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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
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MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE POLITICS OF FAILURE –  
A COMMAND ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS OF  
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL ROMÉO DALLAIRE AND UNAMIR**

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>CHAPTER ONE: WHAT HAPPENED IN RWANDA?</b> .....	<b>6</b>
Introduction .....	6
The History of Rwanda and the Path to the Genocide .....	7
The United Nations and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR).....	11
The United Nations Secretariat and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).....	16
The Complex Environment of Rwanda.....	19
Command, Commanders and Mission Success.....	21
Who is Roméo Dallaire? .....	28
Canada’s Contribution to UNAMIR .....	30
Conclusion.....	32
<b>CHAPTER TWO: CAR MODEL OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT</b> .....	<b>33</b>
Introduction .....	33
The CAR Model .....	33
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Model.....	37
Competency Factor Overview and Assessment .....	38
Intellectual Competency .....	39
Emotional Competency .....	42
Interpersonal Competency .....	43
Physical Competency .....	47
Competency Assessment .....	47
Authority Factor Overview and Assessment.....	47
Legal Authority.....	48
Personal Authority.....	51
Authority Assessment.....	52
Responsibility Factor Overview and Assessment .....	52

Extrinsic Responsibility.....	53
Intrinsic Responsibility.....	55
Responsibility Assessment.....	56
CAR Model Command Analysis Result.....	56
<b>CHAPTER THREE: THE PATHWAYS TO MISFORTUNE.....</b>	<b>59</b>
Introduction.....	59
Analysing Military Failure and Command.....	60
Mapping Military Misfortune.....	63
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Model.....	64
Lines of Operation Overview.....	66
Matrix of Failure - UN and UNAMIR Overview.....	72
Political Line of Operation – Matrix of Failure Analysis.....	77
Military Line of Operation – Matrix of Failure Analysis.....	90
Cohen and Gooch Layered Analysis Result.....	96
<b>CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>97</b>
Introduction.....	97
How do the Results of the Models Compare?.....	98
Conclusion.....	104
Where to from here?.....	105
<b>APPENDIX 1.....</b>	<b>107</b>
<b>APPENDIX 2.....</b>	<b>109</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>112</b>
Figure 1 - The Clausewitzian Trinity.....	20
Figure 2 - The Complex Environment of UNAMIR.....	21
Figure 3 - CAR Model Structure and Overview.....	36
Figure 4 - The Balanced Command Envelope (BCE).....	37
Figure 5 - LGen Roméo Dallaire - CAR Model Assessment.....	58
Figure 6 - Matrix of Failure - United Nations and UNAMIR.....	76

## ABSTRACT

Rwanda was a country in turmoil for many decades before the events of 1994 and possessed a long and turbulent history marred by political instability, civil wars and ethnic strife. Attempts at peace, including the 1993 peace agreement, proved ineffective and broken. During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, approximately 800,000 Rwandans were killed. These killings were conducted in broad daylight under the watchful eyes of an international peacekeeping force.

This paper focuses on two main questions: if a mission such as UNAMIR fails, does this automatically imply a failure by the commander? Should a commander be held solely responsible for failures that happen under his command? This paper aims to answer these questions by conducting a detailed examination of what happened in Rwanda and the organizations or people who had defining roles. It will then conduct command analyses using two academically rigorous models, the Pigeau-McCann Competency-Authority-Responsibility (CAR) and the Cohen and Gooch Layered Analysis models. Through the use of these models, this paper will demonstrate that this mission failure was not the exclusive responsibility of the military commander. In addition, the results will demonstrate that no military commander could have succeeded under the conditions that existed within UNAMIR. Finally, based on the politics of failure, this paper will demonstrate that UNAMIR was destined for failure.

## INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

The systematic slaughter of men, women and children which took place over the course of about 100 days between April and July of 1994 will forever be remembered as one of the most abhorrent events of the twentieth century. Rwandans killing Rwandans . . .<sup>2</sup>

Rwanda was a country in turmoil for many decades before the events of 1994 and possessed a long and turbulent history marred by political instability, civil wars and ethnic strife. Attempts at peace, including the 1993 peace agreement, proved ineffective and broken. During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, approximately 800,000 Rwandans were killed.<sup>3</sup> Astoundingly, this equates to over five lives terminated every minute. In addition to the 800,000 who were brutally slaughtered, millions were displaced.

These killings were conducted neither under the veil of secrecy nor the cover of darkness. Rather, they were conducted in broad daylight under the watchful eyes of an international peacekeeping force. Without a doubt, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was a failure. Peace was not maintained and many would argue that it never existed. The international community abandoned its

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<sup>1</sup> LCdr T. D. Richard, "Unfulfilled Responsibilities – The Command Environment for Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire and UNAMIR" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Joint Command and Staff Programme Command Paper, 2009) – This Canadian Forces College Paper was produced by the author of this current paper. It was used extensively in this paper.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda," <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/8614428.04336548.html>; Internet; accessed 28 November 09, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Phil Clark, "Hero, Failure or Casualty? A Peacekeeper's Experience of Genocide," <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=261>; Internet; accessed 12 November 2009.

commitments and the Rwandan victims were not protected in their time of crisis. But it is not enough to simply say that the mission failed. Who or what was to blame? For Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, the UNAMIR Force Commander, his time and experiences in Rwanda have forever changed his life.

The pain of killing yourself is nothing compared to the pain of living with this. I was the commander, my mission failed and hundreds of thousands of people died . . . I can't find any solace in statements like I did my best. A commander can't use that as a reference, in any operation. He succeeds or he fails, and then he stands by to be accused of and to be held accountable for. And my mission failed.<sup>4</sup>

Following these tragic events, LGen Dallaire openly and repeatedly accepted personal responsibility for this mission's failures. In this regard, Dallaire stood alone. Until 1999, he was the only one publicly to be so forthright and critical of his own (perceived) personal failings. The international community, to the contrary, was less up-front and timely in their admissions of failure or recognition of their involvement. It was only with the release of the *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda* of 1999 (5 years post-genocide) where this began to change. The report was detailed and offered broad criticism to individuals and organizations within the UN. As acknowledged by the United Nations Secretary General in 1999 —The world chose to ignore the genocide and eventually proved unwilling to stop

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<sup>4</sup> Public Broadcasting System. "Ghosts of Rwanda: Frontline Interview with General Romeo Dallaire," <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/dallaire.html>; Internet; accessed 7 Dec 2009.



the genocide once it began.”<sup>5</sup> But interestingly, there have been few who were implicated and who have come forward to publicly accept responsibility for their failings in the genocide response. In fact, as will be noted later in this paper, the events did little to hamper career advancement within the UN organizational system.

At the 10 year Memorial Conference on the Rwandan Genocide, the United Nations Secretary General (who it should be noted was one of the implicated and promoted) further criticized and provoked discussions relating to the international efforts in Rwanda. He questioned the Security Council’s authority, the effectiveness of peacekeeping, and the resolve of the international community at large.<sup>6</sup> But were these just words spoken to appease a still damaged country and its people? Or was he genuine in his remarks in the hope of seeing effective change to prevent further such atrocities? Mr. Bill Graham, the Foreign Affairs Minister for Canada and Canada’s Head of Delegation at the conference, acknowledged that –although it [the international community] had learned what needed to be done, [it] still lacked political agreement to prevent a Rwanda from happening again”<sup>7</sup>

But if it is truly the desire to prevent another Rwanda from happening, then is it enough to be non-specific in laying blame or responsibility for the failures experienced in

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<sup>5</sup> United Nations. —Statement of the Secretary-General on receiving the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.” [http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sgsm\\_rwanda.htm](http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sgsm_rwanda.htm); Internet; accessed 28 November 2009.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, —Memorial Conference on Rwanda Genocide Considers Ways to Ensure More Effective International Response in Future.” <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/afr868.doc.htm>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2010.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations, *Memorial Conference*.

1994? As stated rhetorically by authors Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, “if no one can be blamed, everyone must be at fault”.<sup>8</sup> Perhaps these statements surrounding the painful events of 1994 could stem —...the starting point for a foundation of reconciliation”.<sup>9</sup> But is it enough to simply blame the full institution for the failures and be done with it? Or were the statements offered by the Secretary General aimed to deflect responsibility for the failures? Acknowledging an institutional failure is an important step towards explaining such failures in collective, vice individual, terms. But the analysis must go further, much further, to truly understand the circumstances and factors which contributed to the failures. Through the use of academically rigorous models, this paper will demonstrate that this mission failure was not the exclusive responsibility of the military commander and will determine where the key failings were.

This analysis will be completed by first conducting a detailed examination of what happened in Rwanda and the organizations or people who had defining roles. It will then include an analysis of the concepts of command and mission success. This analysis will facilitate the completion of the command analyses which constitute the later part of this paper. The command analyses will be conducted through the detailed use of the Pigeau-McCann Competency-Authority-Responsibility (CAR) and the Cohen and Gooch Layered Analysis models. The paper will conclude with a detailed comparative analysis

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<sup>8</sup> Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 14.

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, —UNWhitaker Report on Genocide, 1985”  
<http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/whitaker/section4.htm>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2010.

of the results and provide final commentary towards LGen Dallaire and the command environment within which he was forced to operate as the UNAMIR Force Commander.

## CHAPTER ONE: WHAT HAPPENED IN RWANDA?

### Introduction

For what is Rwanda...but an underdeveloped, stunningly poor, post-colonial backwater, a lilliput of a state somewhere \_out there', so obscure and so far outside the main thoroughfares of commerce that few Westerners before 1994 could have placed it on a cognitive map, let alone an actual map.<sup>10</sup>

This statement is credited to but one author. But perhaps, more than any other statement could do, it conveys how the world viewed Rwanda. Was Rwanda of any strategic value to any of the world's leading nations? Did the events within the borders of Rwanda matter to nations separated by oceans and continents? Was Rwanda just another African problem? Looking back on the international community's dreadfully poor response to the events in Rwanda, it provides a very sad commentary on both the international will to help and on Rwanda's place as a nation-state within the twentieth century international system of nation-states.

This chapter will take the important step of setting the stage for the remainder of the paper by providing a detailed examination of what happened in Rwanda. This will include a detailed historical political analysis of Rwanda, an examination of the United Nations Secretariat, the UNAMIR mission and the complex environment within Rwanda. It will then include an analysis of what it means to command with an examination of

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<sup>10</sup> Mark Levene, —Connecting Threads: Rwanda, the Holocaust, and the Pattern of Contemporary Genocide.” in *The Genocide Studies Reader*, ed. Samuel Totten and Paul R. Bartrop, 258 – 284 (New York: Routledge., 2009), 260.

command analysis and mission success, concluding with an overview of the UNAMIR Force Commander, LGen Roméo Dallaire.<sup>11</sup>

### **The History of Rwanda and the Path to the Genocide**

Genocide, what Winston Churchill once termed as the “...crime without a name”,<sup>12</sup> is the gravest of violations of human rights<sup>13</sup>. It was the horrific slaughter of millions of Jews during the Nazi Holocaust in Europe that served as the impetus for the 1948 *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. Through the unanimous adoption of this convention on 9 December 1948, the world laid notice that such events were “...a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world.”<sup>14</sup> But the Holocaust and Rwandan genocide do not stand alone as the only twentieth century instances of genocide. According to the 1985 United Nations Whitaker Report on Genocide, a report sanctioned to assist the UN in understanding how to prevent genocide, there were eight other instances cited as qualifying under the genocide definition.<sup>15</sup> Of significance for

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<sup>11</sup> Since the focus of the command analysis is UNAMIR while under the command of LGen Romeo Dallaire, this paper will only focus on UNAMIR up to the point of his departure in August 1994.

<sup>12</sup> Prevent Genocide International, “A Crime Without a Name,” <http://www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/crimewithoutaname.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 April 2010.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations, *Whitaker Report*.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations, *Genocide Convention*.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations, *Whitaker Report*.

this paper, the report makes specific mention of the Tutsi massacres of Hutus in Burundi in 1965 and 1972.<sup>16</sup>

As noted in the Journal of Humanitarian Assistance archives,<sup>17</sup> a review of the historical background to Rwanda will not lead to a few isolated reasons for the 1994 genocide. It postulates that the events were the result of a —.cumulation of events of the past, with one factor forming a building block for the next, and all actors and factors interrelating and interacting.”<sup>18</sup>

As mentioned, Rwanda was a country marred by political instability, civil wars and ethnic strife. The country was occupied by two main groups, the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority, that struggled for power since Rwanda was awarded to Belgium by the League of Nations after World War I. But it was under this colonial rule that the ethnic divide was introduced and rigidly enforced through privilege and oppression.

The Belgians groomed the minority Tutsi population as the ruling class in order to enforce harsh colonial order against the Hutus. However, in 1962, Rwanda became an independent nation which coincided with a Hutu revolution and their assumption of power.<sup>19</sup> As an independent Rwanda, it unfortunately remained a polarized ethnic state

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<sup>16</sup> United Nations, *Whitaker Report*.

<sup>17</sup> Reliefweb, “Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (Rwanda),” <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/nordic/book5/pb025c.html>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2010.

<sup>18</sup> Reliefweb, *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*.

<sup>19</sup> Adam Lebor, *Complicity with Evil* (Virginia: Yale University Press, 2006), 165-166.

with the majority (Hutus) now in charge. For over three decades, throughout the period of 1962 to the 1990s, the minority Tutsis were the subject of “systematic political violence”<sup>20</sup> in Rwanda to allow the Hutu to maintain power. Near the end of these many turbulent years, Rwandan Tutsis who fled to neighbouring countries and were exiled by the government formed a rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). It was the RPF that launched an incursion into their home country in 1990, provoking a civil war that lasted in excess of three years, until the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in August 1993.

The 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement was the result of a cease-fire arrangement that aimed to end the civil war, and lay to rest the decades of ethnic clashes and bad governance. As a part of the arrangement, it was agreed that previously exiled Rwandans had the right of return to their home country. It was also agreed that Rwanda would institute a power sharing arrangement. It would become a multi-party state, empowered through ethnic and political power sharing notably between the Tutsi RPF and the ruling Hutu party, le Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MRND). This power sharing was to be achieved through the integration of the armed forces of the opposition groups and through a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) in anticipation of general elections and a democratically elected government.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Public Broadcasting System. “Ghosts of Rwanda: Frontline Interview Philip Gourevitch,” <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/gourevitch.html>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2009.

<sup>21</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 8.

However, as will be discussed, the Arusha Peace Agreement did very little to put an end to the political and ethnic violence. From the perspective of the MRND, according to author Philip Gourevitch —.the threat of peace was even greater than the threat of war”<sup>22</sup> because it would have amounted to a defeat of the self-serving military dictatorship of President Habyarimana and to the ideology of the Hutu extremists. It was under the face of losing total control of the government, through the mandated power sharing arrangement, that the Hutu-led government had established militias called the Interahamwe which continued their escalating persecutions of Tutsis. With increasing frequency, the government radio station incited hate messages and promoted anti-Tutsi propaganda. The agreed upon mandated government power sharing arrangement between the warring factions never came into existence, even after a UN peacekeeping force became involved. There were clear signs even in 1993 that there was never any true intention for the agreed upon peace to become a reality.

The historical causes of Rwanda’s —polarized ethnicity”<sup>23</sup> are not easily defined. Divides within the nation cannot be attributed exclusively to ethnic differences or specific events during or since the colonial period. Rather, it has been suggested that it is a —.product of a long and conflict-ridden process, in which many factors contribute to the

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<sup>22</sup> Public Broadcasting System. —Ghosts of Rwanda: Frontline Interview Philip Gourevitch,” <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/gourevitch.html>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2009. In the aftermath of the genocide, Gourevitch spent over nine months in Rwanda trying to understand how this extraordinary crime had come to pass, how it was organized, how the Western powers had stood by and watched it happen, and how Rwandans are living with this legacy.

<sup>23</sup> Reliefweb, *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*.



total picture.”<sup>24</sup> But all of the evidence supports the hypothesis that a political manipulation of ethnicity<sup>25</sup> played a contributing role to the events surrounding and including the 1994 genocide.

### **The United Nations and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)**

The Arusha Peace Agreement was an agreement to share powers and create much-needed political stability and security in Rwanda. For the first time in decades, peace appeared as an option. However, peace was not going to happen without assistance, as both parties to the agreement formally invited the United Nations to supervise the implementation of the peace process. Thus, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was born.

Just after the signing of the peace agreement, it was necessary to gain a more complete awareness of the situation in Rwanda. For this purpose, LGen Dallaire and a small team completed a reconnaissance mission. He was charged to conduct the necessary political and military analysis to make recommendations for the establishment of the UNAMIR. This initial effort, however, experienced some challenges which will be addressed later.

UNAMIR was a United Nations Chapter VI peacekeeping mission, established with the unanimous adoption of resolution 872 (1993) on 5 October 1993. Chapter VI

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

missions are permitted in accordance with Chapter VI – Pacific Settlement of Disputes – of the United Nations Charter. The goal of a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission is to assist parties in attaining and maintaining peace through the use of diplomacy (negotiation and mediation) but without the use of force.<sup>26</sup> The response to such missions will likely include a military observer force but may also include, but is not limited to, diplomatic, developmental and economic dimensions. Today, the UN engages in a more structured process called Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). This process aims to —. . . contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin”.<sup>27</sup>

The focus of UNAMIR was on political stability and security. Specifically, it was mandated to: contribute to the security of Kigali within a weapons-secure area (KWSA); monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government’s mandate; assist with mine clearance; investigate instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement; monitor the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons; assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities and relief operations; and investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the

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<sup>26</sup> Public Broadcasting System. “Ghosts of Rwanda: Frontline Interview with General Romeo Dallaire,” <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/dallaire.html>; Internet; accessed 7 Dec 2009.

