

## Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

## Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

**MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES THESIS**

**THE ADAPTIVE ARMY INITIATIVE AND  
AUSTRALIAN OPERATIONAL ART IN THE CONTEMPORARY BATTLESPACE**

By Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Rawlins

*This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Governments of Canada and Australia, or the Canadian Department of National Defence or the Australian Defence Force. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.*

Word Count: 31,987 (including quotes)  
27, 229 (less block quotes)

*La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada, le gouvernement Australien et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada et l'Australie. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.*

Compte de mots: 31,987 (27,229)

## CONTENTS

Table of Contents	ii
List of Figures	iii
List of Tables	iii
Abstract	iv
Chapters	
1. Introduction	1
2. <i>Adaptive Campaigning - Army's Future Land Operating Concept</i>	16
3. <i>The Adaptive Army Initiative</i>	32
4. Australian Operational Art and Generalship	57
5. Generating Adaptive Commanders to Practice a Contemporary Australian Operational Art	88
6. Conclusion	120
Bibliography	142

## **List of Figures**

Figure 3.1: *Adaptive Army Streams*

Figure 3.2: The New Army Functional Command Structure

Figure 3.3: Command and Control External to Army

Figure 3.4: Temporal Learning Loops

Figure 3.5: The Australian Army Training Continuum

## **List of Tables**

Table 3.1: Measures of Success for Implementing the Adaptive Army Initiative

## ABSTRACT

On 27 August 2008, the newly appointed Chief of Army announced the implementation of a significant reform of the Australian Army known as the *Adaptive Army Initiative*. The stated purpose of this initiative is to refit the Land Force, structurally, conceptually and culturally, to ensure it remains capable of winning the land battle in the complex operating environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The basis for change, and the design parameters for the future force, are both enunciated in new capstone doctrine - *Adaptive Campaigning – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept* (AC-FLOC).

In order to achieve this, a raft of inter-linked institutional, ideological and functional changes are postulated as fundamental to achieving cultural realignment, in order to generate an institutional culture of adaptation at every level. The future Land Force must demonstrate all the attributes of a complex adaptive system, in order to overcome a more sophisticated adversary employing asymmetric methods in the competitive learning (security) environment of the future. Changes to Army’s command and control architecture, force structure, education and training and other enabling processes are envisaged to ensure the Land Force is capable of translating strategic guidance into tactical action. Future commanders operating at the operational level of war must be proficient in the practice of the *operational art* in order to ensure unity of action across five lines of operation germane to all future security operations.

Two key commentators contend that this initiative replicates the pre-existing organisational penchant within the Australian Defence Force to ‘talk big’ but ‘walk small’ on this issue. Dr

Michael Evans charts Australia's political preference for small tactical contributions to global (alliance) security interventions, with an overarching strategic-tactical command and control architecture, that operates to limit the deployed force's exposure to close combat. An operational level commander, exercising full theatre command through the design and execution of campaign plans, is only enabled in regional security interventions where the risk of combat is negligible. Major General (retired) 'Jim' Molan warns that this type of experience at the operational level of war does little to prepare future operational commanders for the practice of the *operational art* in the most demanding of situations – the joint land combat line of operation. Together they point to Canadian experience in Kandahar province in Afghanistan, and the developing crisis as to who will assume operational command and control in Oruzgan province following Dutch withdrawal, as 'wake up calls' for the ADF. The clear and present danger is that the requirement to execute the *operational art*, to plan and execute campaign plans, and to prepare and command the force in extended joint combat operations may be forced upon the future land force, irrespective of Australia's political preferences. The ADF thus needs to better prepare future operational commanders for this responsibility, through enhanced educative and experiential opportunities, in the practice of a contemporary Australian *operational art* in the future battlespace. Both endorsed doctrine and a realistic appraisal of worst-case future contingencies demand the ADF remediate this problem.

An examination of the promulgated intent, direction and detail relating to the five streams of reform in the *Adaptive Army Initiative* reveals little focus upon these issues to date. Whilst the Chief of Army has recently and publicly expressed a measure of concurrence that

preparation and practice of the *operational art* is lagging, this acknowledgement is not reflected as a priority in the current reform process. The issue of what constitutes the priority strategic and operational requirements for the ADF, to which the *Adaptive Army Initiative* orients its measures of success, is afflicted by the ever-present realities of time and resource constraints. Evans and Molan argue that this lack of focus is not an issue of resources; rather it reflects a deliberate and pervasive hesitancy on the part of senior leaders in the ADF to prioritise and prepare for joint land combat at the operational level of war. This reflects a historical and contemporary appraisal that the government is unlikely to demand this capability from the ADF in the near future. Current education and experiential placement programmes reflect the approach that a contemporary Australian *operational art* will be limited to regional security leadership interventions, in which a premium on all other lines of operation other than joint land combat is evident.

This paper contends that it is well within the purview of the *Adaptive Army Initiative* to lobby for, and/or implement, educative and experiential reforms designed to enhance the proficiency of operational level commanders to fully execute the *operational art*. To fail to do so, given the premium placed upon the concepts of *operational art*, campaign planning and *generalship* in AC-FLOC, exposes the future Land Force to an unacceptable risk of operational future in the complex operating environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Failure to remediate this, given the strategic guidance promulgated in the *Defence White Paper 2009* and recent operational developments, constitutes a manifestation of Molan's dichotomy of a 'failure of *generalship*'

-----

## **THE ADAPTIVE ARMY INITIATIVE: AUSTRALIAN OPERATIONAL ART IN THE CONTEMPORARY BATTLESPACE**

*The Australian Army's success in force generation and preparation and the conduct of contemporary and future operations will be determined largely by its capacity to learn and adapt. Only through a continual cycle of reviewing and adapting in response to a changing environment will the Army retain its ability to fulfil its operational charter while also creating a culture that is capable of encouraging innovation and creativity. The 'Adaptive Army' initiative is more than a simple reorganization. It is a cultural realignment that seeks to generate profound change in training, personnel management, knowledge management, learning cycles and, eventually, the Army's culture.<sup>1</sup>*

---

*This is your last chance. After this, there is no turning back. You take the blue pill - the story ends, you wake up in bed and believe whatever you want to believe. You take the red pill - you stay in Wonderland and I show you how deep the rabbit-hole goes.*

Morpheus in *The Matrix*

---

<sup>1</sup> LTGEN Ken Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 7.



## CHAPTER ONE

Since Clausewitz penned *On War*<sup>2</sup> nearly two hundred years ago, introducing a comprehensive lexicon for the analysis of war, his work seems to have birthed its own cottage industry. This industry, recruited from the ranks of professional military officers, intellectuals and academics, toils indefatigably to distinguish the modern manifestation of war from that described by Clausewitz. Invariably, new developments or changes are described in extreme terms – as profound, revolutionary or paradigm-shattering – and normally constitute the basis for proposed changes to force structures, operational methods or capability development processes. The dangers of stagnation and institutional conservatism are deeply lamented, and select historical lessons are newly resurrected to justify the imperative for change. A very brief scan of recent professional and academic literature pinpoints the in-vogue epithets of this modern reformist movement – war has now become ‘complex,’ the belligerents ‘complex adaptive systems,’ the result of their interaction ‘operational uncertainty.’ New epistemologies, particularly the infant Science of *Complexity*, have been energized and vectored to selectively critique and discredit previous operational concepts and methods. Proponents of the ‘old school,’ who maintain the nature and characteristics of war have remained constant and inviolable, simply dismiss this ‘new hysteria,’ arguing “[T]he use of the new words arguably puts good old wine in shabby new bottles.”<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

<sup>3</sup> William F. Owen, "The War of New Words: Why Military History Trumps Buzzwords," *Armed Forces Journal*, November 2009, downloaded from URL <http://www.afji.com/2009/11/4114043> on 21 Feb 10.

On 27 August 2008, in his inaugural speech to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Canberra, the newly appointed Chief of Army (CA), Lieutenant-General Kenneth Gillespie, announced the implementation of a new reform of the Australian Army known as the *Adaptive Army Initiative*. In reviewing contemporary and future security environments, strategic guidance, and the efficacy of current structures and methodologies, this reform package clearly emanated from a similar wellspring - the nature and practice of modern warfare had altered, demanding a significant measure of organisational change. The basis for change would soon be promulgated in the 2009 publication of *Adaptive Campaigning – Army's Future Land Operating Concept* (AC-FLOC), providing the conceptual, doctrinal and force modernization direction to ensure Army's continued success in future operating environments.<sup>4</sup>

During this speech the Chief of Army outlined three challenges demanding attention. The Army needed to **continue** to excel on operations; it needed to **remain** capable, responsive and relevant; and Army's structure, organisation and processes needed to be **optimized** to exploit existing capabilities and resources, with the ability to develop new capabilities as required.<sup>5</sup> In light of the contemporary debate as to the *changed* or *changing* nature of modern war, the chosen language was instructive. There was no connotation of failure or deficiency levelled at the existing organisation; rather, the initiative would simply build upon the Army's recent operational successes, but this evolution would now be guided by a more refined conceptual model of the future battlespace delineated in AC-FLOC. Nonetheless, this superimposition of

---

<sup>4</sup> Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army. *Adaptive Campaigning: Army's Future Land Operating Concept* (Canberra, September 2009). This document, under development at the time of the announcement, subsumed and extrapolated previous conceptual documents that had been widely circulated for professional review within Army, including *Complex Warfighting* and *Adaptive Campaigning* (the former endorsed by the Chief of Army's Senior Advisory Committee on 7 May 2004, and the latter on 1 December 2006).

<sup>5</sup> Chief of Army speech to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 27 August 2008, downloaded from URL [http://www.army.gov.au/docs/Chief\\_Of\\_Army\\_Speech.pdf](http://www.army.gov.au/docs/Chief_Of_Army_Speech.pdf) on 21 Feb 10.

two distinct processes - *profound cultural change* on the one hand, with *careful evolution* on the other - appears jarring.

The *Adaptive Army Initiative* adopts this seemingly paradoxical methodology of a 'revolutionary evolution' warily, but quite deliberately. AC-FLOC dissects the current and forecasts the future operating environments, embedding its observations and deductions into the organisational psyche as capstone doctrine. From this analysis of the future battlespace the requirements and characteristics of the future land force are derived. The resultant force modernisation guidance conforms to an existing *concept-led* and *capability-based* philosophy, tempered by the ever-present realities of resource restrictions and ability to maintain accurate awareness of any threat.<sup>6</sup> Proceeding from this AC-FLOC design sheet, the *Adaptive Army Initiative* details both the specifications for the future Land Force and a roadmap for its implementation. The initiative is couched as the first iteration of a land force specifically tailored to meet the rapidly evolving demands of the contemporary and future operating security environments - an organisationally engineered *complex adaptive system* - designed and enabled to solve modern, complex and rapidly mutating security issues.

Despite this commendable aim, the *Adaptive Army Initiative* has attracted a range of critics since its announcement. This criticism has ranged from the 'shabbily rebottled restatement of Clausewitzian principles' school of thought, through to those who cautiously endorse the aim, but remain sceptical as to the likelihood of the initiative ever realising its own ambitious rhetoric. Some suggest the initiative simply pays lip-service to some of the more pressing, difficult or

---

<sup>6</sup> Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning, Army's Future Land Operating Concept...i*.

controversial criticisms of Army's recent deployed performances or approach to full spectrum operations. Once such school of thought goes so far as to suggest that without remediation, recent operational experience will actually predispose the ADF toward failure in attempting to convert contemporary strategic guidance into tactical success at the operational level of war.

This warning, advanced by its two key proponents Dr Michael Evans and recently retired Major-General Andrew ('Jim') Molan,<sup>7</sup> has seemingly also resonated in the recorded experiences and observations of a number of recently returned Army tactical commanders and staff officers. It is argued that Australia's penchant for strategic control of tactical actions has resulted in significant dissonance at the operational level of war - the level at which strategic guidance is translated into tactical action to achieve specified national security objectives. The methodology employed by a commander to achieve this translation is generally referred to as practice of the *operational art*. Consistency in strategic guidance from government, as well as in operational experience, both indubitably reflected in AC-FLOC, suggest that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will continue to operate at a high rate of tempo at this level of war for the foreseeable future as Australia maintains its contributions to global and regional security operations. The announcement on 20 February 2010, foreshadowing a withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan, and mounting pressure from NATO for Australia to assume operational command of Oruzgan province, has led many critics to argue that this crisis of experience may soon become manifest in either strategic (diplomatic) embarrassment or - potentially - operational failure.

---

<sup>7</sup> Dr Michael Evans is the resident Academic Fellow at the Australian Defence College in Weston Creek, Canberra. MAJGEN Molan was previously the Commander of the Australian Defence College, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) headquarters (under General Casey) in Iraq from 2004 to

This paper contends that the *Adaptive Army Initiative* inadequately addresses this concern. Whilst the initiative implements many reforms designed to facilitate the efficacy of operational command, it presently falls significantly short of addressing the identified requirement to prepare land force commanders for successful practice of the *operational art* in the complex operating environment of the early 21st century. Despite the measured language of simple evolution used by the new Chief of Army, the consistent background rhetoric proclaims this initiative as something much more than a simple reorganization of the Land Force in light of a revised appraisal of the nature of warfare. It is trumpeted as the catalyst for deep-seated *cultural change* in order to allow the Army to maintain relevance and succeed in a complex 21st century battlespace. Predating - but clearly informed by the most recent *Defence White Paper 2009* - the *Adaptive Army Initiative* defines the future operating environment as one in which the Land Force must be prepared to concurrently contribute to coalition operations as a force provider, but also be prepared to assume leadership of other forces as a regional security leader. The prosecution of concurrent expeditionary operations since East Timor in 1999 has led many to argue that Australia is now more fully engaged at the operational level of war than since Vietnam. In light of this criticism, identified geopolitical trends, and the emphatic analyses of AC-FLOC as to the necessary attributes of the future Land Force, the requirements for Army to train and prepare its current and future commanders for the practice of the *operational art* in combat operations have - seemingly - never been more pronounced.

---

2005. Both have been at the forefront of the position that the ADF presently lacks sufficient experience and ability to successfully prosecute *operational art* in contemporary **combat** operations as a security leader.

## What is the *Operational Art*?

Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1 (ADDP 00.1) *Command and Control* defines the operational art as the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations.<sup>8</sup> The practice of the *operational art* enables a commander, ostensibly performing command functions at the operational level of war, to translate strategic guidance into operational and (ultimately) tactical actions. ADDP 00.1 therefore asserts that it will require a commander to:

1. identify the military conditions or endstate that constitute the strategic objective;
2. decide the operational objectives that must be achieved to reach the desired endstate;
3. order a sequence of actions that lead to fulfilment of the operational objectives, and
4. apply the military resources allocated to sustain the desired sequence of actions.<sup>9</sup>

However, as Evans identifies, the operational level of war and the *operational art* are not completely synonymous concepts. The operational level of war is a more positional concept, in that it links and reconciles strategic and tactical actions within an overall continuum of activity. The *operational art*, in contradistinction, is a more cognitive and creative expression of the means and methodology employed by a commander to achieve this. Thus, according to Vego,

---

<sup>8</sup> Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication, ADDP 00.1 *Command and Control* (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, July 2009), 4.

the *operational art* is best defined as "...a component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting and sustaining major operations and campaigns aimed at accomplishing operational or strategic objectives in a given theatre."<sup>10</sup>

## Outline

This paper seeks to determine whether the *Adaptive Army Initiative* tacitly recognises this requirement, and if so, whether pragmatic measures have been implemented or are envisaged to address this deficiency in the practice of an Australian *operational art* in the 21st century.

In Chapter Two, the paper examines the conceptual and philosophical framework and force modernisation guidance underpinning the Adaptive Army Initiative - *Adaptive Campaigning: Army's Future Land Operating Concept*. This document, whilst recognising the inherent difficulty in predicting future conflict, outlines a series of baseline assumptions which are advanced as likely to be prevalent characteristics of the future global and regional security environments. The result of this confluence of factors is stated to generate a new and more dangerous operating environment for which the land force must prepare and continually adapt - the *complex operating environment* - typified by a new genre of *operational uncertainty*. The conceptual and philosophical response to this complexity that is developed is *Adaptive Campaigning* - a series of requirements, principles and tenets that the future land force must possess in order to be able to achieve the military component of a Joint and Whole of Government approach to resolving conflicts and advancing Australia's national interests. AC-

---

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>10</sup> Milan N. Vego, *Operational Warfare* (US Naval War College, 2000), 2.

FLOC explicitly identifies the *operational art*, campaign planning and *generalship* as necessary attributes of a future Land Force able to adapt and excel in the future battlespace.

In Chapter Three, the paper moves to an examination of the available detail of the *Adaptive Army Initiative*. The guidance provided by the Chief of Army to implement five streams that constitute the bulk of the initiative are expanded, based upon open source literature and unclassified elements of departmental directives. At its core, this initiative aims to make Army a more effective organisation, better positioned to operate across the spectrum of current and future joint operations in whatever capacity demanded by Government - most recently elaborated in the 2009 *Defence White Paper*. In order to achieve this, a raft of inter-linked institutional, ideological and functional changes are postulated as fundamental to achieving **cultural realignment**, in order to generate an **institutional culture of adaptation** at every level.<sup>11</sup> Adaptation is consistently couched as the self-evident antidote to operational complexity. The key focal areas for institutional adaptability are identified as Army's ability to shape and contribute to Australian Defence Force (ADF) strategic and operational planning, the closer alignment of force generation and force preparation processes, training effectiveness, output efficiency and the quality of information flow and decision cycles within key headquarters. A number of enabling functions including personnel, materiel and knowledge management processes are also targeted for reform to generate a professional workforce attuned to complexity and solving complex problems - ostensibly key characteristics of a force enabled to successfully practice the contemporary *operational art*.<sup>12</sup> Measures to reform the efficacy and responsiveness of joint

---

<sup>11</sup> LTGEN Ken Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 9.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, 13.



operational command of deployed forces are clearly evident as central to the *Adaptive Army Initiative*.

In Chapter Four, contemporary criticisms pertaining to Australian generalship and the ability of contemporary operational commanders to successfully practice the *operational art* are outlined. Following a brief outline of why a uniquely Australian invocation of *operational art* is considered necessary, the views of Dr Michael Evans and (retired) Major General Jim Molan - particularly in light of the seminal 2008 article *The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The ADF and Operational Art* - are examined. Any conformity between their views and recent observations and reflections by contemporary Army commanders with operational experience at battle group level are highlighted.

Finally, in Chapter Five, the paper analyses the likely ability and/or efficacy of the *Adaptive Army Initiative* to address these criticisms. In characterizing the initiative as a 'profound change,' the Chief of Army connotes an organization operating in a fundamentally different capacity to its predecessor, despite the carefully diplomatic employment of the verbs *remain*, *continue* and *optimize* in his inaugural speech. Generous observers would doubtless contend such language merely reflects executive hyperbole, designed to market and 'sell a brand' in order to garner support and resources; nonetheless, the energy and vigour with which this initiative has been advanced and gained momentum indicates it is likely more than just a clever marketing exercise by the new incumbent. The *Adaptive Army Initiative* has already realized significant doctrinal, structural and organisational change in the short 18 months since its public announcement in September 2008. Whether such change has the ability to, or is likely to facilitate any

improvement in the cognitive and experiential ability of Australian Army commanders to practice the *operational art* at the operational level of war is the key question for determination.

At this point, it must be noted that the *Adaptive Army Initiative* is self-heralded as a validated methodology - the result of 12 months comprehensive analysis, review and war-gaming to test the probative strength of its stated approach.<sup>13</sup> There is substantial evidence of the review recognising, accepting and committing Army to remediating many recent criticisms of its operational performance - particularly in light of hard lessons learnt across the full spectrum of conflict in recent operational deployments. There is clearly comprehensive compliance with the timbre of strategic direction articulated in the 2009 *Defence White Paper*. There is a focus on capturing and implementing lessons learned in short, medium and long learning loops. In recent speeches to the Australian Joint Command and Staff College courses, the Chief of Army has also recognised and accepted the flavour of criticism of Australian inexperience and reduced capability to practice a contemporary Australian *operational art*.

Yet despite this apparent recognition, AC-FLOC dedicates little more than seven short paragraphs to the foundational concepts of *operational art*, campaigning and *generalship*. There is little explicit recognition of, nor tangible direction for structural or organisational remediation that can be identified in the *Adaptive Army Initiative*, that realistically addresses the experiential or educational needs of future operational level commanders to effectively practice these skills. Whilst the ever-present danger of seeking to address every criticism, pre-empt all contingencies, and assuage every pundit is that the package may promise much but deliver too little, these

---

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, 8.

issues are clearly identified by the chief architect and capstone doctrine as being crucial issues for the future Land Force.

The *Adaptive Army Initiative* promises an Army "...better postured to contribute to the conduct of joint operations in a manner that balances our extant commitments with preparations for future contingencies...a more effective Army, and one that is well positioned to transition to the Army After Next in the coming decades."<sup>14</sup> In the words of one recent commentator lamenting a similar phenomenon after the *2000 Defence White Paper*, Army must beware of 'slip between cup and lip' in seeking to realize its own heavily marketed rhetoric.<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless, given the importance of the strategic guidance in the most recent *Defence White Paper 2009* and inklings of a NATO request for Australia to assume operational leadership in Oruzgan province in Afghanistan, Army may very well need to be mindful of 'slip between cup and lip' in promising an adaptive organisation able to forecast, adapt and successfully execute operational command in future global and regional security deployments necessitating joint land combat.

## **Methodology and Literature Review**

If the *Adaptive Army Initiative* expressly aligns itself to the modern battlespace, in order to equip the organisation for success, then the analytical battlespace for this paper is the conjugal verb - *adaptive*. It is clearly identified, both conceptually in AC-FLOC and culturally in the *Adaptive Army Initiative*, as the cornerstone quality upon which success in the contemporary and future

---

<sup>14</sup> LTGEN Kenneth Gillespie, "Implementing the Adaptive Army in 2009 - AL1," CA Directive 14/09, dated 24 August 2009, 7.

<sup>15</sup> Nick Jans, "People Issues in the White Paper: Beware of Slip Between Cup and Lip," *Security Challenges* 5, no 2, (Winter 2009).

battlespace depends. Its invocation connotes not simply a state of achievement, but an ongoing and iterative systemic process by which the organisation can constantly evolve in response to external stimuli in order to ensure operational success. The *adaptive commander* of the 21st century Land Force will be a commander who is able to successfully execute the *operational art* to design and oversee regional and global security campaigns, emanating the skills and qualities of generalship in clearly definable measure.

This character of adaptation presents an inherent difficulty in qualitatively appraising or validating the methodology of the *Adaptive Army Initiative* in preparing future commanders to practice the operational art. Because the initiative is lauded as but the first deliberate step in designing and developing an organisation capable of continual adaptation, determination of any measure of success will be essentially retrospective (in terms of current success) as well as predictive (in terms of how well the organisation has engineered itself for future circumstances). Nevertheless, in terms of looking at recent criticism of Army's operational performance and the observations and impressions of recent commanders, it is possible to scope the parameters of the expressed concern that the ADF has not - and possibly is not - optimally training and preparing commanders for the exigencies and intricacies of commanding at the operational level - in essence, to capably apply the *operational art*.

A second - and related - difficulty is the fact that the *Adaptive Army Initiative* is progressively being developed, and the intimate detail of the discrete measures that will ultimately put the 'flesh on the bones' of this reform process are still being debated, developed and tested. Nonetheless, there is a great wealth of detail in terms of the conceptual guidance and instruction

from the Chief of Army and Army Headquarters which provide a clear roadmap for the course and direction of the initiative. Indeed, the vast bulk of the literature and evidence in relation to the mechanics of the initiative are primary source documents emanating from the Chief of Army and his headquarters. The vast majority of these official documents, directives and orders are classified and thus - whilst referenced - are not available as open source documents. Feedback from recently deployed Army commanders at battle group and operational headquarter levels has also been referenced, but the anonymity of current serving personnel was also a precondition for the use of their impressions and observations. This tends to mirror many of the most recent articles published in the *Australian Army Journal*, in which discussion and debate as to the *Adaptive Army Initiative* and its requirements has been manifest.

The only real simplification of the process of reviewing and appraising the likely efficacy of the initiative in addressing the concern of contemporary operational art arises from the fact that the Chief of Army has very recently acknowledged this concern and indicated that it requires some measure of remediation.<sup>16</sup> This buttresses the identification of *operational art*, campaign planning, and *generalship* as being key concepts and necessary components of the future Land Force in AC-FLOC.<sup>17</sup> In terms of determining whether the initiative places a premium upon this remediation, an indication of any review or future scan of the joint professional military education system (JPME) at the Australian Defence College has been sought from various members of staff at this institution.

