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PAY ME NOW OR PAY MORE LATER: TASK GROUP OR SINGLE SHIP IN THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

In order for Canada to make a meaningful contribution to international and domestic security it requires combat capable forces. These forces must have the ability to contribute to homeland security while also being ready and able to deploy internationally. With respect to the navy, this means not only having the ability to contribute warships to an emerging crisis; it also means having the ability to lead a maritime coalition in response to that emergent crisis. A naval task group provides Canada the flexibility to do both.

Since the Second World War, naval leadership has remained steadfast in its pursuit of the naval task group despite fiscal constraints imposed by successive governments. While the navy has been able to maintain the ability to deploy a task group despite these constraints, it has reached a defining moment in its history. With no firm plan to replace the ageing destroyers and support ships, the navy will soon find itself in a position where in may not be able to answer the government's call to respond with a task group. Canada has gained considerable diplomatic leverage as a result of its credible naval force. Abandoning the naval task group construct will put that leverage in jeopardy.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It's my view that the navy has reached a key defining moment in its history.

- Vice-Admiral P. Dean McFadden[1]

In January 2010, the Chief of the Maritime Staff, Vice-Admiral P. Dean McFadden declared that ". . . the navy has reached a key defining moment in its history."[2] This statement was made in the context of a key strategic planning session in Cornwall, Ontario, where the navy met to discuss the compelling need for change over the course of the coming decade. It is apparent that the time has finally come for a decision to be made on the future of the navy. It is no longer sufficient to operate in the context of what the navy 'should be', but rather it is time to determine what the navy 'could be'.

The navy's most senior leaders and policy makers concluded that, in order to move forward, the navy must restore institutional balance amongst its three main tenets; force development, force generation, and force employment.[3] Success will be achieved by defining a force generation model able to deal with the unpredictable and disruptive events in today's uncertain world rather than focusing on the current force employment model. In today's contemporary security environment, the navy has to be successful at force development by converting ideas and concepts into capabilities that are relevant in

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[1]Vice-Admiral P. Dean McFadden, *Commander's Appreciation – Outcomes of the Strategic Planning Meeting – Cornwall 5 – 8 January 2010* (Chief of the Maritime Staff: file 3371-1180-1 (DMSC / RDIMS #187401), 15 January 2010).

[2]*Ibid*., 1.

[3]*Ibid*., 2.

both domestic and international operations.[4]

Will these capabilities, shaped by the Government of Canada, require two task groups, one from each coast, or a single contingency composite task group with the ability to assemble a second?[5] Or, given current fiscal constraints, should Canada consider shifting its priorities away from the task group construct toward a single ship deployment policy, one that would include a ship that could operate in littoral waters?

This question is not new to the Canadian Forces (CF). Since the introduction of the 1947 Defence White Paper, the Canadian government has wrestled with the issue of maritime requirements. More specifically, they have questioned how to employ the Canadian Navy, particularly the naval task group. The Defence White papers of the 60s, 70s, 80s, 90s and arguably the *Canada First Defence Strategy* have all pronounced in one form or another the requirement for the navy to maintain the ability to deploy a task group. Despite this, the government has not translated this requirement into a sustainable capital procurement plan that will maintain this capability. The question remains, based on the future security environment, can the Government of Canada continue to provide the funding required to maintain a navy capable of sailing a task group?

This paper will argue that in light of the challenges in today's contemporary security environment, it is imperative that the Canadian Navy maintain the task group capability. Firstly, it is necessary to explore the history of the task group and its application in the Canadian Navy. This will further define the future requirements of the naval construct by studying the historical aspect in concert with the Government of

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[4]*Ibid*., 3.

[5]*Ibid*., 4.

Canada's foreign and defence policy objectives. This paper will consider the long standing debate over of task group versus single ship capability. It will focus Canada's ability to realize its current foreign and defence policy objectives and ambitions through "an expeditionary sea-support capability, centred on a naval task group . . . [one] able to contribute to theatre missile defence . . . ?"[6] If not, given the current day fiscal context, can Canada remain a credible player on the international scene by shifting its naval construct to a "single element specialization?"[7]

In order to answer these questions, this paper will begin by examining the evolution of Canadian Defence policy objectives post World War II, commencing with the defence white paper *Defence 1947* through to the *Canada First Defence Strategy* document published in 2008. Second, it will define today's task group model by examining each individual platform that a task group is composed of, including the destroyer, frigate, auxiliary oil replenishment ship (AOR), submarine and air assets. Thirdly, it will conduct a comparative analysis of task group deployments and single ship operations. The criteria used to examine these case studies will be based on the aspects of force employment, force generation and force development and the navy's ability to conduct all three. Finally, this paper will explore the future security environment and the role of the task group within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and in terms of Canada - United States (US) relations.

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[6]Paul T. Mitchell, "A Transformation Agenda for the Canadian Forces: Full Spectrum Influence," *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 4 (Winter 2003-2004): 61; http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo4/no4/transfor-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 22 February 2010.

[7]*Ibid*., 61.

The chapters that follow will underscore the commitment the navy has signalled in pursuing the task group concept. It will demonstrate that despite the Government of Canada's trend of fiscal cutbacks in terms of naval equipment procurement, significant demands on the navy to perform both internationally and domestically persist. It will further reveal that Canada will lose credibility on the international stage should the government not be prepared to commit fiscally to re-vitalizing the fleet that. Finally, it will address the requirements necessary to both design and build not only the next navy but the navy after next.[8]

[8]Chief of the Maritime Staff, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2001), 22.

CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

Contrary to popular belief, admirals get only the warships their political masters buy for them.

- Peter Haydon[9]

Leadership or Policy

Was it naval leadership throughout history that shaped the Canadian Navy or was it the Government of Canada's defence policy statements? Answering this will provide insight into the current question over the construct of the future fleet. Further, given the fiscal realities of today should the navy continue to pursue the concept of the task group or be resigned to a more fiscally responsible solution? In order to answer this, the navy must be ready to look at alternative designs as well as review the rationale for the fleet as a whole.[10] The first step in rationalizing the fleet is to examine the conditions that caused the navy to be where it is today. Through the study of the Government of Canada's defence policy statements since World War II, the history of the construct of the Canadian Navy can be answered and in turn so can the answer as to the construct of the future fleet.

Canada's Defence 1947

The first Canadian defence policy was Brooke Claxton's *Canada's Defence 1947*. The aim of this policy statement was to provide the definitive direction necessary for the CF to affect the fiscal cutbacks and demobilization required to take Canada back to a

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[9]Peter Haydon, "Choosing the Right Fleet Mix: Lessons from the Canadian Patrol Frigate Selection Process," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 1 (August 2008): 66.

[10]*Ibid*., 65.

prewar status. Claxton envisioned a more nationalized, unified, and efficient defence force, including a single defence headquarters. This force would be able to defend Canada against aggression and assist civil powers in maintaining law and order. Furthermore, alongside other friendly nations it would be capable of carrying out virtually all collective action under the umbrella of the newly created UN.[11] Claxton's tenets from the 1947 White Paper - self-defence, collective action and a more unified defence force - organizationally and administratively continue to hold true.

The transition for the Royal Canadian Navy from war to peace was not easy. The navy, intent on retaining its 'big ship' status, suggested a fleet program based on a task force centred on light fleet carriers. This task force would comprise two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, and two flotillas of destroyers. Naval air elements were also to be included as well as ships that could be called out quickly in the event of yet another war. In all, the personnel requirement for this peacetime navy would total 20,000 - 10,000 afloat and 10,000 ashore.[12] Running counter to this, Claxton, under direction from Prime Minister Mackenzie King stated ". . . that the navy's role in hemispheric defence would be coastal defence and escort work against submarines. In a war outside of Canada, the navy would be employed in escort work similar to operations in the Second World War."[13] With this declaration, Claxton signalled the demise of the task force concept to one of small ship escort work. Captain (N) Lund notes that "this frustrated the navy's original plans, which

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[11]School of Policy Studies, "Introduction to Canada's Defence 1947," in *Canada's National Defence: Volume 1 Defence Policy*, ed. Douglas L. Bland, 1-8 (Kingston: Queen's University, 1997), 3.

[12]Capt (N) Wilfred G.D. Lund (Ret'd), "The Rise and Fall of the Royal Canadian Navy, 1945-1964: A Critical Study of the Senior Leadership, Policy, and Manpower Management" (PhD. Dissertation, University of Victoria, 1999), 69.

[13]*Ibid*., 118.

had been developed in a political vacuum, for carrier-oriented general purpose task groups."[14] The political vacuum in which the naval staff of the 1940s worked was based on perceived naval requirements vice political direction; this was not the first, nor would it be the last time this would occur.

White Paper on Defence: 1964

Paul Hellyer's *White Paper on Defence: 1964* continued on many of the same themes as Claxton. The issue of unification came to the fore as well as participation in international organizations such as the UN and NATO. Like Claxton, Hellyer looked to support collective defence in order to deter military aggression both domestically and abroad.[15] In terms of maritime forces, Hellyer's white paper indicated that the navy would ". . . continue to have an important role in conjunction with the strategy of flexible response."[16] Additionally, he re-emphasized Canada's role in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) indicating an emphasis on research and development in this field. This was further evident in the cancellation of the general purpose frigate program. The role of the general purpose frigate program was to provide an area air defence capability, but these capabilities were not seen as critical for North American anti-submarine operations.[17] Minister Hellyer's years at the helm exacted a demanding toll on the navy. Haydon highlights that "not only had the fleet structure been brutally changed by budget cuts and

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[14]*Ibid*., 119.

[15]Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), 5.

[16]*Ibid*., 14.

[17]Peter T. Haydon, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group," in *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*, ed. Ann L. Griffiths, Peter T. Haydon and Richard H. Gimblett, 95-129 (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Dalhousie University, 2000), 113-114.

short-sighted attempts at rationalization but, worse, morale had declined severely as a result of the loss of distinct identity caused by unification."[18] This political position would not improve as the CF moved into unification and the political power of the navy was subsumed by the greater Department of National Defence.