<sup>27</sup> United Nations, —United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Resource Centre,” <http://www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php>; Internet; accessed 19 April 2010.

gendarmerie and police.<sup>28</sup> Subsequent Security Council resolutions (all of which are summarized in appendix 1) were passed in the months leading up to the start of the genocide until its conclusion in August 1994. These resolutions were intended to raise concerns for the events that were unfolding in Rwanda. Their additional purpose was to enhance, or degrade, to varying degrees, the mandate and expectations of the UN force.

In the fall of 1993, as the Peace Agreement was still in its infancy, some would suggest that it was also on its deathbed. Those with first-hand knowledge of the region at that time raised the alarm bells to identify that Rwanda remained on the brink of instability and that the peace agreement was tremendously fragile. It was stated that a peaceful solution to the troubles within Rwanda were only —. .vaguely in sight in the country”.<sup>29</sup> Just after the Arusha Peace Agreement was signed, the Ndiaye report<sup>30</sup> cast significant doubt on the prospects for peace, political stability and human security unless specific and timely measures were taken by the UN and the international community. Sadly, its measures were never taken. In an eerie sense of foreshadowing, the report even cautioned that —The international community cannot remain indifferent”.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> United Nations, —Security Council Resolutions – 872(1993),” <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.html>; Internet; accessed 9 April 2010.

<sup>29</sup> Willium.com, —The History of a Verified Genocide,” <http://www.willium.com/articles/information16nov1996/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2010.

<sup>30</sup> Prevent Genocide International, —Ndiaye Report - Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and other Dependent Countries and Territories,” <http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/ndiaye1993.htm>; Internet; 19 March 2010.

<sup>31</sup> Prevent Genocide International, *Ndiaye Report*.

For a mission to achieve success, it needs to have a clear definition and understanding of its task (the mandate) and it needs the resources to achieve these tasks. However, mandate and resources became a central defining issue for the UNAMIR mission and its leadership.

It became clear very early in the mission that there were gaps in the scope and more importantly in the interpretation and application of the mission's mandate. As noted in the *Independent Inquiry*, the planning process in the establishment of the mission was inadequate.<sup>32</sup> It did not adequately recognize the political realities and tensions within Rwanda based on first-hand feedback and other UN reports that highlighted the fragility of the operating environment. The UN was overly optimistic that the peace process would be successful, so much so that they did not have a back-up plan in case the peace process failed. In essence, the UN had adopted hope as a course of action. Even as the security situation became further volatile, there were insufficient measures taken to adjust the mandate for fear of breaching its neutrality,<sup>33</sup> a desire to remain "excessively neutral".<sup>34</sup> There were also inadequacies related to the interpretation of UNAMIR's responsibilities and freedom of action in regards to the KWSA, its ability to seize weapons, and ability to conduct deterrent operations of any sort. All of these factors support the position that the mandate was inadequate to contribute to mission success.

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<sup>32</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 31.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>34</sup> Adam Lebor, *Complicity with Evil*, 256.

From the very beginning of the mission, UNAMIR equally suffered from a lack of resources. The August 1993 reconnaissance mission estimated that a force of 4500 soldiers would be required to fulfill its mandate.<sup>35</sup> The United States had pushed for a “symbolic presence”<sup>36</sup> of just 100 soldiers. France countered by a larger, but wholly inadequate recommendation of 1000 troops. In the end, just over 2500 troops were authorized for UNAMIR.

Unfortunately, the troops that were deployed as part of UNAMIR were hindered by a “dire logistical situation”.<sup>37</sup> The troops from contributing nations were woefully equipped and the mission lacked the most basic supplies such as water, food, ammunition, and fuel. LGen Dallaire highlighted their inadequate logistical status.

...more than 70% of [his] time...was dedicated to an administrative battle with the UN’s somewhat constipated logistic and administrative structure, a structure on which the mission and the force was totally dependent.<sup>38</sup>

It became clear quite early that the mission was operating in a “pull” system<sup>39</sup>, where resources were not offered but rather had to be fought for bit by bit.

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<sup>35</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 32.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>38</sup> Roméo Dallaire, “The End of Innocence: Rwanda 1994,” in *Hard Choices*, ed. Jonathan Moore, 71-86 (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 73.

<sup>39</sup> Richard Cobbold, “Interview with Roméo Dallaire,” *RUSI Journal* Vol 150, Iss 5 (Oct 2005): 8; <http://proquest.umi.com>; Internet; accessed 13 December 2009.

By adopting UNSCR 872 (1993), the UN took the right first step to achieving its end state of peace and security in accordance with the Arusha Peace Agreement. However, there was an insufficient mandate and an extreme reluctance to make it more robust. The initial request for a large troop contribution was not satisfied. Logistical support for the mission was woefully inadequate from the beginning to the very end. Any reasonable person could come to the same conclusion as that of the *Independent Inquiry* – that the mission mandate, force structure and political/social environment were not aligned which played a significant role in the events of 1994.

### **The United Nations Secretariat and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)**

UNAMIR staff did not operate in isolation. In fact, they functioned under the direction of the United Nations Secretariat. The Secretariat is the “principle organ” of the UN.<sup>40</sup> In accordance with the UN Charter, the Secretariat is comprised of “Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require”.<sup>41</sup>

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), as the principle agent of the Secretariat for peacekeeping missions, operates as a bridge between the bureaucracy and political environment of UN Headquarters and the missions operating throughout the world. But it is recognized that they exist within a complex political operating environment. The Secretariat’s standing at the nexus of competing and conflicting

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<sup>40</sup> Thant Myint-U and Amy Scott, *The UN Secretariat – A Brief History (1945-2006)*. New York: International Peace Academy, 2007. Amy Scott, *The UN Secretariat – A Brief History*, vii.

<sup>41</sup> Myint-U and Scott, *The UN Secretariat* . . . , x.

international agendas can often be the content as well as the context of its work.”<sup>42</sup> As suggested in *The UN Secretariat – A Brief History (1945-2006)*, the Secretariat often operates across multiple interfaces with competing agendas in areas such as being a parliamentary check for the UN General Assembly, advising the UN Security Council, serving executive functions and finally the Secretary General’s vital roles in conflict mediation and as a global agenda setter.<sup>43</sup> From these tasks, it is indisputable that the United Nations possesses an immense responsibility and has a wide global reach.

But its effectiveness and ability to achieve its objectives, thus the wishes of its members, has been impacted to various degrees by its organizational and functional changes that have been instituted throughout the years. Changes to the structure or functions within the Secretariat have been a frequent occurrence, necessitated by political direction, changes in leadership from the Secretary General or fiscal constraints or restrictions. According to *The UN Secretariat – A Brief History (1945-2006)*, there was also a sense that Secretariat reform is — .a Sisyphean<sup>44</sup> task, endlessly repeated with often little awareness of how things have come to be the way they are”.<sup>45</sup> It has also been stated that the reforms often suffered from —a lack of urgency”.<sup>46</sup> When Boutros Boutros-

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<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, x.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, x.

<sup>44</sup> Sisyphean = incessantly recurring or futile.

<sup>45</sup> Myint-U and Scott, *The UN Secretariat*. . . , ix.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, foreword.

Ghali became Secretary-General in 1992, he continued on the trend of Secretariat changes but he did it with a greater urgency than was the norm. In a short two months, he made significant changes that had a direct impact on UNAMIR (and other missions for that matter). The old office for Special Political Affairs was turned into the new DPKO.<sup>47</sup> The logistical support functions for peacekeeping previously housed within the Department of Management were also brought into the increasingly full hands of the DPKO. All other political offices were brought together to form the new Department of Political Affairs. However, *The UN Secretariat – A Brief History (1945-2006)* acknowledges that there was little clarity on the respective roles of DPA and DPKO.<sup>48</sup> The line of “DPA was political. . .DPKO was operational”<sup>49</sup> remained a blurry one. Although committed to Secretariat streamlining while improving effectiveness during a period of near fiscal catastrophe, the reforms unfortunately did little to streamline decision-making.<sup>50</sup>

*The UN Secretariat – A Brief History (1945-2006)* highlights other areas where the Secretariat impacts UN missions. It describes the variability in the authority or influence of the Secretary General, depending on his relationship with the five permanent

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<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.



members of the Security Council (the P5).<sup>51</sup> Constant or widespread changes in the organizational structure of departments within the Secretariat have resulted in departments that have often been overworked and understaffed with shifting and ambiguous responsibilities. During the period of UNAMIR's mission, this symbolizes DPKO's work environment. In the years surrounding the UNAMIR mission, there was a significant growth in peacekeeping operations worldwide. Unfortunately, there was no such increase in DPKO staffing to allow it to effectively manage this growth.

The Secretariat changes (designed to increase effectiveness and efficiency) were perhaps too significant and too quick such that the resulting staffs were ill-equipped to fulfill their own responsibilities. Combined, these played a significant role in Rwanda, a role that will be further analyzed later in this paper as the responsibilities and actions of each appropriate levels of the UN organization are explored.

### **The Complex Environment of Rwanda**

Despite any differences between UNAMIR and the DPKO, there was one great commonality. Both operated in very complex environments. The Clausewitzian Trinity<sup>52</sup>, shown in figure 1, generally illustrates the interdependencies and complexities of the competing elements which exist in operational environments such as in Rwanda. To fulfill its mandate, UNAMIR staff was responsible for working with the Rwandan *government* to achieve significant political milestones. It was responsible for working

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<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 118.

<sup>52</sup> Clausewitz.com, —Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TRININTR.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 April 2010.

within Rwandan *society* and with its people. It maintained a military force necessary to assist in achieving further objectives and to interact with the Rwandan *military* components. Despite the academically rigorous debate that may exist on Clausewitz's intent for the Trinity and its constituent elements, it clearly supports the assertion that missions such as UNAMIR could not be myopic in their approach. Competing, yet interdependent, elements such as those presented in figure 1 were present. These complex interdependent elements each required an appropriate level of emphasis. An over-emphasis in any one would have meant neglect, or failure, in dealing with one or both of the other interrelated elements. Such was the general operating environment of UNAMIR.




Figure 1 - The Clausewitzian Trinity

Source: <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/>

More specifically, UNAMIR and DPKO staff did not have to deal with just government - society - military as three finely packaged and discreet (albeit interrelated) elements. Each of these factors was comprised of many constituent elements. As the UNAMIR force Commander, LGen Dallaire found himself to be at the hub of these many competing elements, as illustrated in figure 2. Some would argue that perhaps it should not have been just him at the hub in the early stages of the mission. However, regardless

of the factors that lead to that result, it became the reality. This figure is not to imply that LGen Dallaire was solely responsible for interacting with each of these elements. It is to imply that all of these factors were at play within UNAMIR's operating environment and represented a standing pressure throughout the period of the Rwandan genocide.




Figure 2 - The Complex Environment of UNAMIR

### **Command, Commanders and Mission Success**

In reflecting on the UN and UNAMIR, it can be viewed that these entities are a hybrid mix of civilian-military, bureaucrats and diplomats, managers and leaders (both military and civilian) and one military commander. Each faction played a role in the events surrounding the Rwandan genocide. As detailed, this paper will be analysing the failure of UNAMIR and will highlight where the key failings were and the role of the

military commander. But before delving into this analysis, this objective can only be met if there is a common understanding of command and what can define military success or failure. Does a UN Secretariat official command or manage? What are the limits of his authority?

Command is a term that is often misrepresented and misunderstood. The NATO Allied Joint Doctrine defines command as

. . . the authority vested in an individual . . . to direct, coordinate or control armed forces. It can be described as the process by which a commander impresses his/her will and intentions on subordinates to achieve particular objectives.<sup>53</sup>

But many erroneously believe that command is synonymous to management and leadership. There are numerous academic and military documents which attempt to provide distinction between the three. Dr. Al Okros, in his draft paper titled *Leadership in the Canadian Military Context*, proposed —. command is the ability to initiate action; management is the authority to amend action; and leadership is the capacity to influence action.”<sup>54</sup> Each has distinct definitions and boundaries. But there remains an interrelationship amongst the three and a complement of each is required to achieve operational success in missions such as UNAMIR.

But it must be clear that there is an absolute distinction between command in the context of the civilian and military environment. As highlighted in the CF Manual,

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<sup>53</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(C) Original*, (NATO Headquarters: NATO, 2007), 5-1.

<sup>54</sup> Dr. Al Okros, “Leadership in the Canadian Military Context,” (Canadian Forces College, 2010), 8.

*Leadership in the Canadian Forces - Conceptual Foundations*, military commanders have the authority to use force and the authority to place others in harm's way.<sup>55</sup> Such authority, to send soldiers into situations that could likely lead to their deaths, is an awesome responsibility and a uniquely military function that is not comparable in the civilian sector. In combat, command is about making very difficult choices between equally awful courses of action and sets of outcomes. Similarly, it is far more about making hard choices than making easy ones.

A nation's military is an instrument for that nation to achieve its objectives. As within the Canadian context, the government reserves the right to adjust the boundaries within which its armed forces operates.<sup>56</sup> How has this changed the face of command or what it means to command in the modern day environment? Today, more than ever, governments are held accountable for their actions and for their expenditure of public resources. This places increased emphasis and scrutiny on the actions of the military, creating a greater challenge for military leadership, and by extension, military commanders.

*Leadership in the Canadian Military Context* also highlights the dilemma placed on military leadership, who must balance their professional desire for effectiveness over

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<sup>55</sup> Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Conceptual Foundations* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 11.

<sup>56</sup> Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 *Duty With Honour – The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), 39.

efficiency versus the —. .bureaucratic ideology of efficiency over effectiveness.”<sup>57</sup> With no discredit intended for military commanders of the past, a “modern day” military commander cannot be exclusive in his focus on the military mission. A military must, more than ever, reflect societal values and norms.<sup>58</sup> There must be greater civilian-military cooperation that best complements the government’s intent and military mission objectives. As presented with the Clausewitzian trinity of Government-Society-Military, the commander finds himself with more competing demands, none of which can receive his exclusive attention. By extension, as alluded to by Dr. Okros, mission success must now be evaluated by more than just ensuring state security.<sup>59</sup> In summary, the paradox of military command is that —. .although it is the responsibility of one officer, it must be exercised within a set of complex organizations and involves the interaction of many people”.<sup>60</sup> This is the extreme challenge presented to today’s military commander.

But if a military commander is leading a military mission, and that mission fails, does it automatically imply that the military commander failed? To analyse a mission or a commander to determine success or failure, who or what should be the focus of the analysis? Will an exclusive focus on the commander allow for an assessment of other external factors? Will an assessment on an organization or the chain of command alone

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<sup>57</sup> Okros, *Leadership in the Canadian Military Context*, 5.

<sup>58</sup> DND, *Duty With Honour*. . ., 40.

<sup>59</sup> Okros, *Leadership in the Canadian Military Context*, 6.

<sup>60</sup> Canadian Forces College, —Command Research Paper” (Joint Command and Staff Program 36 Activity Package D/DS 542/COM/RP-1).

provide sufficient examination of the commander? These questions highlight the complexities that exist in any attempt to conduct a command analysis.

Numerous avenues of approach exist to tackle this challenge and to gain a clearer understanding of the function of command and the implications of command failure. Analysis could be conducted using case studies, historical analyses or through the use of biographies. These could produce detailed assessments of the commander, the command environment and/or the command system. However, it is suggested that these less-refined approaches lack the necessary structure to ensure a comprehensive, analytical result. As such, command analysis models are suggested as the recommended approach.

Analytical models allow for a more structured framework for conducting command analyses. By design, they allow for a coherent and systematic approach for advancing the understanding of the commander and the established command environment. These models may be classified based on their focus areas. One which maintains a human perspective is the aforementioned CAR model, proposed by Defence Research Scientists, Dr. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann.

The Pigeau-McCann CAR model allows for an assessment of the commander, but does not neglect the organizational factors which can gravely impact the command environment within which the commander operates. Pigeau and McCann specify that too often success or failure in command gave limited consideration for other influences or factors beyond just the individual exercising command. As stated, command failures are frequently considered personal failures vice systematic ones. But it could be that such a failure had a root cause in a systematic or organizational dysfunctionality. —. . the

command capability of a commander is due as much to the characteristics inherent in the position as it is to the qualities of the person filling the position.”<sup>61</sup>

The CAR model allows one to develop an understanding of the human factors that influence the exercise of command and by extension allows for an assessment on the command capability of the commander and the environment in which he operates. Given its human dimension focus and ability to expose organizational dysfunctionalities, Pigeau-McCann’s CAR model is well positioned for conducting a command analysis of LGen Dallaire and the UNAMIR mission.

A second available model has a layered analysis perspective, a model devised by Political Scientist Eliot A. Cohen and Historian John Gooch. This model acknowledges that a commander operates within a chain (layers) of command and that each layer may have a contribution towards the military failure.

Similar to the perspective articulated by Pigeau and McCann, Cohn and Gooch refer to the “dogma of responsibility”<sup>62</sup> whereby a commander would historically bear full and absolute responsibility for all that happens under his command. They too question the degree to which a military commander should be held solely responsible or accountable for military failures. The search for a sole point of accountability, what they

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<sup>61</sup> Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. “What is a Commander?” in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, ed. by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 79-104 (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Ltd., 200), 87.

