: 1) moderate Muslim governments, 2) the requirement to move and acquire weapons and components, 3) the requirement to

conduct international travel, 4) the requirement to communicate, 5) the requirement for international cooperation with other organizations or sympathizers, 6) AQ franchising and the associated risks to legitimacy and 7) the effects of a well planned and properly executed information operations campaign countering AQ discourse. It has been argued that none of these vulnerabilities can be effectively targeted through the use of military power.

Finally, it has been suggested that if Canada is to improve its "Away Game" in a way that would tangibly reduce the threat that al-Qaeda poses to its citizens, four critical improvements to policy would need to be considered: 1) educate and change discourse on terrorism; 2) embrace traditional specialized roles while leveraging the effects of globalization; 3) refine the comprehensive approach; and 4) determine and define the end state. There is scope for Canada to embrace its traditional specialized roles and human values based foreign policy through the development of alternate state power capabilities. This could be achieved though the development of a strategic level information operations capability. While requiring minimal resources, IO could easily become a specialty for Canada given its multicultural background. It would also allow for Canada to directly affect al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities.

Policy may need to be modified to reflect exactly what Canada's desired end state resembles and how it aims to achieve it. If Canada's aim is to invest in Afghanistan to be able to reap the benefits of its multilateral engagements and its relationship with the US, then existing policy is sufficient. If policy makers want to reduce the threat that organizations such as al-Qaeda pose to Canada as a whole, the deliberate and surgical

targeting of relevant critical vulnerabilities will be a necessity. These vulnerabilities cannot be targeted solely with physical military power; therefore, new emphasis on other forms of state power would need be developed and prioritized.

Regardless of whether al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities are targeted or not, the problem will not be resolved in the near future; therefore, Canada needs to be prepared for a protracted struggle which could last more than a generation. In the meantime, it is paramount to continue to put emphasis on the defensive measures associated with the "Home Game" to ensure Canada's protection, while more efficient methods for reducing the threat to Canadian citizens are implemented in the "Away Game" following the withdrawal from combat operations in Afghanistan. From a strategic and political perspective, further study is required to determine whether al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations have in fact morphed from terrorist organizations into a decentralized movement. If they have, it would be useful for Canadian policy makers to understand if the contemporary global threat that is posed by them can in fact be categorized as a global insurgency. Understanding the nature of the problem is crucial in determining its solution.

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MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

The Away Game:
An Analysis of Canada's
Foreign Security Policy

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ABSTRACT

Appropriating a modified Strange Analysis framework, the author argues that Canada's foreign security policy does not significantly reduce the capabilities of groups who use terrorism as a means to achieve their ends. The difficulties related to defining terrorism are discussed, six enduring components of terrorism are highlighted, and the enabling effects of globalization on the use of terrorism are considered. Within this context, Canada's role in the global "War on Terror" is explained through its liberal foreign policy traditions. Employing al-Qaeda as a case study, Canadian foreign security policy is examined through the discussion of al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities and within a Diplomacy-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) format. The author ultimately concludes that Canada's foreign security policy does not aim to reduce al-Qaeda's ability to conduct operations, but rather seeks to establish security for its citizens through its traditional relationship with the United States and the fulfillment of its multilateral engagements.

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INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that contemporary terrorism has roots that extend well into the 1970s, the attacks against the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001 brought it home to Canadians in a way that they had not experienced in the past. Twenty-four Canadians were killed and suddenly, from a geographical perspective, North America was no longer impervious to attacks. As borders with the United States closed and air travel halted, Canadian policy makers were forced to consider measures necessary to protect the country's citizens and interests at home, while meeting threats far from Canada's borders.

There are no clear lines separating Canada's "Home Game" from its "Away Game," as they are inextricably linked by the nature of the transnational terrorist threat. However, one could conclude that in general terms the former predominantly involves a series of defensive and reactionary measures, while the latter is more offensive, pro-active, pre-emptive and disruptive. The defensive measures are necessary and unavoidable to ensure homegrown terrorism is disrupted and to reduce the effects of any future attacks. Nonetheless, while these measures may reduce the effects of the threat, they will never reduce the threat itself. As the best defence is often considered to be the adoption of offensive measures, this paper will concentrate its analysis on Canada's "Away Game:" it will discuss the pro-active application of various forms of state power abroad that are aimed at reducing the threat of terrorism at home.

Despite not being a direct target of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, there are clear strategic objectives for Canada to engage in the global "War on Terror." Specifically, Canada has four reasons for reducing al-Qaeda's ability to conduct its operations. First, Canada has been identified in Osama bin Laden's discourse as a target because of the support it is providing to the United States in the global War on Terror. Second, Canada has the obligation to carry its share of the burden in defending North America, and therefore must take the necessary measures to ensure that the staging of a terrorist attack on Canadian territory never happens. Third, Canada must fulfill its multilateral engagements as a means to continue to "punch above its weight" in international politics.[1] Finally, peace and security abroad means good business at home; therefore, Canada is inherently interested in global stability in the pursuit of its economic interests. While there are many more justifications, these are important to establish Canada's interest in the "Away Game".

In the War on Terror, Canadian foreign security policy has essentially prioritized the deployment of military force to one failed state: Afghanistan. Regarding the looming withdrawal from a military combat role in Kandahar, there are generally two schools of thought within Canadian borders. The first, and most popular in political discourse, is that Canada has done its fair share and that it is time to pass on the responsibility of establishing peace and security in Kandahar province to other NATO allies. The second is that the mission is not complete and that withdrawal is essentially accepting defeat. However, in both cases, it is generally common knowledge that little progress has been

[1] Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How we lost our place in the world* (Toronto: The Canadian Publishers, 2003), 7.

made in Afghanistan since the beginning of Canada's mission.[2] This is clearly demonstrated by how the insurgency has consistently gained momentum since 2002. With this in mind, the pertinence of the mission can be analyzed in relation to the hefty cost of human and financial resources associated with it. Considering the limited success of the mission, one could wonder whether a broader strategic vision should have been employed to better understand the problem and to creatively apply various forms of state soft power to reduce the threat of terrorism to Canadian citizens.

Utilizing an analysis model developed by Joe Strange, this paper will argue that Canada's foreign security policy does not significantly reduce the capabilities of groups who use terrorism as a means to achieve their ends. Prior to conducting the analysis, in chapter 2, the difficulties related to defining terrorism will be discussed whereas six enduring components of it will be highlighted for the purposes of this discussion. It will be argued that terrorism is a tactic: a means to achieve political objectives, vice an ideology or an end in itself. In preparation for the analysis, the enabling effects of globalization on the use of terrorism as a tactic will be considered in chapter 3. Canadian foreign security policy will be discussed in chapter 4 while considering Canada's liberal foreign policy tradition as a means of explaining its participation in the global "War on Terror." Then, using al-Qaeda as a case study within a modified Strange analysis framework, chapter 5 will deduce critical vulnerabilities from some of the organization's capabilities. Finally, in chapter 6, Canadian foreign security policy will be examined through the discussion of al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities and within a diplomacy-

[2] Statement based off of enemy initiated attacks in Afghanistan from March 2004 to March 2010. See Charles Michael Johnson Jr., *Afghanistan's Security Environment* (Washington: United States Government Accountability Office, 2010), 3.

information-military-economic format. This paper will ultimately conclude that Canada's foreign security policy does not aim to reduce al-Qaeda's ability to conduct operations, but rather seeks to establish security for its citizens through its traditional relationship with the United States and through the maintenance of its multilateral engagements.

CHAPTER 2 – WHAT IS TERRORISM?

Defining terrorism is impossible, yet to effectively examine Canada's foreign security policy regarding terrorism, a conceptual understanding of it must be established. The misunderstanding of what it is and what it means in domestic and international contexts would inevitably lead to false assumptions and inappropriate courses of action. With a view of isolating what terrorism is in a physical sense and to minimize its pejorative nature, this chapter will identify a six enduring characteristics that best describe 21st century terrorism. These characteristics will be useful in the analysis of al-Qaeda's vulnerabilities and will serve as the foundation to explore the means and ways contemporary terrorist organizations have to achieve their political ends. The difficulties in defining terrorism will be briefly discussed before the roots of contemporary terrorism are defined. Noting that this paper aims to discuss the pro-active application of various forms of state power abroad to reduce the threat at home, six enduring and fundamental components of terrorism will be identified.

DIFFICULTIES IN DEFINITION

While there have been many attempts at establishing a universal definition to describe terrorism in both political and legal realms, one could argue that it is a constantly evolving and pejorative term that is impossible to define with enough accuracy and precision to be analytically useful. From a political standpoint, the term must be broad enough to serve as a means to describe the strong condemnation that targeted

governments have regarding terror in general.[3] At the same time, legally, terrorism must be defined with enough precision to ensure that legitimate acts are not wrongfully condemned.[4] This contradiction is the essence of the inherent conflict between domestic and international counter-terror efforts. While they both seek to protect its citizens from the same threat, both means are very different.

The meaning of the word "terrorism" varies with perception; therefore, legal definitions are difficult to establish. The term is generally very subjective as human interpretations and points of view vary depending on one's position: "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."[5] States tend to modify its definition in accordance with their own political objectives and will generally use it to their advantage to "stigmatize, delegitimize, denigrate and dehumanize" their opponents in the eyes of the general population.[6] Osama bin Laden, for example, was considered a freedom fighter and was aided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when he participated in the fight against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in the 90s.[7] Today, he is at the top of the

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[3] C.F. Diaz-Paniagua, *Negotiating terrorism: The negotiation dynamics of four UN counter-terrorism treaties* (New York: City University of New York, 2008), 47.

[4] *Ibid.*, 47.

[5] David Hannay (former UK ambassador): quoted in Paul Reynolds, "UN Staggers on Road to Reform," *BBC News* (14 September 2005) [online news]; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4244842.stm; Internet; accessed 22 April 2011.

[6] Ben Saul, *Defining Terrorism in International Law*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3.

[7] CBC News, "Who Is Osama Bin Laden," *CBC News Online* (19 January 2006) [online news]; available from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/osamabinladen/; Internet; accessed 22 April 2011.

Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Most Wanted List and is one of the US's most infamous enemies.[8]

Terrorists typically do not refer to themselves as terrorists, and this alone is a crucial factor that is quickly discounted or ignored by governments when faced with a supposed "terrorist" threat. Individuals or groups who resort to the use of terrorism often consider themselves as freedom fighters or revolutionaries who are using the means available to them in the pursuit of political objectives against a superior state or military power. From their point of view, their enemy's state law is illegitimate and merely provides a list of crimes that may be committed against them by "legitimate" states.[9] The fact of the matter is that most terrorists have what they consider to be tangible objectives that they believe are worth fighting for. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), for example, was established to represent their people in the struggle to establish a Palestinian state on land that was occupied by Israel.[10] Another example is the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which fought for separation from the United-Kingdom.[11] These organizations fought for objectives that they believed could not be achieved by means other than violence. From this perspective, the word terrorism could be viewed in a more objective light if it is considered as a physical means to achieve some sort of an objective, such as guerilla warfare and insurgency. Its use as a tactic is discussed further below. Understanding the pejorative aspect of terrorism is the foundation to establishing its

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[8] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Most Wanted Terrorists," http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists; Internet; accessed 15 February 2011.

[9] Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*, (Toronto, Nelson Thompson Learning, 2002), 8.

[10] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 65.

[11] *Ibid*., 233.

enduring components, regardless of contestation over specific definitions, and to understanding the contemporary threat. To set the stage for determining the enduring components of terrorism, a mapping of the roots of contemporary terror must be conducted.

PROPAGANDA BY DEED

Historically, there have been many drivers behind the use of terrorism. Causes and motivations such as ideology, grievance, separatism and activism have all fueled the application of violence in the form of terrorism by individuals or groups who found themselves disadvantaged in a struggle for power.[12] This section will argue that contemporary terrorism was not born of the events of 9/11, but rather has roots that extend back to the 18th century. This historical contextualization of terror will then serve to discuss the enduring components of terrorism in general.

In both the pejorative and physical senses, terrorism has consistently evolved within social and historical contexts. Despite the presence of terrorist-like acts in ancient history, terrorism was first articulated as a concept in 1795 during the French revolution to protect the government from counter-revolutionaries.[13] From a state and societal perspective, the original meaning of terrorism initially had a positive connotation within

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[12] Allen Sens and Peter Stoett, *Global Politics: Origins, Currents, Directions,* (Toronto: Nelson, 2005), 221.

[13] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, ed. Russell D. Howard et al., 57-78 (New York: McGraw Hill, 2009), 59.

the context of the "Reign of Terror," as it was a term used by the newly established revolutionary government to maintain order in the midst of the 1789 uprisings.[14] However, with end of the Reign of Terror and the assassination of its architect, Maximilien Robespierre, in 1794, the term became associated with criminal acts and the abuse of office and power.[15] With the Industrial Revolution came massive socioeconomic change, which in turn fostered a new era of violence labeled as terrorism that possessed many of the fundamental characteristics that are still found in terrorism today.[16] Hence, during the 1800s terrorism was used to describe the acts of violent revolutionaries or groups, such as anarchists and nationalists, who revolted against government to achieve various political objectives.[17]

By the 19th century, terrorism had become a revolutionary tactic. The Italian patriot and socialist thinker Carlo Pisacane is considered as being an early advocate of "propaganda by deed,"[18] arguing that "…ideas spring from deeds and not the other way around… The use of the bayonet in Milan has produced a more effective propaganda than a thousand books."[19] In a general sense, this notion of "propaganda by deed" represents the evolution of terrorism very well. As new ideologies such as Marxism and Fascism

[14] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*…, 3.

[15] *Ibid*., 4.

[16] *Ibid*., 3.

[17] Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*…, 5.

[18] Paul Brousse, "La propagande par le fait," *Bulletin de la Federation Jurassienne* (5 August 1877): quoted in Martin A. Miller, "The Intellectual Origins of Modern Terrorism in Europe," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw, 27-62 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 42.

[19] Carlo Pisacane, "On Revolution," in *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas, Volume 1*, ed. Robert Graham, 65-68 (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2004), 68.

were born of 19th century capitalism, nationalism and social change, violence in the form of terrorism was advocated for revolutionaries, nationalist-separatists and violent activists to generate publicity and to rally the masses behind their cause.[20] The Narodnaya Volya, for example, used terrorist tactics to achieve communal self-government in Russia in the late 1870s.[21] Despite fluctuations in tactics and political objectives, for the most part non-state terrorist groups have conducted operations to achieve specific ends, and have used "propaganda by deed" as the means to rally the support of the masses and force governments to respond to their demands. The characteristics that distinguish terrorism from other forms of irregular warfare will be discussed under the following section on enduring components.

In an attempt to compartmentalize terrorism, several typologies have been identified over the years according to ideological motivations. Brynjar Lia provides one of the simplest categorization methods by identifying four general typologies that summarize terrorism in the 20th century effectively: socio-revolutionary terrorism (including left and right wing terrorism), separatist terrorism (ethnic-minorities seeking autonomy or independence), single-issue terrorism (anti-abortion activists, environmental militants, animal-rights defendants, etc.) and religious terrorism.[22] While it is not within the scope of this paper to discuss these typologies and their historical contexts in detail, it is important to consider them as this paper argues that the fundamental characteristics mentioned below span across all of these typologies. From a counter-terrorism

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[20] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*…, 5.

[21] Clifford E. Simonsen and Jeremy R. Spindlove, *Terrorism Today: The Past, The Players, The Future* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000), 118.

[22] Brynjar Lia, *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 11.

perspective, it is of the utmost importance to have a clear understanding of the opponent's objectives. However, while objectives, tactics and contexts vary greatly, the core characteristics of terrorism, as a means to achieve political objectives, remain very similar.