Defence in the 70s

The 1971 Defence White Paper, *Defence in the 70s* changed Canadian defence priorities from its NATO orientation to put national security first. The Minister of National Defence at the time, Donald Macdonald, sought to reduce Canada's commitment abroad by maintaining the position that forces were simply needed as a deterrent against attack. Many however suggested that Macdonald's vision ". . . was the embodiment of Prime Minister Trudeau's 12 April 1969 declaration that he intended to do things differently, and that he intended to 'put Canada first.'"[19] In fact, *Defence in the 70s* identified four major priorities for the Canadian Forces: the protection of Canadian sovereignty; the defence of North America in conjunction with United States forces; fulfilling only NATO commitments agreed upon; and peacekeeping.[20] It was logical therefore, to evaluate naval force structure in order to ensure it was suitable for these new priorities. This led to ". . . a series of Department of National Defence (DND) studies with respect to the future fleet mix."[21]

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[18]*Ibid*., 116.

[19]Haydon, "Choosing the Right Fleet Mix: Lessons from the Canadian Patrol Frigate Selection Process"…, 67.

[20]School of Policy Studies, "Introduction to Defence in the 70s," in *Canada's National Defence: Volume 1 Defence Policy*, ed. Douglas L. Bland, 111-119 (Kingston: Queen's University, 1997), 112.

[21]Haydon, "Choosing the Right Fleet Mix: Lessons from the Canadian Patrol Frigate Selection Process"…, 67.

In all, the department conducted three studies between 1972 and 1974. These studies yielded limited results due to lengthy delays in obtaining political decisions, the convoluted bureaucratic procurement process, and the financial crisis of the mid-1970s. As highlighted by Haydon, "no progress was made with respect to routine fleet modernization and replacement . . . ," essentially leaving the fleet question unanswered.[22] It was not until 1977 that a confirmed replacement program was agreed to by Cabinet. By that time, the current fleet was truly beginning to show its age as the *St. Laurent* class had already been in service for some twenty years. The ageing Canadian fleet was of such concern that SACLANT feared ". . . that the Canadian commitment to NATO was really not very good operationally or numerically."[23] This comment demonstrated the second order effects of this stalemate in decision making, specifically, the potential impact on Canada of not being able to uphold its NATO commitments and, by extension, its status as a viable member of the organization.

This prompted the government to advance two main modernization programs; the Destroyer Life Extension Program (DELEX) and the Submarine Operational Update Program (SOUP). DELEX improved command and control capabilities and integrated the variable depth sonar with the anti-submarine helicopter. SOUP brought the nearly obsolete *Oberon* class submarines into operational service for use in the Greenland, Iceland, and United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap.[24] As Haydon argues, "these improvements were, in fact, very necessary appeasements to SACLANT to convince him that the

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[22]*Ibid*., 69.

[23]Haydon, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group"…, 118.

[24]*Ibid*., 119. The British built *Oberon* class submarines were considered obsolete and largely ineffective as ASW platforms. They were acquired to provide training to surface and air ASW forces and thus relegated to the status of 'clockwork mice.'

Canadian Navy was not about to default on its commitments to collective defence by not having combat-capable ships and submarines."[25]

Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada

The 1987 white paper by Perrin Beatty, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, was centred on the 'commitment-capability gap'. This paper argued that the armed forces were unable to meet governmental commitments because of the poor state of military equipment, commonly referred to as 'rust-out'.[26] The fundamentals of this paper were to increase the resources available to the armed forces while reducing military commitments abroad.[27] This White Paper, largely predicated on money and programmes of the last Trudeau administration, was as short-lived as the announcement of a program to build ten to twelve nuclear powered submarines. With the end of the Cold War, so too ended "[t]he bold and magnificent dream to ensure Canadian sovereignty with the help of a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines . . . ."[28] The end of the Cold War also brought to light the challenge of determining what the new security environment would look like.

However, the NATO force goals of 1987 and 1992 called for "a mixture of ships that combined command and control capability, local area air defence, and sophisticated ASW systems with integral air support in the form of embarked helicopters and

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[25]*Ibid*., 119.

[26]School of Policy Studies, "Introduction to Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada," in *Canada's National Defence: Volume 1 Defence Policy*, ed. Douglas L. Bland, 182-190 (Kingston: Queen's University, 1997), 183.

[27]Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987), 47.

[28]Haydon, "Choosing the Right Fleet Mix: Lessons from the Canadian Patrol Frigate Selection Process"…, 73.

logistics."[29] These goals were still based on the Cold War threat and were insufficient to provide the input necessary for Canadian strategic guidance. Regardless, DND interpreted these force goals to mean modernizing the destroyers to have a local area air defence capability, proving the newly acquired Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) to be a capable unit, and replacing the ageing CH 124 *Sea King* fleet. As the Cold War ended, "the Canadian Navy had essentially made the transition from a specialized ASW force that would have been assigned piece-meal to NATO in various formations, to a concept of national task groups assigned specific tasks . . . ."[30] The challenge for the navy became one of determining its post-Cold War role.

1994 Defence White Paper

David Collenette's *1994 Defence White Paper* had to deal with many of the same issues that Claxton faced in preparing the 1947 defence plan. With the end of the Cold War and no perceived threat, Collenette's White Paper was presented in an environment where the world's strategic situation had radically changed. Further to this, the global increase in failed and failing states added to the aura of uncertainty of the future security environment. His responsibility was to convince Canadians that "Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security," while at the same time managing a fiscally constrained budget.[31] The aim of the government to create an effective and affordable force once again became the underlying theme just as it had been

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[29]Haydon, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group"…, 122.

[30]*Ibid*., 123.

[31]School of Policy Studies, "Introduction to 1994 Defence White Paper," in *Canada's National Defence: Volume 1 Defence Policy*, ed. Douglas L. Bland, 281-288 (Kingston: Queen's University, 1997), 281.

in 1947. This time, however, the aims and means of national defence were brought into question as two camps prevailed. One group argued to retain traditional Cold War general purpose forces, while the other proposed a military suited to an emerging world characterized by regional conflicts.[32] Collenette found himself advocating for a general purpose force while also stating that the military no longer needed to be prepared for Cold War missions. In the background, complicating the issue, defence spending was cut, programs were cancelled and bases were closed.[33]

The *1994 Defence White Paper* outlined specific responses required of the navy. First of all, in terms of North American defence, the navy was expected to maintain a maritime task group on each coast.[34] Secondly, with respect to international security, the expectation was a "naval task group, comprised of up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates or submarines) and a support ship, with appropriate maritime air support."[35] Even with the government's aim of maintaining an effective and affordable force given the fiscal restraints imposed, the navy was able to meet its mandate as the CPF had been recently introduced into the fleet and the destroyers were being modernized. Unfortunately, the financial situation Collenette faced meant that the ageing *Sea King* fleet would not be replaced nor would the AORs. Naval planners, however, saw the

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[32]*Ibid*., 281-282.

[33]*Ibid*., 283.

[34]Defence, *White Paper on Defence*…, 3.

[35]*Ibid*., 5.

deployment of a task group as the ". . . preferred response for major operational missions," which tied directly into the mandate established in Collenette's white paper.[36]

Canada First Defence Strategy

Most recently, the *Canada First Defence Strategy* tabled by Peter MacKay in 2008 outlines clear roles and missions for the CF. This strategy document, vice policy paper, underscores the CF's support to the government's national and foreign policy objectives by calling for the forces to " . . . deliver excellence at home, be a strong and reliable partner in the defence of North America, and project leadership abroad by making meaningful contributions to operations overseas."[37] Notably, it required the CF to maintain the ability to conduct six core missions while working in a whole-of-government construct. The *Canada First Defence Strategy* dictated that this 'integrated Defence team' would be capable of meeting security requirements, both domestically and internationally.[38]

For the navy, the announcement that Canada would lead Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) came only months prior to the unveiling of the *Canada First Defence Strategy*. The announcement of CTF 150 aligned perfectly with Canada's newest defence strategy - the deployment of a Canadian naval task group to work in concert with coalition forces. This deployment marked a significant event in the navy as it was the

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[36]Lieutenant (N) Bruce Fenton, "Foreign Policy and Naval Forces: A Canadian Perspective," in *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*, ed. Ann L. Griffiths, Peter T. Haydon and Richard H. Gimblett, 131-145 (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Dalhousie University, 2000), 133.

[37]Government of Canada, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008), 2.

[38]*Ibid*., 3-4.

first time a task group deployed that was not in response to an emergent crisis. Furthermore, Canada was to assume the lead.[39] Therefore, in accordance with the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, Canada would make a contribution to international operations through a leadership role.[40] With deployments as recent as Operation HESTIA, the disaster relief response to Haiti, the Canadian Navy continues to meet the tenets outlined in the 2008 defence strategy by "[d]eploying forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods."[41]

Finally, with respect to the future navy, the twenty year plan outlined in the current defence strategy indicates that starting in 2015 work will begin to introduce fifteen new ships to replace the destroyers and frigates. What will become of this, given the countries current fiscal restraints, partially attributable to the cost of the 'war on terror', remains to be seen.

Summary

This chapter summarizes the tenets laid out in Canadian defence policies since World War II. There are clear themes that run throughout these subsequent defence policies in terms of demands made on the navy versus allocated resources. The demands have remained relatively constant since the first white paper in 1947 as the navy has been continuously asked to be the force of first response to emergent crises throughout the world. Constant fiscal limitations however, have progressively resulted in fleet cutbacks throughout this time period.

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[39]Rear-Admiral Bob Davidson, "Modern Naval Diplomacy – A Practitioner's View," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 11, no. 1 & 2 (Fall and Winter 2008/9): 1-2.

[40]Canada, *Canada First Defence Strategy*…, 2.

[41]*Ibid*., 3.

The ambitions of the navy have always been high even in the face of fiscal restraint. Arguably, these high ambitions were realised in the naval deployments in support of the 'war on terror' with Operation APOLLO from October 2001 to October 2003. At its height, Operation APOLLO reached 1,500 sailors deployed in six ships overseas.[42] More recently however, the navy's ability to realise these high ambitions has been made more difficult with the disappearance of the Command and Control Area Air Defence Replacement (CADRE) project and the procurement difficulties associated with the Joint Support Ship (JSS). However, naval leadership remains as justified today in defending the task group concept as they have been for the past 60 years. Without the intervention of naval leadership in the political arena of defence policy, Canada's naval contribution to Operation APOLLO would most likely have been significantly different, if it even occurred at all.

[42]Davidson, "Modern Naval Diplomacy – A Practitioner's View" . . . 3.