<sup>62</sup> Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes . . .*, 32.



term the “man in the dock”,<sup>63</sup> is history’s convenient way to avoid “deciphering the complex pathways to the disruption”<sup>64</sup> or the other contributing factors that may have lead to the failure.

Through the introduction of their Layered Analysis model, they attempt to resolve this discrepancy. Their model allows for the examination of different levels of the chain of command and their relative contributions to what they term “military misfortunes”.<sup>65</sup> It is through the analytical lens of their model that the “pathways to misfortune”<sup>66</sup> may be determined and where it may become clear that unilateral or exclusive responsibility for failure should not fall to the commander alone. Given the opportunities that this model presents to explore the contributions of each level of the chain of command in the UNAMIR mission failure, the Cohen and Gooch Layered Analysis model has been chosen as the second model to conduct this command analysis.

A third available model for conducting a command analysis maintains a systems perspective. This model, termed the “Albert and Hayes Systems Approach”<sup>67</sup> is more

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<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>64</sup> The BSM Review Log. “The Man in the Dock Theory.” <http://www.bsmreview.com/blog/2009/12/the-man-in-the-dock-theory.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2010.

<sup>65</sup> Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes . . .*, 46.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

<sup>67</sup> Canadian Forces College, “Command and Management Tutorial – The Human Dimension in Command” (Joint Command and Staff Program 36 Activity Package D/DS 542/COM/TU-1).

complex and focuses on the information age transformation of military and civilian institutions.”<sup>68</sup> It introduces key terms, namely agility, focus and convergence, which they postulate —. .form[s] the core for a new conceptual foundation”<sup>69</sup>. The authors acknowledge that assessing command and control using this approach is —. . a point of departure for the systematic exploration of . . .command and control”.<sup>70</sup> Analysis using this model may result in interesting and valuable outputs; however, for missions (such as UNAMIR) that have been established under a command and control construct to which they believe is outdated, the use of their model for this command analysis may not be well suited.

Through the use of these command analysis models, one can better appreciate the role played by the military commander in a military failure. For the purposes of this paper, LGen Dallaire as the Force Commander of UNAMIR, will be the focal point.

### **Who is Roméo Dallaire?**

LGen Roméo Dallaire was a successful career military officer in the Canadian Forces. He possessed a strong work ethic and was often seen as —inexhaustible”. He was a focussed and determined workaholic, uncompromising with those who served under

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<sup>68</sup> David S. Alberts, —Agility, Focus, Convergence – The Future of Command and Control,” *The International C2 Journal*, Vol 1, number 1 (2007): 1-30; [http://www.dodccrp.org/files/IC2J\\_v1n1\\_01\\_Alberts.pdf](http://www.dodccrp.org/files/IC2J_v1n1_01_Alberts.pdf); Internet; accessed 18 March 2010, 3.

<sup>69</sup> Alberts, *Agility, Focus, Convergence* . . ., 3.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

him which inspired loyalty amongst some and frustration amongst others.<sup>71</sup> By his own admission, he was always of the opinion that “peux ce que veux”,<sup>72</sup> an expression that became a Dallaire trademark and a way of thinking that would play a role in his endeavours as UNAMIR Force Commander. Dallaire was a NATO man, his defence knowledge strongly predicated towards the needs of the NATO alliance.<sup>73</sup> LGen Dallaire had never served an overseas operational duty with the UN and he had never commanded overseas<sup>74</sup> so he was eager for the opportunity to serve as UNAMIR Force Commander.

There are some who question whether Dallaire was prepared for his responsibilities as Force Commander of UNAMIR. If the transitional government had taken over as planned and the genocide had been averted, then the UNAMIR mission would likely have progressed as scripted and there likely would be no debate on Dallaire’s abilities as a commanding general. But as the events unfolded, the pressure was mounting and the environment in which he was operating (illustrated in figure 2 above) became ever more complex and demanding. Did Dallaire exhibit the requisite vision, ingenuity or resourcefulness that was required? Did he leverage what he was

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<sup>71</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle: A Story of Generals and Justice in Rwanda and Yugoslavia* (Toronto: Random House, 2000), 34-35.

<sup>72</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, 42. Loosely translated and as intended by Dallaire = where there’s a will, there’s a way.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>74</sup> Lewis MacKenzie, “Dallaire’s Deadly Error,” [http://www.macleans.ca/canada/national/article.jsp?content=20080820\\_93682\\_93682](http://www.macleans.ca/canada/national/article.jsp?content=20080820_93682_93682); Internet; accessed 12 December 2009.

given to achieve far more?”<sup>75</sup> These are some of the questions that will be explored later in this paper.

To many, LGen Roméo Dallaire has become the face for the failure in Rwanda. He has been openly critical of his self-assessed failings and was never reluctant to call out other factions or individuals whom he felt contributed to the perilous response to the events which led or contributed to the Rwandan genocide. Even today, sixteen years following the start of the genocide, he remains an active participant on the international stage to prevent future mass atrocities.

### **Canada’s Contribution to UNAMIR**

Canada has been a leader on the world stage of peacekeeping and has participated in almost every mission since the inception of United Nations peacekeeping.<sup>76</sup> For the mission in Rwanda, there was pressure for Canada to contribute a peacekeeping force and to lead the mission.<sup>77</sup> According to author Carol Off, both parties of the Arusha Peace Agreement supported Canada’s participation in Rwanda. The UN was desperate for nations to get involved and saw this as a win-win opportunity. Gaining Canada’s involvement would assist in fielding a necessary peacekeeping force and perhaps assist in restoring confidence in peacekeeping that had recently experienced significant

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<sup>75</sup> DND, *Conceptual Foundations*, 9.

<sup>76</sup> United Nations Association in Canada. —“Canada and UN Peacekeeping.” <http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/un-peacekeeping/fact-sheets/canada-and-un-peacekeeping>; Internet; accessed 16 April 2010.

<sup>77</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, 25.

difficulties.<sup>78</sup> The UN also saw this as an opportunity for Canada to take the lead and recover from its recent Somalia scandal.<sup>79</sup> In attempting to gain Canada's support, the UN also highlighted that a Canadian force commander would "give the Rwandan mission credibility".<sup>80</sup>

Canada was reluctant to step forward but did eventually take the lead, appointing LGen Roméo Dallaire as Force Commander. But it only contributed a handful of troops to the mission partially due to its ongoing support to other missions. It is possible too that Canada justified its minimal contribution by buying into the UN's false hope that the mission would be "the safest possible."<sup>81</sup> When UNAMIR was formally established in October 1993, a troop strength of 2,548 was authorized. However, despite escalating violence in the region and many warnings coming from the Force Commander, it took five months for the international community to contribute to reach the authorized strength.<sup>82</sup> Canada was not a leading contributor to this mission. Undoubtedly, LGen Dallaire had the full support of Canadian government and military leadership. But

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<sup>78</sup> The UN had recently experienced challenges with their UNOSOM (Somalia) and UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia) mission. For more information, go to <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/pastops.shtml>

<sup>79</sup> Canada was a participating nation in the UNOSOM mission. Unfortunately, in March 1993, two Canadian soldiers were involved in the brutal beating death of a Somali teenager. This incident created public outrage and backlash towards the Canadian military.

<sup>80</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, 25.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>82</sup> United Nations. "Rwanda – UNAMIR Background." <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirS.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2009.

Canada's commitment would have been more effectively demonstrated if it had assisted LGen Dallaire in resolving the known deficiencies within his mission, in particular, if it had provided a significant troop during the early difficult days of the genocide.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter was intended to set the stage for the command analyses. Through the historical review of Rwanda's turbulent and difficult past, to the fragile peace agreement, Rwanda remained on a difficult path.

The DPKO was the Secretariat department responsible for managing all UN peacekeeping missions. They were in the midst of reorganization and like many other departments were undermanned given the scope of their responsibilities. The UN was mired in a financial crisis and had difficulty in inspiring nations to contribute troops and resources to a mission that for various reasons they only half-heartedly supported. These organizational challenges added to the already complex conditions that existed within Rwanda. From the very start of his command in UNAMIR, LGen Roméo Dallaire was dealing with a very complex environment both in Rwanda and in New York.

## CHAPTER TWO: CAR MODEL OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

### Introduction

Chapter one set the stage, laying out the details and challenges in Rwanda from the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the start of the UNAMIR mission through to the start of the genocide. LGen Dallaire, as the Force Commander, was in command of the military component of UNAMIR. The questions have been asked – if a mission fails, does this automatically imply a failure by the commander? Does one commander bear full and absolute responsibility?

The CAR model will be used to answer these questions. This chapter will introduce the CAR command analysis model proposed by Pigeau and McCann. A detailed assessment of each of the constituent elements of the model, Competency, Authority and Responsibility, will then be completed. The analysis will conclude with an assessment of Dallaire and the command environment within which he was operating.

### The CAR Model

It has been stated that the CAR model emphasizes the human dimension of commander. They define command as “the creative expression of human will to accomplish the mission”.<sup>83</sup>

It has already been stated that for many individuals, success or failure in command relies exclusively on the individual exercising command with limited

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<sup>83</sup> Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “Conceptualizing Command and Control,” *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2002): 56.

consideration for other influences or factors. Dr. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann assert that adopting such a position is insufficient as a means to pass judgement on command effectiveness or the effectiveness of the command structure.

Describing ‘commander’ only in terms of the traits of the fortunate few who have excelled in their positions assumed that the pressures, circumstances and difficulties affecting commanders are constant. Even worse, there is a tendency to judge those who had not attained greatness as somehow deficient in their personal traits and skills, when this, in fact, may not be the case.<sup>84</sup>

This is the genesis of the “CAR model”, which incorporates the three dimensions of Competency, Authority and Responsibility. Given the previous assertion that “... the command capability of a commander is due as much to the characteristics inherent in the position as it is to the qualities of the person filling the position”,<sup>85</sup> the CAR model extends an opportunity to assess more than just the commander. It acknowledges the human element of command and affords an opportunity to assess key human elements of the commander. But it allows for an examination beyond just the commander. It rightly recognizes that the commander is only element within a system (an organizational structure). While still maintaining its human dimension focus, the CAR model addresses how the commander fits within that system and provides the ability to expose organizational gaps that may impact the commander and the command environment.

Before conducting the command analysis, it is first necessary to have a clear understanding of the fundamentals of the CAR model. A command analysis using the

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<sup>84</sup> Pigeau and McCann, *What is a Commander?*, 82.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.



CAR model begins with a discreet analysis of each of the elements of competency, authority and responsibility. The assessment values (rated low to high) are then mapped to form the space of command capability. As shown in figure 3, each of the CAR elements describes one axis of a 3-dimensional space.<sup>86</sup> The figure illustrates “a slice”, showing the assessment of authority and responsibility, for a given competency. Within the construct of the CAR model, they define four resulting command environments, each represented within a quadrant of the figure. For instance, in an environment where there is high authority but an unwillingness to accept responsibility, this results in a dangerous command (or the potential for abuse of command).<sup>87</sup> In cases where the reverse holds true (low authority, but high willingness to accept responsibility), this represents an ineffectual command environment.<sup>88</sup> Obviously, neither of these represents a desired command environment or a desired result when conducting a command analysis. A maximal (balanced) command represents an instance where the high authority vested in a commander is best complimented by his willingness to accept high levels of responsibility. It is within this quadrant that military commanders want (potentially need) to be placed to best contribute to mission success.

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<sup>86</sup> Pigeau and McCann, *Re-conceptualizing Command and Control*, 60.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.




Figure 3 - CAR Model Structure and Overview

Figure 3 addressed only a 4-quadrant analysis for a given (static) competency rating. With a view towards the competency factor, Pigeau and McCann then introduce the concept of a three-dimensional command space called the Balanced Command Envelope (BCE).<sup>89</sup> As illustrated in figure 4, the BCE is reflected by plotting the preferred command capability areas (the ellipses in the figure), extending from low competency to high competency. It should be noted in figure 4 that as it extends along the trajectory of competency (low to high), the ellipses (which reflect the preferred command regions) move diagonally along the authority-responsibility surface previously introduced. Regardless of the level of competency, the model asserts that the level of competency should match, or be well balanced with, the levels of authority and responsibility.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.




Figure 4 - The Balanced Command Envelope (BCE) <sup>91</sup>

Source: <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/>

The goal for any commander (or the military organization) is to have balance across all three dimensions. If not, any imbalance would create the potential for a compromised command environment to exist.

### Strengths and Weaknesses of the Model

Author Carol Off wrote that —...it's impossible to evaluate Dallaire's performance as a leader [commander] except by examining it against the moral principles and ethics that guided him in his decision".<sup>92</sup> Her statement is partially valid since moral principles and ethics are part of responsibility. But with the use of the CAR model, the qualitative assessment can extend beyond just responsibility to the remaining two factors. Even though it remains a theory or research framework, it has been rigorously analysed and

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<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

<sup>92</sup> Carol Off, "Do The Right Thing! Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire in the 1990s." in *Warrior Chiefs*, ed. Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, 335-346 (Toronto: Dunham Press, 2001), 335.

there is an ever increasing amount of data that supports its hypothesis. But perhaps the greatest strength of this model is that it focuses on the human dimension at the centre of the command system, and not just the commander or the command system.

The model however does have its limitations. The model addresses some of the factors surrounding the commander. But nowhere within the model is an analysis of the specific tasks (not simply the overall mission) facing the commander taken into consideration. Similarly, the model does not address the moral and ethical challenges of command, both of which are very real human factors in command.

### **Competency Factor Overview and Assessment**

The first dimension of the CAR model is competency. Military members, not unlike other professions, require specific skills and abilities to successfully accomplish their assigned missions. Pigeau and McCann indicate that intellectual, emotional, interpersonal and physical are classes of competencies that play an important part in defining command capability.<sup>93</sup> Within the environment of the Canadian Forces (CF), Dallaire exhibited sufficient competency to reach a flag rank.

However, in this analysis, it is necessary to assess whether Dallaire possessed the requisite amount, type and distribution of competencies<sup>94</sup> to command an international force on the world stage in a tremendously complex environment as was shown in figure 2.

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<sup>93</sup> Pigeau and McCann, *What is a Commander?*, 85.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

In assessing competency, it is important to recognize that it is not an assessment of his absolute level of competency. Rather, it is an assessment of whether his competencies within the model were adequate for the mission and the command environment within which he was situated. It is also important to recognize that competency for a commander can change, even during the period of his command. For instance, at the start of a command appointment, a commander may not necessarily have the requisite competencies for his assigned authority and high responsibility. This could reflect an imbalance or compromised command capability if assessed only in consideration at that particular moment in time. But, over a longer period of time, it can be expected that there could be an increase in competency, or competency growth, as the commander becomes more comfortable and competent in his command responsibilities over time.

It is also important to recognize that while the competency of a commander may change in a static environment conditions, it is also possible that the environment or conditions in which the commander is operating may also change. Changes in the operating environment may reflect competency growth when in fact this might not be the case. Therefore, it is important to understand the conditions which might have existed or contributed to changes in a commander's competency (if applicable).

### **Intellectual Competency**

Intellectual competency includes those skills necessary for planning missions, assessing risks, monitoring situations and making judgements, and must include

creativity, flexibility, and a willingness to learn.<sup>95</sup> It also takes into account knowledge, preparation, training and experience.

Many references are made to Dallaire's lack of awareness<sup>96</sup> of the environment in which he was to command. There were numerous indicators early on in his mission that suggested the political situation was not as stable as Dallaire appeared to have believed. Carol Off indicated that —. . he was full of wide-eyed innocence. . .<sup>97</sup> on the UN and their role in Africa. Even Dallaire acknowledged that —. . [he] went into Africa blind."<sup>98</sup> The political analysis from the reconnaissance mission should have provided greater emphasis towards the realities on the ground, with a particular focus on the —ex-belligerents" at play within the country. However, it was asserted that the reconnaissance mission —. . lacked the necessary political competence to make a correct in-depth analysis of the political situation. . ."<sup>99</sup> Unfortunately, it was this reconnaissance mission that was to lay the foundation for the entire mission.

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<sup>95</sup> Pigeau and McCann, *Re-conceptualizing Command and Control*, 58.

<sup>96</sup> In the next few chapters, many comments made by LGen Dallaire (in interviews, essays and his book) will be used to assist in the conduct of the analyses. It is extremely important to understand that all of the quotes attributed to Dallaire were made post-mission. They could in fact represent his exact thoughts or feelings for the moment in time he is referencing. But they could equally (unintentionally) be misrepresenting reality. With hindsight and his PTSD, it is perhaps possible that Dallaire was overly critical on his actions. Similarly, authors such as Carol Off are also making assertions and comments with the benefit of hindsight.

<sup>97</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, 30.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

At various points, Dallaire questioned his own abilities. “How much of that inability [to convince the world that Rwanda needed help] was linked to my inexperience? Why was I chosen to lead UNAMIR?”<sup>100</sup> Dallaire also lacked political experience and often felt that “... he didn’t have the required aptitude for complex political manoeuvrings”.<sup>101</sup> Yet, at a certain point in his mission (out of necessity or otherwise), Dallaire assumed all political negotiations.<sup>102</sup> It must be questioned whether he was adequately prepared for this responsibility, whether it prevented the general from doing the general’s job<sup>103</sup> and whether it hindered his overall situational awareness. A statement from one of his senior staff members emphasizes the situation: “no longer had any leadership...The general was completely involved in the job of Mr. Booh-Booh”.<sup>104</sup>

Dallaire was also in uncharted waters. He was a general whose military training and experiences were within the predictable and prescriptive (requiring less creativity, it could be argued) comforts of NATO and the Cold War. Rwanda offered no such comfort and necessitated creativity at every turn. Perhaps holding true to his NATO roots, Dallaire often sought solutions and direction from UN Headquarters. But too often,

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<sup>100</sup> Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House, 2003), 515.

