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THE CANADIAN FORCES, DOMESTIC OPERATIONS, AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE: ARE GOOD LUCK AND TACTICAL COMPETENCE STILL GOOD ENOUGH?

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JCSP 36

Master of Defence Studies

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By Major Dan Thomas, CD

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to help bridge a gap in Canadian Forces (CF) doctrine regarding the role of Public Affairs within domestic operations. Support to Canadians at home through various challenges lies at the core of the CF's relationship with the nation. The CF has been called upon to assist with disaster relief, Aid to the Civil Power, national event security, and other operations with consistent tactical and operational level success. While the popularity of the CF is at a historic peak, preserving informed public support cannot be taken for granted in an increasingly complex and competitive informational environment. It requires strategic and coordinated effort, encompassing appropriate new capabilities, to help protect the CF's strategic centre of gravity - public confidence - and to extend it as necessary to lead and partner agencies, in a whole-of-government context.

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It is an article of faith that domestic operations are good for the public reputation of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF or CF¹), since they place the CF in direct, visible support of Canadians and their civil agencies in their time of need. Indeed, assistance to civilian authorities and defence of the homeland were the initial roles of the Canadian Army (CA) in its Militia form, preceding its international (expeditionary) operations and national mobilization obligations by many years, and subsequently complementing them as reserve roles during the Cold War:

The Reserve Army, like its predecessor the militia, was to serve as a framework upon which an expeditionary force could be built should a general mobilization be necessary. In addition, the Reserve Army had the task of providing aid for the civil power in the event of a national emergency. The part played by Reserve Force units in British Columbia in 1948 on the occasion of the Fraser River flood, in Manitoba in 1950 during the flooding of the Red River, and in Toronto in 1954 after hurricane "Hazel", testified to the importance of this role.²

Most domestic operations, particularly humanitarian and disaster assistance, do not normally carry the same physical and institutional exposure, and related risks of controversy, as international (expeditionary) operations. In fact, two consecutive and successful domestic operations helped the CF, and specifically the CA, recover its reputation following the Somalia scandal of the 1990s.³ In addition, and as we will discuss further, Canadian public opinion is

¹ Since the two abbreviations are officially interchangeable at this time, we will use the latter for brevity.

² George Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: the military history of an unmilitary people*, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1960), 390.

³ These were Operation Assistance, the Red River flood of 1997, and Operation Recuperation, the eastern Canada ice storm of 1998.

shifting its focus and emphasis from international to domestic operations, with potentially increased expectations for the timely effectiveness of the CF's intervention. In effect, while the CF may consider itself the "force of last resort" after local and provincial authorities have been overwhelmed, success has fuelled a public perception that the CF's response will be virtually immediate as well as ultimately decisive – despite the closure of bases in the 1990s; the ongoing consolidation of command, control and related capabilities including area support units; and the indefinite postponement of Regular and Reserve personnel growth targets, due to current economic conditions.

Moreover, the effects of global climate change may increase the incidence and severity of natural disasters due to extreme weather events, which would in turn require CF assistance on little to no notice. The threat of catastrophic earthquakes and tsunamis is ever present, particularly on the west coast. Concurrently, Canada will continue to host international athletic, political, economic, and other summit events in the face of complex threats. Potential Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies (ALEA) tasks may arise at any time - and may escalate, vertically and horizontally, even more rapidly than in the past, due in large part to the potentially provocative influence of social media.

Reflecting historic precedents and contemporary realities, some four of the six core missions assigned to the CF within the Canada First Defence Strategy

(CFDS) are domestic in nature.⁴ While a CFDS “reset” is likely, due to the chilling effect of post-2008 economic conditions on its major equipment acquisitions and other ambitions, the relative significance of domestic tasks is unlikely to decline, due to their high public acceptance and limited risks and incremental costs when compared to expeditionary operations. Furthermore, since the whole-of-government context certainly will not change, the CF will remain intertwined with Other Government Departments (OGDs) and mission partners that possess various levels of operational planning and public communications acumen, as we will examine later.

Varied as they are, the common characteristics of domestic operations scenarios is the overall certainty of their occurrence; the capriciousness of many of their specific conditions; and the uncompromising public expectation for flawless mission success. Moreover, while international and expeditionary operational requirements are variable over time and dependent upon global conditions, the nation’s domestic preparedness imperatives are constant, and difficult to abdicate to allies or other parties.

If proof was required that domestic operations remain pivotal to the CF’s relationship with Canadians, it surely arrived in response to recent reports that DND would resume enforcing its existing policy of cost recovery for domestic

⁴Specifically: conduct daily domestic and continental operations; support a major event in Canada, such as the 2010 Winter Olympics; respond to a major terrorist attack; and support civilian authorities during a major

operations from other government agencies. The following widely published passage reflects editorial and public consensus, and reveals how vulnerable the relationship remains to potential public dissatisfaction, according to York University strategic studies professor Martin Shadwick:

...a large amount of the goodwill Canadians have toward the military is based on their past performances helping the public during disasters at home... “This could backfire,” said Martin Shadwick... (who) said it was the Canadian Forces’ top-notch performance responding to a series of disasters in the late 1990s, including the 1998 ice storm that hit much of Eastern Canada, which earned kudos from the public.

“It was the Forces’ response to those that did more than anything to rehabilitate the image of the military in the years after the Somalia affair,” he said. “That was before 9/11 and it showed the Forces at their best.”⁵

Considering the significance of domestic operations to the CF’s relationship with the nation, however, it is remarkable how little specific literature exists on the subject, especially in comparison to the relative proliferation of works on expeditionary operations (most recently in Afghanistan); and how little real rigour and analysis have been applied to the planning, execution, and effects of such operations. One of the most thorough examinations, for example, is an obscure internal document issued by a CA Reserve brigade.⁶

crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.

⁵ David Pugliese, “Military mum over emergency help costs; Generals risk losing the goodwill Canadians have towards Forces; analysts.” *Montreal Gazette*, January 11, 2013.

⁶ Bob Martyn (Ed.), *Domestic Operations: Canadian Army Perspectives*, 33 Canadian Brigade Group, circa 2005. (Pamphlet.)

Thus far, the CF has been successful in keeping its commitments to its citizens; but after such operations cease and troops return to their bases and home communities, how durable is the resulting public appreciation? If the CF is tactically and operationally skilled at Public Affairs (PA) operations in the field, is its prowess matched at the strategic level in order to sustain public support through periods of reduced activity and potential controversy? What organizational or doctrinal developments, including potential fusion with Information Operations/Influence Activities (IO/IA) and their maturing capabilities such as Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), would strengthen long-term stability?

This paper argues that the CF needs to take PA as doctrinally seriously as it takes many other aspects of domestic operations. Such a posture is necessary to help protect its strategic centre of gravity: public confidence in itself, and by association, in the non-military lead agencies it is called upon to support in increasingly complex circumstances.

In order to support its thesis, this paper will begin with an evaluation of the history, characteristics, and trajectory of domestic operations. Next, we will examine the contemporary interrelationship between domestic operations and public opinion regarding the CF. We will then assess the consistency and appropriateness of relevant doctrine, including its depth of strategic level thought

and related concepts in a complex inter-agency environment – with particular emphasis on the PA to IO/IA nexus and public communications, including social media. Finally, we will make recommendations to assist the CF in aligning domestic operations PA doctrine and other institutional requirements with current and future conditions, in order to help stimulate further analysis and action.

Since history helps shape current and future public expectations, it is important to examine the evolving role of the CF role in domestic operations in the context of the nation's evolving defence priorities. An outline of Canada's relevant post-confederation evolution therefore follows, leading to recent examples. Consistent themes throughout will include the shifting emphasis among Aid to the Civil Power, humanitarian assistance, and event security operations; the increasing capabilities of non-military agencies that correspondingly place the CF in a supporting rather than a leading role; the emphasis placed upon public communications; and the consistency of tactical and operational level commanders' experiences - which were then forgotten with equal regularity, until future commanders and their staffs re-learned old lessons.

In its early years, the domestic role of the Militia can be characterised as Aid to the Civil Power operations, reactive to apprehended local insurrections, disturbances, and labour disputes; initiated at the discretion of local civil

authorities; and tied to the limited capacity of police forces. According to one perspective, “In the great majority of cases, troops were used not so much to enforce the law than to defend the established order, and this in practice meant breaking strikes in a period when labour was only beginning to organize.”⁷ The experience of one regiment around the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries was not uncommon, when a show of force generally remained sufficient to deter escalation, and to prevent or pre-empt significant or persistent violence:

A rising was reported amongst the Skeena Indians near Hazelton in the summer of 1888, and the Premier and two of the members of the Cabinet in their capacities of Justices of the Peace called out the Militia...Two days later, when (the Militiamen) reached the offending village, all was quiet...The Steveston riots in July 1900 provided the Regiment with its second call to arms in Aid of the Civil Power...(after) the Reeve...read the Riot Act to the strikers. When they did not disperse, he took the step of requesting military protection...Fortunately, the strikers got word of the army being on their way, and the Regiment disembarked to a quiet town.⁸

During the First World War, the attention of the Militia turned to vital point protection and mobilization (force generation) for expeditionary operations; such tasks are clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Following demobilization, familiar but unpopular Aid to the Civil Power assignments ensued, due in part to postwar economic conditions and social unrest. The 1919 Winnipeg General Strike, however, marked the start of the transition from the Militia to civilian police, with the Army merely in support for such tasks:

⁷ John Gellner, *Bayonets in the Streets: Urban guerrilla at home and abroad* (Don Mills, ON: Collier-Macmillan, 1974), 132.

⁸British Columbia Regiment Association, “The British Columbia Regiment: A Proud History,” <http://www.bcregiment.com/>; Internet; accessed 18 March 2013.