CHAPTER 3

THE TASK GROUP CONCEPT

Task Group: A grouping of units under one commander subordinate to a task force commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific function or functions.

- British Maritime Doctrine[43]

The Task Group

The previous chapter on the history of Canadian defence policy outlined the defence priorities of the Canadian government since the Second World War, focusing on maritime forces and their assigned roles. The answer to the fundamental question of how Canada should structure its naval forces lies within those policies. Haydon notes that "[i]n reality, the reason for the Canadian Navy's commitment to the task group structure is rooted in a blend of operational and political requirements . . . ."[44] This includes the defence of North America, requirements associated with belonging to NATO, the advent of new technology to counter 'rust-out', and finally the tenets as outlined by Canadian defence policy themselves. He affirms that "[t]he overarching fact about a task group organization is that the mission – the operational job to be undertaken – should determine the actual structure of the task group."[45] Missions vary; therefore, the composition of the task group must also vary. What does not change however, is the multi-purpose, combat capable unit from which the task group is comprised. This is commonly referred to as a balanced force.

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[43]Ministry of Defence (Command of the Defence Council), *BR 1806 British Maritime Doctrine: Third Edition* (London: TSO, 2004), 294.

[44]Haydon, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group"…, 101.

[45]*Ibid*., 99-100.

History shows that the task group was developed on two fronts. One, in the Battle of the Atlantic, where Royal Navy (RN) and Canadian ships worked on convoy duty, and a two, where destroyers operated in flotillas which did not include escort duties.[46] The former concept ". . . evolved as a result of experience gained in hunting U-boats . . ." while the latter ". . . reflected the basic concept of fleet training adopted before the war whereby Canadian destroyers would gather once a year to exercise with RN formations . . . ."[47] The two concepts differed significantly as one was based on operational requirements while the other attended to the ever pressing need for training. With the end of the Second World War, so too ended convoy escort operations as post-war naval forces became focussed on carrier-based operations.

Arguably, the first Canadian task group deployed from Esquimalt under the command of Captain Jeffrey Brock with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.[48] However, it was not until 1954 that the Canadian Navy endorsed the task group concept with the creation of the Canadian Carrier Group.[49] With the construction of an oiler in the 1960s, the task group became self-sufficient and able to operate at sea for extended periods of time. This need was further justified given the requirement to form ASW hunting groups to counter the Soviet threat in the Atlantic.[50]

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[46]*Ibid*., 101.

[47]*Ibid*., 101.

[48]*Ibid*., 106.

[49]*Ibid*., 107.

[50]*Ibid*., 111.

By the late 1960's the cost of maintaining carrier-based operations outweighed the budget capacity of the navy and the last surviving carrier, BONAVENTURE, was decommissioned in 1970. At this point, the navy decided to focus on contributing to ASW operations through helicopter-carrying destroyers as the cost of maintaining them was relatively low to that of a carrier.[51] Fortunately for the Canadian Navy, the political will was present in the 1980s and 1990s to modernize the fleet. This was realized with the *Iroquois* class update and the delivery of twelve new *Halifax* Class Frigates.[52] In summary, the navy evolved from the Second World War to an ASW orientated force through the Cold War era, to a fleet of modern ships in the 1990s.

The Destroyer

In the early 1970s, a new version of the Tribal class destroyer was introduced into the navy. They were originally designed for long-range ASW operations given their ability to carry two CH 124 *Sea King* helicopters. These ships also had a modest command and control capability that allowed for the command of tactical units at sea. However, they did not have the capability to provide for local area air defence as they lacked long range air defence weapons. In the 1990s, under the Tribal Class Modernization and Update Program (TRUMP) project, the destroyers were transformed into area air defence ships with a robust communications suite. These improvements provided the navy a platform from which naval leadership could embark in order to exercise command and control over a naval task group.

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[51]*Ibid*., 117.

[52]Marc Milner, *Canada's Navy: The First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 287.

The modifications made during TRUMP included updating the main gun and replacing the Sea Sparrow point-defence missile system with a vertical-launch system. The vertical-launch missile system provides an area air defence umbrella for the task group against air threats. Finally, the twin funnels were removed in favour of a single funnel to aid in the reduction of the ship's infrared signature.[53] The updated Tribal class destroyer, now referred to as the 280 class, became capable of providing the task group with the command and control required to co-ordinate naval operations.

More recently, the CADRE project ". . . examined the replacement of the command-and-control and Task Group air-defence capability currently provided by the ageing Iroquois-class destroyers."[54] This project investigated upgrading the C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities as well as introducing the ability for co-operative engagements.[55] It also recommended a host of general purpose functions including force air defence, force under water warfare, and naval fire support.[56] CADRE was replaced by the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project in 2006. "The military capabilities of the ships would be adaptable so that the three or four lead ships would replace the current destroyers' capabilities and the follow-on ships would be more like frigates."[57] At a minimum CADRE, and later CSC, was to provide Canada with a ship that could replace

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[53]*Ibid*., 287.

[54]Anonymous, "Canadian Navy (Canada), The Market – North America and the Caribbean," *Jane's Naval Construction and Retrofit Markets* (24 October 2007); available from http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Naval-Construction-and-Retrofit-Markets/Canadian-Navy-Canada.html; Internet; accessed 14 April 2010.

[55]Chief of the Maritime Staff, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*…, 128.

[56]*Ibid*., 126.

[57]Jane's, "Canadian Navy (Canada), The Market – North American and the Caribbean"…,

the existing 280 class, thereby allowing the navy to continue to pursue the requirements associated with the task group concept as laid out in the *1994 Defence White Paper*.

The Frigate

Developed in the 1980s and commissioned in the early 1990s, the frigate replaced the ageing ASW fleet. These new frigates, known as the *Halifax* class, were originally designed to operate primarily in the open ocean as ASW and anti-surface warfare (ASuW) platforms. However, they have come to be known more for their role as multipurpose patrol ships that can deploy anywhere in the world rather than primarily ASW and ASuW units. Furthermore, they were designed to be fully capable of interoperability with NATO, the United States, or other allied nations. With a fuel efficient diesel cruise engine and a robust self-defence suite, the frigate is tailored to operate at extended ranges from the task group should the necessity arise.[58]

While naval tactics and procedures have enabled the navy to utilize the frigate to counter the evolving threat in the littoral environment, upgrades to weapons and sensors are required. The DND communiqué on this upgrade notes that "the Halifax Class Modernization and Frigate Life Extension project will manage both the modernization of the combat systems and a planned mid-life ship refit program to ensure the frigates remain effective to the projected end of their service life."[59] These upgrades, which have been both announced and approved, will allow the CPF to remain effective and combat capable in the future security environment. The modernization of the *Halifax* class

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[58]Davidson, "Modern Naval Diplomacy – A Practitioner's View"…, 6.

[59]Department of National Defence, Backgrounder - "Halifax-Class Modernization (HCM) / Frigate Life Extension (FELEX)," (BG-07.024 – June 28, 2007); available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=2369; Internet; accessed 11 April 2010.

however, will not replace the inherent capabilities that come with a destroyer replacement in terms of the command and control and local area air defence they provide.

The AOR

The AOR, three in total, was introduced into the Canadian Navy in the 1960s as a means to extend the endurance of the task group. This class of ship was able to provide the task group with fuel, supplies, and second line helicopter maintenance, either by 'delivery-boy' method, given their limited self-defence suite, or by maintaining a geographical station. This support element gave the task group the flexibility to remain at sea independent of shore support.[60] As emphasized by the Chief of the Maritime Staff, "this competency component is directly related to the Canadian Forces capability areas of Mobility and Sustainment, and obviously will facilitate the *Strategy 2020* objective of Global Deployability."[61]

Without the underway replenishment support of an AOR, additional combatants would be required to maintain the same number of naval units on station. Given that historically the cost and complexity to build additional combatants is much higher than an oiler, ". . . a sound economic case can be made for the requirement to provide an at-sea support capability for the Navy After Next."[62] Further, without an underway replenishment capability, "[t]here would be little or no ability to act in the far reaches of

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[60]Davidson, "Modern Naval Diplomacy – A Practitioner's View"…, 7.

[61]Chief of the Maritime Staff, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*…, 145.

[62]*Ibid*., 146. The *Halifax* class frigates estimated cost was $754 million/ship. The Royal Netherlands Navy AOR replacement project on the other hand was estimated at $328 million/ship.

the EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone], in the Arctic or globally with any meaningful force."[63]

The argument was accepted by the Government of Canada and the announcement of the Joint Support Ship (JSS) project was made in 2006 to replace the ageing AORs. The intent of this project "was to deliver 3 multi-role vessels with substantially more capability than the current *Protecteur* Class oiler and resupply ships."[64] The additional capabilities that JSS would bring, aside from improved re-fuelling and re-supply facilities, were sealift capabilities and amphibious support to forces deployed ashore. "In the end, however, the specifications, design, and budget simply could not be made to agree."[65] To date, the JSS procurement process remains unresolved.

The Submarine

The *Victoria* class submarine was originally built in the United Kingdom in the 1990s as part of their *Upholder* class. It was subsequently sold and commissioned in the Canadian Navy in the 2000s, providing Canada a strategic initiative with respect to maritime operations. The boat's ability to operate quietly given its diesel electric propulsion system allows it to conduct a full spectrum of missions to include surveillance and intelligence gathering, as well as sovereignty, ASW and ASuW operations. Furthermore, they are key to fleet training as they provide a realistic platform for surface and air maritime forces that cannot be replicated through simulation. As stated by Commander Michael Craven, a former submariner, ". . . submarines serve as a credible

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[63]*Ibid*., 146.

[64]Defence Industry Daily, "Canada's C$ 2.9B "Joint Support Ship" Project Sinks," (14 April 2009); available from http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/canada-issues-rfp-for-cdn-29b-joint-support-ship-project-updated-02392/; Internet; accessed 9 April 2010.