<sup>101</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, 35.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

Headquarters never delivered. It is suggested that perhaps Dallaire may have been comforted by the fact that his friend and colleague General Baril was serving in New York. There was certainly an element of trust. But perhaps this extended to an assumption or expectation that Baril could do more for him than otherwise would have been reasonable.

This is perhaps a harsh assessment of LGen Dallaire's intellectual competency. But it is important to acknowledge the previous comments pertaining to competency growth over time. Some of the statements made by Carol Off and by Dallaire himself may accurately reflect Dallaire at the start of the mission. But as the mission advanced, it may not have continued to be the case.

### **Emotional Competency**

Emotional competency refers to an ability to maintain emotional balance and perspective, emotional toughness, resilience, hardiness and ability to cope under stress.<sup>105</sup> Quite clearly, this skill set is vital for military operations because "missions can be ill-defined, operationally uncertain, resource-scarce, and involve high risk to humans".<sup>106</sup>

For many, Dallaire is a soldier who returned a broken man due to his very public depression and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). However, for the bulk of his mission, one observer paints a very different picture of Dallaire. Dr. James Orbinski of Médecins Sans Frontières stated that during the early days of the genocide when "people

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<sup>105</sup> Pigeau and McCann, *Re-conceptualizing Command and Control*, 58.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 58



needed a semblance of clarity . . . Dallaire was clear, firm, strong and uncompromising”.<sup>107</sup> It was also stated that — . . . [Dallaire] was exhausted beyond human comprehension but was still issuing orders and making decisions – every moment – that meant life or death”.<sup>108</sup> However, there were moments where Dallaire recalled losing his sense of “self-preservation”<sup>109</sup>, where he was stretched to his emotional limits. To his credit, when he had reached his emotional near-breaking point, he was strong enough to recognize it and requested to be relieved of his command. This defines the broad range of emotional competency.

It is extremely difficult to be critical of LGen Dallaire’s emotional competency on the premise that a lack of said competency disabled his ability to detach himself from these atrocities to maintain proper tactical or operational command of his troops. It is hard to imagine any commander who could have demonstrated greater resilience and hardiness in the face of such a disaster.

### **Interpersonal Competency**

“Rarely are directives or orders sufficient to rally human will and spirit”.<sup>110</sup> If true, this places an increased emphasis on interpersonal competency. This skill set includes the necessary social skills to interact with subordinates, superiors and a myriad

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<sup>107</sup> Carol Off, *Do The Right Thing*, 340.

<sup>108</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, 68.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 100.

<sup>110</sup> Pigeau and McCann, *What is a Commander?*, 85.

of other organizations to gain their trust, respect and willingness to be a member of a team.<sup>111</sup> Reflecting again on the complex environment illustrated in figure 2, interpersonal competency was an important factor. Dallaire highlighted the challenges that the mission experienced in this regard when he addressed the tensions in dealing with UN civilian hierarchy and some NGOs which — . . . limited the mission’s ability to implement a multidisciplinary plan to assist the Rwandans in achieving success with their hard-fought Peace Accords”.<sup>112</sup> His similar admission that they were not — . . . as proactive as we should have been, and we failed to gain or sustain either the initiative or the confidence of the parties involved. . . .”<sup>113</sup> further accentuated challenges that the mission experienced in this competency area.

Amongst his soldiers who remained throughout the worst of the genocide, Dallaire highlighted the trust and emotional bond that he and his soldiers nurtured:

. . . and when they returned from those dangerous missions, I was there to cry with them over the loss of comrades. This is not the job of staff officers; neither is it the job of subordinate commanders alone. It is the responsibility of the most senior commander.<sup>114</sup>

However, Dallaire experienced failings in two particular areas within this competency. Firstly, there were recognizable problems with the relationship between

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<sup>111</sup> Pigeau and McCann, *Re-conceptualizing Command and Control*, 58.

<sup>112</sup> Roméo Dallaire, “The End of Innocence: Rwanda 1994,” in *Hard Choices*, ed. Jonathan Moore, 71-86 (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 74.

<sup>113</sup> Roméo Dallaire, *The End of Innocence . . .*, 74.

<sup>114</sup> Dallaire, *Shake hands . . .*, 272.

him and the Special Representative to the Secretary-General, Mr. Booh-Booh. LGen Dallaire was the military commander but was in fact only the second-in-command of the UNAMIR. Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh was the Head of Mission, although it is quite clear from the results of the *Independent Inquiry* that the mission lacked the necessary political leadership from him.

. . . there were problems in the relationship between Booh-Booh and Dallaire. The difficulties were known to the Department heads in New York, who did not however intervene. The difficulties may in part be traced to the fact that the Force Commander arrived first in the mission area and was the person to set up UNAMIR to begin with. Much later on, when the genocide began, their respective roles do not seem to have been clear. UNAMIR seems to have suffered from a lack of political leadership on the part of the Special Representative...<sup>115</sup>

Perhaps this is too simplistic an observation; however, it is possible that Dallaire could have done more to enhance this relationship for the benefit of the mission. As a military commander, he was aware of the necessity and the importance of a chain of command. Through an analysis of available documentation, it appears that he was not respecting the chain of command within which he was supposed to operate.

The second failing within this competency is that of trust – the trust brokered with the Rwandan people. It had been suggested by a genocide survivor that the trust Dallaire brokered with Rwandans gave them a false sense of security, a false sense of protection from harm. —. .UNAMIR tricked us into staying”<sup>116</sup> It is not to suggest that LGen Dallaire intentionally misled the Rwandan people or meant to give false promises that he

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<sup>115</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 48.

<sup>116</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, 3.

or his force could not keep. Without a doubt, LGen Dallaire's intentions were nothing but genuine. But his statement does acknowledge this mislaid trust:

The UN mission, and later, the very civilians whose lives it was intended to secure, fell victim to an inflated sense of optimism which I myself participated in formulating, thereby creating high expectations which the UN did not have the capacity to meet.<sup>117</sup>

Did LGen Dallaire possess the necessary interpersonal competency to contribute to command success in the environment for which he was chosen to command? His lack of a functional relationship with Booh-Booh may have hampered their effectiveness in UNAMIR. In regards to the element of trust, it must be recognized that his assessment has the benefit of many years of hindsight. One can look back now and suggest with confidence that there should have been no expectation for wide-scale protection. But in the moment, such an assessment was not so easily made. Thus, Dallaire did not knowingly perpetuate a false sense of optimism. Perhaps one could argue that the lack of a functional relationship between him and the Head of Mission puts an interpersonal competency assessment in jeopardy. But did Booh-Booh have the capacity or desire to offer the necessary political leadership to serve as Head of Mission? Perhaps Dallaire's actions allowed him and the mission to garner the best from a non-ideal situation.

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<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 111.

## **Physical Competency**

For most militaries, physical competency is a core attribute and includes health, agility, endurance and sophisticated sensory motor skills.<sup>118</sup> Much has been written about LGen Dallaire in his capacity as Force Commander, but few critiques have been made on his physical competency as defined in the CAR model. As such, it is suggested without reservation that Dallaire was physically competent.

## **Competency Assessment**

LGen Dallaire was the first to admit that he made errors, in judgement and in some of his actions within UNAMIR. But despite the preceding (harsh) critical analysis, the evidence does not suggest that Roméo Dallaire had a critical failing in any competency area. Perhaps it could be more a reflection on the role of his preparation for the mission. He had the benefit of many years of general CF training, military education and experience. But he did not receive specific and detailed mission-specific training.

Based on the evidence presented thus far, it is suggested that LGen Dallaire was sufficiently competent to perform as military commander in UNAMIR.

## **Authority Factor Overview and Assessment**

–You can safely appeal to the United Nations in the comfortable certainty that it will let you down”<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Pigeau and McCann, *Re-conceptualizing Command and Control*, 58.

<sup>119</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, foreword.

The second dimension of command within the CAR model is authority. Authority as intended by Pigeau and McCann reflects the domain of influence of a commander and is the degree to which a commander is empowered to act, the scope of this power and the resources available for enacting his or her will.<sup>120</sup> It has two integral components: legal authority and personal authority. Legal authority is the power assigned by a formal agency (in this case, the UN) and may be expressed by orders, regulations and laws. Personal authority is that authority provided to an individual by peers and subordinates but is earned over time based on reputation, experience and character.<sup>121</sup>

It is within the authority dimension that Dallaire experienced the most frustration and where the command environment in which he was operating was most dramatically (and negatively) impacted.

### **Legal Authority**

It is widely acknowledged that the mandate of UNAMIR and the resources provided to it were inadequate. This is supported most emphatically by a former UN Secretary-General<sup>122</sup> who expressed tremendous remorse for the role played by the UN.

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<sup>120</sup> Pigeau and McCann, *Re-conceptualizing Command and Control*, 58.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>122</sup> United Nations, Secretary General Statement - *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*. It should be noted that this statement was made by Kofi Annan in his capacity as Secretary-General, following the Rwandan Inquiry, in 1999. Annan was integrally involved in the UNAMIR Mission since he was the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and was the UN Headquarters responsible authority for the UNAMIR mission.

All of us must bitterly regret that we did not do more to prevent it [the genocide]. There was a United Nations force in the country at the time, but it was neither mandated nor equipped for the kind of forceful action which would have been needed to prevent or halt the genocide. On behalf of the United Nations, I acknowledge this failure and express my deep remorse.<sup>123</sup>

The *Independent Inquiry* directly addressed the concerns related to the UNAMIR mandate. It stressed the necessity for mandates to be sufficiently robust at the start of missions. It also stressed that they must allow the Force Commander the flexibility he requires to adapt as the situation warrants.<sup>124</sup>

In Rwanda, this was not achieved. The UN was not flexible and did not exhibit the necessary political responsiveness to help the Rwandan people. Both before and after the start of the genocide, LGen Dallaire devised plans to stop the fighting. These plans, which included modified Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and increased numbers of troops, were denied, repeatedly.<sup>125</sup> Even within their originally assigned mandate, however, there was confusion on the limits to the forces' ROE which impacted their effectiveness in protecting the civilian population.<sup>126</sup> Thus, UNAMIR was ineffective in stopping the

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<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 56.

<sup>125</sup> They were denied partially due to the fact that the requests extended the mission beyond a Chapter VI mandate as assigned by the UN.

<sup>126</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 35 and 56.

killings and as was noted by Col Marchal, Dallaire's senior Belgian officer: —After a few weeks, the extremists knew we had no power.”<sup>127</sup>

In addition to these fundamental issues, the mission then encountered the challenge of having competing missions in Rwanda at the same time. In addition to UNAMIR (a Chapter VI mission), the UN authorized OP Turquoise, a French-led Chapter VII mission. However, OP Turquoise was not under UN command. This undermined the authority and presence of the UNAMIR force.<sup>128</sup> OP Turquoise was authorized to do some of the very things that LGen Dallaire had wanted to do but was denied. This not only reflected an absence of integrated planning, but it also confirmed the lack of legal authority afforded to the UNAMIR Force.

There are some, most notably Major General Lewis MacKenzie, who have been publicly critical of Dallaire's actions, suggesting he tried to do too much. He contends that in some circumstances —. . . ill-conceived and impossible-to-execute orders must be evaluated by the leader, and if warranted, they should be ignored or disobeyed”<sup>129</sup> and that —Field commanders familiar with the UN's flawed decision making process learn to deal with the ambiguities and to rely on their own common sense.” In the area of mission priorities (mission, man, self), MacKenzie and Dallaire have a fundamental disagreement.

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<sup>127</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, 103.

<sup>128</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 27-28

<sup>129</sup> Lewis MacKenzie, *Dallaire's Deadly Error*.



Their dispute will continue but it does highlight the fact that the mandate offered by the UN was not sufficiently clear for the realities on the ground.

In regards to UNAMIR's resources, Dallaire was clear in his assessment: "I . . . give me the means and I can do more."<sup>130</sup> Unfortunately, he was not provided more. He did not have the number of personnel he required. His soldiers were ill-equipped, equipment was ill-prepared and was late to arrive.<sup>131</sup> Despite the diminishing security environment "I . . . expending resources was not in the cards."<sup>132</sup> The *Independent Inquiry*, in its conclusions, highlighted the extreme situation that UNAMIR faced:

[The] Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) should not have allowed UNAMIR to have the dire lack of resources described above . . . The constant pressure by the Security Council on UNAMIR to save money and cut resources . . . created problems in a situation where the mission was too weak to start with.<sup>133</sup>

### **Personal Authority**

As stated, personal authority is that authority earned over time based on reputation, experience and character. When Major Brent Beardsley, Executive Assistant to LGen Dallaire, was asked "Why did you stay?" his answer spoke directly to the

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<sup>130</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, 53.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>133</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 41.

personal authority of Dallaire: “Because General Dallaire inspired us to stay.”<sup>134</sup> This sentiment has been echoed from many sources, although some have suggested that this authority diminished as the mission progressed. Given the limited criticisms, and conversely the vast complements, of his personal authority as intended within this model, further analysis is not required.

### **Authority Assessment**

The extremes evident in regards to legal authority necessitate that it dominate the authority assessment. Dallaire asked for in excess of 5000 troops. His force was ultimately diminished to fewer than 500. His requests for enhanced ROE and expanded mandate were repeatedly denied. His requests for sufficient supplies were met with silence. Based on this evidence, supported by the *Independent Inquiry*, LGen Dallaire had very low legal authority provided to him which hindered his ability to successfully accomplish his mission.<sup>135</sup>

### **Responsibility Factor Overview and Assessment**

The third and final dimension of the CAR model is responsibility. This dimension addresses the degree to which an individual accepts the legal and moral

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<sup>134</sup> Public Broadcasting System. “Ghosts of Rwanda: Frontline Interview Major Brent Beardsley,” <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/beardsley.html>; Internet; accessed 7 Dec 2009.

<sup>135</sup> Although authority includes personal authority, the legal component is assessed to have been so low that it outweighs any possible positive impact that the personal authority might have provided.

liability commensurate with command.”<sup>136</sup> As defined within the model, it is composed of two key elements: extrinsic and intrinsic responsibility.

Extrinsic responsibility refers to a person’s willingness to take responsibility for the legal authority that comes with the position. Intrinsic responsibility, however, refers to the degree of self-generated obligation that one feels towards the military mission.<sup>137</sup> Critics of Dallaire have questioned his decisions. Some have questioned his use of the allocated resources. Others have challenged his preparedness for command. Few, however, have challenged his willingness to accept responsibility.

### **Extrinsic Responsibility**

LGen Dallaire was the mission commander. He understood his mandate and the intent for his mission. Once the conditions worsened in Rwanda, he could have withdrawn his soldiers, retreated into his barracks and left the country once it was clear that UNAMIR no longer had an official mandate.<sup>138</sup> He did not. As mentioned previously, he persevered and attempted to have his mandate expanded to allow him to do more.

The unfortunate deaths of the ten Belgian soldiers remain a sensitive issue. LGen Dallaire believes he appropriately handled the situation surrounding their deaths. He was committed to his mission and his responsibilities as mission commander. Despite

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<sup>136</sup> Pigeau and McCann, *Re-conceptualizing Command and Control*, 59.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, 59-60.

<sup>138</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, 166.

immense criticism from numerous sources, Dallaire admits that — . . . had been willing to risk the lives of Belgian soldiers to save the lives of Rwandans. The mission came first.”<sup>139</sup> As previously mentioned, command is often about making very difficult choices between equally awful courses of action and sets of outcomes. Dallaire was prepared for this responsibility.

Dallaire critics have suggested that he was inflexible and a NATO rules-man.<sup>140</sup> But in light of the available evidence, is this criticism warranted? When ordered to withdraw his troops, he refused because he so firmly believed in his mission.<sup>141</sup> Which mission was it that he so firmly believed in? Was it towards the original mission and a hope to achieve something unachievable? Was he committed to the mission he set for himself, one that he interpreted and created to his own liking, and one that he believed was right? By offering refuge and protection to thousands of civilians, he was also in direct violation of the initial order to maintain neutrality.<sup>142</sup> But he did what he believed was necessary. To some degree, this goes against his philosophy of “mission first” and in regards to extrinsic responsibility, it could be suggested that he did not have the legal authority to “create a mission” as he may have done once his legal mandate was no

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<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.

<sup>140</sup> Lewis MacKenzie, *Dallaire's Deadly Error*.

<sup>141</sup> Carol Off, *Do The Right Thing*, 345.

<sup>142</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, 58-59.

longer valid. But, with the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that his actions were appropriate and were instrumental in saving tens of thousands of Rwandans.

### **Intrinsic Responsibility**

LGen Dallaire could have done as the UN requested or wanted. As the genocide began in April 1994, again he could have sequestered his troops back to his headquarters and waited for the call to withdraw. But he had a sense of obligation for the protection of the Rwanda people that he could not ignore. As such, he did his best to convince the UN to take action. In his mind, he created a workable solution that would have disarmed the belligerents and saved tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands of Rwandans. His warnings went unheeded or were refused. Many people died due to the world body's inaction and it left him — . . . broken man, haunted by his memories and nightmares.”<sup>143</sup> He admitted responsibility for decisions that led to the deaths of the Belgian soldiers, for the deaths of Red Cross personnel, and for the deaths and displacement of millions of Rwanda citizens. — . . . because the mission failed, and I consider myself intimately involved with that responsibility”.<sup>144</sup>

Dallaire was so emotionally impacted by these events because he was so committed, and passionate, towards his mission and his responsibilities. True to Pigeau and McCann's definition of intrinsic responsibility, he exhibited a high degree of obligation to the people of Rwanda and thus it motivated him to do as much as he could.

