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MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES

ECONOMIC SECURITY: CANADA'S REAL SECURITY THREAT

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ABSTRACT

Canada is a trading nation and her very existence is based on the ability to import and export in a stable global community. This aim of this thesis is to argue that in today's global environment, the greatest security threat to Canada is not the traditional notion of physical security from external aggression, but is in fact economic security. The overseas deployment of the Canadian Forces from 1991 until present will be examined, using key military missions to highlight Canada's focus on ensuring prosperity to Canadians through the deliberate employment of the Canadian Forces. The examination of this issue demonstrates that Canada gradually shifted from the UN post Cold War to NATO in the late 1990s, to a preference for coalition operations sanctioned by the UN and NATO, a position that it still holds today.

These gradual changes became evident through an analysis of the rationale behind the decisions to deploy the Canadian Forces to various regional conflicts that emerged after the end of the Cold War. The analysis was conducted through the case study method, systematically analyzing defence economic theory, national interests and foreign and defence policy through the time frames noted above. The constant theme through the argument is that our geographical proximity to the United States and our trade dependence on them directly influences our actions, despite the desire to be seen as an autonomous element and not an extension of the United States. The conclusion of this thesis is that Canada's prime security need is economic security, not physical security, and until there comes a point where that changes, all efforts will be focused towards achieving this aim.

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

The fundamental purpose of Canada's armed forces is to apply coercive force, and at times deadly force, as directed by the Government of Canada to protect Canada, Canadians, and support Canada's interests.

- Doug Bland and Sean M. Maloney[1]

During the Cold War, as a founding member of the NATO Alliance Canada had a responsibility to its allies to have a Canadian Forces (CF) both at home and in Europe that were capable of rapid deployment. These forces were necessary to meet the conventional and nuclear threats posed by the Soviet Union, or even worse, deal with potential nuclear attacks. The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of this Soviet threat resulted in pressure for the government to offset the requirement to maintain a defence capability with that of other demands. This was particularly critical during the early 1990s when the focus was on balancing the budget and reducing the debt. Despite a changing security situation, this same pressure is still very much a key factor in today's Canadian political environment as decisions are made on how to employ and deploy the CF.

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has evolved from a bilateral superpower structure that maintained a strategic, but tenuous, balance throughout the world to a global security environment that is riddled with failed and failing states. The threat of state-on-state violence has been dramatically reduced and armed forces are now being employed in an entirely different spectrum of operations. This spectrum now

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[1]Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 202.

encompasses threats such as the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, piracy in the Gulf of Aden and ethnic wars in the Sudan. There has been significant change in the organization of higher headquarters throughout this evolution, however, the structure and employment of the functional units of the Canadian Forces has changed very little. In light of the requirement to adapt to this changing environment, it begs the question of why that is.

Canada has historically had a very liberal political agenda, focussing on equality and upholding peace in the world. This image emerged post World War II, particularly in the Pearsonian era to represent what was believed to be Canada's national interests.[2] However, as a trading nation, the unspoken reality of Canada's political environment is that our prosperity can only be achieved through a realism approach to foreign affairs. The core premise of this political theory is that people are driven to watch out for themselves and that the primary obligation of every state is to acquire power in order to promote national interests.[3] While this may be counter to the world's perception of Canada as a 'nice' nation, the reality is that this notion permeates Canadian foreign and defence policy.

This aim of this thesis is to argue that in today's global environment, the greatest security threat to Canada is not the traditional notion of physical security from external aggression. It is in fact economic security. As a trading nation, Canada's very existence is based on the ability to import and export in a stable global community. The CF is

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[2]John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Toronto: Thomson Canada Limited, 2007), 29.

[3]Charles W. Kegley Jr., "Theories of World Politics," in *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, eds. Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Shannon L. Blanton, 12th ed. (Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2009), 30.

being employed, structured and equipped to not only facilitate this stability, but to engender global trading partners and maintain Canadian national interests.

Using the tenets of neo-realism political theory, the scope of this thesis will focus on developing a theoretical argument with a view to emphasize the importance of economic security to Canada and its Government. The three areas that will be examined are as follows: defence economics, national interests and development of foreign and defence policy. The defence economics part will focus on alliance theory and defence burdens and while theoretical will establish a conceptual baseline from which national interests can then be examined. The third part, foreign and defence policy, will not be conceptual, but instead will dissect existing policy documents to correlate the analysis from the previous two areas.

The analytical framework will encompass an examination of the expeditionary employment of the CF from the end of the Cold War to present day operations, focussing on operations within the full spectrum of conflict. The rationale behind choosing such a wide scope, essentially 20 years, is to prove that even though the world around us has dramatically changed, the rationale behind the employment of the CF really has not. The three time frames that will form the basis for the framework are as follows: the end of the Cold War until the transition of the Balkan conflict from the United Nations (UN) to NATO (1990-1995), the Balkans conflict until the events of 9/11 (1995-2001), and 9/11 until the present (2001-present). These time frames were chosen to correspond to Canada's heightened focus on the UN, NATO and Coalition Operations.

CHAPTER 2 – BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that the structure of the CF since the early 1990s has not fundamentally changed, the role that today's armed forces play, in world security, bears little resemblance to those times. To facilitate this discussion on the threat of economic security, it is first necessary to understand the changing nature of CF operations from the end of the Cold War to the present. The sudden collapse of the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), and the resulting end of the Cold War, created a power void in many regions of the world, such as the Balkans and Africa, where the USSR had maintained satellite control. It was initially thought that this would be the golden age of the UN as the UNSC, freed from Cold War posturing, appeared to be working together to resolve emerging collective security issues. This was reinforced by the US seeking UN approval to lead a 'coalition of the willing' against Saddam Hussein in 1991.[4]

This exuberance with the UN took a downturn when it was realized that the UN did not have the teeth to deal with the warring ethnicities that quickly filled the power vacuum left by the collapse of communism. The crisis in the Former Yugoslavia, specifically the failure of UNPROFOR, was the impetus for NATO to replace the UN mission as a relevant global stability force. This carried on through to the events of 9/11, where the attacks on the US defined yet another era of global security – the 'Coalition of the Willing.' This entity is distinct as it seeks the approval of the UN and/or NATO, but

[4]Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security* . . ., 102-103.

refuses to be constrained by these organizations should they fail to endorse the intended operations.