[65]*Ibid*., 3.

deterrent to the activities of almost all maritime adversaries."[66] The ability of a submarine to conduct a wide range of underwater operations makes them a valuable part of any multinational formation, evident in their integration in NATO's Standing Naval Force.[67]

Submarines are of strategic importance to Canada given their ability to conduct covert operations from surveillance and reconnaissance to the insertion of Special Forces. Dwight N. Mason stated in his policy paper on Canadian Defense Priorities that "[t]he United States also welcomed Canada's acquisition of the four Upholder class submarines. The U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) and the Department of Defense at very senior levels were strong supporters of this decision."[68] He further indicated that "[t]hese new submarines can make an important contribution to surveillance of the Atlantic and Pacific approaches to North America. They can also make useful contributions to operations abroad where littoral states are involved."[69] The strategic dimension a submarine capability provides makes them vitally important to both Canada and the United States in terms of the defence of North America.

Further, as an integral part of a task group which forms the basis of Canada's participation on the maritime front; submarines contribute to Canada's ability to share the burden of international security and stability with other countries in support of

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[66]Commander Michael Craven, "A Rational Choice Revisited – Submarine Capability in a Transformational Era," *Canadian Military Journal* 7, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 23.

[67]Peter T. Haydon, "Canada's Future Submarine Capability," *Centre for Foreign Policy Studies* (2002); available from http://www.navyleague/eng/ma/papers/Future_Submarine_Cability.pdf; Internet; accessed 11 April 2010.

[68]Dwight N. Mason, "Canadian Defense Priorities: What Might the United States Like to See?" *Policy Papers on the Americas XV, Study 1* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 7.

[69]*Ibid*., 8.

international organizations like NATO. In his article "*The Victoria-Class Submarine Program,*" Commander Bush explains that the ". . . task group is the primary Canadian response unit for maritime operations," and that "[s]ubmarines provide two essential elements to task group operations."[70] First, given they are deployed in advance of the task group, they can provide valuable information to the Task Group commander in terms of battle-space preparation and the tactical environment of the area of operations. Moreover, they can also land Special Forces personnel in advance of operations and conduct, or respond to, initial engagements if necessary. Second, once the task group arrives in theatre, they can provide protection, particularly against enemy ASW assets.[71]

Maritime Air

Maritime air provides a maritime capability that is not often discussed in terms of the naval task group. However, the importance of both rotary and fixed-wing maritime air assets cannot be overstated. The long range patrol aircraft (LRPA) provides an accurate long-range surface and subsurface picture. It can be tasked to conduct search and surveillance in terms of locating contacts and critical contacts of interest as well as providing targeting information to surface combatants. It is also a tactical asset in terms of the task groups' ability to fight by providing a sonobuoy barrier, facilitating the evasion of an enemy submarine. Further, it aids in the location, identification, and prosecution of sub-surface contacts.

The ship borne CH 124 *Sea King* helicopter, similar to the LRPA, extends the visible and radar horizon of the task group. It is able to provide search, surveillance and

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[70]Commander R.E. Bush, "The Victoria-class Submarine Program," *Canadian Naval Review* 1, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 6.

[71]*Ibid*., 6-7.

targeting, as well as aid in the prosecution of a subsurface threat. Canadian naval doctrine emphasizes that "organic air will allow naval forces to optimise the capabilities of weapons and sensor systems by its ability to extend substantially the ISR and control capabilities of its host unit or task group."[72] Furthermore, the additional capability that an embarked helicopter provides allows commanders to conduct battle damage assessment at ranges beyond their organic sensors in order to determine if another engagement is required. Doctrine highlights that "the major advantage offered by an organic air capability will be that it is immediately responsive to the tactical commander and thus not subject to competing requirements of other units or levels of command."[73]

The long term employment of maritime aircraft has enabled the development of tactics, techniques and procedures that have enhanced their effectiveness within the task group. More recently, their employment has broadened extensively from their traditional roles of ASW and ocean surveillance, notably

> Long-range Aurora patrol aircraft and Sea King maritime helicopters also support national and coalition forces (joint and combined) and Other Government Departments (OGDs), through a wide range of operations that include: sanction enforcement; over-land surveillance; tactical lift; land support operations; peace support operations; counter-drug operations; monitoring of illegal immigration; pollution and environmental control; and Search and Rescue.[74]

As a force multiplier, maritime air is a key enabler to the multipurpose role that is being demanded of today's navy, specifically the task groups.

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[72]Chief of the Maritime Staff, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*…, 148.

[73]*Ibid*., 148.

[74]*Ibid*., 65.

Summary

This chapter describes the task group concept from its genesis to the individual platforms that make up its composition, including a look at future ship capabilities. The history of the task group as well as the elements that encompass it are important to study in order to contextualize the origins of the concept. What stems from this study is the ability to determine the construct of future platforms that will comprise the future fleet. Furthermore, this chapter provides the background required to conduct a comparative analysis between task group deployments and single ship operations.

Without the history and background knowledge of the task group and its elements, it would be impossible to build and design a future fleet. The principles established by the Government of Canada in the *1994 Defence White Paper*, reiterated in the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, emphasize the importance of a naval task group to Canada. These principles guide the navy, not only in the design of the navy after next, but the potential roles of the Canadian Navy in this new operating environment. Hence the reasons for describing the elements of the task group, including potential replacement vessels like CSC and JSS.

The argument to continue to pursue the task group concept or to invest in single element specialization was not addressed in this chapter. Nevertheless, it was necessary to incorporate a chapter which laid down the background and framework of the task group prior to developing the argument. In doing so, decision makers will be better informed to determine the construct of the future fleet and ultimately the Canadian Navy.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDIES

Research Methodology (A Comparative Analysis)

The navy concluded the strategic planning meeting held 5 - 8 January 2010 in Cornwall, ON, with the notion that success would be achieved by establishing a relevant force generation model. In order for this model to be successful, the navy in conjunction with the Government of Canada must develop a naval force that is both capable and relevant in the future security environment. The questions that arise are does the navy require two task groups, one per coast? Does it require a single contingency task group with elements from both coasts? Or should they grow a single ship deployment capability, one that can operate in both blue and brown water?

Thus far the history of Canadian defence policy as well as the origins of the task group concept has been examined. While these chapters were descriptive in nature, they provided the background for the analysis required to answer the above question. Throughout history, the key tenets of Canadian foreign and defence policy have been to defend sovereignty and project power. The premise, therefore, is that Canada will continue to pursue these aims. As such, the focus of the CF, in particular the navy, will be on promoting these national interests in the future security environment.

Conducting a comparative analysis between task group deployments and single ship operations will provide recommendations toward the navy's force generation and force development requirements. The task group will be examined in three cases studies: Operation FRICTION; Operation APOLLO; and Operation ALTAIR. Operation

HORATIO and Operation ALLIED PROTECTOR will form the basis for the study of single ship deployments.

The criteria for the analysis of the case studies is based on the navy's ability to conduct force employment and force generation, both of which lead to force development. Force employment is the guidance and direction received from superior leaders to develop and execute campaign plans and operations. It is the ability of the commander to organize forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and concept of operations. It begins with the assignment of a mission to which resources and the authority to use those resources is allocated. This mission will outline the purpose of the operation; in the naval environment, it is traditionally to promote maritime security and protect national interests.[75] Force generation on the other hand is "[t]he process of providing suitably trained and equipped forces, and their means of deployment, recovery and sustainment to meet all current and potential future tasks, within required readiness and preparation times."[76] Force generation and force employment requirements lead to force development which is defined as the "[p]lanning and conceptualising associated with the creation, maintenance and adaptation of military capabilities in the face of changing security and resource circumstances."[77]

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[75]Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 September 2001), I-7.

[76]Defence (Command of the Defence Council), *BR 1806 British Maritime Doctrine: Third Edition*…, 259.

[77]Chief of the Maritime Staff, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*…, GL8.

Task Group Deployments

Operation FRICTION

Canada's maritime involvement in OP FRICTION witnessed Canada deploy a naval task group consisting of HMC Ships *Athabaskan*, *Terra Nova*, and *Protecteur*, as well as their embarked Sea King helicopters, in order to demonstrate Canada's defiance of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.[78] Much preparation was required prior to the task group deploying including upgrades to the ships, the helicopters, as well as additional personnel and training.

Both destroyers had their anti-submarine mortars removed and replaced with *Phalanx* Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS). *Harpoon* surface-to surface missiles were fitted on *Terra Nova* in place of anti-submarine rockets (ASROC), and new chaff systems were added to all three platforms. *Protecteur's* transformation took her from an unarmed supply ship to one with a self-defence suite including new radars, electronic warfare equipment, and two CIWS mountings.[79]

The *Sea King* helicopters were fitted with eleven new pieces of equipment in total. Five for their new surveillance role including Forward-Looking InfraRed surveillance devices (FLIR), stabilized binoculars, improved navigation systems (GPS), and secure communications (Havequick). The other six new pieces of equipment were fitted for self-defence which included chaff, infrared countermeasures, and laser warning receivers.[80] All three ships required an augment in personnel including their embarked

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[78]Major Jean H. Morin and Lieutenant-Commander Richard H. Gimblett, *The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf: OPERATION FRICTION 1990 – 1991* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), 30.

[79]Ibid., 38.

[80]Ibid., 44.

air detachments to bring them to wartime manning levels. Furthermore, training for both the navy and the air force was required on the newly fitted equipment systems.

In addition to equipment upgrades and personnel training, battle orders, specifically tailored to the mission were being prepared in order to provide the direction that would guide the task group's response to any number of circumstances. Morin and Gimblett note that "the task group would require stringent command and control arrangements and quick-reaction self-defence measures," all of which required additional training.[81] Regardless, Task Group 302.3 sailed Halifax on 24 August 1990, two weeks to the day of the announcement that Canada would contribute to coalition operations in the Persian Gulf. Canada's ability to quickly contribute a maritime component, in the form of a naval task group, to an emergent crisis half way around the world serves as a prime example of the navy's operational readiness. The following section on Operation APOLLO and the deployment of CTF 151 further illustrates this point.

Operation APOLLO

In Gimblett's opinion "when defence planners in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) searched for a military response to the attacks of September 11th, they quickly appreciated that the only force immediately capable of taking the fight to the enemy was the Navy."[82] The Canadian Forces standard for deploying a 'Main Contingency Force' was three months; remarkably, the navy deployed Task Group 307.1 in ten days. HMCS *Halifax* was immediately re-tasked from duties with NATO's Standing Naval Force

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[81]Ibid., 46.

[82]Richard H. Gimblett, "OPERATION APOLLO Lessons Learned," *The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies – 2004 Maritime Security Conference*, 18-20 June 2004, 217.