...during the final confrontation...it was the Royal North West Mounted Police and not the Canadian Militia that rode down the strikers. With the local regiments hollowed out by the war and the loyalties of returned soldiers far from certain, the authorities turned to the Mounties to take the lead in restoring public order ...A mixed group of cavalry and motorized machine gun units was dispatched to assist the police once the strikers had already dispersed.⁹

The withdrawal of the CA from such tasks occurred gradually, however, and constantly required careful leadership and professional discretion. A future Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, participated as a subaltern in what he termed “the most objectionable of all military duties”: Aid to the Civil Power, in his case during the 1925 Sydney, Nova Scotia coal miners’ strike. Patrolling on horseback, the soldiers were initially “regarded as stooges of the (mine) owners (and) subjected to every verbal and a good many physical abuses”, but their discipline held; they were gradually able to convince the miners that their role was simply “to protect lives and property against violence”; and the tension subsided through weekly soccer games, ending with a convivial farewell from the miners and their families upon the artillery unit’s redeployment to Petawawa.¹⁰

Following the bleak years of the Great Depression, the Second World War again required mass mobilization for, and eventual demobilization from, expeditionary operations. Subsequently, the CF exercised leadership responsibilities for natural disaster assistance because civilian disaster and

⁹James Wood, *Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 258.

¹⁰Jack Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *Battle Lines: Eyewitness Accounts from Canada’s Military History* (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 2004), 212-214.

consequence management capabilities remained at a limited level of development. The CF filled the gap accordingly – both individually and collectively, as a natural extension of its military and organizational expertise. During the 1948 Fraser River floods in British Columbia, for example, a recently retired officer, Major-General F.F. “Worthy” Worthington, assumed the leadership of Red Cross disaster assistance operations.¹¹

More collectively, as the Commander of Pacific and Central Areas, Major-General George Kitching, related:

In the late 40s’s and 50’s the Army was called on frequently *to take full control* [emphasis added] in communities threatened by floods or other catastrophes. The discipline and the steadiness of the Army units...did much to restore good order and lessen the tensions of those most affected which might, without the presence of the hard working soldiers, have led to a breakdown of authority...

On these occasions, and many others when the soldier was called on in emergencies, the public felt they were getting their money’s worth; the Army was not just blasting off guns and learning about war, it was using its skills and discipline in aid of the Civil Power and it was effective. It also got a great deal of good publicity, which I believe is essential to its existence in peacetime.¹²

The reference to “full control” is significant, since it differs from the current practice to place the CF in support to civilian lead agencies, and was an arrangement made at the request of provincial authorities. During the 1950 Red River floods, for example, the Premier of Manitoba “...requested that the army

¹¹ Larry Worthington, *Worthy: A Biography of Major-General F.F. Worthington, C.B., M.C., M.M.* (Toronto: MacMillan, 1961), 221-222. Major-General (retired) Worthington subsequently established Canada’s Civil Defence organization under the Department of National Defence, and subsequently transferred to the Department of Health and Welfare.

¹² George Kitching, *Mud and Green Fields: The memoirs of General George Kitching* (Langley, BC: Battleline Books, 1985), 294-295.

take over command of flood control immediately (and) to set up Food Control Headquarters in the Manitoba Legislative Buildings no later than noon that day.”¹³ Having done so, the Operation Redramp joint task force commander, Brigadier R.E.A. Morton, and his public relations officer, Major Jack Donoghue, worked closely to incorporate public information as a key line of operation in the campaign - and to successful effect, with activities ranging from daily press conferences to live radio broadcasts and local media monitoring, in order to control rumours and maintain public confidence while encouraging an orderly and voluntary evacuation from Winnipeg. Their conclusions, reflected in their after action report, remain highly relevant:

A very important aspect of our work was our relations with the public. It was obviously necessary to have their confidence and support under existing circumstances and even more so if the situation had deteriorated and a large evacuation had become necessary...Public relations proved very important during the flood. We gave it every consideration and it paid off. *It is necessary to inform and quietly influence the public if you are to control them in the difficult and dangerous circumstances surrounding an emergency* [emphasis added].¹⁴

The final sentence is noteworthy, since it effectively advocates shaping public behaviour. In contemporary times, influencing rather than informing the public falls within the leadership responsibilities of the supported civilian agencies; however, the potential IO/IA-PA nexus in domestic operations will be discussed later in this paper.

¹³ Jack Donoghue, *PR: Fifty Years in the Field* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1993), 37.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 50-51.

Nevertheless, while tactically successful domestic operations have been indisputably good news for the CF, certain senior leaders have also understood that they were too unpredictable and intermittent to provide a reliable basis for public support. Complementary efforts were required to sustain beneficial effects. Accordingly, in the late 1950s, as the Commander, Pacific Area, Kitching initiated a joint regional outreach program that foreshadowed Operation Connection some five decades prior to its national implementation (and subsequent cancellation):

At that time, Canadians, generally, were defence conscious. We had been through World War II when our Navy, Army, and Air Force had been our best ambassadors... (but) (o)ne of the problems in the life of the military is that the soldier seldom meets the civilian...I was determined to keep the Army in front of the public *without having to rely on disasters to do it* (emphasis added). With the full cooperation of the Royal Canadian Navy based at Esquimalt and the Royal Canadian Air Force, I was able to put on a series of Tattoos and demonstrations that were seen by many thousands.¹⁵

Kitching would later apply his concepts in his next appointment in Central Command, Ontario, during the 1960s - until he took his expertise and sensibilities into retirement, like many of his peers, as a result of CF unification.

Also in the late 1950s, the Militia adopted a national survival role as a post-nuclear attack consequence management initiative. Fortunately, it was never challenged as such, and is mainly remembered for its deleterious effect on Militia morale, strength, and operational readiness - even if its chief proponent, the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, conceded:

“The Militia must continue to receive *some* [emphasis added] military training because it is the military-type of training with its built-in disciplines that makes Militia men so very valuable in giving aid to the civil authorities.”¹⁶ As a transient, untested, and unlamented strategic “fad,” the national survival task merits no further examination here.

Not all demands for CF assistance were as straightforward as disaster assistance, however, or as benign as deliberately planned outreach activities and stakeholder relations. The highest risk operations include those that place the CF in Aid to the Civil Power and ALEA and, potentially, in physical or moral confrontation with civilians. As we have seen, the CF undertook these delicate tasks, reluctantly but successfully, into the inter-war period, when they tapered off due to various factors, including the increased capacity of police forces. Following the social changes of the 1960s and the growth of domestic and international terrorism, however, the CF would experience two high-profile operations during the 1970s, both by coincidence in Quebec: the FLQ Crisis in October 1970, and the 1976 Montreal Olympic Summer Games.

The FLQ Crisis culminated the violent activities of the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ), which had evolved through the nationalist

¹⁵ Kitching, *Mud and Green Fields...*, 294-95.

¹⁶ Howard Graham, *Citizen and Soldier: The Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Howard Graham* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), 239.

movement of the 1960s. When the FLQ struck by kidnapping British diplomat James Cross and Quebec cabinet minister Pierre Laporte in October 1970, the federal government ordered two substantial domestic operations that absorbed the bulk of deployable CA resources available in Canada: the commitment of troops to the security of public officials and locations in Ottawa; and the separate and subsequent deployment of forces to assist the government of Quebec and police forces in the province under the War Measures Act.

The action was popular at the time, with approximately 90% of the public in support, both in Quebec and across Canada.¹⁷ The professional conduct of the troops reinforced public acceptance of their role in the crisis. According to William Tetley, a Quebec cabinet minister of the era, discretion in public communication gained the respect of the media, while the troops achieved complementary effects in direct contact with the citizens in the streets:

One may conclude that calling in the Canadian army was the proper course to take and its effect was beneficial. The presence of the army reassured the public and freed up the police to do police work, while the officers and men of the army behaved in an exemplary fashion. There were no cases of the armed forces acting badly towards the public or the public acting badly towards them.¹⁸

¹⁷ Jack Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 365.

¹⁸ William Tetley, *The October Crisis: An Insider's View* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 65. Tetley cited *Le Devoir* newspaper director and provincial opinion leader Claude Ryan that "...no military leader has let slip the slightest statement which might have aggravated matters."

In a contrarian view, Montreal lawyer John Gellner wrote in the aftermath of the FLQ crisis that "...quite often the use of soldiers in a domestic confrontation offers to the revolutionary leaders opportunities for escalating it...the impression is created that the government is calling upon its last resources."¹⁹ From his contemporary perspective, invoking the military as the "force of last resort" would not be conducive to developing public confidence. As we will see, however, his opinion was not affirmed by subsequent events - when the deployment of the CF effectively deterred further violence while signalling determination, not desperation.

In contrast to the short-notice FLQ crisis, the CF's presence at the Montreal 1976 Olympic Summer Games was a deliberately planned national security event in support to the lead security agency, the RCMP. The context for this operation was shaped by two significant developments: domestically, the FLQ crisis itself; and internationally, the Munich 1972 Olympic Winter Games, which had resulted in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes at the hands of Palestinian Black September terrorists, compounded by flawed security arrangements. The effect on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the overall movement was traumatic, and had a significant impact on all future Olympic Games – beginning with Montreal:

¹⁹ Gellner, *Bayonets in the Streets*...57-58.

Montreal had initially planned to copy Munich's "informal" approach to security. After (the massacre), however, Montreal's planners were determined to make security a central priority. Hoping to undercut calls from some Canadians to abandon the '76 Games entirely, Montreal mayor Jean Drapeau even promised to send in the Canadian army if necessary to keep the Games safe. (On the security front, one of Drapeau's main worries concerned possible attacks by Quebec separatists.)