END OF COLD WAR – 1995

The power vacuum mentioned above exemplifies this time frame. There were two significant effects from the end of the Cold War; the diminished influence by the USSR in the UN Security Council and the collapse of communism in a number of countries. The latter issue was the key factor in the sudden emergence of large numbers of failed and failing states as the influence of the USSR dissipated. This left the existing governments without the power necessary to maintain security in their own countries.[5] In this time frame, there are three significant operations that highlight the changing nature of the security environment: Gulf War, Somalia, and the UN mission to the Balkans.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US looked to the UN for support in building a 'coalition of the willing' under UN leadership. It was seen by many that this could be the long-awaited for time period where the collective international community would emerge as the leader and authority in international affairs.[6] Canada's contribution to the Gulf War was significant to the navy and the air force. Relative to what could have been deployed, the deployment of forces - three ships, a field hospital, a CF-18 Squadron and misc elements to coalition activities - was relatively minor. However, the most critical

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[5]Sean Maloney, "Memo to Canada: The World has Changed again," in *The 'New Security Environment': Is the Canadian Military Up to the Challenge*, eds. David Rudd and David S. McDonough. 93-106 (The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004), 96.

[6]Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security* . . ., 103.

aspect of this contribution was that Canada flew her flag during this war, demonstrating solidarity with the other nations in this UN sanctioned operation.[7]

After the Gulf War, the nature of operations began to dramatically change. There was an emergence of what Joel Sokolsky terms 'Canadianization' of US defence policy, notably a shift towards peacekeeping operations.[8] As was noted earlier, the significant increase in failed and failing states throughout the world was at odds with the Western world's efforts to address 'peace-dividend' pressures in their own countries.[9] Sokolsky argues that one of the main reasons for this US shift in policy was that multinational peacekeeping missions offered a potential solution. The prospect that the UN could respond to these regional crises without the primary use of US forces would then enable them to contract their forces.[10]

The Canadian mission in Somalia, the most significant since the Gulf War, was fraught with issues on changing mandates and force structure.[11] Once deployed, it became obvious that this was not a peacekeeping mission, but rather a peace-making mission. It also highlighted that the UN needed a significant contribution of Western forces in order to be effective, which complicated plans to contract expeditionary forces. The UN mandate for this mission was insufficient to contain the instability of the

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[7]Norman Hillmer and J. L. Granastein, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States into the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Nelson, 2007), 296.

[8]Joel J. Sokolsky, "Clausewitz, Canadian Style," *Canadian Military Journal* 3, no. 3 (Autumn 2002), http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vo3/no3/index-eng.asp (accessed 14 February 2010).

[9]Scot Robertson, "Years of Innocence and Drift: The Canadian Way of War," in *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest*, ed. Colonel Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006), 364.

[10]Sokolsky, *Clausewitz, Canadian Style* . . ., 5.

[11]Somalia Commission. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia: Executive Summary. (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997, ES-28.

country, which has continued through to today, resulting in Somalia being a threat to both regional security and the global economy. However, in 1992-93, the focus was not on the impact of this failed state in the global security environment, but rather on the ineffectiveness of the UN itself.

The deployment of forces to Former Yugoslavia in 1992 was also under an UN mandate. However, it quickly became obvious that the deployment of blue helmet peacekeepers in the middle of an ongoing war was ineffective in containing the regional instability. From a Canadian perspective, this 'stability' operation was a far cry from traditional peacekeeping roles and therefore demanded a change in force employment. While the UN mission did remain in force until late-1995, there was a necessary increase in not only the size of the forces deployed, but also in their capabilities, in an attempt to contain the widespread fighting.[12] Unfortunately, without a change in the UN mandate, the situation in Former Yugoslavia continued to degrade, creating significant regional instability.[13] Similar to other nations, the Canadian Government was also attempting to reduce their defence expenditures. From a national perspective, there was an unwillingness to become further entangled in this mission and Canada was seeking to withdraw by summer 1995. Given the government's attempt to reduce defence expenditures, it was with hesitation that they agreed to contribute forces to the American-led NATO mission that would replace the ineffective UN mission.[14]

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[12]Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security* . . ., 226.

[13]Louis A. Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationale," in *Canada and the New World Order: Facing the New Millennium*, eds. Michael J. Tucker, Raymond B. Blake and P. E. Bryden (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 2002), 23.

[14]Sokolsky, *Clausewitz, Canadian Style* . . ., 6.

FROM THE BALKANS TO 9/11

The latter half of the 1990s was a very interesting time frame for the CF. It was gradually emerging from the dramatic cuts of the early 1990s with the realization that the anticipated post-Cold War world peace was not realistic. The CF was also struggling to maintain a global combat capability as a result of the significant cuts to not only personnel, but the budget itself. From an operational perspective, this era saw the government switch its focus from significant contributions to UN missions to participation in NATO missions. The nature of the deployment of forces transitioned to what Sokolsky now termed the "Americanization of peacekeeping".[15] In this time frame, there were three significant operations that epitomized this era: the NATO missions in Bosnia, the attempted Canadian-led UN mission to Zaire, and the NATO mission in Kosovo.

In November 1995, when it became painfully obvious to the global community that the UN mission in Bosnia was not containing the conflict, the US brokered an arrangement. This arrangement, known as the Dayton Agreement, confirmed an effective federation of Bosnia. It also separated the tasks between UN and NATO and set out the guidelines for the NATO led mission know as the Implementation Force (IFOR).[16] Canada's modest contribution (a little over a thousand soldiers) nevertheless was significant for Canada as it challenged Ottawa's UN-centric policy as a means to address

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[15] *Ibid*., 6.

[16] Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, Second ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 216.

global security issues.[17] The mission itself was heavily armed and significantly more robust in its ability to intervene between the warring factions.