ENDURING COMPONENTS

Since the meaning of the word terrorism is pejorative, contextually determined and historically fraught, no attempts will be made to define terrorism as an overarching ideology. Alternatively, the approach to be employed is to consider terrorism as a series of interconnected factors. Six enduring components can be identified: 1) terrorism is a tactic; 2) terrorism is deliberate; 3) violence or the threat of violence is essential; 4) non-combatants are usually targeted; 5) terrorists are non-state actors; and, 6) terrorism is used to achieve political goals. Through the study of dozens of definitions that have been established by various state organizations and leading scholars, these six components were those that surfaced in nearly all attempts to define terrorism. It should be noted that to be considered as fundamental components of terrorism, they must be considered together. When considered individually, none of these components apply exclusively to terrorism. Nonetheless, the identification of these components will serve to demonstrate that in the interest of reducing the threat of terrorism, targeting the groups using the tactic is more effective than targeting the tactic itself.

The first component of terrorism is that it is a tactic used to achieve objectives within a larger campaign. This can be demonstrated by examining the "spectrum of

conflict". This spectrum is essentially a scale that "reflects the environment in which operations occur."[23] Unfortunately, the new version of Canadian Forces operations doctrine no longer makes reference to the spectrum of conflict as it did prior to 2010; however, one can consider the spectrum at Figure 2.1, which was created by Richard H. Schultz in 1986. Within this model, terrorism is situated in the low intensity conflict range between peacekeeping and insurgency.[24] In addition, Figure 2.2 provides a more recent version of the spectrum and again situates terrorism, or from this perspective counter-terrorism, at the low intensity end of the spectrum of combat.[25]



Figure 2.1 – Spectrum of Low Intensity Conflicts
Source: Schultz, *Low-Intensity Conflict and US Policy*, 77.

[23] Department of Nation Defence, B-GL-300-001-FP-001 *Land Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008), 3-9.

[24] Richard H. Schultz, "Low-Intensity Conflict and US Policy: Regional Threats, Soviet Involvement, and the American Response," in *Low Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology*, ed. David J. Dean (Maxwell AFB, Ala: Air University Press, 1986), 77.

[25] John Hillen, "Peacekeeping at the Speed of Sound: The Relevancy of Airpower Doctrine in Operations Other than War," *Airpower Journal* 7, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 8.



Figure 2.2 – The Military Spectrum of Conflict
Source: Hillen, *Peacekeeping at the Speed of Sound*, 8.

According to the figures above, terrorism fits within the spectrum of conflict and is a tactic used with a view of achieving some sort of a tactical, operational or strategic end state. Hence, groups seeking political change may resort to violence if political means are ineffective. If these groups had the physical means and the context required, they could choose to conduct insurgency or even low-intensity conventional warfare to achieve their objectives. Authors such as Jane Corbin and Michael Scheuer argue that al-Qaeda is a perfect example. While al-Qaeda is considered by the US and their allies as a terrorist organization, terrorism has *not* been the only tactic it has employed in its struggle to achieve its objectives. For instance, it attempted, in support of its Taliban allies, to fight NATO forces with conventional combat in the Pashmul area of Kandahar, Afghanistan in September of 2006.[26] Vis-a-vis an obvious imbalance of military power, al-Qaeda was forced to resort to insurgency. Other such examples include al-Qaeda in

[26] Peter Pigott, *Canada in Afghanistan* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007), 188.

Iraq (AQI) and the Irish Revolutionary Army (IRA); "terrorist organizations" that appropriated insurgency tactics in the pursuit of their objectives. "Terrorists" use insurgency when operating within the borders of their sanctuary or state. Therefore, one can conclude that organizations such as AQ are not solely terrorist organizations, but that terrorism is a pragmatic tool for them to use internationally.

Due primarily to an imbalance of power and to the difficulties related to conducting guerrilla warfare or insurgency tactics on the international stage, the logical means to achieving the desired ends is to seek propaganda by deed through terrorism. Figure 2.3 demonstrates the dissociation of terrorism from motivations and objectives. Non-state organizations, which can be motivated by various ideologies, seek to achieve political objectives through the use of various tactics. The appropriate tactic will be selected based on context and available means, such as people, weapons and money.



Figure 2.3 – The Relations Between Motivations, Tactics and Ends

In the visual depiction above, group A may be motivated by socio-revolutionary change and/or separatism. However, depending on the circumstances and resources available, it may choose to use more than terrorism to achieve its ends. It is important to consider this distinction when contemplating what "fighting terrorism" really means. To reduce the threat of terrorist acts, the capabilities of the groups who use terrorism, as a tactic, must be reduced. Defending against the tactic may be possible, however attacking the tactic is not.

The second fundamental characteristic of terrorism is that it is deliberate. That is to say, it is a premeditated and pre-planned application of violence.[27] Terrorist acts are not random acts of violence, but rather tactical level operations that are key components within a larger context. This characteristic is tightly linked to the fact that it is a tactical means to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Scholarly literature, UN organizations and various state agencies are consistent in saying that terrorism involves the use or the threatened use of fear provoking force or violence. This use of violence, and perhaps more importantly its threatened use, is usually intended to influence an audience in some way or to force the hand of state governance to achieve specific political change.[28] As Bruce Hoffman suggests, this violence is "designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the

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[27] Department of State, *Patterns of terrorism 2003* (Washington: US Department of State, 2004), vii.

[28] *Ibid.,* vii.

immediate victim or target", which is reminiscent of Pisacane's "propaganda by deed".[29] In a more legal sense, the UN provides an additionally detailed perspective: terrorists use violence "…with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act…"[30] The US Department of Defence (DoD) is more blunt in stating that the aim of terrorist violence is "… to instill fear and coerce governments or societies."[31] This fear is instilled through the targeting of the "innocent." Essentially, anyone could be a potential victim.

The indiscriminate targeting of innocent noncombatants is the fourth fundamental characteristic of terrorism.[32] Some, such as Boaz Ganor, use the word "civilian" in their definition.[33] Laqueur and the DoD use the term "innocent."[34] In the end, terrorism entails violence that is carried out against targets that may not have been demonstrating aggressive behavior when they were attacked. In essence, the term noncombatant may be

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[29] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*…, 41.

[30] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1566: Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts*, 8 October 2004, 2; available from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/542/82/PDF/n0454282.pdf?OpenElement; Internet; Accessed 2 March 2011.

[31] Department of Defence, Joint Pub 3-07.2 *Antiterrorism* (Washington: US Department of Defence, 2010), I-1.

[32] Daniel D. Novotny, "What is Terrorism?," in *Focus on Terrorism*, ed. Edward V. Linden (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007), 8.

[33] Boaz Ganor, "The Relationship Between International and Localized Terrorism," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 4, no. 26 (28 June 2005); http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=379&PID=1859&IID=557&TTL=The_Relationship_Between_International_and_Localized_Terrorism; Internet; accessed 2 March 2011.

[34] Department of Defence, Joint Pub 3-07.2 *Antiterrorism* (Washington: US Department of Defence, 2010), I-1.

a more useful term to use, as it includes law enforcement and military service people who may be attacked while conducting operations or tasks which are not directly associated with violent acts of war.

Sub-national or non-state actors employ terrorism as a means. Despite attempts to add precision to the term, the indiscriminate targeting of noncombatants could be used in a very pejorative sense. States can be accused of targeting the innocent and can instill terror into the hearts of populations or their enemies; however, their acts would not be considered as terrorism. The non-state nature of terrorism is the fifth fundamental characteristic that differentiates it from other forms of violence.[35] States conduct acts of war, or use terror domestically through law enforcement and oppression, however they are not considered to be terrorists.[36] With this characteristic, though, comes the discussion of legitimacy, or at least the perception of it. Generally speaking, terrorist groups do not abide by international laws and do not typically enjoy the legitimacy of a recognized state.[37] In 1987, Walter Laqueur defined the use of violence by terrorists as the "illegitimate use of force", while in 1983 Martha Crenshaw used the term "socially and politically unacceptable" in her definition.[38] These descriptions are again pejorative, as what is illegitimate to one will undoubtedly be justified in the eyes of the other. Furthermore, true legal definitions, such as the ones found in the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act, provide detailed lists of what are considered to be criminal activity under

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[35] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,"…, 59.

[36] *Ibid.,* 59.

[37] Daniel D. Novotny, "What is Terrorism?,"…, 8.

[38] Laqueur and Crenshaw in White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*…, 8-9.

existing legislation.[39] David Rodin argues that terrorist acts are conducted in the absence of "a substantively just legal process."[40] This is clearly a more quantitative way of measuring legitimacy. Consequently, the FBI, the DoD and the UN make reference to the unlawful use of force in their definitions of terrorism (DoD website, UN Resolution 1566).[41]

Finally, most definitions of terrorism mention the achievement of a political goal. Terrorism seeks to achieve some form of a political objective and, as a tactic, is strategically designed to trigger political change or to achieve something politically relevant.[42] In a report presented to the British Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department in March of 2007, terrorist acts were defined as having the "…purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause."[43] In contrast, the UN Resolution 1566 states that acts or terror "…are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature."[44] Perhaps the all encompassing version of this is provided by the DoD: "Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and

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[39] House of Commons of Canada, *Bill C-36, Part II.1: Terrorism; Interpretation* (As reported to the House of Commons on November 22, 2001), art. 83.01.

[40] David Rodin, "Terrorism Without Intention," Ethics Vol. 114, no. 4 (July 2004): 753.

[41] Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Terrorism*; http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism; Internet; Accessed 2 March 2011.

[42] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*…, 41.

[43] Lord Carlile, *The Definition of Terrorism: A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation*. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, March 2007, 5.

[44] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1566*…, 2.

committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political".[45] When considering Figure 2.3, this particular description is important as it speaks to the argument that while terrorism may be motivated by ideology, it is conducted for the purpose of achieving political objectives.

Regardless of definitional difficulties, it is suggested here that enduring components of terrorism exist, which have roots that extend into the 19th century. The separation of terrorism as a physical tactic from common motivations and drivers was demonstrated while its importance in the understanding of counter-terror strategy was briefly touched upon. To reduce the capabilities of the groups who use terrorism today, one must consider motivations and enablers. With a view of using al-Qaeda as a case study in chapter 5, the following chapter will consider globalization and its various effects on contemporary terrorism.

[45] Department of Defence, Joint Pub 3-07.2 *Antiterrorism*…, I-1.

CHAPTER 3 – GLOBALISATION: CAUSE AND ENABLER

With the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11th 2001, terrorism had taken on an increased lethality and had affected entire populations on a scale that has never been seen throughout history.[46] Not since the Munich events of 1972 had the world witnessed terrorist attacks, and deaths caused by terrorism, live and broadcasted internationally. To counter it, policy makers have the obligation of understanding enablers and motivations to effectively address the key vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations. Many consider the emergence of extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda who claims to have legitimate religious motivations, as the overarching reason for why terrorism has become so indiscriminate, lethal and global.[47] This misunderstanding has created empty and irrelevant political discourse, such as: "they detest democracy" or "this is a war of freedom-loving people against evil barbarians."[48] A complete and useful understanding of international terrorism must see past the superficial and varying ideologies, and the effects of globalization must be considered as the primary enabler behind what is considered to be contemporary terrorism. This section will demonstrate that globalization is both a cause of and an enabler to contemporary international terror.

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[46] W. Andy Knight and Tom Keating, *Global Politics: Emerging Networks, Trends, and Challenges*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 302.

[47] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,"…, 63.

[48] Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 9.

THE 21st CENTURY

International terrorism is not new and was not born of the Cold War or of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11th, 2001. Terrorism became a means of projecting violence on an international scale in the 1970s and 1980s, partly because of technological advances, but also because of the internationalization of the media and its influence.[49] The internationalization of the media helped capitalize the return of propaganda versus deed by taking small operations such as hijackings and turning them into large international incidents. Terrorists began travelling from one country to another in order to target innocent civilians with the intent of creating shock and attracting international attention. Bruce Hoffman argues that international terrorism was born with the Palestinian hijacking of the Israeli El Al commercial airliner in 1971.[50] Given the speed with which news and images of the hijacking could be broadcasted around the globe, the event produced worldwide publicity for their cause. The ratio of propaganda versus deed became powerfully demonstrative of a symbiotic relationship between "terrorism" and the media. International publicity attracted the attention of other groups who found themselves on the losing side of a struggle for power. The media coverage surrounding the hostage taking of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics also demonstrates the large-scale internationalism of terror in the early 70s.[51] The early effects of technology and globalization enabled these events.

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[49] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,"…, 61.

[50] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*…, 64.

[51] *Ibid.,* 68.

During the Cold War, the world was divided into two main camps: the Soviet-Communist dominated world and the American-led Western alliance. Despite frequent "proxy wars," neither super power would dare encroach on the other's sphere of influence or vital interests as to avoid possible global conflict.[52] Terrorism was further enabled following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the consequential uninhibited growth of Western globalization. The somewhat stable power struggle that had existed during the Cold War disappeared and the United States, with its allies, were free to project an uncoordinated and enormous amount of economic, political and social power around the world.[53] Hence, globalization is essentially the projection of Western economic interests, political interests and social culture. Thomas Friedman has described globalization as the integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree that has never been seen in the past.[54] It is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world "faster, deeper and cheaper" than ever before, and provides these same capabilities to non-state actors who seek to achieve political objectives on the international stage.[55] Globalization enables individuals and non-state organizations to weigh into international politics. International travel, the Internet and social media are giving ordinary citizens the ability to achieve the same political importance as state leaders, despite their lack of economical resources, physical power and legitimacy. With globalization comes a paradigm: globalization is a cause of resentment and an enabler of non-state political action.

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[52] Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*…., 20.

[53] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism"…, 66.

[54] Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*…., 9.

[55] *Ibid*., 9.

CAUSE OF RESENTMENT

Globalization could be considered a causal variable of resentment which fuels international terrorism. Economically, it has allowed certain states to develop and modernize at a substantial rate, while many developing countries have been left behind. For example, the human development trends in Yemen are approximately 30% lower than the world average.[56] This has fostered economic inequality and has widened the economic gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots."[57] By leaving the "have-nots" behind, countries such as the US indirectly create breeding grounds for international terrorists by fostering resentment.[58] Furthermore, the dependence of many Middle Eastern countries on oil trade draws attention from heavy oil consumers, again such as the US.[59] National interests are intertwined with economic interests, and the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia is a prime example of how pervasive foreign policy can create the resentment required for extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda, to take action.

In recent years, the impact of globalization has greatly affected developing Arab countries, which has led to contemporary terrorism being construed as solely religious in nature. However, the phenomenon is much broader than that of a specific religion.

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[56] United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Index* [online website]: Available from http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/YEM.html; Internet; accessed April 19, 2011.

[57] W. Andy Knight and Tom Keating, *Global Politics: Emerging Networks, Trends, and Challenges*…, 319.

[58] Jamal R. Nassar, *Globalization and Terrorism*, (Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 104.

[59] Brynjar Lia, *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism*…, 188.

Globalization enables the spread of "Western" culture into the far reaches of the world. This spread is created as a bi-product of things such as affordable air travel, trade agreements, the internationalization of business, the export of cultural media and literature. This cultural homogenization greatly threatens traditional cultures that may feel the need to defend their way of life from the secular and Western-led future that is forced upon them.[60] In the fight against terrorism, this is a fundamental aspect of the threat that cannot be over-estimated and must be understood by Western policy makers.

