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Somalia: In the Shadow of Afghanistan and Iraq

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By Major Spurgeon

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ABSTRACT

The attacks on the Twin Towers changed the West's view on failed states. The invasion of Afghanistan, in the wake of 9/11, demonstrated the dangers posed by ungoverned areas and failed states, which could serve to harbour Al Qaeda operatives planning attacks against Western interests. As the world focuses its attention on Afghanistan and Iraq the threat posed by Somalia continues to grow. To date, international efforts to stabilize and secure Somalia have involved outsourcing and proxy support of an ineffective Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as a less costly means to respond. In this paper I will demonstrate that Somalia represents a growing security threat, which if escalated to the point of Afghanistan (direct threat to Western interests), will likely result in some form of military intervention. Unfortunately, any preventative measures to avert a direct threat to Western interests is being constrained due to the global economic recession and an international weariness to commit to another long and arduous military campaign in the shadow of Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, as a failed/collapsed state Somalia is suffering from a number of related and dangerous triggers that could create a situation not unlike Afghanistan. The triggers for intervention in Somalia are being manifested in terrorism, growing humanitarian crisis and piracy. The paper will investigate each of these triggers which on their own or in unison have the potential to compel the international community into a dangerous military intervention.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Over the last fifty years the world has evolved from a predominately isolationist period to one that now recognizes the relevance of the global village. The events of 11 September 2001 have taught us that obscure and distant countries can impact international security and stability. The ungoverned spaces of collapsed and collapsing states provide safe haven to transnational non-state actors that leverage the instability and disenfranchisement of the population to further their criminal or terrorist objectives.

During the Cold War the superpowers were successful in restraining and controlling fragile states. This all changed in Somalia with the end of the Cold War, marked by the fall of President Barre's brutal dictatorship in 1991. The country plunged into lawlessness and clan on clan violence as various political actors attempted to fill and exploit the power vacuum. Regrettably, despite the best intentions, successive UN missions led by the U.S., failed to bring any lasting stability to the region. In the years leading up to 2001, status quo remained the order of the day and Somalia continued its descent into anarchy.

The attacks on the Twin Towers changed the West's view on failed states.¹ The invasion of Afghanistan, in the wake of 9/11, demonstrated the dangers posed by failed states, which could serve to harbour Al Qaeda (AQ) operatives planning attacks against Western interests. The world awoke to the new reality of globalization and security related interdependence. A renewed intelligence effort was initiated to support the War on Terror. Africa, specifically Somalia, quickly rose in importance due to its prolonged

¹ The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government, [22 July 2004]), <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf> (accessed 20 March 2010).

lawlessness, Muslim population, proximity to the Middle East and AQ desires to expand operations. Today, after successive regional and international backed transitional governments, the country remains ungovernable, ripe for AQ inspired movements and attacks. This paper serves to provide an awareness of the threat represented by Somalia because at the moment the international community is distracted by the global recession and ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In this paper I will demonstrate that Somalia represents a growing security threat, which if escalated to the point of Afghanistan (direct threat to Western interests), will likely result in some form of military intervention. Unfortunately, any preventative measures to avert a direct threat to Western interests are being constrained by U.S. fatigue to commit to another long and arduous military campaign in the shadow of Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, as a failed/collapsed state Somalia is suffering from a number of related and dangerous triggers that could create a situation not unlike Afghanistan. The triggers for intervention in Somalia are being manifested in terrorism, growing humanitarian crisis and piracy. All three of these triggers are caused by Somalia's inability to exercise the powers of statehood. The paper will investigate each of these triggers which on their own or in unison have the potential to compel the international community into a dangerous military intervention.

In order to accomplish this task the paper has been divided into five chapters. Chapter Two will examine some of the relevant academic and historical writings that will serve to provide a theoretical and conceptual foundation on the subject of collapsed and collapsing states. The chapter will review Colonial and Cold War influences that saw superpower interference and abandonment, contributing to the current crisis. Although

Somalia, for all intents and purposes is a failed/collapsed state it does at the moment enjoy a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that has been given formal recognition and support by the international community. For that reason concepts of sovereignty and intervention, so closely linked, will be examined as a means to better understand the historical and legal precedent of the international community's ability and willingness to intervene into the affairs of a sovereign state such as Somalia.

It is important to provide the background or contextual factors that comprise the current threat. Chapter Three will examine some of the socioeconomic factors that contribute to our general understanding of Somalia. For instance, the social structure of Somalia, predominately nomadic, provides some insights into how the people have come to view the role of central government. Other factors such as the current state of government and economy will be outlined in a manner that links them to the current crisis. In the end, the background will provide the reader with essential elements to better appreciate the complexity of the problem.

The substantive part of the essay, Chapter Four, will identify three growing security concerns: terrorism, humanitarian crisis and piracy. In addition to the current conditions, this chapter will provide a number of possible scenarios that would mobilize the international community into action. For example, Somalia, primarily Muslim, is quickly being seduced into an extreme form of Islam, concurrently the Al Qaeda affiliated group, Al Shabab, is waging jihad against the African Union troops that are supporting the TFG. The possibility of this regional insurgency graduating to a transnational threat is very real. At the same time millions of Somalis are on the cusp of a major famine due to climatic changes and insecurity that is limiting the delivery of food

aid. Lastly, garnering much of the international attention, pirates continue to attack economically vital shipping in the Gulf of Aden. These trends on their own or as a cumulative effect could trigger the international community into action.

Lastly, Chapter Five will provide a more pragmatic assessment of the international community's willingness and capacity to undertake a long and complex intervention into Somalia. The chapter will investigate the effect of the global recession and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on the present and future geopolitical landscape. Perhaps we are entering a post-Afghanistan world that has lots its liberalist desires to intervene in hotspots because of the difficulty and cost. In any respect, current wars have taught the international community some hard lessons which will influence the way interventions are selected and executed for years to come. To better appreciate the current situation it is important to conduct a review of the relevant scholarly works.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

The last twenty years have seen an explosion of written works on the new era that emerged from the ashes of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks in New York significantly changed the way we view our world. In this chapter some of the themes of these literary works will be reviewed in order to provide a foundation to the growing threat to international security posed by the collapsed state of Somalia. The aim of this chapter is to review the historical context, post Cold War era, concepts of collapsed states, sovereignty, globalization and intervention. To begin, it is important to understand the historical context that gave birth to the state of Somalia.

The state of Somalia was the invention of colonial powers such as Britain, France, and Italy. David Laitin provides an important description of the Somalia people. Unlike

most countries in Africa Somalia is comprised of a very homogenous culture.² To take this a step further, Laitin further states that genealogy forms the heart of their social system, bordering on xenophobia.³ Somali social systems value lineages, demonstrated by the distribution of national resources through clans vice an impartial system.⁴ Laitin identifies some key facts that provide some deductions when viewed from the perspective of an international intervention. Somalia in essence has never really valued a central government instead relying on clan and tribal dynamics. This aspect continues to complicate efforts to bring a centralized and democratic government to Somalia.

The Cold War era provides an interesting backdrop to the current crisis. In the immediate years following World War Two, the Cold War began and so did superpower involvement in Africa. Mohammed Ayoob brilliantly outlines the role of superpower rivalries on Somalia's early days of independence following colonial rule in 1960. During 1950-1960s, the U.S. was a strong supporter of Ethiopia and conveniently Somalia was controlled by its allies: Britain, France and Italy.⁵ Ayoob points out that U.S. interests were aimed at containing and pre-empting USSR influence in Africa. On the other hand, the USSR was drawn to Somalia for two reasons: to counter U.S. influence and promote Somalia socialism.⁶ For these reasons USSR/Somalia relations

² David Laitin and S. Said Samatar, *Somalia Nation in Search of A State* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), 28-29.

³ *Ibid.*, 28-29

⁴ *Ibid.*, 30

⁵ Ayoob Mohammed, "The Horn of Africa," in *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World*, Vol. 1 (New York, N.Y.: St. Martins Press, 1980), 164-167.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 164-167

reached their high in 1969. These early relationships would set the stage for superpower politics, serving to shape the region for years to come.

As the Cold War gained momentum Somalia became a poker chip in superpower games of strategy. In 1977 loyalties changed and a re-alignment took place that saw the USSR and US switch allegiances. After the election of a socialist government in Ethiopia relations with the U.S. deteriorated, providing a new opportunity for the USSR.⁷ As a result the Soviets abandoned Somalia at a critical time when it was getting ready to launch an offensive to regain part of its “Somalia territory” in Ethiopia known as the Ogaden. To their surprise the USSR provided Cuban troops to Ethiopia, successfully repelling the Somali offensive.⁸

This reversal of loyalties provides an informative example of the level of superpower manipulation directed through proxies in Africa. H.Sidky draws on the Afghanistan experience during the Cold War to further explain this phenomena and its impact on the current state of international security. In 1979 the U.S. created, trained and equipped the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan to draw in and defeat the USSR.⁹ Fundamentally, they wanted to entice the USSR into a Vietnam like war. During the bitter and devastating war against the Soviets thousands of Afghans died and critical infrastructure was destroyed. At the end of the war the U.S. abandoned Afghanistan and it descended into anarchy. The only means to stabilize the country came in the form of the Taliban with its Islamic fundamentalist’s platform. The Taliban ultimately ended up

⁷ *Ibid.*, 164-167

⁸ *Ibid.*, 164-167

⁹ H. Sidky, "War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978-2001," *Modern Asian Studies* 41 (Jul, 2007), 849-887, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1310407611&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&ROT=309&VName=POD>.

supporting Al Qaeda, leading to the 9/11 attack and current conflict. In summary, these events demonstrated the role superpowers played in creating some of the collapsed states of the 21st century. The legacy of the Cold War continues to this day. Although western interventionists may have short term memories many of these Cold War inspired actions persist in creating feelings of distrust towards foreign interventions. An appreciation of the historical context is important in any lasting solution.

Before we go any further much work has been done to define and understand the phenomena of collapsed states. First, according to William Zartman, a state is an authoritative political institution that is sovereign over a recognized territory.¹⁰ Perhaps more importantly a state has a social contract in which citizens trade freedom for security.¹¹ According to Robert Jackson the concept of state can be further broken down to “quasi-state”.¹² Jackson argues that quasi states, despite being enfranchised with statehood, do not possess the political will, institutional authority and organized power to protect human rights or provide socioeconomic welfare.¹³ According to this definition Somalia could, and perhaps more appropriately, be described as a quasi state.

Jeffrey Herbst puts the discussion of collapsed states into context, explaining that European countries took hundreds of years to evolve into functioning states. It must be

¹⁰ *Collapsed States the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, ed. William Zartman (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 7

¹² H. Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 21, http://books.google.com/books?id=8tc2UDYy-HAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:quasi+intitle:states&lr=&as_drrb_is=q&as_minm_is=0&as_miny_is=&as_maxm_is=0&as_maxy_is=&as_brr=0&cd=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false (accessed 22 March 2010).

¹³ *Ibid.*, 21

remembered that statehood in Africa is only now celebrating its 50th anniversary.¹⁴ In fact Gerard Prunier argues that African statehood was introduced right in the middle of the Cold War and its evolution was frozen in time until further notice.¹⁵ Colonial influences at nation building essentially ceased in 1960.

Nevertheless to gain a better grasp of Somalia it is important to reflect on the definition of a collapsed state. A collapsed state, therefore, is one in which structure, law and authority have fallen apart.¹⁶ In essence it no longer can perform basic functions of a state and it becomes paralyzed and inoperative. He further goes on to outline some of the nuances of his definition. For example, a collapsed state does not mean anarchy instead the social system falls back on ethnic nationalism. The components oppose center and resort to local governance with warlordism, gangs, etc.¹⁷ The causes are varied, however Zartman explains that authoritative regimes, not unlike that of President Barre in Somalia, lead to tyranny and a breach of this social contract.

Marina Ottaway takes this concept further describing the relationship between democracy and authoritarianism on the potential for state collapse. She argues that democracy is the best safeguard against state collapse because it provides representation to divided segments of society.¹⁸ In contrast, authoritarianism creates a very dangerous condition in which segments of society need to compete for representation. She is not;

¹⁴ Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, *The Future of Africa: A New Order in Sight?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 21.

¹⁵ Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 529.

¹⁶ *Collapsed States the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, 303.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 244

however, naïve to believe that democracy provides a panacea for resolving all collapsed states. Instead she acknowledges the difficulty of transiting from state collapse to democracy, arguing that it should occur in graduated steps. She introduced the idea of power sharing as an interim step where conflict groups work together in negotiating a solution. Conceptually, the idea seems promising if and when countries such as Somalia are ready and the international community possesses the patience and will to enable it.

A number of significant events have taken place over the last 20 years marked by the end of the Cold War and events of 11 September 2001. Both of these events have served to change the way in which we observe and understand the world. Unfortunately for Africa, this post Cold War period has not been kind, as former superpower proxies were orphaned according to John Davis.¹⁹ Jeffrey Herbst supports this assertion, further describing how donors provided money and support to African proxies in order to gain strategic benefit. Today countries such as Somalia have lost strategic significance.²⁰ The effect, according to William Zartman, has created a global change in international relations. Today superpower restraints have been lifted and authoritarian systems in the Third World are no longer supported, resulting in small dangerous conflicts.²¹ The post Cold War era has created a “global law and order deficit”, according to Chester Crocker, U.S. Assistant secretary of State for Africa.²² As a result of this instability, according to

¹⁹ John Davis, *Africa and the War Terrorism* (Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), 192.

²⁰ Herbst and Mills, *The Future of Africa: A New Order in Sight?*, 22.

²¹ I. William Zartman, "Making Sense of East Africa's Wars," *Wall Street Journal* Nov 15, 1996, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=10454511&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&ROQ=309&VName=PQD>.

²² *Collapsed States the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, 208.