While this flew in the face of the Canadian image of the CF as peacekeepers, it nonetheless exemplified that the era of traditional peacekeeping had come to an end. The world was no longer about state-on-state violence, but about regional instability based on ethnic and religious issues that did not lend themselves to 'classic' peacekeeping. As Jockel notes, these areas of operations are inherently more dangerous as they lack disciplined armed forces. A professional force would respect negotiated truce settlements, whereas non-government belligerents have their own agendas that they are pursuing. This randomness increases the danger to the individual peacekeeper as it does not lend itself to the vision of peacekeeping as a low-risk task.[18]

The planned UN mission to Zaire in the latter part of 1995 was the ultimate turning point for Canada with respect to UN operations. In addition to the inability of the UN to muster itself and take decisive action, Canada was unable to exercise her promised leading role in the multi-national mission. Canada simply did not have sufficient resources to carry out the mission. The common factor in the two issues surrounding the mission to Zaire was the US's unwillingness to participate. This reinforced the fact that the UN needed US support, particularly in the form of intelligence and strategic lift, in order to conduct operations.[19] The CF, lacking capabilities in both these areas, caused

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[17]Colonel William N. Peters, *Club Dues? the Relevance of Canadian Expeditionary Forces* (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 2001), 35-36.

[18]Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada & International Peacekeeping* (Toronto: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1994), 4-5.

[19]Maloney, *Memo to Canada: The World has Changed Again . . .*, 97.

the Canadian government to recognize that they did not have the means necessary to carry out these idealistic missions, regardless of national interests.

Ironically, the deployment of NATO forces to Kosovo was under the human security envelope, however, the mission began without an UN mandate.[20] Unexpectedly, Canada got on the American-led bandwagon similar to other NATO partners who were under enormous public pressure to stop the Serbian genocide of Kosovar Albanians. This deployment, the largest since Korea, was a significant combat contribution to the NATO Force. Further, it assisted in the legitimization of the mission, regardless of the absence of a specific UNSC resolution authorizing NATO's intervention. Most significant though, Canada's deployment of CF-18s to participate in the bombing campaign marked a change of Canadian political culture with respect to the deployment of its forces overseas. This mission spelled the end of the confidence that the Canadian government had in the ability of the UN to contain ongoing regional instabilities that threaten the global security environment.

9/11 – PRESENT

The events of 9/11 fundamentally changed the global environment, particularly the security threat. While the singular loss of life that occurred on 9/11 was horrific (and greater for the US than Pearl Harbor), it was not that significant in comparison to the genocides of the 1990s. Rather, the significance of this event was that the US response to

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[20]Fen Osler Hampson, "The Changing Nature of International Conflict: Challenges and Responses," in *Security, Strategy and the Global Economics of Defence Production*, eds. David G. Haglund and S. Neil MacFarlane (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 25.

a direct attack on its soil was a unilateral combat response. The UN and Western nations rallied behind the US, and NATO recognized the attack under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as an attack on the sovereignty of one of its allies. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the US was willing to exercise their hegemonic power regardless of the actions of the rest of the world. Fortunately calmer heads prevailed, recognizing that in order to mitigate anti-Americanism, coalition operations would be preferred. From a Canadian perspective, Sokolosky notes that in this time frame, the nature of the security environment also changed, specifically that "the economy, the environment, culture and human security now dominated international strategic relations."[21] There are three operations in this time frame that typify the continuing evolution of the employment of the CF: the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the Iraq War, and the current ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

After the horrifying events of 9/11, there was no discussion that Canada would not deploy forces in support of the newly minted GWOT, even though the mission was poorly defined and without guidance on an anticipated end state. More importantly though, this event brought to light the effect that terrorism had on all aspects of security.[22] For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the Canadian public felt compelled to deploy forces abroad in order to defend Canadian interests. The initial deployment in October 2001 comprised a naval task group, special forces (SOF) and a CC-150 Airbus into Germany. The land element, a battle group, struggled to deploy in the same time frame as it was hampered by the lack of strategic lift, finally deploying in

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[21]Sokolsky, *Clausewitz, Canadian Style . . .*, 4.

[22]Robertson, *Years of Innocence and Drift: The Canadian Way of War . . .*, 370.

January 2002. By July 2002, the battle group had completed its mission in Kandahar and was not able to be replaced due to the high operational tempo of the Canadian Army. The naval task force and SOF also drew down their operational commitments by the end of 2002. While the declared reason was operational tempo, the lack of a clearly defined mission made it difficult to continue a Canadian contribution to the GWOT.

The CF appealed to the government to not extend the land element in Kandahar beyond July 2002. The government complied, citing the mission in Balkans as its reason. When the US came looking for coalition support in January 2003 to prevent Saddam Hussein from using Weapons of Mass Destruction, it put Canada in a bind. Plans were already in place to transition the NATO forces in the Balkans to the European Union Force, which would free up troops for another mission. Further, fundamentally the rationale behind the US-led operation was based on sketchy intelligence. This, paired with international scepticism that the US's reason was based on their national economic interest, caused significant disconcertion in the Canadian government.

After the initial GWOT, there was reluctance to become involved in another mission without a well-defined end state. However, there was significant pressure from the US to participate. It can be argued that Canada's coincidental announcement to redeploy forces to Afghanistan in summer 2003 was a sidestep to avoid participating in Iraq. Regardless, the fact remains that CF units did not deploy to Iraq in support of the US coalition. To note, CF personnel embedded with the units of other countries were allowed to deploy as part of their units, however, they were not considered a Canadian

contribution to the mission.[23] This decision resulted in significant repercussions by the US; these will be discussed more specifically later.