---

<sup>16</sup> LTGEN Ken Gillespie. Addresses to Australian Command and Staff College, 11 June 2009, downloaded from URL [http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/docs/speech\\_to\\_acsc-11\\_jun\\_09.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/docs/speech_to_acsc-11_jun_09.pdf) and 19 February 2010, downloaded from URL [http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/docs/CA\\_Speech\\_to\\_ACSC.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/docs/CA_Speech_to_ACSC.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning*...40.

I must also acknowledge - from the outset - that my own experiences, observations and reflections from my time as the Commander of Overwatch Battle Group (West) - Two, deployed to Southern Iraq in the period November 2006 to June 2007, infuse and influence this analysis of the *Adaptive Army Initiative*. Where my views or experiences differ from those other tactical and operational commanders recently deployed, I have acknowledged this in the footnotes.

## CHAPTER TWO

### ***Adaptive Campaigning - Army's Future Land Operating Concept***

*"The purpose of Adaptive Campaigning - Future Land Operating Concept (AC-FLOC) is to provide the conceptual and philosophical framework and force modernisation guidance to the Army in order to ensure that it remains postured to meet the demands of the future. It is developed firmly within the higher guidance and parameters provided by the Defence White Paper 2009 (WP 09)."*<sup>18</sup>

-----

*"The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards."*

Sir William Butler, Charles George Gordon (1907)

### ***The Philosophical and Conceptual Framework***

#### **A New Strategic Environment**

The *Adaptive Army Initiative* germinates from a position that the strategic environment in which Army operates has fundamentally altered: existing structures and processes cannot deal with the

---

<sup>18</sup> Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning*...iii.

scope and magnitude of this change. The analytical bedrock underpinning this argument is provided by Part 1 of *Adaptive Campaigning - The Future Land Operating Concept (AC-FLOC)*. AC-FLOC, whilst constituting capstone doctrine for the Army, is nevertheless subject to explicit caveats that it neither seeks to predict future contingencies nor functions as a “. . . prescriptive manual describing the methods of execution.” Rather, its purpose is to provide broad guidance for future force design based upon certain probable characteristics of the future security environment, thus it professes itself to be “...conceptual in approach, aspirational in purpose and dynamic in guidance.”<sup>19</sup>

Nonetheless, in effectively characterising the current and future security environments, AC-FLOC predicates its conclusions on eight extant assumptions:

1. **Globalization.** Globalization is predicted to further destabilize global security by creating new enemies of Western hegemony in the international order, conferring upon them unprecedented tools and geographic reach, enabling them to prosecute grievances in a more violent and systematic fashion.
2. **US conventional military primacy out to 2030.** The unipolarity of US conventional military dominance is predicted to force contenders into a posture of *avoidance behaviour*, characterised by the operational and tactical strategies of terrorism, insurgency, subversion, and information operations inducing strategic exhaustion,

---

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, 4. Doctrine is the formal and authoritative expression of military knowledge and thought. It is important to note that it does not reflect **policy**. Doctrine says 'how things should be,' not how they are. It attempts to be as universal as possible, and is thus prescriptive rather than proscriptive in purpose.



reducing the likelihood of decisive military success as a solution to international security issues.

3. **The predominance of intra-state conflict.** AC-FLOC posits that infra-state conflict will supplant inter-state conflict as the primary means of resolving cultural, ethnic and religious disputes in the international order.
4. **Consolidation of demographic patterns.** Population growth in the developing world will be marked by a corresponding decline in the populations of developed nations. This will likely generate destabilizing patterns of mass migration, humanitarian crises and extreme demographic responses to natural disasters, further exacerbating global and regional security issues.
5. **Increased resource competition.** Competition for resources will be fuelled by factors such as climate change, population growth, increased energy demands and declining fossil fuel resources, leading to infra and inter-state conflict over resources and territories containing resources such as oil and water.
6. **Accelerated urbanisation.** With up to 60% of the world's population predicted to live in cities by 2030, this will challenge the ability of governments and public infrastructures to meet basic human needs, creating mass civil unrest as well as increasing the likelihood of disease and pandemics.

7. **Technological advances.** The miniaturization and increased lethality of modern weaponry, including its affordability and accessibility, will increase the asymmetric capabilities of irregular or terrorist elements against conventional military forces.
  
8. **Global economic crises.** Economic downturns and recessions are predicted to exacerbate existing social instability in many nations, presenting the potential for a rise in extremism.<sup>20</sup>

These global trends are also predicted to have a correspondingly deleterious impact upon the regional security environment, which will require the Land Force to make active contributions to regional security arrangements; it must also be prepared to do so without assistance from coalition partners if necessary.<sup>21</sup> Accordingly, the ADF faces the likely simultaneous requirement to be both a global 'security contributor' whilst also operating as a regional 'security leader.'<sup>22</sup>

Whilst forecasting a continuation of these trends, AC-FLOC clearly posits that the future battlespace for Land Forces will be different from that previously encountered in two important respects - an *increased range of security contingencies within more complex urban environments*.<sup>23</sup> The clear implication is that any measure of *certainty* or *simplicity* - presumably legacy characteristics of the Cold War epoch - will no longer be operative in the future security environment. It suggests a new era of strategic asymmetry has supplanted the 'aesthetic

---

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, 8-12.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, 13.

<sup>22</sup> Michael Evans, "The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The ADF and Operational Art," *Security Challenges* 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008), 105.

symmetry' of the Cold War adversaries,<sup>24</sup> and the baseline assumptions from which AC-FLOC's strategic review proceeds reinforces this perception.

This position - unsurprisingly - also reflects the spirit of government guidance in the most recent *Defence White Paper 2009*. This document maintains the more 'expeditionary' security posture of its predecessor, based upon a similar analysis and characterisation of the current international security environment. Importantly, the 2009 White Paper stipulates that Australia must maintain the capability:

1. to act independently where there is a unique strategic interest at stake, where Australia would not want to rely on the combat forces of any foreign power;
2. to lead military coalitions where shared strategic interests are at stake and where Australia would be willing to accept a leadership role, in part to compensate for the limited capacity or engagement of others; and
3. to make tailored contributions to military coalitions where Australia shares wider strategic interests with others, and where Australia is willing to accept a share of the burden in securing those interests.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup> Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning*...13.

<sup>24</sup> Michael Evans, "The Continental School of Strategy: The Past, Present and Future of Land Power," Land Warfare Studies Centre, Study Paper no 305 (June 2004), 78.

Land Forces are directed to continue to be prepared to contribute to the stability and security of the immediate region,<sup>26</sup> and to intervene more widely in failed or fragile states on the basis that they remain vulnerable to adverse influences.<sup>27</sup> There is no geographic differentiation specified. On the basis of this analysis, AC-FLOC directs that the Land Force must be **designed** for contingencies in complex environments, and **optimised** for a diverse range of operations in complex terrain.<sup>28</sup>

### **The Complex Operating Environment**

It is from this point forward in AC-FLOC that the term *complexity* rises to its symbolic and literal ascendancy. Complex environments, complex terrain, complex problems, complex actors...AC-FLOC further distils changing strategic trends into a new set of conditions for Land Force operations known as the *Complex Operating Environment*. It is also at this point, in Chapter 3, that the true character and nature of modern war is most thoroughly distinguished from its Clausewitzian origins, as something far more *complex* and *adaptive* than its descriptive forefather would have likely ever contemplated.

AC-FLOC posits that the pace and intensity of modern technological and social change, coupled with the global and regional security trends outlined, results in a temporal and conceptual *compression* of the execution of modern battle. That is, Krulak's iteration of the 'three block war'

---

<sup>25</sup> Australian Government - Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, Defence White Paper 2009, downloaded from URL [http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence\\_white\\_paper\\_2009.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf) on 15 December 2010, 12-13.

<sup>26</sup> Defence White Paper 2009...59. The South Pacific and East Timor are highlighted.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, 35-36.

<sup>28</sup> Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning*...14.

- the synthesis of peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention and conventional mid-intensity battle on a single day within three city blocks - has itself become subject to even greater compressive force. Rather, the reality of the modern and future battlespace is a compression of every hitherto conceived type of activity across the spectrum of conflict into one activity: "...rather than the diverse range of activities occurring at separate times, on separate blocks, they are likely to occur all at once, on the same block. In other words, the *One Block War* or *Complex War*."<sup>29</sup>

Leaving aside the physical difficulties inherent in this extreme characterisation of future conflict, this analysis of the nature of modern war comes with much to commend itself. The superimposition of conventional and non-conventional forms of combat, concurrent application of kinetic and non-kinetic measures, and the merging of traditional military and increasingly criminal activities within tactical areas of responsibility no longer the sole domain of the military commander, certainly suggests a new form (if not a completely original invocation) of complexity confronting the future commander. Increased transparency and accountability, and the speed with which second and third order consequences may rapidly generate a new chain of events, are factors that are subsumed into this rubric of *Complex War*.

AC-FLOC argues that this modern manifestation of war ". . . involves the interplay of multiple diverse actors, all competing to influence the allegiances and behaviours of individuals, groups and societies, creating a complex system."<sup>30</sup> Shaping operations from tactical through to strategic levels will inevitably define and characterise future conflict. At each and every level, this interaction involves individuals, groups and societies learning and adapting as a result of their

---

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, 16.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, 16-17.

mutual interaction - a *Complex Adaptive System*.<sup>31</sup> The existence of an entity able to observe, understand and shape these relationships and interactions, linking strategic guidance to tactical action, is unstated but clearly connoted in this characterisation of the future battlespace.

Outside its complexity, this environment is also predicted to become more diverse, diffuse and lethal as a result of three enduring trends:

1. **The diffusion of lethality.** High levels of lethality will no longer be the sole purview of the nation state or conventional militaries. Instead, Land Forces will encounter individuals or groups with high lethality but low detectable signature across a diverse range of operating environments.
2. **The disaggregation of the battlespace.** Owing to significant improvements in ISTAREW capabilities and precision fires, the adversary will now seek to operate in smaller but highly lethal groups using unconventional and more subversive frameworks.
3. **The myth of the empty battlefield.** Smaller, more lethal and less detectable adversary grouping will continue to populate the battlespace, exploiting technological and psychological levers to dominate rather than physically occupy ground.<sup>32</sup>

AC-FLOC therefore predicts that in future war, the enemy will retreat into complex terrain (physical, human and informational) in order to operate below detection and discrimination

---

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, 17.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, 17-18.

thresholds, in order to blunt the technological and military superiority of conventional military forces. They will seek to win future conflict, fought in this complex terrain, through informational means - establishing a *dominant narrative* - to win the battle for the minds and hearts of populations with a stake in the outcome.<sup>33</sup> The future Land Force will need to be agile, decisive and networked in order to locate and defeat this sophisticated, unencumbered adversary.

The result of this confluence of adaptive actors, utilising complex terrain to negate the ISTAR EW advantage and exploiting technological and social levers to increase their lethality and informational persistence, is the emergence of another (seemingly) novel twist to the Clausewitzian concept of the 'fog and friction' of war - *Operational Uncertainty*.

### **Operational Uncertainty**

Rather than simply paraphrasing Clausewitz, AC-FLOC defines *Operational Uncertainty* as unpredictable and rapid spikes in the level of violence employed by an adversary.<sup>34</sup> Whilst not stated in the publication, this definition almost certainly recognises that an indigenous adversary will generally possess the initiative in future complex security operations. This adversary will generally wrest this advantage as a function of being able to operate below the detection or discrimination threshold, being able to mask the organisation in a human environment, only concentrating in order to rapidly escalate or de-escalate the level of violence as the situation or a strategy requires. Over time an adversary is also expected to adapt in order to exploit capacity

---

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, 20.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, 22-23.

gaps between traditional military and policing activities, which will generally form mutually reinforcing components of a Whole of Government security and stability operation.

AC-FLOC advances that the logical corollary is that Land Forces, whilst traditionally structured and trained to undertake warfighting operations, will be required to assume a range of additional responsibilities. This is because the Land Force is considered better able to cope with unpredictable spikes in violence than Other Government Agencies (OGAs) and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs).<sup>35</sup> It is axiomatic, therefore, that the scope and range of capabilities demanded of the Land Force will commensurately increase in future security and stability operations. An extension of traditional warfighting tasks, roles and capabilities is clearly countenanced. As Evans has noted, commanders at the tactical and operational levels will be integrated with or must deal with interagency, multinational and media elements. Accordingly, “...the 21st century officer is increasingly expected to be an ‘alchemical blend of multiple archetypes’—a blend of anthropologist, police officer and diplomat and yet still a joint warfighter.”<sup>36</sup>

Having outlined these challenges posed by the future operating environment, Part 2 of AC-FLOC then addresses itself to how Army must respond. Whilst the document concedes that war has always been complex, it is the *increased complexity* of future war that demands a current, cogent and comprehensive response from the Land Force. AC-FLOC advances that the touchstone element of this response, in both conceptual and organisational terms, is the essential quality of *adaptability*. Accordingly, in Chapter 4 a new operational methodology known as *Adaptive*

---

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*, 22.



*Campaigning* is invoked, whilst the institutional embodiment becomes the *Adaptive Army*, requiring the fundamental capabilities specified in Chapter 5.

### **The New Methodology - *Adaptive Campaigning***

AC-FLOC defines the conceptual response - *Adaptive Campaigning* - as "[a]ctions taken by the Land Force as part of the military contribution to a Joint and Whole of Government approach to resolving conflicts and advancing Australia's national interests."<sup>37</sup> Whilst this definition does not, in itself, outline how Army must adapt itself to the future operating environment, AC-FLOC suggests Army must address itself to five lines of operation that will be present in all future conflicts:

1. **Joint Land Combat** - those actions required to defeat organized resistance and secure the environment in order to set aside and sustain the conditions for other lines of operation.
2. **Population Protection** - actions to provide protection and security to threatened populations in order to set the conditions to establish order and the rule of law.
3. **Information Actions** - actions to inform and shape the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour and understanding of target population groups; to assure the quality of friendly information; and to disrupt or dislocate adversary command capabilities.

---

<sup>36</sup> Michael Evans, *From the Long Peace to the Long War: Armed Conflict and Military Education and Training in the 21st Century*, Australian Defence College Occasional Paper no 1 (2007), 16.

4. **Population Support** - actions to relieve immediate human suffering by establishing, restoring, or temporarily replacing necessary essential services in affected communities, in order to positively influence the population and gain their support.
  
5. **Indigenous Capacity Building** - actions to facilitate the establishment of capacity within civil communities whilst concurrently establishing longer-term governance and socio-economic activity meeting the needs of the indigenous population.<sup>38</sup>

AC-FLOC contends that each of these lines of operation are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and the Land Force will only be successful if it can orchestrate and successfully prioritize effort across all five lines simultaneously. *Adaptive Campaigning* therefore clearly reinforces the contemporary view that coordinated Whole of Government effort is necessary for the resolution of future complex security dilemmas. Nonetheless, as *Operational Uncertainty* will intrude upon and impede this effort, the Land Force must be prepared to assume many of these tasks in the absence - temporary or otherwise - of other specialist agencies.

Up to this point AC-FLOC is merely descriptive of the environment, without providing any meaningful insight into mechanisms by which complexity or uncertainty can be mitigated or overcome. Four key elements are therefore introduced and explained in terms of their capacity to empower the Land Force to overcome complexity and uncertainty:

---

<sup>37</sup> Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning...* 27.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, 28.

1. **The Operational Tenets of Success** - in order for the Land Force to effectively orchestrate effort across all 5 lines of operation, it must demonstrate the operational tenets of flexibility, agility, resilience, responsiveness and robustness.
  
2. **The Adaptation Cycle** - the Land Force must gain detailed situational understanding through physical interaction with the problem (a bias for action), allowing the force to learn and adapt to conditions through the cycle ACT - SENSE - DECIDE - ADAPT (the ASDA cycle). This interaction - *Adaptive Action* - will generate a "...greater understanding of complex situations as well as an enhanced capacity to deal with them, the ability to learn at all levels, and an understanding of when adaptation is needed" in what is termed the *competitive learning environment*.<sup>39</sup> *Mission command* is advanced as the optimal command and control methodology to allow subordinate commanders to fully interact with the problem within a higher commander's intent, promoting faster and more effective learning cycles and therefore accelerating the process of adaptation.
  
3. **The Human Dimension** - in order to ensure success, the Land Force must equip personnel at every level with cultural competency, sound ethical and moral underpinnings, and complex analytical and decision-making skills exploiting modern technological, communication and networking capabilities.

---

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, 31-32.

4. **Operational Art and Campaigning** - the Land Force must equip its senior commanders with revised campaign design and operational planning skills more appropriate to the contemporary and future complex operating environments.<sup>40</sup>

## **Operational Art and Campaigning**

AC-FLOC identifies the need for future commanders to be skilled in the practice of the *operational art* in order to realise the synergies of Adaptive Action and Mission Command. The application of *operational art* is divided into two critical components: firstly, campaign design and operational planning, and secondly, the personal and professional attributes of *generalship*. This cognition of the *operational art* therefore contemplates a holistic view that a commander must be capable of planning as well as prosecuting operations in conjunction with political and interagency counterparts. AC-FLOC posits that:

"The Land Force has a requirement to educate and develop joint and interagency commanders skilled in the operational art at all levels from combat team to joint task force; this must encompass skills and experience developed throughout one's career that enable the military commander to master strategic dialogue across the military and political domains. Army must recognise the critical role of generalship in order to prepare the Land Force for the challenges of future conflict."<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, 30-41.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, 40. AC-FLOC defines *generalship* as "...the exercise, by General (star-ranked) officers, of military command and leadership in its widest connotation in the planning, preparation and conduct of military campaigns. Generalship

Whilst defining generalship as a series of attributes and skills resident in the operational commander, AC-FLOC nevertheless highlights the fact that the contemporary battlespace necessitates tactical commanders also have an understanding and ability to practice the *operational art*. No longer the remit of a single layer of command, recent operational experience suggests tactical and strategic commanders will also become involved in conducting, or assisting in the conduct, of operational planning. Operation HELPEM FREN (2003), in which the Commanding Officer of an Australian infantry battalion deployed as both the Battle Group commander of a combined arms battle group, as well as the Joint Force Commander of a Joint, Multi-National force as part of an Australian Federal Police-led mission, is highlighted as a seminal example of this requirement.<sup>42</sup>

Strangely, however, given this compression of strategic, operational and tactical command requirements, and the characteristics of the *Complex Operating Environment* rendering previously linear-based planning methodologies obsolete, AC-FLOC argues that, in the Australian context, a revised and **circumscribed** approach to campaign planning is necessary. The Whole of Government approach to future security operations, in which the strategic objectives of a campaign are likely to be described in a list of agreed accepted enduring conditions, will likely mean that "...Operational Art is a little more circumscribed than envisaged in existing doctrine and involves the orchestration of tactical actions, through one or more lines of operation, to ultimately achieve the directed strategic accepted enduring conditions."<sup>43</sup>

---

requires competency in the application of the full range of tools through which conflict is handled and is based upon the exercise of direct leadership to inspire others to think, act or endure."

<sup>42</sup> It is - nevertheless - important to note that this mission did not contemplate nor realise any combat operations against an organised resistance, whether military or insurgent.

AC-FLOC posits that these various concepts and attributes constitute the philosophical and conceptual framework - the design sheet - from which an Adaptive Army must be built. The remainder of the document dedicates itself to a closer analysis of the actions and effects required across the 5 lines of operation under *Adaptive Campaigning*. In order to now determine whether the current reform process addresses the requirements of this 'design sheet', it is necessary to examine exactly what the *Adaptive Army Initiative* portends for the future Land Force.

---

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, 40.

## Chapter Three

### *The Adaptive Army Initiative*

*"The Adaptive Army is more than a simple reorganisation. It is a series of inter-linked initiatives, bound together through common intent, to ensure that the Army remains relevant and effective and that it maintains its reputation as one of the nation's most respected institutions..The Adaptive Army initiative is a **cultural realignment** designed to inculcate an **institutional culture of adaptation** at all levels of the Army."*<sup>44</sup>

-----

On 28 August 2008, the day after his inaugural speech to ASPI, the new Chief of Army released CA Directive 22/08, *"Adaptive Army: The Evolution of Army's Higher Command and Control Structures."*<sup>45</sup> This document constituted the first formal prescriptive direction to the Australian Army on the background, aim, intent and scope of the initiative. The reform process was, and continues to be, lauded as the most significant restructuring of the Australian Army since the Hassett reforms of 1973.<sup>46</sup>

This response to the environmental scan inherent in AC-FLOC, and the most recent guidance provided to the ADF in the *Defence White Paper 2009*, is termed the *Adaptive Army Initiative*. It

---

<sup>44</sup> Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI...8-9.

<sup>45</sup> LTGEN Ken Gillespie, "Chief of Army Directive - 'Adaptive Army': The Evolution of Army's Higher Command and Control Structures - AL1", CA Directive 22/08, dated 5 November 2008.

<sup>46</sup> Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI...9.

emanated from a 'rigorous self-examination' by Army in the preceding twelve months before its official unveiling in September 2008. Extensive wargaming and modelling by key agencies including Army Headquarters and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), are said to have generated "...an initiative designed to ensure that the generation and preparation of land forces is conducted more effectively and efficiently and is better aligned with the new joint command framework."<sup>47</sup>

As stated, the initiative is lauded as the most significant restructuring of the Army since the Hassett reforms of 1973, which embedded the functional headquarters structure into Army. The Hassett reforms reflected lessons learnt from the Australian Army's involvement in the Vietnam conflict, building a structured framework of command, control and training that drew a dividing line between individual and collective training, and imposed a strict hierarchical system of headquarters to exercise command and control over Army elements. It is argued that these structures reflected assumptions of an era where joint operations were the exception rather than the norm, and the single services tended to collaborate more effectively with allied counterparts than with the other services within the ADF.<sup>48</sup> With the institution of a culture of defence self-reliance first expressed in the *Defence White Papers* of 1987 and 1994, it is felt the ADF has now developed a truly joint operating mindset, which was given its first formal structural incarnation with the establishment of an operational level headquarters on 31 January 1997.<sup>49</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, 8.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>49</sup> At that time the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) delegated command at the operational level to a permanent Commander Australian Theatre (COMAUST). This commander and his headquarters, Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAUST), were later reviewed and have transformed into Commander Joint Operations (CJOPS) and Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQ JOC) on 16 March 2004.



The initiative aims to create a more effective organisation, structured to meet the requirements of the contemporary and future operating environments, by achieving five important goals:

1. improving the Army's alignment with, and capacity to influence, the ADF's strategic and operational joint planning;
2. improving force generation and preparation whilst balancing operational commitments and contingency planning;
3. increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of training within the Army;
4. improving the linkage between resource inputs and collective training outputs within the Army's force generation and force preparation continuum, and
5. improving the quality and timeliness of information flows throughout the Army so as to enhance its adaptation mechanisms at all levels.<sup>50</sup>

As expressed, the initiative seeks to achieve more than just a reorganisation of existing functional structures, but rather to inculcate the institutional *culture of adaptation* as demanded by AC-FLOC. Accordingly, five **streams of activity** are envisaged as depicted in Figure 3.1.

---

<sup>50</sup> Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI...10.




Figure 3.1 - Adaptive Army Streams<sup>51</sup>

### Rebalanced Command and Control and Force Structure

The first, and arguably most tangible, aspect of the *Adaptive Army Initiative* to be implemented to date, has been an evolution of Army's higher command and control structures. The stated purpose of this restructuring is to better enable force generation and preparation functions to meet the needs of operational deployments and contingencies. This will necessitate enhancement of the Land Force's adaptive cycles by better aligning headquarters to identify and exploit short, medium and long learning cycles.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

In order to maintain current operational commitments, whilst facilitating transition, the restructure and re-roling of functional headquarters has occurred sequentially over a twelve month period:

- a. On 3 December 2008, **Headquarters 1st Division** (HQ 1 Div) was re-roled to focus upon the **force preparation** of conventional Army force elements for specified operations and contingencies;<sup>53</sup>
- b. On 27 January 2009, **Army Headquarters** (AHQ) was restructured into 2 divisions. The first division, under Deputy Chief of Army (DCA), assumed a focus on Army's current operations, whilst the second, under command of the new Head Capability Development - Army (HC-A), assumed responsibility for force development and strategic planning.<sup>54</sup>
- c. On 1 July 2009, **Forces Command** (FORCOMD) was created with the primary function of **force generation** of Army individual and collective capabilities based upon Foundation Warfighting Skills.<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> Gillespie, CA Directive 22/08...2.

<sup>53</sup> Force preparation takes forces worked up to a particular state of general collective readiness and expertise in foundation warfighting skills, and attunes them to the specific demands and requirements of a particular mission or theatre, certifying them for readiness to undertake mission specific tasks and roles. HQ 1st Division also became subject to assignment under operational control of Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQ JOC) for operational planning purposes from this time.

<sup>54</sup> This subscribes - in many respects - the continental staff system of orthodoxy of dividing staff effort to allow focus groups to dedicate their attention to current operations (G3) and future operations (G5).