...the organizers of Montreal's games (made security their top priority) by deploying some sixteen thousand troops and police to patrol the Olympic grounds around the clock...The bill for security at Montreal came to \$100 million, fifty times the outlay for Munich.²⁰

The stakes for the survival of the Olympic movement, and the prestige of the host nation, were very high indeed at Montreal as the first post-Munich summer games venue. Consequently, the CF undertook an enormous and complex domestic operation²¹ which integrated nearly 9,000 personnel with the RCMP-led security force,²² in addition to many specialist personnel embedded in the civilian organization to provide logistical, communications, and other technical expertise.²³ The security profile was intentionally high, albeit genial, in order to produce a calming strategic effect: "(s)ecurity would be in no sense undercover. Instead, it would be a constant, understanding, and courteous presence designed to put residents and visitors at ease."²⁴ Whether due to deterrence or to other factors, security problems were fortunately limited to some

²⁰David Clay Large, *Munich 1972: Tragedy, Terror and Triumph at the Olympic Games* (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 282, 305.

²¹The title was Operation Gamescan '76.

²²Paul Charles Howell, *The Montreal Olympics: An Insider's View of Organizing a Self-Financing Games* (Montreal & Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009) 183.

²³Canadian Forces Combat Camera. *Op Gamescan 76*. (Video.)

²⁴Paul Charles Howell, *The Montreal Olympics: An Insider's View of Organizing a Self-Financing Games* (Montreal & Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), 182.

16 “limited and benign” reported incidents.²⁵ Mission success at Montreal, while apparently taken for granted at the time, fulfilled the high expectations set for, and standards set by, the CF in the appropriate application of military capabilities in support of civilian authorities.

Following a relative interlude through the 1980s, this legacy would be tested again under much more stressful circumstances - and once again in Quebec - during the Oka crisis in the summer of 1990, when the planned expansion of a local golf course into a traditional burial ground aggravated historic indigenous grievances, and led to a fatal confrontation between Mohawk Warriors with their supporters and the Quebec provincial police at Kanesatake. This crisis threatened in turn to escalate into a wider conflagration between indigenous peoples and their neighbours - both in the local vicinity, and elsewhere in Canada.²⁶

The confrontation escalated at once into the media, when the warriors claimed that the fallen policeman, Corporal Marcel Lemay, had been killed by his peers. “The story that he had been shot by his own people was all over the media later that day and was not denied by any official source at the time.”²⁷ The non-

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 184-85.

²⁶ In addition to urban demonstrations and other acts of solidarity, some members of the Lil'wat First Nation blockaded the public Duffey Lake Road at Mount Currie, BC, for several months until late 1990. See also Swain (cited below), 135.

²⁷ Harry Swain, *Oka: A Political Crisis and its Legacy* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), 82.

kinetic operation therefore began concurrently with the kinetic²⁸ – and, as we will see, continues to this day, including the recycling of imagery and rhetoric from the crisis, and the instant accessibility of on-line content.

In such a charged and high-profile environment, pressure on the discipline, impartiality, and professionalism of the CF was immense. Following the Mohawk Warriors' erection of barricades and closures of traffic routes²⁹, the Quebec provincial government requested the deployment of the CF in Aid to the Civil Power. In compulsory response, the CF initiated Operation Salon in order to remove the barricades, restore freedom of movement, remove fortifications, and facilitate the restoration of public order and security. The CA provided the majority of the 4,500 personnel and the command and control capability, supported by the other environments.³⁰

The complex operation has been well documented in various sources and from various perspectives. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to summarize or evaluate the actions taken on the ground, it is important to emphasize that the overall operation was carried out under the assumption that the psychological dimension of the deployment would be as decisive as the

²⁸ The term “kinetic” implies the application of firepower and related activities, whereas “non-kinetic” encompasses moral, informational, and psychological actions.

²⁹ The Mercier Bridge was a particularly vital and symbolic point, as a major commuter route.

³⁰ Timothy C. Winegard, *Oka: A Convergence of Cultures and the Canadian Forces* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008), 123-24.

physical, according to the estimates of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Army commander: "...police forces having failed, the army was the last barrier before social breakdown. Displaying visibly overwhelming power... would make it clear that there was little future in armed opposition, thus minimizing the chance of further shooting from the Mohawk side."³¹ Consistent with historical precedents, the shooting subsided when the army stepped in - despite the widespread proliferation of weaponry and preparation of battle positions in the area.

In addition, in an era when evolving broadcast and print media were increasingly capable of filing "breaking news" and other content from the field by utilizing cellular phones and other technologies, it was well understood that the informational and media aspects of the mission would remain vital components of the overall campaign: "With television crews on the scene each and every day, the army had to do its task in the full glare of publicity."³² Moreover, well before the deployment of the CF, the media had begun to frame the story in favour of the warriors and their supporters, as opposed to "intolerant white land thieves."³³ In this environment, success in the field could easily be undermined by failure in the media.

³¹ Swain, *Oka...*132.

³² Granatstein, *Canada's Army...*, 380.

³³ Swain, *Oka...*, 106.

Like the overall operation, this component reached its culminating point with the isolation of a group of protesters, including their own “embedded media,” in a treatment centre. The ongoing “media circus” irritated the federal Privy Council to the extent that it directed the CF to sever the landlines (under a court warrant) and jam electronic communications.³⁴ The action had its desired effect in helping de-escalate the tension – but would be difficult if not impossible in the current environment, owing to the proliferation of communication technologies. In fact, the effect was only temporary, since an aboriginal filmmaker, Alanis Obomsawim, was among the protesters. Her two-hour documentary film, *Kanehsatake: 270 Years of Resistance*, is highly favourable to the warriors and their supporters, and remains readily accessible via YouTube, the National Film Board (NFB), and other sites, where it creates ongoing second- and third-order effects by continuing to fuel fundamental misrepresentations of the CF and its members via blogs and other Internet content. For example, the following sentiments expressed on an on-line film review site reinforce the filmmaker’s apparent stratagem of manipulating the soldiers’ own professionalism under pressure in order to present them as amoral automatons:

The individual soldiers hide behind the usual unthinking platitudes like ‘I’m just obeying orders’ and ‘I have a mission to accomplish’ instead of relying on their own moral compasses. The result is that their behaviors are akin to mental illness symptoms, including denying verifiable facts, showing indifference towards the suffering in front of them and adopting self-induced stone-faced autism as a way of avoiding questions, confrontations and emotional involvement. The military is seen using fear and intimidation tactics, suppressing press coverage and frequently breaking promises. And

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 144-45.

yet hardly any soldier openly expresses dissatisfaction with their vocation or the institute they serve, and certainly none try to redress the wrongs.³⁵

Nevertheless, the eventual outcome of Operation Salon, according to the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs at that time, was another domestic success for the CF:

The army carried out its duties with a degree of thoughtfulness that – given the budgets and respect that society at large is willing to accord its armed forces in peacetime – Canadians had little right to expect. Domestic internal security operations require strategic sensitivity, tactical brilliance, and firm discipline where boots meet the ground. Canada was lucky on the first and well served on the rest.³⁶

The echoes of Oka were subsequently heard in the woods of the British Columbia interior when a small group of activists occupied a rancher's camp at Gustafsen Lake. In this instance, however, the role of the CF in support to the RCMP was logistical, consisting of rations, pyrotechnics, and Bison armoured personnel carriers whose presence was initially withheld from the media. In fact, the CF's involvement was not merely underplayed but actively denied by the RCMP until the Bison deployment became obvious - perhaps in order not to escalate the strategic stature of the event, and in any case, to accomplish an apparent tactical decoy effect at a known media location:

...When the APCs, also known as Bisons, (appeared), it was one of the biggest news stories of the standoff witnessed by the media. The arrival of the APCs was all the more shocking because the police had been denying

³⁵ Film Walrus, "Review of Kanehsatake: 270 Years of Resistance." <http://www.filmwalrus.com/2009/05/review-of-kanehsatake-270-years-of.html> ; Internet, accessed 5 April 2013.

³⁶ Swain, *Oka...*, 129-30.

various media queries about whether the military (or military equipment) was going to be called in... Unknown to the media (at the time) was the fact that the RCMP had strategically positioned other APCs closer to the camp.³⁷

Concurrently, the CF was preoccupied with significant issues of its own.

During Operation Deliverance - the deployment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group and other elements to assist with humanitarian operations in Somalia in 1993 - several paratroopers were implicated in the criminal torture and beating death of a local teenager caught in their secured compound.³⁸ The ensuing scandal escalated through and beyond 1995, with its broader implications of leadership issues and a national “cover-up;” led to the disbandment in disgrace of the Airborne; sustained a high-profile public inquiry that fed the Ottawa press gallery a steady and conveniently accessible source of scandal at the CF’s expense; and caused a devastating morale breakdown and existential crisis for the CA and the CF:

Certainly, the results of a rules-based army operating in full view of the television cameras were entirely predictable. Officers and NCMs understood that the worst thing that could happen to their career was to be in the media. The unwillingness to show initiative developed and grew, the managers displaced the leaders, and the army turned inward, its élan drying up.³⁹

The “Somalia scandal” demonstrated, if nothing else, how fragile public support for the CF can be in a crisis of confidence - especially when there is no

³⁷ Sandra Lambertus, *Wartime Images, Peacetime Wounds: The Media and the Gustafsen Lake Standoff* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004), 88-89. Tension between the media and the RCMP media relations effort was a constant theme during the crisis, as the media believed they were being used as means to manipulate both the protestors and broad public opinion.

³⁸ David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: MacLelland and Stewart, 1996), *passim*.

apparent strategic effort or capacity to address the issue, or to protect the institution's long-term reputation.⁴⁰ Fortunately, two natural disasters offered a cure to the CF's catharsis - and not a moment too soon.

The first crisis occurred in the spring of 1997, when the Red River flooded large tracts of southern Manitoba farmland, and threatened Winnipeg itself. As we have seen, this is a historically recurring threat, where the CF has established a successful legacy. In 1997, however, two fundamental differences emerged from past operations: the increased role of the Province of Manitoba in managing the overall crisis, albeit with the CF in close support; and the effect of media in escalating public interest to the national level, thus increasing both the short-term immediacy and long-term stakes to the CF for its role in the drama.