ENABLER OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

Globalization provides terrorists with means of travel and communications. Developing countries who resent the US, their allies and homogenization, understand their situation thanks to the globalization of technology.[61] Of all the technological advances that have been made readily available worldwide, means of communications and publicity are perhaps the most obvious. The internet, mobile phones and instant messaging give terrorist organizations the ability to plan, coordinate and conduct operations with greater ease and for much less money.[62] Terrorists have the ability to advertise recruitment and project messaging to an immense audience. In a business that strives on publicity and that seeks to reach the largest audience possible, the internet is a substantial enabler. It also facilitates the proliferation of simple, inexpensive yet deadly

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[60] W. Andy Knight and Tom Keating, *Global Politics: Emerging Networks, Trends, and Challenges*…, 319.

[61] Jamal R. Nassar, *Globalization and Terrorism*…, 104.

[62] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism"…, 66.

technology that can easily be acquired by terrorist organizations for the conduct of their operations.[63] This large-scale spread of information is putting destructive powers that were once reserved for states into the hands of individuals and non-state organizations.[64] Technology gives terrorists the opportunity to plan, shoot, edit and broadcast their own propaganda videos, extreme power to individuals or non-state groups who, in theory, have no power.[65] It gives non-state actors the opportunity to participate in global politics. Furthermore, technology facilitates international coordination and the administration of terrorist organizations. [66] These are all capabilities that would not be made available to contemporary terrorists without globalization.

From a moral and economic perspective, globalization can provide hope. In situations where populations are denied a voice against oppressive state power, communications and media provide hope to the uneducated and can provide concrete evidence that it is possible to take action. [67] Therefore, given the far-reaching characteristics of terrorist organizations over the internet, the media is now capable of mobilizing a far larger number of fighters and supporters than ever before. Globalization and uneven economic development encourages the migration of youth from the countryside to large city centers. This urbanization of the youth in developing countries often exposes them to extremist ideologies and makes them vulnerable to recruitment,

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[63] Brynjar Lia, *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism*…, 188.

[64] Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Longman, 2003), 226.

[65] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*…, 198.

[66] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism"…, 67.

[67] Jamal R. Nassar, *Globalization and Terrorism*…, 103.

which, in turn, creates a lucrative pool of potential recruits for terrorist organizations.[68] Globalization provides diverse means of support, which give terrorists the means to carry out attacks far away from the base of their organization. This distinction between where a terrorist organization lives and where an attack is launched not only globalizes the threat but makes dealing with it much more difficult than before.[69]

TERROR: A THREAT TO GLOBALIZATION

While globalization enables terrorism, terrorism, in turn, threatens globalization by forcing states to take expensive measures to defend their populations. The contemporary multi-polar security environment is characterized by far reaching non-state threats to innocent civilians around the world. Terrorism is proving to be far more successful in this context than counter-terror efforts. The threat of terrorism alone is forcing governments to spend large amounts of resources in an attempt to counter the threat that can be posed by one individual with a twenty-dollar weapon, such as a homemade bomb.[70] Terrorism has transformed state decision-making and has affected the way states conduct business internationally.[71] It has forced governments to tighten border control policies and has adversely affected trade patterns and financial markets.[72] For example, the mere threat of terrorism has affected commercial insurance policies and

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[68] Brynjar Lia, *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism*…, 188.

[69] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism"…, 66.

[70] Allen Sens and Peter Stoett, *Global Politics: Origins, Currents, Directions…*, 229.

[71] *Ibid.,* 229.

[72] National Intelligence Council, *Mapping of the Global Future: Report on the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project* (Pittsburg: Government Printing Office, 2004), 93.

loan management, as clauses regarding terrorist activities are now common practice.[73] Terrorism has also increased the cost of international shipping as a result of supply chain disruption.[74] As such, it could be argued globalization is indirectly threatening the security and prosperity of those who benefit from it. The long-term effects of such a huge financial burden could have catastrophic results for affected states. A historical example can be drawn from the decade long Soviet counter-insurgency in Afghanistan during which the Mujahedeen validated the tactic of "death by a thousand cuts" with great success.[75] While there are limitless conclusions regarding the USSR's demise, it is clear that the war in Afghanistan was an important factor.[76] Similarly, the role globalization plays in exporting terrorism to the far reaches of the globe is clear, and the cost to the countries affected by it is not negligible.

Globalization will continue to provide terrorist organizations with opportunities to carry out their activities and means to convey their cause internationally.[77] Unless Western states consider the often unintended and disruptive effects of westernization, of secularization and of globalized capitalism, less privileged citizens of developing states around the world will continue to be frustrated by the radical changes that will be forced

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[73] Dwight Jaffee and Thomas Russell, "NBCR Terrorism: Who should bear the risks?," in *Global Business and the Terrorist Threat*, ed. Harry W. Richardson et al., 74-91 (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2009), 74.

[74] *Ibid.*, 74.

[75] Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, *Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters* (St-Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Company, 2001), iv.

[76] George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 488.

[77] Brynjar Lia, *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism*…, 188.

into their lives.[78] Therefore, while one must consider motivation behind terrorist acts, the effects of globalization must first be considered as the primary enabler behind what is considered to be contemporary terrorism. If globalization is both a cause and an enabler to international terrorism, then it is also a fundamental part of the solution.

[78] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism"…, 68.

CHAPTER 4 – CANADA'S "AWAY GAME" POLICY

Canadian politicians are faced with the dilemma of establishing what balance between domestic and foreign security needs to be achieved to best protect their citizens. As described in the 2005 International Policy Statement, "an increasingly interdependent world has tightened the links between international and domestic security, and developments abroad can affect the safety of Canadians in unprecedented ways."[79] With this in mind, this chapter will explain how Canada's liberal international foreign policy tradition affects Canada's participation in the so-called "War on Terror." This will be done through the discussion of traditional Canadian foreign policy. The establishment of this tradition will then serve to demonstrate that dealing with failed or failing states through military intervention within a comprehensive approach is the basis for Canada's foreign security and defence policy. In turn, these conclusions will support the argument that Canada's foreign security policy derives from tradition and national interests and will ultimately serve in the analysis of Canadian foreign security policy.

In theory, foreign security and defence policy are embedded in and derived from an analysis of threats. Once such threats are identified and understood, government establishes priorities to facilitate the allocation of appropriate resources to counter them. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) concludes that the greatest threat to the security of Canadians is international terrorism, yet uncovering Canada's foreign

[79] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 2005), 6.

counter-terrorism policy is challenging.[80] The 2004 National Security Policy (NSP) and the IPS were both drafted under the Liberal Paul Martin Government and provide broad and repetitive policy guidance regarding foreign security. This is also the case for the *Canada First* Defence Strategy, published in 2008 and created under the Stephen Harper Conservative Government, which is built upon the foundations of the NSP and IPS.[81] However, foreign security policy is generally "revealed" through actions under the Harper Government rather than in written documents.[82] To mitigate the lack of documentation, as Kim Nossal argues, one should consider that there has not been any major shift in Canadian foreign policy following the events of September 11th, 2001. If anything, the events of 9/11 have merely re-enforced Canada's liberal foreign policy tradition rather than trigger any fundamental changes.[83] Indeed, this fact facilitates the identification of the principal tenets of Canada's "Away Game".

LIBERAL TRADITION

Historical trends can typically be found at the root of any democratic state's foreign policy, and Canada is no exception. Over the past 60 years, Canada has maintained a predominantly liberal internationalist foreign policy that has kept many, if

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[80] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 38.

[81] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2008), 9.

[82] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era*…, 28.

[83] Kim Nossal, "Canadian Foreign Policy After 9/11: Realignment, Reorientation or Reinforcement," in *Foreign Policy Realignment in the Age of Terror,* ed. Lenard Cohen et al., 20-34 (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003), 21.

not all, of the fundamental principles that Louis St-Laurent described in his Gray Lecture at the University of Toronto in 1947. Of these principles, CAN-US relations, multilateralism and human values are predominant in the lecture.[84] Today, Canada is still heavily involved in a myriad of international organizations, continues to play an important leadership role on the international stage, strives to impose order in the world and maintains peacekeeping as a hallmark of its diplomacy.[85] Although it can be argued that some of these values have eroded over time and to varying degrees, applying principles such as these in foreign policy has given Canada the ability to exercise influence that has far surpassed its real stature on the international stage.[86] This section will demonstrate that Canada has diverged from its specialized roles to meet its obligations regarding its relationship with the United States, that multilateralism remains a mandatory component of foreign policy and that the traditionally Canadian principle of human values has been set aside in favor of the other two. This analysis will contextualize Canada's involvement in the War on Terror and will begin with the examination of Canada's traditional relationship with the United States.

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[84] Louis St-Laurent, *Les bases de la politique canadienne dans les affaires internationales* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Fondation Duncan et John Gray, 1947), 25.

[85] Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How we lost our place in the world* (Toronto: The Canadian Publishers, 2003), 21.

[86] *Ibid*., 11.

Canada-US Relations

Canada's relationship with the United States has always been one of the major historical centerpieces of Canadian foreign policy.[87] At the conclusion of the Second World War, geography made it such that Canada and the US shared certain purposes and ambitions related to economics and security. The defense of North America on the eve of the Cold War and the overwhelming predominance of trade with the US became fundamental reasons for Canada's dependence on its southern neighbor.[88] While Canada's partnership with the US was paramount, Canada needed to assert itself as an autonomous and credible actor within an international system composed of sovereign states. Thus, foreign policy makers needed to find the appropriate balance between affiliation that gave Canada leverage and independence that tended to give it credibility on the world stage.[89] According to Patrick Lennox, the balance between the two resulted in the adoption of a set of specialized and distinct roles specially suited to Canada that would allow it to act as an honest broker and a sovereign state in the eyes of its citizens and the international community, while reinforcing its cooperative relationship with the US.[90] Therefore, Canada's traditional roles as mediator, peacekeeper and problem solver, to name only a few, stemmed from this paradox between affiliation and autonomy.[91] As

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[87] John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Toronto: Nelson, 2007), 21.

[88] Kim Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1996), 57.

[89] Patrick Lennox, "The Illusion of Independence", in *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 45.

[90] *Ibid*., 45.

[91] *Ibid*., 45.

Louis St-Laurent describes Canada's relationship with the United States, this very dilemma is quite evident and would serve as the foundation for the future of Canadian foreign policy.

From a contemporary perspective, the continued importance of the United States is demonstrated by the fact that most Canadian foreign policy decisions are made based on the degree to which the issue will "impinge" on relations between the two countries.[92] Canada's decision regarding its participation in Iraq and its involvement in Afghanistan are clear examples. However, official discourse continues to depict the image of a mutually beneficial relationship based on equality as it discusses the importance of bilateral trade, energy and the defense of the continent.[93] Prime Minister Harper has openly commented on the true nature of the relationship: "…This relationship, …, only works if it is governed by mutual respect, and the way to earn that respect is to ensure Canada shoulders its fair share of the burden of defending North America…."[94] To shoulder its "share of the burden," Canada is required to uphold its 1938 security pledge and assure the US that Canada will not allow threats to reach the US via Canadian territory.[95]

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[92] Kim Nossal, The *Politics of Canadian Foreign* Policy…, 33.

[93] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Canada and the United States: No Two Nations Closer* (February 2009) [on-line]; available from http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/can-am/Closer-etroites.aspx; Internet; accessed 2 November 2010.

[94] Prime Minister of Canada, "PM Unveils Canada First Defence Strategy – 12 May 2008"; http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&featureId=6&pageId=46&id=2098; Internet; accessed 8 March 2011.

[95] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era*…, 93.

The dilemma of independence and affiliation continues to be a reality. On the one hand, Canada seems to be using its privileged relationship with the United States as leverage to demonstrate its importance relative to other states; "Little wonder, then, that the first foreign visit a newly elected U.S. president makes is very often to Canada. (…) It reflects the significance and durability of a relationship that has spanned more than a century."[96] On the other, a discourse persists depicting Canada's autonomy and how the two countries may not always agree:

> As sovereign nations, with at times divergent interests, the two countries are sometimes confronted by difficult issues. (…) But on every occasion, because they are good neighbours and have so much in common, solutions have been found.[97]

The reality is that Canada is very dependent on the US for economic prosperity and security. This reality greatly affects Canada's interests and the roles it is able to play internationally.

Despite Canada's attempts at diversifying trade, roughly 80% of its exports go to American markets, while 60% of imports are received from them.[98] Considering that economics are key determinants of national interests and that these, in turn, determine foreign policy, it can be argued that this type of an economic arrangement would not necessarily give Canada leverage when it happens to disagree with the US. In fact, as Roy Rempel suggests, Canada would be in a position in that the rules would be dictated

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[96] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Canada and the United States: No Two Nations Closer* … ; Internet; accessed 2 November 2010.

[97] *Ibid.*

[98] Patrick Lennox, "The Illusion of Independence", in *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future*…, 47.

to it.[99] Another example of this divergence from discourse is the actual structure of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).[100] Today, over 94% of NORAD's personnel are American and more than 84% of its budget is generated by American money.[101] Contrary to the partnership advertised in official discourse, the existence of a natural continental hierarchy is evident.[102]

With regards to Canada's specialized role in international politics, its position regarding the US deployment to Iraq was considered by many to be the manifestation of its autonomy and unfaltering commitment to the United Nations. While this is partially true, Canada made great efforts to support its southern ally in other ways. For example, it attempted to gain the UN Security Council's support for the invasion of Iraq and nonetheless deployed a relatively large number of troops to Afghanistan to participate in the War on Terror.[103] Considering the specialized tradition that it has prided itself with for the past 60 years, the mission in Afghanistan would be considered an odd fit "as it contrasts sharply with the country's reputation for serving in other more specialized capacities."[104] Despite the odd fit, one of the main reasons for the deployment to

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[99] Roy Rempel, "Canada's National Interests", *in Dreamland: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 152.

[100] NORAD is the bi-national command established in 1958 by Canada and the US to defend North American airspace. NORAD has now expanded to encompass the defense of air, space, and sea.

[101] Patrick Lennox, "The Illusion of Independence", in *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future*…, 47.

[102] *Ibid*., 47.

[103] *Ibid*., 55.

[104] *Ibid*., 56.

Afghanistan was to maintain good relations with the US; Canada sought the image of autonomy, but knew that affiliation was important.

Multilateralism

If Canada's relationship with the United States can be considered as a constant historical centerpiece to Canadian foreign policy, then Canada's commitment to multilateralism since the Second World War is most certainly a cornerstone. Understanding the importance of multilateralism for Canada, Louis St-Laurent linked it to national security: "If there is one conclusion that our common experience has led us to accept, it is that security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international organization."[105] Given the geography, ambition and power of its southern neighbor, multilateralism was, and still is, a way in which Canada could counter-balance American interests when its own were not aligned. Furthermore, the fact that security abroad meant prosperity at home was well understood, which was exemplified by Canada's participation in a multitude of defense and economic organizations in the post-World War era, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[106] Over a decade later, the results of Canada's heavy reliance on multilateralism became evident as Lester B. Pearson expressed his opinion that a robust military was unnecessary since, as he chimed, "alliancemanship would do

[105] Louis St-Laurent, *Les bases de la politique canadienne dans les affaires internationales*…, 25.

[106] John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*..., 113-114.

just fine".[107] This is arguably still true to this day considering Canada's dependence on the US for its own security.

Undeniably, multilateralism remains a key principle in Canadian foreign policy. Demonstrating how policy makers envision the importance of international organizations in the future, the 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) describes how Canada needs to play an innovative leadership role to reform these various entities so that they reflect the realities of today.[108] Canada is still associating itself with states, such as the US, who share similar interests and has been able to "punch over its weight" in many instances because of these relationships.[109] The IPS describes how Canada "…must therefore continue to seek ways to engage current and emerging superpowers in mechanisms for global governance."[110] Today, Canadians continue to prefer autonomy when it comes to the US, as they did sixty years ago, and fulfilling the various specialized roles mentioned earlier in a multilateral context around the globe has proven to be an effective way of maintaining that distance.[111] Therefore, Canada's efforts in multilateralism are more than simply methods of projecting its identity and attaining its interests. As was the case in

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[107] Douglas Bland, "Everything Military Officers Need to Know about Defence Policy-Making in Canada," in *Canadian Strategic Forecast 2000: Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century*, ed. David Rudd, Jim Hansen, and Jessica Blitt (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), 20.