Atlantic during a port visit in Spain. HMC Ships *Iroquois*, *Charlottetown*, and *Preserver* under the command of Commodore Drew Robertson sailed to join from the port of Halifax.[83] HMCS *Vancouver* and HMCS *Toronto* sailed from their respective home ports on 30 October 2001 and 5 December 2001 respectively. This rounded out the Canadian contribution to the 'war on terror' to six warships by the end of 2001.

As stated by Gimblett in his book on Operation APOLLO, "for the better part of two years, the Navy mobilized for the largest prolonged Canadian naval operation since the Korean War. Practically the entire fleet – fifteen of its seventeen major surface combatants – deployed to the South West Asia theatre."[84] The level of effort however, to keep the elements of a task group deployed on the other side of the world were unsustainable. The 2001 Canadian Forces Defence Plan allowed for a rotation ratio of 3:1 for deployed forces. The shortfall for the navy was that personnel shortages had required that a destroyer be put into long-term reserve status while equipment limitations meant that there were only two replenishment ships in service.[85] Despite these shortfalls, from 2001 to 2003 the Canadian Navy's sacrifice and commitment saw them engaged in the following missions:

- command of a multinational task group;
- force protection and screening of US Marine Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs);
- compilation of a Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) over a large geographic area with multiple air, surface and sub-surface contacts, in challenging political environments;
- escort of Coalition and other vessels through vital chokepoints along the sea lines of communication (SLOC) (e.g., the Strait of Hormuz);

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[83]Richard Gimblett, *OPERATION APOLLO* (Ottawa: Magic Light Publishing, 2004), 19.

[84]*Ibid*., 157.

[85]*Ibid*., 56.

- Al-Qaida and Taliban Leadership Interdiction Operations (LIO);
- UN-sanctioned Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO);
- integration in USN carrier battle groups (CVBGs);
- logistics re-supply; and
- backfill of higher capability units dispatched on other taskings.[86]

OP APOLLO was a significant achievement not only for the Canadian Navy but Canada as a whole.[87] The navy's ability to rapidly deploy a task group in response to a crisis lent credibility to the country on an international scale. "First, our major peer allies certainly noticed," particularly in the realm of network centric warfare.[88] Second, when the United States Navy (USN) ". . . got distracted with other operations against Iraq (*Operation Iraqi Freedom*, or OIF), [Canada] carried 'the can' on 'the war against terror' (*Operation Enduring Freedom*, or OEF)."[89] OP APOLLO ended in October 2003 giving way to a new operation that would see Canada contribute periodic forces that could be sustained over a longer period of time, namely OP ALTAIR.

Operation ALTAIR

The Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) website states that "Operation ALTAIR [was] the contribution of Canadian warships to the U.S.-led coalition fleet conducting anti-terrorist operations in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea

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[86]*Ibid*., 54.

[87]*Ibid*., 157.

[88]Gimblett, "OPERATION APOLLO Lessons Learned"…, 219. Dr. Paul T. Mitchell, "Small Navies and Network Centric Warfare: Is There a Role? Canada and US Carrier Battlegroup Deployments," Naval War College Review 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 96; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=341882611&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1271466642&clientId=1711; Internet; accessed 16 April 2010.

[89]Gimblett, "OPERATION APOLLO Lessons Learned"…, 219.

under Operation ENDURING FREEDOM."[90] The navy's involvement in OP ALTAIR from January 2004 to September 2008, demonstrated Canada's commitment to international security. These five rotations helped keep ". . . Canada's navy relevant, responsive, and effective in the new security environment."[91] While four of the five rotations saw Canada integrate single ships into USN carrier strike groups, this next section will focus on Rotation 4our where Canada assumed lead of Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150).

Rotation 4 for OP ALTAIR is perhaps the best example of Canada deploying a task group. HMC Ships *Iroquois*, *Calgary*, and *Protecteur*, with an embarked Flag Officer and his command staff, deployed to the Arabian Sea from June to September 2008 as a part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.[92] CTF 150, a Canadian led contribution and collectively known as Task Force Arabian Sea (TFAS), was the first deliberate Canadian deployment of a naval task group. Previous task group deployments were reactive in nature and in response to an emergent crisis. Further, CTF 150 was only the third time that Canada would lead a maritime coalition.[93] Canada's ability to lead CTF 150 increased its credibility on the international stage, tying it directly into the *Canada First Defence Strategy* which was announced only a few months later that same year. This was reinforced by Rear-Admiral Bob Davidson, the CTF 150 commander,

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[90]Department of National Defence, Backgrounder - "Operation ALTAIR," (CEFCOM BG 07.007-November 1, 2007); available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=2493; Internet; accessed 12 April 2010.

[91]*Ibid*., 1.

[92]Davidson, "Modern Naval Diplomacy – A Practitioner's View"…, 1.

[93]*Ibid*., 2.

when he commented that ". . . Canada's navy has a key role to play in building Canadian national influence worldwide."[94]

On 29 February 2008, the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Peter MacKay announced that Canada would lead a naval coalition force in the Middle East from June to September 2008 under OP ALTAIR. As he noted in his press announcement, "[t]his significant contribution to CTF 150 shows Canada's dedication towards making the world a safer place."[95] He further stated that "[d]enying terrorists the use of the maritime environment as a venue for illicit operations translates into added security for Canadians at home and abroad."[96] Minister MacKay's words offer a connection between international stability and domestic security.

The deliberate deployment of a naval task group showcased Canada's ability to lead on the international stage and brought recognition to Canada. Canada's mission as the leader of CTF 150 was to work together with coalition forces to ". . . defeat terrorism, prevent piracy, reduce illegal trafficking of people and drugs, and promote the maritime environment as a safe place for mariners with legitimate business."[97] The question that needs to be answered is how the deployment of a Canadian naval task group and its associated leadership cadre fulfilled the criteria for this mission?

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[94]*Ibid*., 3.

[95]Department of National Defence, News Release - "Canada to lead Combined Task Force 150," (NR-08.013 – February 29, 2008); available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2585; Internet; accessed 19 March 2010.

[96]*Ibid*., 1.

[97]This statement originated in Commander's Guidance from the Commander of US Naval Forces Central Command who also served as the Combined Maritime Forces Commander. Cited in Rear-Admiral Bob Davidson, "Modern Naval Diplomacy – A Practitioner's View," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 11, no. 1 & 2 (Fall and Winter 2008/9): 13-14.

First of all, in order to counter terrorism it is necessary to control the area in which terrorists operate. As Rear-Admiral Bob Davidson states, "[i]n the complex maritime world where the movement of traffic is not well regulated, finding terrorist activity hidden with a web of black and gray market activity and human and drug smuggling is an enormous challenge."[98] He further articulated that "[i]t is within this web of underground trade that terrorism can hide and flourish. Therefore, reducing illicit activity can go a long way towards building confidence, reducing risk for mariners, and creating the conditions for a successful counter-terrorism campaign."[99] TFAS did exactly that. They contributed to maritime security operations by establishing a series of patrols to ". . . disrupt and deter the use of the maritime environment by violent extremists."[100] These patrols, in conjunction with naval boarding operations based on acquired intelligence, provided a presence in the area which elicited a 'sober second thought' response from those who would use the sea for illegitimate business.

In terms of piracy, the increased activity off the coast of Somalia led to the creation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1816 in June 2008. This resolution allowed task force ships to enter Somalia territorial waters for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy in a manner consistent with the same action permitted on the high seas.

Unfortunately, this resolution was not substantive enough. In December 2008, UNSCR 1853 was passed which provided the authority necessary for the fight to be taken

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[98]*Ibid.*, 12.

[99]*Ibid.*, 12.

[100]*Ibid.*, 18.

into the territory and airspace of Somalia.[101] These resolutions had an effect on the Canadian government and soon after UNSCR 1816 was passed, HMCS *Ville de Quebec* was reassigned to escort World Food Program (WFP) ships off the coast of Somalia.

On request from the WFP and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), both UN organizations, HMCS *Ville de Quebec,* who was at sea operating with Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) 1, was tasked to join TFAS and subsequently CTF 150 in order to escort ships carrying WFP food assistance. In all, they provided an escort to ten ships under contract to the WFP, protecting them from piracy and armed robbery.[102] According to the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Peter Gordon MacKay, "[t]he Government of Canada was proud to respond to the request from the United Nations to provide security, while ensuring the safe arrival of critical food supplies at designated ports."[103] He went on further to say that "[b]y escorting World Food Programme supplies the brave men and women of our Canadian Forces continue to contribute to humanitarian efforts and international peace and stability."[104] This led to immediate recognition for Canada and aided TFAS in accomplishing its mission of maritime security operations.

Finally, in order to further make the maritime environment safe for those with legitimate business, CTF 150 targeted vessels engaged in either human or drug

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[101]*Ibid*., 22-25.

[102]Department of National Defence, News Release - "HMCS Ville de Quebec completes mission: WFP humanitarian operation successfully supported," (CEFCOM NR 08.038 – October 23, 2008); available from http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/nr-sp/doc-eng.asp?id=2792; Internet; accessed 20 March 2010.

[103]*Ibid*., 1.

[104]*Ibid*., 1.

smuggling. There were however, only a few instances where the coalition was directly involved. This can be attributed to two causes. One, the onset of the southwest monsoon season limited the numbers of small dhows on the water. Two, the deterrence of having coalition warships in their operating area reduced the resolve of smugglers.[105] In all, the Canadian-led task force accomplished their mission goals as laid out by the Combined Maritime Forces Commander by engaging in maritime security operations to provide deterrence, prevent piracy, and reduce terrorism.

Single Ship Deployments

The counter-argument to the naval task group is that of single ship deployments. One could argue that with the exception of OP FRICTION and OP APOLLO, this had become the norm. However, in most cases these were not truly independent operations given that the ships deployed were for the most part integrated into USN Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs).