<sup>55</sup> The force generation cycle is a progressive cycle that enables units to be at the highest appropriate state of training prior to their assignment to 1st Division and/or CJOPs for force preparation or deployment. This new headquarters subsumed the former Headquarters Land Command (LCOMD) and headquarters Training Command (TRGCOMD) and took under command all Army elements and units previously assigned to these former Commands.

Over time, following development and implementation of a series of supporting actions including the *Rebalancing the Army Initiative*, this command and control structure is anticipated to reach mature state around 2013, as depicted in Figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2 - The New Army Functional Command Structure<sup>56</sup>

As previously indicated, this structure has the stated aim of more closely aligning headquarters to the most relevant temporal learning cycle in order to facilitate faster learning, and thus adaptation.

**Forces Command**, the headquarters responsible for force generation of Army force elements for operations, is to utilise a single training continuum to unify the majority of Army's conventional

<sup>56</sup> Australian Army, "Adaptive Army Public Information Paper," 26 August 2008, <http://www.army.gov.au/AdaptiveArmy/docs/Adaptive%20Army%20Public%20Info%20Paper.pdf>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2010.

individual and collective training. The primary learning focus is the medium learning loop and thus doctrine development in support of Foundation Warfighting Skills.

**Special Operations Command** retains its extant missions and functions including both the force generation and force preparation of special forces elements for deployment on operations, therefore focusing on the short learning loop sequence.


**Headquarters 1st Division**, with its focus upon force preparation of Army force elements, will conduct higher level collective training for directed missions and contingencies. Its principal learning focus is also the short learning loop and therefore the development of tactics, techniques and procedures for contemporary operations.<sup>57</sup>

These new arrangements have been designed to both align the Army command structure more closely with current ADF joint command arrangements, whilst still allowing the Land Force to maintain single-service specialist warfighting skills. ADF joint command arrangements have clearly established Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQ JOC) as the principal measure for command and control of ADF assets at the operational level of war. Thus the initiative also stipulates that Army force elements must be fully capable of operating as part of a joint and/or interagency task force, though the precise mechanism by which this will be achieved is not elaborated upon in any great detail.

The role of HQ 1 Div will clearly be critical in this process, as it will serve as the 'bridge' between a number of these functional areas, in terms of both planning, command and control and

training of deployed force elements. This headquarters is to retain its capacity to deploy as a joint headquarters on operations, and is to work synchronously with Commander Joint Operations (CJOPS) in the conduct of operational planning. HQ 1 Div is allocated the responsibility of providing technical land advice for CJOPS planning and campaign design. COMD 1 Div is also allocated the responsibility for mounting all conventional operations conducted by conventional Army force elements and thus assumes the responsibility for certifying these elements as trained, ready and capable of fulfilling allocated tasks and missions.

This command and control structure, in terms of its interface with the ADF joint command and control hierarchy, operates according to Figure 3.3.




**Figure 3.3 - Command and Control External to Army<sup>58</sup>**

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> LTGEN Ken Gillespie, "Chief of Army Directive - 'Adaptive Army': The Evolution of Army's Higher Command and Control Structures - AL1", CA Directive 22/08, dated 5 November 2008, B-2.

Headquarters 1st Division is to also exercise technical control of all deployed Army force elements on behalf of the Chief of Army.<sup>59</sup> Intrinsically - and crucially under the auspices of the *Adaptive Army Initiative* - this also confers the responsibility for ensuring the lessons learnt from these elements are captured, absorbed and transmitted into the Army's various learning cycles as delineated in Figure 3.4.<sup>60</sup>



**Figure 3.4 - Temporal Learning Loops<sup>61</sup>**

<sup>59</sup> *ADF Joint Operational Command and Control 2001* specifies that technical control is not a command or operational authority but is used to designate the specialized and professional operating end employment procedures essential to the proper management and operation of forces. Technical control advice may not be modified but may be rejected in part or total by a commander in consideration of operational factors.

<sup>60</sup> Headquarters 1st Division has recently established an Adaptive Warfare Cell responsible to overseeing the short learning loop observation and analysis cycle.

<sup>61</sup> Australian Army, "Adaptive Army: An Update on the Implementation of the Adaptive Army," 8 May 2009, downloaded from URL

A key organisational addendum within this system is the creation of the new Land Combat Readiness Command (LCRC), raised in December 2008 and to achieve initial operational capability by 1 March 2010, expanding and subsuming the previous Combat Training Centre (CTC). Coming under command of HQ 1 Div, in support of its force preparation function, the role of this organisation is to "...provide practiced, ready and certified forces for specific operations and contingencies, as directed by CJOPs, to ensure the successful conduct of joint, combined and inter-agency operations."<sup>62</sup> Additionally, this agency will also conduct warfighting training to support the achievement of Army's mission essential task requirements - presumably this refers to the conduct of foundation warfighting skills for Army elements outside the preparatory, deployment and reconstitution cycle for operations.

Finally, the *Rebalancing the Army Initiative* seeks to ensure Army capability is aligned with Government strategic direction as enunciated in the *Defence White Paper 2009*. A truncated process of review and reconstitution is to be implemented to remove capability hollowness, the trimming of force structure not fully funded and therefore not manned or equipped to a desired capability level. This rebalancing in order to remediate force structure hollowness is to take place over a period of time, such that by 2014 the Army achieves a force structure that: (1) has remediated its hollowness, (2) maintains an appropriate mix of capability and workforce, and (3) remains operationally deployable, affordable and structurally sustainable.<sup>63</sup>

## **Personnel Initiatives**

---

[http://intranet.defence.gov.au/armyweb/sites/CA/docs/ADAPTIVE\\_ARMY\\_PAPER\\_08\\_May\\_09.pdf](http://intranet.defence.gov.au/armyweb/sites/CA/docs/ADAPTIVE_ARMY_PAPER_08_May_09.pdf); accessed 14 January 2010, 7.

<sup>62</sup> Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI...12.

<sup>63</sup> LTGEN K. Gillespie, "Rebalancing Army," Chief of Army Directive 20/09 dated 6 May 2009, 3-4.



That people constitute the bedrock of capability is so widely intoned in contemporary militaries that it constitutes an ubiquitous truism. The *Adaptive Army Initiative* invokes this very same metaphor, citing as critical to its success Army's ability to recruit, train, develop and retain high quality uniformed and civilian personnel. However, rather than being content to simply reflect the historical metaphor, the initiative differentiates itself by cajoling Army to better educate and cognitively equip its people in order to "...embrace, lead and exploit the opportunities" offered by the complex operating environment.<sup>64</sup> Accordingly, the initiative ushers in a raft of personnel initiatives designed to attract, educate, condition and retain Land Force personnel with the cognitive wherewithal to survive and indeed, *prosper*, in this complex 21st century battlespace.

Whether the proposed reform measures actually represent an appropriate or effective methodology to achieve this, given their presently embryonic state, will take some time to determine. Nevertheless, the *Army People Plan*, released in May 2009, has commenced the process of establishing a workforce of the appropriate size, and properly trained and educated to become the AC-FLOC envisaged *complex adaptive system*. The *Army People Plan* revolves around six main themes:

1. Maximising Army's people capability through the effective use of the total workforce.

This theme focuses on fully integrating the regular, reserve and civilian part of the workforce to ensure that the workforce is balanced across ranks, categories and specialisations.

2. Providing competitive employment offers to attract and retain people. This theme focuses on ensuring Army remains an attractive and competitive employer, delivering compelling employment offers that appeal to both potential and current employees.
3. Developing personnel throughout their career. This theme entails development and sustainment of innovative methods for developing personnel and ways in which leadership can be cultivated at all levels.
4. Maintaining the health and wellbeing of Army personnel through the provision of health and mental health services, and improved occupational health and safety programmes, in order to improve the resilience of personnel and their families.
5. Improving Army personnel management. This theme focuses on ways of improving all aspects of personnel administration and improving the quality of human resource data.
6. Clear and consistent communication of personnel policies, strategies and initiatives. This theme looks to institute comprehensive ways of communicating personnel initiatives to Army and their families.<sup>65</sup>

A 'comprehensive strategy' for the career development and progression of officers is also envisaged to create leaders with the intellectual ability to "...perform a diverse range of activities in an increasingly complex environment" and "...the ability to adapt effortlessly to dynamic and

---

<sup>64</sup> Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI...13.

<sup>65</sup> Andrew Hetherington, "Plan for Our People," *Army*, Edition 1210, April 16, 2009, 2.

challenging scenarios."<sup>66</sup> A diversity of postings exposing officers to a wider range of command, leadership and management demands in a variety of challenging and dynamic environments is encouraged, and yet - somewhat paradoxically - a transition to three year command appointments and general posting tenures is instituted. Whilst the extension of command tenure from a 2 to 3 year period will arguably meet the aim of ensuring "...continuity for a single command team to manage a full deployment cycle within a unit or formation, including pre-deployment, deployment and reconstitution," and allow commanders to consolidate their skills without having to compress training regimes, the reduction in exposure to a wider variety of command, leadership and managements positions concomitant to a three year posting tenure is not explicable using the same logic. The posting of operational level commanders to coalition or allied headquarters engaged in joint land combat operations is not addressed or detailed in present reform initiatives.

### **Enhanced Education and Training**

The initiative also seeks to implement a new *Army Training Continuum*, tailored to generate Land Forces capable of joint, combined, and interagency operations in the complex 21st century battlespace. In this respect, its aim aligns to that of its forebear - the uniqueness resides in the execution of a continuum tailored to generate an *Adaptive Army*, overseen by a single command (FORCOMD) ensuring a "...unified approach to the conduct and assessment of training" across Army.<sup>67</sup> This contrasts with the previous functional command system in which Training Command was responsible for individual training, whilst Land Command retained responsibility

---

<sup>66</sup> Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI...14.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid*, 15.

for collective training. This division of responsibilities, and associated organisational inertia borne of established training regimes, was a source of great consternation to deployed commanders as Army's tempo exponentially increased in the late 1990's. It became extremely difficult to align training regimes between these two commands to individual and collective availability within units based upon deployment cycles.

The Army Training Continuum subsumes the full spectrum of training from *ab initio* training (basic training), through individual training (skills to enable individuals to take their place as a team member), and finally collective training of teams, constituted by foundation warfighting and ultimately mission specific training as demanded by a mission, environment and threat, as depicted in Figure 3.5.

## THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY TRAINING CONTINUUM




Figure 3.5 - The Australian Army Training Continuum<sup>68</sup>

Guided by the philosophical and conceptual framework of AC-FLOC, the new Army Training Continuum focuses upon the development of these foundation warfighting skills as the bedrock for operational capability. Conceivably, this entails a focus upon conventional high-end warfighting skills which can then be adapted and/or supplemented by other skills and attributes enabling the Land Force to conduct the full spectrum of sustained operation demanded by the *complex operating environment*. Whether this is to incorporate any of the additional tasks and responsibilities of other agencies, in order to overcome *Operational Uncertainty*, is not elaborated upon in any of the open source documentation available to date. Whether any aspect

<sup>68</sup> Australian Army, "Adaptive Army Public Information Paper," 26 August 2008, downloaded from URL: <http://www.army.gov.au/AdaptiveArmy/docs/Adaptive%20Army%20Public%20Info%20Paper.pdf>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2010.

of this training continuum addresses the practice of the *operational art* is also not delineated in any great detail in any other document other than the identification of a need in Part Two of AC-FLOC.

The initiative also seeks to engender a learning environment by which the Army can become a *true learning organisation* - where "...shared, timely knowledge and flexible learning are accepted as the norm for individuals, teams and the organisation."<sup>69</sup> This *Army Learning Environment* is to be delivered through the *Army Continuous Learning Process* structured along three lines of development: training and education, lessons integration, and the creation of an environment conducive to learning. It will be achieved when the Army boasts an environment characterised by the optimal conditions for learning where lessons are routinely converted into learning in a relevant, effective and efficient manner.<sup>70</sup> Whether any such lessons are transferred or absorbed into the joint professional military education (JPME) architecture designed to prepare officers for more senior appointments at the operational or strategic levels is also not delineated in documentation to date.

### **Material Management Improvement**

Director General Plans and Preparedness - Army (DGPP-A) is tasked with the restructuring of materiel management to support the *Adaptive Army Initiative*. The aim of this enabling reform is to reduce the cost of ownership and improve availability of Army equipment to better support restructured organisations. The *Adaptive Army Initiative* is advanced as providing "...the

---

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, 15.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, 15.

necessary impetus to address equipment holdings in units versus loan and training pools, the inventory required to sustain existing capability and the maintenance system," in order to develop a unitary and integrated materiel management system.<sup>71</sup> Specific management reforms already commenced include a review of inventory managed by the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), a review of performance measures and reporting under the Materiel Sustainment Agreements, a review of preventative management regimes, and a repair pool trial for B vehicles.

The (seemingly paradoxical) outcome that is sought is for Army to increase the maintenance capacity within individual units whilst, concurrently, reducing the maintenance burden, through a raft of reforms to be implemented by the DMO and Joint Logistic Command (JLC). This is to be achieved through more efficient materiel management processes to reduce the cost of ownership, such that the availability of land materiel can be increased through a reduction in unit equipment holdings and an expansion in maintenance system capacity from the unit level to the national support base. Initial guidance on improvements to inventory management and reduced costs of ownership were promulgated in CA Directive 22/08.

### **Army Knowledge Management**

The *Adaptive Army Initiative* identifies knowledge management as one of the key mechanisms to optimise learning and the process of adaptation in the Land Force. Accordingly, the initiative enunciates the requirement to develop an agile, robust and responsive system for knowledge management, through five streams of effort:

---

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, 15.

1. **Workforce and Communications** - to improve individual and group networking through media such as 'blogging', in order to facilitate more collaborative knowledge sharing.
2. **Leadership** - the transition of Army's achievement of strategic goals to an online medium utilising the most accurate corporate databases.
3. **Task and Army Diary Management** - to provide unified transparency to actions, milestones and reforms underway in Army.
4. **Information Management** - the foundation stream promulgating clear business rules and protocols to be enforced throughout Army, adaptable and easily revised as technology and processes evolve.
5. **Army Knowledge Domain** - to facilitate more collaborative knowledge sharing across Army.

The optimal confluence of people, training and knowledge management is stated to be an "...essential pre-requisite to the achievement of a truly adaptable army for the twenty-first century."<sup>72</sup> The sum result of all these measures, according to the Chief of Army, is that:

---

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*, 18.



"The Adaptive Army Initiative will ensure that Army is better positioned to contribute to the conduct of joint operations in a manner that balances extant commitments with preparations for future contingencies. Quite simply, the Adaptive Army Initiative will result in a more effective Army, and one that is well positioned to transition to the Army After Next in the coming decades."<sup>73</sup>

### **The Implementation Strategy**

As indicated, the initiative is presently in its infancy, with many of the organisations affected by and responsible for detailed reform measures, still developing and implementing directives. In this sense, the initiative at this stage, outside the macro command and control restructuring, can only provide the broadest of guidance to subordinate headquarters and formations to inform their development and implementation of the spirit and intent of the reform. Chief of Army has nevertheless indicated that the initiative represents a design to inform more detailed planning at Functional Command and formation levels. The stated approach is to devolve development and implementation as far as possible in order to both empower and exploit expertise at the relevant organisational level:

"My intention is to identify issues for resolution, issue guidance, and then continue providing subordinate commanders the freedom to produce detailed solutions based upon their situational awareness at the levels at which they operate. This approach aims

---

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, 19.

to allow for better solutions to the challenges we face, and provide for broader ownership of the solutions to the problems we face as an Army."<sup>74</sup>

This also seems to be fully in line with the spirit and operating methodology of a *complex adaptive system*.

### **Metrics for Success**

Chief of Army defines the endstate for the initiative as being met when Army has in place self-sustaining processes to continually review and adapt Army objectives, structures and processes necessary to maintain the five goals of:

1. improving Army's alignment with and capacity to inform ADF strategic and operational joint planning;
2. execution of force generation and preparation balancing current commitments and contingency planning;
3. effective and efficient training through the integrated Army Training Continuum;
4. linkage between resource inputs and collective training outputs within the force generation and preparation continuum, and

---

<sup>74</sup> Gillespie, Chief of Army Directive 22/08...3.

5. improved quality and timeliness of information flows throughout Army to enhance adaptation mechanisms.<sup>75</sup>

In delineating his measures of effectiveness, CA has prescribed that the initiative is to be guided by a single highest measure of success:

"Adaptive Army will be successful if it aligns the outputs of Army's force planning, force generation and force preparation with the joint strategic and operational requirements of the ADF, efficiently and effectively."<sup>76</sup>

Importantly, in line with the emphasis upon and background analysis of complex *adaptive systems*, the initiative also details measures of failure. This stems from the assumption that organisations at high risk of high impact failures tend to develop methods to allow them to cope better with complexity, generating a preoccupation with failure, which in turn leads to early identification and arresting of unfavourable trends. Accordingly, the initiative enunciates measures of success as well as articulating specific 'mistakes' that are stated to be 'unallowable'.

Functional Commanders are directed to develop appropriate measures of effectiveness for their parts in implementing the *Adaptive Army* as well as ensuring the iterative review and operation of their commands in an adaptive fashion. Guidance is provided for measures of success and failure at the following levels of command:

---

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

- a. **Army level.** Effectiveness at the 'endeavour' level requiring the definition of overall measures of success and failure for the implementation of the initiative. This focuses on design of the appropriate force generation and force preparation process, and its adaptive refinement as demanded by developing circumstances and strategic guidance.
  
- b. **Functional command level.** Functional Commands are directed to develop and promulgate the measures of success and failure pertaining to the correct force generation and preparation measures, and the functions to achieve and adapt them as demanded by circumstances.
  
- c. **Formation level (and below).** Functional commands, in conjunction with subordinate formation units, are to develop and promulgate measures of success and failure appropriate to selection and achievement of the right prioritised *tasks* within force preparation and generation measures. These measures should also take into account measurement of adaptation requirements.<sup>77</sup>

Army-level measures of effectiveness nesting beneath the each of the five goals were promulgated by the Chief of Army in November 2008, as detailed in Table 3.1.

---

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid*, G1-2.

**Table 3.1 - Measures of Success for Implementing the Adaptive Army Initiative<sup>78</sup>**

Goal	Measures of Success	Measures of Failure
<p>Improve Army's capacity to shape and inform the ADF's strategic planning.</p>	<p>Army is able to provide better quality information to external organisations, in a more timely manner, to shape current and future Army commitments.</p> <p>Army is better able to quantify funding current and future requirements, and is allocated sufficient resources by Government to achieve its strategic goals.</p>	<p>Army unable to provide quality information that shapes current and future Army commitments.</p> <p>Army is unable to quantify funding current and future requirements better than the current practice.</p>
<p>Improve Army's capacity to inform the joint planning for the conduct of operations.</p>	<p>Army has better quality information on the status of Land FE, in near real time through the development and implementation of an IT-supported, command-led capability/readiness reporting system.</p>	<p>Army is unable to influence the production of campaign plans by HQ JOC.</p>
<p>Better execute force generation and preparation, in a manner that balances operational commitments and contingency planning.</p>	<p>Army is able to provide direction to Functional Commands and synchronise their effort to produce appropriately trained individuals and collective organisations.</p> <p>Army FE that are 'fit for purpose' for each mission are able to be prepared in the minimum time required with an optimum level of resources.</p> <p>Army has better quality information on the status of Land FE in near real-time. Linkage of Functional Commands to HQ JOC for planning is established and effective.</p>	<p>Army has not provided Functional Commands sufficient flexibility in their information sharing, and planning support, relationships with HQ JOC</p> <p>Army does not provide sufficient quality direction to Functional Commands and synchronise their effort to produce appropriately trained individuals and collective organisations.</p>
<p>Increase the effectiveness and efficiency of training within Army through the development of a Single Training Continuum.</p>	<p>Army is able to clearly define the level of capability to be provided by Land FE against known resource inputs.</p> <p>Army is able to provide better quality guidance to Functional</p>	<p>Disunity between the approaches taken for individual and collective training - no single training continuum.</p> <p>Different standards and approaches for collective training</p>

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid*, Attachment 1 to Annex G.

	Commands on the priority for resourcing (including allocation of personnel and strategic fleet management) of Functional Commands.	between Functional Commands.  No alignment between operational requirements and collective training.
Improve the linkage between resource inputs and collective training outputs within Army's force generation and preparation continuum.	Army is able to provide accurate forecasts of collective capability outputs which are possible when providing input for the Defence Management and Finance Plan (DMFP).  Army is able to provide informed estimates to the CDF, in advance, of the costs for changes in force posture and capability.	Army is unable to provide accurate forecasts of collective capability outputs possible when providing input for the Defence Management and Finance Plan (DMFP).  Army is unable to provide informed estimates to the CDF, in advance, of the costs for changes in force posture and capability.
Improve the quality and timeliness of information flows throughout Army in order to enhance Army's adaptation mechanisms at all levels.	Army has improved its capacity to inform short and medium term capability development (across Fundamental Inputs into Capability) to support operational commitments and contingency preparations. Army's longer term concept development process is better informed and able to prioritise capability requirements for the Army After Next (AAN).  Systematic implementation of readiness reporting.	Information is not relayed to AHQ in a manner that facilitates timely decision-making.          No systemic readiness reporting.

It is also important to note that the *Adaptive Army Initiative* is also specified to be **resource neutral**, through the identification of offsets and a focus upon the (what seems to be the now institutionally entrenched) process of increasing efficiency. Director General Resource Management - Army (DRGM-A) is directed to develop a resource forecasting and management concept to support the initiative, whilst Director General Plans and Preparedness - Army (DGPP-A) is empowered to conduct Unit Establishment Reviews in order to trim surplus manpower positions and equipment holdings to give full effect to the *Rebalancing the Army Initiative*.

Importantly, Deputy Chief of Army is allocated the responsibility of ensuring that the evolved command and control structure for Army aligns with the current, and any proposed, joint command and control arrangements. Army's linkages and arrangements with the other Services, Defence Groups and agencies are to be considered and factored into any restructuring activities in order to ensure alignment and interoperability is maintained and/or enhanced.

This measures constitute the macro overview of what the *Adaptive Army Initiative* seeks to achieve in developing and sustaining an organisation attuned and capable of succeeding in the contemporary and future complex operating environments. The process of determining the detail of many of these reform measures is ongoing and is presently not widely disseminated in open source documentation. Nonetheless, the intent and objectives of the Army, functional and formation level reforms are apparent from both doctrinal and directive publications from Army Headquarters. The basis for reform is manifest not only in the observations and analyses undertaken by the Chief of Army and Army Headquarters, but also in response to a variety of other criticisms, critiques and observations afforded by a wide variety of commentators reflecting upon the operational and institutional performance of the Army in recent years.

## Chapter Four

### ***Australian Operational Art and Generalship***

"In short, the operational art, the great intellectual contribution of the continental school of strategy to 20th-century military theory, retains significance for two interconnected reasons. First, across a wide battlespace, only the logic of operational art prevents war from descending into a flurry of disconnected engagements governed by the calculus of attrition. Second, because campaign planning is defined by the requirements of strategy, operational art remains as important to modern warfare as the realm of tactics."<sup>79</sup>

-----

"Our capability now at the tactical level is very high, except for our experience of close combat. Our strategic generalship is as good if not better as it has ever been. But there is a black hole in the middle in the operational area."<sup>80</sup>

#### **The Operational Level Conundrum**

Australian joint doctrine defines the operational level of war as being concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations to achieve strategic political

---

<sup>79</sup> Michael Evans, *The Continental School of Strategy: The Past, Present and Future of Land Power*, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Study Paper no. 305 (June 2004), 84-85.

<sup>80</sup> MAJGEN Jim Molan, quoted by Patrick Walters, "Army Strength Questioned," *The Australian*, 19 July 2008, downloaded from URL <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/army-strength-questioned/story-e6frg8yo-1111116956632> on 1 March 2010.



objectives.<sup>81</sup> It is recognised that the majority of operations conducted at this level will be joint operations. ADF (joint) and Army doctrine elaborate further in specifying that in the contemporary and future security battlespace, these operations will more frequently be joint, interagency and/or integrated Whole of Government in nature. Operations at this level may also involve forces from other countries in allied or coalition operations. Most importantly, as is mutually recognised in the doctrine of most other Western nations, the operational level is said to provide the link between the strategic and tactical levels of war, ensuring that strategic direction (government guidance) is translated into tangible, realistic and synchronised actions at the lowest activity levels in order to maintain both focus and unity of effort.

Nonetheless, Australian doctrine explicitly recognises that - in reality - the distinction between these levels can and does become blurred by the realities of the contemporary battlespace.