[108] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*…, 26.

[109] Nelson Michaud, "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 347.

[110] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*…, 27.

[111] Nelson Michaud, "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*…, 349.

the late forties, it is also a means by which Canada is able to distinguish itself from the US and by which it can deal with states that have more power on a mutually beneficial playing field.[112] Prime Minister Paul Martin attempted to revive Canada's multilateral and international principles through the establishment of new important institutions, such as the G20, and peacemaking initiatives, and Prime Minister Steven Harper has arguably followed suit.[113] In the terms of the global War on Terror, Canada's participation is reflective of its multilateral tendencies. As clearly articulated on the DFAIT website, Canada is committed to fulfilling its international responsibilities and to demonstrating reliability to its allies. As a clear indication of multilateralism vis-à-vis terrorism, it states that:

> Because counter-terrorism requires effective international co-operation and co-ordination, Canada works to develop legal instruments, best practices and international standards to combat terrorism in international, regional and functional fora...[114]

Multilateralism remains an important component to Canada's foreign policy; therefore, Canada's participation within multilateral organizations remains paramount.

Human Values

Canada's foreign policy has not only been influenced by national interests, but has also been greatly influenced by human values. These values have influenced how Canada deals with the US and have driven many important multilateral engagements

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[112] Stéphane Roussel et Chantal Robichaud, "L'État postmoderne par excellence? Internationalisme et promotion de l'identité internationale du Canada." *Études internationales* 35, no. 1 (mars 2004): 6.

[113] Nelson Michaud, "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*…, 350.

[114] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Terrorism* [on-line]; available from http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx; Internet; accessed 15 February 2011.

since World War II. During the post-WWII years, the idea of protecting the individual demonstrated how policy makers envisioned the way Canada would apply human values in world affairs, as they were the foundation upon which the country was built.[115] As Louis St-Laurent stated, "No foreign policy is consistent nor coherent over a period of years unless it is based upon some conception of human values."[116] Human values contributed to forging Canada's national identity as Canadians felt the need "to do something" on the world stage, whether it be through peacekeeping, development or conflict prevention.[117]

Today, the fundamental national interest remains to protect and promote well being at home and abroad.[118] Beyond the fact that discourse places human rights as "a central theme of Canadian foreign policy," Canada has included important human rights issues, such as gender equality, the protection of children and indigenous peoples, within its foreign policy.[119] The Foreign Affairs and International Trade website states that "Canada stands up for human rights and takes principled positions on important issues to ensure that freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, values that define this

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[115] Nelson Michaud, "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*…, 350.

[116] Louis St-Laurent, *Les bases de la politique canadienne dans les affaires internationales*…, 25.

[117] Stéphane Roussel et Chantal Robichaud, "L'État postmoderne par excellence? Internationalisme et promotion de l'identité internationale du Canada."…, 2.

[118] Roy Rempel, "Canada's National Interests", *in Dreamland: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined* Sovereignty…, 154.

[119] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Human Rights* (February 2009) [on-line]; available from http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/human-rights_droits-personne.aspx; Internet; accessed 2 November 2010.

country, are enjoyed around the world."[120] Keeping our world safe and contributing to the well being of others are still seen as major objectives for foreign policy makers.[121] A contemporary example of this is Prime Minister Harper's assertion that Canada's objective in Afghanistan is to "improve the lives of Afghanistan's most vulnerable citizens."[122] This was recenty re-enforced by Peter McKay as he explained why the Canadian military is in Afghanistan: "This isn't the first time Canadians have been called on to help defend the basic principles we all believe in; freedom, democracy, rule of law, Respect for basic human rights…"[123] Discourse demonstrates the continued importance of human values in Canadian foreign policy, although it may not be reflected in reality on the ground.

Canada has arguably diverged from its traditional value-based practices since the terrorist attacks against the US on September 11th, 2001. Canada's mission in Afghanistan is one that is almost purely based on CAN-US relations and multilateralism, vice human values, despite contradictory discourse. Pushing it even further from its value-based tradition, Canada's heavy involvement in Afghanistan is precluding it from being able to conduct other traditional value-based engagements. This is exemplified by Canada's quasi-symbolic deployment in January 2010 to provide humanitarian assistance

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[120] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Human Rights*...

[121] Nelson Michaud, "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*…, 347.

[122] Prime Minister of Canada, "PM Highlights Canada's Role on the World Stage – 23 September 2010"; http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&featureId=6&pageId=46&id-3672; Internet; accessed 8 November 2010.

[123] Peter McKay, "Munich Security Conference: The Future of the Alliance and the Mission in Afghanistan – February 7, 2009"; http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=2875; Internet; accessed 8 November 2010.

following a devastating earthquake in Haiti. While the deployment was in fact "humanitarian," it was far too short lived to provide any lasting effect.[124] Human values still exist in discourse, however politicians may have been forced to diverge from them in order to satisfy foreign policy principles of greater importance.

To conclude, Canada has diverged from its traditional specialized roles because its government has understood that the parameters for security at home include maintaining its relations with the US. To maintain these relations, Canada needs to participate, in some capacity, in the War on Terror and must take all necessary measures to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack against the United States being staged in Canada. To maintain it autonomy, it must also maintain its multilateral engagements in order to continue its attempts at "punching over its weight" on the international stage. Finally, Canada has diverged from its traditional human values principle of foreign policy in order to meet its obligations regarding the other two principles. It is the dynamic between these three principles of Canadian foreign policy that has set the parameters for Canada's foreign security and defence policy.

MEETING THREATS ABROAD

Policy and discourse make it clear that the Canadian government has chosen to focus its international counter-terrorism efforts on failed or failing states. The NSP states that "failed and failing states can provide a haven for terrorists, which can pose risks to

[124] Prime Minister Harper directed the deployment of Canadian Forces to conduct humanitarian relief operations in Haiti for 30 to 60 days.

the security of Canadians."[125] Similarly, the IPS places failed or failing states squarely at the center of Canada's international security policy, as they "…dot the international landscape, creating despair and regional instability and providing a haven for those who would attack us directly."[126] The document also weighs the importance of gaining the initiative by meeting the terrorist threat outside of Canada's borders: "The Government also recognizes the importance of meeting threats to our security as far away from our borders as possible, wherever they may arise. Security in Canada ultimately begins with stability abroad."[127]

Unable to govern effectively, a handful of states provide sanctuary to terrorist organizations and allow them to breed within their borders, causing instability not only regionally, but also within the international system. According to Canadian policy makers, by helping to stabilize these states, terrorist cells are denied their use as safe havens and logistical nodes, hence reducing the threat of terrorist attacks on Canadian soil. Prime Minister Harper verbalized this when he stated "…if we [Canada] abandon our fellow human beings to lives of poverty, brutality and ignorance, in today's global village their misery will eventually and inevitably become our own."[128] Therefore, from

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[125] Privy Counsel Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2004), 50.

[126] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*…, 1.

[127] *Ibid.,* 2.

[128] Prime Minister of Canada, "Prime Minister Harper addresses Australian parliament in Canberra, Australia – 11 September 2007"; http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&featureId=6&pageId=46&id=1818; Internet; accessed 8 March 2011.

a Canadian perspective, failed states are considered as being the single most important enablers for terrorist organizations.

If failed and failing states are the focus of Canada's foreign security and defence policy, then the political priority given to global security on the world stage is confusing. This confusion lies between discourse and reality. For example, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) website addresses the importance of international stability and further describes how failed and failing states should be managed from a capacity building perspective:

> Our security is inextricably linked to that of other states. When they lack resources or expertise to prevent and respond to terrorist activity, the security of Canadians and Canadian interests at home and abroad is at risk. Counter-terrorism capacity building (CTCB) assists other states with training, funding, equipment, technical and legal assistance so threat they can prevent and respond to terrorist activity, within international counter-terrorism and human rights norms, standards and obligations.[129]

Despite the clarity of this explanation, it does not transcend across all policy documents, which suggests a lack of synchronization amongst government departments. For example, the IPS clearly states that Canada needs to focus on where its interests are at stake and where a meaningful contribution can be made:

> The fluid nature of the international security environment makes it difficult to predict the precise threats that we might face even five years from now… Nevertheless, in order to concentrate our efforts in areas where Canada can make a difference, the Government has decided to focus on failed and failing states.[130]

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[129] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Terrorism* [on-line]; available from http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx; Internet; accessed 15 February 2011.

[130] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*…, 5.

In other words, the focus needs to be placed on areas that Canada can influence with the capabilities available to it, and not necessarily on areas where the threat to Canadian citizens can be significantly reduced. The NSP also mentions the issue of capacity in Canada's response: "Assisting failed and failing states is one area where the links with both our national security and our capacity to contribute are clear."[131] Therefore, if Canada's policy is limited by capacity and by poor inter-departmental synchronization, so too are the potential courses of action that could result from comprehensive threat analysis.

Another example that demonstrates the divergence between discourse and reality concerns the prioritization of counter-terror efforts. This divergence is related to the imbalance between domestic and international aspects of counter-terrorism policy.[132] "Contributing to international security" is the last of three security priorities put forth by the Government of Canada in the National Security Policy (NSP), and the Prime Minister himself has confirmed this in his speeches.[133] Yet, the document contradicts itself by stating that the government has placed "the highest priority on countering international terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, assisting failed and failing states, and defusing intra and interstate conflicts."[134] Given the complex nature of the terrorist threat and the limited means Canada has to counter it, this

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[131] Privy Counsel Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*…, 50.

[132] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era*…, 30.

[133] Privy Counsel Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*…, 5.

[134] *Ibid.*, 48.

confusion may be diverting power from key sources within other government departments.

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The last component of Canadian foreign security policy relating to the stabilization of failed and failing states is the requirement to conduct operations within an interdepartmental framework. The whole-of-government approach, more commonly known today as the Comprehensive Approach (CA) to stability operations, is evident throughout written policy and verbal discourse, but the DFAIT website provides the most useful explanation:

> The multi-pronged fight against terrorism must include diplomacy, intelligence, security and law enforcement, customs and immigration, transportation, justice and finance expertise. All of these branches of government must work together to: identify and arrest terrorists; to stop their operations; to protect and defend people, societies, and economies from terrorist attack; and to mitigate effects of an attack.[135]

It is interesting to note that many of the functions mentioned by DFAIT have domestic connotations, although many can also be applied in a foreign context. In Afghanistan, the Canadian Forces' should theoretically be playing a supporting, albeit essential role of establishing security for the application of other forms of state power."[136] In reality, Canada's contribution to Afghanistan is predominantly military in nature.

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[135] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Terrorism* [on-line]; available from http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx; Internet; accessed 15 February 2011.

[136] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2008), 9.

Stabilizing failed states are complex operations that inherently require complex desirable outcomes, such as establishing host-nation government, building host-nation security forces, revitalizing the economy and re-establishing public institutions. These outcomes entail enduring solutions that are shaped not by military action, but by social, economic and political change.[137] Failed and failing states have problems across the entire spectrum of their national organization; therefore, a comprehensive approach to harness a multitude of diverse initiatives is required to address the issues of each discipline effectively.[138] The CA involves supporting military operations that will allow for a permissive environment in which the rebuilding of fragile and failed states can occur.

THE REALITY

Internationally, the Canadian government's approach to terrorism has been fundamentally military. However, as Prime Minister Harper explains, there is logic behind this approach: "The successful pursuit of all of Canada's interests around the world – trade, investment, diplomatic and humanitarian – ultimately depends on security…."[139] With a view of establishing security, the government has placed considerable importance on the Canadian military, as clearly defined by the CFDS

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[137] Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2010), 154.

[138] Craig Leslie Mantle, *How Do We Go About Building Peace While We're Still At War?: Canada, Afghanistan and the Whole of Government Concept…,* 3.

[139] Prime Minister of Canada, "PM unveils revised motion on the future of Canada's mission in Afghanistan - 21 February 2008"; http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&featureId=6&pageId=46&id=1995; Internet; accessed 8 March 2011.

through the means of procurement and increased human resources. The weight placed on the Department of National Defence in relation with other departments is quite evident. In the IPS, it is the Canadian Forces that have been given the prioritized roles of "protecting Canadians, defending North America in cooperation with the United-States, and contributing to international peace and security."[140] The CFDS suggests that the Canadian Forces need to be able to address issues such as terrorism, which is arguably difficult to accomplish with military resources.[141] It is clear that the Canadian government has chosen military force as the principal tool to be used for counter-terrorism on the international stage.

SUMMARY

This chapter has demonstrated that Canada's contemporary foreign and security policy is driven by traditional liberal principles that have existed since the end of the WWII. While the protection of Canadian citizen's is certainly a priority, it is clear that Canada's involvement abroad speaks to its need to maintain a functional relationship with the US for both reasons of security and trade. It is also a result of Canada's traditionally strong commitment to multilateralism; maintaining credibility with NATO allies and maintaining the perception of Canada as a values based co-founder of the UN.

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[140] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*…, 2.

[141] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Policy*…, 7.



Figure 4.1 – Canadian Foreign Security Policy.

The analysis of policy and discourse indicates that Canada understands its role as a middle power. American influence has forced Canada to diverge from its specialized roles and has strongly encouraged Canada's military participation in the Global War on Terror. It has also greatly influenced its "Home Game" as it struggles to ensure that terrorists don't use Canada to stage an attack on the US.

In the end, Canada's foreign and security policy is not specifically directed at reducing the terrorist threat to Canada, although the principles of multilateralism and CAN-US relations may achieve this aim indirectly. The roots of the terrorist threat are identified as failed and failing states, yet Canada's policy to counter it prioritizes a defensive posture and domestic counter-terror measures. The *Canada First* Defense

Strategy clearly prioritizes the defence of Canada and of North America above "contributing to international peace and security" for the military, but the bulk of the military's operations since the events of 9/11 have been carried out overseas, and primarily in Afghanistan. Despite its understanding of the threat, priorities and the allocation of resources derive from traditional foreign policy principals and limitations related to capabilities. To effectively counter the threat, critical vulnerabilities must be identified and targeted with all forms of state power. Chapter 5 will address the issue of al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities with the help of the Strange model.

CHAPTER 5 – CASE ANALYSIS – AL-QAEDA'S CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES

Thus far, this paper has established that from a non-pejorative perspective, terrorism is a tactic used by non-state extremist groups in the pursuit of political objectives vice an ideology or motivation. This distinction is critical, as one must target the group that utilizes terrorism as a tactic as opposed to fighting the tactic itself. The conditions that encourage terrorism have also been considered through the discussion of globalization as both a cause and an enabler of terrorism. Ultimately, Canadian counter-terror policy makers need to consider these factors and accept the role Canada has chosen to play in the globalizing international system. The effects of the traditionally Canadian principles of multilateralism and CAN-US relations have also been discussed to establish an understanding of the scope of Canada's participation in the global War on Terror.

With a view to arguing that Canada's foreign security policy is ineffective at concretely reducing the threat of terrorism to Canadian citizens, this chapter will use a modified Strange analysis model to deduce al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities (CVs). Al-Qaeda has been chosen as the focus of this case study for three reasons. First, having named Canada as a potential target, al-Qaeda is clearly a threat to Canadian security. Second, while Canada has made great efforts to stabilize Afghanistan during the last decade, it has essentially been fighting al-Qaeda, or at the very least al-Qaeda enabled groups such as the Taliban. Third, terrorism has been a key component of the vast majority of CSIS reports and governmental policy documents since 9/11. Considering these points, it is reasonable to consider al-Qaeda as a major threat to the security of the

Canadian population. Prior to conducting the analysis, the modified Strange Analysis model will be explained before the origins of al-Qaeda as a "terrorist" organization are briefly described. The Strange analysis will start with the consideration of al-Qaeda's strategic objectives. Critical capabilities (CCs) will then be examined in detail to identify targetable CVs.