This was particularly true during the first four rotations of OP ALTAIR. For example, the first to deploy on Rotation 0 was HMCS *Toronto* who operated with the USS *George Washington* Carrier Strike Group from January to July 2004. HMCS *Winnipeg* sailed on Rotation 1 from April to October 2005 and operated with the US Fifth Fleet. Next was HMCS *Ottawa* who deployed on Rotation 2 from September 2006 to March 2007 and worked with the USS *Boxer* Expeditionary Strike Group. Finally, Rotation 3 from November 2007 to April 2008 saw HMCS *Charlottetown* sail in consort with the USS *Harry S. Truman* Carrier Strike Group. Although these deployments

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[105] *Ibid*., 19-20.

served to foster interoperability with the USN, it is questionable as to their ability to project Canadian leadership values abroad.[106]

Operation HORATIO

There is one particular single ship deployment in the navy's recent history however, that was a truly independent operation and did in fact project Canadian leadership abroad. In 2008, HMCS *St. John's* was reassigned from Caribbean counter-narcotics operations to supply humanitarian relief aid to the southern coast of Haiti. The highlight of this operation was that HMCS *St. John's* mission had a significant contribution to Canada's standing on the international stage.

HMCS *St. John's* was reassigned from her counter-narcotics mission in the Caribbean after successive hurricanes devastated the country of Haiti. *St. John's* was tasked to deliver humanitarian assistance to the southern coast of Haiti under the newly minted mission OP HORATIO. In a little over two weeks of work, in conjunction with the WFP, DFAIT, CIDA, and the international organization CARITAS, *St. John's* dispersed over 547 metric tons of humanitarian supplies to the south coast of Haiti.[107] With *St. John's* already in the Caribbean area of operations, it proved that having a ship deployed could rapidly bring influence to an emergent situation. It also addressed current

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[106]Department of National Defence, CEFCOM - "Operation ALTAIR," (January 5, 2010); available from http://comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/altair/index-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 12 April 2010.

[107]Richard Oliver Mayne, "Changing Tides," *Legion Magazine* (January 9, 2010) [magazine on-line]; available from http://www.legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2010/01/changing-tides/; Internet; accessed 22 February 2010.

foreign and defence objectives by being a positive force in the world through a meaningful contribution internationally.[108]

Operation ALLIED PROTECTOR

Finally, while not truly a single ship deployment as she reported to a task force already engaged in her area of operations, it is worth mentioning the efforts of HMCS *Winnipeg.* Her deployment as a single Canadian ship with SNMG 1 in support of OP ALLIED PROTECTOR, the NATO approved plan to conduct counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, was unique in that it highlighted the diverse roles being demanded of today's navy.[109] In the Department of National Defence press release, Defence Minister MacKay stated that, "[t]he security challenges facing Canada are real and globalization means that developments abroad can have a profound impact on the safety and interests of Canadians here."[110] He went further to say, "Canada's participation in this maritime force is another example of our government's continuing commitment to international peace and security, which also enhances the security of Canada and Canadians at home and abroad."[111] In all, *Winnipeg's* deployment further demonstrated Canada's ability to address security challenges by building a safer maritime environment.

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[108]Canada, *Canada First Defence Strategy*…, 1.

[109]Department of National Defence, News Release – "Government of Canada tasks HMCS Winnipeg to NATO Fleet," (CEFCOM NR 09.006 – March 27, 2009); available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=2929; Internet; accessed 20 March 2010.

[110]*Ibid*., 1.

[111]*Ibid*., 1.

However, as with any single ship deployment, issues arose. Had a self-sufficient task group been available, it is entirely likely these issues would have been curtailed. For example, for both *St. John's* and *Winnipeg*, fuel and resupply was an issue. *St. John's* depended on the port of Kingston, Jamaica for its services while *Winnipeg* relied on alliance resources for support. The argument then becomes whether a task group is necessary or if the status quo of allied or contractor support will suffice.

The Plan

Maritime Capability Planning Guidance (MCPG 2010) provides direction for a four-year planning period commencing 1 April 2010. The focus of MCPG 2010 revolves around three main challenges: the ability to sustain human resources; the ability to provide projects and the personnel to deliver the future fleet; and the ability to advance capital projects to deliver the future fleet.[112] By providing solutions to these three main problems, Maritime Command will endeavour to meet its mission to ". . . generate and maintain combat-capable, multi-purpose maritime forces for employment both at home and abroad by operational commanders."[113]

With respect to force generation and force employment, MCPG 2010 lays out a ten-year fleet plan pertaining to fleet readiness.[114] This plan, to be updated annually, will have both coasts adjust their operational schedules in order to generate professional competency while addressing operational tempo concerns. To that end, the navy has indicated that the Composite Contingency Task Group (CCTG) will be the primary

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[112]Department of National Defence, *Maritime Capability Planning Guidance MCPG 2010 (2010/11 – 2013/14)* (Ottawa: Canadian Navy, 2010), 1/5.

[113]*Ibid*., 1/5.

[114]*Ibid*., A-1/3.

operational means by which both force generation and force employment will be achieved. This means that the number of ships sustained at a high readiness level will be limited to the CCTG base of one destroyer, one AOR, two frigates (one on each coast), two helicopter air detachments, and a forward logistics organization. The CCTG will be augmented as necessary by any ship deploying on international operations. The rest of the fleet will be maintained at standard readiness levels. The basis of this model means that fewer ships will be generated to high readiness, thereby providing greater stability amongst the sailors in the fleets and reducing the demands on operational and training agencies.[115]

Furthermore, each coast will also maintain a national task group comprising the high readiness ships assigned to the CCTG and two standard readiness ships. This force will be available to deploy on domestic operations in order to support other government departments, and will constitute the bulk of the navy's force generation requirements.[116]

Without the ability to operate in a task group, the force generation capabilities of the navy will wane as ships will operate independently. This means that sailors will not be able to acquire the skill sets necessary to be able to contribute to coalition task forces. There are certain hard core professional skills that can only be fostered in multi-ship operations. These include manoeuvring in close formation, underway replenishment training, interoperability with subsurface and air assets, and command and control training for a deployed staff.

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[115]*Ibid*., A-1-1/7.

[116]*Ibid*., A-1-2/7.

In terms of submarines, the implementation of the *Victoria* class in service support contract should see the submarine fleet move toward full operational capabilities as early as 2011. Due to the current manning shortages in the submarine community, the navy intends to refocus and improve submarine personnel production. In doing so, as the bulk of the sub-surface fleet becomes operational, they will be fully manned to deliver strategic capabilities for the Government of Canada.[117]

Planning considerations with respect to force employment include the maintenance of a ready duty ship in support of Canada Command operations and allocating sea days to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Also to be considered are the assets available to maintain the memorandum of understanding with Public Safety Canada and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).[118] On a broader international scale, ships will continue to deploy to both the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific approaches to North America in support of counter-narcotics operations. Domestically, Great Lakes deployments will continue as part of the ongoing outreach program to educate Canadians about their navy.[119]

The force employment aspects as outlined above stem from the requirements laid out in the *Canada First Defence Strategy.* These requirements include conducting domestic and continental operations as well as the provision of the already agreed upon support to civilian authorities.[120] While all of the above tasks and subsequent missions can and most likely will be handled by single ships, these ships still need to be capable of

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[117]*Ibid*., A-1-3/7.

[118]*Ibid*., A-1-5/7.

[119]*Ibid*., A-1-7/7.

[120]Canada, *Canada First Defence Strategy*…, 3.

operating in a blue water type capacity given the size of the three oceans that surround Canada. Therefore, as the Government of Canada looks to the navy to design the future fleet, it has to take into consideration the operating area.

The final portion of force employment is Canada's ability to project leadership abroad. This ability stems from the maritime engagement campaign plan which looks toward Canadian naval participation in international exercises and operations. The navy intends to continue to contribute to international exercises like RIMPAC while still maintaining the ability to partake in operations like OP ALTAIR and SNMG. If the decision was made to go to a single element specialization, the ability to project leadership abroad would be hampered. Having a task group available enables Canada to not only participate in these operations but periodically lead them, thereby providing visibility on the international stage. In order for the navy to deliver effect, force development is vital in terms of building the future fleet.

In the 1980s, Canada was faced with an ageing fleet that required replacement. The choice was made to build the CPF. The first of these ships are nearly twenty years old and are about to undergo modernization. In the meantime, the destroyers as well as the AORs are nearly timed out despite extensive modernization and refit programs. The question, which was also posed in the 1980s, was what should the future fleet look like? In order to answer this question the navy's role in the 21st century must first be determined. The next chapter will look at the future security environment and Canada's role with the United States. However, what has been done thus far in terms of current force development will first be addressed in order to provide the appropriate context for the follow on discussion.

In an effort to become a truly joint force, the navy petitioned for three JSS to replace the AOR. These ships would provide the fuel replenishment capacity to maintain the task group concept while providing strategic sea lift capabilities to support the army. Although these replacement ships were announced, the bureaucracy surrounding the procurement process prevented it from happening. The delay with JSS ". . . was the product of industry telling the government to either decrease the ship's requirements or increase the funding allocated to the program. . . ."[121] Whether the navy continues to pursue JSS or decides that a better course of action is simply an off-the-shelf replacement to the ageing AORs is yet to be determined. Regardless, the decision as to the type and number of vessels to be acquired and/or built must come quickly as the life expectancy of the current AORs is estimated at 2010.

Furthermore, the navy has to decide on a replacement ship for the ageing destroyers. There has been much work and discussion surrounding the design concept of the CSC, given the navy's desire to maintain a local area air defence capability as well as the command and control aspects that are inherent in today's destroyers. Particularly in light of the challenging and complex missions anticipated in the future security environment. According to Mike Burleson's article for New Wars, the CSC would be thirty-three feet longer than the *Halifax* class frigates in order to carry the extra sensors and weapons needed.[122] He suggests that upgrading four to six of the *Halifax* class frigates would be sufficient and the sensible solution to the destroyer replacement while

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[121]Mayne, "Changing Tides," *Legion Magazine*…, 8.