Australian Defence Doctrine Publication - D (ADDP-D) posits that a particular action may be so critical to a campaign, and a campaign so critical to a war aim, that a particular tactical action may invite or necessitate direct strategic oversight. Similarly, the impact of pervasive and insistent media attention may also generate patently strategic implications or outcomes from discrete tactical actions, which may also encourage strategic command and control of tactical action.<sup>82</sup> Yet, as AC-FLOC highlights, the modern complex operating environment - characterised by the concept of *Operational Uncertainty* - demands a more responsive and agile command and control architecture to allow land forces to adapt at a faster rate than a smaller, less encumbered and less constrained enemy. *Adaptive Action* and *Mission Command* are therefore highlighted as vital components of *Adaptive Campaigning* to allow a situational

---

<sup>81</sup> Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication - D, *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine* (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2005), 3-4.

commander to more rapidly process information, and thus appropriately act and adapt in the adversarial competitive learning environment.

Paradoxically, however, AC-FLOC contends:

"The result is, in effect, a campaign framework that may be largely provided to the operational commander for implementation. In this context, operational art is a little more circumscribed than envisaged in existing doctrine and involves the orchestration of tactical actions, through one or more lines of operation, to ultimately achieve the directed strategic accepted enduring conditions."<sup>83</sup>

It could be suggested that AC-FLOC seeks to 'hedge its bets' in this regard. Whilst accepting the primacy of strategic direction, AC-FLOC nevertheless recognises that a convoluted and bureaucratic strategic to tactical command, communications and control (C3) mechanism is likely to be too unwieldy to effectively prosecute the ASDA cycle faster than a contemporary adversary. AC-FLOC therefore posits that an alternative approach is necessary "...to position the Land Force to learn and adapt more quickly than its enemies, both at the individual and collective level."<sup>84</sup> This new approach must allow tactical forces the freedom of action to quickly and effectively respond to an adversary only occasionally surfacing above detection and discrimination thresholds, whilst still assuaging the modern demand for continual strategic input into the direction of operational command.

---

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*, 3-5.

<sup>83</sup> Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning*...40.

## Delegation of Command - Theatre Command

One of the extant ADF doctrinal principles of command and control which traditionally serves to obviate this difficulty is **delegation of command**. This principle circumscribes the ADF philosophy of centralised direction with decentralised execution, fully synchronous with and enabled by the methodology of Mission Command espoused in AC-FLOC. Capstone doctrine specifies that at all levels of command "...subordinate commanders should be given necessary directions and resources to enable them to conduct the tasks required of them. Devolution of authority, and cultivation of leadership skills at all levels of the ADF, are vital means of ensuring the future effectiveness of the ADF."<sup>85</sup>

In accordance with this philosophy, ADF strategic level command and control arrangements are organised hierarchically from the strategic to tactical - with the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) normally exercising command of ADF operations through Commander Joint Operations (CJOPS), who is supported by his functional Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQ JOC). The CDF directs the respective Service Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Force (and possibly Special Operations Command) to assign requisite forces to CJOPS for these operations. From this it can be seen that a functional level of command is clearly interposed between the strategic and tactical levels in Australian command and control architecture, ostensibly to ensure tactical actions accord with strategic direction. Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1 (ADDP 00.1) expressly contextualises this as follows:

---

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid*, 32.

<sup>85</sup> ADDP-D...8-4.

"The operational level of command is the primary responsibility of CJOPS. This level of command plan, synchronise and conduct campaigns and operations to achieve strategic objectives. The operational level provides direction and resources to force elements (FE) taking military action, thus acting as the interface between the strategic and tactical levels of command. The focus of command at this level is on forming joint forces, deploying them into areas of operations, monitoring and controlling operations and sustaining them logistically."<sup>86</sup>

Thus whilst the CDF retains the right to command operations when necessary, in practice CJOPS exercises command at the operational level, or can delegate **theatre command** of assigned forces to a commander situated in theatre. CJOPS remains accountable to the CDF for deriving from the military strategic endstate operational level planning guidance for the development of operational objectives, as well as the mounting and conduct of designated operations to achieve these operational objectives. Theatre command may be exercised by CJOPS personally, but where concurrency of operations and/or the operating environment requires it, theatre command would normally be exercised by a designated Joint Task Force (JTF) commander who forms a suitable headquarters in theatre.<sup>87</sup> Delegation to a commander on the ground in the operating environment is fully contemplated by Australian joint military doctrine and AC-FLOC, and is usually considered to be optimal for rapid and informed tactical decision-making. Given the exigencies of One Block War, the speed of decision-making contemplated by the ASDA adaptation cycle, and the rapidity of violence connoted by the concept of *Operational Uncertainty*, the establishment of a theatre headquarters with greater environmental and temporal

---

<sup>86</sup> ADDP 00.1...4-2.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid*, 3A-1.

situational awareness, would seem to be the optimal C2 architecture for future complex operations.

However, recent operational experience suggests a reticence on the part of government and/or the ADF to implement a fully enabled and operative, theatre command headquarters for Australian tactical forces engaged in global coalition operations. This reticence is not as apparent in ADF command and control arrangements for regional security operations, where Australia appears more willing to assume lead nation command and control responsibilities.

### **Recent Joint Deployments at the Operational Level of War**

The recent tempo and concurrency of ADF deployments throughout the region and globe since 1999 has led many to contend that Australia is now more fully engaged at the operational level of war since the Vietnam conflict. The increased commitment of ADF elements up to an including several concurrently deployed battle groups in support of the Global War on Terror, with battle group and JTFs also deployed on regional security and stability operations, coupled with the relatively recent implementation of a joint command and control architecture in the ADF, forms the basis for the argument that the ADF is now fully committed and functioning at the operational level of war. The establishment of a Joint Task Force 633 (JTF-633) headquarters in Baghdad in 2005, with National Command Executive (NCE) authority with a measure of command oversight of concurrent battlegroup operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with operational control from HQ JOC, buttresses such an assertion. Similarly, the deployment of individual augmentees in positions of responsibility in senior coalition headquarters at both

the strategic and operational levels also indicates that Australian officers are now fully engaged in the planning and direction of operations - if not campaigns - at the operational level of war. Nonetheless, the caveated nature of the operational command and control exercised by these headquarters has led several key commentators to observe that whilst ostensibly created and engaged in direction of Australian forces abroad, these headquarters and their commanders are not fully enabled to practice the true *operational art*.

### **The Emasculated View of Australia's Contemporary *Operational Art***

Whilst – ostensibly – the ADF has conducted a variety of successful contemporary operations spanning these three levels since 1999, several eminent authorities have questioned the real depth and character of this experience. Most recently, internal criticism has intensified in relation to Australia's expertise and ability to both plan and execute effective **combat** operations at the operational level of war. Academics such as Dr Michael Evans, returned operational-level commanders such as Major General Jim Molan, and a number of recently deployed battle group commanders, have all questioned the self-proclaimed robustness of the ADF to plan and execute operations at this level in the contemporary or future battlespace described by AC-FLOC. These critics question both the depth of contemporary experience, and (more importantly) the motivation to address any inexperience, in identifying, training and preparing commanders for the exigencies of combat operations at the operational level of war - in essence, in the application of the *operational art* in the most extreme conditions of the future battlespace. Their views of this most extreme environment accords precisely the Joint Land Combat line of operation specified as critical to *Adaptive Campaigning*, outlined in Part Two, Chapter Four of AC-FLOC.

In 2008, in his controversial article “*The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The ADF and Operational Art*,”<sup>88</sup> Dr Michael Evans concluded that Australia’s geographic, geopolitical and military history had conspired to undermine a proper conceptualisation a modern Australian “way of war.” Evans argued that these (unmitigated) factors have generated a cadre of Australian commanders patently unprepared for the burden and exigencies of contemporary command at the operational level of war. At the time of publication this criticism bristled many serving and recently retired senior officers in the ADF. It almost immediately generated a number of counter-opinions from recently retired Chiefs of the ADF as well as various Service Chiefs, particularly given the generally accepted view that the ADF had performed very creditably on operations in East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Iraq and Afghanistan during their tenure. However, the crux of Evans’ contention was that a historical legacy of Australian success at the tactical level as a small force provider to global operations, and the ‘straight-jacket’ of intellectual stagnation imposed by a continental defence focus of the last two decades of the twentieth century, combined to **mask** an induced weakness at commanding operations at the operational level of war. Appraised ‘success’ was a function – simply – of the relatively benign nature of operations being conducted at the operational level during this time. The convergence of these two factors still conspires to derogate – if not disintegrate – an appropriate conceptualisation of the *operational art* appropriate to Australia’s middle power geopolitical position. Without such conceptualisation, Evans considers it inevitable that the existing joint professional military education (JPME) system will fail to properly prepare commanders for the application of the *operational art* in the future battlespace.

---

<sup>88</sup> Evans, *The Closing of the Australian Military Mind*...131. The article was researched and written at the request from the Commandant of the Australian Defence College, Major-General Jim Molan.

Evans has continued to be outspoken and blunt in his assertion that Australian senior military leadership continues to neglect this "...development of operational art as an educational seed bed for developing future senior joint force commanders."<sup>89</sup> Sporadic success in heavily circumscribed tactical combat actions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and operational success as a force leader in *regional security operations* (East Timor and the Solomon Islands), have effectively duped senior leadership into a sense of complacency as to the likely future parameters of ADF command and control at the operational level of war. Failure to recognize or acknowledge this continues to represent a veritable 'closing of the mind,' thus exposing the ADF to a risk of future failure at the operational level in the contemporary security climate. Evans warns that the current security climate and timbre of government direction means that the ADF can no longer simply bank upon only providing small, measured and caveated tactical elements to coalition forces abroad, under the direct command of strategic headquarters in Canberra. Rather, the default force design template needs to be based upon the ability to field a self-contained Joint Task Force (JTF), capable of operating across the entire spectrum of conflict, with an operational headquarters capable of effectively coordinating a series of tactical actions within a given theatre. This headquarters would operate doctrinally - actually and effectively - in translating strategic direction into tactical action, exercising delegated theatre command as extant Australian joint command and control doctrine envisages:

"A new Australian approach to operational art must aim to translate the requirements of Australia's global-regional interface into a comprehensive operational rationale for the use of military force for global 'missions of choice' and regional 'missions of



necessity’ ...to field a self-contained Joint Task Force designed for regional ‘missions of necessity’ but one that is also capable of fulfilling global commitments that transcend the traditional strategy-tactical alliance model if this is required by policy-makers. Any realistic approach to operational art must seek improved integration and linkage, if not a synthesis, between the alliance and lead-nation operational models of military activity. This is a conceptual challenge that confronts the ADF with the dual need to simultaneously address its legacy of inexperience in lead-nation operational activity while seeking better operational-level linkages in more traditional alliance missions.”<sup>90</sup>

Evans suggests it is axiomatic that the ADF must train, educate and prepare a commander for this type of command in accordance with its own specified doctrine - that is, within the parameters as detailed by AC-FLOC. This would demand an operational level commander capable of exercising theatre command over a Joint Task Force – whether Australian or coalition – as well as being proficient in the design and execution of associated campaigns, whether global or regional in character. Whilst not explicitly stated in the *Defence White Paper 2009*, ADF doctrine or AC-FLOC, this could conceivably entail a potential (and controversial) requirement for an Australian operational commander to plan campaigns and lead coalition forces in combat operations as a global security leader in the future. Whilst not explicitly stated, such an eventuality is neither ruled out nor dismissed in any strategic or doctrinal publication presently operative.

---

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid*, 105.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid*, 125-126.

Evans certainly stops short of suggesting that Australian commanders should assume responsibility for the command and control of coalition forces, and the development and execution of combined and integrated coalition campaign plans, in the current Global War on Terror (GWOT). At this point in time, governmental guidance and the trend of Australian contribution to the GWOT suggests that Australia will continue to contribute an array of tactical force elements, with Australian commanders fulfilling the traditional role of a *National Command Element* (NCE), ostensibly to ensure compliance with Australian political-diplomatic direction rather than being responsible for the operational planning and direction of tactical combat operations. Evans highlights this as the more traditional Australian ‘small force provider’ contribution model, in which:

“...[s]trategic control from Canberra is usually more important than operational thought or operational design and tactical presence may be as important as tactical performance. Indeed, alliance or coalition objectives may be political-diplomatic rather than military-strategic. In the alliance model, the most significant feature is that force provision is based on choice with participation being about protecting national interests within an allied campaign plan. The strategic-tactical levels of warfare are what matter with any deployed headquarters often performing as a facilitation mechanism.”<sup>91</sup>

Whilst this approach may be the more strategically 'comfortable' position for Australian policy-makers, Evans nevertheless suggests that this model could soon become obsolete, if it is not already so. Indeed, it does not take a large intuitive or intellectual leap of faith to deduce that the

confluence of international security conditions and government national security policies, charted in both the *2009 Defence White Paper* and AC-FLOC, may soon demand Australian commanders at the operational level exert more direct influence and control over deployed operations, based upon the regional-global security nexus enunciated by Evans. Recent news articles suggest that NATO and the United States are about to 'call Australia's bluff' and request Australia assume operational command over Oruzgan province in late 2010, following the likely withdrawal of Dutch forces from Southern Afghanistan. This situation may prove to be the catalyst to explode this politically preferred means of waging war via the mechanism of a limited strategic-tactical campaign, scathingly identified by the Australian political analyst, Paul Kelly, in 2002:

"For half a century the Australian way of war has been obvious; it is a clever, cynical, calculated, modest series of contributions as part of US-led coalitions in which Americans bore the main burden. This technique reveals a junior partner skilled in utilising the great and powerful while imposing limits on its own sacrifices."<sup>92</sup>

Whilst the Australian government has hitherto downplayed the pressure from the US government and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assume operational command in Oruzgan, many commentators as well as professional military officers are suggesting this would

---

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid*, 123.

<sup>92</sup> Paul Kelly, "No Lapdog, this Partner Has Clout," *The Australian*, 28 August 2002, downloaded from URL <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a713707181&db=all> on 5 April 2010.

be in Australia's long-term international security and diplomatic interests.<sup>93</sup> The assumption of this role would clearly demand the ADF, and most likely Army, field a capable Joint Task Force commander - one able to execute the roles and responsibilities outlined in Australian doctrine at the operational level of war, specifically in the Joint Land Combat Line of Operation identified in AC-FLOC.

This is precisely the type of situation envisaged by Evans, and the one for which he contends the current training system does not adequately prepare individuals. Even if the concept of deployed operational command sits somewhat uncomfortably with the current generation of senior Australian 'generals,' used to the exercise of strategic command of tactical force elements, the contemporary operational environment described in both governmental and ADF environmental scans renders such traditionalist conceptions obsolete. Command at the operational level must now be based upon functional imperatives, rather than the traditional view that an operational commander was only needed once Australian force elements reached a specified operational 'size.' Bailey highlights the fact that there have always been doubts as to how such a cumbersome command and control architecture could ever enable a force to be agile, responsive and maintain decision superiority over an adversary in the complex contemporary battlespace:

"...the challenge of how to manage and exploit the high-density, three-dimensional battlespace of the future, incorporating fire and manoeuvre on land and in the air, with low-level control but high-level command, has yet to be convincingly explained."<sup>94</sup>

---

<sup>93</sup> Michael Vincent, "Push for Australian Command Role in Afghanistan", ABC News - The World Today, downloaded from URL <http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2010/s2841771.htm> on 4 April 2010.

AC-FLOC certainly does not actually seek to explain, nor promote, this methodology as appropriate given the characteristics of the future complex operating environment. Evans thus argues it is imperative that the ADF develop a unique Australian conceptualization of *operational art* and prepare commanders for its execution in contemporary global and regional security operations. The strategic-tactical interface is no longer responsive enough to guarantee timely translation of strategic direction into tactical actions against the modern adversary in the contemporary *complex operating* environment. Evans does little more than suggest the ADF realise its own doctrine in equipping future operational level commanders for this role:

“In order to try to link lead-nation force-generation operational model with the alliance force-provision model the ADF should pursue an operational art that reflects a functional approach to enhance saliency, flexibility and freedom of action. In the alliance force-provision model in particular, an approach to operational art based upon the notion of functions assists in deciding which operational-level structures and strategic level interfaces may be required in a specific deployment. In terms of aligning the alliance model with the lead-nation model, functions such as the operational level of command, operational level structures (including combat support and sustainment), operational level infrastructure (including forward operating bases, and support bases) and the function of campaigning can and should be tied to joint force commanders wherever possible.”<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>94</sup> MAJGEN J. Bailey, *Field Artillery and Firepower* (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD, 2004), 533.

<sup>95</sup> Evans, *The Closing of the Australian Military Mind...*126.

Evans argues that Australia now needs to invest in and energise a cadre of officers empowered and capable of operating under the auspices of mission command at the operational level – to truly and skilfully "...employ military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations...to properly translate strategy into operational and ultimately, tactical action."<sup>96</sup> In order to revitalise this dormant capability, and thus also a sense of strategic 'trust' in a cadre of Australian operational commanders capable of practicing an Australian *operational art*, Evans proposes a series of key reforms:

1. the operational art must be developed as a means of improving integration between the alliance and lead-nation models of Australian military activity;
2. to assist in such integration, ADF doctrine needs to be amended to clearly reflect the tenets that the operational art is not about size, but about function, and must also address the conceptual issue of the merging levels of war;
3. the ADF needs to develop comprehensive campaign planning that embraces not simply technology but the complex needs of multinational, interagency and coalition operations across the spectrum of conflict. In particular, greater attention must be paid to a more temporal and realistic concept of stability operations, and

---

<sup>96</sup> Department of Defence, *Joint Operations for the 21st Century* (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, June 2007), downloaded from URL <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/FJOC.pdf> on 5 April 2010, 20.

4. the institutional neglect of military art within the ADF must be urgently addressed by reforming the curriculum of the joint professional military education system (JPME) at the Australian Defence College.<sup>97</sup>

### **Linking Australian *Operational Art* to the Joint Land Combat Line of Operation**

*“We have a ready measure to run over the Army’s changes – the book just released by retired Major General Jim Molan, Running the War in Iraq. At the end of his lively tome, Molan applies his Iraq experiences to the future of the Australian Defence Force ...[t]he Australian military education system is not helping senior officers to be competent joint operational (field) commanders...The Molan tests are as good a measure as any to apply to the command changes to create an Adaptive Army.”<sup>98</sup>*

Whilst Evans arrives at his conclusions through a theoretical and historical analysis of Australia's geopolitical position and policy outlook, his views about the imperative for revitalising Australian *operational art* are also reflected by a recently retired senior Army operational commander. Major General Andrew (Jim) Molan, previously a commander of the Australian 1st Brigade and subsequently the 1st Division, deployed to Iraq as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCOS) on the Multi-National Forces - Iraq (MNF-I) Headquarters in Baghdad during the period April 2004 - April 2005. During this period he was responsible for intimate campaign planning and the oversight of combat operations at

---

<sup>97</sup> Evans, *The Closing of the Australian Military Mind*...124.

<sup>98</sup> Graeme Dobell, “Army dances to its own rhythms,” *The Interpreter*, Lowry Institute for International Policy, 29 August 2008, downloaded from URL <http://lowryinterpreter.org/post/2008/08/29/Army-dances-to-its-own-rhythms.aspx> on 15 January 2010.

the operational level, including the extended battles for Fallujah during April and November 2004.<sup>99</sup> His criticism of Australian inability and - more poignantly - reluctance to engage in necessary remediation to master the *operational art* is founded upon his joint combat experience at the operational level of war in Iraq.

Molan's forthright warning is that recent Australian operational experience has not, and will not, prepare future commanders for the exigencies of sophisticated joint land combat at the operational level of war which will likely characterise the future battlespace. He highlights that the ADF has not conducted sustained close combat since Vietnam, and whilst the type of experience gathered from recent tactical deployments to coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is beneficial, it is insufficient to meet the doctrinal proficiency requirements of the future Land Force for the pivotal joint land combat line of operation outlined in AC-FLOC.<sup>100</sup> Whilst accepting the fact that commitment of ADF elements to joint combat operations at the operational level is - ultimately - at the discretion of government, he nevertheless contends that there are other compensatory mechanisms available to facilitate experience and proficiency in the *operational art* in the current absence of combat operations at the operational level. When asked on his return from Iraq how Australia could continue to influence the war in Iraq, his response was short: "You should have replaced me with another Australian general!"<sup>101</sup> This forthright response accentuates Molan's perspective that the heavily constrained strategic-tactical model of

---

<sup>99</sup> This tour of duty as the chief operational planner for a force of over 175,000 coalition troops covered the Iraqi elections in January 2005, and the pre-election shaping battles of Najaf, Tal Afar, Samarra, Fallujah, Ramadan (2004) and Mosul.

<sup>100</sup> MAJGEN Jim Molan, "Iraq Truisms: Five Truisms for the ADF out of Iraq," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, Issue no 171 (November 2006), 11.



limited, caveated participation in modern joint land combat is insufficient to prepare operational commanders for the exigencies of joint land combat in AC-FLOC's future battlespace. Molan, like Evans, warns that assuming that future operational requirements will always conform to the recently combat-constrained nature of ADF deployments is risky:

"We in Australia luxuriate in what I describe as wars of choice within wars; we choose the wars we want to fight in, we choose the timing of our participation, we choose the geographical areas of our participation (and so control the level of likely combat), we choose the kind of operations we will conduct and we choose when we come home...Australia may not have that luxury in the years ahead."<sup>102</sup>

In examining their most recent commentaries, it is clear that both Evans and Molan take issue with the senior cadre of leaders in the ADF for inadequately addressing this issue with national authorities, particularly strategic leadership within the Department of Defence as well as relevant departments within government. In light of the conceptual demands of the future force inherent in AC-FLOC, Molan contends that more must be done to prepare land forces, and particularly future operational commanders, for the conduct of sustained joint combat operations in the future battlespace. To do otherwise is to fail to equip this

---

<sup>101</sup> Patrick Walters, "A Nation at War, but Kept Clear of Combat," *The Australian*, July 19, 2008, downloaded from URL <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/a-nation-at-war-but-kept-clear-of-combat/story-e6frg8yo-1111116954627> on 1 March 2010.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.* Indeed, both AC-FLOC and the *Adaptive Army Initiative's* focus upon warfighting as being the core methodology could be argued as completely in accordance with this view, as the most extreme and unique requirement that military forces bring to national security for Government.

level of leadership as their positional responsibilities would demand - in essence, a failure of *generalship* - manifest in this apparent reticence to realise actual and extant doctrine:

"If our ADF deployed force is not capable of sophisticated joint warfighting operations, particularly in the use of joint fires and joint ISR, then it will not be able to join a future battlefield, will have to leave the battlefield or will have to revert to an excessively high level of force ('kinetics' in the jargon—bombs and bullets)...to deploy forces that are not effective joint warfighters capable of sustained close combat is taking a big risk. Remember, the enemy has a vote. If you are the weak link, he will attack you. That is what asymmetry is all about."<sup>103</sup>

Molan asserts two inherent weaknesses undermine operational capability in respect of the demands of modern war. Firstly, this lack of joint tactical combat operational experience at the organisational level, and secondly a lack of effective 'generalship' - the skills and attributes necessary to run campaigns in the joint land combat line of operation identified by AC-FLOC.<sup>104</sup>

### **Australian Generalship**

"One of the great strengths of our society is that it does not take its leaders, particularly its politicians (perhaps its generals) too seriously. The downside of this commendable trait is that we tend to forget that our 'generals', our senior

---

<sup>103</sup> Molan, *Iraq Truisms: Five Truisms for the ADF out of Iraq...* 12-13.