THE STRANGE ANALYSIS

The Strange analysis is an appropriate analytical model; however, altering its process is considered to be necessary to maximize its effectiveness. While using the idea of a center of gravity (CoG) as the starting point for his analysis, Joe Strange aims to identify targetable CVs that, if denied, interdicted or destroyed, would cause the defeat of the enemy. According to Canadian doctrine, CoGs are "characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight".[142] However, according to Clausewitz' definition, a CoG is the source of moral and physical power. Therefore, it would be difficult to argue that "characteristics" and "localities" could be CoGs.[143] A CoG can be a physical, political or moral entity. Moral and political CoGs influence the outcome of events by virtue of their determination, influence and leadership.[144] On the physical plane, they can be armed forces, national economic and industrial power or

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[142] Department of National Defence, CFJP 5.0 *Operation* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008), GL-1.

[143] Dr Joe Strange, *Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language* (Quantico: Defense Automated Printing Service Center, 1996), 43.

[144] *Ibid*., 44.

power stemming from large populations.[145] The CoG does not merely contribute to strength because in theory it is the strength.[146] Therefore, successfully neutralizing the CoG can lead to the defeat of the enemy through the use of minimal resources, hence minimizing casualties and avoiding an attritionist conflict.

Unfortunately, a center of gravity in a particular conflict is sometimes difficult to determine accurately and can evolve throughout the various phases of any given conflict. There are many examples in history that clearly demonstrate, with the advantage of hindsight, how CoGs have been wrongfully chosen. For example, Saddam Hussein was identified as the enemy CoG during Operation Iraqi Freedom. This CoG was shortsighted and was clearly inappropriate given the intensity of the hostilities that ensued following his removal.[147] The risk is that if planners concentrate their efforts on an irrelevant CoG, the end result could be nearsighted strategic plans, the inappropriate attribution of the various means of state power and regrettable second and third order effects.

Addressing this risk related to CoG identification, the Canadian Forces College acknowledges that the determination of the CoG is not always possible, and that there

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[145] Dr Joe Strange, *Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language…,* 44.

[146] Joe Strange and Richard Iron. "Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship Between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities." In *Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities* (Quantico: Marine Corps War College, 2001), 7.

[147] Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iraq: Trends in Violence and Civilian Casualties: 2005-2009* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 16.

may be more than one CoG depending on the circumstances.[148] Therefore, in the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CFOPP), the primary purpose of the Strange Analysis is to identify targetable critical vulnerabilities with a view of establishing effective courses of action for friendly forces to take against the enemy. From this perspective, the importance of the CoG becomes debatable and in some cases negligible. Understanding the difficulties entailed with determining the CoG, Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier of the U.S. Army developed an "Ends, Ways and Means" framework, which is in effect a modified Strange analysis. It serves as a tool in CV identification, but can also be used to determine the CoG. Within this modified version of the model, friendly or enemy "critical capabilities" (CC) are the start point for the analysis in the stead of the CoG. As the "critical requirements" (CR) are elaborated from the CCs and, subsequently, the CVs are identified, a pattern may become apparent which could assist in the identification of the CoG. Essentially, the analysis seeks to answer three questions: what is the desired end state, how can it be achieved and what resources are required?[149] Considering the risks and limited benefits associated with the determination of a CoG, the modified Strange Analysis will be used here solely to determine al-Qaeda's CVs in this case study.

Prior to commencing the analysis, the six steps of the framework require elaboration. Contrary to the original Strange analysis model, the first step in the modified framework is to clearly identify the desired ends. In effect, al-Qaeda's desired political

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[148] Canadian Forces College, "CFC Guide to CF Operational Planning Process" (Joint Command and Staff Program Handout CFC 230), II-9/17.

[149] Dale C. Eikmeier, "A Logical Method for Center of Gravity Analysis," *Military Review* (September-October 2007): 62.

outcomes need to be identified. For example, the expulsion of US military forces from the Middle East can be considered as a desired political outcome. In step two, ways to achieve the desired ends will be explored while those that are most likely to be successful are highlighted. Ways are actions; therefore, they will be expressed as verbs. The most essential of them will be expressed as critical capabilities. For instance, al-Qaeda's ability to sustain itself logistically is one of its CCs. In step three, the means required to enable and execute the CC will be identified. These means are critical requirements, which are essential conditions and resources necessary to possess a critical capability. Gaining access to foreign countries, for example, could be one of many CRs that would allow al-Qaeda to achieve the above-mentioned CC. Step four will see the selection of the critical items from the CR list that are the most vulnerable and valuable. These will be identified as critical vulnerabilities: critical requirements that are vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack in a manner that achieves decisive results.[150] Regardless of whether the CoG has been identified or not, the targeting of these CVs would inevitably neutralize CRs and deny CCs to the enemy, while minimizing the resources, effort and cost required to defeat him. Prior to discussing al-Qaeda's desired political outcomes, the organization's origins will be briefly set into context.

[150] Dale C. Eikmeier, "A Logical Method for Center of Gravity Analysis"…, 65.

AL-QAEDA

Origins

Al-Qaeda has been successful at forcing itself into international politics over the course of the last two decades. Although many refer to it is as a "terrorist" organization, AQ is in essence a political movement, possessing limited military abilities, which seeks to achieve political objectives by whatever means necessary.[151] According to Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, AQ was "…born as a result of the failure of discredited Arab governments to defend their countries" and is the consequence of a dual realization on the part of private actors, such as Osama bin Laden.[152] First, according to AQ, certain Arab states were too weak to defend their citizenry against globalization and secularization. While bin Laden has been clear in his discourse that the enemies of Islam were imposing themselves in the Muslim world through "colonization, imperialism, economic exploitation, and repressive governance," he blames weak Muslim governments.[153] Second, these weak governments were also too strong to be overtaken.[154] However, as Michael Scheuer argues, AQ was primarily created to ensure the survival of the global Islamist movement, which would have been threatened by the

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[151] Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 44.

[152] *Ibid*., 45.

[153] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 77.

[154] Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War*…, 45.

end of the jihad against the Soviets in the late 90s.[155] It was to serve as a base to support the global jihad through organization, training and money.

AQ's origins can be traced back to Abdallah Azzam, a university lecturer and leader of the Arabs who travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to help resist the Soviet invasion and established an office to facilitate the preparation, training and movement of fighters.[156] Based off of the successes of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, and in partnership with Osama bin Laden, the elements of an international, all Muslim army were put in place.[157] The purpose of this force was to wage war against the US and its allies to achieve a variety of political objectives. Initially, AQ was a hierarchical organization that was characterized by a command structure and consultative council. Since 9/11, it has pragmatically morphed into a loose confederation of terrorist groups with members living and operating in over 40 countries. While AQ's strength is unknown, it is estimated to be at roughly seventy thousand worldwide with thousands attending training camps in Sudan, Yemen and Afghanistan.[158] As will be discussed below, it has become a movement sustained by a common ideology, charismatic leadership and political objectives. These factors render AQ extremely difficult to defeat with military force.

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[155] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden*…, 72.

[156] Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War*…, 46.

[157] *Ibid*., 46.

[158] Jack Boureston and Charles Mahaffey, "Al-Qaeda and Mass Casualty Terrorism: Assessing the Threat," in *Al-Qaeda: An Organization to be Reckoned With*, ed. Lawrence J. Bevy, 29-40 (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2006), 30.

As an organization, AQ resorted to the use of terrorism as a tactic in its overall strategy for pragmatic reasons. Primarily, following 9/11, its members knew that they could not fight the US directly without suffering heavy casualties and defeat on the battlefield.[159] Even attempts at using the guerrilla tactics that the Mujahedeen had used in Afghanistan against the Soviets had proven to be costly given modern military technology. Bin Laden himself acknowledged this disparity and described the measures AQ needed to take in order to counter it:

> Due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, namely using fast-moving forces that work under complete secrecy…. It is wise in the present circumstances for the armed military forces not to be engaged in conventional fighting with the forces of the… enemy… unless a big advantage is likely to be achieved; and the great losses induced on the enemy side that would shake and destroy his foundations and infrastructure… spread rumors, fear, and discouragement among the members of the enemy forces.[160]

Thus, the strategy employed by AQ was to delay the Allies, to inflict casualties, to force the commitment of vast amounts of treasure and to slowly degrade public support for their mission. Secondly, terror is the simplest tactic to use on the international stage. The weapons can be made with local materials and the operations require minimum personnel to be executed. The use of the tactic is further facilitated by the creation of independent and regional franchises that, while loosely connected to AQ central, are encouraged to attack targets of opportunity as they see fit and in accordance with the parameters that are set by Allah and his Prophet.[161] The Strange analysis demonstrates

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[159] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era*…, 158.

[160] Osama bin Laden, *Declaration of Jihad: August 23, 1996*, http://www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/declaration_of_jihad2.html; Internet; accessed 20 March 2011.

[161] Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War*…, 54.

that these affiliations could in fact be considered as a vulnerability, among several others. Given the international expansion of AQ since 9/11, the requirement to examine Canadian foreign security policy, which prioritizes military stability operations in one failed state, is certainly required.

Ends

Appropriating the modified Strange analysis model, al-Qaeda's political objectives will be examined. It is commonly understood that al-Qaeda's movement is based on three basic foundations: the full political representation of a specific interpretation of Sharia law; the liberation of the homelands; and the liberation of the human being.[162] While considering these foundations, it will be argued that AQ's end state is composed of three overarching objectives: the removal of weak or corrupt Islamic governments in the Middle-East; the removal of military forces belonging to the US or its allies from the Middle East; and the end of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. All three of these objectives will be briefly described before considering the critical capabilities that al-Qaeda has to achieve them.

Governments and the media have tended to ignore al-Qaeda's objectives, citing the hatred of freedom or the radicalization of Islam as the driving factors behind its operations. These misconceptions are surprising considering the clarity and consistency with which AQ has always expressed its objectives in discourse. Bin Laden alone has

[162] Christopher M. Blanchard, *Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology*, ed. Lawrence J. Bevy, 11-28 (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2006), 18.

broadcasted twenty-three messages in the five years following 9/11, and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has produced just as many. Even before the attacks against the World Trade Center in September of 2001, Bin Laden had made his frustrations, particularly with the US (and its allies), very clear:

> We believe the US is responsible directly for those who were killed in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq… This American government abandoned humanitarian feelings by these hideous crimes. It transgressed all bounds and behaved in a way not witnessed before by any power or any imperialist power in the world. The United States today has set a double standard, calling whoever goes against its injustice a terrorist. It wants to occupy our countries, steal our resources, impose on us agents to rule us… and wants us to agree to all this. If we refuse to do so, it will say, "you are terrorists."[163]

In a broad sense, AQ is seeking to establish a new world order in which negative and secular influence from the US no longer threatens Muslims. To establish this order the old order needs to be removed. As such, Canada has arguably become an AQ target solely because of the support it provides to the US in its fight against "terrorism." Shortly after Canada deployed troops to Afghanistan, bin Laden issued a taped statement mentioning it as a new AQ target; "Why did your governments ally themselves with America to attack us in Afghanistan, and I cite in particular Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Germany and Australia? As you kill, you will be killed…"[164] It is not Canadian foreign policy in and of itself that frustrates al-Qaeda, it is its relationship with the US.

Al-Qaeda being, in a sense, a movement of religious motivation, the corruption of Islam is its primary cause of frustration. This has been clear in AQ discourse since the

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[163] Osama bin Laden in Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 183.

[164] Osama bin Laden, Taped Voice, *Bin Laden Speeches*, November 12, 1993, http://www.niu.edu/phil/~kapitan/Bin%20Laden%20Speaks.html; Internet; accessed 12 Jan 2011.

early 90s as bin Laden expressed that "No one can be unaware of the tremendous spread of corruption, which has penetrated all aspects of life. It can no longer be a secret to anyone that various evils have spread…"[165] The source of this corruption, according to AQ discourse, is weak, secular and corrupt Middle Eastern governments that allow themselves to be influenced by intrusive American foreign policies. By disposing of non-believers and bad influences, Al-Qaeda believes that a true Islamic society could be revived across all Muslim states through the creation of a new Caliphate. In a statement from 1995/1996, while discussing the corruption of Islam in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden stated that "… [The] main problem is the US government, while the Saudi regime is but a branch or an agent of the US. By being loyal to the US regime, the Saudi regime has committed an act against Islam."[166] Bin Laden has clearly and repeatedly stated the requirement to dispose of weak governance and to establish an Islamic Caliphate that protects its citizens from the secular and intrusive world, primarily by abstaining from being part of it. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the complexities related to the possibility of establishing a Caliphate given the numerous differences and divides within Islam. However, as will be discussed below, these divisions could be considered as vulnerabilities for al-Qaeda if they were to be exploited effectively.

As understood by al-Qaeda, weak governance at home is only part of the problem. While this weak governance is, according to bin Laden, responsible for allowing the corruption of Islam, it is also setting the conditions for the exploitation of the holy lands

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[165] Osama bin Laden in Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden* (New York: Verso, 2005), 6.

[166] *Ibid*., 45.

by the Christian (US) and Jewish (Israel) crusaders. Therefore, AQ has a near enemy and a far enemy, and the far enemy must be fought simultaneously with the near one.[167] Hence, the second objective that is the withdrawal of US military forces from the "Holy Lands." In a message addressed to the Saudi Arabian government in 1996, bin Laden explained the degree of "degradation and corruption" to which the Islamic motherland had sunk by referring to weak governance and to the "feebleness and cowardice" of Muslim scholars: "This is because of their neglect of religion and weakness of faith which allowed the enemy to attack. The enemy invaded the land of our umma [community], violated her honor, shed her blood and occupied her sanctuaries."[168] Later, he described the US presence in Saudi Arabia as the "greatest disaster to befall on Muslims since the death of the Prophet".[169] This discourse clearly demonstrates how the withdrawal of US forces in the Middle East is a political objective.

The last objective that will be used for the purposes of this paper will be the end of the US support that is provided to Israel in its "oppression" of the Palestinians. From AQ's perspective, the US, among others, is providing political and military support to help Israel in its illegal occupation of Palestinian territories.[170] According to bin Laden:

> We declared jihad against the US government, because the US government is unjust, criminal, and tyrannical. It has committed acts that are extremely unjust, hideous, and criminal, whether directly or through its support of the Israeli

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[167] Lawrence J. Bevy, *Al-Qaeda: An Organization to be Reckoned With* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2006), 1.

[168] Osama bin Laden in Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden…*, 15.

[169] *Ibid*., 25.

[170] Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War*…, 70.

> occupation of the Land of the Prophet's Night Journey. And we believe the US is directly responsible for those who were killed in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq.[171]

Peace with the Jews is perceived as being nothing but betrayal to Islam. Therefore, stopping US support to Israel, through its pervasive foreign policy, is an objective.

By analyzing and connecting these political objectives, an end-state can be determined. AQ seeks to remove weak and secular governments that are tolerant of US Middle Eastern foreign policy, to force the withdrawal of US forces and to stop US support of Israel. The common denominator of these three objectives is US foreign policy. Therefore, if these three objectives were to be achieved, it is clear that the end state would involve the disappearance of pervasive US foreign policy in the Middle East. Furthermore, bin Laden has often justified the actions of 9/11 as defensive measures stating the need to protect Muslims from US foreign policy. The end state would also involve the security of Muslims. Thus, it is argued that AQ's desired strategic end state is the following: the US no longer applying influential foreign policy in the Middle East; the security of Muslims no longer threatened by external secular threats; and governance based on Sharia law established. The establishment of this tentative end state has set the conditions for the next step, which demands the identification of the critical capabilities possessed by AQ that may allow them to achieve.