[122]Mike Burleson, "Canadian Destroyer Replacement," *New Wars* (March 20, 2010) [journal on-line]; available from http://newwars.wordpress.com/2010/03/20/canadas-destroyer-replacement/; Internet; accessed 21 March 2010.

the remaining frigates would simply be modernized. However, given the recent implementation of the frigate life extension and *Halifax* class modernization programs, it is unlikely that any of these ships will be converted to replace the destroyer. Therefore, Canada has to look at either building or purchasing a replacement. To add to this comment, Burleson indicates that the navy has been looking at European designs for its destroyer replacement based on Dutch, German, Spanish, and Norwegian models.[123]

The ultimate decision remains in the hands of the navy with government approval. Should the navy wish to retain the capabilities associated with the task group concept, replacements for both the AOR and destroyer must come soon. The critical issue is that if the navy gets out of the blue water game completely and reverts to a more constabulary force that is capable of taking care of Canadian sovereignty, then like naval air, it will be a very difficult game to back into, both technologically and operationally. Haydon succinctly summarizes the issue in noting that "without the AORs and the command and control ships, the whole house of cards indeed comes tumbling down: the task group concept goes; the ability to command a multinational formation is in jeopardy; and sustained operations are no longer possible."[124]

Summary

Despite current fiscal restraints, the navy continues to pursue the task group concept. The comparative analysis done between the task group and the single ship suggests that the navy remains 'on track' in terms of this pursuit. Further, from a naval

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[123]*Ibid*., 2-3.

[124]Peter T. Haydon, "Canadian Naval Requirements for the 21st Century," *Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century* (Spring 2001); available from http://www.navyleague.ca/eng/ma/papers/Canadian%20Naval%20Requirements%20for%2021st%20Century.pdf; Internet, accessed 13 April 2010.

point of view, the ability to deploy a task group allows Canada to lead an international operation, thereby projecting leadership abroad. As international and domestic security step to the forefront of Canadian foreign and defence policy, the task group concept simply makes sense. Therefore, ship design has to be line with the aim of building a combat capable, multi-purpose fleet. This discussion forms the basis of the final chapter as it explores force development in the future security environment.

CHAPTER 5

THE FUTURE

If a service does not possess a well defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence and apathetic or hostile to the clams made by the service upon the resources of society.

- Samuel P. Huntington[125]

The Future Security Environment and the Future Fleet

Historically, Canadian international policy has consisted of security of the nation and defence of national interests. In turn, Canadian defence policy has consisted of the defence of Canada, continental defence, and the maintenance of international peace by contributing to coalition and UN operations.[126] In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, these traditional notions of defence and security have become inescapably linked to the point where they have in fact become analogous.[127]

In the new security environment, ". . . being ready to win wars for the nation includes serving as a force of diplomacy around the world, and modern naval operations present far more opportunity for creating national influence as part of such a comprehensive strategy . . . ."[128] Today's wars are in fact crisis management operations

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[125]Samuel P. Huntington, "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 80, no. 5 (May 1954) [journal on-line]; available from http://blog.usni.org/2009/03/09/from-our-archive-national-policy-and-the-transoceanic-navy-by-samuel-p-huntington/; Internet; accessed 17 April 2010.

[126]BGen W.D. Macnamara (Ret'd), "The International Strategic Environment and Canadian National Security Interests," in *The 'New Security Environment': Is the Canadian Military Up to the Challenge?* ed. David Rudd and David S. McDonough, 33-41 (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004), 35.

[127]Department of National Defence, "Canadian Influence in a Maritime World: The Requirement for an Engagement Strategy for Canadian Naval Forces," (Ottawa: Canadian Navy, Draft), 8.

[128]*Ibid*., 9.

that seek to obtain political objectives rather than the destruction of another state's military. According to Haydon, "such military operations today are extensions of the diplomatic process, intensifying when diplomacy has failed to find a solution to a crisis or to prevent one."[129] The conclusion is that military forces need to understand their operating environment in terms of history, culture, socio-economic, and political makeup. Further they need to ". . . stand ready to quickly bring capabilities to bear in responding to unforecast world events, whether Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Response or other moves up the spectrum of conflict."[130] All this to say that military operations are more than ever linked with diplomatic action in terms of an initial and rapid response to a developing or existing situation. Follow-on deployments become necessary to maintain order with a whole of government approach to restoration and rebuilding.[131]

While the past has seen a preference for using naval forces as an initial response to an emergent crisis, it is nearly impossible to determine naval requirements based on future security. What is required is to maintain a force that is balanced and ready to respond quickly to whatever crisis or operational requirement arises.[132] For example, a sound naval policy for Canada requires the navy to:

- deploy a naval task group within ten days and sustain that force for an extended period;
- deploy one destroyer permanently with a U.S. carrier battle group;

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[129]Peter T. Haydon, "Canadian Naval Future: A Necessary Long-Term Planning Framework," *IRPP Working Paper Series* no. 2004-12 (November 2004); available from http://www.irpp.org/wp/archive/wp2004-12.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 March 2010.

[130]Defence, "Canadian Influence in a Maritime World: The Requirement for an Engagement Strategy for Canadian Naval Forces"…, 11.

[131]Haydon, "Canadian Naval Future: A Necessary Long-Term Planning Framework"…, 6.

[132]Haydon, "Canadian Naval Requirements for the 21st Century"…, 10.

- be able to command a NATO or other multinational task force;
- deploy a frigate or destroyer with a NATO or other multinational force;
- deploy one submarine internationally with either a U.S. or multinational force;
- operate a second submarine independently in Canadian and adjacent waters;
- patrol Canada's coastal areas in the Atlantic and the Pacific and support other government departments at sea;
- provide sea lift to a vanguard force of some 1,200 people as part of an international response to a crisis;
- maintain air patrols over Canada's three oceans; the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Arctic;
- deploy a naval vessel into northern waters;
- conduct mine countermeasures including route survey and bottom conditioning;
- conduct harbour security operations; and
- conduct search and rescue operations at sea.[133]

These requirements are not specific to any international policy, either foreign or domestic. They do however, encompass the six core missions laid out in the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, and are closely tied to the ". . . federal government's commitment to building and maintaining a fleet of ships that will deliver national maritime security and services."[134]

Understanding that the time-line for the future fleet is some twenty-five to thirty years out, it becomes necessary to outline a naval force structure in terms of general concepts. First of all, if the task group is to be the fundamental construct the navy wishes to pursue, the destroyer replacement is imperative, not only for the area air defence it provides, but also for the leadership abilities inherent in their command and control suites. Secondly, the AOR replacement is as vitally important as it provides the task

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[133]Haydon, "Canadian Naval Requirements for the 21st Century"…, 10.

[134]Dave Mugridge, "Editorial: Could 2010 See Canada's Navy Rise Like a Phoenix?" *Canadian Naval Review* 5, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 2.

group with sustainability. A second capability that should be sought after when considering a replacement AOR is sea-lift. This capability should at a minimum meet the requirement of delivering a vanguard force of some 1,200 troops including their vehicle and stores requirements.[135]

With respect to the existing submarine and frigate fleets, planning needs to start immediately in order to ensure a seamless transition as the newer vessels become operational and the existing fleet is phased out of operations. These new surface and sub-surface vessels require the ability to operate with coalition forces as well as undertaking constabulary roles along Canada's coastline, including the north. Finally, control of maritime aviation needs to be transferred to the navy. This would see a heightened priority placed on upgrades to maritime patrol aircraft as well as the delivery of the CH 124 *Sea King* helicopter replacement.[136] This is reinforced by Haydon who notes that "only by adopting a force structure of this nature can Canada be assured of having a multi-purpose, combat-capable navy available to meet the challenges of the 21st century. . . ."[137]

Homeland Defence

Another question in the context of the future security environment that needs to be addressed is what agency should be responsible for homeland defence? The answer in this case does not necessarily fall solely to the navy. Although the navy has the command and control capabilities to lead in this environment, there must be a whole of

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[135]Haydon, "Canadian Naval Requirements for the 21st Century"…, 12.

[136]*Ibid*., 13.

[137]*Ibid*., 14.

government approach to homeland security. Law enforcement, including the policing of commercial ports, ought to remain the mandate of the RCMP, and fishery patrols should remain the responsibility of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The majority of sovereignty and security patrols, however, should be conducted by the navy. Not only is the navy properly equipped, it is their duty to exercise sea control of sovereign waters. The navy also needs to be accountable for operations in Canada's north. While this might mean taking control of ice-breaker assets currently held by the Canadian Coast Guard, the north is a question of Canadian sovereignty for which the navy should be ultimately responsible.[138]

The issue of homeland defence does not mean that there is a requirement to design and build a separate fleet, particularly in today's day of fiscal restraint. What it does mean is that these issues, as well as a host of others including economics and Canada – United States relations, needs to be taken into consideration as the navy considers its future requirements.

Canada – United States Relations

Sharing the longest undefended border in the world, Canada has maintained a special relationship with the United States. First of all, "[a]t the political level, the foremost issue remains Canada - US relations. The degree to which the United States can affect us is immense, and should not be underestimated."[139] Secondly, at the economic level, the United States as our largest trading partner represents forty percent of our gross domestic product and, in turn, twenty percent of our individual wealth. Therefore ". . .

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[138]Haydon, "Canadian Naval Future: A Necessary Long-Term Planning Framework"…, 13-14.

[139]Macnamara, "The International Strategic Environment and Canadian National Security Interests"…, 37.

our standard of living is heavily dependent on continuing trade with the United States."[140] Finally, "[a]t the military level, we still have concerns about the interlinked issues of internal security and Canada - U.S. defence relations."[141] All this to say, that as one of two nations which share the continent of North America, Canada's relationship with the United States is pivotal in terms of domestic policy and security. Should this relationship breakdown in any one of the three areas indicated above, there is a real risk of significant ramifications for Canada.

Arguably, one of the reasons Canada entered into the 'war on terror' was to appease the United States and help foster that all important relationship. For example, it has been suggested that Canada's participation could be attributed to the softwood lumber agreement. Until then, the United States imposed illegal tariffs on softwood lumber imports defying court rulings on the matter. When Prime Minister Harper announced that Canada was going to get tough on terror, President Bush announced that the US would soften their stance on the softwood lumber issue.[142]

Politics and economics drive countries; the employment of the military is most often a result of these drivers. In Canada however, not only is the military and in this case the navy, driven by politics and economics, it is impelled by the United States Navy. In January 2010, Chief of Naval Operations for the USN, Admiral Gary Roughead outlined the *United States Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*. In his forward to this new vision, Admiral Roughead states that "[i]n the face of significant

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[140]*Ibid*., 37-38.

[141]*Ibid*., 38.