The deployment to Afghanistan in 2003 was significant as Canada assumed command of the Multinational Force in Kabul in addition to contributing a battalion size Battle Group (infantry, armoured reconnaissance and engineer soldiers) for sector security in the west of Kabul. This leadership role continued in February 2004 when then Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier was chosen as the Commander of ISAF for a six-month rotation. These leadership roles by the CF corresponded to an increased comprehension by the Canadian government of the additional alliance benefits that could be reaped through significant military contributions to NATO led operations. Despite an operational pause from August 2004 to August 2005, the CF remained relevant within NATO and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom through the continued contribution of forces, albeit smaller. The relevance increased when Canada declared its willingness to participate in the ISAF expansion into the remainder of Afghanistan. The deployment of forces to the province of Kandahar in August 2005, recognized to be the most dangerous of the regions, firmly entrenched Canada's contribution to the GWOT and the wider issues of international security.

During the operational pause in 2004-2005, Canada decided to withdraw its forces from the NATO mission in Bosnia and the UN mission in the Golan Heights. The political upheaval from the mission in Bosnia was negligible as regional stability allowed for a much-needed transition to Eurocorp forces. This allowed NATO Headquarters and the contributing countries to shift their focus to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Thus,

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[23]Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World . . .*, 171.

as long as Canada continued to participate in Afghanistan, they were still seen as a viable contributor to the overall NATO effort. However, this was not the situation with the withdrawal from the Golan Heights in early 2006. The withdrawal of UN troops essentially ended the last major CF contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.

CONCLUSION

The rationale behind the deployment of the CF over the last 20 years has shifted from UN-centric idealistic peacekeeping missions to NATO missions that had more teeth to achieve their objectives. This shift has continued to most recent times as Canada operates under NATO/UN mandates that are heavily influenced by US leadership, and to a greater extent, their national interests. This time frame has seen the CF conduct operations across the full spectrum of warfare, reinforcing the capability of the CF to be deployed globally to maintain Canadian national interests. However, the choice of deployments has been more about maintaining our alliance commitments than necessarily being in the interest of global security. The sole exception in this period is the lack of CF contribution to the second Iraq war, which resulted in what Brian Bow terms 'grudge linkages' such as US policy changes on Canadian softwood lumber and Alberta beef.[24] This was mitigated only through the subsequent contribution to the ISAF mission.[25] From a realist perspective, the common thread throughout the deployments is the

[24]Brian Bow, "Rethinking 'Retaliation' in Canada - U.S. Relations," in *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future*, eds. Brian Bow and Patrick Lennox, 63-82 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 77.

[25]Thomas G. Barnes, "Canada's Military Capability and Sovereignty," in *The Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy*, eds. Patrick James, Nelson Michaud and Marc J. O'Reilly, 411-430 (Toronto: Lexington Books, 2006), 421-422.

influence, and in some cases the approval, of the US. As much as Canada wants to maintain its autonomy, the fact remains that the might of the US can skew Canada's sought after power position in international affairs. Canada needs to be powerful enough to ensure that uniquely Canadian interests can be pursued in today's global environment.

CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The thesis underlying this paper is complex and needs to be developed through a multitude of sources as it is not easily recognized as a known fact. The very existence of armed forces throughout history has been for the purpose of defending the sovereignty of the state and projecting power in order to achieve the interests of the state. In this paper, the premise, or assumption, behind the argument is that Canada's borders are not at risk and will not be for the foreseeable future and, as such, the focus of effort for the CF is the defence of wider Canadian national interests rather than its sovereignty.

In international relations, realism theory purports that politics and foreign policy are driven by a state's own interests, whereas liberalism theory takes a much softer approach, focussing on the needs of the individual. With globalization, these theories have been expanded to include neo-realism and neo-liberalism, which incorporate the nuances of multilateral, plurilateral and transnational actors that directly influence international relations. The Canadian government is somewhere between the two extremes of realism and liberalism. Where exactly along this spectrum Canada finds itself is the research question that will define the essence of this thesis. The core of this paper is to examine the argument from an economic security perspective using the tenets of neo-realism theory.

The core tenet of neo-realism theory is that in a global system, while the state remains the primary actor, the capabilities of the state define its position, and its influence, in the power balance.[26] This tenet, translated into foreign policy, implies that a

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[26]Kegley, *Theories of World Politics . . .*, 34.

state uses all available means to achieve its global position. From a military perspective, Bland and Maloney argue that:

> most Canadian officers would describe themselves as belonging to the 'realist school' of international politics. They believed that states are the centre of global affairs, security of the state is the ultimate goal or national interest and that security is best assured by power derived from economic and military capabilities.[27]

However, the military perspective alone is not enough to answer the question of what is the core political theory behind Canada's actions.

This paper will utilize the case study methodology to develop this argument. The rational behind choosing the case study methodology are that it facilitates an in-depth analysis of just a few examples of CF operations against broader social science topics in order to sustain the thesis of this paper.[28] The background of this paper outlined the significant CF operations since the end of the Cold War. However, it is necessary to analyze these operations against specific areas of study, using neo-realism theory, in order to determine the underlying factors influencing the employment of the CF. The rationale behind choosing a singular political theory is to ascertain whether or not there is a substantive argument in favour of neo-realism theory. Three case studies will examine CF operations from different perspectives. The topics of these case studies are: defence economics, national interests and the interrelation of foreign and defence policy.

The data collection for this paper will be from a multitude of sources, both primary and secondary. While there will be significant weight given to renowned Canadian authors on defence and foreign policy, such as Douglas Bland, Jack Granastein,

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[27]Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security . . .*, 68.

[28]Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Designs and Methods*, Fourth ed. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2009), 8.

Sean Maloney and Joel Sokolsky, it is also intended to seek countering views from institutes, such as the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, and recognized foreign policy and defence journals, such as the International Journal. The primary sources will be predominantly Government of Canada published documents, however, where possible Committee Reports will also be utilized. While it is not the intent to present the argument from a predominantly Canadian perspective, the reality is that there is not a lot of materiel written about Canadian foreign and defence policy outside of Canada.

CHAPTER 4 - CASE STUDIES

War is the continuation of policy by other means.