The significance was apparent to a future Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, who assumed responsibility for directly protecting the City of Winnipeg as commander of the CA's Second Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (2 CMBG), while the western-based First Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG) was deployed further upstream south of the city. Hillier and his staff swiftly established relations with civic officials and other organizations, while getting down to the tedious task of filling sandbags under ubiquitous media

³⁹ Granatstein, *"Canada's Army..."*, 411.

⁴⁰ On the contrary, the CF's public communications capability had been contained and effectively "muzzled" in December 1996 under "CDS 120," which directed that all interviews, press conferences, and news releases required the personal approval of the Acting Chief of the Defence Staff, Vice-Admiral Murray.

attention in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust that, reflecting the adverse tone of the era, "...appeared, to us, to be trying to put a negative spin on our efforts."⁴¹ As the mission unfolded, however, Hillier and his troops conducted a series of planned and impromptu media and community relations activities that echoed their predecessors' efforts nearly 50 years previously, and to highly beneficial long-term effect:

The Winnipeg flood changed the way many individual journalists and some news organizations viewed the Canadian Forces...We were their men and women in uniform; their soldiers; their Canadian Forces; their sons and daughters...The reconnection of Canadians with their armed forces had started...Although it took a while to see, that flood was the start of change for the CF.⁴²

A second natural disaster occurred in late 1998, and much more unexpectedly than the first: ice storms caused widespread power blackouts, road closures, and other public disruptions from eastern Ontario through Quebec to the Maritimes. Still in command of 2 CMBG, and with the benefit of staff and leaders who had worked together recently in Manitoba, Hillier "leaned forward" in recalling his troops from Christmas leave, and in deploying them from Petawawa to the Ottawa Carleton region to link up with local authorities - even as the provincial lead agency, Emergency Measures Ontario, was "nowhere to be seen."⁴³

⁴¹ Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats, and the Politics of War* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2009), 178.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 178-82.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 191.

Once again, Hillier and his troops found that their role significantly involved establishing “psychological security” with the local population, in tandem with the physical effort.⁴⁴ They also encountered extensive media attention – just as they had done in Manitoba, but this time in close proximity to the challenging context of the nation’s capital, including its cynical press gallery that had recently covered the Somalia Inquiry on a nearly daily basis for months:

There were dozens of media outlets represented from across Canada, as well as a crew from CNN, and with all of those important people there, the only person they wanted to talk to was the man in uniform. Unfortunately, it was like going back to the first days of the Red River flood: the journalists seemed to feel that there was something negative going on and their job was to find and expose it...Within two days, however, their scepticism largely disappeared and, as in Manitoba, we developed a warmer relationship.⁴⁵

In a provocatively implied inversion of cause and effect, one reporter even asked Hillier to respond to “a rumour” that the CA was trying to escalate the crisis for its own benefit.⁴⁶ While Hillier was able to counter the allegation at the time, the more recent and ongoing development of social media would likely complicate the matter if it recurs during future operations, since the declining “gatekeeper” effect of trained journalists - acting under at least rudimentary professional standards - is likely one of the less constructive consequences of the growth of “citizen journalism,” as we will consider shortly.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 196.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 195-96.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 198.

While the policies of the previously cited CDS 120 nominally remained in effect during the operation, its restrictions proved impossible to enforce in a situation where the media and the soldiers were entwined across a widespread domestic area of operations. Consequently, the Commander Land Force Quebec Area, Major-General Alain Forand, estimated that the benefit of favourable public attention outweighed the risk of offending higher authority, and allowed his troops to interact with the media accordingly.⁴⁷ Fortunately, the policy environment was also about to change for the better with the introduction of the DAOD 2008 series in March 1998. For example, DAOD 2008-2, *Media Relations and Public Announcements*, “...empowers and encourages DND employees and CF members to speak the media about what they do in their official capacity as a valuable and important way to provide Canadians with a richer understanding of the day-to-day operations and contributions of the CF and DND”, within reasonable limitations.⁴⁸ Following the grim years of the 1990s, this policy gradually helped reverse the CF’s sense of internal exile (previously attributed to Granatstein), and enabled the development of a gradual resurrection of its eroded role in Canadian society.

⁴⁷ Major-General (retired) Alain Forand, conversation with author, 14 April 2012.

⁴⁸ Department of National Defence. A-AD-207-001/AG-000, *Public Affairs Handbook* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000), 87. Technically, this policy remains in effect. The other DAODs are 2008-0, *Public Affairs Policy*; 2008-1, *Accountability and Responsibility*; 2008-3, *Issue and Crisis Management*; 2008-4, *Public Affairs, Military Doctrine, and CF Operations*; 2008-5, *Public Affairs Planning and Program Delivery*; and 2008-6, *Internet Publishing*.

Subsequently, following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, one of the first major international summit meetings in the heightened security environment took place in Kananaskis, Alberta in June 2002. Known to the CF as Operation Grizzly, the G8 summit security operation placed the CF in direct support once more to the RCMP. Although the event preceded the inauguration of Canada Command and its standing Joint Task Forces by several years, its conduct reinforced the requirement for an integrated security model, initiated as far in advance as possible in order to mitigate any potential dissonance in terminology, command and control, communications, and other issues. Consequently, according to its Chief of Staff, Colonel David Barr, “(it) is in the area of interagency planning, particularly between the CF and RCMP, where there is the greatest room for improvement.”⁴⁹

While the CF PA posture was primarily reactive, the commander of the CF’s complement, Joint Task Force Grizzly, Brigadier-General Ivan Fenton participated in a joint, interagency editorial board meeting with his police counterparts at *The Calgary Herald*. His perspective became the primary reported theme when he noted that “...soldiers will take their lead from the RCMP when dealing with protesters, adding his troops will use an ‘absolute minimum’ of force when assisting the RCMP.” Fenton also expressed concern that “...protesters

⁴⁹ David Barr, “The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Interagency Cooperation.” (*Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2003-2004), 43.

and ‘limelight seekers’ who intend to test summit security in Kananaskis will be risking their lives.”⁵⁰ In an early manifestation of the growing influence of the Internet, the story was picked up and circulated among activist websites - where the posted response thread gathered and galvanized predominantly negative sentiment to summit security, the CF, and the summit itself.⁵¹

Returning to its Olympic legacy, the CF was called upon once more to support the RCMP, in this case with the security of the 2010 Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games in a mission appropriately entitled Operation Podium. While the scale and nature of this operation mirrored Montreal 1976 in some respects, involving some 4,500 personnel from all environments in a variety of roles,⁵² there were also differences in scope. Due in part to expeditionary operational commitments, the CF was selective in its tasks, and did not agree to embed logistics, communications, and other specialists in the organizing committee – to the chagrin of the organizers, as we will see. Lessons learned during Operation Grizzly were put to good use, largely due to the influence of experienced principal personnel assigned to Operation Podium, including Barr.

⁵⁰ Mark Read, “Lethal force approved for G-8 Troops armed for terror threat.” (*Calgary Herald*, 24 May 2002).

⁵¹Rabble.ca, “Babble: Soldiers prepared to kill citizens who protest at Kananaskis.” http://archive.rabble.ca/babble/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=2&t=001538 ; Internet; accessed 30 March 2013.

⁵²Tyrone Pile, “The Canadian Forces: Supporting RCMP-led security for the 2010 Winter Games.”(*RCMP Gazette*, Vol. 72 No. 2, 2010), 31.

Significantly, the key strategic conditions set by Canada Command included the seizure of “the opportunity to raise the profile of the CF where appropriate” while protecting the “strategic centre of gravity (which encompassed) inter-governmental, interdepartmental, and interagency coordination”.⁵³ CF planners, including PA⁵⁴, were duly embedded in the RCMP-led Integrated Security Unit (V2010 ISU) in order to help achieve the CF’s intended strategic effects. In addition, they were responsible for helping implement the RCMP’s policy to provide effective security - but not to “overshadow” the Games, according to the V2010 ISU’s Chief Operating Officer, RCMP Assistant Commissioner Bud Mercer.⁵⁵ As an outcome, he related that “...(one) of the many legacies that’s left behind is our execution of a plan in an integrated model.”⁵⁶ For his part, the Commander of Joint Task Force Games (JTFG), Rear-Admiral Tyrone Pile, agreed that “(t)he Vancouver 2010 Winter Games is a model for future domestic operations and a testament to what can be achieved through partnership and co-operation.”⁵⁷

This is not to suggest that the “whole-of-government” operation was in all respects flawless, and we will examine the particular challenges of integrated, inter-agency PA planning and execution later. Indeed, the closest the CF-RCMP

⁵³ Department of National Defence, JTFG 3350-2 (DCOS Ops) 19 August 2010, 7/40.

⁵⁴ The author of this paper served in that capacity from August 2008 until June 2010.

⁵⁵ Joanna Burgess, “Rising to the challenge: Games security wins praise from team leader.” (*RCMP Gazette*, Vol. 72 No. 2, 2010), 29. A high security profile, such as at Montreal 1976, was intentionally avoided.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Pile, “*The Canadian Forces...*”, *Ibid.*

relationship came to public embarrassment likely occurred following a land component-led stakeholders' open house and presentation held in its bed-down facility near Whistler - apparently intended as a domestic IA, but conducted on short notice and without proper PA messaging, coordination, or support. Consequently, its outcome included an unflattering report in the local *Whistler Pique* newspaper that was republished by the on-line publication *The Tyee*:

Precisely what they're here to protect us against is a mystery to everyone. Lt. Col. Malcolm Bruce, Deputy Commander of 1CMBG, gives us a presentation outlining the Canadian Forces' role in the Sea to Sky corridor ... followed by a question from (MP) John Weston: what threats is the Army concerned about? Bruce defers to RCMP Staff Sergeant Andre Labrecque, who responds that it's a sensitive subject, everything's being monitored and he'll "have to leave it at that."⁵⁸

Fortunately, the operationally integrated CF-RCMP relationship had developed sufficient depth to withstand this tactical-level setback - which affirmed the importance of timely, parallel PA coordination and integration among all entities.