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<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.

## **Responsibility Assessment**

LGen Dallaire worked tirelessly, to the point of exhaustion. He did this because he was committed to his responsibilities as Force Commander. He willingly accepted the responsibilities afforded him by his position and he took personal ownership of the mission beyond expectations as could be witnessed by his struggles at the end of his time in Africa and upon his return to Canada for many years thereafter.

## **CAR Model Command Analysis Result**

Having completed the discreet assessments of competency, accountability and responsibility, it is now possible to make an assessment on the command environment in which LGen Dallaire was operating. As stated, some have suggested that the failure to stop the genocide was a failure of Dallaire, almost exclusively. A more objective assessment using the CAR model suggests otherwise.

The CAR model outlines a relationship between responsibility and authority, for an identified competency level. Based on the evidence presented in this paper, LGen Roméo Dallaire was sufficiently competent to be the UNAMIR Force Commander. This takes into consideration the four dimensions of competency (intellectual, interpersonal, emotional and physical) which are included within the model. Specific attention was paid to intellectual competency. LGen Dallaire's intellectual competency received a rather harsh analysis but certain qualifiers were established which related to critiquing in hindsight and competency changes over time. However, it is suggested that these factors (whether negative or positive) did not suggest that he was anything but sufficiently competent.

In regards to authority, the assessment considered legal authority, that which was assigned to him, and personal authority, that which was earned. This assessment laid little criticism towards his personal authority. However, through the assessment of the legal authority factor, it is clear that LGen Dallaire was not delegated the necessary legal authority to conduct his mission. For this reason, LGen Dallaire was rated low in authority.

The final factor of responsibility includes extrinsic and intrinsic responsibility. As noted, critics of Dallaire have questioned his decision. Some have questioned his training and preparedness. But few, however, have challenged his willingness to accept responsibility. As such, LGen Dallaire was rated extremely high in responsibility.

Therefore, under the lens of the CAR model, it can be assessed that LGen Dallaire was operating outside of the Balanced Command Envelope because he was operating in an ineffectual command environment, as illustrated in figure 5. This environment is characterized by his acceptance of high levels of responsibility but without commensurately high levels of authority being provided. Further analysis on this result and its effects on the mission will be discussed in chapter 4.




Figure 5 - LGen Roméo Dallaire - CAR Model Assessment



## CHAPTER THREE: THE PATHWAYS TO MISFORTUNE

### Introduction

—That which seems correct when looked at from one level may, when viewed from a higher one, appear objectionable.”<sup>145</sup>

Military commanders, particularly in wartime, have the power and authority to send soldiers to their deaths. In making these life and death decisions, commanders often assume great risk to their mission, their men and potentially themselves and are held to a tremendously high accountability standard for their actions and decisions. Political Scientist Eliot Cohen and Historian John Gooch refer to the previously mentioned —dogma of responsibility”<sup>146</sup> whereby a commander would historically bear full and absolute responsibility for all that happens under his command. Should a commander be held solely responsible for failures that happen under his command? Is it sufficient that they take the brunt of the historical criticism? They contend that the search for a sole point of accountability is history’s convenient way to avoid —deciphering the complex pathways to the disruption”<sup>147</sup> or identifying other contributing factors that may have led to the failure.

The Layered Analysis model introduced by Cohen and Gooch attempts to resolve this discrepancy. It allows for the examination of different levels of the chain of

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<sup>145</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 159.

<sup>146</sup> Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes . . .*, 32

<sup>147</sup> The BSM Review Log, *The Man in the Dock Theory*.

command and their relative contributions to a failure under analysis. It is through the analytical lens of their model that the pathways to misfortune may be determined.

This chapter will first begin with a generic analysis of military failure and command, followed by an overview of the five steps<sup>148</sup> to the Layered Analysis model. The strengths and weaknesses of their model will then be discussed. In order to set the groundwork for the application of the model, an introduction and assessment of lines of operation will then be provided. The Cohen and Gooch layered analysis model will then be used to develop an analytical matrix, known as a matrix of failure. The chapter will then conclude with a detailed assessment and analysis of the responsibilities and critical tasks for the military and bureaucratic levels of the chain of command within the United Nations and UNAMIR along each of these lines of operation. This will allow for a determination of the pathways to misfortune for the UNAMIR mission.

### **Analysing Military Failure and Command**

As Cohen and Gooch clearly articulate in their book *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* failures occur for many reasons. This should come as no surprise but they make this assertion in their build-up to the justification for their model's development. Perhaps some missions were simply destined for failure, thus forcing the commander to focus on minimizing losses vice achieving successes. Perhaps others occurred as a result of "a stroke of blind chance". Indeed, some failures occur due to

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<sup>148</sup> It is important to recognize that the five steps associated with this model are actually iterative/cyclical; this paper is summarizing the results of the analysis, not presenting it as it was actually completed.

absolute and unequivocal incompetence.<sup>149</sup> But it cannot be ignored that sometimes failures occur because of complex, previously undefined factors. Their point is that failures happen due to many different factors and as they say “The only feature many defeats have in common is the outcome”.<sup>150</sup>

The development of their layered analysis model owes credit to the contributions of Clausewitz, the oft quoted military strategist. Clausewitz, through his *Kritik* theory or “critical analysis” concept, argued against what he referred to as “horizontal history”<sup>151</sup> whereby the study of war is done at only one level, that level often being of the military commander.

Yes, military commanders have power and authority that often exceeds those of their civilian counterparts and they possess unique responsibilities as a function of their military employment. But do military commanders control all things? Do they have unilateral authority over all mission-related functions? Perhaps in days of old, this may have been closer to reality but even then it was likely never an absolute. But those days are long gone. For certain, commanders must remain responsive to the enemy. But the commander is under influences that now extend much further than the military battlefield. More so today than in the past, commanders may also become victim to organizations where he has no control or to organizational subcultures that may be outside of his

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<sup>149</sup> Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes* . . . , 1.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

influence. He may also at the mercy of political pressures he cannot counteract or military technologies he cannot change.<sup>152</sup> In this sense, military commanders are under ever increasing constraints and may have lost partial control or influence within their own domain. Given these constraints, and in considering failures where absolute incompetence is not a factor, how then is it possible that commanders, and commanders alone, can be held responsible for military failures? This question is a partial impetus that put Cohen and Gooch on their path to model development.

What does this mean for military command as a professional responsibility? Military commanders will still exercise command, the formally delegated authority, —. .for the direction, co-ordination and control of military forces”.<sup>153</sup> They will still be held accountable for their actions and decisions, and it remains a given that they will be critically analysed in the event of any failure.

But it is through the use of Cohen and Gooch’s Layered Analysis model that it becomes clear that unilateral or exclusive responsibility for failure should not fall to the commander alone. It is this model that recognizes the distributed organizational framework and that responsibility does not simply lie at the feet of a single commander.

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<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>153</sup> DND, *Conceptual Foundations*, 8.

## Mapping Military Misfortune<sup>154</sup>

The intent for the Layered Analysis model has been clearly established to this point. But how is the model put into practice in order to produce the results that it espouses? Cohen and Gooch's Layered Analysis model is a five-step process. This process will be conceptually introduced and will be applied later in this chapter.

What is the failure? This question represents the first step in the process and it is the most important to resolve because it establishes the baseline from which the remainder of the analysis will progress. They propose a "counterfactual analysis"<sup>155</sup> as a means to best answer this question. By this they suggest considering what may have been required in order minimize or eliminate the failure. What were the critical tasks? This question represents the second step to their process. Identifying the critical tasks is perhaps more obscure than identifying the failure. But the key element is to identify those broadly defined tasks that went incomplete or unfulfilled and which had a significant level of contribution towards the previously defined failure.<sup>156</sup>

The third step in the process is the conduct of the layered analysis. It is in this step that the various levels of the organization are identified and their contributions towards the failure are assessed. The analysis then focuses on how each layer may have interacted with one another and how they may have performed their assigned duties and

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<sup>154</sup> Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes* . . . , 46.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

tasks. The results of these focus areas will assist in the conduct of the fourth step, the construction of the matrix of failure. This step provides a graphical representation of the now completed analysis. It is this representation that provides the visualization necessary to proceed to and complete the fifth and final step in the process.

At the conclusion of these first four steps, the matrix of failure is now in a position that enables the identification of the pathways to misfortune. This final step allow for the derivation of the connected errors across the multiple levels of command. By identifying subordinate failures that contribute to each other at various command levels, these relationships are graphically represented on the matrix of failure. This result thereby determines the pathway to misfortune.

### **Strengths and Weaknesses of the Model**

Similar to the CAR model, the Cohen and Gooch Layered Analysis model recognizes that the military commander is generally one element within a system and that most commanders report through a chain of command to higher authorities. This model recognizes the complexities that exist within a chain of command and provides a systematic framework for analysing failures across these organizational levels.

The Cohen and Gooch model, however, is a historical analysis tool that is only as good as the data that supports it. Out of necessity, it requires comprehensive data that accurately represents the command structure, interrelationships, responsibilities and actions across the various command levels. The authors identified a few instances where the lack of accurate or detailed historical data would impact the ability to provide a complete analysis of a particular failure. They have identified instances where despite

best intentions, there was an –excessive unwillingness to criticize high-level decisions and policies”<sup>157</sup> but an ease in finding commanders critically at fault. If their model is to be effective to analyse all levels of the chain of command, then accurate data requiring analytical criticism is required. In addition, they indicate that data capture of historical military failures has often lacked depth, or it centred on leading figures or particular campaigns or battles.<sup>158</sup> Sometimes this can lead to insufficient data to accurately highlight the pathways to failure. Fortunately, each of these minor weaknesses is correctable. But it requires the aid of those who are capturing or writing the history for the particular mission failure that is under analysis. If the data is detailed and sufficiently broad in its scope, then the Cohen and Gooch model will most definitely achieve its aim. Given today’s information age, recent and future failures will have more than enough data to support such an analysis. UNAMIR’s failure is a case in point – it happened in 1993/1994 and the amount of data available through many sources far exceeds the requirements of their Layered Analysis model.

Historian and author Robert Doughty speculated that the model leads to —. . .an oversimplification of some very complex developments. . .”<sup>159</sup> The authors acknowledge that it may oversimplify relationships or that picking the critical tasks might

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<sup>157</sup> Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes* . . . , 37.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>159</sup> Doughty, Robert A. –Military Misfortunes: Pitfalls in Understanding.” (December 1990); <http://www.usamhi.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/1990/1990%20doughty.pdf>; Internet; accessed 5 April 2010.

be slightly off aim.<sup>160</sup> Indeed, failures are complex. They may not be easily defined and there may be more than one. However, the simple conduct of the analysis brings it back to the strength of the model. Regardless of a perceived or real oversimplification of certain elements of the analysis, it forces the analysis across the various organizational layers, thus avoiding the horizontal history or exclusivity of analysing a single individual.

### **Lines of Operation Overview**

In order to effectively complete a layered analysis as intended by Cohen and Gooch, it is necessary to analyse behaviours and interactions of different layers of the organization and its command structure. But the interesting challenge with the United Nations and UNAMIR rests within the mandate for the mission and for the organizational structure within which it was must operate.

The mandate called for more than just military action. UNSCR 872(1993) mandated the mission with several key tasks which required a complement of military, diplomatic/political and humanitarian efforts. Similarly, the command structure was not just a military chain of command. By order of the UNSCR, UNAMIR was headed by a UN Diplomat. The Secretary General appointed a Special Representative (later appointed Mr. Jacques Roger Booh-Booh) —. who would lead UNAMIR in the field and exercise authority over all its elements.”<sup>161</sup> He was charged with fulfilling all requirements of the mandate as approved by the United Nations Security Council. But,

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<sup>160</sup> Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes* . . . , 54.

<sup>161</sup> United Nations. —Security Council Resolutions – 872(1993).”  
<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.html>; Internet; accessed 9 April 2010.



despite the language stipulated in the mandate, his main efforts were along the diplomatic channels. He may have been the Head of Mission, and would have had influence over the military component, it must be clear that he was not the military commander. As such, he did not command military troops. This is an important distinction that was discussed in chapter one.

LGen Dallaire was the second in command of UNAMIR and was the military Force Commander. He was empowered to fulfill the military components of the mission's mandate and with command authority over the military contingent. Although it turns out that Dallaire and Booh-Booh experienced interaction or interpersonal difficulties, the design of that relationship called for them to work "hand in glove" where both would perform complementary tasks, diplomatic, political and military, keeping each other and UN Headquarters informed.

How much information should they have exchanged between themselves? How did they communicate this information back to United Nations Headquarters? Did they operate and communicate along the same line of operation for what were different lines of work (focus areas)? To answer these questions and provide more insight into the arrangements that existed within UNAMIR and the UN, this analysis will briefly turn towards Canada's International Policy Statement (IPS) of 2005 and the country's ongoing efforts in Afghanistan.

In 2005, the Canadian government reassessed how it intended for Canada to remain relevant and impactful in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. International peace and security was under the constant threat of terrorism. Environmental changes created natural disasters

across the globe. The delta between the world's wealthiest countries and its poorest ones was becoming greater.<sup>162</sup> Canada was committed to change. As the IPS stated –Canada benefits directly when the world is more secure, more prosperous, more healthy. . .”<sup>163</sup> It was with this goal in mind that Canada introduced the 3-D approach.<sup>164</sup> Canada determined that this approach, across the disciplines of defence, development, and diplomatic would be the best way for it to make a difference in post-conflict situations. As articulated in the IPS, the 3-D approach introduced the idea of multiple and concurrent lines of operation (the disciplines) that would allow

. . . undertaking Defence efforts to strengthen security and stability, pursuing Diplomacy to enhance prospects for nation-building and reconstruction, and making certain that Development contributions are brought to bear in a coordinated and effective way.<sup>165</sup>

Current missions highlight Canada's commitment to such approaches. Canada is at war in Afghanistan but its focus is not exclusively limited to a military role/line of operation. The focus of the government's efforts extends across the defence, diplomat and development domains, although the language in the 2007 Afghanistan Compact, which Canada is committed to supporting,<sup>166</sup> identifies security, governance and

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<sup>162</sup> DFAIT, *Canada's International Policy Statement . . .*, i.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, ii.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, iv.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, iv.

<sup>166</sup> Canada, —Canada's engagement in Afghanistan,” <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/approach-approche/compact-pacte.aspx?lang=en>; Internet; accessed 15 April 2010.

development. Canada is able to achieve results across this spectrum by drawing on resources and expertise from across the federal government, not from just one department. They extend resources to fulfill the mission's needs and it draws upon expertise that would not otherwise reside within one department.

Looking back towards the United Nations and UNAMIR, a comparison can now be drawn to the 3-D approach chosen by Canada. The mission was not focussed exclusively on the military component. Yes, defence and physical security was a key element, one that proved increasingly important as the time passed. However, at the start of the mission, it was intended to be just one spoke in the wheel. There was a mandate to work on the diplomatic and developmental fronts to monitor the repatriation of Rwandese refugees. There was a further humanitarian effort to ensure relief operations were progressing. UNAMIR, through many of its activities, was required to liaise with NGOs in the conduct of their duties in direct support of the mission. By comparison, it could be suggested that the UN and UNAMIR operated along a 3-D like model for international missions.

It is now appropriate to address the questions that introduced the topic of lines of operation to have a clear appreciation for those that existed within the UN and UNAMIR. How much information should Dallaire and Booh-Booh have exchanged between themselves? As previously mentioned, they should have been “hand in glove” in their working relationship. Although they had different responsibilities, they should have been transparent in their communications to and from UN Headquarters, which as it turned out, would have eliminated some of the miscommunications and delays that did take place.

How did they communicate information back to United Nations Headquarters and should they operate and communicate along the same line of operation for what were arguably different lines of work (focus areas)? This highlights the complexity of the dynamic of the UN and its missions. By accepting the analogy that the UN and its missions operated in a 3-D like model, then it would have been necessary for them to be able to communicate back to their respective Offices of Primary Interest for issues related to their associated “focus area”. For example, it may have been necessary for Booh-Booh to liaise with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) for a particular matter related to a diplomatic or political issue. Similarly, it may have been necessary for Dallaire to communicate to DPKO or to the Military Advisor of the Secretary General for guidance on a military-related issue. Each of them would have been fulfilling their responsibility within their respective line of operation and would have made their communications in support of that effort. Even if they had each contacted the same office, perhaps they would have contacted them in different capacities in support of different objectives. A key example which will play out during the soon-to-come analysis will be their interactions with DPKO. It was necessary for each of them to communicate with DPKO for many items, but their communications and consultations may have served different purposes.

For the purpose of this analysis, it is now suggested that Booh-Booh and Dallaire, in the conduct of their duties, primarily operated along separate lines of operation. Booh-Booh operated primarily along a Political Line Of Operation (PLOO). In some regards this could be compared to operating at a political strategic or operational level and it extends through all levels of the United Nations hierarchy, from him as Head of Mission

to the UN General Assembly. Dallaire operated primarily along a Military Line Of Operation (MLOO). Perhaps, the MLOO placement within the UN hierarchy is somewhat more difficult to define; however, it is suggested that the MLOO extends from the Force Commander up to the Secretary General.