- Clausewitz

In this chapter, the discussion will be broken into the three case studies. The first case study, defence economics, will take a theoretical approach and consider the different aspects of defence economics and its interrelation with the employment of the CF since the Cold War. The second will analyze Canadian national interests and the respective employment of the CF in support of these interests. Lastly, existing foreign and defence policy documents will be studied to determine whether or not the employment of the CF has been in line with existing policy documents.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS

The study of defence economics has become increasingly more relevant since the end of the Cold War, particularly the development of alliance theory. During the Cold War, Canada's alliance commitments were predominantly based around NATO and the UN. However, post-Cold War, the pressure to reduce defence expenditures despite the rising number of failed and failing states resulted in an increased reliance on alliances in order to address the global security threat. Alliance theory was initially developed in 1966 by Olson and Zeckhauser, who argued that in an alliance, defence is a purely public good. There were four aspects to their theory: the existence of defence burdens, the inefficiency of defence expenditures, the irrelevance of alliance size, and the demand for

defence correlated to the threat.[29] For Canada, the geographical proximity to the US added another factor into this equation – finding the right balance so as to not be seen as taking a 'free ride' on defence while spending the minimum practicable.

In addition to recognizing the public good benefit of being part of an alliance, Sandler and Hartley note that there are also private benefits among allies that will occur as a result of being part of a 'club'. They argue that with an increase in defence burden sharing, it is more likely that there will be additional private benefits between the different parties within the alliance depending on the public benefit that was received.[30] This analysis of alliance theory, as it relates to the deployment of the CF, will note instances in which these private benefits occur. Moreover, this section will focus on examining Canada's role in the international stage to determine whether Canada is in fact doing its part within the alliance and if there are any resulting private benefits. This examination will include an analysis of the changing nature of the CF's post Cold War operational deployments and their correlation to the US changing its emphasis from UN operations to NATO missions to 'coalitions of the willing.'

Canada on the International Stage

Since World War II, Canada has sought to find its place in the world, struggling to establish a power position amongst its allies. While Adam Chapnick argues that Canada's perception of itself as a middle power is a myth, he recognizes that there is

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[29]Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, *The Economics of Defence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 19.

[30]*Ibid*., 30.

merit in the argument that Canada is one of many functional powers in areas where it has more to contribute than others.[31] The irony of Canada's defence is that the proximity to the US has resulted in Canada being able to focus less in this area, which creates a challenge to have the right balance of forces to maintain our commitment within international alliances. Gates and Terasawa note that the provision of a public good causes non-excludability, which does create an incentive to 'free ride'.[32] Canada prides itself on being a player on the world stage, albeit with niche capabilities. However, a defence capability is required in order to be seen to be contributing to the public good of the alliance. This applies not only to the defence of North America, but also to Canada's ability to project forces abroad in order to maintain her commitments to the UN and NATO. As pressures for decreased defence expenditure arose in the early 1990s, it also caused an examination of Canada's contributions to the UN, NATO and our bilateral relationship with the US.

Canada has deployed its armed forces throughout the world in a multitude of UN, NATO and coalition missions. Bland and Maloney note that

> the essence of Canadian defence policy over the last 50 years has been to contribute to allied efforts, in effect, 'to lend troops' where needed. Within this framework, the size and capabilities of the contributions are never too important and neither is the credibility of the military force as defined in military terms . . . being there is the strategic objective.[33]

From a strategic perspective, the additional benefit of being involved in these missions is not to achieve a decisive military effect, but rather to demonstrate that Canada is willing

[31]Adam Chapnick, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth," *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (Spring 2000), 200.

[32]William R. Gates and Kasuraki L. Terasawa, "Commitment, Threat Perceptions, and Expenditures in a Defence Alliance," *International Studies Quarterly*, no. 36 (1992), 101.

[33]Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security* . . ., 77.

to be a viable member of an alliance. The critical piece is that Canada is not perceived to be ‘free-riding’ on defence matters. The challenge, however, is to ensure that Canada is always doing something to contribute. On analysis, the determination of where to participate appears to be more about secondary benefits, thereby reinforcing the argument made above by Bland and Maloney.

Post-Cold War to 1995

The 1987 Defence White Paper, *Challenge and Commitment*, addressed the growing ‘commitment-capability gap’ that had grown in the previous decades. It also detailed an ambitious procurement plan that would close this gap. However, the end of the Cold War necessitated a re-examination of Canada’s commitments in light of the growing pressure to reduce defence expenditures. One outcome was the emergence of capability-based planning. This enabled the freedom to choose alliance involvement based on the existence of capabilities rather than being fixed to a defined alliance commitment. This generated a fine line however, as Fergusson notes, “commitments become the price of entry for a range of political objectives.”[34] As such, regardless of the ongoing pressures to reduce defence expenditures, Canada adroitly realized that these reductions could not come at the expense of contributing to its alliances. Further to this, as Gates and Terawa note, “decreasing commitment among allies could be

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[34]James Fergusson, "Beyond the Dollar Crisis: Defence Strategy and Procurement in Canada," in *Security, Strategy and the Global Economics of Defence Production*, eds. David G. Haglund and S. Neil MacFarlane, 93-106 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 96.

counterproductive because it would compromise the alliance's integrity. It reduces disproportionality at the expense of effectiveness."[35]

The changing strategic environment since the Cold War has called into question the rationale behind Canada's ongoing contribution to its alliances in light of the reduced security threat. On the other hand, as Colonel William Peters notes in his book *Club Dues*, participation in alliances has the potential to be a useful conduit for other interests. The most notable, and the one that could be most effectively manipulated, was an awareness of ongoing global issues and their impact on Canadian interests.[36]

Post-Cold War, the pressure to reduce defence expenditures in an uncertain security environment had a secondary effect – the economic impact of these reductions. The supply-side of the Canadian Defence Industrial Base (DIB) became a politically contentious issue as demand for defence, and the public's willingness to pay for it, decreased. Although this was not a Canadian-only phenomenon, it did affect the defence industry relationships between the member states of NATO.[37] In essence, Canada required a baseline international market in order to maintain not only an export market for its niche defence industry capability, but also a major weapons system import market. In the early 1990s, there was extensive debate about end-user controls on Canadian defence exports. A conflict emerged over the requirement to relax regulations in order to retain market shares versus a concern over whether or not the final product would be

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[35]Gates and Terasawa, *Commitment, Threat Perceptions, and Expenditures* . . ., 116.