Francis Mading Deng, security institutions such as NATO and the UN have been strained.²³ We are seeing this strain due to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Although described as orphans at the close of the Cold War the new War on Terror has witnessed a renaissance in the strategic value of states such as Somalia. John Davis sees Africa seized with an opportunity to take on renewed strategic importance due to the emergence of terrorism. Africa, with its numerous failed or failing states, provides an attractive safe haven for Al Qaeda which capitalizes on poverty and corruption in order to pursue its objectives. Furthermore, Africa's large Muslim population provides an ideal recruiting base for AQ. Evidence, outlined by John Davis, illustrates the extent of AQ influence in the region. For example, Islamic fundamentalists, sponsored by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, are using mosques and madrassas to promote anti-western messages of jihad against infidels. Davis quotes a senior intelligence official that captures this growing strategic importance, "We awoke to the need to prevent another Afghanistan and preclude Bin Laden jihadist from setting up shop in Africa".²⁴ The terrorist threat in Somalia will be further described in subsequent chapters; needless to say academics such as John Davis raise an alarming trend, demanding that the West see Africa through the lens of international security.

In parallel to the events that have shaped the world since the end of the Cold War globalization has been spreading at an exponential rate. Many academics have written about the effects of globalization on the social, political and economic fabric of our lives and in particular its impact on Africa. Globalization has seen unprecedented levels of

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 144

prosperity, unfortunately, argues Jeffrey Herbst, wealth has not migrated to Africa. In fact Africa's per capita income has been at its lowest level in 20 years. Furthermore, African states have increasingly been marginalized. For example, African global trade and capital has fallen from 6 percent in 1990 to one percent today.²⁵ Nevertheless, despite significant aid from western nations, Africa has not been able to develop due to a lack of governance and insecurity that continues to discourage foreign investment and economic development.²⁶

The inability of Africa to benefit from globalization has served to highlight the important linkage between impoverishment and terrorism and the insecurity it causes the international community, so argues Herbst. Simply stated, poverty breeds terrorism and causes endless demands for humanitarian intervention.²⁷ The U.S. government was quick to see this linkage, as outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy:

The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.²⁸

In his final analysis Jeffrey Herbst provides a gloomy outlook for Somalia. He sees a state in the midst of institutional collapse that due to brand image of decline, diseases and instability will not be able to develop in the foreseeable future.²⁹ John

²⁵ Herbst and Mills, *The Future of Africa: A New Order in Sight?*, 7.

²⁶ Jeffrey Herbst, *Africa and the Challenge of Globalization* (Singapore: The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005), 25.

²⁷ Herbst and Mills, *The Future of Africa: A New Order in Sight?*, 1-7.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 6

²⁹ Herbst, *Africa and the Challenge of Globalization*, 14-15.

Davis amplifies this outlook by identifying the growing gap between those prospering under globalization and those that are not, causing an increasing sense of frustration that is contributing to terrorism and creating an unmanageable situation.³⁰

All of these factors have conspired to create the conditions in which states such as Somalia, in the absence of superpower influence, have collapsed. The previous paragraphs have clearly articulated the causes and perhaps more relevant the consequences. The post Cold War era has changed the way in which concepts of sovereignty are understood. The 1990's, with conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia fed debates on sovereignty. Nevertheless, debates on upholding state sovereignty and protecting human rights have been on going since 1945.³¹ As Richard Haas argues, sovereignty is not absolute and citizens as well governments have rights.³² In extreme cases intervention is necessary in order to preserve life and peace.³³ According to William Zartman, the international community has increased its expectations of states to protect its citizens. Sovereignty is now viewed as a responsibility and not a cover for tyranny.³⁴ At the same time he emphasizes the importance of respecting sovereignty as a means of protecting states from unrestrained interference. Perhaps in reference to

³⁰ Davis, *Africa and the War Terrorism*, 19-74.

³¹ Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, "Canada's Human Security Agenda," *International Journal* 60, no. 4 (Autumn, 2005), 6,
<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=971926771&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

³² Richard N. Haass, *The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course*, First ed. (United States: Public Affairs, 2005), 43-44,
http://books.google.ca/books?id=r9IIQ07ntUAC&dq=richard+haass+and+intervention&printsec=frontcover&source=in&hl=en&ei=uSemS_eLHYnSsgOs3f2OBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=12&ved=0CCoQ6AEwCw#v=onepage&q=richard%20haass%20and%20intervention&f=false.

³³ *Ibid.*, 50

³⁴ *Collapsed States the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, 267.

superpower politics orchestrated during the colonial and Cold War days. Nonetheless, he argues that when the state fails to protect its citizens the international community is permitted to breach sovereignty and intervene.³⁵ Francis Mading Deng supports this contention, emphasizing the primacy of human rights over sovereignty.³⁶ This view, held by many, was also stated by Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali in 1992, when he proclaimed that sovereignty is the will of democratic people and that tyranny does not deserve the rights of sovereignty. Surprisingly Canada has taken a lead in moving this debate forward with the introduction and subsequent UN adoption of the concept of Right to Protect (R2P).³⁷ R2P permits the UN to intervene in a sovereign state when the state is not capable of protecting its citizens from mass killings and/or genocide.³⁸ Perhaps, idealistic at its core, R2P appears somewhat hollow in its application given the many examples of atrocities and conflicts in places such as Zaire and Darfur that went unopposed.

Notwithstanding the discussions on sovereignty, Jeffrey Herbst raises an interesting observation. He blames the international community for maintaining an archaic view of sovereignty that recognizes colonial based boundaries. For example the international community continues to ignore the independence of Somaliland, a region of Somalia. He argues that for any lasting solution in Africa the boundaries may need to be re-designed.³⁹ His assertion was predictably first recognized in the 1960's by the

³⁵ Zartman, *Making Sense of East Africa's Wars*, 4-8.

³⁶ *Collapsed States the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, 212-214.

³⁷ Riddell-Dixon, *Canada's Human Security Agenda*, 3.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 3

³⁹ Herbst and Mills, *The Future of Africa: A New Order in Sight?*, 38-39.

Organization of the African Union that warned that the colonial boundaries constitute a grave threat and permanent de-stabilizing factor.⁴⁰ However, the debate does signify a key turning point in the way the international community views the concepts of sovereignty, providing the moral and legal framework for intervention in states such as Somalia.

Following the logic of the previous discussion on sovereignty it is only fitting that we end this chapter with a review of the concepts of international intervention. Ibrahim A. Gambari takes a traditional view of intervention defining it as a legal or coercive interference by an outside party in the sphere of jurisdiction of an independent political community, a term generally criticised as an attack of a sovereign state.⁴¹ An intervention can take on many forms such as military force and/or economic sanctions. Gambari makes an important point arguing that multi-lateral interventions are more effective than unilateral because they diffuse national interests and are seen to be more altruistic. Furthermore, they are perceived as impartial and the cost and burden can be shared amongst the intervening nations.⁴²

A multi-lateral approach to interventions appears to be the most effective. Furthermore, Richard Haass argues that the world is transitioning from a uni-polar (U.S. dominated) to a non-polar community of influential state actors.⁴³ According to Haass

⁴⁰ Jeffrey Herbst, "Challenges to Africa's Boundaries in the New World Order," *Journal of International Affairs* 46, no. 1 (Summer, 1992), 17-20, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=727059&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=POD>.

⁴¹ *Collapsed States the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, 222-223.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 222-223

⁴³ Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (May/June, 2008), 44, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1483499541&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=POD>.

this new multi-polar world will be increasingly more volatile and unstable demanding closer coordination and cooperation.⁴⁴ At the current time the means to coordinate and authorize a multi-lateral action is best done within the framework of the UN Security Council (UNSC), argues Karsten D.Voigt.⁴⁵ Even so, Voigt recommends that the current construct of the UNSC does need to reform in order to better represent the interests of a broader segment of the world.⁴⁶ Other nations such as Brazil would tend to agree and are at this moment attempting to champion UNSC change that would widen the membership to be more geographically representative. There are many that criticize the effectiveness of the UN to address collapsed states such as Somalia, unfortunately for the moment it represents the only international organization with the capability to coordinate and authorize intervention.

Evaluating the international community's track record with respect to interventions Jeffrey Herbst provides a contrarian view. He argues that the West has to date been conducting interventions "on the cheap".⁴⁷ He sees an absence of ideas and not money as the deficit in conducting effective interventions. The legacy of the ill fated operation in Mogadishu, in 1993, which resulted in the deaths 18 U.S. soldiers, significantly influenced the future of humanitarian interventions. Its legacy has resulted in international paralysis, according to Herbst, evidenced by inaction during the atrocities

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Karsten D. Voigt, "Canada, Transatlantic Relations, and the Challenges of Crisis Intervention," *International Journal* 60, no. 3 (Summer, 2005), 741, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=931226211&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 741

⁴⁷ Herbst and Mills, *The Future of Africa: A New Order in Sight?*, 40.

that occurred in Rwanda in which Hutu's slaughtered 500 000 Tutsis'.⁴⁸ Herbst persuasively argues that despite the identification of differing forms of intervention nations are analytically seeking ways to avoid costly nation building. He empathetically believes that any intervention that seeks to resolve the symptoms of collapsed states must, as a core element, provide basic nation building to rebuild the institutions whose collapse created the situation in the first place.⁴⁹ A humanitarian surgical strike is not possible for a long lasting solution and could in some cases further aggravate the problem. His works, despite being somewhat dated, are extremely relevant to the current state of international interventions. In the case of Somalia terrorism, humanitarian conditions and piracy are symptoms of state collapse and to date are being addressed separately. For that reason any meaningful intervention will be long, complex and involve nation building.

Francis Mading Deng takes a more detailed analysis of the process of intervention. He outlines a three step escalatory approach to intervention: monitoring, diplomatic, and mobilization.⁵⁰ His thesis describes the merits of prevention vice a reactionary approach involving a massive intervention to put a collapsed state back together.⁵¹ This approach, if feasible, would be effective in identifying states vulnerable to state collapse and using non-intrusive means to divert disaster. Unfortunately this process is making some large assumptions on the ability of the international community to conduct such a process. Due to the complexity of the task, coupled with limited resources and lack of coordination, it is unlikely that international actors would have the

⁴⁸ Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (Mar/Apr, 1996), 70-82, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=9271407&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&ROQ=309&VName=POD>.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 70-82

⁵⁰ *Collapsed States the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, 208-210.

foresight to act in such a way. In any respect, his warning is valid that failing proactive actions the possibility of tackling a collapsed state with a massive intervention is extremely difficult.

In summary it is clear that modern Somalia is the result of years of influence from its colonial custodians to the superpower manipulations of the Cold War. The world has been inconsistent in its appreciation of the importance of Somalia, contributing to its collapse. At the close of the Cold War Somalia and the other Third World proxies became orphans. Their authoritative regimes became tyrannical, causing fissures in their societies that ultimately led to state collapse.

International views on sovereignty diverged from the supremacy of the state to a responsibility to intervene when a state could or was no longer willing to provide basic needs for its citizenry. In this light Somalia saw a number of failed interventions in the early 1990s. In the years following poverty, insecurity and the emergence of terrorism grew. The events of 9/11 changed the way in which the world measured the consequence of ignoring failed states such as Afghanistan.

Somalia is once again gaining importance as terrorism takes hold. In the chapters that follow a more in-depth analysis will focus on the growing security threat Somalia poses to the international community due to triggers such as terrorism, humanitarian disaster and piracy. All of these factors, indicative of a collapsed state, could if escalated to a direct threat to the West lead to an international intervention. First, like the literature review, it is important to provide the background to the present situation.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 219

CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

In order to fully appreciate the nature of the problem in Somalia it is critical that some background be provided. As a failed or quasi state the TFG has failed to provide for the socio economic welfare of its citizens. For example, Somalia has routinely ranked extremely low in the UN's annual Human Development Index. Although no ranking has been completed recently in 1996 Somalia was ranked 171 of 174.⁵² This chapter will outline historical origins, social structure, state structure and economic factors that reflect some of the reasons for this low ranking. It is important to note that the complexity of the crisis is not easily described in such few words; however this chapter aims to frame the situation, allowing a better comprehension of the factors that continue to aggravate a solution. First the historical context will be outlined below.

HISTORY

The history, as with many of the countries that comprise Africa, began under the protectorate of a colonial power. For Somalia this involved primarily the colonial powers of Italy and Britain. For the purposes of this essay we will commence in the year 1960 when Somalia unified from the protectorates of British Somaliland and Italian Puntland to form the Republic of Somalia.⁵³ To begin the boundaries were drawn with complete disregard of the ethnic and clan boundaries that spanned five traditional lands known as Ogaden, now in Ethiopia, Northern Frontier District of Kenya, French Somaliland and

⁵² United Nations, "Somalia Country Brief 2002," UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators Office for Somalia, <http://www.unsomalia.net/infocenter/factsheets.htm> (accessed 03/28, 2009).

⁵³ Accountability Office US Government, *Somalia: Challenges and Development Efforts* (New York: Novinka Books, 2008), 10.

Djibouti.⁵⁴ In fact the Somali Flag, a white five pointed star on a blue background, symbolizes the desire to see these lands once again re-united.⁵⁵ This aspect explains the origins of regional friction between Somalia and its neighbours.

The unification of southern and northern Somalia served to sow the seeds of instability that would eventually result in the collapse of the government in 1991. Symbolizing this discontinuity, the number of seats in the newly formed Parliament did not provide fair representation for the North, known as former Somaliland.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the North was not treated well by the South through political betrayal and humiliation, angering politicians, traditional leaders, intellectuals, business community and military leaders.⁵⁷ These main factors, amongst many, served to marginalize the North, ultimately leading to the overthrow of the government in 1970 by Major General Siad Barre.⁵⁸

During this period Somalia was subject to the effects of the Cold War, as were others in Africa. During the height of the Cold War the Soviet Union and the United States employed proxy wars as a means to gain strategic currency in Africa. Somalia was caught in this superpower game of brinkmanship. The United States supported the Barre

⁵⁴ Bridget Thompson, "Failure of the State Rooted in History," *Cape Times* Jan 27, 2009, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1633379761&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ "Commentary on History of Somaliland's Unification with Somalia," *BBC Monitoring Africa* (Apr 1, 2009), 2, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1670976201&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 2

⁵⁸ US Government, *Somalia: Challenges and Development Efforts*, 10.

government, while in the other camp, the Soviet Union supported Ethiopia.⁵⁹ The superpowers understood and exploited the traditional rivalry between Somalia and Ethiopia that was for the most part based on tribal and religious differences. The brutal regime of President Barre would exist as long as Somalia remained strategically important. This dynamic would soon change.