<sup>104</sup> Jim Molan, "Running the War in Iraq: The Nature of Modern Warfare and the New Defence White Paper," (Speech to the Lowry Institute for International Policy, 3 September 2008).

commanders, are the only individuals in uniform that, by themselves, can lose a war for us."<sup>105</sup>

Molan's position reflects the widely accepted view that successful senior military leadership demands competency in two broad organisational functions: firstly, an *operative* or functional ability and secondly, a strong measure of informed and pragmatic *organisational stewardship*. This is the view that the conduct of war actually consists of both planning for the use of military forces, as well as directing those force elements once engaged in operations. This approach is more generally expressed in terms of the interdependent functions of *fighting* and *getting ready to fight*, which are said to demand different general (operating and training) competencies:

1. *Operating* reflects the ability to make and execute decisions under uncertainty and urgency; the real-time direction of strategic, operational and tactical developments; and such intangibles as cohesion, adaptability and risk management. In addition, peacetime operating responsibilities require diplomacy; routine deployments management; regional awareness, intelligence and vigilance; and crisis management. Competence in operations planning therefore spans peacetime and contingency responsibilities.
2. *Getting forces ready to operate* involves planning, programming, and resource management; infrastructure and support service; skill definition and enhancement (eg:

---

<sup>105</sup> Molan, *Iraq Truisms: Five Truisms for the ADF out of Iraq...*15.

individual and unit training); technological-strategic foresight; research and development; investing in people and systems; and policymaking.<sup>106</sup>

Molan clearly professes a symbiotic relationship between both these functions in terms of his concept of *generalship*, in that senior leadership of the ADF bears the responsibility of developing and overseeing those processes necessary to prepare future joint force operational commanders, as well as enhancing and refining their own ability to practice the *operational art*. It is clearly his contention that the current senior leadership of the ADF are neglecting both aspects of this responsibility. His most recent commentary reinforces this view that senior leadership appear content to conclude that the type of recent operational experience is sufficient to prepare future operational commanders for the exigencies of the future battlespace. He contests this based upon his own operational experience; instead contending that a mitigation strategy is required to ensure that this erroneous conclusion does not become a self-perpetuating reality:

"...the inability to prepare 'generals' for future campaigns is as old as war itself. If the generals cannot do their job, the troops, no matter how well trained or equipped they are, could find themselves in an un-winnable situation, not unknown in our military history. And if militaries are not 'fighting' (conducting modern joint military operations) regularly and their senior commanders are not 'campaigning' (planning

---

<sup>106</sup> David C. Gompert, *Preparing Military Forces for Integrated Operations in the Face of Uncertainty* (RAND Issue Paper, National Defence Research Institute, 2003), 2.

and executing complex military operations) in the field regularly, then complacency is almost inevitable, and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is critical."<sup>107</sup>

This can be considered the pragmatists' extension of Evan's argument. Evans conceptual argument was that "...[o]ver the next decade, this dichotomy needs to be addressed by developing an innovative operational art for senior officers that is based on viewing Australia as a middle-power with global regional military commitments that must be synthesised within a coherent framework of both capability and performance."<sup>108</sup> Molan goes further, suggesting that this requires more than just conceptual and intellectual effort – it necessitates both Australian forces and operational commanders assuming a greater share of exposure to modern, joint (in his parlance 'sophisticated') combat in Australia's global commitments or 'wars of choice.'<sup>109</sup> If, as he recognises, this is precluded through a continuation of the Australian political preference for 'limited' global and regional interventions precluding joint land combat, then mechanisms such as embedded (exchange) command appointments in coalition headquarters, as well as revisions to various JPME programmes are required to address the experiential deficiency.

### **Observations of Recently Returned Army Battle Group Commanders**

Similar sentiments are also reflected in the commentary of several recently returned Army tactical commanders and staff officers from both Iraq and Afghanistan, most with tactical regional security experience from either East Timor and/or the Solomon Islands operations.

---

<sup>107</sup> MAJGEN Jim Molan, "Debate: The ADF and Operational Art", *Security Challenges* 4, no 2 (Winter 2008), downloaded from URL <http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol4no2DebateOpArt.pdf>, 133.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid*, 105

Their experience with the strategic-tactical command and control interface seemingly operative in these theatres, as well as the more doctrinal operational level command architecture in regional security operations, reflects a general level of dissatisfaction with the quality of current operational commanders in the ADF:

"...it must be appreciated that each senior officer, by the very nature of his rank and appointment, will have a significant impact on the organisation that he resides within. An Army of our size should be able to achieve excellence in every instance of senior officer appointment. This is not necessarily the case at present. Point in case, a senior officer without any unit leadership experience outside of military schools (since being a troop leader) was placed in charge of an operational task force. The officer was pre-disposed to accept advice from junior staff officers over field commanders, was focused primarily on keeping close control of everything which resulted in high degrees of micro-management, had very poor interpersonal skills for an operational environment and displayed little understanding of his subordinate organisations. These issues were undoubtedly a result of his inexperience in field command."<sup>110</sup>

Whilst the general applicability of this view must be tempered by the variable qualities of individuals assigned to particular positions, the timbre of this type of opinion has clearly resonated with the new Chief of Army. In a far more diplomatic fashion, in an address to the Australian Command and Staff College on 12 March 2009, Chief of Army observed "...[o]ur job then, is to ensure an appropriate translation of these national objectives into tactical actions on

---

<sup>109</sup> Molan, "Running the War in Iraq: The Nature of Modern Warfare and the New Defence White Paper," Speech to the Lowry Institute for International Policy, 3 September 2008.

the ground (or indeed in the air or on the sea). That translation process is the operational art, and I am not sure we have always done a good job in educating our people to give them that understanding or the right skill sets to master the art. Whatever way we go with this, it must be part of our nascent Army training continuum and it must recognize the effects of personnel tempo."<sup>111</sup>

Such issues are not uniquely Australian - these arguments can also be identified in recent professional debate in many Western militaries in relation to the Iraq and Afghanistan conflict, particularly in the United States. One of the most famous of such recent criticism was that of LTCOL Paul Yingling, who in response to setbacks in the Iraq War, famously contested "...[t]hese debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America's general officer corps. America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy."<sup>112</sup> Most relevantly, in linking the errors between Vietnam and Iraq, Yingling has contended that American generals failed the US military by:

1. failing to envision the conditions of future combat and preparing forces accordingly,
2. failing to estimate the means and the ways necessary to achieve those aims of policy prior to the commencement of operations, and

---

<sup>110</sup> Email from recently returned Army battle group commander to the author, March 2010.

<sup>111</sup> Gillespie, Address to ACSC (12 March 2009)...10-11.

<sup>112</sup> Paul Yingling, "A Failure in Generalship," *Armed Forces Journal* (May 2007), downloaded from URL <http://www.ajji.com/2007/05/2635198> on 10 March 2010.

3. failing to provide senior democratic institutions (Congress and the public) with an accurate assessment of the conflict.<sup>113</sup>

What amplifies this difficulty for Australia, according to Molan, is the fact that the United States maintains the opportunity to learn such lessons because they engage in 'wars of necessity,' providing time and resources to effectively adapt because of the strength of political will to 'ride out' difficulties and achieve mandated security outcomes. Such political will, and thus endurance in the face of adversity or setbacks, cannot be guaranteed due to Australian policy predilection for 'wars of choice.' Consequently the ADF, and in particular the Land Force, does not have the same latitude or window of opportunity to learn the *operational art* or develop *generalship* - it must apply these skills and qualities at a higher level of expertise at the commencement of operations.

The reflections of contemporary battle group commanders are also generally analogous with this point of view, though unsurprisingly tend to reflect a more personal and incisive concern with the quality of appointed operational commanders, whether in Joint Task Force or NCE positions. Commanders appointed without brigade or divisional level (or corresponding environmental level) command experience, or with previous combat experience at the tactical level, are often subject to criticism for their ability to effectively practice the *operational art* in theatre command, generally attempting to modify staff or bureaucratic methodologies to the exercise of operational command with very limited success:

---

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*



“In some instances it also appeared to us...that he [the operational commander] was employing his own level of bureaucracy to delay decisions, often deferring things that were within his remit, to higher. This is also contrary to the intent of Adaptive Army. For a more experienced commander many decisions would have been delegated and those that were made at his level would have been made with a high degree of intuition. Adaptive Army must assist in developing potential senior officers, equipping them with the necessary experience and education to excel at the rank of Colonel or Brigadier. If individuals are lacking this experience at Major or Lieutenant-Colonel level, then in my view, their window of opportunity for advancement has passed. Allowing personnel without sufficient command experience impacts not only in the operational realm, but also in the barracks. Such officers are likely to become industrious and incompetent. Industrious due to their professional drive, but incompetent because of their lack of experience/education.”<sup>114</sup>

Many would contend that an operational commander who lacks this type of experience and/or confidence, and thus the ability to practice the *operational art* in translating strategic guidance into tactical action, can be ‘compensated for’ by a more direct strategic-tactical command and control architecture. However, many recently returned battle group commanders, attest that the insertion of a commander at the operational level, whether a JTF or NCE commander, who has not been intimately involved in the development or ongoing modification of a campaign plan often only contributes to confusion as to what strategic outcomes must be achieved.<sup>115</sup> This

---

<sup>114</sup> Email from recently returned Army battle group commander to the author, February 2010.

<sup>115</sup> This was certainly my own experience in Iraq as the Commander of Overwatch Battle Group (West) -2 working under JTF633. Very late in the deployment it became apparent, during a meeting between CJOPS, Commander JTF633 and myself, that there were three completely different interpretations of what OBG(W)-2 support to

potential for confusion at the operational level within a strategic-tactical command interface replicates problems experienced by other nations where an operational commander cannot, or does not, have the ability to develop a unified campaign plan. In Kosovo, Brigadier-General J.H.P.M Caron, the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) attested:

“There was also an absence at the operational level of a campaign plan that established priorities and focussed the mission’s efforts. It left the deputies with parochial attitudes and working only toward their own particular area of interest and not for the benefit of the mission as a whole. This had a very disruptive impact on the overall mission. Further exacerbating the problem was the fact that we were simultaneously trying to establish the mission and conduct operations.”<sup>116</sup>

Similarly, Evans cites General Wesley Clark’s memoirs as affirming similar problems at the operational level in Kosovo. For Clark, the key problem in directing operations was managing the political–military interface which constantly attempted to inject political–strategic issues into tactical activities. As an operational level commander, he observed that the “...transition from the political dynamic to a military dynamic was a continuing struggle on many fronts,” made immensely more difficult by the ability of strategic leaders to contact and direct tactical commanders through modern communication technologies.<sup>117</sup> The great threat is that unity of

---

coalition forces in contact meant, and thus what actions were authorized. A difference of interpretation between myself and COMD JTF-633 as to the parameters of this assigned task, revealed a completely different interpretation on the part of CJOPs when clarification was sought from him in person during a visit to OBG(W)-2.

<sup>116</sup> Brigadier-General J.H.P.M Caron, “Kosovo, The Military-Civilian Challenge and the General’s Role,” in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen J Harris (St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 296-297.

<sup>117</sup> Michael Evans, “From the Long Peace to the Long War: Armed Conflict and Military Education and Training in the 21st Century,” *Australian Defence College Occasional Paper no 1* (2007), 15.

action and the linkage between operational and tactical action is interrupted, because the operational commander's intent may be modified or altered without his or her knowledge.

There is evidence in commentary from recently returned Australian officers in deployed battle groups and operational planning headquarters in Afghanistan that this situation replicates itself in this theatre. The requirement for theatre specific temporal and environmental knowledge in developing campaign plans is heavily emphasised. Without this environmental specific knowledge, generated through discovery action and confirmed through decisive action, operational plans and documents likely read well, but can be "...difficult to action and are perhaps unrealistic in their objectives."<sup>118</sup> An operational commander without real-time knowledge of the situation or intimate involvement in planning is similarly unable to act as the medium to advise on the feasibility of strategic guidance. The lack of a focussed, realistic and adaptive campaign plan greatly complicates the task of tactical force elements attempting to realise strategic and operational outcomes:

"Provocatively, almost four years after Australia's military re-engagement in Afghanistan, a clear and cogent campaign plan for Australian operations would only just seem to be emerging...At task force and task group level, there have been 'campaign' or operational plans (OPLAN) created in an attempt to provide purpose, order and meaning to tactical operations. Anecdotally, most of these plans have not survived rotation of deployed contingents..."<sup>119</sup>

---

<sup>118</sup> MAJ Brett Chaloner, "Thoughts for Australian Planners in Afghanistan," *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 2 (Winter 2009), 35.

There is nothing in the Australian preference for a more direct strategic-tactical command and control architecture that remediates this issue. Instead, it is far more likely to exacerbate the problem. AC-FLOC clearly highlights the requirement for an operational level of command in the future complex operating environment. The tenets of *Adaptive Action* - demanding rapid and nuanced discovery and decisive actions, speed of decision, and a faster cyclic progression through the adaptation cycle - particularly against a fleeting and agile adversary, mean the tactical commander will likely be fully engaged in prosecution of the tactical battle. The geographic, temporal and situational displacement of a strategic headquarters outside theatre will derogate its ability to sequence and direct a series of tactical actions with sufficient fidelity or responsiveness, particularly if there are concurrent battles underway. An intermediate level of command at the operational level is clearly necessary. The Australian penchant for a direct strategic-operational interface greatly complicates and distracts the tactical commander from prosecution of decisive action:

"The reality is that Australian Army battle groups deploying to Afghanistan are attempting to balance the tactical expectations placed on them by Regional Headquarters South and the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters with the strategic expectations placed on them by the ADF. Nobody is providing support to the battle group commander to develop an operational framework to manage these competing expectations. As one returned Afghanistan Reconstruction Task Force Commander acknowledged, '80% of my job was operational, 20% tactical; my sub-unit commanders were 20% operational and 80%

---

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid*, 35.

tactical. Success demanded operational art. I was setting my own operational objectives to meet Australia's intent."<sup>120</sup>

Both AC-FLOC and recent commentary from the Chief of Army reflect an organisational awareness of this problem. AC-FLOC specifies that the Land Force maintains the requirement to educate and develop joint and interagency commanders skilled in the operational art at all levels from combat team to joint task force. Accordingly, "...this must encompass skills and experience developed through one's career that enable the military commander to master strategic dialogue across the military and political domains. Army must recognise the critical role of generalship in order to prepare the Land Force for the challenges of future conflict."<sup>121</sup> The new Chief of Army has also expressly acknowledged this, asserting "...[t]hat translation process is the operational art, and I am not sure we have always done a good job in educating our people to give them that understanding or the right skill sets to master the art."<sup>122</sup> His argument to a recent Australian Command and Staff College class that improved education will improve this seems relatively one-dimensional in light of Molan's recommendations, which are founded upon very recent operational experience in joint land combat. Molan clearly intones that something more than education alone is required. This view seems to increasingly resonate with recently returned Army battle group commanders from both regional as well as global security operations:

"I still think there are two parts in Army. Those who have been on contemporary operations with Australian soldiers (not as a staff puke in a JTF, too far removed from

---

<sup>120</sup> LTCOL Trent Scott, "Adapt or Die: Operational Design and Adaptation," *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 3 (Summer 2009), 115.

<sup>121</sup> Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning*...40.

<sup>122</sup> Gillespie, *Address to ACSC* 11 June 2009...15.

the actual doing) and those that haven't. Those that haven't don't quite understand how adaptive the operating force currently is."<sup>123</sup>

Such an opinion as to the aggregate value of experience very much aligns with the views of the eminent historian Samuel Marshall, who famously wrote "The good general is simply a good company commander in his post-graduate course."<sup>124</sup> Accordingly, it seems apparent that there is a collective body of opinion that a problem exists in terms of Australia's ability to generate, through education and experiential opportunities, future operational level commanders comfortable with execution of a contemporary manifestation of Australian *operational art*. This problem, or (at the very least - requirement) is identified in both joint as well as Army doctrine, in direct and public observations by the new Chief of Army, in academic circles, as well as resonating in the observations and reflection of recently returned tactical commanders working to the current crop of ADF operational 'commanders.' What remains to be seen is whether current (or projected) reform within the *Adaptive Army Initiative* adequately addresses and/or remediates this consensus of concern.

---

<sup>123</sup> Email from recently returned Army battle group commander to author, February 2010.

<sup>124</sup> Samuel Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War* (Peter Smith, Gloucester, 1978), 177.

## Chapter Five

### Generating Adaptive Commanders to Practice a Contemporary Australian Operational Art

*“The heart of the Evans case is that systemic change has been imposed already upon policy-makers, government officials and military professionals, as well as upon societies as a whole, but that not enough of us are doing anything of consequence as a result...It will be interesting, to say the least, to watch how military training and education establishments respond to the kinds of challenge being issued here. It is not, after all, just the profession of arms for whom the famous remark in Giuseppe Di Lampedusa’s novel The Leopard has such striking relevance today, ‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change’.”<sup>125</sup>*

-----

*"At the end of the day, I seek to inculcate a culture of adaptation within the Army. While as individuals we possess a remarkable ability to adapt, in an institutional sense, the Army does not."<sup>126</sup>*

#### Does an Imperative for Change Really Exist?

If Evans and Molan were once sidelined as conceptual heretics, their views appear to have rapidly gained wider recognition and greater measure of mainstream acceptance within

---

<sup>125</sup> Peter Foot, "Foreword" to Michael Evans, "From the Long Peace to the Long War: Armed Conflict and Military Education and Training in the 21st Century," *Australian Defence College Occasional Paper no 1* (2007), vii – viii.

<sup>126</sup> Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI...19.

professional military circles. Whether this is as a result of realisation of Evan's views of Australia's geopolitical reality in the *Defence White Paper 2009*, or that the architects of AC-FLOC and the *Adaptive Army Initiative* have sought to incorporate elements of Molan's Iraq experiences, there is increasingly a greater reflection of their vantage points in organisational literature and professional debate. Most importantly, both AC-FLOC and the Chief of Army reflect a parallel focus on the importance of *operational art*, campaign planning and generalship for the future land force. There is also sufficient similarity in the views of many recent deployed tactical commanders to suggest that, at the grass roots, a call for change is gaining momentum – the ADF must generate commanders more attuned to the difficult and diverse demands of operational command in contemporary security operations. Whilst ADF joint doctrine does not appear to emanate the same imperative urgency, there is clearly a similar emphasis upon the importance of effective practice of the *operational art* at the operational level as a necessary prerequisite for successful future joint operations.

Both ADF and Army doctrine clearly specify that Australian force elements must be capable of prosecuting joint combat in order to win conflicts at the operational and tactical levels of war.<sup>127</sup> There is no distinguishable caveat that can be divined from extant doctrine that the ADF or Land Force will be insulated from the demands of joint combat operations at the operational level in any future global or regional security operation. The *Defence White Paper 2009* specifically provides that the ADF must be capable of acting

---

<sup>127</sup> ADDP-D, 2-14. ADDP-D.3 *Joint Operations for the 21st Century* states emphatically "We need to excel at joint, interagency and coalition operations because this is our core business. Warfighting remains the core competency of the ADF. The future force must be able to win conflicts and secure the peace in complex operational environments."



independently, leading military coalitions, as well as making tailored contributions to military coalitions.<sup>128</sup> There is no discernable prioritisation or geographic differentiation between these three tasks. The ADF Joint Warfighting Framework clearly details the requirement for Australian military forces to be able to undertake decisive operations at the operational level within the 'high threat conflict' spectrum, as dictated by Australia's Military Strategy (AMS).<sup>129</sup>

In recent addresses to Australian Command and Staff College courses the Chief of Army has similarly intoned that the practice of the *operational art* is crucial to Australian success in deployed operations in the contemporary battlespace.<sup>130</sup> The Chief of Army's Development Intent and Design Rules (particularly Rule 4) clearly posit that the Army must be capable of planning, integrating, balancing and sustaining actions across AC-FLOC's five lines of operation for an extended period. The pre-eminence of the Joint Land Combat Line of Operation is also affirmed in ADF Joint Doctrine, which promotes warfighting as the principal competency for Australia's military forces.

Despite this seemingly clear strategic and conceptual direction, and corresponding doctrinal entrenchment, that the ADF must be prepared to lead a military coalition engaged in joint land combat at the operational and tactical levels, many contend a persistent reluctance still pervades senior ADF leadership - that this requirement is unlikely ever to be invoked by

---

In AC-FLOC Chief of Army specifically states that Army, as part of the broader ADF, must be prepared to win the joint land battle now and joint land battles of the future.

<sup>128</sup> *Defence White Paper 2009*...12-13.

<sup>129</sup> ADDP-D, 2-14.

<sup>130</sup> See, for example, his three most recent addresses to the Australian Command and Staff College courses on 12 March, 11 June 2009, and 19 Feb 2010 respectively.

government. This likely exists as a manifestation of the view that middle-power nations such as Australia, despite political and doctrinal rhetoric to the contrary, lack the political resolve as well as the organisational daring to willingly seek out or assume such responsibility. Proponents of this view would cite precisely the same *Realpolitik* charted by Evans - Australian political penchant for tactical alliance force provision to global coalition combat operations, and operational leadership of regional security deployments that fall short of decisive combat operations.

It also seems to have been reflected in ADF Joint doctrine predating the *Defence White Paper 2009*. In the ADF's *Future Joint Operating Concept*, published in 2007, the ADF's predicted future operational command responsibilities in 2030 were restricted to "...defend[ing] Australian territory against credible threat without relying on the combat forces of other countries, in keeping with longstanding Government policy, [and to] provide joint forces to contribute to, or lead, coalition operations in Australia's neighbourhood."<sup>131</sup>

Such a position - until very recently - also reigned supreme in Canadian professional military discourse, a nation frequently cited as sharing a remarkably similar geopolitical outlook and military capability as Australia:

"It could be argued that middle-powers are incapable of exercising operational art, and perhaps do not require an independent operational level at all. In this case,

---

<sup>131</sup> Department of Defence, *Joint Operations for the 21st Century* (Canberra: Strategic Policy Division, 2007) downloaded from URL <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/FJOC.pdf> on 5 April 2010, 5.

their small, tactically focussed militaries would only require an understanding of operational doctrine to the extent that permits them to integrate tactical forces into larger alliance or coalition operations, and to effectively participate in coalition headquarters (HQ) - a requirement limited to a small number of senior commanders and staff officers."<sup>132</sup>

The probative strength of this position seems to have been fatally undermined by Canada's willing assumption of operational command of Kandahar Province in Afghanistan in 2006. Whilst a healthy debate still circulates within the Canadian military as to whether Headquarters Regional Command – South operates at the high tactical or lower operational level of war, there is more general agreement that this command practices the *operational art*, in designing and overseeing operations that translate strategic guidance into tactical action. Where proponents of the more limited applicability of the *operational art* to the ADF frequently cited this analogous Canadian position, the Canadian political ‘reversal’ now serves to buttress the opposing school of thought. The lesson for senior ADF leaders may well now be that it is extremely risky to selectively ‘cherry-pick’ aspects of both strategic guidance and doctrine, based upon convenient temporal interpretations of prevailing political expedients. Indeed, the current uncertainty as to Australia’s decision concerning operational leadership of Oruzgan province fans the flames of those arguing for greater focus on developing expertise in operational command and the practice of the *operational art*.

---

<sup>132</sup> Richard Dixon, *Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective* (Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2004), 2.

A similar position - that the ADF has little contemporary need for remediation of the *operational art* - has also been expressed, most notably by a former Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), (retired) Admiral Chris Barrie. His counter-argument to the central basis of both Evans and Molan's contention, that a focus on tactical success as a small-force provider had reduced the ADF's capability to exercise the operational art, centres upon the view that Australia has actually been highly successful at the operational level of war in recent years:

"...even though the bulk of Australia's military experience has been focussed on the tactical there has also been significant world demand for our expertise in the higher levels of conflict especially in UN operations. A classic example of this was for Australian leadership in Cambodia with United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, a multinational force commanded by Lieutenant-General Sanderson. This tells me that we must be getting something right."<sup>133</sup>

Barrie's contention is that responsibility for operational command and the impetus for reinvigorating an Australian *operational art* would likely only materialise and deliver direct benefit where a direct threat to Australia was considered imminent. His view is that "...[t]hese are the circumstances when there would be no reasonable doubt in our community about the need for Australian leadership and what Australian leadership must deliver."<sup>134</sup> Whilst such a view possibly reflects an earlier historical emphasis upon the Defence of Australia (DoA) construct, which had primacy during his tenure as CDF, it seems clear from the most recent *White Paper* and the AC-FLOC's environmental scan that global insecurity outside Australia's immediate

---

<sup>133</sup> Chris Barrie, "Debate: The ADF and Operational Art," *Security Challenges* 4, no 2 (Winter 2008), 140.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid*, 140.

region is now considered to represent just such a direct threat to Australian national security. His view as to UN operations constituting a 'higher level of conflict' also seems at variance with the current ADF classification of the spectrum of conflict outlined in both ADF and Army capstone doctrine. The wider geopolitical view of Australia's security interests and primacy of warfighting as the core competency for the ADF, reflected in the *Defence White Paper 2009* and Army capstone doctrine (AC-FLOC) clearly derogates the probative weight of Barrie's position that the imperative for operational leadership will only vest when the Australian mainland is directly threatened.

Nonetheless, despite the fact that government strategic guidance and capstone doctrine directs the ADF to invest in the ability to practice a contemporary Australian *operational* art, plan and execute campaigns, and to practice a high order of generalship, a hesitancy as to the priority to be afforded to these requirements also appears evident. As the Chief of Army's guidance in respect of the *Adaptive Army Initiative* explicitly recognises, finite resources, time and the concurrency of existing operational commitments clearly limit or (at best) demand a sequential approach to development of the future Land Force. Nevertheless, the arguments advanced by Barrie and other senior serving and retired generals, seem to be founded less issues of resourcing than on interpretative *realpolitik* - the call for such capability is rhetorical rather than real. The foundation of this hesitancy is an issue of great political sensitivity, and thus something that serving military professionals are often reticent to openly acknowledge. It is - of course - an inherently political issue. To illuminate such a debate would draw attention to exactly what Kelly

has described as Australia's cynical, modest and calculated approach of contribution to global security operations.<sup>135</sup>

Undaunted by any such political or professional sensitivity, Molan wades directly into this morass with characteristic élan and candour. He illuminates this seeming paradox between requirement and resolve using a mission-focus construct - in which *missions of necessity* are contrasted against *missions of choice* at opposing ends of a spectrum. He argues that where Australia possesses the freedom to choose which conflict, what level of combat exposure, what type of force elements, and how long to contribute them - a *mission of choice* framework and corresponding mentality is invoked. In this type of deployment, particularly where decisive combat operations are envisaged as necessary, Australia would seek to avoid operational command responsibility based upon a negative appraisal of operational (and hence political) risk. The default position is thus a manifest preference to inject highly combat capable niche elements at the tactical level, employing Evan's construct of a strategic-tactical C2 architecture to continually monitor and moderate the deployed force's exposure to operational risk.