[36]Peters, *Club Dues? the Relevance of Canadian Expeditionary Forces* . . .,101.

[37]David G. Haglund and Alistair D. Edgar, *The Canadian Defence Industry in the New Global Environment* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 104.

transferred to a third party that was on Canada's restricted list.[38] This argument became highly politicized in 1992 after General Motors sold 1,117 Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) to Saudi Arabia followed by Saint John Shipbuilding entering into negotiations with Saudi Arabia for frigates.[39] Post-Gulf War, this market had opened up and in light of the receding defence markets of NATO partners, Canadian defence industry took advantage of the demand for defence exports.

The deployment of CF elements to the Gulf War caused extensive discussion in Ottawa about the ability of the CF to achieve the perceived political agenda of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Hillmer notes that Mulroney argued that regardless of Canada's expertise and reputation as a peacekeeper, there was a responsibility to respond to the attacks against Canada's friends and allies.[40] While recognizing that the countries involved were members of the UN, an UN mandate for the Gulf War did legitimize Canada's participation. However, opponents of Mulroney questioned the motive behind the US and UK's interest in the region as well as his deferent relationship with the US. The party line in Ottawa at the time was that Canada had in fact persuaded the US to resist independent action and allow UN sanctions to be imposed. The desired outcome was to give the impression that the coalition force was in fact an international force, not a force intended to protect US national interests.[41]

A neo-realist would argue that all political and security actions are taken to promote national economic interests. In Canada's case, the force package was relatively

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[38]*Ibid*., 135.

[39] *Ibid*., 62.

[40]Hillmer and Granastein, *For Better or For Worse . . .*, 295.

[41]*Ibid*., 296.

low risk as it did not include an offensive land element. Nonetheless, it was still sufficient enough to achieve the effect of deploying the Canadian flag in the Gulf War theatre of operations, thus showing solidarity to the tailor-made coalition. This argument is supported by Colonel Peters, where he argues that Canada's participation in the Gulf War was discretionary from a military perspective. He notes that Canada would have accrued benefits of the coalition action, notably security of oil reserves, whether forces were deployed or not.

The economic threat to Canada posed by Saddam Hussein's occupation of the oil fields and the desire to be a participant in the peace settlement outweighed the opposing arguments for participation, however, the force contribution was minimal.[42] Colonel Peters remarked that Jean Morin, official historian of the Gulf War, concluded that the main demand of the US from Canada was diplomatic support and multilateral legitimacy. This reinforces that the deployment of forces to the Gulf War was less about force contribution and more about what Canada could contribute otherwise.[43] In return for its contribution, Canada was considered a viable partner in the Gulf War coalition, despite 'free-riding' on the public benefit of the security provided by the coalition.

1995-2001 - The Importance of NATO

After Jean Chrétien came to power in 1993, he focused on expanding Canadian peacekeeping efforts in an effort to reinforce Canada's role in the world. In addition to

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[42]Peters, *Club Dues? the Relevance of Canadian Expeditionary Forces . . .*, 28-29.

[43]*Ibid*., 32.

deploying troops abroad to a variety of UN missions, he also personally led trade missions with a view of mitigating Canada's economic dependence on the US. However, as Hillmer and Granastein note, "his efforts to expand Canadian trade made almost no headway in checking the steady growth in continental economic links."[44] Chrétien's negative views toward being seen as a puppet of the US marred his three terms in office, and it can be argued that this affected the nature of troop deployments in his initial years in office.

Public support for UN operations declined in the mid-1990s as a result of a number of issues. The in-depth examination of the Somalia mission, which received unusually close analysis as a result of the Somalia Inquiry, highlighted the ill-preparedness of the UN to effectively contain regional crises. Somalia was the first UN peacekeeping operation which employed force in order to achieve UN objectives, however, this force was based on the inherent right of self-defence versus offensive actions to achieve a military objective. Regardless, the UN did not have the teeth to contain the situation, nor the collective will to do so.[45] Likewise, in the Former Yugoslavia, the detention of Canadian military personnel by Serbian soldiers in December 1993 and the taking of Canadian soldiers hostage in April 1994 also highlighted the danger to Canadian peacekeepers.[46] The inability of the UN to mitigate the dangers which faced the Canadian soldiers culminated in a push for the CF to leave Croatia in 1995. However, Joel Sokolsky argues that multilateralism is key to achieving

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[44]Hillmer and Granastein, *For Better or For Worse . . .*, 303.

[45]Gregory Wirick and Robert Miller, *Canada and Missions for Peace: Lessons from Nicaragua, Cambodia and Somalia* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1998), 100.

[46]Albert Legault, *Canada and Peacekeeping: Three Major Debates* (Clementsport, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1999), 84.

broad foreign policy objectives and that the motivating factor behind expanding military ties is economics, not traditional military security.[47] As such, despite Chrétien's preference to withdraw from the Balkans, the pressure from the US to transition to NATO operations placed Ottawa in a difficult predicament of not being seen to be participating at all.

Militarily, the transition to the NATO-led IFOR in Former Yugoslavia was inevitable. While the more aggressive nature of the mission did not appeal to the Chrétien government, who was an ardent supporter of peacekeeping, it did provide an opportunity to regain some of the faith lost as a result of the withdrawal of forces from Europe. Although the actual contribution of 1,000 ground troops was relatively minor, it was enhanced by a leadership role with the Canadian Multinational Brigade in the north-western sector.[48] The size of this contribution received much criticism both domestically and internationally even though it was in line with aims laid out in the *1994 Defence White Paper* of providing support to NATO, reinforcing that it is not about troop contribution but rather about being a participant in an Alliance.