Unfortunately for Somalia, in particular the residents of northern Somaliland, President Barre's rule was characterized by new levels of brutality and the strengthening political domination of the South.⁶⁰ More specifically, he routinely committed massive human rights abuses such as killings, detentions, rapes, torture, unfair trials, confiscation of private property, curfews, checkpoints, etc.⁶¹ Largely for these reasons and the lack of superpower support, with the conclusion of the Cold War, he was deposed in 1991. The country plunged into anarchy and the one hope for civility amongst chaos, Somaliland, declared independence in May of 1991.⁶²

Following the violent overthrow of the Barre government internal battles raged as various clan and tribes attempted to gain control of the central government.⁶³ In concert the strategic value of Somalia rapidly declined with the end of the Cold War. Western countries ignored Somalia for the first two years of this violent struggle for control. It wasn't until 1993 when media coverage identified a devastating famine which resulted in

⁵⁹ "Failed State," *The Times* Dec 21, 2009, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1925562331&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&ROT=309&VName=POD.;> *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Commentary on History of Somaliland's Unification with Somalia*, 3.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 4

⁶² "Special Report: A SHORT AND BLOODY HISTORY," *The Observer* Nov 23, 2008, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1600885951&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&ROT=309&VName=POD.>

the deaths of 300 000 Somalis.⁶⁴ The mounting death toll continued to climb because relief agencies were not able to deliver food due to insecurity. In response the UN approved several humanitarian operations into Somalia. The first mission, led by the U.S. and supported by Pakistani soldiers, was launched in 1993.⁶⁵ For the most part the mission was successful in its task of delivering humanitarian aid and countless Somalis were saved.

As the UN mission matured it became clear that insecurity was severely hampering development and reconstruction efforts. In 1995 the UN intervention ended with the infamous “Blackhawk down” episode, in which 18 U.S. Rangers died attempting to capture warlord General Mohamed Farah Aideed.⁶⁶ For various reasons President Clinton decided to withdraw all military forces from the country effectively ending the mission. The legacy of this decision continues to influence international relations with the Third World.

The departure of the UN left a country that according to Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State, represented the definition of a failed state locked in lawlessness.⁶⁷ During the years that followed more than a dozen internationally brokered attempts at a peaceful resolution failed.⁶⁸ For the first time since the departure of the UN a transitional government formed in 2000, during a peace conference in neighbouring

⁶³ "Somalia," *Background Information Summaries* (08/31, 2006), 2, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=22249555&site=ehost-live>.

⁶⁴ *Failed State*, 2.

⁶⁵ *Special Report: A SHORT AND BLOODY HISTORY*, 1-2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Failed State*, 2.

Djibouti.⁶⁹ Predictably the interim government failed in 2003 due to issues of representation, power sharing and active interference from regional players in Arab states and Ethiopia.⁷⁰ Finally, after a long and arduous two year peace process Somalia saw the establishment of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG).⁷¹ The fragile TFG remained in power until 2006 when it was overthrown by the Union of Islamic Courts, a coalition of businessmen, clerics and militias linked to Al-Qaeda.⁷² Also known as the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), the council's primary object was the establishment of a Somalia version of the Taliban, advocating the enforcement of Sharia law.⁷³ This I would argue was a pivotal point in the narrative of Somalia. Traditionally, Somalis had practiced a moderate form of Islam. For some of the reasons identified during this historical overview such as foreign interference, corruption, ineffective government and lawlessness, the conditions in 2006 were ripe for the introduction of Islamic extremism.

In response to the take over by the CIC the TFG requested support to regain power. Perhaps, given the already complex and difficult missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States urged Ethiopia to send troops to Mogadishu to assist the TFG.⁷⁴ Ethiopian history and the fact that they are Christian added a dangerous sectarian

⁶⁸ Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, ed. Tim Huxley (Temple, Place, London: Oxford University Press, 2004), 8.

⁶⁹ *Somalia*, 5.

⁷⁰ Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, 8.

⁷¹ *Special Report: A SHORT AND BLOODY HISTORY*, 2.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Somalia*, 4.

⁷⁴ *Special Report: A SHORT AND BLOODY HISTORY*, 2.

element to the conflict.⁷⁵ By 2008, the TFG was largely able to maintain its power due to a significant Ethiopian troop presence and assistance from the European Union and African Union.⁷⁶ It was clear that the TFG was fragile at best and not really an effective or representative government for the majority of Somalis. Objective assessments of the TFG's effectiveness up to 2008 described a government unable to establish administrative infrastructure to conduct government business, in a large part due to epidemic corruption.⁷⁷ Once again the conditions in Mogadishu were ready for another attempt by CIC to seize power.

The 2008 emergence of the Islamist militant group, Al-Shabab, was born out of the necessity to combat the conventionally superior Ethiopian troops protecting the TFG.⁷⁸ Due to Al-Shabab's growing support and effective employment of guerrilla warfare they succeeded in collapsing the government, resulting in the TFG President fleeing to Djibouti in January 2009.⁷⁹ Today, notwithstanding the existence of a new TFG, the government remains largely ineffective. This success would no doubt embolden Al-Shabab, reinforcing the utility and effectiveness of such tactics, setting a dangerous trend for Somalia that will be outlined in greater detail in the next chapter.

In summary, the historical context of what is now Somalia plays an important role in understanding the complexity of the problem. Its colonial parents and superpower masters did not do any favours in constructing and developing the state of Somalia.

⁷⁵ *Somalia*, 3.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 3

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 3

⁷⁸ *Special Report: A SHORT AND BLOODY HISTORY*, 2.

⁷⁹ *Somalia*, 3.

Corruption, fuelled by tribal and clan loyalties, served to produce ineffective government that resulted in the departure of Somaliland and the dictatorship of President Barre's regime. Barre's government amplified the North and South conflict introducing more brutal practices of degradation and abuse that finally led to the 1991 collapse of the government and violence induced famine of 1993.

Notwithstanding altruistic intentions, the U.S. led humanitarian interventions from 1993-1995 lacked commitment and failed to provide a lasting solution. More disturbingly, the rise of Islamic extremism continues to sabotage efforts by the UN, international community and regional actors attempting to resolve the lawlessness in the country. The effects pose a growing threat to the international community.⁸⁰ In addition to history, the social structure provides a means to better understand the Somali people.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

History tells the story of Somalia; nonetheless it is important to be familiar with the social structure to understand the people of Somalia. The data provided in this section is based on estimates, as one might imagine the lack of a functioning government has made it extremely difficult to conduct an accurate census. Latest assessments have determined that the population of Somalia numbers approximately 10 million.⁸¹ The Somali citizens are rural, living off the land for subsistence with 60% nomadic herders, 20% farmers and 20% urban.⁸² The urban population has expanded due to insecurity, resulting in the city of Mogadishu swelling to over 2 million residents.⁸³ This change

⁸⁰ *Failed State*, 2.

⁸¹ *Somalia*, 1.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 4

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 4

from a traditional agriculturally based culture to city dweller has no doubt contributed to the instability and anarchy found in the major cities.

Typical to the continent, the majority of Somalis are divided amongst clans and tribes.⁸⁴ This is an important feature of the Somalia social landscape. Any efforts to form a representative government must account for clan and tribal affiliations or it will fail. For Westerners this concept is difficult to comprehend. However, in societies based on tribal linkages it is very important and arguably drives much of the internal dynamics of the country.

Religion has and continues to play an important part in Somalia life. The majority of Somalis, 99 percent, are Sunni Muslims, leaving one percent Christian.⁸⁵ Historically Somalia has had a long and rich religious heritage. According to the Koran, the Prophet sent out four messengers, one of these messengers went to Harar (now on Ethiopia's border).⁸⁶ As a result Somalia has produced significant numbers of religious scholars despite its small size. Traditionally, the people of Somalia have practiced a moderate form of Islam known as Sulfi, however due to the instability and Ethiopian occupation they have become vulnerable to more extremist forms such as Salafism and Wahabism.⁸⁷ The growth in more extremist versions of Islam is changing the historical composition of Somalia and unfortunately making it suitable for extremist's movements such as AQ.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 4

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 4

⁸⁶ Thompson, *Failure of the State Rooted in History*, 2.

⁸⁷ Angela Rabasa, "Radical Islam in East Africa," RAND Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG782.pdf (accessed 01/06, 2010).

By way of summary, the social structure of Somalia illustrates a country in transition and social upheaval. The traditional peoples of Somalia were until recently agricultural, tribal and clan based. They practiced a moderate form of Islam that was tolerant of different views and peoples. However, instability caused by the collapse of the government has seen this dynamic change. More and more people are fleeing to the large cities for refuge. Furthermore, extremist's versions of Islam are on the rise, providing the necessary ingredients to feed a growing AQ supported insurgency.

STATE STRUCTURE

Many argue that Somalia is a collapsed state because it lacks a functioning central government. Nevertheless, until recently governance and conflict resolution was accomplished through the Nomad's Code, known as the Heerbegti, a clan based honour and legal code.⁸⁸ The move away from a nomadic life and into the cities has eroded even this basic form of governance which is disappointing and unfortunate.

At present Somalia is comprised of a loose grouping of commercial estates and villages separated by farm land.⁸⁹ The current trend suggests that the population is moving away from a tribal to one of business relationships that transcend tribe and clan distinctions.⁹⁰ This fact is important as it emphasizes the increasing influence of commercial entities in providing day to day governance. In the towns municipal authorities, primarily utilizing Sharia law, do what they can to provide basic law. The outsider tends to focus on the lack of a central government and fails to see these virtually

⁸⁸ Thompson, *Failure of the State Rooted in History*, 2.

⁸⁹ Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, 27.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 27

invisible mechanisms of governance at the local level.⁹¹ Somalia has never really subscribed to a central and powerful government, instead viewing such a government as a negative force creating winners and losers.

Today Somalia has a TFG headed by President Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad.⁹² As in previous governments, it is ineffectual in establishing governmental institutions in order to provide a meaningful and value added service to its citizens. There is ample evidence to suggest cracks in the TFG. For example, Members of Parliament (MPs) are reaching out to donor countries in an effort to persuade them to abandon the current government in favour of a regional approach.⁹³ Although there is likely some truth to the MPs accusations against the current government it is possible that as in all political arenas they are attempting to play politics in order to increase their regional independence. Although the motivations are not clear, there may be merits to the promotion of a regional bottom up approach vice a central government which to date has not worked.

Not all the news regarding the development of governance in Somalia is terrible. A few weeks ago the cabinet of the TFG approved a new constitution, giving more power to the people.⁹⁴ The new constitution is now on its way for Presidential approval. This represents a positive step forward for the fledging TFG of President Ahmad.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 27

⁹² "Somali MPs in Kenya Said Working on Formation of Regional Administrations," *BBC Monitoring Africa* (Dec 21, 2009), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1925601081&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=POD>.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 2

⁹⁴ "Somali Transitional Government Approves New Constitution," *BBC Monitoring Africa* (Dec 3, 2009), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1913705681&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=POD>.

Nonetheless, the viability and very survival of the TFG is intimately linked to international financial support. Perhaps as a result of the global recession, the UN has warned donors that promises of money have not yet been received, leaving the TFG vulnerable to failure.⁹⁵

At this point in the paper it is timely to introduce Somaliland, an oasis of governance amongst the anarchy. Somaliland is situated in north-western Somalia and maintains a population of approximately 3.5 million. Since declaring independence in 1991, it has for the most part been successful in establishing and maintaining a functional government.⁹⁶ In deep contrast to the rest of the country, Somaliland boasts a parliament, police force, municipal structures and has held several elections and constitutional reforms. In spite of these impressive accomplishments it has not been able to obtain international recognition, slowing its growth and economic prosperity.⁹⁷ Somaliland provides some light in the darkness, perhaps providing a foothold with which to exploit across the country.

To summarize, Somalia, with its nomadic beginnings has never really embraced the concept of a central government instead favouring local and regional affiliations based on tribal and religious codes. For the most part this system of governance has worked. However, commercial and economic influences have replaced this code of conduct. By no means is their order and civility in Somalia, however, the small break

⁹⁵ "UN Appeals for Funds to Assist Somali Government - Radio," *BBC Monitoring Africa* (Oct 29, 2009), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1888484161&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

⁹⁶ Rabasa, *Radical Islam in East Africa*, 10.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

way autonomous region known as Somaliland does provide some level of optimism that governance in Somalia is possible. At the present time the TFG of President Ahmad is extremely fragile, this coupled with a growing insurgency and lack of funding could result in a situation in which an Islamic Council like organization seizes control, necessitating international intervention. Just as important as governance, economics, the life blood of Somalia will be described in the next section.

ECONOMY

One would expect that a collapsed state plagued by famine, insecurity and lack of governance would not have a functioning economy. Even so, the Somali people are survivors and the trade of goods and services continues in the absence of a central government and financial sector. During President Barre's dictatorship the government existed to benefit Barre and his allies, not the average citizen.⁹⁸ Therefore, not unsurprisingly, the lack of a government has in some ways promoted capitalism and economic activity for the average citizen.

Somalia has little industry, instead its people are divided into nomads, farmers, fishermen and city dwellers.⁹⁹ Since the collapse of the government in 1991 economic activity has declined, with agriculture accounting for 65 percent of Somalia's GNP.¹⁰⁰ The pastoral sector, which has traditionally operated outside the formal economy, has done extremely well in recent years, due to the absence of governmental interference.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Ryan Ford, Alex Nowrasteh and Benjamin Powell, *Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos Or Improvement?* The Independent Institute;,[2006], http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:policyfile&rft_dat=xri:policyfile:article:00090362.

⁹⁹ Thompson, *Failure of the State Rooted in History*, 2.

¹⁰⁰ *Somalia*, 4.

¹⁰¹ Ford, Nowrasteh and Powell, *Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos Or Improvement?*, 7.

In contrast, urban businesses, which were historically linked to the presence of a stable central government, have suffered. Nevertheless, the commercial sector has demonstrated some resiliency, attracting foreign industries such as Dole Fruit, BBC, Coca-Cola and British Airways.¹⁰² This foreign investment would appear to indicate that the security situation and/or security provided is adequate for some foreign investment activity. However, much of the foreign investment is hampered by instability and lack of a functioning central government. For example, there are proven reserves of oil and gas in northern Somalia.¹⁰³ Unfortunately, exploration and exploitation are at a stand still as foreign companies lack confidence in the government to administer and uphold land and exploration rights.¹⁰⁴

The absence of a central bank has not stopped the creation and issuance of currency. Remarkably, the local currency provides for an unexpectedly stable monetary system.¹⁰⁵ Like many Third World nations, the Somali population is heavily reliant on the financial support provided by the Diaspora.¹⁰⁶ The Diaspora contributions account for a staggering one billion dollars or 18 percent of GNP.¹⁰⁷ The transfer of these funds

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Somalia*, 4.