At the other extreme, where the likelihood of high spectrum conflict (warfighting) is reduced, but the political demand for intervention is higher – historically where the security threat is in closer proximity to the Australian mainland - there is a commensurately greater political willingness and resolve to delegate operational command and control of deployed forces to an operational commander. He characterises these interventions as *missions of necessity*. Because the risk of casualties is lower in these circumstances, there is a greater willingness on the part of

---

<sup>135</sup> Kelly, *No Lapdog, this Partner Has Clout...* downloaded from URL <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a713707181&db=all> on 5 April 2010.

government and hence senior ADF leadership to relax direct strategic control of tactical operations, and thus an operational commander is afforded a higher degree of freedom of action to translate strategic guidance into tactical action. This commander is thus more able to fully practice the *operational art*, but it falls well short of practicing the *operational art* in the primary joint land combat line of operation.

Molan's construct clearly implies that domestic political considerations will always impinge – whether explicitly or implicitly - upon the resolve of senior ADF leaders to realise the Australian doctrinal methodology for command and control at the operational level. Accordingly, the true level of commitment and resolve to 'practice what doctrine preaches' will remain highly circumstantial:

"The purpose of conducting a mission of choice is not necessarily to win (although rhetoric may spin on this issue) but to show commitment. Because our forces are small and limited in the actions that they can take (though wars of choice might still involve high levels of combat), we have limited say in the overall campaign plan. As a security leader, the ADF is to provide sometimes much larger forces to regional conflicts and to play a leadership role – in fact, Australia may be a major player or the coalition leader, with Australian leadership doing the campaign plan and commanding the military activity. The amount of choice is very much less and so it is referred to as a 'mission of necessity'. In this situation, the ADF has to deploy at a time and to an area of operations often decided by an opponent, and our actions and the nature of the force are decided by the necessity to actually win. A deployment to

show commitment rather than to actually win will produce operations that are fundamentally different."<sup>136</sup>

Molan's broader rhetoric on this issue, and the deduction to be made from his construct, is that a measurable differential between a recognition of a conceptual need, and actual resolve to address a reality considered somewhat implausible, has materialised and remains entrenched in the psyche of senior ranks of the ADF. His position is that - despite rhetoric to the contrary - the focus of ADF education and training for operational level commanders is upon preparing for the more likely *missions of necessity* rather than the more dangerous *missions of choice*.<sup>137</sup> If one accepts this as a plausible reality, that a very limited resolve exists to prioritise the development of adaptive operational commanders capable of practicing the *operational art* across all lines of operation in future security contingencies, then it would stand to reason that the reform measures contemplated by the *Adaptive Army Initiative* would reflect this dissonance.

Before examining what the *Adaptive Army Initiative* portends in this respect, it is necessary to examine what means of education and training are considered necessary and available for preparing commanders for the practice of the *operational art* at the operational level of war.

---

<sup>136</sup> MAJGEN Jim Molan, "Choice and Necessity in Australia's Way of War," *The Interpreter*, Lowry Institute for International Policy (2 September 2009), downloaded from URL <http://www.lowryinterpreter.org/post/2009/09/02/Choice-and-necessity-in-the-Australian-way-of-war.aspx> on 12 January 2010.

<sup>137</sup> Molan has contended "The Government is spending \$50 billion buying excellent war-fighting equipment between now and 2018, but I don't think we are matching that with an attitude and ethos of combat. We say it, but I don't see it being manifest in training at a higher level, and that concerns me." Quoted by Patrick Walters, "A Nation at War, but Kept Clear of Combat," *The Australian*, July 19, 2008, downloaded from URL <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/a-nation-at-war-but-kept-clear-of-combat/story-e6frg8yo-1111116954627> on 1 March 2010.



## The Acknowledged Means of Remediation

The two most frequently cited and acknowledged means of improving the ability of Australian operational commanders to successfully practice the *operational art* are **educative** and **experiential** in nature. The former is most ardently advocated by Evans, stemming from his conceptual and historical analyses of the problem and his professional capacity to assist in its remediation. His most pragmatic recommendation is for a review and improvement of the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) system - specifically at the Australian Defence College (ADC) - to reflect an emphasis on the operational art, campaign planning techniques and the symbiotic qualities of operational *generalship*.

Molan also strongly advocates this approach, but extends it further, contending experiential supplementation is necessary to fully develop competent and capable operational commanders capable of practicing the *operational art* in the joint land combat line of operation. This position reflects his combat arms practitioner background, and accords with his own reflections on the beneficial experience of his joint land combat experience during his appointment as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in MNF-I headquarters. Based upon this very rare opportunity afforded to very few Australian operational commanders, Molan advocates the ADF seek every opportunity for experiential learning and consolidation of these skills by placing operational level commanders in coalition and multi-national operational appointments involving joint land combat. In his review of Evan's Occasional Paper *City Without Joy: Urban Military Operations into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Molan takes the opportunity to ram home this point in the context of urban operations:

“In my view, fighting in cities has two dimensions. The first dimension is that of generalship and the need to provide an operational-strategic shaping of urban combat. The role of a general is to shape a city fight in a manner that gives soldiers as good a chance as possible of achieving stated objectives. This is demanding in an urban environment because...command often becomes fragmented, so driving control from the operational to tactical level...To have failed to undertake this operational-strategic preparation and to have sent soldiers into a civilian-populated Fallujah under conditions of all-seeing media scrutiny would have been, in my view, irresponsible generalship. The second battle of Fallujah was successful because of months of shaping, a willingness to learn from experience, and the application of sufficient human and logistical resources.”<sup>138</sup>

What Molan emphasises from his operational experience is the requirement for practitioners to move beyond the merely speculative and mechanistic application of joint planning processes, easily replicated and practiced in a non-adversarial environment, and into the reality of commanding and controlling joint land combat operations post H-hr.<sup>139</sup> His controversial statements in respect of the requirement for the ADF (and thus Land Force) to be given exposure to, and practice the art of adaptation in conflict, cannot be fully achieved through the pre-H hr processes of planning on existing courses within the Army Training Continuum, nor are they

---

<sup>138</sup> MAJGEN Jim Molan, "Foreword" to Michael Evans, "City Without Joy: Urban Military Operations into the 21st Century", *Australian Defence College Occasional Series no. 2*, (2007), vii.

<sup>139</sup> Land Warfare Procedures - General 0-1-6 defines H-hr as "The specific time at which an operation or exercise commences, or is due to commence." Australian Army, Land Warfare Procedures - General, LWP-G 0-1-6, *Land Glossary (Developing Doctrine)*, 2004, downloaded from URL <http://adel2.defence.gov.au:8087/index.html> on 1 March 2010. In essence, the dichotomy between planning and executing an operation is that point at which the

adequately addressed in the conduct of regional security deployments as a security leader in something less than “contemporary, sophisticated joint combat.”<sup>140</sup> Evans is in full agreement, having previously written on the issue of education and training before publishing his views on the ADF and contemporary *operational art* in 2008:

“An officer must simultaneously understand the practice and theory of the operational art in order to relate its relevance to changing conditions. A similar equation applies to the question of reconciling indirect, high-level command (electronic Napoleons and tactical generals) with direct, low-level control (strategic corporals and privates) on the networked battlespace. Such questions, because they involve both practice and theory, embrace both training and education and this intimate relationship will require careful management in the future.”<sup>141</sup>

The timbre of these arguments also infuses the commentary of contemporary battle group commanders in recent professional literature. In many respects, it is communicated with a greater sense of exasperation, in that recently deployed tactical level commanders frequently cite difficulties in synchronising their actions with appointed operational level commanders with neither tactical nor operational experience, whose situational awareness is derogated by the strategic-tactical command interface emplaced during deployed combat operations.<sup>142</sup> It is also -

---

operation is launched, and its implementation is interactive with the adversary and other stakeholders within the battlespace.

<sup>140</sup> Molan, *Choice and Necessity in Australia's Way of War...* downloaded from URL <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2009/09/02/Choice-and-necessity-in-the-Australian-way-of-war.aspx> on 12 January 2010.

<sup>141</sup> Evans, *From the Long Peace to the Long War...*18.

<sup>142</sup> This determination is made taking into account the observations from recently returned battle group commanders on pages 64 and 66.

seemingly - though more diplomatically, reflected in recent comments by the Chief of Army to Australian Command and Staff College courses.

Given that education, training and experience are cited as the means of preparing commanders for the challenges of operational command, it remains to be seen what extant and proposed measures of remediation and/or reform are contemplated by the *Adaptive Army Initiative*, in so far as they can address this issue for future land force operational commanders.

### **The Current Educational Approach**

At the Australian Defence College (ADC) in Canberra, two specific courses are conducted annually to provide education and training to officers at the tactical-operational and operational-strategic interfaces. The first of these 12 month courses, the Australian Command and Staff Course (ACSC), takes officers from all three services and the Australian Public Service, to prepare them for unit command and higher staff appointments in the ADF at O5 rank. The second and more senior course, the Defence and Strategic Studies Course (DSSC), is conducted by the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) for officers and managers at the O6/O7 levels, to provide them with the "...knowledge, awareness and skills to operate at the highest levels of leadership, command, policy formulation and management" in Defence.<sup>143</sup>

In both courses a significant amount of time is spent on analysing and interpreting the future security environment in preparation for future appointments at the higher tactical, operational and/or strategic levels. The aim of the Australian Command and Staff Course is to prepare

selected career officers for command and staff appointments at the O5 level in environmental, Joint and integrated environments. The Defence and Strategic Studies Course seeks to enhance the ability of participants to provide timely and effective advice to government, apply military power to achieve national objectives, and develop and sustain military capability to meet national objectives.<sup>144</sup> This course is divided into five thematic 'blocks.' The focus of Block Two is on the contemporary and future strategic setting, which logically transitions into the third block of eight weeks duration, focussing on higher command and the conduct of combined and joint operations. This block concludes with a seven day campaign planning exercise.<sup>145</sup> This course claims to be "...designed to benefit practitioners by equipping them with practical skills to work with confidence in the uncertainty that characterises [the] rapidly evolving strategic environment."<sup>146</sup>

### **The Australian Command and Staff Course**

At first glance of these stated curricula, it would appear that both the ACSC and DSSC courses specifically address the **educative and training requirements** for Australian officers and senior public servants in the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) to operate effectively at the operational level. Indeed, the core objectives of the ACSC course align themselves with the stated key functions of a military commander at the O5 level – excellence in warfighting – in order to develop and refine the ability of individual officers to:

---

<sup>143</sup> This course is also of 12 months duration.

<sup>144</sup> Australian Defence College, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, 'Introduction,' downloaded from URL [http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/cdss\\_home.htm#thecourse](http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/cdss_home.htm#thecourse) on 16 April 2010.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.* As at April 2010, the CDSS website advises that the higher command and conduct of combined and joint operations block "...is responsive to the contemporary strategic environment and is under ongoing development to meet identified operational requirements."

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*

1. lead a joint staff planning team to develop and execute joint operational plans in joint, Defence and integrated environments;
2. lead a single Service staff planning team to develop and execute single Service plans in an operational or strategic management environment;
3. lead a staff team in a specialist operational or management area, and
4. analyse national, regional and global strategic issues when planning.<sup>147</sup>

A supporting objective of this course is also the analysis of command at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.<sup>148</sup> During the Strategic Studies module of ACSC students also analyse the international environment, national power and the conduct of military operations, including the review of economic, political, social and other factors that contextualize military thinking and military operations. This module comprises two units – ‘War, Politics and the Use of Force’ and ‘The Australian Strategic Environment.’ In 2008 a new elective was included, the Complex Planning and Operations (CPO) unit, undertaken by a small group of students who nominate to undertake this short but more detailed planning course.<sup>149</sup>

More relevantly, during the Joint Operations Studies phase (stated to be the ‘capstone element of the course’), students are instructed and participate (including the opportunity for some to lead) a

---

<sup>147</sup> ACSC Website, downloaded from URL [http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/acsc\\_vision.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/acsc_vision.htm) on 15 March 2010.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

notional planning team to develop and execute joint operational plans as part of a whole of government approach, in a complex, contemporary security environment. This Joint Operations module steps students through the following phases:

1. Evolution of the Operational Art.
2. The Joint Planning Process.
3. Planning a Joint Campaign.
4. Executing a Joint Campaign.<sup>150</sup>

Notwithstanding that the course does not (nor is realistically able) to practice students in the execution of joint operations post H-hr (that is, in commanding, controlling and adapting a plan in contact with an adversary), the aims and objectives of the course ostensibly seem to address the requirements of graduates commanding at the higher tactical level, or working as a staff planner at the operational level. The structure and sequencing of individual modules seems well adapted to providing the context as well as discrete cognitive skills and mechanical tools to function as a planner and commander at the lower operational level.

---

<sup>149</sup> This elective does not actually subject the participants to any greater detail in terms of planning tools, techniques or practices. Rather it focuses on a more detailed contextualisation of operational planning considerations within the higher Defence organisation.

<sup>150</sup> ACSC Website...downloaded from URL [http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/acsc\\_course.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/acsc_course.htm) on 15 March 2010.

## The Defence and Strategic Studies Course

The Defence and Strategic Studies Course also appears to address itself to the cognitive and procedural skill sets required of commanders operating at the higher operational and/or lower strategic levels of war. Whilst the course explicitly addresses itself to interfacing with government and the defence bureaucracy at the strategic level, the course nevertheless provides contextual as well as procedural instruction and practice in aspects of the *operational art*. The course itself is broken down into five thematic blocks:

1. **Block One: Frameworks for Strategic Leadership and Command** - covering the frameworks for strategic leadership and focussing on the strategic working environment and the ability to think critically within this environment;
2. **Block Two: The Contemporary and Future Strategic Setting** - examining the strategic setting in the Asia Pacific region and beyond;
3. **Block Three: Higher Command and the Conduct of Combined and Joint Operations** – addressing the employment of military force at the strategic and operational levels;
4. **Block Four: Capability and Force Development** – analysing how military strategy is translated into capability and force structure requirements, and



5. **Block Five: Security Policy Development and Decision-Making** – examining the basis of public policy and national decision-making, including the major influences on these processes and the features differentiating good and bad policy.<sup>151</sup>

The stated aim of Block Three is to prepare graduates for employment in the high command environment by exposure to the application of the campaign planning process at the strategic and operational levels.<sup>152</sup> The course curriculum provides a detailed breakdown of this component as follows:

“In Week Three, course members review the campaign planning process, the concepts of Network Centric Warfare and Effects Based Operations, including relevant strategic and operational level doctrine. Week Four is a series of seminars on command and leadership experiences in various theatres in the last ten years from both Australian and US senior commanders. Particular emphasis is placed on coalition building and multilateral forces. Course members also have the opportunity to discuss the relationship between the military and the United Nations and non-Government organisations with representatives from those institutions. In Week Five, course members examine contemporary planning processes through case study analysis. Weeks Six and Seven look at the capabilities and limitations of the environmental components as well as the planning considerations for intelligence,

---

<sup>151</sup> CDSS website...downloaded from URL [http://www.defence.gov.au/adcdss\\_home.htm#coursebreakdown](http://www.defence.gov.au/adcdss_home.htm#coursebreakdown) on 30 March 2010.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

force protection, logistics and information operations. The Block concludes with a seven day campaign planning exercise.”<sup>153</sup>

Key learning objectives enunciated for this module incorporate:

1. an examination of the translation of strategic policy into military strategy;
2. an understanding of the strategic implications of campaign planning and higher planning for joint, inter-agency and combined operations;
3. a consideration of the factors associated with successful coalition operations;
4. an understanding of force design and force delivery considerations for specific environmental capabilities, and
5. an understanding of the Australian strategic/operational military planning process.<sup>154</sup>

As with the ACSC curriculum, this stated approach and sequence of studies also appears well-adapted to the educative and training requirements of future commanders at the operational level of war. However, given that this type of education and training realistically only addresses the

---

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>154</sup> Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies Handbook 2009, Australian Defence College, downloaded from URL <http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/CDSS/Handbook%202009-2.pdf> on 30 March 2010.

methodologies of conceptualising and planning for operations, and not the practice, there is a further call for the ADF to maximise experiential opportunities for future commanders.

### **The Experiential Requirement for the Practice of the *Operational Art***

The crux of Molan's contention, that Australian recent operational experience will not adequately serve future Land Force commanders in honing the practice of the *operational art*, is that few opportunities exist for them to plan and direct operations on the joint land combat line of operation. Whilst Army maintains a large regimen of staff and operational exchange postings, many to coalition headquarters engaged in joint combat operations, he argues that these postings are insufficiently **command and control** oriented, and all too frequently insulated from responsibility for the direction of forces engaged in joint combat operations. This is the crux of his view that Australia should have sought to fill the position as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in MNF-I Headquarters after his tenure had expired in 2004. Similarly, he contends the overt and/or clandestine caveats placed upon many current Australian operational and tactical commanders limiting their operations and/or exposure to contact with the enemy inculcates lessons antithetical to the future prosecution of decisive operations on the joint land combat line of operation. In a recent speech to the Lowry Institute, Molan has argued:

"We have limited experience of joint offensive combat operations or "sophisticated fighting" - you don't win wars by going to a theatre of war and being defensive and protecting yourself. Current deployments are extraordinarily valuable....but the interesting thing about our current deployments is that we are going to war and with

very few exceptions were are not gaining the compensating combat experience. For a professional military this is extraordinarily important."<sup>155</sup>

Whilst, under the auspices of the Personnel Initiative Stream of the *Adaptive Army Initiative*, the Chief of Army has announced a comprehensive strategy for the development of officers, by deliberately exposing them to a "...wider range of command, leadership and management demands in a variety of challenging and dynamic environments,"<sup>156</sup> there is little to suggest any tangible enhancement of experiential combat command and control opportunities (at the operational level) in the manner suggested by Molan. Indeed, the focus or intent of the *Adaptive Army Initiative*, in terms of revised experiential content, seems more focussed upon regional and internal inter-agency cooperative enhancements, in all lines of operation other than the joint land combat line of operation enunciated in AC-FLOC:

"One of our *Adaptive Campaigning* implementation tasks is to establish a program of secondments to key agencies for selected officers. This aims to develop a cadre of officers familiar with OGAs and their manner of operating in order to facilitate greater interagency cooperation and a swift response in times of crisis. Another recent initiative is the launch of the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, which was formally opened by the Prime Minister yesterday. While these are worthy initiatives, what are the next steps? I would like to expand on this question to include our relationship with industry. It is vital for us in the Army to ask 'how can we work

---

<sup>155</sup> Molan, *Choice and Necessity in Australia's Way of War...* downloaded from URL <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2009/09/02/Choice-and-necessity-in-the-Australian-way-of-war.aspx> on 12 January 2010.

<sup>156</sup> Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI...13.

better with industry?' We need to develop relationships with our partners in the commercial world that allow the innovative nature of the private sector to help us discover new and innovative solutions to new challenges in time-sensitive situations."<sup>157</sup>

Further initiatives of this nature, announced by Chief of Army, include the recent signing of an interoperability Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Australian Federal Police, the launch of an Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence in 2008, and the signing of a strategic partnership with Australia's equivalent of US Aid in 2009.<sup>158</sup> This relative emphasis may be suggestive of a current prioritisation of the four lines of operation other than joint combat, despite the enunciated position that foundation warfighting constitutes the fundamental individual and collective skillset underpinning the Land Force's operational capability.<sup>159</sup> In line with this, during his inaugural speech, the Chief of Army stated "...[o]ur contemporary, and likely future, operations are about rebuilding (and often building for the first time) and influencing civil societies. Our operations will often be less about killing the enemy than making them irrelevant to the population."<sup>160</sup> It seems rather more feasible that what these respective statements envisage are a focus or prioritisation at respective levels of the Land Force, rather than being contradictory statements. That is, that the current focus for enhancement of individual and collective skills at the tactical level is upon foundation warfighting, but at the operational and strategic levels of command, officers and staffs need to build skills and abilities to generate

---

<sup>157</sup> Gillespie, Address to ACSC on 12 March 09. These initiatives will likely have far greater impact in the population protection, information action, population support and indigenous capacity building lines of operation, though they could have some potential to enhance the ability of a commander to set and sustain conditions required for the other lines of operation.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>159</sup> Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI...14.

better joint and inter-agency effects in the population protection and support, information action and indigenous capacity building lines of operation.

Whether this is actually the case or not, the promulgated personnel initiatives of the *Adaptive Army Initiative*, as they relate to officers anticipating assumption of operational command appointments, seem to reflect an emphasis upon the preparation of senior leaders attuned to the effective functioning of the Australian Defence Organisation - the bureaucracy and that element of the organisation dedicated to the *preparing to fight* competency - than the planning and direction of joint and decisive combat operations in the complex operating environment outlined in AC-FLOC. Proponents of Molan's position would assert that the focus of the enunciated career pathway strategies in this personnel stream will likely create leaders with the "...intellectual capacity to perform a diverse range of activities in an increasingly diverse environment,"<sup>161</sup> but that this environment is too far removed from the exigencies of the future battlespace to enhance any operational adaptiveness in practicing the *operational art* in joint land combat.

### **Fiddling at the Margins**

It is clear that are substantive measures in place, in both the educational and experiential realms, that cater to the strategic and doctrinal emphasis upon developing leaders capable of practicing a contemporary Australian *operational art*. Many of these measures are legacy in nature, pre-dating the development of the *Adaptive Army Initiative*, and many also likely reflect a

---

<sup>160</sup> Gillespie, Speech to the ASPI (27 August 2008)...downloaded from URL [http://www.army.gov.au/docs/Chief\\_Of\\_Army\\_Speech.pdf](http://www.army.gov.au/docs/Chief_Of_Army_Speech.pdf) on 21 Feb 10.

recognition of and ostensible dedication to remediating the deficiencies in education and training highlighted by Evans and Molan. Whilst Chief of Army has clearly enunciated a measure of agreement with the views of these advocates as to the central importance of the *operational art* for future Land Force commanders, this has not yet blossomed into tangible direction or chartable intent in any openly circulated *Adaptive Army Initiative* directives. Molan - in particular - continues to be outspoken in his views as to the dangers of neglecting any opportunity for operational joint combat experience at the organisational level, using the promotion of his book *Running the War in Iraq* to take his message to as wide an audience as possible.

Evans also acknowledges that recent changes and additions to the JPME program are beneficial, even if they only represent a limited commitment to remediate some of the issues he highlights. His most recent commentary continues to highlight that many of the key obstacles to reform remain conceptual, and are likely a by-product of higher political-military reticence to extend the scope or nature of Australian military commitments to global security operations. His view is that senior military leadership, in constantly analysing and attempting to interpret government strategic intent, remain fixated on the view that contributions to conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan are about training indigenous forces and nation-building rather than the prosecution of counter-insurgency (COIN) or stabilisation operations (STABOPS). The latter two activities entail more activities on the joint land combat line of operation than the former.

Utilising the AC-FLOC lexicon, Evans would therefore assert that the joint land combat line of operation in Afghanistan is subordinated (or - alternatively - should be undertaken by another

---

<sup>161</sup> Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI...14.

coalition element) to the population support, population protection and indigenous capacity building lines of operation. His view clearly subscribes to Kelly's characterisation of Australian contributions being calculated, cynical, modest and heavily caveated. From this position, it is easy to understand his concern with the situation unfolding in Oruzgan province. Should a Dutch withdrawal eventuate, removing both the Headquarters and resources ostensibly once committed to the COIN (joint land combat) line of operation, Australia would no longer have the luxury of being able to focus its activities predominantly along the other four lines of operation.<sup>162</sup>

The subtlety but urgency of Evan's argument is often lost on many who are critical of his position. It is important to understand that it is not just an issue of whether Australia should - or should not - 'step up' and formally assume operational command and control of Oruzgan province. Evan's argument that ADF must be capable of operational command and control, and be an expert at practicing the *operational* art, does not emanate from a position that formal assumption of operational responsibility is in Australia's strategic or diplomatic interest. His concern is that the need to practice the operational art may be thrust upon the ADF in this theatre, either formally or by a defacto reduction in coalition capabilities dedicated to the joint land combat line of operation in this province. Should the Dutch capability not be (adequately) replaced then Australia would be forced into having to redirect its focus to the joint land combat line of operation, as a necessary requirement to enable current training, reconstruction and stabilisation lines of operation. Accordingly, Evans laments:

---

<sup>162</sup> Noting, of course, that the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) in Afghanistan is predominantly focussed upon a land combat line of operation. However, it is likely that operations of the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force (MRTF) and the SOTG are quite discrete, and not sufficiently mutually reinforcing, to allow the MRTF to continue unaffected by a Dutch withdrawal from the province.