Otherwise, the CF strove to maintain a low public profile, apart from the visibility of its 62-member ceremonial contingent⁵⁹. The Chief Executive Officer of the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC), John Furlong, responded with a valuable acknowledgement of the CF's contributions. In his memoir, Furlong acknowledged the provision of CF support to the games, ranging from the CC-150 *Polaris* Airbus that flew the Olympic flame party from Greece to Canada to the CH-146 *Griffon* helicopter that facilitated his departure from

⁵⁸ The Tyee, "500-soldier brigade keeps watch on Whistler backcountry."
"<http://thetyee.ca/Blogs/TheHook/Olympics2010/2010/02/04/WhistlerBackcountry/> ; Internet; accessed 8 April 2013.

⁵⁹ Pile, "The Canadian Forces...", *Ibid*.

Whistler at the conclusion of the Paralympic Winter Games. The latter arrangement provided him the opportunity to “...(reflect) in solitude on the men and women in uniform around me, and others like them who serve and protect us the world over. Courageous, loyal, proud, and driven. My job was easy compared with theirs.”⁶⁰ In fact, Furlong’s sole criticism of the CF was that not that it was too visible or engaged, but on the contrary that it was not more integrated with the Olympics organizing committee (such as it had been in Montreal):

I wanted the military involved because if we needed special jobs taken care of. I figured we could count on them because the word *fail* is not in their DNA...after that initial meeting (with the Chief of the Defence Staff), I would be a little disappointed when the armed forces said it couldn’t provide this or that service to the Games. They were extended pretty thin, given their commitments around the country and abroad, so were unable to commit to anything big in the run-up to the Games.⁶¹

Nevertheless, the successfully integrated security effort helped afford the CF and the RCMP symbolic and high-profile places of honour adjacent to the podium.

At this juncture, it is important to assess the current interrelationship between domestic operations and Canadian academic and public opinion, taking into account the increasing availability of polling data, in order to make relevant recommendations.

⁶⁰ John Furlong. *Patriot Hearts: Inside the Olympics that Changed a Country*. (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2011), 317.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 156.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, public support for the domestic role of the CF swiftly escalated from 25% to 42% between 1990 and 1992, thus eclipsing interest in its international obligations, according to a contemporary analysis that echoed the consequences of Oka while foreshadowing more recent opinion:

Most Canadians believe the Canadian Forces should centre their activities within Canada. The importance of international activity has also declined somewhat...In the aftermath of the Oka crisis...Canadians see an enhanced role for the Canadian Forces in supporting local, provincial, and national police forces as required and with provision of strong support for civil authorities in times of domestic crisis.⁶²

Subsequently, public and media attention became preoccupied with the mission in Afghanistan, for such apparent and valid reasons as the casualties and other unfamiliar consequences of relatively intense combat operations. More recently, however, there are clear signs of a renewal of interest in domestic operations - both among experts, and across the Canadian population. Even at the height of the Afghanistan combat mission, for example, University of Ottawa faculty members postulated:

...DND can better achieve its mission of protecting Canadians by strengthening the CF's capacities to aid the civil authority than by engaging in overseas operations. More precisely, Canadian defence policy should prioritize an enhancement of the CF's capacity to assist governments (local, provincial, federal) during crises, such as natural disasters, critical infrastructure failures (bridge collapses, major blackouts, etc.) and terrorist attacks...Assisting with

⁶² David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, *Canada's International Security Policy* (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 304-06.

the maintenance of law and order (aid to the civil power) must be the CF's second priority.⁶³

Concurrently, polling detected a substantial shift in popular opinion that the "primary role of the Canadian Army is to defend Canada," from 30% in 2009 to 41% in 2012. Within the same period, the proportion of Canadians who believed that natural disaster response is a vital domestic role for the CF rose from 43% to 50%.⁶⁴ Canadian media reported the following interpretation:

...for the first time since 2008, more respondents indicated they wanted the military to focus on domestic operations, such as responding to natural disasters and protecting Canadian sovereignty, rather than undertaking international missions.

"That would probably trouble many people in the Defence Department," (University of Ottawa professor Philippe) Lagasse said. "...most of this is contingent on the Canadian Forces deploying on international missions, but the results indicate the public puts its priority on the military getting the job done at home first and foremost."⁶⁵

While it may be tempting to view domestic and expeditionary operations as mutually exclusive or even antithetical, it may be more appropriate to view them as complementary or even convergent, according to political commentator Michael Den Tandt:

With Canadian soldiers fighting and dying in Afghanistan and reservists from communities across the country engaged in the effort, there was little in the public mood for anything but support. At the same time, the CF's service record suggests there was more to public support than overseas

⁶³ Philippe Lagasse and Paul Robinson, *Reviving Realism in the Canadian Defence Debate* (Kingston, ON: Queen's University, 2008), 96-97. This contrasts with an earlier view that "The mission of the professional soldier is to protect the community from *external* threats." (Gellner, 147)

⁶⁴ Ekos Research Associates, *Views of the Canadian Forces: 2012 Tracking Study* (Ottawa, 2012), 23, 52.

⁶⁵ Lee Berthiaume, "Declining visibility in the Canadian Forces." Postmedia News (wire agency), 18 September 2012.

action. For years, soldiers have been ready-aye-ready whenever the people ...required their help...they came when they were asked. They always do. That is a fundamental point of pride for the Canadian soldiers I know, and also part of the unwritten contract that links them with the broader population.⁶⁶

For its own part, the CA made no apologies for its allegedly expeditionary fixation, according to its blueprint publication *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow*: “Domestic operations are typically done quite well using capability designed for international operations and warfighting, but in some discrete areas, such as on arctic operations, some select additional capabilities may be required.”⁶⁷ The CA’s inherent adaptability can be called upon as required to reorient itself successful between domestic and expeditionary tasks, or vice versa.⁶⁸ Following this logic, IO/IA capabilities developed for expeditionary operations may also be dedicated to domestic necessities, as we will examine later.

Encouragingly, the public reputation of the CF itself remains at its highest point in many years. According to recent polling, “Over the last decade, the only major profession in Canada that has experienced a significant increase in public trust has been soldiering. It’s up 17 points from the mid-seventies, according to Ipsos-Reid tracking surveys. The military are now up at the top of the list, with

⁶⁶ Michael Den Tandt, “Your Canadian Forces rescuers are here, will that be cash or cheque?” *National Post*, January 8, 2013.

⁶⁷ Department of National Defence. B-GL-300-000/AG-001, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2011), 63-64.

⁶⁸ Examples include the temporary diversion of the Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians) Battle Group from pre-deployment training for the Balkans to fighting the Manitoba flood in 1997; and the deployment of the Second Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry to form Task Force Whistler during the 2010 Olympic Winter Games - shortly following its redeployment from Afghanistan.

first responders.”⁶⁹ Such public confidence is a welcome advantage to the CF and its partners - but experience has shown it should not be ignored or taken for granted, as we have seen in the brief but dangerously dichotomous breach between Oka and Somalia. As we have also seen, the potential unpopularity of certain ALEA operations could well be manipulated to adversely affect public opinion of the CF, even if the institution may have no real influence or control over the underlying issues and conditions that lead to such tasks.

Having traced the trajectory and relationship of domestic operations and Canadian public opinion, it is now time to examine to what degree the CF is strategically poised to capitalize on this renewal of public interest in domestic operations, and to protect public confidence in its capabilities. An assessment of current doctrine is instructive - viewed through the lens of joint operations since, by their nature, domestic operations are inherently joint and interagency.

At the doctrinal pinnacle, the “capstone” document for CF operations is Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) 01, *Canadian Military Doctrine*. This current (September 2011) reference establishes the Canadian operational philosophy within the overall doctrinal context of the generation and application of military power. While making no specific reference to PA or other arms and enablers, CFJP 01 importantly emphasizes the CF’s supporting role to civil

⁶⁹ Darrell Bricker and John Ibbitson, *The Big Shift: The Seismic Change in Canadian Politics, Business, and Culture and What It Means for Our Future* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2013), 256-57.

authorities in fulfilling their national security responsibilities, thus affirming the subordination of the military to relevant civilian institutions.⁷⁰

Domestic operations are further developed in a supporting reference, CFJP 3-2, *Domestic Operations*, which sets forth the framework for the employment of the CF; classifies the types of domestic operations⁷¹; defines provision-of-service and humanitarian-assistance operations; elaborates on the characteristics of assistance to law enforcement agencies and aid of the civil power; and discusses “military and non-military interactions in a comprehensive approach to domestic operations.”⁷² Significantly, it develops the theme of PA, as follows:

0215. Domestic operations involving the CF are characterized in most instances by the heightened interest of Canadians in the activity or event the CF is going or going to be doing... The PA Centre of Gravity is likely to be “to establish and/or maintain the confidence of the public in the ability of the CF to assist the various agencies involved in the domestic operation.”

0216. In most domestic operations...(t)he key role of Operational-Level commanders and their PA staffs is to support the responsible civil authorities in planning and effective management within their mandates and responsibilities. Operational PA staffs should develop close working relationships with public affairs/information staffs of various provincial/territorial and other agencies *ahead of time* [emphasis added], in order to set the conditions for success for public information plans and programs during a domestic operation.⁷³

⁷⁰ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01, *Canadian Military Doctrine*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2011), 6-12.

⁷¹ Specifically: provisions of service; humanitarian assistance; assistance to law-enforcement agencies; aid of the civil power; and defence of Canada, including sovereignty.

⁷² Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-302/FP-001, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3-2, *Domestic Operations*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2011), 2-1.