The contribution to the NATO mission in Former Yugoslavia transitioned from the IFOR mission to the Stability Force (SFOR) mission, which was a less aggressive mission and more in line with a peacemaking operation. However, it did not supplant the government desire to focus on UN operations. In late 1995, Canada once again pushed for a major UN mission, this time to Zaire. This mission was Canada's attempt at being a lead nation in the UN context. It was quickly realized that despite best intentions,

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[47]Joel J. Sokolsky, *The Americanization of Peacekeeping: Implications for Canada* (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1997), 40.

[48]*Ibid*., 42.

Canada could not fulfil this mission without US assistance. The reality of Canada's defence dependence on the US came to the forefront as a result of insufficient strategic lift and a gap in its intelligence gathering capabilities, both of which were assumed would be resolved by the US.[49] However, this mission did not align with US national interests to pursue. Despite Canada's attempt to exert strategic influence within the UN, the reality of the situation was that Canada's interests needed to be in line with that of the US. This mission, although reinforcing Canada's commitment to the UN, saw Canada gain limited private benefits from the other members of the UN.

Hampson notes that the 'coalition of the willing' that was experienced in Zaire reinforced that weak regional actors or middle powers are ineffective in a protracted conflict. In order to deal with a security situation such as this, the force that is required is a 'coalition of the willing and capable'.[50] In an attempt to extract itself from a position of dependence on the US for expeditionary operations, this mission demonstrated that Canada was in fact a defence burden on the US. It further showed that Canada could not take over a leadership role within the UN unless it was also in the US's interest to provide the necessary assistance.[51]

After Canada's failed sojourn as a lead nation in UN operations, the directed focus of CF efforts reverted to NATO operations. In addition to Canada's ongoing contribution to SFOR, which had continued to be an aggressive peacemaking force, there was little debate over deploying forces to Kosovo, despite an initial lack of either a

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[49]James Apparthurai and Ralph Lysyshyn, *Lessons Learned from the Zaire Mission* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997), 5.

[50]Hampson, *The Changing Nature of International Conflict* . . ., 24.

[51]Delvoie, *Canada and International Security Operations* . . ., 17.

NATO or an UN mandate authorizing such a force deployment. Colonel Peters notes that the extraordinary collective will of the European governments, including the left-wing ones, to address the human security situation in Kosovo engendered an increased response from the Canadian government.[52]

Although the Canadian government pushed for an aggressive ground offensive, it can be argued that these actions were designed to push for a government agenda more than effective deployment of military forces. Particularly when recognizing the emphasis that Minister Axworthy had placed on the international community's responsibility to address human security. The reticence of the Minister of National Defence (MND) and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to deploy ground forces was due to an already heavy land contribution to the Balkans. This resulted in an initial deployment of a fighter squadron with a follow on deployment of peacekeeping forces.[53] While the rationale behind the deployment was human security, the mission to Kosovo highlighted that NATO was seeking legitimacy in the new world order.[54] For Canada, it was crucial to be seen to contributing as much as possible to this mission in order to reinforce its status as a contributing member to NATO and her right to have a seat at the table.

On a side note, although Haiti was not initially described in this paper as a key event, it was this very mission that highlighted the use of the CF in order to achieve other means. Hillmer and Granastein recount the events of a 1997 NATO meeting in Madrid where Prime Minister Chrétien's microphone was inadvertently left on, resulting in the

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[52]Peters, *Club Dues? the Relevance of Canadian Expeditionary Forces* . . ., 36.

[53]*Ibid*., 37.

[54]Norman Hillmer and J. L. Granastein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World into the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Nelson Thomson Canada Ltd, 2008), 314.

inadvertent overhearing of Chrétien's comment that "Clinton had asked him to provide troops to help ease a recurring crisis in Haiti [to which Chrétien replied] I send my soldiers and then afterward I ask for something in return."[55] In an alliance, if one agrees with Sandler and Hartley's theory about private benefits being received as a result of sharing of defence burdens, then this can be seen as a turning point where the benefits of deliberate defence contributions are more than about resolving the security situation.

9/11 – Present – Coalition Operations

The events of 9/11 had a profound effect on the global political environment. Since the end of the Cold War, the militaries of both Canada and the US had designed their forces based on the fourth tenet of alliance theory – demand for defence that correlates to the threat. 9/11 demonstrated that the sovereignty of North America could be significantly affected by non-state actors, which prompted a new generation of alliances. President George Bush declared that the world was divided into two categories – those that worked willingly with the United States and those who did not.[56] In consideration of the long history of Canada trying to differentiate itself from the US and protect national interests, Hillmer and Granastein note that while Canada would align itself with the US, it was inevitable that the perception would be that Canada fell into the latter category.[57]

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[55]Hillmer and Granastein, *For Better or For Worse* . . ., 304.

[56]*Ibid*., 301.

[57]*Ibid*., 301.

The US has been providing effective homeland defence to Canada, accepting that in this regard Canada as a defence burden, but unwilling to accept the risk of a partially undefended North America. In his book, *Campaigns for International Security (2004)*, Bland argues that "guaranteed homeland defence does allow Canadian politicians to join almost any 'coalition of the willing' that seems worthwhile to the national interest."[58] Post 9/11, Canada had no choice but to deploy on the GWOT as an attack on the US was more than an attack on an alliance partner, it threatened the security integrity of North America. To reinforce Bland's comment, this coalition was very much in the national interest. The initial deployment of forces in October 2001 signalled an immediate response to the US request for coalition support.

Canada's continued contribution was limited by ongoing missions to Bosnia and 'rust-out,' however, it was critical to be seen to be contributing as much as possible in response to this newly minted GWOT. Sokolsky argues that given the importance of the GWOT to the Americans, Ottawa had no ability to leverage its military contributions to the overall strategic or political direction of this war. Moreover, it was anticipated that the contributions to this effort would have a positive impact on trade disputes such as softwood lumber and farm subsidies.[59] The constraints of the CF's capabilities, specifically the inability to deploy without assistance from US strategic lift, were understood in Washington. Regardless of this dependency, the effort it took for Canada to participate in this mission demonstrated solidarity for a key ally. This changed with the second Gulf War.

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[58]Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security* . . ., 77.

[59]Sokolsky, *Clausewitz, Canadian Style* . . ., 9.