"We still do not do enough on operational art and above all operational art in the inter-agency battlespace. For instance, there has been little work done on how classical COIN differs from modern stabilisation. We are light years behind our Allies in this respect. I have spoken to Special Forces officers who run their own professional military education on COIN/STABOPS because the system does not provide it outside of ACSC. Because we are not 'in the fight' in the sense that we run Oruzgan we get away with ad-hocery, but this may not last...What we do at ADC on contemporary warfighting/op art/STABOPS is a mere candle in the darkness; there needs to be far more in future."<sup>163</sup>

Molan - whilst somewhat independently - also seems to argue this exact same angle. Whilst his views - and the views of similar proponents - are all too often interpreted as simple advocacy for Australia to assume operational command in Oruzgan province, his arguments also support a view that the ADF needs to be prepared for a 'worst-case' scenario. That is, whether the Australian government desires or plans otherwise, contingencies such as the Dutch withdrawal from Oruzgan province without effective replacement, even for a limited period, will necessitate deployed forces adjust their operations. This adjustment could conceivably force the Land component into operational command and control of actions on the joint land combat line of operation, whether willingly or otherwise. His argument is, as AC-FLOC specifies, that the responsible commander should be prepared for, and versed and proficient in, executing the *operational art* in a sophisticated, complex joint land combat scenario. He cites his own experience as demonstrative of the view that an operational level commander must be highly

---

<sup>163</sup> Dr Michael Evans, email to the author dated 10 March 2010.

proficient in planning and executing action across all five lines of operation, in order to be able to adaptively campaign:

"If you can't fight, then you will never get to the clever parts of counterinsurgency, which is the hearts and minds. Because it is the strategy of the enemy to get between you and the people. If you are not strong and tough enough, you can't touch the hearts and minds of the people...It all depends whether you are in the fight to show commitment or in the fight to win. If you are in the fight to win, you have got to conduct offensive operations. If you are only in the fight to show commitment, you can have one man and a dog there...I don't think we are matching that with an attitude and ethos of combat. We say it, but I don't see it being manifest in training at a higher level, and that concerns me."<sup>164</sup>

### **An Issue of Focus and Priority**

The dichotomous aspect of the current debate as to the realisation of a contemporary Australian *operational art* is clearly not whether it is conceptually necessary for the future Land Force. All interested parties and stakeholders are in agreement that the ADF will be engaged at the operational level of war in the future complex operating environment. The characteristics of this environment are such that the commanders at every level will need to be familiar with, and proficient in, the practice of the *operational art* if they are to prevail against a sophisticated,

---

<sup>164</sup> MAJGEN Jim Molan, quoted by Patrick Walters, "A Nation at War, but Kept Clear of Combat," *The Australian*, July 19, 2008, downloaded from URL <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/a-nation-at-war-but-kept-clear-of-combat/story-e6frg8yo-1111116954627> on 1 March 2010.

unencumbered, agile and lethal adversary. Ostensibly, the key leaders in government and the ADF have formally and publicly 'signed up' to the necessity of generating a cadre of commanders versed in the practice of the operational art, across the five lines of operation specified in AC-FLOC, to be able to plan and execute campaigns and exhibit the necessary qualities of *generalship* sufficient to both prepare and command land forces committed to complex 21st century operations.

The reality is that this debate, like so many others in the realm of national security and defence, is another issue of focus and priority - of quantity and quality - that defies a neat, objective, calculable solution. The assertion that the issues raised by Evans and Molan are being serially neglected in the current education and training regime could not be validly substantiated. Numerous individual cases of Defence seizing upon or endorsing experiential opportunities for operational level commanders to hone their skills in planning and directing joint combat operations in coalition headquarters are easily cited. It is clear that both Evans and Molan have had measurable impact upon the JPME curriculum at ADC, with both individuals intimately involved in the review, design and ongoing delivery of specific courses and modules that address the concerns they themselves have raised.

Similarly, anecdotal evidence from recently deployed battle group commanders suggests many are encouraged by the 'new breed' of senior officers progressing up the ranks who have had greater experience - albeit generally at the higher tactical level - in deployed operations, many of whom have been intimately involved in the planning and direction of joint land combat operations. Many of this 'new generation' of operational commanders retain first-hand experience

of the dissonance that results from a selective strategic-tactical command architecture that effectively sidelines an operational commander in the contemporary operating environment. This cadre of future operational commanders endorse freedom of action, speed of decision, and the enabling methodologies of mission command and adaptive action - as AC-FLOC specifies - as necessary for the Land Force to out-manoeuvre an agile and sophisticated adversary, particularly one well-attuned to the inherent restrictions and attendant vulnerabilities of Western joint and inter-agency task-organised force elements.

Nevertheless, it remains abundantly clear that both Evans and Molan remain steadfast in their view that what has been achieved, what is contemplated, and what is likely to be realised is patently insufficient. Their view is that once the veil of rhetoric is pierced, it becomes abundantly clear that there is a very low priority afforded to the remediation of these issues. This may emanate from a conceptual reluctance, from an interpretation of the *realpolitik* of current government security contributions, or from a view that these issues are not the 'wolf closest to the stable'. An examination of the available literature, Chief of Army's promulgated intent and direction in relation to the *Adaptive Army Initiative*, and a canvassing of staff at the agencies best positioned to remediate such issues, turns up very little to repudiate this assertion. As the initiative currently stands, it would appear measures contemplated for enhancing operational commander's abilities to practice the *operational art* at the operational level in the joint land combat line of operation are simply 'fiddling at the margins.'

Evans directly contests the claim that the curriculum content at ADC is 'practitioner focussed,' and questions its ability to meet the qualitative claims of its efficacy in preparing commanders

for the real challenges of planning and executing future campaigns in the 21st century complex operating environment. He contends:

"The ADC has made incremental changes to campaigning and COIN which is good but insufficient. For so long as we continue to conduct a limited liability mission in Afghanistan there will be no pressure to modernise the entire JPME curriculum around joint warfighting. When an officer attends ACSC he will not hear the word 'war' for the first four weeks but is instead bombarded with management theory such critical thinking, etc. Much of this is irrelevant and needs to be replaced by strategic thought - real analytical thinking. There are plans for an Academic Faculty here but also many obstacles to its implementation - not least suitably qualified people and the imperatives of the Strategic Reform Plan."<sup>165</sup>

In order to overcome a perceived conceptual reluctance and resource limitations, Evans proposes the solution is to employ retired generals on contract to run the two respective courses at ADC. He considers this necessary for both continuity and cogency of the courses, but also because these individuals would operate outside the posting/promotion cycle, thereby enhancing conceptual freedom of action and objectivity, and allowing tenure sufficient to oversee consistent curriculum reform. From this point Evans argues it would be possible to build a "...civil-military faculty dedicated to a strategy-operations joint curriculum...[to] get rid of 75% of the management element and replace it with operational warfighting and strategic theory."<sup>166</sup>

---

<sup>165</sup> Dr Michael Evans, email to the author dated 30 March 2010.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*

Molan clearly concurs, citing this as a crucial requirement for the successful prosecution of the *operational art* in the complex 21st century battlespace, one that will likely - whether desired or otherwise by government - necessitate Australia realising its own doctrine and having to command and control joint combat operations to secure Australian national interests:

"The Australian way of joint operational command should be based on the deepest understanding of the nature of modern war, it should be the most professional activity that we as a military undertake, it should be intellectually rigorous and test candidates as individuals, it must create as high a level of joint technical competence as we see in the single Services, and it should be based on uncompromising standards, because that is what war is. Of course it should be resourced appropriately."<sup>167</sup>

---

<sup>167</sup> Molan, *Iraq Truisms: Five Truisms for the ADF Out of Iraq...*16.

## CONCLUSION

"You do not get strategic credit for not being able to fight, or by fighting clumsily. All you do is reinforce unfortunate stereotypes despite diplomatic rhetoric. Anyone who doubts that just needs to read Ambassador Bremer's book on his year in Iraq."<sup>168</sup>

-----

### **The Current State of Play**

The *Adaptive Army Initiative* seeks to realise an organisation capable of operating effectively in the complex security environment of the 21st century. Whilst acknowledging that the Army has performed creditably in a high tempo environment on deployed operations since 1999, the new Chief of Army has indicated that significant structural and cultural reform is necessary for the Land Force to continue to remain relevant and successful. The breadth of this challenge, posed by both the future complex operating environment and the extent of necessary change, in order to realise the strategic objectives of the *Defence White Paper 2009*, is now articulated in Army's new capstone doctrine - *Adaptive Campaigning: Army's Future Land Operating Concept* (AC-FLOC).

AC-FLOC defines the challenge posed by the new complex operating environment by demonstrating how the characteristics of conflict have changed. Based upon a prospective and

---

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid*, 12

holistic environmental scan, it postulates that the future global security environment will exhibit all the characteristics of complex adaptive system, but that certain enduring characteristics will make it possible for the Land Force to anticipate, structure and equip itself to successfully realise its core competency - warfighting - through the delivery of nuanced military power to fulfil national security objectives. The nature of geopolitical, technological and demographic trends will force the future Land Force into conflict with a new type of adversary. This adversary is predicted to utilise every means available, including asymmetric decisive action as well as a dominant narrative to achieve strategic outcomes, reflecting a sophisticated understanding of the inherent vulnerabilities and operational constraints of Western militaries, in order to undermine and weaken the political resolve of governments to maintain deployed interventions. AC-FLOC therefore posits that a new operating methodology is necessary for the Land Force to adapt and excel in this complex operating environment - *Adaptive Campaigning* - in order to "...influence and shape the overall environment to facilitate peaceful discourse and stabilise the situation with conditions conducive to Australia's national interests as described in *WP 09*."<sup>169</sup>

The *Adaptive Army Initiative* is heralded as the first iterative design of a Land Force structured for the contemporary fight; conceptually and cognitively enabled to constantly adapt itself to the evolving future complex operating environment. In order to create and maintain an inherently *adaptive* organisation, the initiative seeks to sequentially and iteratively build an organisation structured to undertake the six warfighting functions outlined in the ADF's *Future Joint Warfighting Concept* (FJOC).<sup>170</sup> It is not just about fighting, but the future Land Force must be

---

<sup>169</sup> Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning*...27.

<sup>170</sup> These elements include shaping actions, mandate for interventions, force projection and sustainment, defeating armed forces, counter-insurgency and rule of law, governance and support to transition. Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning*...27-28.



prepared to fight. *Adaptive Campaigning* derives a number of broad elements from these functions, in order to tailor the design and development process to enable Land Force operations within a Whole and Joint Government construct. From these design parameters, the *Adaptive Army Initiative* energises five broad streams of reform activity: rebalancing of Army's command and control and force structures, and processes to improve personnel management, training and education, materiel and knowledge management systems. Whilst such measures seek to enhance the preparation of current force elements for existing operations, through the realisation of more expedient temporal learning loops, the initiative seeks to be more far prospective and ambitious in its desired impact upon the future Land Force. The Chief of Army seeks to inculcate and embed a culture of adaptation within Army, to improve the individual and collective capacity to analyse, learn and exploit opportunities – to ‘out-adapt’ the adversary - in the future competitive learning environment. Cultural change is predicted to take time:

"The cultural issues inherent in such a dramatic change cannot be managed by simply drawing a new organisational chart...The Army needs to be agile in its approach to operations, and ready to adapt to a changing world - significantly, this is also the means to create a culture that encourages innovation and creativity."<sup>171</sup>

Clear measures of success (and failure) are enunciated to guide the progressive development and manage the change process. These metrics postulate that the *Adaptive Army Initiative* will be successful if it aligns the outputs of Army's force planning, force generation and force preparation with the joint strategic and operational requirements of the ADF, efficiently and effectively. It is precisely this issue - of what constitutes the most pressing strategic and/or

operational requirement - in which passionate professional debate has emerged in relation to this reform process.

The nature and tempo of Australian security interventions, particularly military deployments in both global and regional security crises since 1999, lead many to suggest the ADF is now more fully engaged at the operational level of war than since Australian commitment to the war in Vietnam. It is at this level of war that strategic guidance is translated into sequential and unified tactical action in order to achieve specified national security objectives. The methodology employed by the operational commander to achieve this is referred to as the *operational art*. Australian joint military doctrine elevates the *operational art* to a pre-eminence as a central concept in the ADF's thinking on the conduct of war. Capstone doctrine defines *operational art* as "...the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations... [translating] strategy into operational and ultimately, tactical action."<sup>172</sup>

This is the *functional* responsibility of a command at the operational level of war. At this level the commander functions a crucial intermediary between strategic and tactical actors: the operational commander is both a medium as well as filter, to advise on the feasibility and 'realisability' of strategic objectives and endstates, and to ensure dispersed tactical operations are appropriately sequenced and unified to ultimately realise them, in both time and space. This coordination methodology is the technical art of campaign planning, and for this reason the operational commander will normally be intimately involved in and/or responsible for the

---

<sup>171</sup> Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI...19.

<sup>172</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Joint Operations for the 21st Century*...20.

development and execution of a given campaign plan within a designated theatre. This is - in fact - the traditional doctrinal methodology that is outlined in extant ADF joint doctrine, most notably in ADDP 00.1 *Command and Control*. It is also the proposed doctrinal methodology – though slightly caveated – presented in AC-FLOC. The tactical actions to be planned and sequenced as part of this process may necessitate joint land combat, or as AC-FLOC posits, this may be only one aspect of the Land Force response as part of an integrated, Whole of Government approach to security operations.

In Army's latest iteration of this process, prescribed in AC-FLOC and developed into the contemporary methodology known as *Adaptive Campaigning*, an operational commander will orchestrate and moderate action across five lines of operation. The operational commander must be prepared to engage in **joint land combat** as one of these specified lines of operation; there is no other element of national power capable of executing this type of activity other than a military entity. Indeed, the operational commander must be a master of this trade in order to win the current and future joint land battles.<sup>173</sup> Successful practice of the *operational art* by an operational commander will, however, also be predicated on the proper preparation, training, equipping and resourcing of the force elements engaged in the discrete tactical actions that comprise the campaign. By virtue of the fact that joint land combat remains the sole purview of military forces, government must also be properly advised in order to appropriately enable the Land Force to win the joint land battle. This process of preparing the force to fight, as well as executing (or commanding) the fight, are the accepted core competencies of *generalship*. Both AC-FLOC and the *Adaptive Army Initiative* articulate the importance of the *operational art* as

---

<sup>173</sup> As specified by the Chief of Army in his foreword to AC-FLOC. Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning...* i.

being crucial to the process of force design, the successful execution of *Adaptive Campaigning*, and best practice of *generalship* within Whole of Government (interagency) and/or coalition constructs.

Chief of Army has recently proclaimed significant progress across the five streams of the *Adaptive Army Initiative* since its inception: the most visible changes to date have been the structural changes to Army's command and control architecture. The rebalancing of functional responsibilities, in particular, is now well-advanced.<sup>174</sup> Chief of Army continues to promulgate updated and more detailed policy guidance, and his intent remains still serves to guide development and implementation of discrete reforms: functional headquarters have been afforded significant latitude to design and institute reforms that align with the spirit and intent of his direction within their own functional areas. Foundation warfighting is advanced as the principal focus of training and educational reform, forming the "...bedrock from which the Army adapts to meet its operational requirements and which equips force elements to conduct the full spectrum of sustained operations."<sup>175</sup> A new Army Training Continuum synchronising individual and collective training in line with this approach was implemented on 1 July 2009 with the raising of Forces Command (FORCOMD). AC-FLOC highlights the critical role of *generalship* in the higher command and control aspects of foundation warfighting: in terms of preparing for future conflict the Land Force must "...educate and develop joint and interagency commanders skilled in the operational art at all levels from combat team to joint task force."<sup>176</sup> Chief of Army

---

<sup>174</sup> Gillespie, "The Adaptive Army Initiative," *Australian Army Journal* VI...7.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid*, 14-15.

<sup>176</sup> Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning*...40.

has very recently emphasised the importance of the *operational art* in future joint operations by acknowledging deficiencies in the existing system of education and training.<sup>177</sup>

Nevertheless, despite this rhetoric, it is suggested that this new training continuum **continues** to neglect both the conceptual and practical dimensions of Australian *operational art*. Two proponents of the view that Australian operational level commanders lack proficiency in the *operational art*, assert that this clear *strategic and operational requirement* continues to be sorely neglected by senior leadership in the ADF. These increasingly outspoken critics, Dr Michael Evans and (retired) Major General Jim Molan, assert that a conceptual and cognitive reluctance to address this issue still pervades senior leadership within the ADF. Limited reforms of the joint professional military and education (JPME) system, pre-dating the *Adaptive Army Initiative*, are neither sufficient nor are reinforced by any proposed measures in the initiative, nor is there any indication of tangible intent to develop additional reform in this area. Their view is that an educative and experiential methodology, emphasising the pre-eminence of the joint land combat line of operation for uniformed practitioners, must be implemented as a matter of conceptual and practical necessity. The existing emphasis on inter-agency and departmental skills and attributes in current courses at the Australian Defence College, geared toward the generation of strategic leaders and defence 'bureaucrats' rather than operational level commanders, sorely neglects the skills required to 'win the joint land battle,' and instead over-emphasises that component of *generalship* dedicated to designing, preparing and administering the future force. Evans and Molan both arrive at this conclusion, that Australian officers will continue lack the ability to practice the *operational art* at the operational level of war, unless

---

<sup>177</sup> In his speeches to Australian Command and Staff College courses on 11 June 2009 and 19 February 2010.

urgent measures of remediation are put in place, from different but highly complementary perspectives.

Evans contends that the crux of this reluctance to act is essentially conceptual in nature. Australia's history of junior partner alliance warfare has precluded any real evolution of knowledge of the operational level of war, and the manifest political-military preference for a strategic-tactical command architecture in operations involving land combat has denied operational commanders any opportunity to practice the *operational art*. The only relaxation of this tight strategic control has occurred in regional security operations, where the risk of close combat and sustained casualties is commensurately reduced. In these interventions, operational commanders at the Joint (interagency) Task Force level are more fully empowered to practice the *operational art*, but the opportunity to plan, sequence and oversee operations on the joint land combat line of operation is negligible. Evans acknowledges that the exposure of Australian forces to combat at the operational level is a matter of governmental policy, but warns that the ADF has not taken sufficient steps to enable alternative methodologies for developing expertise in the *operational art*. Incremental changes in the JPME system, in the Australian Command and Staff (ACSC) and Defence and Strategic Studies Courses (DSSC), do little to redress the current imbalance in course curricula, which he contends places a premium on developing managerial skills for 'diplomats and defence bureaucrats'<sup>178</sup> over core warfighting competencies.

His analysis suggests this is likely because the current crop of strategic leaders in the ADF 'grew up' in the Defence of Australia (continental defence) construct, and their operational experience since this time has led them to become attuned to (what Australian political commentator Paul

Kelly describes as Australia's "...clever, cynical, calculated and modest" contribution methodology to coalition operations, where responsibility for sustained close combat, and thus casualties, is attendant. This is evidenced by the institutional predilection to characterise (and thus structure) land operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as reconstruction and training missions, rather than counter-insurgency or stability operations. The joint land combat line of operation is left to coalition partners to execute. Whether this is done by design or default, Evans warns that the Land Force nevertheless must be prepared to execute sustained operations on this line of operation, because (as AC-FLOC highlights) the initiative resides with the adversary and the tenet of *operational uncertainty* is ever-present. Whether the Australian government agrees to assume operational control of Oruzgan province in Afghanistan in 2010, or whether the Dutch combat capability is not adequately replaced, Evans warns that Australia's shortcomings in practicing the *operational art* at the operational level of war may soon become evident by default.

Molan arrives at the same conclusion, but through a different prism - the prism of his own experience at the operational level of war as the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) in Multi-National Headquarters - Iraq. This exposure to the exigencies of planning and commanding joint land combat operations at the operational level of war underpins his view that current JPME system, and Australia's recent operational experiences in deployed operations, fall well short of adequately preparing future operational commanders for the practice of the *operational art*. Molan emphasises remediation in a more experiential manner: whilst acknowledging the importance of the JPME system in preparing commanders for the cognitive and conceptual challenges of joint land combat, the ADF should seize every opportunity to embed Australian

---

<sup>178</sup> Michael Evans, "Rejoinder," *Security Challenges* 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008), 144.

commanders into multi-national or coalition billets, in positions of responsibility for the planning and execution of joint land combat operations at the operational level of war. His focus is thus upon strategic and operational commanders exercising both core competencies of *generalship*. Generals must prepare the Land Force for current and future operations, and prepare themselves and their successors to capably execute the *operational art*. The most demanding, and thus most important aspect of this preparation is on the design and execution of joint combat operations (warfighting), as there is no other government or non-government agency that can discharge this responsibility. Failure to demonstrate resolve and expertise on the joint land combat line of operation will fundamentally undermine efforts on other lines of operation, and lose the fight for the 'hearts and minds' of any target population. He too throws a spotlight on the evolving situation in Afghanistan is a warning to senior leadership that force preparation and training should not be predicated on matters of (existing) political expediency. To do so continues to expose the organisation to an unacceptable risk of operational failure, which will ultimately be judged as a 'failure of *generalship*':

"The concern I have is that the ADF thinks that the superb performance it has shown in East Timor and Solomon Islands in less than ferocious combat situations is the maximum level of capability that we have to show. I would argue that there is a lot more to it than that."<sup>179</sup>

Similar concerns surface, though are expressed more personally and anecdotally, in the reflections of recently returned tactical commanders and staff officers from global and regional



deployments. Many recently returned Battle Group commanders, in particular, highlight a concern that their operational level commanders or supervisors, whether exercising some measure of theatre command as a Joint Task Force commander, or nominal oversight as the appointed National Command Element, were visibly dislocated by the ubiquitous strategic-tactical interface or simply demonstrated a lack of individual expertise in practicing the *operational art* in complex security environments. Several have intimated that they were able to easily differentiate between operational level commanders with pre-existing tactical command experience in deployed operations, and those whose experience had been limited to staff positions in either deployed or organisational headquarters. The timbre of their commentary reflects Molan's own self-reflection on beginning his tenure as Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations in Iraq: "I felt that although I was as good as any contemporary Australian commander, I was seriously underprepared to command forces on a modern, complex operation."<sup>180</sup> This self-reflection is instructive, given that Molan's career profile, education and training up to this point would have been considered as close to optimal as the existing individual and collective training continuum could have delivered.<sup>181</sup>

The optimal process of preparing officers for the practice of the *operational art*, campaign planning and *generalship* must involve both educative and experiential opportunities. Revisions of the ACSC and DSSC courses at the Australian Defence College in recent years have incorporated important competencies such as joint planning, the design of campaign plans, and

---

<sup>179</sup> Walters, *A Nation at War, but Kept Clear of Combat...* downloaded from URL <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/a-nation-at-war-but-kept-clear-of-combat/story-e6frg8yo-1111116954627> on 1 March 2010.

<sup>180</sup> Jim Molan, "Debate: The ADF and Operational Art," *Security Challenges* 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008), 135.

<sup>181</sup> Up to this point, MAJGEN Molan had the benefit of significant command experience as both a Brigade and Divisional Commander in Australia, experience in the US Warfighter program and operational experience in

analysis of the contemporary complex operating environment and Australian security policy into the curriculum. Indeed, both principal critics - Dr Evans and MAJGEN Molan - are currently engaged in the development, design and delivery of these courses to the next generation of operational commanders. The Chief of Army has recently emphasised to several ACSC classes the importance of the *operational art* for command at the operational level, mirroring AC-FLOC's discernable emphasis. Examples of recent initiatives such as the signing of inter-departmental Memoranda of Understanding, and experiential opportunities for embedding officers in inter-departmental positions, are highlighted as practical measures being undertaken to improve the ability of future commanders to better plan and sequence activity along the five lines of operation highlighted in AC-FLOC. This has done little to placate either Evans or Molan, who remain outspoken in their belief that the Australian military mind is closed to seriously remediating the issue of enabling commanders to successfully execute the *operational art* - across all lines of operation - at the operational level of war.