¹⁰⁴ "Somaliland Economy: Petroleum-Licensing Round Expanded," *EIU Views Wire* (Nov 4, 2009), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1893480891&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁰⁵ Ford, Nowrasteh and Powell, *Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos Or Improvement?*, 22-23.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Matthew Saltmarsh, "Remittance Companies Become the Lifeblood of Somalia's Economy; for Somalia, Remittances are a Lifeline," *International Herald Tribune* Nov 13, 2009, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1900187901&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

is done through remittance companies, quickly becoming one of the largest growth industries in the country.

In summary, it is clear that by no means is Somalia a great business environment, however, some things have prospered in the lawlessness or more accurately in the absence of a repressive central government. According to Western norms the absence of a central government would cause the collapse of the economic system. In the case of Somalia, which is primarily orientated towards a pastoral economy, the lack of government has resulted in a certain level of prosperity. Even so, the presence of a central government does provide the environment to stimulate foreign investment such as oil and gas exploration. Therefore, intervention that serves to establish governance will need to prove its value in the promotion of an economy that is fair to all. People will not want to see regulation and taxation with no tangible benefits or worse negative consequences to the current “status quo”.

SUMMARY

This chapter has provided an overview of some of the critical factors that have shaped Somalia into the state we see today. Its colonial beginnings and Cold War influences all led to its disintegration and plunge into lawlessness and violence in 1991. Its people, primarily Sunni Muslims, living a pastoral, nomadic life have despite the odds done remarkably well in the harsh climate and topography of Somalia. The prolonged instability has seen the emergence of Islamic extremism in response to foreign occupation, namely by Ethiopian troops supporting the TFG. The TFG, regardless of limited success, remains grossly ineffective and for the most part irrelevant to the populace. All of these factors will play an important part in the final analysis and

resolution of the crisis. In the next chapter conditions and scenarios will be investigated that could precipitate an international intervention into Somalia. The likely scenarios are terrorism, humanitarian crisis and piracy.

CHAPTER FOUR: INTERVENTION TRIGGERS

Notwithstanding the difficulty in predicting when and where future international interventions will occur there are enough indications that are cause for concern in Somalia. This chapter will investigate three primary factors that could on their own or in combination compel the international community to take action. The evolution and global nature of terrorism in the region is one such concern. Furthermore, as was the case in the early 1990's, a devastating famine could once again generate an intervention as conditions such as drought, high food prices and violence converge to worsen an already horrific situation. Piracy, the last trigger most popularized in the press of late, has impacted the financial bottom lines of international companies that use the sea routes off the coast of Somalia for transporting valuable strategic seaborne commodities such as oil. It is understood that these triggers are not all inclusive; however they best represent the issues of direct interest to the international community. Terrorism, which would likely be a factor in any intervention, will now be explained in more detail.

TERRORISM

The subject of terrorism is difficult to define given the complexity of the al Qaeda (AQ) movement world wide. It is clear, however, that previously moderate Somalia has seen an emergence of a number of extremist organizations affiliated with AQ. Since 2001, the Western world has launched two major offensives into Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of combating terrorism, therefore the subject of terrorism in Somalia and the

wider implications are relevant and critical to this analysis. The aim of this section is to provide an overview of the terrorist threat on the ground and those that transcend the borders of Somalia, posing a direct threat to Western interests.

The post 9/11 world changed almost overnight the significance that collapsed states such as Somalia play in combating international terrorism. From obscurity, Somalia witnessed a surge in naval, air and intelligence collection.¹⁰⁸ This effort was helpful in developing a more defined assessment of the current state of Somalia with respect to terrorism.¹⁰⁹ Intelligence collection and analysis is difficult for Western countries lacking the historical and cultural knowledge of the region. It is for this reason that the U.S. has leveraged the intelligence capabilities of indigenous agencies such as the Puntland Intelligence Services (PIS) and the Somaliland National Intelligence Service (SNIS).¹¹⁰ Nonetheless, the intelligence derived from these local services must always be suspect, given clan and tribal biases. All this to say the renewed intelligence effort has provided a relatively accurate picture of the current threat posed by Islamic extremism in Somalia. A July 2004 report of the Africa policy advisory panel concluded that “the threat of terror to U.S. interests in Africa is concrete, rising and discernible. The probability of another attack on Americans on African soil is high.”¹¹¹ This threat will be further described over the next few sections.

¹⁰⁸ Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, 67.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 68-69

¹¹⁰ Crisis Group International, *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?*, [2005], http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:policyfile&rft_dat=xri:policyfile:article:00076510.

¹¹¹ Peter Kagwanji, "Counter-Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New Security Frontiers, Old Strategies," *African Security Review* 15, no. 3 (08, 2006), 10, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=22865575&site=ehost-live>.

Africa has come to be regarded as an increasingly important region, where American geopolitical interests and the potential threats to those interests are on the rise.¹¹² The foundations of many of the theories for the origins of terrorism in the region are based on the absence of a central government. For example, General William Ward, Commander Africa Command, stated “We clearly worry about the threat of violent extremists taking hold in any part of the continent where there are spaces that are under-governed or not in full control of the government.”¹¹³ More specifically, the absence an effective central government creates the conditions in which Somalia has become a safe haven for terrorists in a similar way to Afghanistan.¹¹⁴ Somalia’s unpatrolled border and thriving underground arms market make it an ideal location to plan and launch terrorist attacks against regional interests.¹¹⁵ For example, the Kenyan/Somalia border is rarely patrolled and only has two sporadically manned check points.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, Somalia is known to host one of the largest arms markets in the world, referred to as the “Bakaaraha Arms Supermarket”, in Mogadishu.¹¹⁷ This market sells large and varied quantities of weapons to serve the entire region. These examples serve to illustrate the ease with which criminals and terrorists exploit the ungoverned areas of collapsed or quasi states.

¹¹² Rabasa, *Radical Islam in East Africa*, 8.

¹¹³ RENEE MONTAGNE, "African Command Working to Counter Terrorism," *Morning Edition (NPR)*, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=n5h&AN=6XN200906241007&site=ehost-live>.

¹¹⁴ International, *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?*, 1.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Rabasa, *Radical Islam in East Africa*, 20.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

There are other factors that contribute to the emergence of Islamic extremism in Somalia. First, the region's proximity and history with the Middle East facilitates the movements of terrorist agents within and across the two regions.¹¹⁸ Second, countries in the region are either predominantly Muslim or have significant Muslim minorities.¹¹⁹ In recent years this Muslim population has been moving towards a more extreme version of Islam. Lastly, and perhaps of greatest effect, is a mix of widespread poverty, instability, violence and lawlessness coupled with a sense of marginalization have facilitated the emergence of Sharia law and fundamentalist interpretations of Islam.¹²⁰

Missionary and transnational charity organizations have played a major role in the radicalization of the population. Under the regime of President Barre these charities and organizations were strictly controlled. Since Somalia's collapse in 1991 these groups have flourished. Some, even attempting to create through political and other means an Islamic state in Somalia.¹²¹ Presently there a number of extremist Islamic missionary groups and/or charities that are succeeding in converting the traditionally moderate population to a more radical form of Islam such as Salafi or Wahabism.¹²² The influence of these groups cannot be underestimated; their success creates fertile grounds for the recruitment of jihadi soldiers into AQ's ranks.

¹¹⁸ Kagwanji, *Counter-Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New Security Frontiers, Old Strategies*, 10.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 10

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ Rabasa, *Radical Islam in East Africa*, 43.

¹²² *Ibid.*

The jihadist movement in Somalia, despite recent attention over the last several years, is not necessarily a new development. During the 1990's there was a group known as al-Itihaad al-Islami, a band of Wahhabi militants who were determined to establish an Islamic state in the country.¹²³ Fortunately, they only obtained minority and marginal support. Of more concern are the trends observed over the last several years. There is increasing evidence to suggest that historically moderate Somalis are becoming increasingly radical.¹²⁴ Since 2003, there has been a surge of new and more ruthless jihadi groups with links to AQ.¹²⁵ The link to AQ is particularly concerning due to their global objectives, resources and effective international recruiting campaign.

The radicalization of segments of the Somalia population did not occur overnight. Perhaps one of the greatest polarizing actions was initiated by the TFG in 2004.¹²⁶ The President at the time, Abdillahi Yusuf, a strong anti-Islamist, had legitimate concerns regarding the security of his Parliament in Mogadishu and appealed for the deployment of foreign troops.¹²⁷ The African Union and the international community were unable or unwilling to dispatch troops. As a result, regional actors such as Ethiopia formed their own intervention force.¹²⁸ As previously mentioned, Ethiopia and Somalia have a longstanding mistrust of each other complicated by Ethiopia being primarily Christian.

¹²³ International, *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?*

¹²⁴ Rabasa, *Radical Islam in East Africa*, 1.

¹²⁵ International, *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

The presence of Christian “occupiers” on Somalia soil assisted those radicals attempting to galvanize support for jihad.¹²⁹ This is best described by a prominent jihadi leader, Sheik Hassan Aweys, who condemned the deployment and accurately warned the TFG that Somalis would wage jihad against any foreign troops who set foot on Somali soil.¹³⁰ This point is worth further amplification. The effect of foreign troops on Somali soil not only mobilized the minority extremist segments of the population but enraged and called to action people previously considered moderates. A Somali professional remarked,

from Ethiopia's perspective it will be a war between Ethiopia and the Islamists. But for we Somalis, it is not so simple. I have to fight side by side with anyone who is fighting Ethiopia....People do not want to join the Islamists but if it comes to that, how can you refuse a coalition with them? It won't matter who chews *qaad* and who doesn't when the enemy is just over the horizon.¹³¹

By the end of 2004, after nine months of dithering, regional countries ended up not deploying anything and calls for jihad went silent.¹³² In any respect, this episode is powerful in that it demonstrated the ability of AQ to mobilize citizens of the country that would not normally participate in jihad, foreshadowing things to come.

AQ’s interest and presence in Somalia is long and well documented. AQ first appeared in 1993, during the infamous “Blackhawk down” operation. Although not actively fighting American troops in the streets of Mogadishu, it is believed that AQ was

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Ibid.*

supporting Aideed's clan with money and weapons.¹³³ Initially, AQ viewed failed Somalia as a region that was crying out for the creation of a second Afghanistan, in which Sharia law and the war against the U.S. could continue.¹³⁴ Immediately following the death of the U.S. soldiers, former President Clinton ordered the withdrawal of all troops from the country. More importantly, this withdrawal reinforced AQ perceptions that an insurgent force could defeat a superpower, pivotal in shaping future AQ campaigns.¹³⁵

In the years that followed, AQ enjoyed some success in the region. Throughout 1998 AQ operatives linked to Somalia conducted multiple attacks against western interests, resulting in 225 deaths and 4000 injuries.¹³⁶ In November 2002 AQ carried out a simultaneous, two pronged attack on Israeli interests in Mombassa, Kenya. Further, AQ operatives linked to Somalia acquired two Strela anti-aircraft missiles from the streets of Mogadishu and unsuccessfully attempted to shoot down an airliner destined for Tel Aviv.¹³⁷ On the same day, terrorists launched a complex attack involving small arms and IEDs against the Israeli frequented Paradise Hotel, killing 15 and injuring 80.¹³⁸ The attacks failed due to the poor accuracy of the missiles and training, however the planning and acquisition demonstrated a dangerous capability in the region.¹³⁹ Following both

¹³³ Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, 66.

¹³⁴ International, *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?*, 6.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

these attacks it is believed that the chief operatives and architects crossed back into Somalia.¹⁴⁰ The operations clearly demonstrate the importance of Somalia as an enabler for the conduct of regional terrorist attacks.

The importance of Somalia to AQ appears to be growing, increasingly enabled by technology. For example, using the internet during 2006 and 2007, AQ ran and operated the web magazine, “Sada al-Jihad” (Echo of Jihad), advertising its belief in the importance Africa plays in its global struggle of jihad.¹⁴¹ Additionally, AQ forums and websites promote jihad worldwide, in particular Somalia. The web initiatives attempted to inspire radicalization and provide training and other resources such as maps and guides for candidates wishing to travel to Somalia.¹⁴² Regardless of some success, there is limited evidence that Somalia may be a difficult place to operate due to its very homogenous population. Foreign AQ operatives would stand out and it would be difficult for them to operate due to language, race and cultural differences.¹⁴³ Even so, the advent of the internet and the intent of AQ to create another front of jihad in Somalia does present a growing and dangerous threat to international and regional interests. As a final passing thought on the significance of Somalia to AQ, in November 2008, CIA Director Michael Hayden named Somalia as one place where Al Qaeda leaders were

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ Rabasa, *Radical Islam in East Africa*, 2.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

working to establish new offensives.¹⁴⁴ The Somalia representative of AQ, Al Shabab will now be explored.

Al Shabab, an AQ affiliated indigenous group, has emerged as the primary franchise for AQ related activities. After the leadership of the CIC fled to Eritrea, the fighting arm of the CIC, Al Shabab, became the leading anti-TFG entity in the country.¹⁴⁵ On February 29, 2008 the United States labelled Al-Shabab a Foreign Terrorist Organization, describing it as "a violent and brutal extremist group with a number of officials affiliated to Al Qaeda."¹⁴⁶ Al Shabab is estimated to number 6000-7000, employing guerrilla style tactics against the TFG and its allies.¹⁴⁷ Many of its leaders and soldiers were trained by AQ in Afghanistan or Pakistan, making them extremely effective and dangerous.¹⁴⁸ By way of example, its now dead leader, Hashi Ayro, fought with the Taliban against the American invasion in 2001.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, speaking to his group's effectiveness, they successfully toppled the TFG and forced the withdrawal of the conventionally superior Ethiopian Army in January 2009. In the end they had gained control of most of Mogadishu, along with the provisional capital at Baidoa and much of southern Somalia.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁴ "Al-Shabab (Somalia)," *Background Information Summaries* (11/24, 2008), 1-1, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=35537579&site=ehost-live>.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ "Aden Hashi Ayro," *Background Information Summaries* (05/09, 2008), 2-2, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=31990572&site=ehost-live>.