The existence of separate lines of operation may allow for concurrent efforts in a more effective manner. But it is not intended to pigeon-hole responsibilities or details within one area or another. It is recognized that the distinction between the two may be blurry and that often times it would have been necessary for Booh-Booh and Dallaire each to interact with or on behalf of the other within the opposing line of operation. This is allowable and is to be expected. Out of necessity, it is a structure that must remain flexible and adaptive. Typically, Force Commanders of UN missions would spend the majority of their time within the MLOO and operate in support of the PLOO. However, as was previously noted, LGen Dallaire spend a considerable amount of time, more than should have been necessary, operating within the PLOO by effectively assuming the Head of Mission's job. This was the reality within UNAMIR, a reality which impacted his operations within the MLOO.

This detailed analysis of the lines of operation was important to complete since it highlights the complex operations and functioning of the UN and its missions. These separate lines of operation, the PLOO and MLOO, will now form an integral aspect of the command analysis using the Cohen and Gooch Layered Analysis model. The chain of command within the United Nations and UNAMIR is far-reaching but easily definable. Critical tasks and responsibilities are clear. Drawing on information presented

earlier, all of the elements are now in place in order to continue with the crux of the command analysis – the completion of the matrix of failure and failure path analysis.

### **Matrix of Failure - UN and UNAMIR Overview**

To this point, the discussion towards the model has been sufficient to permit an understanding of its origins, its strengths and weaknesses, and the theoretical application of it in mapping out military failures. It is through the model's analytical lens where a broader understanding of the pathways to misfortune may be determined and where the result of the analysis will allow for a broader understanding of the contributions (or contributors) to the failure.

It was identified that the most important step in the model's five-step process is the very first one – identifying the failure. Without a clear understanding of the failure, a proper analysis result will never be achieved. Much has been written already in this paper about the issues, concerns and failures within UNAMIR. But perhaps the single best statement that reflects the mission's failure was made by the Secretary General in 1999 when he wrote –The world chose to ignore the genocide and eventually proved unwilling to stop the genocide once it began."<sup>167</sup> Based on this acknowledgement, the following failure is identified as the key failure for UNAMIR:

*Failure to prevent the genocide and failure to stop the genocide once it began*

True to the requirements of the model, this failure statement facilitated the completion of the follow-on steps. The focus now extends towards setting the stage for a

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<sup>167</sup> United Nations. *Statement of the Secretary-General . . .*

systematic analysis of the matrix of failure. This will include an overview of the constituent elements of the matrix, including the command levels, the critical tasks and how a matrix of failure is populated with the subordinate failures.

UNAMIR was established under the direction of UNSCR 872 (1993). It is clear that it remained responsible to the United Nations at large and the command levels of each of these organizations combine to form the command levels of the matrix of failure. The command levels chosen extend to the highest levels of the United Nations, up to the Security Council and General Assembly. Within UNAMIR, the Force Commander and Head of Mission were obvious choices given their integral involvement. The DPKO as an entity played an important role. They were the functional authority for all peacekeeping missions and therefore maintained responsibility and accountability for the actions and results of their missions. The Secretary General is the senior Secretariat official and to many he is the face of the United Nations. He represents the United Nations as their designated spokesman and has a key role in influencing the direction of the UN's interventions and missions throughout the world. To the point, he played a vital role in Rwanda. The inclusion of the Military Advisor to the Secretary General (General Baril) may appear as a slight divergence from the clear-cut necessity of the other levels. But he also played an important role as noted in the *Independent Inquiry*. Given his direct inclusion in many elements of the mission by his friend and colleague, LGen Dallaire, General Baril has been included in the command level as part of this analysis. Arguments could possibly be made to include other unidentified command levels in this matrix of failure. This will not be disputed. However, it is considered that these are the key command levels and through their use, they will allow for an adequate demonstration

of what the model was created to show – the distribution of failures across multiple command levels.

Three critical tasks were selected to form part of this analysis. These critical tasks were political will, strategic factors and command and control. Political will, within the context of this paper, quite simply represents the willingness to act or intervene. Strategic factors identify those elements which could serve as enablers or inhibitors for attaining strategic objectives. For the purposes of this assessment, strategic factors include resources, mandate, force structure and Rules Of Engagement (ROE). The final critical task that was included in this matrix was command and control. For the purposes of this analysis, the command and control definition will be the one proposed by Pigeau and McCann as part of their research. They proposed that command and control is — . . . the establishment of common intent to achieve coordinated action.<sup>168</sup> In their words —Without coordinated action military power is compromised. Without common intent coordinated action may never be achieved.”<sup>169</sup> This is a definition that plays out well in the context of the United Nations and UNAMIR.

Having established the applicable command levels and the critical tasks, the subordinate failures need to be identified. This step requires an objective assessment of how the respective command level contributed to the failure under analysis. It is not possible within the confines of this paper to articulate in infinite detail how each

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<sup>168</sup> Allan English, *Command & Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Trenton: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre Production Section, 2008), 14.

<sup>169</sup> English, *Command and Control* . . . , 14. This book may also be referred to for additional information on intent (explicit and implicit).



command level of the organization failed in their responsibilities across each critical task. This is not the intent of the analysis. The objective is to identify in sufficient detail the most significant failure or a summary of failures that reflect the command level's role towards the failure under analysis.

Figure 6 graphically represents the result of the detailed Layered Analysis or mapping for UNAMIR. It illustrates the command levels, critical tasks and a summary of each subordinate failure at each level. However, given the importance of the two lines of operation – political and military – that existed within this mission, failures in this matrix were classified according to their respective line of operation.

Finally, the matrix of failure culminates with the illustration of the pathways to misfortune. The arrows that piece together the relationship between failures at the various command levels highlight this important result. Given the dual lines of operation, the results illustrate that there are equally two critical pathways to misfortune.

The next portion of this chapter will provide a detailed synopsis of each of these critical pathways shown in figure 6. The intent is to discuss only those failures which are along the pathway to misfortune. Periodically, other failures of a respective command level may be brought forward to illustrate or emphasize a particular subordinate failure along the pathway to misfortune.

Failure under analysis – failure to prevent the genocide and failure to stop the genocide once it began			
Command Level	Political Will	Strategic Factors	Command and Control
United Nations General Assembly	<p>POL - Lack of political will to act or act with sufficient assertiveness.</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>POL - not applicable</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>POL - Lack of unity in nations' response to the events in Rwanda.</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>
United Nations Security Council	<p>POL - Unwillingness of the United Nations Security Council to acknowledge a genocide was taking place or likely to take place / an unwillingness to intervene to prevent the killings or stop them once they started.</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>POL - Strategic Factors were inadequate and lacked the necessary clarity to contribute to success.</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>POL - not applicable</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>
United Nations Secretary-General (Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali)	<p>POL - Legitimizing inaction through lack of involvement, misperceptions of the realities within Rwanda and by not raising attention as mandated through Article 99 of the Charter.</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>MIL - Apathetic efforts to address situation in Rwanda and effectively and comprehensively address the deficiencies in the strategic reviews.</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>MIL - not applicable</p> <p>MIL - Undermining the efforts of UNAMIR with excessive attempts to maintain a non-existent ceasefire.</p>
Military Advisor to the Secretary General (General Maurice Baril)	<p>POL - not applicable</p>	<p>POL - not applicable</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>POL - Failure to ensure the direct involvement and active engagement of the Secretary General.</p> <p>MIL - Failure to properly address the concerns raised by the FC in the Jan 1994 fax and push for appropriate military action.</p>
Department of Peacekeeping Operations	<p>POL - Failure to provide the necessary political leadership to challenge/inform a disengaged Secretary General and not close relevant international community.</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>POL - Failure to ensure a UN mandate under its charge had an appropriate mandate, ROE and sufficient resources.</p> <p>MIL - Failure to ensure that UNAMIR was established with an adequate back-up plan.</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>POL - not applicable</p> <p>MIL - Inability or unwillingness to compile information from all intelligence sources that supported the realities of the Rwandan genocide</p>
Special Representative to Rwanda (Mr. Jacques Roger Booh-Booh)	<p>POL - Failure to take the necessary measures to highlight the realities within Rwanda.</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>POL - Failure to engage within the mission early enough.</p> <p>MIL - Failure to provide the necessary follow-up with the Rwandan government.</p> <p>MIL - Failure to develop and foster an effective working relationship with the FC.</p>
UNAMIR Force Commander (General Roméo Dallaire)	<p>POL - not applicable</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>POL - Failure to appreciate the political realities of the United Nations and inadequacies of UN bureaucracy.</p> <p>MIL - not applicable</p>	<p>POL - Failure to complete an adequate political analysis of the mission to ensure adequate awareness of the political realities of the Rwandan Peace Process.</p> <p>MIL - Failure to convince, compel or guilt higher authorities to take appropriate action or empower him to take appropriate measures.</p> <p>MIL - Failure to develop and foster an effective working relationship with the Special Representative.</p>
<p><b>Legend:</b> Political Line of Operation (PLOO) = → Military Line of Operation (MLOO) = ⇨ Critical Path</p>			

Figure 6 - Matrix of Failure - United Nations and UNAMIR

## Political Line of Operation – Matrix of Failure Analysis

–The interests of the UN, not the victims, all too often come first.”<sup>170</sup>

This statement is very emblematic of the role played by the UN General Assembly. The work of the United Nations derives largely from the mandates given by the General Assembly.<sup>171</sup> It is the main governing body of the UN and is composed of representatives of all Member States. In 1993, the General Assembly was comprised of 183 member states. Along this line of operation, what role did the UN General Assembly play in the *failure to prevent the genocide and failure to stop it once it began*?

The pathway to misfortune along the Political Line Of Operation (PLOO) begins with the United Nations General Assembly. They demonstrated that they lacked the political will to act or act with sufficient assertiveness. The *Independent Inquiry* highlighted that lack of political will was the overriding failure to this mission.<sup>172</sup> According to former Secretary General, Kofi Annan, –The international community was guilty of sins of omission.”<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Adam Lebor, *Complicity with Evil*, 265.

<sup>171</sup> United Nations. –United Nations – Main Bodies.” <http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/>; Internet; accessed 4 March 2010.

<sup>172</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 30.

<sup>173</sup>United Nations, –Memorial Conference on Rwanda Genocide Considers Ways to Ensure More Effective International Response in Future” <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/afr868.doc.htm>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2010.

Why was there such a lack of political will towards Rwanda? It was a reflection of the growing pressures in the early 1990s. The UN was reeling in Yugoslavia. It suffered from under the shadow of Somalia. The resolve of nations was reaching the point of peacekeeping fatigue. This was clearly demonstrated by the difficulty in garnering quantifiable support for the mission, a mission which the UN at least in principle supported. But the reality remained that most nations were not willing to step forward to contribute the number of troops necessary to allow the UN to meet the target it established for itself in the resolution it had approved. Others might suggest more directly, however, that the reluctance to support Rwanda was not primarily due to fatigue but because Rwanda was of little strategic value (therefore, not in the national interest) to many countries.<sup>174</sup>

The lack of political will by the United Nations member states played directly into the next level of the pathway to misfortune, the collective failure of the UN Security Council and the member states of the UN in regards to the strategic factors (mandate, resources, force structure and ROE). The strategic factors were inadequate and lacked the necessary clarity to contribute to success. As noted within the *Independent Inquiry*,

UNAMIR was not planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed in a way which provided for a proactive and assertive role in dealing with a peace process in serious trouble.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 44.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

The mandate for the mission was slow to be established and it failed in both adequacy and clarity, particularly given the fragility of the peace agreement, a partial result of a poor political reconnaissance mission.<sup>176</sup> Requests from the Force Commander for an increased mandate were not supported despite the escalation in violence and degrading peace situation. As the violence was growing in Rwanda, threats of not extending the mission unless the requirements of the peace agreement were met proved to be backwards logic. Lack of adherence to the Arusha Peace Agreement should have meant more pressure from the UN, not less. This was not the case until well after the genocide began. The mandate also did not allow the Force Commander the authority or flexibility to adapt to changing situations on the ground - "After a few weeks, the extremists knew we had no power."<sup>177</sup>

Resources, as previously mentioned in chapter 2, proved to be woefully inadequate. The troops and the mission did not have the most basic of supplies. LGen Dallaire believes that an increase in troops and money would have allowed him to make a substantial difference.<sup>178</sup>

ROE proved to be a tremendous deficiency in this mission. First, a request for approval of a draft set of ROE went unanswered.<sup>179</sup> The *Independent Inquiry* highlighted

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<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>177</sup> Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle*, 103.

<sup>178</sup> Dallaire, *Shake hands...*, 514.

<sup>179</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 35.

the disturbing observation that there was a lack of clarity regarding which ROE were in force.<sup>180</sup> Could the men on the ground use deadly force to protect civilians? This would appear to be a fundamental question for which there should be no dispute. Unfortunately, UNAMIR's interpretation differed from that of the UN Headquarters. UNAMIR personnel believed that they did not have such permission but Mr. Iqbal Riza, the Chief of Staff to the Head of DPKO, had a different opinion. He indicated that —. .nobody would have blamed them”.<sup>181</sup> Questions of such fundamental importance should not be based on personal opinion and chance. Clarity was required but it was regrettably absent. Certainly, DPKO holds some responsibility for this failure but it ultimately remains the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council to ensure that such confusion is not present. They failed in this regard.

The UN Security Council, in particular its permanent members, also suffered from a lack of political will and is the next failure in the pathway to misfortune. They were the power brokers and they carried the burden for many aspects of the UN's global efforts. However, the United Nations Security Council was unwilling to acknowledge genocide was taking place and demonstrated an unwillingness to intervene to prevent the killings or stop them once they started. Under the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, genocide is a crime under international law.<sup>182</sup> Once genocide is acknowledged, the

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<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>181</sup> Public Broadcasting System., —The Triumph of Evil: Frontline Interview Iqbal Riza,” <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/riza.html>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2009.

<sup>182</sup> *Genocide Convention*.

nations of the world are obligated to intervene and punish the offenders.<sup>183</sup> Therefore, the solution (in the eyes of the United States and perhaps others) was to avoid the use of the word genocide.

Although the whole of the Security Council ~~bears~~ a responsibility for its lack of political will<sup>184</sup> the United States played a particularly profound role. President Clinton visited Rwanda in March 1998, just four years removed from the start of the genocide. In a speech to the people he attempted to lay out an apology for his country's inaction.

... all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror. The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy as well. We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe haven for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide.<sup>185</sup>

During the genocide, the United States and its defenders suggested that there was insufficient evidence to suggest genocide was taking place. The *Independent Inquiry*, to the contrary, concluded that the evidence was stronger than the US wanted to believe. As noted by author Adam Lebor in *Complicity with Evil*, he suggests that the US administration's inaction was partially due to ~~paralysis~~" of the prospect of further US

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<sup>183</sup> Public Broadcasting System. "Ghosts of Rwanda: Frontline Interview Boutros Boutros-Ghali." <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/ghali.html>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2009.

<sup>184</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 37.

<sup>185</sup> Public Broadcasting System, "Promoting Peace," [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/jan-june98/rwanda\\_3-25a.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/jan-june98/rwanda_3-25a.html); Internet; accessed 17 April 2010.

casualties following their experience in Somalia.<sup>186</sup> To take it one step further, not only did the US not want to intervene, LGen Dallaire suggested that the US was also — . . .not going to support anyone else getting involved.”<sup>187</sup> Their actions led to a belief that the lives of troops were more significant than those of Rwandans.<sup>188</sup>

The Security Council as a whole also bears collective responsibility. It failed to take action in regards to Rwanda’s membership on the Security Council during the period of the genocide. Rwanda was elected by the African regional group in 1993 to be a non-permanent member of the Security Council for a 2-year term. Throughout the full duration of the genocide, the Kigali government (the same government that was committing or sanctioning the atrocities) had full disclosure to the UN’s intentions towards Rwanda.<sup>189</sup> This brings overwhelming discredit to the founding principles of the United Nations that no country petitioned for their removal from the Security Council. Finally, the UN Security Council’s failure is further demonstrated by their passing of Resolution 912 (1994) which actually mandated a reduction in the number of troops despite escalations in violence and brutality.

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<sup>186</sup>Adam Lebor, *Complicity with Evil*, 248.

<sup>187</sup> CNN.com, —Amanpour: Looking back at Rwandan Genocide,” <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/04/06/rwanda.amanpour/index.html?iref=allsearch>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2010.

<sup>188</sup> Peter Rayment, *Shake Hands with the Devil – The Journey of Roméo Dallaire, a Documentary Film*. White Pine Pictures, 2004.

<sup>189</sup> Adam Lebor, *Complicity with Evil*, 172.



The inaction and failures of the UN governing bodies contributed to those that followed within the Secretariat. The Secretary General had the opportunity to be more proactive in trying to shape the UN's response in Rwanda. However, he failed in this capacity, rendering him an integral element along this pathway to misfortune. He legitimized inaction through his lack of involvement, misrepresentations of the realities within Rwanda and by not raising attention as mandated in Article 99 of the Charter.

Article 99 empowers, or places the burden on, the Secretary General to “bring to the attention of the SC any matter which threatens the maintenance of international peace and security”.<sup>190</sup> Despite the political balancing act that the Secretary General must adhere to in dealing with the oft misaligned Security Council, he did not meet the obligations of this article. He rarely attended Council discussions, instead sending his special political advisor where presentations often lacked details or accuracy.<sup>191</sup> In fact, the *Independent Inquiry* highlights that “he was absent from New York [UN Headquarters] during much of the key period of the genocide.”<sup>192</sup>

As summarized by the authors of *Legitimizing Inaction*, in numerous reports and interviews during April 1994, the Secretary General represented “mythical interpretations of the events” highlighting fighting due to “unruly members”, killings “for no apparent

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<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, 95.