[142]Richard Marcus, "American Canadian Relations: The Carrot and the Stick," *DAWN Ontario* (May 15, 2006); available from http://dawn.thot.net/richard_marcus7.html; Internet; accessed 27 March 2010.

shifts in the nature and character of the threats our nation faces, this Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges will guide our efforts to prevent, limit, and interdict irregular threats and adversaries."[143] Further he indicates that "[t]he steps we take now will ensure our Navy is prepared fully to work with partners to stabilize regions at risk, and when necessary, dissuade, deter, and defeat irregular actors who seek to undermine security, stability, and prosperity."[144] The comments made by Admiral Roughead not only describe the future security environment, they are the driving force behind the USN's relationships with a host of internal organizations as well as their international partners.

As one of these partners Canada has a responsibility to foster interoperability with the United States, in particular with their military. The Canadian Navy has done this on numerous occasions with single surface ship integration into CVBGs and maritime interdiction forces. The aim of this interoperability was to help stabilize and strengthen maritime domain awareness by supporting maritime operations abroad and by ensuring the security of North America; however, it had the secondary effect of demonstrating our solidarity with the US. As observed, "Canadian warships were at the top of the American's list of preferred contribution, primarily because of the Navy's record of interoperability with the US Navy . . . ."[145] Any alternative to interoperability with the United States ". . . would demand a far greater expenditure of public funds than the

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[143]United States, Chief of Naval Operations, "The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges," (Washington, DC: United States Navy, January 2010), 2.

[144]*Ibid*., 2.

[145]Conference of Defence Associations, *A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication Data, 2002), 11.

workings of Canadian politics are likely to make possible."[146] These funds would inevitably come at the expense of public programs such as health care, education, and social services, which would be politically damaging to any government holding public office. However, as argued in a study done by the Conference of Defence Associations, ". . . funding the armed forces does not take money from health care and education. On the contrary, reasonably sufficient armed forces provide the nation's insurance that allows society to generate wealth and progress peacefully."[147]

There is an alternative for domestic security. However, that alternative would see the Canadian Navy transition to a constabulary force. Although a constabulary only force would answer domestic security issues, it would all but eliminate Canada's ability to exercise influence over international security concerns.[148] Despite a stated desire to project influence in the world, the resources required to foster this ambition militarily have not been forthcoming. Without a firm Canadian fiscal commitment, the answer is clear - "[i]n order to play a significant role on the world stage, Canada has to get into bed with the United States."[149]

Defence Industrial Base

Linking this back to the future fleet, while the navy wish list includes both a destroyer and AOR replacement, there appears to be no political drive to replace both.

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[146]Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs, "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues," in *The Canadian Forces and Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition?* ed. Ann L. Griffiths, 1-46 (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Dalhousie University, 2002), 36.

[147]Conference of Defence Associations, *A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces* …, 1.

[148]Middlemiss and Stairs, "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues" …, 37.

[149]*Ibid*., 37.

This seemed clear as discussions surrounding CADRE disappeared given apprehension over the cost of a destroyer replacement. Instead, the pursuit of a replacement AOR came to the forefront with the government announcing funding for JSS.[150] Unfortunately, the procurement train wreck with respect to JSS has forced the navy to revisit its requirements and design concepts after the bids submitted during the Project Definition phase were non-compliant.[151] This also led to questions about the Canadian shipbuilding industry as a part of the defence industrial base.

In terms of the shipbuilding industry in Canada, the National Partnership Project Committee in their 2001 report on the Canadian Shipbuilding Industry made recommendations with respect to the federal procurement process. In their report they suggested that the Government of Canada:

- recommit to the policy of procuring, refitting and overhauling in Canada;
- eliminate the peaks and valleys of procurement for the Navy and the Coast Guard through more effective forward planning and thereby keep order books and employment levels more consistent over the longer term; and
- bring the impact of accrual accounting to bear on long-term vessel planning and management in the federal government as a means to assisting in making cost-effective decisions in vessel acquisition and management over the long term.[152]

In essence, the Canadian shipbuilding industry needs to benefit from federal government procurement, particularly with projects being considered for the Canadian

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[150]Anonymous, "Canada's C$ 2.9B "Joint Support Ship" Project Sinks," Defense Industry Daily (14 Apr 2009); available from http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/canada-issues-rfp-for-cdn-29b-joint-support-ship-project-updated-02392/; Internet; accessed 9 April 2010.

[151]David Pugliese, "More Trouble for the Joint Support Ship Program?" *Ottawa Citizen Defence Watch*, 15 May 2009, 4.

[152]The National Partnership Project Committee, "Breaking Through: Canadian Shipbuilding Industry," (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (Industry Canada), 2001), 40.

Navy and the Coast Guard estimated at some $5 billion. The Committee notes that "the challenge is to accelerate these programs and to phase them so there is a smooth annual expenditure of funds, which will have to be made in any event to sustain the Canadian government fleets."[153] The difficulty in past years is that procurement for the navy and the Coast Guard has been inconsistent. The fundamental issue is that "shipyards gear up for major contracts like the frigate program, expand their operations, modernize their facilities, invest in new equipment, and hire and train a large work force."[154]

Unfortunately, when a contract like the frigate program closes, there is not enough work to keep the expanded facilities running. This results in not only the shipyard having to close this aspect of its operations, but also results in a loss of the labour skills and technological progresses that were acquired during the shipbuilding. With a more managed approach to shipbuilding, there would be advantages for government and industry alike in terms of sustaining shipbuilding expertise in the country.

Summary

The events of the past decade, and in particular those of 11 September 2001, have shown that borders, no matter the distance, are not safe. Further, these events have demonstrated that to remain prominent on the international stage, a country must contribute to international security. Surrounded by three oceans, international security and in particular domestic security is vital to Canada as a trading nation. Canada has a requirement, therefore, to make a meaningful contribution to both international and domestic security in the maritime environment.

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[153]*Ibid.*, 39.

[154]*Ibid.*, 40.

The type of ship that is congruent with the concept of the task group would enable Canada to contribute to a major international maritime operation for an extended period. It would also continue to allow opportunities for the navy to integrate into CVBGs or deploy with NATO forces like SNMG. What should not happen is a future fleet that is designed as a small ship navy predicated on domestic operations. In short, too much would be lost if the navy became a constabulary force.

Consideration therefore must be made for ships that are able to deploy long distances, for extended periods, and have the sea keeping characteristics to operate in the waters that surround Canada. The characteristics inherent in these types of ships would allow them to deploy as part of a task group while being able to conduct operations in Canada's sovereign waters. The inclusion of an AOR with strategic lift capabilities will further enhance the contribution that Canada is able to make internationally in terms of disaster response and humanitarian aid delivery. Finally, the addition of a destroyer with an area air defence capability and a robust command and control suite would allow a Canadian task group to lead a coalition of maritime forces or operate independently, anywhere and in any threat environment.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The forced abandonment of the Naval Task Group is imminent. As a consequence, Canada will no longer have the capability for independent national presence in multinational operations at sea.

- A Nation at Risk[155]

The negative implications of abandoning the task group concept are enormous for Canada. As a consequence, the navy would be left with no alternative but to focus on homeland defence which would limit Canada's influence as a medium power with global interests. As the defence community observes, "overall, any military or diplomatic leverage enjoyed as a result of credible naval contributions would be lost."[156]

The political and military attraction with the task group is that it is a symbol of Canadian sovereignty which has the ability to act independently at sea. To that end, the task group structure fulfills the following functions:

- it provides the highest level of naval force a medium power such as Canada can contribute to a combined and/or joint operation;
- it provides the training framework not only for such missions but also for individual units assigned to multinational naval groups, as well as providing experience for future commanders of multinational naval groups; and
- it provides a mechanism whereby the state can deploy naval forces for a complex national mission.[157]

Therefore, the task group structure provides the Canadian Navy with the flexibility required to contribute to the Government of Canada's strategic aims in

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[155]Conference of Defence Associations, *A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces*…, xi.

[156]*Ibid*., xi.

[157]*Ibid*., 9.

the future security environment.

Chapter 2 summarized the tenets laid out in Canadian defence policies since World War II. The general theme that ran through this chapter was that while the demands on the navy have remained relatively consistent, fiscal constraints and significant increases in the costs of naval platforms have resulted in progressive decreases in the fleet's size and structure. The conclusion however, was that despite fiscal limitations, naval leadership is justified in continuing its pursuit of the task group concept. The navy's contribution to OP FRICTION in the 1990s and OP APOLLO in the 2000s validated the maintenance of the Canadian naval task group.

Chapter 3 described the origin of the task group concept including the individual elements that comprise it. While this chapter was fairly descriptive in nature, it provided the background information necessary to set the stage for the comparative analysis that followed. The conclusion emphasized the importance of the task group highlighted against the *1994 Defence White Paper* and reiterated in the *Canada First Defence Strategy*.

Yet, despite fiscal restraints, the navy remained steadfast in its pursuit of the task group concept. The conclusion with respect to the comparative analysis done in Chapter 4 suggested that the navy was 'on track' in its force development goals. It also indicated that a task group provides force generation capabilities as well as the ability to project leadership abroad. Given that international and domestic security has become intrinsically linked, having a task group allows Canada to contribute to maritime security in the global environment.

The final chapter discussed the composition of the future fleet in the future security environment. To use the words of Senator Raoul Dandurand, Canadians could no longer consider themselves living in "a fire-proof house."[158] Security concerns for Canada range from risks from terrorist threats to economic considerations should the international maritime community be threatened. Surrounded by three oceans, these risks pose a significant concern to Canada as a trading nation. Consideration therefore must be made for ships that are able to deploy with a task group as well as provide for homeland defence. The Government of Canada cannot lose focus on the requirement for the navy to remain an internationally deployable force vice a navy built solely for continental security.

In summary, this paper concludes that in building the next navy and in the conceptual design of the navy after next, there remains a requirement to continue in the pursuit of multi-purpose, combat capable ships. These ships need not only be able to contribute to domestic security in support of the defence of North America, but must also have the ability to deploy anywhere in the world in order to provide a safe and secure maritime environment. While the future security environment is unpredictable, it is certain that Canada's Navy will be called upon again to provide the government with a means of first response to an emerging crisis. Having ships that are capable of providing this type of diplomacy require sustainability, command and control capabilities, and versatile organic air assets, all of which are inherent in the task group concept.

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[158]Andrew F. Cooper, "Between Fragmentation and Integration: The Evolving Security Discourse in Australia and Canada," Australian Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 1 (May 1995) [journal on-line]; available from http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/809856_731515095_791622362.pdf; Internet; accessed 17 April 2010.

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