¹⁵⁰ *Al-Shabab (Somalia)*, 1-1.

The group remains very active, planning and executing numerous suicide attacks across the country.¹⁵¹ Al Shabab in recent weeks has conducted bombings and assassinations against the TFG and its supporters, employing Iraq and Afghanistan tactics.¹⁵² For example, in June 2009 the group conducted an IED attack against AU troops, 10 people were killed.¹⁵³ The tactics employed represent a serious threat, as the group continues to import and employ tactics from other jihad fronts. This transfer of tactics could indicate the presence of AQ facilitators and strengthens fears that the group may one day have aspirations outside their regional operating areas.

There is little doubt today that the group is strongly aligned to AQ. A recent video by the leader clearly articulated the group's loyalty and intentions to support Bin Laden and the AQ inspired jihad.¹⁵⁴ At the time of writing, there does not appear to be any decline in the groups activities which to date have been primarily focused on local and regional concerns regarding foreign occupations of Somalia. However, given its stated intent and apparent alliance to AQ it is only a matter of time until the group or fringe elements of the group begin to expand their objectives to include international targets.

As illustrated, the AQ presence, primarily being exercised through Al Shabab, presents a significant regional threat. However, the transnational threat trends are of

¹⁵¹ *Aden Hashi Ayro*, 2-2.

¹⁵² Rabasa, *Radical Islam in East Africa*, 64.

¹⁵³ "Au Peacekeepers Targeted in Mogadishu," *Arabia 2000* (06/05, 2009), <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=6FI504909433&site=ehost-live>.

¹⁵⁴ "Al Shabab Video shows Allegiance to Bin Laden," *Wall Street Journal - Eastern Edition* 254, no. 70 (09/22, 2009), A13, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=44491645&site=ehost-live>.

greater relevance to the West. For all the reasons already mentioned the situation in Somalia has become a breeding ground for increased radicalization and AQ terrorist activities. Unfortunately, there is a growing body of evidence suggesting this conflict transcends borders and is having the undesirable affect of spilling over into North America.

For several years there has been sporadic reporting from law enforcement agencies identifying Westerners going to Somalia to participate in jihad. Just last summer there were numerous reports out of Minnesota, identifying 20 Somali youth who had allegedly been recruited by Al Shabab and had fought in Somalia from 2007-2009.

¹⁵⁵ Interestingly, one of the men has been identified as the first known American suicide bomber. ¹⁵⁶ Family members and law enforcement have characterized these young men as being alienated and generally not feeling as though they had a future. ¹⁵⁷ These characteristics likely facilitated their recruitment. Minnesota has the second largest concentration of Somalis outside of Somalia, numbering almost 70 000. ¹⁵⁸ In response to this growing trend, the President of Somalia visited Minneapolis in October of last year in an effort to dissuade young men from joining the ranks of Al Shabab. ¹⁵⁹ This trend it not isolated to Minnesota but is occurring throughout North America. For

¹⁵⁵ "Al-Shabab Recruiting in the United States," *Background Information Summaries* (07/16, 2009), 1-1, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=43447841&site=ehost-live>.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ James Walsh, *Somalia's President Seeks Support in Twin Cities: The War-Torn Country's Leader Will Visit the 70,000-Member Local Community as He Struggles to Keep His Government from Collapsing* Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), [2009], <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=n5h&AN=2W61147130683&site=ehost-live>.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

example, a father recently came forward because his son, a Somali American from Seattle, recently conducted a suicide attack in Somalia that killed 21 AU peacekeepers and civilians.¹⁶⁰ These examples have forced the FBI and other agencies to re-think how they investigate and forewarn domestic borne terrorist attacks.¹⁶¹

The recruitment of Somali Americans by Al Shabab raises some interesting concerns with respect to the transnational threat to North America. Although these young men are believed to be taking up arms in Somalia it is possible that they could become further radicalized by AQ and be employed against global targets. Their experience in Somalia and understanding of Western culture and practices make them extremely dangerous.

The growing transnational threat emanating from Somalia represents the most probable scenario that would result in an international intervention. Over the course of this section it has become quite evident that ungoverned areas, in particular of Muslim regions, tend to breed terrorism and serve to facilitate attacks against Western interests. Furthermore, success in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan has forced AQ to shift its efforts into the ungoverned areas of Yemen and Somalia.¹⁶²

An intervention could be expedited by an attack or failed attempt at striking North America if the attack was linked in some way to Somalia. The recent attempted attack on an airliner bound for Detroit Christmas day aptly illustrates this potential. The bomber

¹⁶⁰ Steve Miletich, *Father of Somali Refugee from Seattle Ashamed of Son's Apparent Connection to Suicide Bombing* Seattle Times, The (WA), [2009], <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=n5h&AN=2W6822449091&site=ehost-live>.

¹⁶¹ Walsh, *Somalia's President Seeks Support in Twin Cities: The War-Torn Country's Leader Will Visit the 70,000-Member Local Community as He Struggles to Keep His Government from Collapsing*

¹⁶² "Al-Qaeda Shifts into Dangerous New Territory," *The Daily Telegraph* Jan 4, 2010, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1932470071&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&ROT=309&VName=POD>.

allegedly was trained and equipped in Yemen by the local AQ group.¹⁶³ Until Christmas day most Westerners never thought about Yemen as a potential threat vector. Today the country's profile as a state harbouring terrorist has gained increased attention and awareness. In response to the incident, the U.S. government stopped just short of ordering a military operation to root out AQ in Yemen. Instead, according to U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. would fund, train and provide Special Operation Forces to mentor Yemeni security forces.¹⁶⁴ It is conceivable that if the attack had been successful the U.S. would have ordered the immediate invasion of Yemen in order to deny safe haven to AQ in a similar response to Afghanistan. Interestingly, much of the same language to describe Yemen, by people such as Secretary of State Clinton, is reminiscent of the language depicting the situation in Somalia.¹⁶⁵

Although illustrative in nature Yemen has highlighted the transnational relationship between Al Shabab and international terrorism. Soon after the Christmas day attempt Al Shabab released a statement indicating its readiness to send fighters to Yemen should the U.S. attack.¹⁶⁶ I would argue that any intervention in Somalia would also attract foreign fighters from other parts of the world in much the same way Al

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ "World News: Yemen Forces Hunt Leader of Local Al Qaeda Group," *Wall Street Journal* Jan 7, 2010, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1934293181&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁶⁵ Andrew England, "International Scrutiny of Yemen must be Sustained," *Financial Times* Jan 12, 2010, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1937895461&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁶⁶ "Somali Government Set to Move Against Rebels; Military Drive to Gain Control of Mogadishu to Begin at the End of January, PM Says," *Toronto Star* Jan 4, 2010, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1932015161&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

Shabab voiced its support for Yemen. As long as Somalia provides safe haven for terrorists and criminals the potential of a regional or international attack on Western interests continues to grow.¹⁶⁷

In summary, Somalia represents a growing terrorist threat both regionally and internationally. The population, previously moderate, has been relentlessly subjected to extremist propaganda and recruitment tactics. This radicalization has inspired individuals not previously inclined to take up the cause and join the ranks of AQ. The country itself provides ungoverned areas and a marginalized and poor population ripe for AQ propaganda and recruitment. As a result of these factors, groups affiliated and supported by AQ such as Al Shabab have grown in effectiveness and strength, significantly challenging the TFG and its allies.

As the insurgency matures there is growing evidence that Al Shabab is recruiting from the Somali Diaspora in order to increase its strength. Young men from across North American cities have been recruited to conduct attacks in Somalia. These young men will one day return to their home in the U.S. or Canada. There is a possibility they maybe recruited by AQ to conduct global attacks due to their ability to live and work in Western countries. Yemen, which shares many similarities to Somalia, demonstrated the effect an attempted attack on an U.S. bound airliner had, resulting in the mobilization of Yemeni security forces supported by U.S. money and special operation forces. It is not hard to imagine a scenario in which a successful attack on North American soil attributed to Somalia could create the conditions for an immediate military intervention. This

¹⁶⁷ International, *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?*, 18.

section has identified the factors and growing trends that could one day make this a reality. The development of a humanitarian disaster could have the same effect.

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Sadly, factors such as insecurity, violence, economic conditions, social structure, climate and terrorism are all conspiring to create a devastating humanitarian disaster. To further compound the problem, due in a large part to the global recession, traditional international donors are scaling back their contributions. The recent disaster in Haiti could reinforce this decline as donor fatigue sets in. Climatic changes are producing extremely challenging conditions with more droughts and 75 percent less rain.¹⁶⁸

Reports indicate that women and children, as in most third world countries, are being hit the hardest. According to the UN, Somalia has the worst statistics with 1 out of 5 children severely malnourished with school enrolment and immunizations the lowest in the world.¹⁶⁹ Despite a growing list of ailments it is clear that famine is another side effect of a collapsed state that is no longer capable of managing resources and protecting its citizens.¹⁷⁰ The aim of this section is to examine current conditions and factors that could trigger an international intervention based on humanitarian grounds. It must be emphasized that aside from a moral obligation there are strategic considerations when viewing the growing humanitarian crisis in Somalia. For instance, Richard Haass points

¹⁶⁸ Susan Anyangu-Amu, "Hunger: New Warning on Food Security for Horn of Africa," *Global Information Network* (Dec 31, 2009), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1930879881&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁶⁹ "UN Says Children in Somalia Making Strides Despite Humanitarian Crisis," *Voice of America News / FIND* (Dec 16, 2009), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1922465381&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁷⁰ Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, "Doing Harm by Doing Good? the International Relief Effort in Somalia," *Current History* 92, no. 574 (May, 1993), 199, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1579533&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

out that humanitarian disasters create large populations of refugees that have and can trigger regional instability and wars.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, the refugees are vulnerable to terrorists groups that can threaten regional and transnational interests. Therefore it is important to view the growing humanitarian crisis not only from one of a moral obligation but also in the context of a growing security threat to Western interests.

It is important to note current conditions are very similar to the 1993 famine that resulted in the first of a series of U.S. led UN interventions. For example, last year Somalia was at the top of Médecins Sans Frontières' (MSF) annual list of most neglected humanitarian disasters. Furthermore, over 40 non-governmental organizations issued a statement that Somalia was a disaster that could no longer be ignored.¹⁷² Similar to 1993, due to wide spread insecurity, agencies are not being permitted to distribute aid, thus any intervention would ultimately need to secure aid shipments and distribution putting itself in direct confrontation with the terrorist threat identified in the previous section. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to believe that the current state of Somalia, extremely favourable to the development of a major humanitarian disaster, could trigger an international intervention.

As a unified voice, all the non-governmental agencies operating in Somalia have been broadcasting the same ominous message. They are convinced the conditions are grave and international attention is desperately needed. Looking at the problem from a regional perspective, Oxfam estimates 23 million in the Horn of Africa are moving

¹⁷¹ Haass, *The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course*, 43.

¹⁷² R. MacDonald, "Save Somalia!" *The Lancet* 373, no. 9682 (Jun 27-Jul 3, 2009), 2184, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1769787591&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

towards disaster, the worst in over 10 years.¹⁷³ Out of the Horn of Africa Somalia has been the hardest hit due to persistent violence and instability.¹⁷⁴ It is estimated that 3.2 million Somalis now rely on food aid, a number that is two thirds higher than 2007.¹⁷⁵ These numbers, consistent amongst agencies, would appear to accurately reflect the extensive nature of the problem.

Climate change is having a devastating effect on the traditional way of life in Somalia. Droughts to rain cycles are dramatically shorter from what was a 10 year cycle to 5 and now 2-3 years.¹⁷⁶ In contrast, when not in a drought, the welcomed rains have been severe, creating dangerous and devastating floods. For example, in 1998 one million were affected by El Nino related flooding.¹⁷⁷ The effects are being seen in the important agriculture industry. UN's Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia, on September 29th estimated that this year's Gu/Karan cereal harvest would be the lowest in more than a decade, totaling 6,605 tonnes, or just 36% of the annual average over the past ten years.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷³ *Drought to Leave 23m Africans Hungry and Destitute - Oxfam* Irish Times, [2009], <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=n5h&AN=9FY3274655335&site=ehost-live>.

¹⁷⁴ "Somalia: Country Outlook," *EIU ViewsWire* (Nov 1, 2009), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1894448721&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁷⁵ "Somali Economy: Little-Known, Dispersed and Dying People," *EIU ViewsWire* (Feb 27, 2009), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1653156421&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁷⁶ "International: A Catastrophe is Looming; East Africa's Drought," *The Economist* 392, no. 8650 (Sep 26, 2009), 59, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1866100701&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁷⁷ James Ciment, "Flooding in Somalia Takes Heavy Toll," *British Medical Journal* 316, no. 7127 (Jan 24, 1998), 250, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=25874982&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁷⁸ *Somalia: Country Outlook*

The global recession has had a major impact on Somalia. First, as previously mentioned, the Somalia people rely heavily on remittances from family and friends living abroad. Over the last couple of years the remittances have significantly declined, leaving some Somalis more vulnerable to starvation.¹⁷⁹ To add insult to injury, the recession has resulted in inflated food prices and extreme volatility in the international markets. For example, since 2007 prices have almost doubled and in the case of water quadrupled, causing riots and further insecurity.¹⁸⁰ In the absence of a functioning government riots and further insecurity has resulted, raising levels of frustration amongst the populace.

For many years the Somali people have been dependent on international donations and distribution of aid by agencies such as the World Food Program (WFP). For various reasons that will be discussed in greater detail these agencies have for the most part ceased operations. Somalia, within the NGO community, has been identified as the most difficult country in the world to supply with aid, due to the situation on the ground and donor reluctance given the TFG's ineptness in dispersing the aid.¹⁸¹

In addition to a general decline of donations its greatest donor, the U.S., has withheld almost 50 million dollars, significantly impacting the flow of aid into the country.¹⁸² The U.S. donations account for more than 40 percent of the total aid entering

¹⁷⁹ "Press Conference on Humanitarian Operations in Somalia," *US Fed News Service, Including US State News* (Dec 10, 2009), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1918656581&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁸⁰ *International: A Catastrophe is Looming; East Africa's Drought*, 59.