<sup>192</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 48.

reason”, a “frenzy of massacres” and meaningless violence.<sup>193</sup> His misrepresentations may have met the political boundaries in which he had to operate, but it is clear that they did not reflect the harsh reality. The authors also contend that by his language and phrasing, he was removing responsibility from the international community of its responsibility to act. Even after he publicly acknowledged on 4 May 1994 that genocide was taking place,<sup>194</sup> he once again deflected responsibility from the international community:

It is not our intention to impose a certain formula on the two protagonists to the dispute. We need the agreement of the two protagonists, and then we will have to play the role of catalyst, of mediator.<sup>195</sup>

In April 1994, after the UN Security Council approved of a reduction in UNAMIR staffing to a mere token force, the Secretary General did not exercise his moral authority<sup>196</sup> to object with any passion to this decision. The *Independent Inquiry* stated the obvious, that he could have done more.<sup>197</sup>

It is duly recognized that he operated within a very complex arrangement. He felt he needed to use the language that would not offend the UN Security Council and its

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<sup>193</sup> Bjorn Willum, “Legitimizing Inaction towards Genocide in Rwanda: A Matter of Misperception?” *International Peacekeeping*, Fall 1999, 11.

<sup>194</sup> Bjorn Willum, *Legitimizing Inaction . . .*, 12.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>196</sup> Adam Lebor, *Complicity with Evil*, 7.

<sup>197</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 37.

members. But, by not being more insistent, by not placing himself in a position to try and inspire for change even if it was clear that the will to help was lacking, he compromised the authority of his position. He had the moral obligation to do this. It could be argued that the political will was not there and no actions by the Secretary General or others would have sparked a greater response. Was he perhaps a powerless scapegoat?<sup>198</sup> Perhaps this is true; however, this does not remove the obligation to at least try with all available power and influence. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's actions during this genocide was a partial contributor to his demise as UN Secretary General, serving only a single term and making him the shortest serving Secretary General on record.

General Maurice Baril was serving as the senior Military Advisor to the Secretary General. He was a Canadian General Officer serving in a political institution. By his own admission, he existed within —. . .an organization swamped and sinking under the dead weight of useless political sinecures, indifference and procrastination”.<sup>199</sup> Perhaps it was this viewpoint that contributed to his failure to ensure the direct involvement and active engagement of the Secretary General. There is less documentation available to highlight the actions and involvement of General Baril in this affair. There are

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<sup>198</sup> Bjorn Willum, *Legitimizing Inaction* . . . , 3.

<sup>199</sup> R.W. Johnson, “Their Blood on our Hands,” *Sunday Times* (27 February 2005): 41; <http://proquest.umi.com>; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

indications that he advised LGen Dallaire on numerous occasions, including the growing concern within the UN Security Council<sup>200</sup> and the fact that ~~no~~ cavalry was coming<sup>201</sup>

But as a former military commander, it should have been clear to him that UNAMIR did not have the requisite command and control structure and necessary strategic factors to allow the mission to succeed. It is clear that the Secretary General did not do enough (based on effort, not results) to alter the political support for the mission. Did Baril do his part to ensure that the Secretary General was aware of the impact on the ground in Rwanda? Did he do his part to ensure his friend, colleague and fellow Canadian General was not left to squander and fail? This is less clear. Based on public information that is available, LGen Dallaire has been very cautious to comment on the role of General Baril in the genocide response. Similarly, General Baril has been relatively quiet on his own involvement and his perception of the involvement and failings of others up and down the chain. It is recognized that there were limits to his authority and as a military officer in UN Headquarters he obviously could not publicly call out the Secretary General or a nation to do more. But it is suggested that he could have done more to convince the Secretary General to effectively live up to the responsibilities of his position.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), as previously stated, was the bridge between the bureaucracy and political environment of UN Headquarters and

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<sup>200</sup> Dallaire, *Shake hands...*, 209.

<sup>201</sup> Public Broadcasting System. "Ghosts of Rwanda: Frontline Interview with General Romeo Dallaire," <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/dallaire.html>; Internet; accessed 7 Dec 2009.

UNAMIR. As the principle agent of the Secretariat for this mission, they played a very significant role in the pathway to misfortune along the PLOO. The DPKO failed to provide the necessary political leadership to challenge/inform a disengaged Secretary General and indecisive/reluctant international community. Their failures, from a lack of persistence in pushing the Secretary General and Security Council to do more to not providing important information to them, are noted in detail within the *Independent Inquiry*.

Of particular note, the *Independent Inquiry* highlights the actions of the DPKO in light of the escalating violence in April 1994. Rather than trying to enhance the mission, they cast doubt upon it.

The instinctive response to question the feasibility of an effective UN response, rather than actively investigating the possibility of strengthening the operation to deal with the new challenges on the ground.<sup>202</sup>

The DPKO was immensely aware of the lack of political will to support this mission. Rather than trying to shape the environment to seek change, they apparently took a position of avoidance. Despite the increasing political pressure, the *Independent Inquiry* concluded that the DPKO was too quick to succumb to the lack of political will widespread within the UN upper echelons. They also withheld information from the Security Council because they predicted it would not have made a difference<sup>203</sup> rather than trying to use the information to sway opinions.

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<sup>202</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 36.

<sup>203</sup> Adam Lebor, *Complicity with Evil*, 170.

Adam Lebor, in *Complicity with Evil*, states that —The UN is a pleasant place to work, especially for those who don't rock the boat.”<sup>204</sup> Does being in a huge bureaucracy offer protection to individuals from being held personally accountable for organizational decisions? Similarly, does it impact the sense of personal accountability that one should have towards their responsibilities and will it impact their vigour in seeking solutions in the face of impending failure? Lebor suggests that the culture of bureaucracy within the DPKO means that —. . . [a civilian bureaucrat] has little to gain by making a decision that may turn out badly,<sup>205</sup> and that it may be better not to make a decision”.<sup>206</sup> It appears in many regards that this philosophy was partially at play within the DPKO. In addition, beyond possible damage caused to reputations, many of those involved in this affair have since been promoted within the Secretariat.<sup>207</sup>

The pathway to misfortune along the PLOO extended down to the UNAMIR leadership. As Head of Mission, Mr. Jacques Roger Booh-Booh was an integral member of the UN's political mandate within Rwanda. However, he failed to take the necessary measures to highlight the realities within Rwanda, particularly given the obvious lack of action and support demonstrated by his superiors within the Secretariat. For LGen Dallaire, he failed to appreciate the political realities of the United Nations and

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<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>207</sup> Adam Lebor, *Complicity with Evil*, 254.

inadequacies of UN bureaucracy. Each played important roles in their contributions to the pathway to misfortune along the political line of operation.

According to LGen Dallaire, Booh-Booh did not have the skills to operate in a complex environment such as Rwanda.<sup>208</sup> Whether or not he possessed the necessary skills may be up for debate, but the *Independent Inquiry* concluded that the mission suffered from a lack of political leadership.<sup>209</sup> This is a shared responsibility between Booh-Booh and Dallaire.

UNAMIR had a responsibility to accurately portray the realities on the ground in Rwanda. LGen Dallaire contends that Booh-Booh often changed his reports to UN Headquarters regarding the political situation in Rwanda.<sup>210</sup> He indicated that the changes “were not as dynamic and as portentous.”<sup>211</sup> This necessitated, in his view, that he submit his own political commentary and analysis in his weekly military assessments. This created the dilemma of multiple reports being issued, each report likely carrying messages that varied in their tone and level of detail. This lack of cohesion by Dallaire and Booh-Booh is a shared failure and may have lead the DPKO to question the veracity of some of the potentially conflicting or incongruent information.

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<sup>208</sup> Richard Cobbold, “Interview with Roméo Dallaire,” *RUSI Journal* Vol 150, Iss 5 (Oct 2005): 8; <http://proquest.umi.com>; Internet; accessed 13 December 2009.

<sup>209</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 48.

<sup>210</sup> Richard Cobbold, *Interview with Roméo Dallaire*.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*

To a lesser degree, Dallaire's motto of "peux ce que veux" also played a role in his failures in Rwanda. At various points during the mission, he sought changes to the mandate (or at least requested a broader interpretation of it), he requested more troops and he wanted more resources. He wanted and expected quick approval. Nothing happens quickly in the UN. These were not unreasonable demands, but in the context of a risk adverse political environment that the UN was shelled within, his requests were not satisfied and in many cases were denied. It could be argued that his requests were completely justified and if supported by the political element, perhaps they may have been received more favourably. His frequent requests might also highlight his political inexperience.

The routing of the famous genocide fax (a transcript is included in appendix 2) that originated from Dallaire in January 1994 is symbolic of Dallaire's interaction and comfort within the PLOO. The fax proceeded from Dallaire to General Baril. It then proceeded from Baril to DPKO personnel who then sent it back to the Head of Mission (for his eyes only) for his assessment and recommendation. The fax was then sent back to DPKO for their consideration. Finally a response was sent back to UNAMIR. This was a very convoluted manner to convey a very important message. LGen Dallaire did not initially consult with Booh-Booh and he bypassed the DPKO. This highlighted his comfort in dealing with General Baril but it perhaps also highlighted his lack of comfort in operating within the PLOO (and with his Head of Mission).

### **Military Line of Operation – Matrix of Failure Analysis**

Many of the failures along the Military Line Of Operation (MLOO) relate to command and control which was previously defined as — . . the establishment of



common intent to achieve coordinated action.”<sup>212</sup> In this regard, these failures extend from the UN Secretary General down to the Force Commander.

The Secretary General contributed to the pathway to misfortune along the MLOO by undermining the efforts of UNAMIR with excessive attempts to maintain a non-existent ceasefire. UNAMIR wanted to focus its efforts on preventing the escalation of violence and then on saving lives. But it encountered grave difficulties, many of which have already been discussed (ROE to offer the protection that was needed, resources to support their own troops and those under their protection, etc). The UNAMIR mandate called for UNAMIR to “monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement”. But their efforts became focussed on setting the conditions to allow for a cease-fire to come into force. This, it could be argued, was not in their mandate. The *Independent Inquiry* commented on the increased emphasis in this area.

The Inquiry finds it disturbing that records of meetings between... the Secretary General, and officials of the so-called Interim Government show a continued emphasis on a cease-fire, more than the moral outrage against the massacres.<sup>213</sup>

In support of this misguided emphasis, there are two specific meetings where the Secretary General may have erred. Very early on, in September 1993, the Secretary General warned both parties that if there was violence, the UN would have difficulty getting troops. He also highlighted the extreme demands on UN resources and its

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<sup>212</sup> English, *Command and Control* . . . , 14.

<sup>213</sup> United Nations, *Rwandan Independent Inquiry*, 41.

financial crisis.<sup>214</sup> Perhaps this warning inspired the government to escalate the violence earlier than planned. In December 1993, the Secretary General coordinated a meeting between a UN official and President Habyarimana where he warned the President that they were aware of plans to kill the opposition.<sup>215</sup> The President was warned that the “UN would not stand for this” but unfortunately armed with the information from the September 1993 meeting and the UN’s lack of response up until that point, did this threat hold up to scrutiny? Did the Secretary General set the conditions for the violence? Did this undermine the efforts of the UNAMIR personnel?

Another related important example that demonstrated the impotence of the United Nations in taking measures to prevent the violence relates to the establishment of the BBTG. The BBTG was part of the foundation to the Arusha Peace Agreement. But deadlines related to the BBTG came and went on at least five occasions, yet the UN still used naïve language which called for its prompt installation.

General Baril, the Military Advisor to the Secretary General, was the next command level to contribute to the pathway to misfortune along the MLOO. He failed to properly address the concerns raised by the Force Commander in the January 1994 fax (the genocide fax) and failed to push for more appropriate military action. The *Independent Inquiry* indicates that the fax was not brought to the attention of the

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<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

Secretary General.<sup>216</sup> Perhaps this was not the responsibility of General Baril, but given the urgency of the fax, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Baril should have discussed this with the Secretary General (or at least assured that someone else had done so). LGen Dallaire wanted to take decisive action. The response back from the UN did not allow for this and they provided other instructions. The *Independent Inquiry* suggests that —. . action more forceful than the meetings which were held”<sup>217</sup> did not qualify as the immediate and determined response that was required. General Baril should have recognized this from the comfort of the UN Headquarters and pushed for more to be done.

Just as they did within the PLOO, the DPKO played an integral role in the pathway to misfortune along the MLOO. The DPKO failed by demonstrating an inability or unwillingness to compile information from all intelligence sources that supported the realities of the Rwandan genocide. The *Independent Inquiry* highlighted an institutional weakness in the —. .analytical capacity of the United Nations”<sup>218</sup> and raised many detailed examples where the signs were there but they were ignored. The DPKO failed to properly consider the Ndiaye report which suggested that the conditions for what constitutes a genocide may apply in Rwanda.<sup>219</sup> What is more alarming is that this report

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<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

<sup>219</sup> Prevent Genocide International. —Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and other Dependent Countries

was not revisited once more signs became clear. The immediate fragility of the Peace Accord, as noted by both signatories to the accord, was an initial warning. The lack of establishment of the BBTG was a factor. The request for enhanced ROE from the Force Commander made reference to a destabilizing situation. The military and political assessments from UNAMIR highlighted the deteriorating situation. The genocide fax should have provoked significant action. Considered in isolation, it may be defensible that the DPKO did not take more definitive action. But when considered all together, it is clear that the DPKO failed to demonstrate the analytical capacity that was required..

Also along the MLOO pathway to misfortune, the DPKO failed to ensure that UNAMIR was established with an adequate backup plan. It was previously suggested that the UN was overly optimistic that the peace process would be successful, so much so that they did not have a back-up plan in case the peace process failed. This relates well to the DPKO's ignorance of the signs that suggested that failure for the intended mission was a clear possibility. As noted in chapter 2, it is necessary that the Force Commander be afforded the necessary flexibility to adapt to the realities on the ground. Dallaire made attempts to adjust but he was not supported.

The Head of Mission also played a role in the pathway to misfortune along the MLOO. He failed to provide the necessary follow-up with the Rwandan government on their efforts towards establishing the BBTG. Given the numerous missed deadlines in its establishment, it is clear that the Rwandan government did not see it as a priority. It was also clear that Booh-Booh was not sufficiently persistent to force their hand or at least be

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and Territories.” <http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/ndiaye1993.htm>; Internet; 19 March 2010.

a more visible presence. Booh-Booh also failed to develop and foster an effective working relationship with LGen Dallaire. They should have worked as a team, but it was obvious that their efforts were in isolation and did not contribute to an effective command environment within UNAMIR.

Within the MLOO, LGen Dallaire played a very significant role and he had a contributing failure to the pathway to misfortune. In addition to his failure to develop an effective working relationship with Booh-Booh, Dallaire also failed to convince, compel, or guilt higher authorities to take appropriate action or empower him to take appropriate measures. This is perhaps a particularly harsh assessment given all that he did to raise concerns. Perhaps no action on his part, no matter how vast or heroic, could have lead to action. But given the fact that the response remained ineffective, it is appropriate for him to accept some degree of that responsibility.

He did experience some challenges that reflect on his command and control within UNAMIR. LGen Dallaire requested further ROE but when a response was not received, he did not follow up – ambiguity and confusion remained. He failed to provide warranted protection to key personnel. He failed to maintain proper flow of information within UNAMIR and he failed to maintain effective command of his troops when the crisis hit. These are all areas for which Dallaire himself has accepted responsibility. But it must be recognized that for many of these items, Dallaire as the Force Commander simply fell victim to the direction and instructions that were provided to him. In other words, he had to play with the cards he was dealt.

### **Cohen and Gooch Layered Analysis Result**

The Cohen and Gooch Layered Analysis model offers a method to conduct a historical analysis of military failures which shifts the often unilateral focus away from the commander to highlight critical tasks, critical lapses and errors across hierarchical levels of the chain of command.<sup>220</sup>

The preceding analysis, supported by figure 6, outlined the key subordinate failures that existed across the command levels and that contributed to the ultimate failure to prevent the genocide and failure to stop the genocide once it began. The descriptive analysis lead to the pathways to misfortune along the political and military lines of operation. This demonstrated that the failure under analysis was not just the responsibility of the commander. Responsibility is shared across multiple command levels. A significant result of the two pathways to misfortune highlights their origins and main contributing critical task.

Along the PLOO, the lack of political will was the main cause of the pathway to misfortune and it originated from the highest levels of the United Nations. Within the MLOO, the results show that command and control was the key contributor to the pathway to misfortune which originated by the failures of the Secretary General and was perpetuated down to the Force Commander.

This result will receive further assessment in Chapter 4.

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<sup>220</sup> Canadian Forces College, *Activity Package D/DS 542/COM/TU-1*.

## CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

### Introduction

Rwanda proved to be a failure on the world's stage. The world was watching but it failed to prevent or intervene to stop a genocide which saw the horrific side of humanity. It would appear that the ingredients to help were available and in place. A UN assistance force (UNAMIR) was present. The mission had an eager and passionate Force Commander, LGen Roméo Dallaire. The mission had a mandate which could have positioned the left and right of arcs for mission success. The long-standing *Genocide Convention* should have offered the necessary umbrella protection for those being persecuted and freedom of action for those charged to protect. None of these seemed to matter. The genocide began and continued unabated for far too long.