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[171] Osama bin Laden in Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden…*, 46.

CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

The capabilities that are necessary for Al-Qaeda to achieve its objectives and, ultimately, its end state are numerous. The capabilities and requirements that will be mentioned below derive from the most recent works from leadings authors such as Steve Coll, Bruce Hoffman and Michael Scheuer. While it is not within the scope of this paper to provide an exhaustive list and to describe each of them in detail, five CCs will be highlighted with the specific purpose of identifying useful CRs and CVs for the analysis of Canadian foreign policy in the next chapter. It is deemed by the author that these capabilities are absolutely necessary for AQ to achieve its objectives. It should be noted that AQ possesses far more than five CCs, but that the following are perhaps the most pertinent for this discussion. Each CC will be briefly described before the related CRs and CVs are deduced from it.

Establish Sanctuary

Al-Qaeda's ability to establish sanctuary is a critical capability because without it, command and control, sustainment and training would be rendered extremely difficult. As Jim Arkedis argues, the only opportunity for al-Qaeda to stage large scale and devastating terrorist attacks against its enemies is under the umbrella of sanctuary similar to that which was once provided by the Taliban in Afghanistan.[172] It is true that some attacks have been largely planned and coordinated via the internet since 9/11, however

[172] Jim Arkedis, "Why Al Qaeda Wants a Safe Haven," *Foreign Policy* (23 October, 2009) [on-line]; available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/got_safe_haven?page=full; Internet; accessed 28 March 2011.

chat rooms and social media do not support the building of the trust, the confidence and the cohesion created by physically meeting to plan and train for a mission. Furthermore, some successful and comparatively smaller attacks, such as the London mass transit bombings of July 2005, were homegrown, AQ inspired attacks that did not need international sanctuary to be planned and executed. [173] However, significant international attacks on the scale of 9/11 require sanctuary. This requirement is demonstrated by how the assumed 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed put his operatives through a series of training programs to develop their proficiency with firearms, unarmed combat, Western culture and even the English language.[174] The preparation of these operatives was key to the success of the operation and would have been impossible to do over the Internet or without significant space to conduct training. Hence, the sanctuary provided by the Taliban and the Pashto areas bordering on Afghanistan and Pakistan was key to the mission's success.

The importance of sanctuary has proven to be the source of much debate. Arkedis speaks to the argument that denying sanctuary to AQ is pointless given the organization's ability to relocate to another sympathetic country.[175] It would prove to be extremely difficult for bin Laden and his senior leadership to conduct international travel, as they are well known by law enforcement agencies around the globe. Relocation would also mean that AQ would need to re-establish its smuggling networks and underground financial arrangements. Given how Osama bin Laden has claimed responsibility for

[173] Jim Arkedis, "Why Al Qaeda Wants a Safe Haven"…

[174] *Ibid.*

[175] *Ibid.*

attacks that were not his to claim, it is also arguable that al-Qaeda is now decentralized and incapable of providing command and control because its senior leadership is on the run. However, as Michael Scheuer warns, this may be all part of bin Laden's plan. [176] It would be dangerous to assume that al-Qaeda is no longer a functional organization. Vis-à-vis this possibility, the US and its allies should maintain its efforts to deny sanctuary through the application of all means of state power.

If AQ's ability to establish sanctuary could be denied to them, operations would undoubtedly be hindered. By focusing on failed and failing states, Canada is partly addressing the issue of sanctuary. Notwithstanding Canada's efforts in Afghanistan, an analysis of critical vulnerabilities related to AQ's ability to establish sanctuary is worthy. Through the analysis of what is necessary for al-Qaeda to have the capability of establishing sanctuary, three critical requirements can be brought forth. First, AQ must have some form of state backing. It would be extremely difficult for it to establish bases, training institutions and logistical facilities without its host being aware of the situation. With state backing, there must also be a degree of public support that would make co-existence of al-Qaeda members and countrymen possible. Second, it requires the ability to ship weapons and equipment internationally while moving a fair number of fighters in and out of the host country. The ability to travel internationally, as will be discussed in further detail below, is a third and repetitive critical requirement that would be difficult to achieve without the cooperation and support of state governance. These were the conditions that were in place in Afghanistan under Taliban rule, and these are conditions

[176] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden*…, 130.

that would be difficult to reproduce elsewhere given the unique set of circumstances that had made them possible.

The examination of these CRs reveals an important vulnerability – moderate governments of Muslim countries. Moderate governments, such as Saudi-Arabia's, who tend to establish economic relationships with AQ's enemies, will tend to want to maintain those relationships. Moderate governments would also prefer avoiding being the focus of US attention if they were to "harbor terrorists." Furthermore, governments that would tend towards more secular foreign interests would not necessarily choose to support al-Qaeda in its cause. Therefore, foreign policy, diplomacy and information operations that seek to influence these governments and their populations would have a negative impact on AQ's ability to establish sanctuary, which would in turn limit the scope and scale of their operations. For these reasons, moderate Muslim governments are considered as a targetable vulnerability for al-Qaeda because of their ability to disrupt the AQ message.

Exploit Vulnerabilities

Considering the obvious "imbalance of power" as described by bin Laden, AQ is incapable of attacking conventional forces on a battlefield. As mentioned above, AQ uses terrorist tactics against its enemy's critical vulnerabilities to achieve its objectives with minimal resources and effort. [177] Population centers, symbols of power or installations of economic significance are targets that have proven to be effective at

[177] Jack Boureston and Charles Mahaffey, "Al-Qaeda and Mass Casualty Terrorism: Assessing the Threat"…, 37.

achieving propaganda by deed. The attacks on 9/11 resulted from AQ's exploitation of lax border and airport security in the US. The secondary effects of these attacks enabled AQ to exploit larger vulnerabilities, such as American paranoia and its hard charging nationalism. According to Scheuer, it was through the exploitation of these vulnerabilities that bin Laden lured the US, and its allies, into a war in Afghanistan.[178] This exploitation has also forced the US and its allies to spend billions on security measures designed to ensure that another 9/11 will not happen, while the organization has since attacked suitable targets with comparatively minuscule budgets. When considering the enemy's limitless exploitable vulnerabilities, the opportunities for al-Qaeda to attack significant targets are also limitless.

As an example of obvious economic vulnerabilities, there are thousands of kilometers of oil pipeline that are of critical economic importance to the United States and Canada. In total, it is estimated that in the US there are approx 56,000 kilometers of gathering lines, 88,000 kilometers of trunk lines (crude) and 152,000 kilometers of refined product lines that crisscross the country, with another 100,000 kilometers of various lines in Canada.[179] It is physically and economically impossible to secure all of these lines. Sea shipping containers are another important vulnerability. Every day, nearly 17,000 shipping containers arrive at one of the US's 300 ports. Of these, only 2% are inspected.[180] These are just two examples of critical vulnerabilities that AQ has the

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[178] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden*…, 130.

[179] "How Many Pipelines are there?," *Pipeline 101*, [internet site]; available from http://www.pipeline101.com/Overview/energy-pl.html; Internet; accessed 16 March 2011.

[180] J.F. Fritelli et al., *Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues* (New York: Novinka Books, 2003), 34.

ability to exploit with relative ease. Given Canada's economic dependence on the US, any disruption to trade in the US would have a significant impact on the Canadian economy as well. The will of the American population is another vulnerability that AQ is capable of exploiting. In Afghanistan and Iraq, AQ and its affiliates inflict casualties on allied forces to target the will of their enemy's population and to cause economic strain. This "death by a thousand cuts" tactic has been successful given the decline of US public support to the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.[181] The ability to attack US vulnerabilities is certainly a critical capability that facilitates the achievement of all three of AQ's political objectives.

The analysis of the means required for AQ to retain this capability has highlighted four critical requirements. Once again, the list is not exhaustive but will provide the data required to identify the most obvious of vulnerabilities for the purposes of this discussion. First, for al-Qaeda to attack its enemy's vulnerabilities, it needs weapons. Some form of power is necessary to achieve propaganda by deed and to force the hands of opposing state governance. Therefore, AQ needs the ability to acquire various types of weapons or to build them from readily available materials. While the related logistical challenges will be discussed below, it can be noted here that without weapons, AQ would not be capable of using or threatening the use of force on a scale that would allow it to achieve its objectives.

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[181] Jennifer Agiesta, "Public Supportive of Iraq, Afghanistan Drawdowns," *The Washington Post* (16 July 2010) [newspaper online]; available from http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind –the-numbers/2010/07/public_supportive_of_iraq_afgh.html; Internet; accessed 20 March 2011.

Secondly, unlike a conventional military force, AQ is hunted by law enforcement agencies worldwide. If some of the organization's members lack discipline or are inexperienced, they risk detection, which would in turn lead to cells being dismantled and operations disrupted. For example, an investigation triggered by the discovery of ricin, a highly toxic protein obtained from the pressed seeds of the castor-oil plant, in a London apartment led to the arrest of sixteen AQ operatives in Spain who were plotting a major European attack.[182] Therefore, it can be said that in order for AQ to successfully attack its enemy's vulnerabilities, its ability to avoid detection is a Critical Requirement.

In the pursuit of its objectives, AQ has operated and attacked targets in North America, in Europe, in Africa, across the Middle East and elsewhere around the world. To have a global effect, al-Qaeda needs the ability to successfully travel from one country to the next. As an example which speaks to the challenges that international travel may pose on AQ operatives, the arrest of a German citizen traveling from Afghanistan to Europe led to the disruption of a terrorist plot to attack several locations in Britain, France and Germany in 2010.[183] Once again, considering how detection leads to disruption, the ability for operatives to gain unimpeded access to foreign countries through various means is a CR.

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[182] "Major Al-Qaeda Attack Foiled," *BBC News* (24 Jan 2003) [online news]; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2690629.stm; Internet; accessed 15 March 2011.

[183] "Terror Plot Foiled," Al Jazeera and Agencies, Europe (29 Sept 2010) [online news]; available from http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2010/09/201092923819317720.html; Internet; accessed 15 March 2011.

Finally, AQ leadership requires the ability to communicate direction to the organization. Considering the decentralization of AQ since the 9/11 attacks and the emergence of various officially and unofficially affiliated groups, it is difficult to identify the degree to which communications are essential.[184] However, if AQ hopes to achieve its objectives, its leadership would needs to continue communicating guidance, intent and direction to its followers. This communication is facilitated by the globalization of media technologies. Senior AQ leadership is still capable of broadcasting encrypted messages through various forms of discourse, if ever it needed to do so. It is more probable that the organization as a whole is able to communicate with very little risk of detection over the internet. Furthermore, given these technologies, it is also capable of conducting its information operations campaign to gain the support of the masses, to instill fear into its enemy's populations and to encourage recruitment with little or no obstruction. Without these means of communications, it would be extremely difficult for AQ to attack its enemy's vulnerabilities in an international context.

Through the consideration of these critical requirements, several critical vulnerabilities can be identified. The most obvious are perhaps the difficulties associated with obtaining and moving weapons or their critical components, such as detonators, chemicals and explosives. Another vulnerability that can be considered is the use of weapons of mass destruction. In discourse, AQ has clearly voiced its intent of acquiring or building nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. While there is little evidence that indicates they may be successful, the use of such a weapon may in fact become a

[184] The decentralization of al-Qaeda will be discussed in further detail below.

vulnerability rather than a capability.[185] An attack of such magnitude may breath new life into American resolve, as with their allies, to continue fighting, rather than achieving the desired end state.

When considering the necessity to avoid detection and to gain access to foreign countries, the requirement to travel becomes a critical vulnerability that is targetable through various means of state power. AQ operatives are also vulnerable when they communicate with each other because the means that are used, namely the Internet and cellular telephones, are not secure means for the transmission of information. Communication can lead to detection and disruption. It would be difficult to envision the targeting of these vulnerabilities with military power, as is the case with the vulnerabilities associated with AQ's decentralized and clandestine methods of sustaining its operations.

Sustain Operations

The ability to sustain operations is another of AQ's critical capabilities, as operations on the scale of 9/11 would not be possible without it.[186] Similar to any military or civilian organization, the structure of AQ includes a logistical division that is charged with the provision of funds for buying weapons, paying salaries, compensating

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185 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, "Al Qaeda's Nuclear Ambitions," *Foreign Policy* (16 November, 2010) [on-line]; available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/16/al_qaedas_nuclear_ambitions?page=full; Internet; accessed 28 March 2011.

[186] Jack Boureston and Charles Mahaffey, "Al-Qaeda and Mass Casualty Terrorism: Assessing the Threat"…, 31.

families and handing out bribes.[187] They can also assist with travel arrangements and the shipment of weapons and equipment. In the execution of their most successful attacks, the sustainment piece of the planning and execution phases has been critical. Based on his Afghan experience, bin Laden built al-Qaeda as an organization that was fully capable of providing itself with the required "money and souls" to conduct global jihad.[188] While one could argue that since 9/11 a centralized logistical system is no longer possible, logistical support is still necessary even if it is decentralized amongst al-Qaeda affiliates.[189] Therefore, the ability to move money, people, weapons and equipment remains a critical capability. There are five critical requirements for sustainment that will be considered.

First, sanctuary and some form of state backing are again necessary. While there are examples of home grown attacks or attacks that have been planed and coordinated over the Internet, such as the Madrid train bombings in March of 2004, the reality is that large scale and relevant attacks of greater logistical complexity require space to reduce the risk of being detected and disrupted.[190] Given that the requirement for sanctuary has been discussed with sufficient detail above, it will not be elaborated on here.

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[187] Daniel Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy," *Foreign Policy* (7 December, 2010) [on-line]; available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/07/al_qaedas_m_and_a_strategy?page=full; Internet; accessed 28 March 2011.

[188] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden*…, 69.

[189] Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 134.

[190] Jim Arkedis, "Why Al Qaeda Wants a Safe Haven"…

Money is the second critical requirement that enables al-Qaeda to sustain its operations. Given the transnational nature of the organization, it is dependent on contributions from international donors for sources of funding.[191] This reality makes the international transfer of funds necessary. This was relatively easy to do through various legitimate businesses and banks in the 90s. [192] However, following the attacks of 9/11, many of AQ's assets were frozen and subsequent heavily tracked by various state counter-terror organizations. Despite this set-back, AQ has demonstrated remarkable flexibility and has managed to devise alternate methods to fund its operations. While sometimes aligning itself closely to international criminal organizations, it created legitimate and illegitimate institutions, charities and banks to allow for the undetected and unhindered movement of funds for its operatives around the world.[193] The ability for AQ to finance its operations is key, however targeting it is difficult and would not yield enough success to degrade AQ's capability of sustaining itself.

The physical movement of personnel and equipment requires, as do other critical capabilities, access to foreign countries. As previously mentioned, international travel and shipping create opportunities for detection and become critical vulnerabilities. As with the critical capability of targeting enemy vulnerabilities, methods of communications are also required for sustainment. Considering the complexity of AQ's logistical web, some method of communication, perhaps in the form of a legitimate enterprise, is absolutely required.

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[191] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden*…, 50.

[192] Angel Rabassa, *Beyond Al Qaeda: Part 1; The Global Jihadist Movement* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2006), 57.

[193] *Ibid*., 57.