¹⁸¹ *Somalia: Country Outlook*

¹⁸² YORK TIMES Jeffrey Gettleman NEW, "Somalis Starve as Hitch Depletes Food Help," *Age, the (Melbourne)* (10/03, 2009), 18, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=n5h&AN=SYD-5R8F4NMM4GG15Q2AFXX&site=ehost-live>.

Somalia; therefore it is not difficult to see the significance of this problem.¹⁸³ The U.S. is concerned that its money is feeding Al Shabab, these concerns, according to the UN are legitimate.¹⁸⁴ Other donors feel that the TFG is unable to reliably and legally receive and manage the aid funds entering the country. As a means to alleviate these concerns and restore confidence, the UN has appointed an international accounting firm, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, to oversee the allocation of funding.¹⁸⁵ The ability of this international accounting firm to overcome systematic corruption and re-energize donor activity is yet to be seen. The finances for the UN mission in Somalia are so bad that the 2010 budget is starting at zero, creating a deadly scenario where desperate Somalis flee and spill over into fragile neighbours.¹⁸⁶

Perhaps of greater concern is insecurity which is severely hampering relief efforts. Earlier this year, as an indication of the dangerous environment, the UN announced it was shutting down its services in Southern Somalia, affecting over one million.¹⁸⁷ This was in response to the unprecedented levels of violence directed against aid workers, with 43 killed during the last year.¹⁸⁸ For example, as late as 8 January 2010, two workers from the World Food Program were killed distributing food.¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, MSF reports that

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Somalia: Country Outlook*

¹⁸⁶ *Press Conference on Humanitarian Operations in Somalia*

¹⁸⁷ "UN Halts Food Aid in Lawless Region," *Winnipeg Free Press* Jan 6, 2010, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1933591251&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ "Somalia Economy: Humanitarian Crisis Deepens," *EIU ViewsWire* (Feb 2, 2009), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1653159591&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

efforts to bring medical care have been stopped due to shelling, explosions and open combat.¹⁹⁰ The current state of affairs for aid agencies was best summarized by WFP spokesman Peter Smerdon in Nairobi. He states, "But there's a moment that comes when the risks involved are too high. Rising threats and attacks on humanitarian operations, as well as the imposition of a string of unacceptable demands, have made it virtually impossible."¹⁹¹ This statement reflects the frustration experienced by aid agencies attempting to ameliorate the situation.

The primary group targeting the aid workers is Al Shabab. In recent weeks Al Shabab has over run and looted a number of UN food compounds in southern Somalia.¹⁹² In addition to the violence, the group is yielding unreasonable pressures on UN aid, such as no women allowed and the paying of protection money.¹⁹³ For instance last year Al Shabab demanded that all aid agencies pay a registration fee of 20 000 dollars twice per year.¹⁹⁴ In a country that is starving it is difficult to understand Al Shabab's motives in creating such an inhospitable environment for relief efforts. A recent press release from Al Shabab identifies the aid agencies as foreign spies who are acting in concert with

¹⁹⁰ W. Wakabi, "Fighting and Drought Worsen Somalia's Humanitarian Crisis," *The Lancet* 374, no. 9695 (Sep 26-Oct 2, 2009), 1051, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1869121391&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁹¹ Daniel Howden AFRICA CORRESPONDENT, "Starvation Looms as UN Suspends Somalia Food Aid," *The Independent* Jan 6, 2010, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1933459361&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁹² M. O. J. O. N. Jean-Marc, "UN Suspends Food Relief in Somalia; Attacks, Extortion from Rebels Halt Operation," *The Gazette* Jan 6, 2010, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1936602891&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁹³ C. O. W. E. L. L. Alan, "United Nations Cuts Food Aid to South Somalia," *International Herald Tribune* Jan 6, 2010, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1933268821&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁹⁴ Jean-Marc, *UN Suspends Food Relief in Somalia; Attacks, Extortion from Rebels Halt Operation*, A.14.

regional and international forces to take over the country.¹⁹⁵ More accurately, Al Shabab is using the aid or forced famine as a means to control and influence the population.¹⁹⁶ This influence has been increasing throughout the country and in particular southern Somalia, resulting in agencies no longer being able to hire and employ local security for fear they have been compromised by Al Shabab.¹⁹⁷ Recently, there have been some overtures from anti-governmental groups such as Al Shabab supporting aid shipments into their controlled areas.¹⁹⁸ The motives and sincerity are suspect. For the time being the insecurity in the country, primarily as a result of the efforts by Al Shabab, will continue to severely impede the flow of aid.

Up until now the prognosis for Somalia has been very bleak, however over the last several years there has been some success. Efforts by a number of agencies have been highly successful in reducing the instance of deadly diseases such as malaria by simply issuing insecticide sprayed insect netting.¹⁹⁹ Perhaps more impressive, Somalia has been polio free since 2007.²⁰⁰ Additionally, development efforts have successfully created infrastructure to secure clean drinking water for two million of the population.²⁰¹ All these efforts have increased the quality of life for a small segment of the population.

¹⁹⁵ CORRESPONDENT, *Starvation Looms as UN Suspends Somalia Food Aid*, 20.

¹⁹⁶ *International: A Catastrophe is Looming; East Africa's Drought*, 59.

¹⁹⁷ *Somali Economy: Little-Known, Dispersed and Dying People*

¹⁹⁸ "Somali Islamist Group Welcomes Aid Agencies in Areas Under its Control," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile* (Jan 6, 2010), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1933996001&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁹⁹ *UN Says Children in Somalia Making Strides Despite Humanitarian Crisis*

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

These initiatives demonstrate what can be accomplished with donor money and international will. Oxfam's deputy director, Jeremy Loveless, best summarizes the situation, "More must be done to invest in helping these communities cope with the dry years - through long-term rural development and investing in national agriculture. But in the short term lives are at stake and emergency aid is needed now".²⁰² Unfortunately much of this progress is or will be reversed due the aforementioned conditions that are serving to impede international aid efforts.

The current conditions in Somalia alone will not trigger an international response despite liberalist calls for action. In order to stimulate international mobilization the media plays a critical role. In the absence of media coverage, for all intents and purposes, a humanitarian crisis is not heard or seen by the public.²⁰³ In Op RESTORE HOPE, the U.S. led humanitarian operation in 1993; it was the aid agencies through the media that exerted incredible political pressure that ultimately led to the U.S. decision to deploy troops.²⁰⁴

In most parts of the world, in particular Somalia, aid agencies exert a tremendous influence on the media.²⁰⁵ Critics claim that biased Western journalists are hosted by Western based aid agencies and never solicit news from the local population instead

²⁰² Katharine Houreld, "Horn of Africa Drought Brings Hunger, Poverty; War-Torn Somalia Suffering through 6th Failed Rainy Season," *Toronto Star* Dec 18, 2009, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1923601911&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁰³ C. Orwin, "Humanitarian Military Intervention: Wars for the End of History?" *Social Philosophy & Policy* 23, no. 1 (Winter, 2006), 207, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1011709391&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁰⁴ de Waal and Omaar, *Doing Harm by Doing Good? the International Relief Effort in Somalia*, 1.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 200

taking all their cues from their agency hosts.²⁰⁶ Aside from these criticisms it is clear that media reports do reach a wide international audience. One such example of this effect was the New York Times picture that showed a young Sudan girl struggling to climb a hill to a feeding station as a vulture sat in waiting. The photograph was extremely effective in generating aid and donations whether or not it accurately represented the situation on the ground.²⁰⁷ In addition to the CNN effect, YouTube and social networking sites permit the instantaneous broadcast of news from the field which can be a powerful tool in raising international awareness. A significant media blitz could expedite and pressure elected officials into international action.

In summary, it is clear that destructive factors are contributing to the inevitable humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Since 2008 there have been many proclaiming that Somalia is on the cusp of a major famine that would rival 1993. Each week the situation appears to be worsening, further aggravated by Al Shabab's efforts to stop food aid. Given current operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and now Haiti it would take a significant humanitarian disaster to trigger an intervention. Despite the grave assessment, without an effective media campaign that once again raises the profile of Somalia, the growing humanitarian crisis is unlikely to garner the interest of the Western world. However, aside from the moral obligations an emergent humanitarian crisis does contribute to the growing security threat to Western interests. Given the trends described in this section it appears that Somalia is moving towards a climax that will compel the international community to react.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 201

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 201

PIRACY

Over the last few years piracy off the Horn of Africa, specifically along the Somali coastline, has grabbed the headlines. In essence, the sea dimension is just another representation of the failed state and lawlessness that has come to symbolize Somalia. Its impact for the moment has been financial and therefore more damaging to the international community.

Unlike other parts in the world where pirates operate, Somalia due to lawlessness provides an ideal sanctuary to plan and execute operations, making the problem significantly more complex. Unfortunately, Somalia provides an ideal base of operations for pirates because of its remoteness and vast 3000 mile coastline, coupled with the lack of a Somali or regional navy to administer to the security of the Gulf of Aden.²⁰⁸ As evidence, the UN Secretary General has assessed that in many cases the pirates possess more capabilities and resources than the TFG.²⁰⁹

The act of piracy is not a new phenomenon. Today it continues to pose a threat to international marine traffic around the world. Yet it is important to put the Somali piracy problem in to context. In 2007, almost half of the world's piracy was occurring in African waters, mainly near Somalia.²¹⁰ Furthermore, the numbers of attacks off the coast of Somalia have doubled in 2008 and at this time represent 40 percent of all piracy activities worldwide.²¹¹ These statistics clearly demonstrate the magnitude of the

²⁰⁸ "Somalia Politics: A Long War of the Waters," *EIU ViewsWire* (Jan 9, 2010), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1937603621&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁰⁹ Lauren Ploch and others, *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa* (Washington,DC: Congressional Research Service,[2009]), www.crs.gov (accessed 20 January 2010).

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

problem. The U.S. National Maritime Security Strategy, issued in 2005, emphasized the importance with, “safety and economic security of the United States depends on the secure use of the world’s oceans” and “well organized and well equipped” pirates threaten international security.²¹² In the next few paragraphs this section will outline the impacts, description of the pirates, current actions and possible scenarios that could result in an international intervention. The impacts to marine traffic in the region will now be outlined.

The importance of the Gulf of Aden to the flow of international seaborne economic activity and its crucial role as a transit zone for ships passing in or out of the Red Sea cannot be overstated. For example, each year 21 000 commercial vessels transit through the Gulf of Aden and this number continues to grow annually.²¹³ Perhaps more important is the financial and resource implications for the traffic. When it comes to oil the traffic in this part of the world represents ten percent of the total waterborne oil shipments.²¹⁴ In 2006, the U.S. Department of Energy estimated that 3.3 million barrels of oil pass through the area daily.

Due to the significance and quantity of economic activity it is not surprising that piracy has had a global financial impact. To illustrate this point it is estimated that due to damage, ransoms, insurance rate increases, modifications to ships and route diversions

²¹² *Ibid.*

²¹³ Jay James Carafano, Richard Weitz and Martin Edwin Andersen, *Maritime Security Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond* (Washington,DC: The Heritage Foundation,[2009]), www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/sr0059.cfm (accessed 20 January 2010).

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

the cost is somewhere between 1 and 16 billion dollars per year.²¹⁵ As a case in point an operator wishing to avoid the Somali coast must take the longer and safer route adding 2700 miles or in financial terms an annual fuel cost to the tanker of 3.5 million dollars.²¹⁶ The costs, considerable on their own, are further exaggerated by the global recession that is impacting marine operators worldwide. It is easy to understand why the issue of piracy is garnering so much attention from the international community. Aside from the economic impact it is important to understand the motivations and capabilities of the pirates. Sometimes the why and how of what they do is important in determining the appropriate response.

On the surface the pirate's actions appear motivated purely by economic drivers as a means to escape poverty. However, the issue is more complex and multi-dimensional. At the moment there are several groups of pirates, numbering around 1000 strong.²¹⁷ Yet some estimate that their numbers are going to swell with 2500 pirates in training.²¹⁸ They, not unlike other segments of the Somali population, are organized along clan lines based in distinct geographical regions of the shore line with varying capabilities and intents, making a generalized response difficult.²¹⁹ It is important to understand the evolution and conditions that motivate the pirates to continue the attacks.

²¹⁵ Ploch and others, *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*, 10.

²¹⁶ Carafano, Weitz and Andersen, *Maritime Security Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond*, 8.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹⁸ Patrick Lennox, "Contemporary Piracy Off the Horn of Africa," *Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute* (2008), 11, <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Contemporary%20Piracy%20off%20the%20Horn%20of%20Africa.pdf> (accessed 29 January 2010).

²¹⁹ Ploch and others, *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*, 5.

According to a group of experts, led by UN Special Representative to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the reasons are simple and represent some of the factors examined in this essay thus far such as poverty, climate change, insecurity and illegal international fishing.²²⁰

Astonishingly, the piracy activity appears to have started as a grass roots response by disenfranchised fishermen to combat illegal fishing and environmental infractions off the Somali coastline. The fishermen, observing the death of their traditional fishing grounds, decided to take action and began patrolling the waters in make shift boats. The Somali Prime Minister estimates that up to 220 ships are currently fishing illegally.²²¹ Furthermore, a recent UK report backs up this claim, estimating that Somalia lost 100 million dollars between 2003-2004 from its Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) due to illegal tuna and shrimp fishing.²²² Perhaps more disturbing is the growing body of evidence that indicates that international actors are using Somalia to dispose of nuclear, lead, heavy metals and biological waste.²²³ Both the illegal fishing and the environmental exploitation appear to have been the catalyst that initially led the fishermen to take action on the high seas. It would, however, be naïve to believe these are the only reasons. Today, despite noble beginnings, piracy is strictly motivated by economics. For example, in the small coastal town of Eyl, a major pirate base, local

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ M. Ikken, "The Reasons Behind Piracy," *New African*, no. 486 (Jul, 2009), 34, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1796256281&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²²² Ploch and others, *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*, 7.