⁷³ *Ibid.* The “ahead of time” reference may have been influenced in part by Hillier’s experiences in having to improvise civic relationships upon arrival in the Area of Operations (AO), particularly during the 1998 ice storm.

Notably, this contemporary and influential document is primarily focussed on the operational - rather than the tactical or strategic - level, and does not explore or develop the internal linkages between PA and other activities or enablers, such as IO/IA disciplines. This limitation is also the case with the most recent and comprehensive domestic operations reference of all, the Canada Command *Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations* (SOODO). Issued in April 2012, it identifies the strategic centre of gravity as the ability of the CF to “(M) maintain confidence of (the Government of Canada) and Canadians in the CF’s ability to deliver an effective force in response to any domestic challenges when requested.”⁷⁴ Following an affirmation and definition of PA’s integral role in domestic operations, its 18-page PA annex provides comprehensive, process-driven guidance regarding PA support in the finite context of rapid response operations. Once more, there is no strategic language regarding the overall impact of domestic operations, nor any examination of the potential roles of IO/IA enablers. Furthermore, while there is mention of “Web 2.0, including social media”⁷⁵ for information dissemination, significantly, and like other references, there is no provision for external media – including social media – monitoring and analysis, even if these are decisive points from which the CF’s centre of gravity, public confidence, can be either threatened or protected.

⁷⁴ Department of National Defence, Canada Command 6397-03000-01 VOL 005 (Dom Strat 1), *Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations* (SOODO) (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2012), 5/33.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, X 6/18.

For its part, the CF's specific joint PA doctrine manual devotes slightly more than one page to domestic operations. Primarily focussed at the tactical and operational levels, it correctly identifies the "...heightened political, audience, and media interest that requires a wide-ranging PA program."⁷⁶ Consistent with other references, and with the overall subordination of the CF to supported agencies, it stipulates that civil authorities are "...in control and responsible for establishing the appropriate public and community relations policy and for directing public information programs."⁷⁷ Apart from generic language regarding PA planning within the Operational Planning Process (OPP), however, the only strategic language is to identify ADM (PA) as the source of strategic level PA support – without further defining the rationale for, or nature of, such support.⁷⁸

Specific doctrine also exists for the conduct of humanitarian and disaster relief operations, both internationally and domestically. Considering the historic significance of such operations within Canada to the CF's relationship with the nation, the omission of PA and public communications from the domestic context of the one of the most directly relevant references seems remarkable. In contrast, the PA impact of the international deployment of the Disaster

⁷⁶ Department of National Defence, B-GL-005-361/FP-000 *Joint Public Affairs* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007) 4-28.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

Assistance Response Team (DART) is certainly not overlooked - despite its less direct impact than domestic operations to the CF's perceived relevance at home:

4. **Public Affairs.** It is in the best interest of the CF to provide positive information to media whenever possible. Public Affairs (PA) is a force-multiplier and will have a direct impact on the level of public and political support given to a humanitarian operation, as well as on the morale of the troops and their families back home. Joint PA staffs will write and implement a pro-active PA Plan to keep Canadian and international audiences aware of the CFs' contribution to the disaster ensuring that it is coordinated with other government departments as necessary.⁷⁹

In summary, the consistent quality of existing doctrine is a tactical and operational, rather than strategic, patchwork. The CF approach has been traditionally reactive to tasks, and only with the advent of CF transformation has there been a concerted attempt to be proactive. Strategically, PA has generally tended to remain in a passive posture, due in part to the requirement not to compete with lead agencies for public attention. This perspective may be predicated, however, on a false assumption that such recognition is a "zero-sum game." It also fails to take into account the spectrum of capabilities, such as Combat Camera and media escorts, the CF can deploy in the interests of its mission partners as much as itself, as we will examine further.

As we have already seen, during earlier domestic operations in which the CF fully took charge on behalf of civilian authorities (such as the 1950 Red River floods), tactical and operational commanders employed public communications

⁷⁹ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FL-040, *Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), 4-4.

to directly influence public behaviour, as well as simply to inform audiences. During contemporary domestic operations, is it appropriate to adopt IO or IA methodology and delivery means recently honed during expeditionary operations?

Linkage between PA and IO is legitimized in DAOD 2008-4, *Public Affairs, Military Doctrine, and Canadian Forces Operations*, which stipulates:

Information operations is an integral component of *all* CF operations [emphasis added].

Public Affairs has an important role to play in supporting information operations planning and execution.

To this end, the DND and the CF shall fully integrate PA into the design, development and implementation of information operations at all levels, including policy and doctrine, in accordance with DAOD 8010-0, *Information Operations*, this DAOD, and DAOD 2008-0, *Public Affairs Policy*.⁸⁰

Unfortunately, the cross-referenced DAOD 8010-0 pertains in fact to Lessons Learned, and there is no other DAOD relevant to IO. Among doctrinal publications, the most relevant - *Canadian Forces Information Operations* - is some 15 years out of date, despite interest in its revision. Its definition of IO, however, remains in effect: "...actions taken in support of political and military objectives with the aim of *influencing decision-makers* [emphasis added] by affecting and exploiting information while protecting one's own information."⁸¹

⁸⁰ Department of National Defence, DAOD 2008-4, *Public Affairs, Military Doctrine, and Canadian Forces Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1998). The DAOD 2008 series effectively rescinded the restrictions of CDS 120, and sanctioned relatively permissive CF PA policies that persist to this day.

⁸¹ Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-010, *Canadian Forces Information Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1998), 1-2.

PA requires a seat at the IO table, among other relevant disciplines such as CIMIC and PSYOPS, and a role in the coordination of messaging, in particular, in order to prevent apparent contradiction or inconsistency. In the international (expeditionary) operations context, the necessity of functional coordination across the non-kinetic plane became obvious during operations in Kandahar Province, with implications beyond the Afghanistan theatre of operations, according to the senior public affairs officer for the former Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM), now entitled the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC):

One of the major difficulties was the synchronization and convergence of politico-military operations. PA activities, Intelligence Operations (IOs), psychological operations (PSYOPS), and effects-based operations (EBOs), including theatre-wide interagency effects (TIE), within a common communications strategy...There is no doubt that public diplomacy and the government-wide approach have and will continue to have a major effect on the management of CF PA activities in Canada and on operations...PAOs must fully participate in supervising IOs while continuing to act as advisors to the commander.⁸²

Implicitly, PAOs bear particular responsibility for ensuring fusion across all disciplines, in order to prevent divergent and dissonant messaging, and other actions that would compromise operational integrity and public credibility.

Certain synergies with PA indeed emerge from any consideration of IO/IA in a domestic context, where the CF is frequently and simultaneously

⁸² Christian Lemay, "The 'Operationalization' of Canadian Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: The Importance of Correctly Understanding the Communication Strategy." *Canadian Army Journal*, Vol. 12 No. 1 (Spring 2009), 30-43.

interacting with First Nations (FNs), Other Government Departments (OGDs) at all levels, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Crown Corporations, and non-public agencies at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. CIMIC cells, for example, can deploy trained Liaison Officers (LOs), particularly at the tactical level where the CF may be engaged with local governments and their first responders and emergency managers⁸³. Since their interactions may well be in the public commons, or will at least enter the public record via media coverage and meeting minutes, consistency in messaging and means with all audiences is vital to mission cohesion - including public confidence.

Furthermore, these non-military organizations operate within varying levels of communications acumen, and require careful coordination in order to achieve intended public confidence effects. For example, during the 2003 British Columbia forest fire crisis, inconsistent inter-agency and public communications by government officials was a fundamental structural flaw identified by former Manitoba Premier Gary Filmon's report, which recommended the development of a crisis communications strategy; the establishment of a deployable "Emergency Communications SWAT team;" and cooperation in

⁸³ Host First Nations liaison, for example, was an important component of the Operation Podium outreach campaign, in consultation with the V2010 community relations unit and its police First Nations LOs.

communications training.⁸⁴ The CF has expertise to share in all three areas - and others, such as “Red-Team” interactive threat simulation.

Accordingly, while it is not the mandate of the CF to visibly fill every void of public information and thus appear to usurp lead agencies, the expertise of the CF offers capabilities and methodologies that can be integrated and shared within a whole-of-government context, perhaps in the “leading from behind” analogy attributed to General Rick Hillier, former Chief of the Defence Staff. Indeed, the CF’s structure and mission focus offer useful attributes of “hierarchy, discipline and cohesion”⁸⁵ that have waned in other agencies in recent decades, according to Moncton public administration professor Donald J. Savoie, who also holds the Canada Research Chair in Public Administration and Governance, and who adds: “The military has been able to retain cohesion, hierarchy, and its internal power structure because it has retained clarity of purpose...leaving aside the military, it is difficult to identify any government department that has clarity of purpose in a world of horizontal or joined-up government where a multitude of outside actors...have carved out a niche for themselves.”⁸⁶ Such “clarity of purpose” would be a virtue well worth sharing during complex and challenging circumstances - such as a major earthquake or other natural disaster, when major

⁸⁴ Gary Filmon, *Firestorm 2003 – Provincial Review* (Vancouver: The Province of British Columbia, 2004), 47.

⁸⁵ Donald J. Savoie, *Power - Where Is It?* (Montreal & Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 214.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 216.

partners may be incapacitated with little national depth to draw from; or an Aid to the Civil Power operation, when they may have already failed, or may even have effectively disengaged.