The international movement of money, people, weapons and equipment theoretically requires international cooperation, which is the fifth CR that will be considered for sustainment. It would be extremely difficult for sustainment of this nature to be possible without the assistance of facilitators in destination countries. The requirement of this cooperation may be exploitable if effectively targeted by a comprehensive information operations campaign and/or by diplomacy. International cooperation is thus considered as a critical vulnerability that is targetable. While the use of commercial systems, such sea delivery systems and airlift, to sustain their operations is an example of how AQ is exploiting its enemy's vulnerabilities, it is also a vulnerability for the organization itself as it risks detection. Traceable funds also remain a vulnerability despite the fact that AQ has developed various clandestine means to move funds internationally with relative success. Considering the challenges related to tracing money underground, this particular means is not ideal for effective targeting and should not be considered as a critical vulnerability. However, as a viable means for the US and its allies to deny AQ its capability to sustain itself, attempts at intercepting funding, at denying its sanctuary and at prioritizing intelligence collection and sharing should be maintained.

Recruitment and Training

Without people, al-Qaeda would not be able to achieve its objectives; therefore the ability to recruit and train them is a critical capability.[194] The means with which AQ has been able to sustain itself with human resources have evolved considerably since 9/11. As the particular conditions that existed under Taliban sanctuary disappeared, the organization's structure decentralized, as did its methods of recruitment and training. As Jason Burke suggested in 2004, the best bin Laden could do following 9/11 was to provide broad strategic guidance aimed at autonomous cells that were able to function without him.[195] And as Daniel Byman chimed, "Maintaining effective command from remote parts of Pakistan was always difficult; the U.S. drone campaign has made it even harder."[196] However, based on his latest messages, it is also a known fact that bin Laden has access to the internet, which could provide him with the means to issue direction to subordinates. Scheuer makes a compelling argument as to how false assumptions have repeatedly resulted from bin Laden's "extended silences."[197] Bin Laden's inability to command the organization is one of those assumptions that have emerged from little more than wishful thinking.[198] Therefore, it can be assumed that bin Laden's ability to exercise control over al-Qaeda's operations are limited to some degree because he has

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[194] James A. Bliss, "Al Qaeda's Center of Gravity" (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 2004), 6.

[195] Jason Burke, "Think Again: Al Qaeda," *Foreign Policy* (1 May 2004) [on-line]; available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/05/01/think_again_al_qaeda?page=full; Internet; accessed 28 March 2011.

[196] Daniel Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy"…

[197] Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden*…, 135.

[198] *Ibid*., 135.

been forced to go into hiding. Nonetheless, despite the perceived decentralization of al-Qaeda, it may be dangerous to assume that the organization is no longer capable of operating in a coordinated and hierarchical fashion.

In relation to recruitment, AQ's decentralization is reflected by the fact that it is creating or enabling franchises with the help of other terrorist organizations. For example, it received members of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which renamed itself the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[199] AQ is expanding much like organized crime in that smaller national level organizations are merging under its banner and are conducting operations internationally. In 2009 jihadists in Yemen and Saudi Arabia announced a merger under the AQ in the Arabian Peninsula and began conducting international operations such as the Detroit plot as well as a plan to blow up cargo planes as they approached US cities.[200] These affiliated organizations offer many practical rewards to AQ central, such as fighters and additional smuggling networks. For instance, AQ in Iraq (AQI), under Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi, managed recruits, money and public affairs independently of bin Laden. Affiliation with an already well-established organization precluded the need for AQ central to worry about recruiting, training and commanding entire units of fighters. However, these affiliated groups offer more than just practical rewards. In the case of the AQI, bin Laden had little or no influence over its operations in Iraq.[201] AQ central was unable to establish control over its Iraqi affiliate,

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[199] Daniel Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy"…

[200] "US Charges Nigerian Suspect Over Plane Bomb Plot," *BBC News* (6 January 2010) [online news]: available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8444694.stm: Internet; accessed 19 April 2011.

[201] Peter Bergen, *The Longest War* (New York: Free Press, 2011), 271.

who was essentially pursuing its own historical agenda by targeting Shiite Muslims and also killing Sunni civilians in the process. In the end, the AQI was to become a substantial liability for AQ because of its use of ruthless and indiscriminating violence, which in turn reduced support and respect for the organization as a whole. Therefore, the franchising of the AQ banner and the loose command structure that resulted from decentralization could be exploited as a vulnerability.

The study of the capability to recruit and train reveals six principal critical requirements. First, for AQ to have the ability to recruit and train its jihadists, sanctuary, as described above, is a critical requirement. Without sanctuary, it would not be possible to indoctrinate and train new members to the same degree as the men who participated in the September 11th attacks. Secondly, to encourage the young to leave their families and homes to fight and die there is a requirement for charismatic leadership. Bin Laden provides this leadership to jihadists across the Islamist world. He has become an icon of the struggle against globalization, secularism and the US, with his image being further glorified by the inability of the US and its allies to catch him. His removal would most probably not cause the collapse of the organization; it would suffice to say that the lasting effects of his influence as a martyr would fuel the participation of many individuals in the fight against the oppressors of Islam. Capturing bin Laden and, as Bruce Hoffman has stated, forcing him to endure treatment similar to the treatment endured by Saddam Hussein would humanize his image and would ultimately have a more lasting impact.[202] Nonetheless, bin Laden would eventually need to be replaced by a leader of equal significance. Considering that bin Laden's influence would increase if he was to become

[202] Peter Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 383.

a martyr and that the al-Qaeda would continue to exist without him, he is not a critical requirement and cannot be considered as a significant vulnerability to the organization.

The third CR for recruitment is its dependence on financing. Without money, it would not be possible for recruits to travel, nor would it be possible to house them and feed them. Money is required for advertising and for purchasing training equipment. Teachers and installations also require money. In the case of this CC, access to foreign countries and the inherent ability to conduct international travel are a fourth CR for recruiting and training as the movement of people is obviously necessary. As previously mentioned, means of communications are also necessary for al-Qaeda to conduct its recruiting campaign, to invite new fighters to training camps and to ensure the advertising necessary for canvassing the necessary funds and public support.

The last critical requirement for the conduct of recruitment and training are madrassas and Islamist teachers. International Madrassas, or schools, run by extreme Islamist Mullahs are necessary to promulgate the Islamist ideal and convince otherwise moderate individuals that it is their Muslim duty to fight the oppressors of Islam. Without these individuals, al-Qaeda would not have been able to grow into a serious global non-state actor. These extremist teachers could be considered as critical vulnerabilities, because they are reasonably few in numbers and are relatively easier to target in an international counter-terrorism context than al-Qaeda leadership would be. Generally speaking, it would be easier to collect information on them, as they would tend to live out in the open with the general population. The risk, however, would be to create the illusion of intolerance and oppression if they were to be targeted in any way other

than through information operations. The targeting of Islamist extremism at its source could easily become a double-edged sword and would be dangerous.

Three critical vulnerabilities can be deduced from these Critical Requirements. First, the franchising of al-Qaeda and the assumingly reduced central command structure is a vulnerability that could easily be leveraged by an effective information operations campaign or by other and various forms of state power. A degree of international cooperation is necessary for this particular situation to be effective. If that cooperation or dedication is lacking, such as it did in the case of the AQI, then it could hinder al-Qaeda in an important way. Therefore, attempts could be made to leverage those differences and to take advantage of that situation. Secondly, international travel appears once again as a targetable critical vulnerability as the movement of people from one country to another would be necessary to conduct the advanced training required for large-scale operations. Last, sanctuary is also and once again a critical vulnerability to conduct the advanced training required for complex terrorist attacks. The analysis of the requirements for recruiting and training lead to another logical and essential capability: the ability to establish public support.

Establish Public Support

The last critical capability that will be discussed is al-Qaeda's ability to establish public support. This capability has an overarching importance and effect on many of the critical requirements that give al-Qaeda the capabilities that will assist in the achievement of its political objectives. For example, public support will greatly influence the ability to

obtain weapons or their components. It will assist al-Qaeda operatives in avoiding detection. Public support is reflected through the assistance provided to operatives in gaining access to foreign countries. It is necessary to establish sanctuary and to obtain enough donations to allow for the financial survival of the organization. In many ways, public support is essential to recruitment and is a key component to the contemporary franchising of al-Qaeda. In this context, public support also greatly influences the degree to which the international cooperation required for success is effective. From a strategic perspective, public support is necessary for the achievement of propaganda by deed. Al-Qaeda needs the support of like-minded Islamists; otherwise its existence would be threatened. Public support is a key necessity for a transnational non-state terrorist organization like al-Qaeda.

There are four critical requirements for al-Qaeda to maintain the capability to establish public support. First, the Internet as described earlier provides the means necessary for al-Qaeda to issue its guidance and to broadcast its propaganda. If forced to employ traditional media to promulgate its messaging, it is doubtful that al-Qaeda would be able to achieve the success and influence that it currently has. Mass media facilitates the production of increasingly large propaganda with smaller deeds. The second requirement is charismatic leadership. As previously discussed, bin Laden and his super-human stature among extreme Islamists provide this leadership to disillusioned individuals around the globe.

The third requirement of public support is the perception of legitimacy. Bin Laden has generally used the Koran to justify al-Qaeda's reasons for jihad against its

various enemies and to legitimize the use of terror in the pursuit of his objectives. As was demonstrated by the AQI's exaggerated use of violence in Iraq, this perception of legitimacy is fragile and can be considered as an important vulnerability. The last critical requirement for al-Qaeda to establish public support is the absence of an effective information operations campaign to counter its own propaganda. Education is key and information could be used to reach the uneducated and disillusioned masses in a more convincing manner. Al-Qaeda's influence is possible only because there is no viable counter-argument.

All of these requirements are vulnerabilities; however, it is judged that the following two are of greater importance. First, the fragility of al-Qaeda's legitimacy could be exploited when considering its current decentralized organization. If one could convince its recruitment and support base that it is, in fact, an illegitimate organization that is corrupting Islam for its political interests, significant damage would be caused. This ties in very closely to the second vulnerability, which is the information operations campaign. If a counter-information-operations campaign that would target the less educated and disillusioned recruitment base for lower level al-Qaeda fighters could be successfully initiated, al-Qaeda's ability to gain public support would certainly be affected, as would the various critical requirements that are dependent on it. Therefore, al-Qaeda's information operations campaign is considered as an important critical vulnerability.

SUMMARY

This chapter has used a modified Strange analysis model to deduce al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities. The model has been explained before briefly touching on the origins of al-Qaeda as a "terrorist" organization. The Strange analysis was conducted in consideration of al-Qaeda's three main strategic objectives. While the deductions that were made are not exhaustive, it is believed that the critical requirements that have been identified are amongst the most important and the most pertinent for this discussion, which forms the context for evaluating Canadian foreign security policy. In the next chapter, these vulnerabilities will be used to determine how well Canada's foreign security policy is at directly reducing the threat that al-Qaeda poses to Canadian citizens.

CHAPTER 6 – EXAMINATION OF POLICY

The targeting of the most critical of al-Qaeda's vulnerabilities with the appropriate sources of state power is necessary to degrade the organization's capabilities and relevance on the global stage. This being said, the purpose of this analysis is to examine the pertinence of Canadian foreign security policy with respect to al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities. Through the modified Strange analysis, the examination of al-Qaeda's critical capabilities has revealed seven principal vulnerabilities: 1) moderate Muslim governments, 2) the requirement to move and acquire weapons and components, 3) the requirement to conduct international travel, 4) the requirement to communicate, 5) the requirement for international cooperation with other organizations or sympathizers, 6) AQ franchising and the associated risks to legitimacy and 7) the effects of a well planned and properly executed information operations campaign countering AQ discourse.

To appropriately frame the examination of Canadian foreign security policy, the comprehensive approach, a key tenet mentioned in chapter 4, will be used to categorize the means with which the above-mentioned CVs can be effectively targeted. To this end, the diplomacy – information – military – economic (DIME), a simple acronym representing a whole-of-government approach, will be appropriated. The American DIME format is preferred over its Canadian equivalent (defence – diplomacy – development (DDD)) for the simple fact that it possesses an "information" tenet, which is considered by the author to be of utmost importance in this particular study. Ultimately, this analysis will argue that Canada's heavy reliance on the military in its foreign security policy is not consistent with the means required to effectively target critical

vulnerabilities. This chapter will thus be divided into four parts: military, diplomacy, information and economic. The military tenet is purposefully being placed first as it will help contextualize further discussion. It will conclude with thoughts on how Canada might be able to improve its foreign security policy in a manner that would positively reflect its liberal foreign policy tradition and its national interests.

MILITARY

While conducting this analysis, it became surprisingly apparent that none of al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities as described could be effectively targeted solely by military sources of physical power. As previously established, the bulk of Canada's "Away Game" is its military involvement in Afghanistan, which has provided limited positive results during the last decade. The deployment of Canadian military assets to Afghanistan can be justified by the fact that Canadian foreign security policy focuses on failed and failing states, and Afghanistan is certainly one of them. For regional stability to exist, there must be effective governance. For the creation of new and effective governance to be possible in a failed state, a safe and secure environment must be established. Therefore, military capabilities are certainly necessary to maintain that environment until the host nation is strong enough to maintain it on its own. However, Afghanistan is not the only failed or failing state, yet Canada's efforts have been solely focused on a single country for a decade.

The reality for Canada as a middle power is simple: security for Canadians means relying on others. Therefore, the Canadian government is following its liberal foreign

policy tradition by maintaining its relationship with the US and by actively participating in its various multilateral engagements, and this despite the requirement to diverge from its human values based principles. The Canadian government is not focused on directly reducing al-Qaeda's capabilities so much as it is attempting to increase its credibility amongst its allies on the world stage. By doing so, as claimed in Canadian policy, the threat posed to Canada by al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization is indirectly being reduced.

DIPLOMACY

When considering the Global War on Terror, most people envision conventional armies fighting insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan, when in fact defence diplomacy is a tool that is of far greater importance. As an alternative to military power, defence diplomacy via multilateralism is proving to be a viable method in applying soft power in order to achieve political objectives. Unprecedented levels of economic interdependence and mutual reliance on the global commons have created new vulnerabilities for states, as many recognize they cannot adequately address these challenges on their own. Moreover, vis-à-vis non-traditional security threats, such as terrorism, which increasingly transcend borders and criss-cross regionally, states are relying more on multilateral approaches to international defence and security relations. Canada's abilities with regards to defence diplomacy are enabled by the multilateralism that it has traditionally adhered to since the end of the Second World War. For example, Canada's heavy involvement with the United Nations (UN) includes its membership in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), based in Montreal, which aims to maintain civil aviation security. It also enables its membership in the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which

similarly upholds maritime security.[203] Canada's involvement in the UN is also reflected by its response to the counter-terrorism measures implemented by United Nations resolutions and by the Counter-Terrorism Committee.[204] Canada's partnership with the European Union, as reflected by the EU-Canada Partnership Agenda, is also testament to Canadian multilateralism and the importance it places on diplomacy to "tackle" global security issues.[205] This partnership has helped to establish important international norms that increase international security in the domains of money laundering, document security and travel security.[206] Canada's membership in the G8 is another important tool that allows it to apply soft power in the form of diplomacy in a manner that gives it additional leverage on the international stage. In all, Canada is a member in over fifty international organizations and twelve conventions.[207] Diplomacy, through multilateralism, presents Canada with the opportunity to retain influence on the international stage and shape outcomes from a military and defence perspective.

Diplomacy does not only apply to inter-state relations and can be used to affect terrorism. Arguably, diplomacy can be effectively employed to address four of the eight

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[203] Wyn Rees, *Transatlantic-Counter Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 132.

[204] Letter dated 23 March 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/297/90/PDF/N0629790.pdf?OpenElement, 4 May 2006.

[205] European Union, *EU-Canada Partnership Agenda*, EU-Canada Summit (Ottawa, 18 March 2004); Available from http://eeas.europa.eu/canada/docs/partnership_agenda_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 March 2011.

[206] Wyn Rees, *Transatlantic-Counter Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative*…, 132.