²²³ Carafano, Weitz and Andersen, *Maritime Security Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond*, 9.

media reports indicate that the town is booming due to the proceeds, mainly ransom profits, amounting to almost 30 million per year.²²⁴

Now that we have a better appreciation of the motives of the pirates it is important to understand their capabilities. Analysts have noted that capabilities and tactics are becoming more sophisticated as the proceeds from ransoms continue to grow. The pirates typically use small arms such as AK-47s and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) to overpower the unarmed merchant ships. Additionally, small boats launched from a mothership have enabled the pirates to launch attacks at extreme distances from the coastline, allowing them to avoid naval patrols, monitor and survey for additional targets.²²⁵ Technological developments have enabled the pirates to operate more effectively with GPS and mobile long range communications, permitting coordinated attacks.²²⁶ As a testament to their impressive capabilities, the Greek owned freighter, Navios Appollon, was captured on December 28th, fully 370 km (200 nautical miles) east of the Seychelles, which is more than 1,300 km from Somalia.²²⁷ These improved capabilities and tactics have served to frustrate the efforts of Naval counter-piracy operations. The pirates are able to mobilize and capture a ship in 15-30 minutes, outpacing the ability of on going international maritime patrols to intercept them.²²⁸

²²⁴ "Somalia Economy: Incidents of Piracy on the Rise," *EIU ViewsWire* (Nov 5, 2008), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1605865081&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²²⁵ Ploch and others, *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*, 7-8.

²²⁶ C. Joyner, "Navigating Troubled Waters: Somalia, Piracy, and Maritime Terrorism," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 10, no. 2 (Summer, 2009), 85, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1881115341&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²²⁷ *Somalia Politics: A Long War of the Waters*

²²⁸ Ploch and others, *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*, 8.

It is important to address the transnational nature of the piracy problem. It is widely believed that the pirates are supported by a network of Somali businessmen and international criminal organizations that provide operational essential financing, supplies and intelligence.²²⁹ It is clear that any solution will need to address this transnational support link.

As with the on going situation in Somalia with respect to terrorism and humanitarian triggers, piracy has not resulted in an international intervention on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan. At the moment there are a number of countries that are participating alone or in international coalitions, attempting to tackle the sea dimension through the use of navy war ships. The situation, despite being an annoyance has not really escalated to the point of an international ground intervention. The next few paragraphs will outline some potential flashpoints that could mobilize the international community to intervene ashore.

The U.S. takes great lengths throughout the world to safeguard its citizens. The attacks of 9/11 are a recent example of what the United States can do in response to an attack against its citizens. To date the pirate attacks have not resulted in many casualties with the main effort being reserved for the acquisition of ransoms. Nonetheless, recent trends provide a disturbing and potentially dangerous situation.

On 8 April 2009, the U.S. MV Maersk Alabama was hijacked off the coast of Somalia. Vermont resident, Captain Richard Phillips, was taken hostage. In response the U.S. dispatched the war ship U.S.S. Bainbridge embarked with Special Forces and FBI

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

agents.²³⁰ Following failed attempts at negotiation U.S. snipers from the Navy ship killed the pirates and rescued the captain.²³¹ To date most pirate attacks have not resulted in casualties, however this pivotal action by U.S. snipers may have changed this dynamic.

In response to the killings, the leader of the pirate group vowed revenge and emphasized his intent to hunt down and kill U.S. citizens.²³² The status quo in the pirate-victim arrangement would appear to have been violated. Moreover, fears of escalation are increasing as more and more merchant ships are hiring private security and arming themselves.²³³ Additionally, the rules of engagement for participating navies is slowly becoming more aggressive, resulting in the deaths of pirates on a few occasions.²³⁴ The scenario involving the MV Maersk Alabama provides an important example of a pirate scenario involving U.S. citizens that resulted in a lethal demonstration of military action. Should the pirates escalate their attacks on U.S. shipping, resulting in the deaths of U.S. citizens, it is quite plausible that the international community would intervene in a more robust way to include a ground intervention.

As mentioned in the previous section, humanitarian conditions are being aggravated due to the violence and lawlessness that has to date resulted in the cessation of aid programs. Piracy is but one of many factors that is adversely affecting the flow of humanitarian goods into the country. Much of the food aid destined for Somalia enters

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ Lennox, *Contemporary Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*, 12.

through the port in Kenya.²³⁵ The WFP has reported that the cost of shipping aid via the sea has increased due to piracy, resulting in the reduction of shipments.²³⁶ In fact, to emphasize the impact, 80 percent of all food entering Somalia is shipped by sea; half has been lost to piracy.²³⁷ This scenario clearly illustrates the linkages between the current and growing humanitarian problem and piracy. Therefore, the reduction in food aid deliveries via the sea and the resulting humanitarian problem could provide the necessary motivations for an international intervention.

Many Somalia analysts have been attempting to determine the linkage between AQ and the pirates. To date this link remains illusive. Nevertheless, such a link if proven correct could present the pirates in an entirely different light, under the mandate of the War on Terror. There is a fear that if and when such a link were to occur the monies and equipment acquired by the pirates could be used to support AQ operations in the region to include Iraq and Afghanistan. This potential is particularly dangerous given the types of cargo recently held for ransom in Somalia. For example, the hijacking of the MV Faina in February 2009 resulted in the pirates obtaining a military cargo ship containing T-72 tanks and large quantities of ammunition and small arms.²³⁸ This cargo, if placed in the hands of AQ operatives, could have been used in the construction of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) or in support of AQ operations worldwide. Thankfully, the hijacking ended peacefully with the payment of a 3.2 million dollar

²³⁵ Ploch and others, *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*, 12.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ "Somalia Economy: Piracy Threatens Deliveries of Humanitarian Aid," *EIU ViewsWire* (Jul 31, 2007), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1367984861&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²³⁸ Ploch and others, *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*, 9.

ransom.²³⁹ Nevertheless, the hijacking of the MV Faina made many countries take notice of the potential risk.

Aside from the debate there is little evidence at this time to suggest that Al Shabab and the pirates are working together. In fact, Al Shabab in previous years has opposed piracy as an offence under Sharia law.²⁴⁰ On the other hand, reports suggesting a link continue to surface with some regularity. For example, there was some sporadic reporting indicating that pirates were assisting AQ in transporting foreign fighters, in particular the terrorists that took part in the 2009 Yemen attack.²⁴¹ A scenario that paints a picture of AQ controlling the country to include the economically and strategically important sea lanes of the Gulf of Aden would be too much for the international community to ignore, necessitating an intervention on a scale similar to Iraq and Afghanistan.²⁴²

Piracy has resulted in a number of international initiatives aimed at reducing the economic impact on merchant ships. The April attack on the MV Maersk Alabama resulted in a re-energized U.S. government calling for a more robust anti-piracy policy.²⁴³ As a direct result the U.S. chaired an April 23 donor conference in which 250 million dollars was raised to support the UN mission and TFG plans to build police and security

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

²⁴² R. Spencer, "Will Jihadist Pirates Now Strike at U.S.?" *Human Events* 65, no. 14 (Apr 20, 2009), 11, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1689709491&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁴³ Ploch and others, *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*, 2.

forces.²⁴⁴ Despite this money the effects at sea are not evident and likely won't be for some time.

The UN has attempted to curb the growth of piracy by passing a number of consecutive Security Council resolutions authorizing third parties to conduct anti-piracy operations with the approval and coordination of the TFG.²⁴⁵ As a result there have been a number of NATO, Chinese, Russian and Indian missions aimed at escorting relief aid.²⁴⁶ For the most part these efforts have not been well coordinated.²⁴⁷ Furthermore, the nature of these operations has been defensive vice addressing the root problems ashore.²⁴⁸ This ineffectiveness was recently demonstrated by the statistics, indicating that the number of hijackings has gone up from 32 in 2008 to 42 in 2009.²⁴⁹

These naval operations are unfortunately confounded by international law related to the detainment of pirates. In general, legal authority under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provide that all nations must cooperate to the fullest in combating piracy.²⁵⁰ Nonetheless,

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁷ Carafano, Weitz and Andersen, *Maritime Security Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond*, 17.

²⁴⁸ Lennox, *Contemporary Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*, 12.

²⁴⁹ "International: A Long War of the Waters; Somalia's Pirates," *The Economist* 394, no. 8664 (Jan 9, 2010), 47, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1935351541&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁵⁰ Carafano, Weitz and Andersen, *Maritime Security Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond*, 11.

the issue of captured pirates continues to paralyze naval operations.²⁵¹ To date, as a work around, some countries are handing off pirate detainees to Kenyan courts. This option is not ideal given deficiencies in the Kenyan justice system. In response international actors are attempting to strengthen the courts, in the meantime many of the pirates are simply let go.²⁵² The impediment to effective counter-piracy operations is so great that the UN Security Council has this as a topic on its agenda.²⁵³ This legal shortcoming is creating significant problems and will need to be resolved if current and future interventions are to be successful.

In summary, the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia is symptomatic of a greater problem ashore. The lawlessness, violence, poverty and international exploitation are all causal effects that have resulted in the current situation at sea. Fishermen angered and mobilized by the destruction of their fishing grounds attempted to patrol their waters. The origins of piracy have evolved to a more criminal venture fuelled by the extreme poverty and transnational actors that support the operation. Pirates are well equipped and positioned to conduct swift and efficient attacks. So far pirate activities have been financially motivated resulting in few casualties; however this dynamic may be changing. First, the escalating violence could see the targeting of U.S. citizens, demanding a more lethal response. Second, there is growing concern of an AQ-Pirate link that has spawned

²⁵¹ MIKE CORDER, "Commander of EU Naval Flotilla in Gulf of Aden Says War on Somali Pirates is Not Over," the *Canadian Press*, (Sept , 2009).
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=n5h&AN=MYO094715097109&site=ehost-live>.

²⁵² M. Fink and R. Galvin, "Combating Pirates Off the Coast of Somalia: Current Legal Challenges," *Netherlands International Law Review* 56, no. 3 (Dec, 2009), 367,
<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1921007371&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁵³ Allan Woods, "Navy's Piracy Mission Troubled; Ottawa Infighting and Lack of Vital Supplies Hindered Operation Off Somalia, Report Says," *Toronto Star* Jan 9, 2010,
<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1935817341&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

fears of dangerous cargo falling into the hands of terrorists. At the same time the pirates are choking off the critical flow of food aid, serving to worsen the growing humanitarian crisis. It is clear that any lasting solution will need to attend to the ashore problems, chiefly the lack of an effectively functioning government.

Somalia continues to represent a security threat as a result of terrorism, growing humanitarian crisis and piracy. Unfortunately, declining international will to intervene as a result of the global recession and on going missions in Afghanistan and Iraq will further constrain any preventative measures that could serve to sidestep the requirement for a massive intervention. These factors and their impact on any future interventions in Somalia will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: INTERVENTION FATIGUE

Despite the growing threat, the legacies of Afghanistan and Iraq will likely limit interventions into Somalia. Perhaps the world has transitioned from the post-Cold War liberalist period to a more realist appreciation of the pitfalls associated with the long and dangerous interventions that have come to symbolize the post Cold War era. The aim of this chapter is to provide an assessment of the international community's willingness to intervene in Somalia. The world is interconnected, boundaries have dissolved and distant collapsed states do affect the security of the global village.²⁵⁴ The international community has taken some minimal steps to contain the symptoms of collapse states such as Somalia. However, the appetite for a sustained engagement does not seem likely in the near future, unless like Afghanistan, collapsed states become a significant transnational threat. Somalia is building towards this eventuality.

²⁵⁴ Orwin, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: Wars for the End of History?*, 217.

At present the international community appears to be taking a “wait and see approach” to Somalia in lieu of preventative measures. Despite the growing security threat there is little or no international policy debate demanding Western intervention. Regional actors, primarily Kenya, intimately linked to the spill over of instability from Somalia have in recent years called for a more robust Western intervention.²⁵⁵ Surprisingly, in a recent interview, the Somalia President did not demand U.S. military intervention; instead he recognized its value in strengthening the institutions of governance in Somalia.²⁵⁶ It would appear that the U.S. Government has for the moment ruled out the deployment of U.S. troops in its place favouring a policy of providing expertise and resource support to the TFG through other regional actors.²⁵⁷ Due to a number of factors the prospects for an international intervention are unlikely until the situation deteriorates to such a degree that a massive intervention is necessary in order to counter a direct threat to Western interests. The next few paragraphs will provide the substantiation to this assertion.

At the current time there is much debate about the merits of continuing the long and arduous mission in Afghanistan. These debates, besides serving to embolden the Taliban, are clear examples of the reluctance of the international community to take on dangerous and difficult future interventions. At a recent conference in London, attended

²⁵⁵ "Kenyan President Appeals for International Intervention in Somalia," *BBC Monitoring Africa* (Sep 24, 2008), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1560637501&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁵⁶ "A Talk with Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed," *Asharq Alawsat* 18 March 2010, <http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=20278> (accessed 20 March 2010).

²⁵⁷ "US Threatens Action Against Eritrea," *Western Mail* Aug 7, 2009, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1821536601&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

by major Afghanistan stakeholders, the theme revolved around ways to end the conflict. Participants openly discussed exit strategies that would involve paying the Taliban to surrender.²⁵⁸ Exit plans were contingent on handing over security to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) beginning at the end of 2010 in less volatile provinces. The rest of the country would be handed over in 5-10 years. Despite being overly optimistic on the readiness of the ANSF to assume control of the country these discussions clearly highlighted the desperation of Western nations to exit the conflict. The politicians attending the conference were simply representing their constituent's impatience and fleeting support.

As the largest contributor to the Afghanistan mission and potential contributor to future interventions around the world, President Obama has telegraphed his intentions in recent speeches. Following almost 90 days of study President Obama decided to surge in 30 000 additional troops with clear intent to begin withdrawal in 2011.²⁵⁹ His articulation of a time phased withdrawal clearly represents U.S. impatience and unwillingness to continue in a protracted war that in addition to the human cost is extremely expensive. Given that the U.S. represents the majority troop contributor to the mission it is not surprising to see other nations discussing exit plans as witnessed during the recent London conference.