Within this congested and complex environment, Public Safety Canada is the federal agency in charge of coordinating diffuse inter-departmental and inter-governmental cooperation and communication across its very broad spectrum of responsibilities, including emergency management, corrections, border security, law enforcement, and crime prevention.⁸⁷ Perhaps due to the breath of its institutional mandate, its integral communication capabilities and practices are corporate rather than strategic, operational, or even tactical. During the Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, for example, Public Safety Canada and the Province of British Columbia co-chaired a Government Partners Public Affairs Group (GPPAG) that met periodically in the planning stages, and then formed an autonomous body nested outside the chain of command, ostensibly to facilitate whole-of-government communication during the Games period. The arrangement seemed reasonable, given the inter-agency complexity of a deliberately planned event with its implicit requirement for institutional connectivity, including exercises at many levels. Unfortunately, according to the Public Affairs Annex to the Joint Task Force Games (JTFG)

⁸⁷ Public Safety Canada. "What we do." <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/abt/www/index-eng.aspx> ; Internet; accessed 8 April 2013.

After Action Report, the contribution of GPPAG actually became unconstructive during the Games period:

Inter-jurisdictional PA coordination is always complex in domestic operations. While the GPPAG concept facilitated cooperation in the years and months leading up to the Games, its role during the operation was not as productive. From the operational point of view, GPPAG caused undue delay and complexity, mainly due to uncertainty around reporting lines, product and process duplication, PA engagement beyond area-of-responsibility (i.e. passage of operational information), and agreed upon SOPs.⁸⁸

Flawed planning, influenced by bureaucratic process rather than operational imperative, therefore led to an unwieldy arrangement that actually inhibited mission performance. A more “military” approach, better aligned with the chain of command and informed by OPP methodology, could have been very much more appropriate to the situation. As we have seen, CF planners (including PA) were embedded to significant mutual benefit in the RCMP-led Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit (V2010 ISU) Others would have been at least as advantageously situated with Public Safety Canada in Ottawa, thus synchronizing the strategic with the operational and tactical levels. Indeed, in such circumstances as a high-profile Aid to the Civil Power operation, it could be argued that the CF should be permitted to “lead from the front,” or at least “lead from within,” since it possesses a range of PA and compatible competences and capabilities to match its logistical and other qualities prized by other agencies.

⁸⁸ Department of National Defence, JTFG 3350-2 (DCOS Ops) 19 August 2010, Annex Q, Q-2/6.

For example, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is a relevant capability that lends itself to the joint interagency public domestic operations environment.⁸⁹ As noted previously, the CF can be engaged, intensively and concurrently, with its mission partners and other agencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels during domestic operations. While standing Joint Task Forces have cadres of part-time Regional Liaison Officers (RLOs) to coordinate operational-level headquarters with their provincial and territorial counterparts, a vacuum at the tactical level creates risk of operational level overload and “pull-down.” Tactical CIMIC teams would offset the risk by improving connectivity at the municipal and regional levels and ensuring a beneficial flow of information throughout the hierarchy, from the field through joint headquarters to NDHQ.

Conversely, some IO/IA capabilities merit significant caution in the domestic context. For example, the development of Army Reserve Territorial Battalion Groups (TBGs) for force employment in domestic operations may have created a potential role for PSYOPS tactical dissemination capabilities to assist in the delivery of urgent messaging to target audiences, such as evacuation orders to affected residents during natural disasters. In addition, this role would help exercise and maintain a capability recently developed during expeditionary

⁸⁹ The acronym “JIMP” (Joint Interagency Multinational Public) is frequently applied to expeditionary operations. While most domestic operations are not “multinational,” the most severe, such as catastrophic

operations, partly in order to retain it in readiness for future international deployment. Such activities could potentially utilize PSYOPS delivery means, such as loudspeaker trucks and in-person dissemination - but certainly not their doctrine or methodology, which is intended for foreign audiences and not for use with domestic Canadian audiences, except “...at the direct request/approval by Cabinet (and) in accordance with Canadian law and Canadian doctrine.”⁹⁰

For clarity, the distinction between PA and PSYOPS is delineated as follows in current Canadian PSYOPS doctrine:

PA differ from PSYOPS in that PA convey their messages through uncontrolled public media whereas PSYOPS uses media controlled by own forces. J5 PA will direct the manner in which PA are conducted during Joint operations. The commanders at all levels should ensure that these themes and messages portrayed at all levels are coherent with each other, and that the integrity of both direct and indirect communications on behalf of the CF remains intact. However, there is always a clear division between PSYOPS and PA activities.⁹¹

The employment of this capability in even the most innocuous manner could soon prove problematic, however, since the delivery of a message implies ownership even when the deliverer is not formally in charge of the operation. Declaring states of emergency, and creating or enforcing evacuation alerts or

earthquake and tsunami, could well involve reciprocal responses from the United States under existing agreements, and potentially other nations.

⁹⁰ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-313/FP-001, *Psychological Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, v2 2004), 1-1. Like much other doctrine, some of the terminology is one or two evolutions out of date, and “J5 PA” is now SJS PA.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 1-6.

orders, are the purview of provincial, territorial and municipal authorities.⁹² Their primary delivery agents include police forces, which are familiar with local geography and communities, and are legally authorized to enforce orders when warranted. Furthermore, placing CF members at risk of potential confrontation with the public could unduly and unintentionally trigger an escalation in the threat level and nature of the operation.

Canadians are rightfully protective of their freedoms, which are protected by law and custom, and suspicious of any perceived or potential intrusion by federal or other authorities. We will shortly see how even the Olympics can be misrepresented as a threat to civil liberties. References in open source literature could easily be taken out of context to incur misconceptions that the CF is illegitimately “conducting PSYOPS in Canada.” Critics and potential adversaries monitor the CF’s communications by cruising the Internet and open source documentation routinely, and misrepresenting or exploiting it accordingly - for example, by denouncing such recent measures as Operation Connection and the shift to realistic field imagery in recruiting products as mere “propaganda”.⁹³

However well-intentioned by the CF, tactical and operational activities could trigger strategic “blowback,” to the detriment of long-term public support

⁹² The Filmon firestorm review (cited above) analyses the public information duties of civilian authorities in significant detail.

to the CF, if their credibility can be undermined. Such activities can be problematic in most domestic operations, since they may leave the CF and its supported agencies vulnerable to accusations of illegitimately “manipulating” Canadians and public opinion. Furthermore, the usual “adversary” in a natural disaster is the effect of nature and climate change - rather than a sentient human opponent. Safeguards are therefore essential in the use of IO capabilities that are intended, by current expeditionary-focused definition, to influence behaviour, and by implication, to require an active and adaptive adversary.

Indeed, even in permissive domestic operations, there is significant risk of either passive misunderstanding or active disinformation regarding the CF’s role that can be disseminated instantly through websites, blogs, and social media as well as traditional means. For example, in the years leading to the Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, the chief spokesperson for the “No Games 2010 Coalition” and “2010 Watch” networks, Chris Shaw, denounced the integrated security effort; posited that the CF was “in disarray” due to its international operational tempo; and predicted that “(s)ecurity will serve to tarnish civil liberties during the Games and for years afterwards, yet fail to prevent an attack against the Olympics.”⁹⁴ Mr. Shaw’s prognostications borrowed

⁹³ Ian McKay and Jamie Swift. *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety*. (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012), 251.

⁹⁴ Chris Shaw, *Five Ring Circus: Myths and Realities of the Olympic Games* (Gabriola Island, BC: New Society, 2008), 224, 282.

expertise and credibility from his concurrent status as a CA Reserve officer; yet even if they were largely discredited by the outcome of the Games experience, they were highly influential in shaping the security narrative at the time.

The risks of misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the CF's role increase exponentially in active ALEA (sometimes even when it the source is subsidized by the Canadian taxpayer), such as in the following depiction of the resolution of the 1990 Oka crisis:

The Oka crisis ended...as it had begun, with bitter recriminations and violence. The state used the Army's overwhelming power to push for the end of the Mercier Bridge blockade and the Oka occupation – managing, as it had in the past, *to put down its domestic opponents* [emphasis added] in a show of force that the army had seldom been able to assert in peacekeeping operations abroad.⁹⁵

Clearly, while the intended effect of the deployment of military forces in ALEA is to deter or de-escalate physical violence (as has been emphasized throughout this thesis), their actual, anticipated, or implied presence can have the unintended effect of elevating the stature of the crisis in the eyes of its proponents. One work goes so far as to liken such situations to kinetic military counter-insurgency operations.⁹⁶ Coordinated, factual messaging is necessary to counter potential disinformation and misinformation – via integrated and complementary means.

⁹⁵ McKay and Swift, *Warrior Nation...*,184.

⁹⁶ Amory Starr, Luis Fernandez, and Christian Scholl, *Shutting Down the Streets: Political Violence and Social Control in the Global Era* (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 149.

In the contemporary informational environment, the capacity of blogs and social media to influence mainstream media coverage is symbiotic and significant - and vulnerable to deliberate manipulation. According to a current practitioner, “(t)he economics of the Internet (have) created a twisted set of incentives that make traffic more important – and more profitable – than the truth.”⁹⁷ In this environment, disinformation and misinformation planted in low-level blogs can swiftly ascend the hierarchy through more established blogs to taint trusted mainstream sources. “A writer finds a narrative to advance that is profitable to them, or perhaps that they are personally or ideologically motivated to advance, and are able to thrust it into the national consciousness before anyone has a chance to bother checking if it’s true or not.”⁹⁸ A collateral phenomenon, “iterative journalism,” allows early false information to remain posted even as it is corrected or superseded by future updates.⁹⁹

The New York Times’ media and culture columnist, David Carr, shares this concern, according to a recent interview with *The Vancouver Sun*:

(Carr) has watched the Internet evolve into a wild world in which anyone can claim to be an expert and illusions can be real enough if you create a convincing persona...

⁹⁷ Ryan Holliday. *Trust Me, I’m Lying: Confessions of a Media Manipulator*. (New York: Penguin, 2012), 15.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 130-131.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 166-86.