How could the mission have failed so miserably under the watchful eyes of an international peacekeeping force? Who or what was to blame for this failure? In the event of such failures, where should responsibility lie? Does the commander, organization or both accept this responsibility? These are a few of the questions that this paper aimed to answer. Specifically, through the use of the two chosen command analysis models this paper sought to establish that the mission failure in Rwanda was not the exclusive responsibility of LGen Dallaire. It had the dual purpose to determine where the key failings in this mission could be attributed.

This chapter will provide a summary of the results achieved in chapters 2 and 3 and will then focus on relating these results in answering the questions previously noted. Finally, an analysis will be made on how the results compare and what this comparison

might say about the Force Commander and the command environment within which he was operating.

### **How do the Results of the Models Compare?**

So far, many questions have been asked relating to commanders and mission success. Through the use of the CAR model result, answers to some of these questions can now be provided. The results of the CAR model analysis determined that LGen Dallaire was operating outside of the Balanced Command Envelope because he was operating in an ineffectual command environment. This environment was characterized by his acceptance of high levels of responsibility but without commensurately high levels of authority being provided.

To be in an ineffectual command environment compromises a commander's ability to command. As noted by Pigeau and McCann, in this instance, environments such as these undermine the very purpose of command and render a commander powerless to accomplish his mission.<sup>221</sup> LGen Dallaire took the responsibility and wanted to achieve more. However, he was not authorized to achieve all that he wanted and all that was necessary. A number of conclusions can be made based on this result.

The first conclusion that can be drawn from this assessment points to the heart of the CAR model's intent. This result demonstrates that LGen Dallaire should not bear full and absolute responsibility for his mission's failure. He took full advantage of or

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<sup>221</sup> Pigeau and McCann, *Re-conceptualizing Command and Control*, 60.



maximized the results for those competency factors which were within his direct control or that he could influence.

In considering a second conclusion, it is appropriate to ask a further question – would another commander have had greater success in accomplishing what LGen Dallaire could not? All other things being equal, it is suggested that another commander would have made no difference. It is asserted that the mission would have failed regardless of which commander was leading the mission due to the ineffectual command environment the commander was forced to operate within and the failures evident within the UNAMIR mission. In summary, the circumstances were such that the most balanced commander couldn't possibly have affected the outcome.

A final conclusion that could be drawn relates to a –what if? scenario. What if one of the conditions had changed, how would it have impacted the result? It was noted that Dallaire was not afforded the legal authority commensurate with his position as Force Commander and which he needed to effectively execute his command. Legal authority in this context relates to power assigned and which may be expressed by orders, regulations and laws.<sup>222</sup> It also relates to providing the commander sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances as necessary.

The mandate of UNAMIR and the resources assigned to it were inadequate. But Dallaire could not affect change without the support and approval of UN Headquarters. For instance, when he wanted to stop the killings at the beginning of the genocide in early

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<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.

April 1994, he made a request for more troops and an enhanced mandate. Unfortunately, his request was not approved. If it had been approved, would it have made a difference?

Author Scott R. Feil commissioned a 70-page report titled *Preventing Genocide – How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda*<sup>223</sup>. This report was submitted to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Based on the research and expert panel which prepared the report, it came to the conclusion that had Dallaire's recommendations been adopted, UNAMIR —. .could have significantly altered the outcome."<sup>224</sup>

By adjusting the legal authority as suggested above, if he was afforded the resources (the means) as he had requested, he would have been operating within the Balanced Command Envelope. Within this preferred command capability area, a commander would have balance amongst the factors of competency-authority-responsibility, allowing him the best opportunity to achieve mission success.

The second model employed for the purpose of the command analysis was the Cohen and Gooch Layered Analysis model. The use of this model was for similar purposes as that of the CAR model – to prove that exclusive responsibility for failure should not fall to the commander alone. It was also used in order to examine the

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<sup>223</sup> Scott R. Feil, from Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1998, *Preventing Genocide – How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda* Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA372355&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>; Internet; accessed 18 Apr 2010

<sup>224</sup> Scott R. Feil, *Preventing Genocide . . .*, 3.

relationship and impacts of the various levels of the chain of command towards the key failure.

Figure 6 within chapter 3 provided a detailed overview of the command levels, critical tasks and the related subordinate failures towards the failure under analysis. By articulating failures that happened at each command level, a couple of conclusions can be made.

First, the Cohen and Gooch model resulted in the same initial conclusion as the CAR model – that the failure was not the exclusive responsibility of the military commander. A second conclusion relates to the linking of the failures. By linking the failures across the command levels, it resulted in the pathways to misfortune along the respective lines of operation. The scope of these failures was large and spanned most command levels resident within the UN and UNAMIR. Along the PLOO, the lack of political will was the main cause of the pathway to misfortune and it originated from the highest levels of the United Nations. Within the MLOO, the results show that command and control was the key contributor to the pathway to misfortune which was originated by the failures of the Secretary General and perpetuated down to the Force Commander. Lastly, the resultant assessment (shown in figure 6) also demonstrated the deficiencies that exist at and between the various command levels.

An additional feature of this model which has not yet been explored relates to the command structure's ability to learn, adapt and anticipate. According to authors Cohen and Gooch, an assessment in these critical areas can provide further insight into

organizational failures.<sup>225</sup> Each of these areas will be discussed in brief in order to illustrate how the UN failed in each regard. A full analysis is not required since the intent is to demonstrate simply the failures, not the full scope of those failures. Similarly, it is not necessary to attribute the individual failures to a specific command level since the analysis is considering the organizational structure as a whole and is assessing its impact on the ability of UNAMIR to fulfill the obligations of its mission.

Cohen and Gooch indicate that a failure to learn is not learning from recent successes or failures.<sup>226</sup> Without a doubt, the UN failed to learn from their recent experiences in Somalia. Somalia demonstrated the challenges of intervention in a country's civil war and the difficulties in managing a ceasefire. It also demonstrated the challenges in providing humanitarian relief and support in unstable regions. Challenges in determining the most appropriate mandate for the mission were evident. Finally, it demonstrated the institutional challenges in trying to negotiate troops to constitute a mission.<sup>227</sup> Many of these same challenges existed in Rwanda and it is clear that a loss of institutional memory or unwillingness to learn from their very recent past contributed to the failure of UNAMIR. It is recognized, however, that the UN and the peacekeeping management authority (DPKO) were under tremendous pressure to not repeat the

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<sup>225</sup> Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes* . . . , 25.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>227</sup> United Nations, —Somalia – UNOSOM I,” <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2010.

mistakes of Somalia in Rwanda. Perhaps this is why they were averse to taking risks. But nonetheless it does not excuse their failure to learn.

A failure to adapt involves the ability to –adapt to new and unexpected circumstances.”<sup>228</sup> In numerous areas of this paper, the degrading security environment within Rwanda was highlighted. It was also noted that this situation was briefed to UN Headquarters by the Force Commander. The DPKO, however, did not take appropriate measures to try and adjust the mandate, and other strategic factors, for the mission to deal with the altered environment in which it found itself. Their failure to adapt to the changes in Rwanda meant that UNAMIR did not have the requisite resources and mandate to do their job.

The third element to this aspect of the Cohen and Gooch model is the failure to anticipate. This is a failure to anticipate predictable situations or failure to take reasonable precautions against a known hazard.<sup>229</sup> This failure commenced with the poor reconnaissance mission which set the conditions for the mission. It has already been noted that many of the key players in this mission failed to accurately appreciate the fragility of the Arusha Peace Agreement. In addition, DPKO and UN Headquarters failed to anticipate the tragic events of 1994 based on the information that was contained in the –genocide fax” and in the few months that followed to the start of the genocide. In summary, they failed to anticipate the results of the degrading situation in Rwanda, despite the signs that were presented along the way.

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<sup>228</sup> Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes . . .*, 25.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

Given this brief analysis, it is necessary now to highlight the implications of combined failures across the learn-adapt-anticipate dimensions. According to Cohen and Gooch, a failure across all three dimensions (experienced either consecutively or simultaneously) results in a catastrophic failure. They assert that there is often ~~no~~ "no escape" from mission failure under this circumstance and the result can be total defeat and/or political collapse.<sup>230</sup>

### **Conclusion**

To this point, the assessment of results from the analyses has been done in isolation. What do the results indicate if considered in combination? Both models support the assertion that this mission failure was not the exclusive responsibility of the military commander. The CAR model extended this assessment by its assertion that no military commander could have succeeded under the conditions that existed within UNAMIR. The pathways to misfortune that resulted from the matrix of failure analysis supports this assertion – the scope and complexities demonstrated by the pathways to misfortune equally suggest that no military commander could have succeeded under these conditions. Finally, the learn-adapt-anticipate analysis which highlights the catastrophic failure that existed is equally supported of the other analyses results. Under the conditions that existed for this mission, it was destined for failure. The politics of failure meant that the mission and LGen Roméo Dallaire could never have achieved success.

Through his experiences in Rwanda, Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire became exposed to the harsh realities of political bureaucracy. "Peux ce que veux" does not

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<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

always hold true and, despite his best efforts, he was not able to influence the United Nations to stop the genocide. The lack of alignment between the mandate, force structure and political/social environment, compounded by the lack of political will and collective inaction of the United Nations, played a defining role in the events of 1994.

### **Where to from here?**

Military officers smartly state that a plan will not survive first contact with the enemy. This oft employed axiom reflects the uncertainty that surrounds military operations, whether they are domestic peacetime operations or military campaigns during times of crisis. It also emphasizes the fact that the mere existence of a plan is just not good enough.

Rwanda failed on many levels which were extensively addressed throughout this paper. But as we look to the future, Rwanda should not be forgotten because failure to heed the warnings of history invites failure for the future. It is under this lens that we can offer a few important lessons that should remain a cornerstone in planning for future missions.

It is a given that strategic factors are necessary if success is to be achieved. These strategic factors however must be mission-specific. No two missions are the same so taking from one mission and applying it to another may not be appropriate. This emphasizes the importance of enhancing political, military, cultural and other regional awareness prior to embarking on any mission.

Command also requires a strong complement of flexibility, adaptability and creativity by its leaders and the organization. This is perhaps the greatest challenge for commanders since in many instances the political machine that supports missions is not

structured to offer these vitally important characteristics or to allow the commander the freedom of movement to do what is required. Commanders must stretch the limits of their military capacity and extend the political boundaries without crossing them.

Missions must also be responsive to changes in the operating environment. If situations demand it, early intervention must be an option. If effectively executed, early intervention may enable mission success otherwise it could spell doom for the future. Finally this intervention cannot be done in isolation; it must be executed by all elements of the mission.

Rwanda demonstrated the vital significance of having a common vision and integration between the civilian (political) leaders and military commanders. Their efforts must be complementary and they must maintain a shared mission focus across all dimensions of their mandate. There must also be awareness that failure in one dimension could spell mission failure regardless of successes elsewhere. With the comprehensive approach of NATO, the DDR mission set for the UN and Canada's own 3-D model, a strategic and operational partnership of the political/civilian and military leadership will be critical for future missions. Forging of this strong partnership should be a pre-mission focus, potentially during pre-mission training that should be expanded to include the military commander and senior political or civilian leadership.

The international community and all of the instruments of international response must never forget Rwanda for fear of such genocides becoming a reality once again.

Never again.



## APPENDIX 1

### UNAMIR Security Council Resolution Summary<sup>231</sup>

UNAMIR was established by Security Council resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 to help implement the Arusha Peace Agreement signed by the Rwandese parties on 4 August 1993. UNAMIR's mandate was: to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.

After renewed fighting in April 1994, the mandate of UNAMIR was adjusted by Security Council resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, so that it could act as an intermediary between the warring Rwandese parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire; assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and monitor developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR.

After the situation in Rwanda deteriorated further, UNAMIR's mandate was expanded by Security Council resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, to enable it to contribute to the security and protection of refugees and civilians at risk, through means including the establishment and maintenance of secure humanitarian areas, and the provision of security for relief operations to the degree possible.

Following the ceasefire and the installation of the new Government, the tasks of UNAMIR were further adjusted by the Security Council to ensure stability and security in the north-western and south-western regions of Rwanda; to stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda to encourage the return of the displaced population; to provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda; and to promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda.

By resolution 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995, the Council decided to further adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that it would exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation; assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks throughout the country with military and police observers; support the provision of humanitarian aid, and of

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<sup>231</sup> United Nations. —United Nations – UNAMIR Resolution Summary.”  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirM.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2010.

assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining; assist in the training of a national police force; contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need.

By resolution 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994, UNAMIR was specifically asked to contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and of human rights officers, and to assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force.

On 12 December 1995, the Security Council, by its resolution 1029 (1995), further adjusted UNAMIR's mandate to focus primarily on facilitating the safe and voluntary return of refugees, and, as an interim measure, contributing, with the agreement of the Government of Rwanda, to the protection of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

The mandate of UNAMIR officially came to an end on 8 March 1996. The withdrawal of the Mission was completed in April 1996.

## APPENDIX 2

### 11 January 1994 cable – The Genocide Fax<sup>232</sup>

On January 10, 1994, General Roméo Dallaire, the Force Commander for UNAMIR in Rwanda, received the most important information from the Chief Trainer of the Interahamwe, the militia of the MRND party, indicating a plot to subvert the peace agreement, slaughter Tutsis at the rate of 1,000 Tutsis every 20 minutes, and kill ten Belgian soldiers to induce the Belgian government to withdraw its peacekeeping contingent. He also informed UNAMIR of four large stocks weapons. In addition, he said that there was a spy on the UN Secretary General's Special Representative's staff. In return for revealing the locations of the arms caches, the informer requested that he and his family be provided with asylum in the West.

When General Dallaire informed New York headquarters (see the cable below) of his plans to go after the arms caches, the plan was immediately vetoed. Further, Dallaire was instructed to inform President Habyarimana immediately about the information.

In investigations afterwards, and in spite of plenty of information that the cable was seen as a crucial item, Riza and Annan first claimed not to have any recollection of the cable, and later said that they received so much information that they did not realize its significance. However, they never ordered any further investigation. The suppression of the cable and follow-up action was the most blatant example of a missed early warning opportunity so necessary to the prevention and mitigation of genocide.

Date: 11 January 1994

To: Baril/DPKO/UNATIONS NEW YORK

From: Dallaire/UNAMIR/KIGALI

Subject: Request for protection for informant

Attn: MGen Baril Room No.2052

Force commander put in contact with informant by very very important government politician. Informant is a top level trainer in the cadre of Interahamwe armed militia of MRND.

He informed us he was in charge of last Saturday's demonstrations which aims were to target deputies of opposition parties coming to ceremonies and Belgian soldiers. They

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<sup>232</sup> eNotes.com. "January 11, 1994, Cable of General Dallaire to UN Headquarters." <http://www.enotes.com/genocide-encyclopedia/january-11-cable-general-dallaire-un-headquarters>; Internet; accessed 16 February 2010.

hoped to provoke the RPF BN to engage (being fired upon) the demonstrators and provoke a civil war. Deputies were to be assassinated upon entry or exit from Parliament. Belgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgians soldiers resorted to force a number of them were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda.

Informant confirmed 48 RGF CDO and a few members of the Gendarmerie participated in demonstrations in plain clothes. Also at least one minister of the MRND and the Sous-Prefect of Kigali were in the demonstration. RGF and Interahamwe provided radio communications.

Informant is a former security member of the president. He also stated he is paid RF150,000 per month by the MRND party to train Interahamwe. Direct link is to Chief of Staff RGF and president of the MRND for financial and material support.

Interahamwe has trained 1700 men in RGF military camps outside the capital. The 1700 are scattered in groups of 40 throughout Kigali. Since UNAMIR deployed he has trained 300 personnel in three week training sessions at RGF camps. Training focus was discipline, weapons, explosives, close combat and tactics.

Principal aim of Interahamwe in the past was to protect Kigali from RPF. Since UNAMIR mandate he has been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. He suspects it is for their extermination. Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis.

Informant states he disagrees with anti-Tutsi extermination. He supports opposition to RPF, but cannot support killing of innocent persons. He also stated that he believes the president does not have full control over all elements of his old party/faction.

Informant is prepared to provide location of major weapons cache with at least 135 weapons. He already has distributed 110 weapons including 35 with ammunition and can give us details of their location. Type of weapons are G3 and AK47 provided by RGF. He was ready to go to the arms cache tonight—if we gave him the following guarantee. He requests that he and his family (his wife and four children) be placed under our protection.

It is our intention to take action within the next 36 hours with a possible H-Hr of Wednesday at dawn (local). Informant states that hostilities may commence again if political dead-lock ends. Violence could take place day of the ceremonies or the day after. Therefore, Wednesday will give greatest chance of success and also be most timely to provide significant input to ongoing political negotiations.

It is recommended the informant be granted protection and evacuated out of Rwanda. This HQ does not have previous UN experience in such matters and urgently requests guidance. No contact has as yet been made to any embassy in order to inquire if they are prepared to protect him for a period of time by granting diplomatic immunity in their embassy in Kigali before moving him and his family out of the country.

Force Commander will be meeting with the very very important political person tomorrow morning in order to ensure that this individual is conscious of all parameters of his involvement. Force Commander does have certain reservations on the suddenness of the change of heart of the informant to come clean with this information. Recce of armed cache and detailed planning of raid to go on late tomorrow. Possibility of a trap not fully excluded, as this may be a set-up against the very very important political person. Force Commander to inform SRSG first thing in morning to ensure his support.

Peux ce que veux. Allons-y.

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