An analysis of the current educative and experiential methodologies, and reforms proposed or envisaged by the Chief of Army in the *Adaptive Army Initiative*, reveals the basis for this continued scepticism as to how serious the ADF (and Army) are about realising the rhetoric. It is difficult to divine any real linkage between the Chief of Army's emphasis upon core warfighting skills, at both the individual and collective levels in the Army Training Continuum, with systems and processes to generate operational level commanders capable of applying the *operational art* in the joint land combat line of operation. Whilst the *Adaptive Army Initiative* remains in its infancy, the predominant focus and activity to date has clearly been on the structural and

---

regional security interventions including command of an evacuation operation. He had also completed the Army Command and Staff Course and predecessor to the Defence and Strategic Studies Course.

organisational revision of higher command and control functions, to generate and prepare force elements for existing deployments. Whilst this is both logical and expedient, Chief of Army has still been extremely active and prolific in his issuance of guidance and intent in relation to other reform streams that will ultimately engender the *cultural realignment* that he seeks. Strangely, given the fact that the predominant responsibility for organisational stewardship of the Land Force rests with the officer corps, to date very little guidance or intent can be discerned relating to the issues of the *operational art*, campaign planning or *generalship*. Organisational initiatives to improve the ability of commanders to execute activity on AC-FLOC's lines of operation, such as inter-agency exchange or positional appointments, fail to address concerns about competence on the joint land combat line of operation. The issue is clearly one of emphasis, focus and priority given the concurrency of operations, high operational tempo and resource restrictions that are manifest in the current Strategic Reform Process. Whilst the JPME is a joint education programme, and thus requires consensus from each of the single services for curriculum revision, there is little in current rhetoric to suggest revision is a matter of priority for Army.

Evans and Molan clearly reject resources and consensus-building as the fundamental reasons for why the *operational art* is being neglected as the "...seedbed for developing future senior joint force commanders."<sup>182</sup> Their position is that senior leadership across the ADF harbours a reluctance to place an emphasis upon the joint combat line of operation in a contemporary invocation of Australian *operational art*, based upon an appraisal of the existing *realpolitik* that limits and caveats ADF contributions to close combat operations. Whilst recent ADF and Army capstone doctrine emphasises the conceptual necessity, recent ADF and Army operational activity highlights the reluctance. The bulk of reforms concomitant to the *Adaptive Army*

*Initiative* reflect this nuanced focus upon improving the Army's execution of the strategic-tactical command architecture for high-risk operations involving the smallest possible (and most highly trained) tactical elements, and mechanisms and methodologies to improve Army interaction with other agencies involved in the population protection, population support, information action and indigenous capacity-building lines of operation. These lines of operation are - unsurprisingly - the predominant and principal lines of operation being practiced by operational commanders engaged in military and inter-departmental (joint) task forces in regional security interventions.

This interpretation of the Evans and Molan perspective makes it easy to understand their agitation as to recent developments in Oruzgan province in Afghanistan. Many interpret their concern that Australia **should be prepared** to assume operational command and control as an argument that Australia **should** assume operational command and control. The latter clearly misstates their position. Both have acknowledged that the decision to assume operational command and control of this province, as was the case with the assumption of Operational Overwatch in Dhi Qar province in Iraq in 2006, is a matter for decision by government.<sup>183</sup> They rather contend that should the Australian government, for whatever reason, decide to assume operational responsibility for Oruzgan province, then the Land Force must be prepared to either restructure its operations to assume greater responsibility for the joint land combat line of operation, and/or be prepared to command and coordinate other coalition forces that may be provided to supplement Australian forces in theatre. All indications to date are that the Australian government intends to resist pressure from either NATO or the US government to assume operational responsibility for Oruzgan province. This is a situation in which Australia

---

<sup>182</sup> Evans, *The Closing of the Australian Military Mind*, 105.

possesses some measure of control in the ultimate decision: Evans and Molan would likely contend that this is the course of action that senior ADF leadership regards as the 'most likely course of action.'

The other possibility that the Evans and Molan perspective countenances is that the Dutch may simply not be replaced, or are replaced with forces inadequate to effectively prosecute the joint land combat line of operation. This would still force Australia to have to restructure (at least some element) of its focus from the reconstruction and indigenous capacity-building lines of operation, to counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations which would, in the present circumstances, inevitably require some measure of joint land combat. This is, by far, the 'most dangerous course of action,' as it would force a defacto assumption of some measure of operational command and control, and would certainly entail increased exposure to sustained joint land combat until such time as a political decision were made to either reinforce Australian commitment, or withdraw it. Molan and Evans insist that, either way, whether by 'hook or by crook,' the Land Force must be prepared for this as its current doctrine clearly contemplates. To fail to do so - to risk operational failure - given that there are some simple measures of remediation easily available, is a contemporary demand for responsible *generalship*. The recent view that a campaign framework would be "largely provided to the operational commander for implementation," thereby leading to a more "circumscribed" manifestation of the *operational art*, seems inherently self-serving and is not borne out by the reality of operations in either Iraq or Afghanistan, as reflected by numerous comments from returned officers who bemoan the lack of

---

<sup>183</sup> The pre-existing Al Muthanna Task Group assumed operational overwatch of Dhi Qar and Al Muthanna provinces following the Italian withdrawal in mid 2006.

guidance, and inability of contemporary operational level commanders to redress the deficiency for tactical commanders.

### **Enabling the Future Adaptive Operational Commander**

The *Adaptive Army Initiative* continues to further develop and implement changes to Army's command and control architecture, force structure, training and education, personnel and materiel capabilities as the reform process gathers momentum. Nonetheless, it is difficult to discern any enunciated intent or envisaged reform to pragmatically address any of the concerns prevalent in the arguments advanced by Dr Evans or Major General Molan. Similarly, it is difficult to identify discrete measures of remediation addressing the concerns expressed by recently returned tactical commanders and staff officers as to the proficiency and/or freedom of action of operational level commanders. These issues are germane to the ADF, rather than just the Land Force, and thus total remediation is beyond the singular remit of the Chief of Army, or any other environmental or higher joint commander - it will most likely necessitate negotiation and shaping of the political will of government and senior policy-makers. Nonetheless, the ultimate responsibility for preparation of the future Land Force, and the preparation of future commanders to execute the *operational art* remains the core function of *generalship*. Senior leadership bears the responsibility to do more than simply acknowledging issues of concern, and toothless remediation by way of doctrinal acknowledgement. Some measure of commitment to practical remediation and/or reform needs to accompany the public acknowledgement. Otherwise, the metaphoric 'slip between cup and lip,' already being watchfully predicted by many critics, will become manifest, and this very well-crafted and holistic initiative may be

consigned to dustbin of ‘good ideas’ – another basic organisational restructure - without ever realising the *profound cultural change* intended.

The *Defence White Paper 2009*, ADF joint doctrine, and AC-FLOC either stipulate the requirement for the future force to be capable of acting independently or in concert, as either a contributor or leader, in complex security operations in the 21st century.<sup>184</sup> There is great inherent risk in assuming that future security responsibilities will accord with those expected or allocated in the recent past. Canadian experience and the developing situation in Oruzgan province highlight the fact that there will rarely ever be sufficient lead time for the Land Force to anticipate the requirement for operational command and control in sustained joint combat. AC-FLOC states that the Land Force must equip its senior commanders with revised campaign design and operational planning skills more appropriate to the contemporary and future complex operating environments.<sup>185</sup> This can only be achieved through a focussed joint professional educational system, and experiential opportunities to plan, implement and execute operational level activities that incorporate simulated or actual experience in the prosecution of joint land combat operations.

The contemporary Australian political-military preference for strategic direction of tactical action that is cited by Evans and Molan will be outpaced , dislocated and overwhelmed by the characteristics of contemporary conflict outlined in AC-FLOC. Recent commentary from deployed tactical level commanders and staff already tend to indicate that this is already occurring. The future security environment will be populated by highly adaptive, capable

---

<sup>184</sup> *Defence White Paper 2009*...12-13.

<sup>185</sup> Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning - Army, *Adaptive Campaigning*...30-41.

adversaries operating below detection and discrimination thresholds, rapidly concentrating and dispersing, who will present only fleeting opportunities for engagement - kinetic or otherwise. The mantra of mission command is already widely promulgated as the principal mechanism to enable the future land force to orient, decide, learn and adapt faster than the tactical adversary: its applicability and desirability is further reinforced and emphasised in AC-FLOC. An operational level of command utilising mission command to realise strategic outcomes through tactical effects is the defining command and control architecture demanded by the complex operating environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This architecture pervades both ADF joint doctrine as well as AC-FLOC. This is advanced as the only methodology capable of increasing adaptability, tempo and speed of decision in relation to the adversary. In the future battlespace, unity of effort cannot be the product of uniformity imposed from the strategic level but must originate from the “spontaneous, purposeful cooperation of the distributed elements of the force.”<sup>186</sup>

There is clearly a need to prepare future operational commanders, and the future Land Force, for the execution of the *operational art* across the five lines of operation that will infuse future security operations. Evans and Molan remind today’s leaders that no other entity can bring the warfighting skillset to any future security intervention contemplated by government. This remains the sole purview of the ADF, and – in the majority of cases where the adversary retreats into and operates from complex terrain - the Land Force will bear the brunt of executing sustained joint land combat. Evans neatly summarises the necessary duality of the educative and training requirement for tomorrow’s operational commander, and today’s ‘general’:

---

<sup>186</sup> John F. Schmitt, "Command and (Out of) Control: The Military Implications of Complexity Theory," in David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security* (National Defence



“The ultimate aim of modern professional military education and training systems in the first quarter of the 21st century should be to produce what might be described as a ‘strategically-astute and operationally-expert officer who can function in both the counsels of state and on the joint, multinational and interagency battlespace’ ...in the complex conditions of the 21st century, a traditional focus on operational skills needs to be complemented by improved strategic knowledge. In short, a new compact must be made between the imperatives of training and those of education that reflects 21st century realities. The senior military professional must increasingly be double-hatted - broadly educated for the counsels of state and yet highly-trained for the demands of the battlespace. There can be no ‘either-or’ choice in future military education and training.”<sup>187</sup>

### **An 'Adaptive' or an 'Adapted' Army?**

Unless something more is envisaged and/or implemented to address these issues raised by Evans, Molan and contemporary tactical commanders, the Adaptive Army initiative will do little more than adapt the existing organisation to the exigencies and demands of extant security commitments. Canada’s ‘reversal’ of its relatively recent conceptually comfortable middle-power position, and the dilemma of future operational command and control in Oruzgan province, both stand as stark reminders that the Land Force may be called – at short notice – to realise its own rhetoric in delivering funded capability. Whether the future Land Force is committed deliberately, or as a result of factors outside political control, to operational command

---

University, Washington DC, 1997), 241.

<sup>187</sup> Evans, *From the Long Peace to the Long War...*12.

and control in joint land combat operations is irrelevant. Future Land Force commanders must be capable of practicing the *operational art*, of designing and executing campaign plans, across all five lines of operation to ensure strategic direction is translated into tactical action, and that tactical action ensures strategic success.

There is - of course - the view that the *Adaptive Army Initiative*, still being in its infancy, will eventually 'get around to' this stated requirement in time. But there also exist, the contrary view, that the initiative will likely achieve as much lasting *cultural realignment* as the tenure of the new incumbent. There is, amongst some recently returned tactical commanders, the view that this initiative is beneficial enough in so far as it *adapts* the organisation to the current operational situation, but its capacity to engender *adaptiveness* will be undermined by the rhetoric-reality gap that characterises Australian contributions to security operations involving joint land combat:

"Adaptive army is a slogan that has been given to the reorganisation of the Army and the reorganisation has been driven in the main by the new HQ ADF and JOC changes and not necessarily by any burning desire to actual be adaptive in an educative or ASDA sense. While we have all had to be most adaptive in dealing with change the focus of the change was on reorganisation...In many ways the success of the Adaptive Army may not be in its adaptiveness but in its ability to protect, train and develop the core suite of capability bricks that Army needs to fight and win both now and into the

future. By placing so much of Army in one command we have achieved a good level of synergy and critical mass as an investment for the future."<sup>188</sup>

Michael Howard has stated "...in structuring and preparing an Army for war you can be clear that you will not get it precisely right, but the important thing to ensure is that it is not too far wrong, so that you can put it right quickly."<sup>189</sup> Whilst doctrine does not constitute policy, and represents a prescriptive rather than proscriptive direction for the future Land Force, the issues of the *operational art*, campaign planning and *generalship* so critical to *Adaptive Campaigning* should be thought of necessary priorities rather than idealistic notions of a future likely never to vest.

Current leaders would do well to remember the words of Sir Basil Liddell Hart, that "...[t]he profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men."<sup>190</sup> Unless something more is done in relation to preparing future operational commanders to apply the *operational art* - at the operational level of war on the joint land combat line of operation – a question mark will remain as the proficiency and ability of the Land Force to win the future joint land battle. The characteristics of future conflict, highlighted in capstone doctrine and recognised by the chief architect of the *Adaptive Army Initiative* - demand individuals cognitively, morally and physically capable of exercising full theatre command in the most extreme of complex security environments. Should a lack of focus or commitment to this preparation translate into setback or failure at the operational level,

---

<sup>188</sup> Email from a recently returned Army Battlegroup commander to the author, dated 9 February 2010.

<sup>189</sup> John Nagle, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Praeger Publishers, 1st ed, 2002), 218

<sup>190</sup> David Sadowski and Jeff Becker, "Beyond the 'Hybrid' Threat: Asserting the Essential Unity of Warfare," *Small Wars Journal* (Small Wars Foundation, 2010), downloaded from URL <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/344-sadowski-etal.pdf> on 3 March 2010, 6.

given the strength of the current debate as to the strategic and operational priorities for the *Adaptive Army Initiative*, then as Molan suggests, there can be little doubt that this would be likely be considered a true 'failure of generalship.'

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ashley, WO1 David, "Adaptive Campaigning and the Need to Empower our Junior Leaders to Deliver the 'I'm an Australian Soldier' Initiative." *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 3 (Summer 2009).

Australian Army, "Adaptive Army: An Update on the Implementation of the Adaptive Army," 8 May 2009, downloaded from URL [http://intranet.defence.gov.au/armyweb/sites/CA/docs/ADAPTIVE\\_ARMY\\_PAPER\\_08\\_May\\_09.pdf](http://intranet.defence.gov.au/armyweb/sites/CA/docs/ADAPTIVE_ARMY_PAPER_08_May_09.pdf); accessed 14 January 2010.

Australian Army, "Adaptive Army Public Information Paper," 26 August 2008, downloaded from URL: <http://www.army.gov.au/AdaptiveArmy/docs/Adaptive%20Army%20Public%20Info%20Paper.pdf>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2010.

Australian Defence Force, *Joint Operations, Command and Control of Australian Defence Force Operations*, (Canberra: Headquarters Australian Defence Force, 1988).

Australian Government - Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, Defence White Paper 2009, downloaded from URL [http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence\\_white\\_paper\\_2009.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf) on 15 December 2010.

*Army*, Edition 1210, 16 April 2009, downloaded from URL <http://www.defence.gov.au/news/armynews/editions/1210/1210.pdf> on 2 February 2010

Australian Public Service Commission, "Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges," 20 April 2004, downloaded from URL <http://www.apsc.gov.au/mac/connectinggovernment1.htm> on 20 February 2010.

Bailey, Major General J. A. B. *Field Artillery and Firepower*. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD, 2004.

Barrie, ADM Chris. "Debate: The ADF and Operational Art." *Security Challenges* 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008), downloaded from URL <http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol4no2DebateOpArt.pdf> on 15 January 2010.

Brigadier J.S Baker, *Report on the Study into ADF Command Arrangements* (Canberra: HQADF, 1987).

Caron, Brigadier-General J.H.P.M, "Kosovo, The Military-Civilian Challenge and the General's Role," in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen J Harris. St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001, 291-300.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, 1984.

Chaloner, Major Brett. "Thoughts for Australian Planners in Afghanistan," *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 2 (Winter 2009).

Commonwealth of Australia, *Australian Defence*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976.

Commonwealth of Australia, *The Defence of Australia 1987*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987.

Commonwealth of Australia, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 199.

Commonwealth of Australia, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2007*. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2007.

Dangerfield, LTGEN J.K, "A Perspective on Contemporary Canadian Generalship Operations in NATO," in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*. Edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J Harris, 213 – 232. St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001.

Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrinal Publication 00.1, *Command and Control*. Defence Publishing Service, 2009.

Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication - D, *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*. Defence Publishing Service, 2005.

Department of Defence, *Decisive Manoeuvre: Australian Warfighting Concepts to Guide Campaign Planning: Interim Edition*, January 1998.

Department of Defence, *Final Report of the Learning Culture Inquiry*, July 2006, downloaded from URL <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/LCIreport.pdf> on 21 Feb 10

Department of Defence, *Force 2020*. Canberra: Public Affairs and Corporate Communications, 2002.

Department of Defence, *Joint Operations for the 21st Century*. Canberra: Strategic Policy Division, 2007, downloaded from URL <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/FJOC.pdf> on 5 April 2010.

Department of Defence, *Force 2020*. Canberra: Public Affairs and Corporate Communications, 2002.

Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defence White Paper 2009*. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2009.

Dixon, Richard. *Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective*. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2004.

Dobell, Graeme. "Army dances to its own rhythms," *The Interpreter*, Lowry Institute for International Policy, 29 August 2008, downloaded from URL <http://lowryinterpreter.org/post/2008/08/29/Army-dances-to-its-own-rhythms.aspx> on 15 January 2010.

Donini, Antonio, Niland, Norah and Wermester, Karin (eds). *Nation-Building Unraveled? Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan*. Kumarian Press, 2004.

Dorn, Walter D and Varey, Michael. "The Rise and Demise of the 'Three Block War'," *Canadian Military Journal* 10, no. 1 (2009).

Evans, Dr Michael. "City Without Joy: Urban Operations into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," *Australian Defence College Occasional Paper no. 2*. Australian Defence College, 2007.

Evans, Dr Michael. "From the Long Peace to the Long War: Armed Conflict and Military Education and Training in the 21st Century," *Australian Defence College Occasional Paper no. 1*. Australian Defence College, 2007.

Evans, Dr Michael. "Rejoinder," *Security Challenges* 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008).

Evans, Dr Michael. "The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The ADF and Operational Art," *Security Challenges*, vol 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008)

Evans, Dr Michael. "The Continental School of Strategy: The Past, Present and Future of Land Power," *Study Paper No. 305*. Land Warfare Studies Centre, June 2004.



Evans, Dr Michael. "The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia's Strategic Culture and Way of War, 1901-2005", *Study Paper No. 306*. Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2005.

Funnell, Ray. "Debate: The ADF and Operational Art", *Security Challenges* 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008), downloaded from URL <http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol4no2DebateOpArt.pdf> on 15 January 2010.

Gillespie, LTGEN Kenneth. "The Adaptive Army Initiative." *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 3 (Summer 2009).

Gillespie, LTGEN Kenneth. "Chief of Army Directive - 'Adaptive Army': The Evolution of Army's Higher Command and Control Structures - AL1." *Chief of Army Directive 22/08*, dated 5 November 2008.

Gillespie, LTGEN Kenneth. "Rebalancing Army." *Chief of Army Directive 20/09*, dated 6 May 2009.

Gompert, David C. *Preparing Military Forces for Integrated Operations in the Face of Uncertainty*. RAND Issue Paper, National Defence Research Institute, 2003.

Greenshields, Major James. "A Proactive Mental Approach: Lessons of a Contemporary Combat Team Commander," *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 2 (Winter 2009).

Headquarters United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting*. US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1997, downloaded from URL [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service\\_pubs/mcdp1.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/mcdp1.pdf) on 14 February 2010.

Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning – Army. *Adaptive Campaigning, Army's Future Land Operating Concept*. Canberra, September 2009.

Hetherington, Andrew. "Plan for Our People." *Army*, Edition 1210, 16 April 2009.

Hogg, LTCOL David. "Rapid Decisive Operations: The Search for the Holy Grail of Joint Warfighting," in Williamson, M. *Transformation Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century*. Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.

Hutcheson, Colonel John. "The Adaptive Officer: Think, Communicate and Influence," *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 2 (Winter 2009).

Ilachinski, A. *Land Warfare and Complexity, Part II: An Assessment of the Applicability of Nonlinear Dynamics and Complex Systems Theory to the Study of Land Warfare*. Centre for Naval Analyses CRM 96-68, July 1996, downloaded from URL: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA362621&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

Jans, Nick. "People Issues in the White Paper: Beware of Slip Between Cup and Lip," *Security Challenges* 5, no. 2 (Winter 2009).

Kelly, Justin and Brennan, Mike. "OODA Versus ASDA: Metaphors at War." *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 3 (Summer 2009).

Kelly, Paul. "No Lapdog, this Partner Has Clout." *The Australian*, 28 August 2002, downloaded from URL <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a713707181&db=all> on 5 April 2010.

Marshall, Samuel. *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*. Peter Smith, Gloucester, 1978.

McDonald, Hamish. "War spinners on the defensive." *The Age*, 27 February 2010, downloaded from URL <http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/war-spinners-on-the-defensive-20100226-p917.html?skin=text-only> on 3 March 2010.

Molan, MAJGEN Jim. "Choice and Necessity in Australia's Way of War." *The Interpreter*, Lowry Institute for International Policy, 2 September 2009, downloaded from URL <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2009/09/02/Choice-and-necessity-in-the-Australian-way-of-war.aspx> on 12 January 2010.

Molan, MAJGEN Jim. "Debate: The ADF and Operational Art", *Security Challenges* 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008), downloaded from URL <http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol4no2DebateOpArt.pdf> on 15 January 2010.

Molan, MAJGEN Jim. "How Much is Enough in Afghanistan?" *Australian Defence Force Journal* VI, no. 2 (Winter 2009).

Molan, MAJGEN Jim. "Iraq Truisms: Five Truisms for the ADF out of Iraq." *Australian Defence Force Journal*, Issue no 171 (November 2006).

Nagl, John A. *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*. Praeger Publishers, 1st edition, 2002.

Ryan, Dr Alex. "The Foundation for an Adaptive Approach: Insights from the Science of Complex Systems." *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 3 (Summer 2009).

Ryan, LTCOL Michael. "Measuring Success and Failure in an 'Adaptive' Army," *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 3 (Summer 2009).

Sadowski, David and Becker, Jeff. "Beyond the 'Hybrid' Threat: Asserting the Essential Unity of Warfare." *Small Wars Journal*, Small Wars Foundation, 2010, downloaded from URL <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/344-sadowski-et-al.pdf> on 3 March 2010.

John F. Schmitt. "Command and (Out of) Control: The Military Implications of Complexity Theory," in David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski. *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security*. National Defence University, Washington DC, 1997.

Scott, LTCOL Trent. "Adapt or Die: Operational Design and Adaptation." *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 3 (Summer 2009).

Stewart, Keith. "Mission Command: Problem Bounding or Problem Solving?" *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 4 (2009).

Strategic Policy Division. *Joint Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2007.

Tamas, Andy. *Warriors and Nation-Builders: Development and the Military in Afghanistan*. Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009.

Thomas, Ross. "Debate: The ADF and Operational Art." *Security Challenges* 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008), downloaded from URL <http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol4no2DebateOpArt.pdf> on 15 January 2010.

Vego, Milan. *Operational Warfare*. US Naval War College, Newport RI, 2000.

Vogelaar AD L.W and Eric-Hanskramer. "Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Missions." *Armed Forces and Society* 30, no. 3 (Spring 2004).

Walters, Patrick. "A Nation at War, but Kept Clear of Combat." *The Australian*, 19 July 2008, downloaded from URL <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/a-nation-at-war-but-kept-clear-of-combat/story-e6frg8yo-1111116954627> on 1 March 2010.

Walters, Patrick. "Army Strength Questioned." *The Australian*, 19 July 2008, downloaded from URL <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/army-strength-questioned/story-e6frg8yo-1111116956632> on 1 March 2010

Winter, LTCOL Scott. "Fixed, Determined, Inviolable: Military Organisational Culture and Adaptation." *Australian Army Journal* VI, no. 3 (Summer 2009).

Yingling, LTCOL Paul. "A Failure in Generalship." *Armed Forces Journal* (May 2007), downloaded from URL <http://www.ajji.com/2007/05/2635198> on 10 March 2010.

### **Presentations/Speeches**

Molan, MAJGEN Jim. "Running the War in Iraq: The Nature of Modern Warfare and the New Defence White Paper," Speech to the Lowry Institute for International Policy, 3 September 2008.

Gillespie, LTGEN Kenneth. Speech to Australian Command and Staff College, 12 March 2009, downloaded from URL [http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/docs/ca\\_speech\\_to\\_acsc-12\\_march\\_2009v3.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/docs/ca_speech_to_acsc-12_march_2009v3.pdf)

Gillespie, LTGEN Kenneth. Speech to Australian Command and Staff College, 11 June 2009, downloaded from URL [http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/docs/speech\\_to\\_acsc-11\\_jun\\_09.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/docs/speech_to_acsc-11_jun_09.pdf)

Gillespie, LTGEN Kenneth. Speech to Australian Command and Staff College, 19 February 2010, downloaded from URL [http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/docs/CA\\_Speech\\_to\\_ACSC.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/docs/CA_Speech_to_ACSC.pdf)