“The Internet is a weird place,” he said, “because in the one instance it is a place where you can work your way through truth because all that is known is one click away.” Yet, he added, “It is the greatest lie machine that ever was.”¹⁰⁰

The effect had long been predicted, as futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler had forecast “(n)ew technologies for simulation make it possible to stage fake media events with which real individuals interact, events that are intensely vivid and ‘real.’”¹⁰¹

Once implanted on-line, misinformation swiftly becomes increasingly difficult to refute as it is picked up and disseminated throughout the public commons. Information can appear instantaneously, and reverberate indefinitely. The cognitive effect can be compounded by the phenomenon known as *confirmation bias*, which is defined as “...the tendency...to seek out information that confirms, rather than disproves, our suppositions.”¹⁰² In order not to abdicate the narrative to the manipulative and untrustworthy, timely detection and intervention become critical, which in turn implies a requirement for vigilant mainstream and social media monitoring and rapid response. This constraint in turn requires dedicated resources and coordination with various agencies - including intelligence, as cited previously by Lemay, and network security, to guard against cyber threats.

¹⁰⁰Jeff Lee. “Thicket of true lies grows online.” (The Vancouver Sun: January 31, 2013), C3.

¹⁰¹ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 174.

¹⁰² Kevin Dutton, *Split-Second Persuasion: The Ancient Art and New Science of Changing Minds* (Toronto, Doubleday Canada, 2010), 185.

This is not to suggest that on-line CF intervention is always warranted, even when its reputation is invoked. It is sometimes appropriate merely to monitor content in order to gauge public perspectives of the CF, and its mandate and capabilities. For example, on the first anniversary of the most recent Stanley Cup riots in downtown Vancouver, local journalist Bob Mackin recounted, in the on-line publication *The Tyee*, his attempt to enter the adjacent Beatty Street Drill Hall to inquire why CA reserve personnel (who were holding a private party there) did not spontaneously intervene of their own volition in the short-lived crisis. The audience reaction was overwhelmingly adverse to the reporter, not to the CF, revealing a more sophisticated public understanding of the proper role of the CF in such circumstances than the reporter himself had demonstrated.¹⁰³ Official CF engagement in this thread would have been unnecessary and counterproductive. It remains beneficial for the CF to be aware of such content, however, as a qualitative rather than quantitative form of public opinion research.

The influence of the Internet is far from entirely adverse, since it also presents opportunities for the CF and its members to proactively disseminate accurate imagery and factual information regarding their role in domestic and expeditionary operations, together with more routine topics such as exercises. The CF can in fact make a significant contribution to the whole-of-government

¹⁰³ Bob Mackin. "One year after riot, reporter revisits strange interlude with Canadian Forces that night." *The Tyee*, <http://thetyee.ca/Blogs/TheHook/Municipal-Politics/2012/06/15/Mackin-Riot-Tale/> Internet; accessed 31 March 2013.

PA effort through its unique capabilities including Combat Camera at the strategic level, and Image Technicians embedded in operational and tactical level organizations, who can acquire and disseminate accurate imagery in order to help fulfil significant media demands for timely, trustworthy, and professional visual content. During the 2010 Winter Olympics, for example, Combat Camera deployed personnel who were accredited to enter controlled access security zones that the public and other media could not, and could therefore operate as an “...integrated CF/RCMP capability (that) helped satisfy intense media interest in the work of security forces.”¹⁰⁴

In fairness, the CF has not entirely overlooked the potential use of social media as a proactive means for public communication and research. Its relevant policy manual encourages “L1s [commands] to use Web 2.0 tools and services as an efficient and effective additional channel to communicate with the public” for various reasons, including “risk and emergency communications”.¹⁰⁵ The policy requires L1s to submit annual social media plans to ADM(PA), as the functional authority, for approval based on such corporate imperatives as conformity with Government of Canada policies that include security, privacy, official languages, access to information, and “rules of engagement” for official users. Risk

¹⁰⁴ Department of National Defence, JTFG 3350-2 (DCOS Ops) 19 August 2010, Annex Q, Q-4/6-5/6.

¹⁰⁵ Department of National Defence, *DND/CF Guidelines for the External Use of Social Media* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2011), 3.

avoidance, rather than effective public engagement, appears to be the primary consideration.

While such a policy may seem to provide beneficial empowerment for public engagement by senior officials, leading to the development of dialogue and public trust, compliance with its mandatory requirements is onerous.

Furthermore, there is little provision for the monitoring of, and timely response to, on-line “chatter” about the CF and its activities - or any crisis management or prevention protocols. Nor is there provision for surge capacity during periods of particular public scrutiny, such as during domestic operations, when PA resources will already be significantly stretched.¹⁰⁶ These are vital considerations in any serious use of social media, however, and the CF is effectively behind current practice among large organizations whose reputations are constantly at stake, and who realize that alacrity and agility are crucial considerations. In a crisis, “(t)he faster you can get a response out and begin interacting with people over the situation that’s gotten them unhappy, the more likely you are to both contain it and get it resolved favourably. A well-crafted-response that takes three days to draw up, wordsmith, and run through multiple levels of approval frankly does you no good.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Operation Podium, for example, occupied up to 45 Public Affairs Officers and Image Technicians at its zenith, in a relatively benign environment.

¹⁰⁷ Jeff Barger, *The Social Media Strategist: Build a Successful Program from the Inside Out* (New York McGraw Hill, 2012), 226.

Unfortunately, few government departments are noted for timely responsiveness – even individually, and to traditional media queries. To compound the issue, the complexity of inter-agency operations, such as the involvement of more than 100 government agencies during the 2010 Winter Olympics¹⁰⁸, can virtually paralyse an already cumbersome consultation and approval process – in an environment that increasingly demands agility instead. A change of mindset is therefore as important as the adoption of technology.

In these circumstances, the “defensive” use of IO capabilities in detecting and reporting disinformation and misinformation activities may be warranted - so long as no “offensive” use is contemplated, such as in directly discrediting their sources. On the contrary, countermeasures should encompass the timely and well-coordinated release of factual information consistent with the commander’s intent - a core PA responsibility. Vigilance, and appropriate resource levels, are crucial – especially in any future Aid to the Civil Power task when the CF, as the force of last resort, would once again bear the primary burden of mission success, and the primary risk of mission failure.

If the CF is to exercise leadership, directly or indirectly, it must “keep its own house in order.” Internally, the strategic headquarters responsible for staging international and domestic operations, CJOC, is a logical point for the collection,

¹⁰⁸ Pile, “*The Canadian Forces...*”, *Ibid.*

fusion, and diffusion of relevant lessons learned. Potential friction or duplication of effort between the force employer (CJOC) and the force developers and generators (principally the RCN, CA, and RCAF) require vigilance, especially since the latter organizations develop and train according to approved doctrine. Since the bulk of deployable IO/IA and PA assets for land-based domestic operations belong to the CA, including its substantial Primary Reserve sub-component, the CJOC-CA nexus is a particularly decisive point.¹⁰⁹ As we have seen, one element, acting unilaterally, can potentially compromise cohesion and public perception - both within the CF, and between it and lead agencies.

To summarize, we have reviewed the evolving role of the CF in various domestic operations - where it remains the nation's ultimate response to a range of challenges, but is increasingly deferential to lead agencies that may not always be properly prepared for their leadership and communications obligations. We next assessed the implications of contemporary public opinion, which holds the CF in high regard, but has uncompromisingly high expectations for mission success in domestic operations. We also established that public attention to domestic operations is increasing as expeditionary operations decline, at least for

¹⁰⁹ The CA remains well aware of its roles, which include “providing armed and unarmed assistance to civil authorities when needed to maintain public order and security...” and “...assisting provincial and other authorities with natural disasters including earthquakes, floods, storms, forest fires and other emergencies.” Department of National Defence. “About the Army.” <http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/ata-asl/index-eng.asp> Internet; accessed 8 April 2013.

the time being. We then evaluated the inconsistent and frequently obsolescent state of CF doctrine relevant to PA and domestic operations, at a time when social media are proliferating rapidly and presenting a constant escalation in both informational threats and opportunities. In these circumstances, characterised by an increasingly diffuse informational environment, unpreparedness would place the CF's domestic legacy at significant risk. In addition, the cancellation of Operation Connection, and a reduction in high-profile public outreach activities due to budgetary considerations, has renewed the CF's dependence on domestic operations – however unpredictable - to uphold its connection with Canadians.

The wealth of expeditionary operational experience, gained at significant cost over the past decade, incurs risk of viewing domestic operations through a largely expeditionary prism. Conversely, primarily expeditionary capabilities should not be overlooked merely because they have largely evolved to meet contemporary challenges elsewhere. Various initiatives have been developed on the informational plane of expeditionary operations; their application in a domestic context must not be impulsive or arbitrary, however, but carefully tailored according to the context - and informed by domestic operational experience. Above all else, the fusion of these capabilities must remain under PA supervision in order to ensure adherence to the commander's intent; compatibility with lead agencies' messaging; and the appropriateness of interactions and message delivery activities with diverse audiences.

In conclusion, while it is impossible to predict with certainty where and when the CF will be called upon next to assist Canadians at home, it is certain that it will, and will gain significant public visibility and credit for successfully doing so. On the other hand, blame could ensue rapidly and linger indefinitely if public expectations, whether reasonable or not, were not met. Since praise seems more transient than criticism, it is essential for the CF to balance its tactical and operational PA acumen with consistent strategic coherence, in order to preserve its trust among Canadians and as precaution against potential calamity - whether actual, fabricated, or alleged.

Complacency is not a viable option. In an increasingly congested and unpredictable informational environment, improved fusion is necessary at all levels between PA and IO/IA, and other relevant disciplines, in order to communicate effectively with Canadians. This ongoing effort would also help the CF complement its whole-of-government partners with relevant capabilities - and to act decisively as the nation's force of last resort, when required.

Experience demonstrates that the current reduction in the operational tempo will not last forever. It does, however, present a transitory opportunity to evaluate and modernize our PA and IO concepts and doctrine in a domestic context - and above all, to adopt a more strategic mentality in order to meet the complex challenges of the future.

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