[207] Margaret Purdy, "Canada's Counterterrorism Policy," in *How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West*, ed. Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, 105-128 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 126.

critical vulnerabilities mentioned above. For instance, moderate Muslim governments could be swayed through various forms of diplomacy. The careful application of cooperation agreements, deterrence measures and diplomatic partnerships, while taking consideration of cultural issues, is an effective way for Canada to affect this CV. The second and third CVs that are already affected by diplomatic measures are the movement of weapons and international travel. Canada's participation in various international organizations renders the placing of international counter-terror measures possible, which in turn makes the shipments of weapons and the international movement of people extremely challenging. Finally, diplomacy could indirectly influence AQ affiliates or other forms of international cooperation through the states within which they operate. Diplomacy is a powerful tool among states in the pursuit of international stability and of national interests. When leveraged with its participation in various international organizations, Canada is capable of applying effective diplomacy to reduce the threat of non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda, despite its middle-power status.

INFORMATION

For the purposes of this discussion, "information" will not only consider the sharing of information with international partners, but will also include other important sources of soft power such as intelligence and Information Operations (IO). The former is of critical importance when attempting to counter an asymmetrical threat. Terrorism cannot be detected by radars or unmanned aerial vehicles. Much like organized crime, information on organizations such as al-Qaeda need to be collected through a host of clandestine means such as electronic warfare and infiltration. Failure to collect

actionable intelligence on its enemy would place Canada on the defensive and force it to adopt reactionary measures to possible threats. Recognizing the importance of intelligence, Canada has increased the budget of its CSIS by 32% since 9/11.[208] However, a foreign intelligence agency comparable to the CIA has yet to be established; therefore, Canada is dependent on its allies in this respect. In terms of foreign security policy, IO seems to have been left unconsidered.

The single most important force multiplier available to military commanders and policy makers at all levels is information operations (IO). Unfortunately, it is often misunderstood and rarely used with any effectiveness. While the related Canadian Forces doctrine is in dire need of being re-written, IO encompasses various essential means to influence populations, governments and opponents alike. First, there is electronic warfare (EW), which is capable of disrupting or delaying through the use of electronic attack measures, but which is also capable of electronic protection as well as the identification and localization of potential threats.[209] EW is one of the most effective means to gather information on terrorist organizations. Second, IO is capable of conducting computer attack, defence and exploitation, the latter of which applies more specifically to information collection in an asymmetric environment. Third, IO includes the conduct of psychological operations (PSY OPS), which is a key capability that governments and militaries can use in support of a variety, if not all, of their operations. As defined by the US Department of Defence, PSY OPS involve:

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[208] Margaret Purdy, "Canada's Counterterrorism Policy"…, 124.

[209] Department of Defence, Joint Pub 3-13 *Info Ops* (Washington: US Department of Defence, 2006), I-7.

> (…) planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.[210]

Finally, IO entails the application of operations security measures that aim to deny critical information to potential opponents.[211] There are also various supporting and related capabilities within IO that could be used to one's advantage, such as public affairs. While the importance of IO has come to light over the last decade with the counter-insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is very little doctrine or policy that has been produced and implemented to be effectively applied against al-Qaeda on an international and strategic scale. IO is a war winning capability that requires greater attention.

That said, intelligence and IO could affect all seven of the identified CVs to varying degrees depending on their priority and on the limited capabilities available to the Canadian government. For instance, various forms of IO could be used in a supporting role to diplomacy in Canada's efforts to affect moderate Muslim governments in the Middle East. IO could also be used with diplomacy, or in its stead, to negatively affect al-Qaeda's international cooperation net. The sharing of intelligence through multilateral engagements facilitates the denial of international travel to al-Qaeda operatives and makes the movement of weapons and their components difficult in an international context. The various EW measures could either hinder communications between AQ members or could facilitate the collection of information and actionable

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[210] Department of Defence, Joint Pub 3-13 *Info Ops* (Washington: US Department of Defence, 2006), II-1.

[211] *Ibid*., I-7.

intelligence on their whereabouts, their intent or the conduct of their operations. The benefits of IO within this context are limitless and are essential to succeed in reducing the threats posed by organizations such as al-Qaeda.

A characteristic that renders al-Qaeda difficult to target is its decentralized structure. IO, and more specifically PSY OPS, could be used by Canada and its allies to either dissociate the franchises or to apply important blows to al-Qaeda's legitimacy in the Middle Eastern community and on the world stage. So far, this capability has not been used to its full potential in this area. Furthermore, a counter-IO campaign should be put into place in order to affect public opinion and to discredit or invalidate AQ discourse. Political discourse, while perhaps partially useful at home, is of little use to influence populations in the Middle East. Alternative measures, whether they be clandestine or not, need to be taken. From a military perspective, IO does not merely support military operations, but is an integral part of them from the planning phases all the way to execution. From a DIME perspective, the same should be considered. All diplomatic, military or economic measures should have an IO component to them. Furthermore, foreign security policy should include IO measures instead of uniquely concentrating all efforts on military resources when considering security abroad.

ECONOMIC

Economic development is used to both encourage international stability and to uphold Canada's traditional human values based foreign policy. In 2009, Canada had invested $616.5 million in foreign economic development, although most of it was spent

in Afghanistan and in Iraq.[212] Economic development is also an important tool that can be used in conjunction with defence diplomacy and information operations to entice international cooperation in the struggle to prevent terrorism. The creation of economic ties, as previously mentioned, also encourages governments to maintain good and peaceful relationships. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has the primary responsibility of ensuring this function within the government. However, its effectiveness at contributing to global security within the Comprehensive Approach is debatable.

CIDA's mission is to help people in poverty and to realize Canada's development objectives.[213] These development objectives originate from a parallel mandate and only marginally support other government departments in their efforts to influence global security. This is demonstrated by a misalignment of priorities between CIDA and DFAIT. For example, CIDA prioritizes development in twenty countries, only three of which, Afghanistan, Haiti and Honduras, can be found in DFAIT's engagement strategy.[214] This is in contrast to CIDA's American counterpart, the USAID, which furthers the US' foreign policy interests in "expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world."[215] Unlike CIDA, USAID

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[212] Margaret Purdy, "Canada's Counterterrorism Policy"…, 126.

[213] Canadian International Development Agency, *Mission and Mandate*, [website]; available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NIC-5493749-HZK; Internet; accessed 18 April 2011.

[214] Canadian International Development Agency, *Regions and Countries*, [website]; available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NIC-5482847-GN3 and http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/priorities-priorites.aspx; Internet; accessed 24 March 2011.

[215] USAID, *This is USAID*, [website]; available from http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/; Internet; accessed 24 March 2011.

does not do "development for the sake of development", but rather plays an important role in supporting larger strategic objectives. This is an important area of improvement for foreign security policy that would strengthen the effectiveness of Canada's CA toolbox.

Other than maintaining the CAN-US relationship and fulfilling multilateral responsibilities, Canada has not reaped many concrete benefits from its military participation in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Canada's image of being a leader in specialized roles, such as diplomacy, peacekeeping and multilateralism, has eroded. This erosion was a contributing factor to Canada losing its bid for a seat in the United Nations Security Counsel in October 2010. As described by Michael Ignatieff, "…It's part of the general pattern of disappointing results for Canada on the international stage."[216] However, it may be possible for Canada to redeem its international reputation while continuing to adhere to its foreign policy tradition.

A REVISED CANADIAN APPROACH

As the world system transformed at the end of the Cold War, so did Canada's application of its foreign policy tradition. While it has maintained CAN-US relations and multilateralism as key foreign policy tenets, it has diverged from its traditional human values based principles, as demonstrated by its involvement in combat operations in

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[216] CBC News, "Cannon Blames Ignatieff for Canada's UN Vote Loss," CBC News, 12 October 2010, available from http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/10/12/un-vote012.html; Internet; accessed 3 November 2010.

Afghanistan. If Canada is to improve its foreign security policy in a way that would tangibly reduce the threat that al-Qaeda poses to its citizens, four critical improvements need to be made: 1) educate and change discourse on terrorism; 2) embrace traditional specialized roles while leveraging the effects of globalization; 3) refine the comprehensive approach; and 4) determine and define the end state.

Firstly, Canadians need to understand their opponents: know your enemy. To this end, leaders need to inform Canadians on the nature of the threat. False impressions in discourse contribute to the establishment of inappropriate measures to deal with the problem. As such, an acknowledgement of what AQ is as an organization and what its members are fighting for would be a considerable step forward. This understanding at the strategic level would undoubtedly have an effect on how the government deals with issues related to the threat.

Terrorism is often a term used by targeted states to delegitimize the actions of a given group, as describe in chapter 2. Terms such as the "War on Terror" amplify the misunderstanding of what a group that uses terrorism is trying to achieve. Therefore, Canada should halt discourse related to fighting "terrorism." Hoffman and Kilcullen both refer to the contemporary terrorist phenomenon as "Global Insurgency," and perhaps this could also be considered as a new perception of the global situation from a Canadian perspective as well. Referring to terrorists as insurgents may dissociate their use of terrorism from the political objectives they are attempting to achieve. A commonly shared understanding of what these political objectives are, paired with a respect for

cultural differences, would undoubtedly enable policy makers to target their capabilities more effectively and efficiently.

The second suggested improvement relates to Canada reverting back to its traditional specialized roles. This is not to say that it should avoid participating in combat operations when the situation dictates, but rather that it should exploit other sources of state power to maximize its effects on the opponent. As mentioned above, the conditions exist for Canada to excel as a leader in the establishment of innovative diplomatic measures to counter al-Qaeda's capabilities. Its respected position in various multilateral organizations would easily give it the leverage required to take these initiatives, while carefully allowing it to dissociate itself from its American ally. For example, Canada has the multicultural and historically tolerant background required to devise an information operations campaign that could educate the general Middle Eastern population while simultaneously countering AQ discourse. It could achieve this by rallying the help and support of its allies while applying its traditionally peaceful diplomatic pressure on targeted governments to gain their cooperation.

Third, there is a clear need for Canada to improve its strategic comprehensive approach to stability operations. The CA currently applies to the conduct of operational level activities within Afghanistan. This whole-of-government approach needs to be brought up to the strategic level and applied to reduce the global risk that organizations such as al-Qaeda pose to Canada at an international level. By placing greater importance on the CA, while at the same time understanding the military's supporting role within it, the application of the correct form of state power would be facilitated. In theory, through

this approach, Canada would have greater success in reducing al-Qaeda's critical capabilities.

Finally, Canada should consider its own desired end state. It is clear that Canada will want to protect its citizens and ensure that no terrorist plot is staged within its borders. Beyond this, it is important to determine what Canada wants to achieve with groups such as al-Qaeda that pose threats to its citizens. It would not be realistic to think that Canada and its NATO allies could dismantle or neutralize al-Qaeda completely. Through the study of Cronin's depiction of how terrorist organizations end, it becomes quite clear that military dominance is not one of them.[217] However, Canada is able to influence the outcome of this conflict through other means. Cronin describes two ways in which terrorist organizations cease to exist that could potentially apply to al-Qaeda, if one is to assume that "achievement of the cause" will not occur.[218] First, there is the failure to effectively transfer the cause from one generation to the next. This could be greatly influenced through a Canadian drafted information operations campaign that aims to influence and educate the follow on generation. The second way is through the loss of popular support, which again could be influenced through effective information operations. In both cases, Canada could leverage the effects of globalization to its benefit to promulgate information. It is clear that failed and failing states cannot be ignored and that robust military capabilities will be required for Canada into the

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[217] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, edited by Russell D. Howard et al., 592-624 (New York: McGraw Hill, 2009), 599.

[218] *Ibid., 599.*

foreseeable future. However, other forms of state soft power need to be used to complement the military efforts and to achieve long lasting effects.

Revising the Canadian approach to foreign security policy is a necessity it to effectively address the critical vulnerabilities of groups who employ terrorism. It has been argued here that four critical improvements need to be made: 1) educate and change discourse on terrorism; 2) embrace traditional specialized roles while leveraging the effects of globalization; 3) refine the comprehensive approach; and 4) determine and define the end state. Canada possesses the potential to develop and perfect alternate means of state power. By opting for its traditional specialized roles, it could increase its influence on the world stage while reducing the threat posed by non-state actors to Canadian citizens.

CONCLUSION

Appropriating a modified Strange analysis model, this paper has demonstrated that Canada's current foreign and security policy does not significantly reduce the capabilities of groups, such as al-Qaeda, who use terrorism as a means to achieve their ends. Through the establishment of six enduring components of contemporary terrorism, it has been shown that terrorism is in fact a tactic used by non-state actors in the pursuit of political objectives. The enabling factors associated with globalization have been highlighted, the most significant of which are the advances in media technology that give non-state actors the capability to act on the world stage. The frustrations that can be caused by globalization have also been discussed and should be taken into consideration by policy makers when attempting to deal with global threats such as terrorism. Ultimately, the effects of globalization must not be ignored and should even be leveraged and used to Canada's advantage.

Despite a lack of clear policy documentation, it has been established that Canada's foreign security policy consists of addressing failed and failing states through a comprehensive approach while using primarily military resources. While this approach is arguably aligned with Canada's traditional liberal foreign policy tenets of CAN-US relations and multilateralism, Canada has diverged from its traditional human values based specialized roles because of its heavy military contribution to the War on Terror. Through the modified Strange analysis, the examination of al-Qaeda's critical capabilities has revealed seven principal vulnerabilities: 1) moderate Muslim governments, 2) the requirement to move and acquire weapons and components, 3) the requirement to

conduct international travel, 4) the requirement to communicate, 5) the requirement for international cooperation with other organizations or sympathizers, 6) AQ franchising and the associated risks to legitimacy and 7) the effects of a well planned and properly executed information operations campaign countering AQ discourse. It has been argued that none of these vulnerabilities can be effectively targeted through the use of military power.

Finally, it has been suggested that if Canada is to improve its "Away Game" in a way that would tangibly reduce the threat that al-Qaeda poses to its citizens, four critical improvements to policy would need to be considered: 1) educate and change discourse on terrorism; 2) embrace traditional specialized roles while leveraging the effects of globalization; 3) refine the comprehensive approach; and 4) determine and define the end state. There is scope for Canada to embrace its traditional specialized roles and human values based foreign policy through the development of alternate state power capabilities. This could be achieved though the development of a strategic level information operations capability. While requiring minimal resources, IO could easily become a specialty for Canada given its multicultural background. It would also allow for Canada to directly affect al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities.

Policy may need to be modified to reflect exactly what Canada's desired end state resembles and how it aims to achieve it. If Canada's aim is to invest in Afghanistan to be able to reap the benefits of its multilateral engagements and its relationship with the US, then existing policy is sufficient. If policy makers want to reduce the threat that organizations such as al-Qaeda pose to Canada as a whole, the deliberate and surgical

targeting of relevant critical vulnerabilities will be a necessity. These vulnerabilities cannot be targeted solely with physical military power; therefore, new emphasis on other forms of state power would need be developed and prioritized.

Regardless of whether al-Qaeda's critical vulnerabilities are targeted or not, the problem will not be resolved in the near future; therefore, Canada needs to be prepared for a protracted struggle which could last more than a generation. In the meantime, it is paramount to continue to put emphasis on the defensive measures associated with the "Home Game" to ensure Canada's protection, while more efficient methods for reducing the threat to Canadian citizens are implemented in the "Away Game" following the withdrawal from combat operations in Afghanistan. From a strategic and political perspective, further study is required to determine whether al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations have in fact morphed from terrorist organizations into a decentralized movement. If they have, it would be useful for Canadian policy makers to understand if the contemporary global threat that is posed by them can in fact be categorized as a global insurgency. Understanding the nature of the problem is crucial in determining its solution.

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