²⁵⁸ S. T. R. I. N. G. E. R. David and L. E. E. Matthew, "International Allies Seek to Map Eventual Exit from Afghanistan at London War Conference," *The Canadian Press* (Jan 28, 2010), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1949155121&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁵⁹ J. Kelly Jr, "Obama's Afghanistan," *United States Naval Institute.Proceedings* 136, no. 1 (Jan, 2010), 8, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1939286551&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

The realities of the global recession are having a profound geopolitical impact on foreign policy.²⁶⁰ To further aggravate the situation, many countries such as the United States are suffering serious fiscal imbalances, serving to constrain national security spending.²⁶¹ For example, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) will require 24 percent more funding due to the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.²⁶² To put this into context, DoD spending has already increased by 45 percent over the last decade.²⁶³ The U.S. deficit is estimated to soar above the trillion dollar mark this year.²⁶⁴ Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the high cost of waging a counterinsurgency. It is not unreasonable to believe that future interventions will be viewed with an economic lens, thereby constraining actions.

The post 9/11 world has seen the spread of Islamic based terrorism to states such as Yemen and Somalia. It is reasonable to assume that any intervention into Somalia would see Western forces engage in a counterinsurgency campaign. In fact the TFG and African Union troops in Somalia are currently fighting an insurgency that is becoming increasingly like Afghanistan. By their very nature counterinsurgencies are extremely long, complex and demand commitment from the populace. As previously discussed in this chapter public will and support is a valuable and disappearing commodity.

²⁶⁰ N. Ferguson, "The Axis of Upheaval," *Foreign Policy*, no. 171 (Mar/Apr, 2009), 56, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1664744751&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁶¹ Jeffrey P. Bialos and others, *Ideas for America's Future: Core Elements of a New National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008), 43.

²⁶² Ionut C. Popescu, "Bridging the Strategy-Resource Gap: Defense Planning in a Time of Crisis," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i53/17.pdf (accessed 12/12, 2009).

²⁶³ "The Future of U.S. Military Power," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 6 (Nov/Dec, 2009), 5, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1887894931&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁶⁴ Ferguson, *The Axis of Upheaval*, 56.

First, it is important to define the counterinsurgency approach to warfare. It is warfare designed to divide a civilian population's allegiance away from a guerrilla force, using minimal amounts of violence.²⁶⁵ Historically, militaries have fought frequent counterinsurgencies such as the Boer War, Vietnam and now Iraq and Afghanistan.²⁶⁶ Despite not being a new concept, British General, Sir Rupert Smith, claims that we have transitioned from the wars of the industrial age to a war amongst the people i.e. non-state and asymmetric.²⁶⁷ It would seem that counterinsurgency warfare is here to stay.

Without talking specifically about Somalia there is currently significant debate on whether these are the types of wars we have the stamina to win. The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide of 2009, clearly states that counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns are costly, long and always more difficult than anticipated. Furthermore, counterinsurgency strategy, to be successful, does require as a basic function nation building. Some argue that there are limitations on the ability of militaries and governments to reshape other people's societies.²⁶⁸ Ho Chi Minh, during the Vietnam War, best summarizes this challenge with "they will kill many of us. We will kill a few of them but they will tire of it first".²⁶⁹ Does the international community have the appetite

²⁶⁵ Spencer Ackerman, "The Colonels and 'the Matrix'," Washington Independent, <http://washingtonindependent.com/2067/the-colonels-and-the-matrix> (accessed 12/09, 2009).

²⁶⁶ Rob de Wijk, "The Limits of Military Power," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment* (Guilford, Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2001), 505-507.

²⁶⁷ Michael Goodspeed, "Canada and New Paradigms of War," Canadian Military Journal, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no1/16-goodspeed-eng.asp> (accessed 12/12, 2009).

²⁶⁸ Gian P. Gentile, "Let's Build an Army to Win all Wars," Joint Forces Quarterly, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/8.pdf (accessed 12/12, 2009).

²⁶⁹ Robert Scales, "The Past and Present as Prologue: Future Warfare through the Lens of Contemporary Conflicts," Center for a New American Security, http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Future_Warfare.pdf (accessed 12/09, 2009).

for a long war involving significant casualties on both sides? Given recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq the answer would appear to be no.

Counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq have taken their toll on the U.S. military. Some have described the Army as being broken.²⁷⁰ Any future military interventions will require boots on the ground; these same boots are already being pushed to the limits in Afghanistan and Iraq.²⁷¹ Military units are only given short recovery times between missions, adversely impacting personnel retention. These factors are not unique to the U.S. military. NATO countries such as Canada are also experiencing the effects of waging a counterinsurgency campaign. Military interventions of the future will require fresh, well equipped troops. Afghanistan and Iraq would appear to be depleting this critical resource.

Donald Rumsfeld, in the days leading up to the Afghanistan invasion, argued that nation building was too costly and unnecessary, insisting that dislodging and disrupting terrorist infrastructure would suffice.²⁷² This approach, although not in fashion at the time, could take on renewed importance given limitations on will and commitment to conduct costly nation building. Unfortunately, the root causes of terrorism in places like Somalia are attributed to the side effects of collapsed states. Hence any effective long term solution would need to re-build the institutions of governance.

²⁷⁰ S. Saideman, "Après Moi Le Déluge: US Interventions After Bush," *International Journal* 64, no. 1 (Winter, 2008), 186-187, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1806855211&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁷¹ Orwin, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: Wars for the End of History?*, 213.

²⁷² Saideman, *Après Moi Le Déluge: US Interventions After Bush*, 185.

Nonetheless, a lack of will does not necessarily mean complete inaction in world conflicts. Today many collapsed and collapsing states such as Sudan (Darfur) and Somalia are being handled through outsourcing. The U.S. and other Western nations are conducting proxy interventions, assigning them to the United Nations, African Union and/or regional forces.²⁷³ Unfortunately, as the intervener of first response, the UN has historically been unable to deliver effective results.²⁷⁴ It must be remembered that blaming the UN for failures such as Rwanda, Zaire and Darfur is really misplaced. The UN is only as good as the members that comprise it. Often, despite UN resolutions authorizing military intervention, the UN is not provided the resources and it therefore is incapable of action.²⁷⁵

It is not difficult to find contemporary examples of outsourcing. For example, as already described in previous chapters, the U.S. supported Ethiopian troops in pushing the Islamists out of Mogadishu and reinstalling the TFG in 2008. This outsourcing, albeit cheaper for the U.S., had an unattended second order effect of creating extremists out of moderates given Ethiopia's historic rivalry with Somalia.²⁷⁶ Furthermore, the U.S. continues to support the ineffective government, routinely providing arms to the TFG

²⁷³ Sean M. Maloney, "How can Somalia really be Fixed?" *Maclean's* 120, no. 3 (Jan 29, 2007), 22, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1205825191&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁷⁴ Orwin, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: Wars for the End of History?*, 215.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 215

²⁷⁶ "International: Continuing to Fail; Somalia," *The Economist* 388, no. 8587 (Jul 5, 2008), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1507068321&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

military.²⁷⁷ Outsourcing is just another indicator of the West's lack of will to commit to complex and dangerous interventions.

In addition to Afghanistan the current situation in Darfur provides an interesting case study that serves to provide a caricature of the international community's willingness to take on interventions in collapsing or collapsed states. Without getting into the specifics of the conflict, the Sudan government is waging genocide against a civilian population in Darfur that is allegedly supporting a non-Arab rebel group.²⁷⁸ At last count hundreds of thousands have died, 2.5 million are displaced and another 4.2 million are in danger.²⁷⁹ In response the UN Security Council authorized resolution 1769 in July 2007, permitting a peace support operation.²⁸⁰ Not surprisingly the mission was outsourced to the African Union (AU). By all accounts the AU troops lack the equipment, force structure and experience to effectively carry out the mission.²⁸¹ International support has been limited to resources and some technical assistance.

Thus far the international response has failed to meet the needs of Darfur despite public rhetoric regarding "right to protect" conventions and policies. Instead, in the spirit of outsourcing, the AU has been left with the mission. President Obama recently

²⁷⁷ "USA Reportedly Plans to Send Additional Arms to Somali Government," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile* (Jul 31, 2009), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1810932731&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁷⁸ E. Reeves, "Failure to Protect: International Response to Darfur Genocide," *Harvard International Review* 29, no. 4 (Winter, 2008), 84, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1444992851&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁸¹ D. Black and P. Williams, "Darfur's Challenge to International Society," *Behind the Headlines* 65, no. 6 (Dec, 2008), 15, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1707523151&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

appointed a special envoy to Sudan, J.Scott Gration, a close friend.²⁸² A re-energized strategy to resolve this crisis would be welcomed by the Darfur people.²⁸³ However, the allocation of assets to Darfur would further stretch scarce resources, making any intervention in Somalia more difficult and perhaps more unlikely.

In summary, it is clear that numerous factors are aligning to change the geopolitical landscape with respect to international interventions into collapsed and collapsing states. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have changed the way in which the international community measures the cost to benefits of conducting future interventions. Due to the high cost of these on going conflicts the public has become impatient and weary of counterinsurgency warfare. The global recession has meant that defence budgets are on the decline as country's attempt to reduce ballooning deficits. In response, as a means to do it "on the cheap", western powers have discovered outsourcing. Unfortunately outsourcing, usually done by less experienced and equipped forces, has proven ineffective and some could argue irresponsible. In any respect, taking a wait and see approach to the growing threat could necessitate the need for a less than desirable massive intervention similar to Afghanistan.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

Not unlike the other major conflicts around the world Somalia is extremely complex and multi-faceted. It is by definition a collapsed state in that it is no longer capable of providing security to its people. The social contract, trading freedom for

²⁸² Orwin, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: Wars for the End of History?*, 214.

²⁸³ J. Prendergast and C. Thomas-Jensen, "Sudan: A State on the Brink?" *Current History* 108, no. 718 (May, 2009), 208, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1706809011&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

protection, has been breached. Somalia did not arrive at its current destination overnight; instead its descent into anarchy has its roots in history. Its colonial masters artificially drew boundaries, separating the nation of Somalia into five parts. The Somalia people, primarily a nomadic, clan based nation never really accepted these colonial boundaries. As a result conflict followed, chiefly with its historical rival Ethiopia. This rivalry was exploited during the Cold War by the superpowers in an effort to counter each others influence and expansion in Africa. Unfortunately, the authoritative regime of President Barre flourished with USSR and US support. All of this ended with the Cold War. Barre's regime, without the support of the superpowers fell, plunging Somalia into anarchy.

During the early 1990's Somalia suffered insecurity, violence and famine. A number of UN sanctioned interventions, as a result of famine, failed to bring any lasting stability. In the interim years leading to the events of 9/11 Somalia continued to fester and for the most part remained outside the consciousness of the international community. The failed state of Afghanistan, the launching pad for 9/11, changed the way in which the world looked at ungoverned areas of failed or failing states. It did not take long for the intelligence community to recognize the threats posed by Somalia. A re-energized intelligence effort quickly identified the emergence of AQ like groups recruiting and flourishing inside Somalia.

Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, specifically Somalia, has been evolving since the early 1990s. Somalia, a predominately moderate Muslim state, has slowly been seduced into a more extremist form of Islam. At the same time the lack of government and its strategic location have provided AQ an ideal place to plan, recruit and acquire weapons.

In recent years Al Shabab has emerged as the principal AQ proxy group waging an Afghanistan like insurgency against the interim government and African Union troops. More troublesome is the increasingly transnational character of the threat. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies are more and more observing young U.S.-Somali men recruited and deployed to Somalia to wage jihad. These men are being further radicalized and potentially recruited to conduct attacks world wide. A scenario, reminiscent of the Yemeni Christmas day bomber is within the realm of the possible. Should a major attack be conducted in the U.S., clearly linked to Somalia, it is not hard to envision an intervention similar to Afghanistan.

Somalia, unfortunately, suffers a great deal from famine. Besides the obvious causes due to climate change and geography, the lack of governance continues to aggravate the situation. At the current time most agencies have suspended food aid due to insecurity. Aid shipments and bases are under continual attack. Aid workers are being killed routinely by Al Shabab and other criminal organizations. At the same time Somalia is experiencing its 6th consecutive drought. The UN estimates that the situation is just as bad as the famine in 1993, with 3.5 million in desperate need of food. Despite these dire predictions the international community has not yet taken action. A massive intervention similar to Op RESTORE HOPE could be triggered if the situation worsens and the media takes an interest. The CNN effect could bring renewed interest and political pressure for action. However, given the insecurity any humanitarian mission would need to have boots on the ground to provide vital security. The operation, although altruistic and in the spirit of good will, would no doubt have to engage in

counterinsurgency operations. Nonetheless, the developing humanitarian crisis could trigger a massive intervention in the near future.

Lastly, piracy off the coast of Somalia has garnered the most international attention over the last few years. The piracy problem has at its root the lack of a credible and effective government. Its origins can be traced to disgruntled fishermen who witnessed the destruction of their fishing grounds by illegal EU fishing boats. At the same time other ships were dumping toxic waste and polluting the waters. The fishermen, in the absence of any Somalia coast guard, began to patrol the waters. It didn't take long for them to realize that more money could be derived from piracy.

The Gulf of Aden is a strategically important waterway for the seaborne transport of commodities such as oil. Piracy has had an immense financial impact on shipping companies. As a result the international community has, under the auspices of the UN, undertaken counter-piracy operations. Despite these operations the frequency of attacks continues to grow. The naval missions are uncoordinated and suffer from legal ambiguities related to the detention of the pirates. Some recent high profile cases have highlighted the potential for the triggering of an international land based intervention. The escalation of violence and possible links to AQ has made the international community extremely nervous.

This essay has provided the background and identified a number of growing security threats that could result in the need for an international military intervention. However, the requirement for intervention does not necessarily mean that the world will react. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have painfully demonstrated the complexity and cost of conducting counterinsurgency campaigns. The will to continue these

conflicts, further reinforced by the global recession and combat fatigue, has meant that the international appetite for future military interventions would only occur in extremis or direct threat scenarios.

In conclusion, there is great consensus that Somalia is a collapsed state and this lack of governance is the root cause of its maladies. Any lasting solution will require boots on the ground and a holistic whole of government approach to rebuild the institutions of governance. Even so, terrorism, humanitarian crisis and piracy, that at the time of writing are growing, present an increasing international security threat. This threat cannot be ignored, however, geopolitical realities will shape the time and way the international community will react to Somalia. The purpose of this essay has been to identify and describe these growing security concerns in an effort to bring awareness so that some preventative actions can be taken to avert a massive and dangerous future intervention. Afghanistan has taught us that ignorance and avoidance are not prudent courses of action in today's global village.

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