Gates and Terasawa note that in the case where members of the alliance doubt a country's commitment to the alliance, the benefit of the alliance becomes more of a private good rather than a public good.[60] In the case of the second Iraq War, the global community called into question the true intentions of the US's actions. While the removal of Saddam Hussein from power was argued to be a public good, the perceived economic, or private, benefits for the US did cause members of the UN and NATO to question the defence benefits to the alliance. This reason, amongst many others, was noted by Jones and Kilgour to represent not only Canada's beliefs, but also that of much of the world. However, they argue that when Canada depends upon the US for its basic security needs, there are bound to be implications; in this case, they assess that it was an increased irrelevance of Canada in foreign defence matters.[61]

The decision by the government to send forces to Kabul in 2003 somewhat mitigated the effect of not deploying troops to Iraq. The real benefit to Canada came when the CF transitioned to combat operations in Kandahar in February 2006, replacing US soldiers which could then be transitioned to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Haglund notes that in 1988, leading Canadian defence economist, Jack Treddenick, observed that an ideal DIB must provide for normal peacetime materiel needs of its forces and be able to rapidly expand to meet increased demand. With the cutbacks of the 1990s, Canada was not able to achieve this goal and as a result, was heavily reliant on the importation of

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[60]Gates and Terasawa, *Commitment, Threat Perceptions, and Expenditures* . . ., 105.

[61]David T. Jones and David Kilgour, *Uneasy Neighbours: Canada, the USA and the Dynamics of State, Industry and Culture* (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd., 2007), 244-245.

major weapons systems.[62] Since 2006, Canada's participation in Afghanistan has reaped significant benefits in priority access to production lines, such as ballistic steel, in not only the US, but also NATO allies. This resulted in a twofold benefit for Canada. Canada could be a key partner in both alliance and coalition operations in today's security environment, but without the overhead of a defence industrial base which cannot be sustained by the needs of the CF.

Conclusion

Canada's contribution to the Gulf War in 1991 was modest, however, increased participation in the UN sanctioned operation was crucial for international influence. This was crucial in light of the US's desire for the UN to shoulder more of the responsibility of international security. However, as significant budget and force reductions came into effect, so did the extent to which Canada could force project military elements in order to maintain international influence. The force contribution to the NATO mission in the Balkans and the failed mission to Zaire reinforced the fact that despite Canada's desire to uphold its national interests, it simply did not have the capacity to do so. The end of the 1990s, notably the Kosovo mission, saw a revitalization of the Canadian-US relationship. The events of 9/11 changed the way that both Canada and the US regarded alliances; for the first time, North America was the target of the attack. Regardless of President Bush's 'with us or against us' attitude, Canada felt an obligation to their closest ally and trading

[62]David G. Haglund, "Transatlanticism Versus Regional Consolidation: Lessons from the Canadian Experience?" in *Security, Strategy and the Global Economics of Defence Production*, eds. David G. Haglund and S. Neil MacFarlane, 71-84 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 73.

partner and deployed forces to the GWOT. However, Canada's multilateralist approach to foreign affairs could not support a subsequent coalition deployment into Iraq in 2003 without the support of the UN and NATO.

Thus, from a defence economics perspective, the employment of the CF post Cold War has been focused more on being seen to contribute to her alliance commitments, be it coalitions of the willing, UN or NATO, than they have been about achieving a military effect. Canada, as a trading nation, needed to be present at the international conflicts in order to ensure that its interests were represented. However, it was not military interests that were of concern, but rather economic interests. It was in Canada's national interest to seek private benefits from alliance participation, much more the public good of defence.

NATIONAL INTERESTS

During the author's time at CFC, her syndicate conducted a seminar on Canadian national interests. In a survey of the twelve members of the group to pick three national interests and three national values, there were common themes on what represented Canadian national interests. Yet, not a single person agreed on what they believed to be the three national interests. Of note, several of the themes were listed as both interests and values.[63] This epitomizes the dilemma in Canadian foreign policy, namely what determines Canadian national interests.

From a neo-realist perspective, it is necessary to examine national interests from the perspective of a state within a global environment. Stephen Holloway notes that it is a given that all states want sovereignty and the ability to defend their borders. In Canada's case, geography and proximity to the US implies that while these interests are important, they are not the cornerstone. He argues that to truly determine a country's national interest, it is necessary to determine their National Interest Perspective (NIP) in order to see the common thread through foreign policies and governmental decisions.[64] Opponents to the NIP will argue that it does not allow for sufficient emphasis of Canadian values, but Holloway notes that a national interest denotes a public interest, or good, versus a private one.[65] The diversity of Canadian views, particularly considering the vast regional, ethnic and cultural differences from coast to coast, means that policy

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[63]Anecdote by author. Seminar was conducted on 21 October 2009 at Canadian Forces College, Toronto, Ontario.

[64]Steven Kendall Holloway, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006), 1.

[65]*Ibid*., 9.

decisions cannot be based on values alone. This is reinforced in the following example by Maloney who notes that

> those who have reputations invested in DFAIT's human security agenda are loath to accept, let alone recognize, the fact that altruism is rarely a prime factor in the decision to intervene decisively. Values are not as reliable an indicator of national intent and endurance as are interests.[66]

Despite the sometimes interchangeable use of values and interests, it is still critical to recognize that values are important to Canadians and that they do permeate decision making. Throughout this section, values will be incorporated into the discussion on interests in areas where there is apparent overlap between the two.

Using the NIP, Holloway argues that the common threads of Canadian foreign policy identify the following national interests: national security, political autonomy, national unity, economic prosperity, and national identity.[67] For the purposes of this paper, national unity will not be discussed as its relevance to the topic at hand is minimal. Canada, as a trading nation, is eminently concerned with economic prosperity. This interest has endured since Canada was founded as geography has necessitated successful trade as key to the nation's survival. National security will be considered in terms of the bilateral relationship with the US, reinforcing and supplementing the previous dialogue on defence economics. The discussion of political autonomy will focus on Canada's multilateral and plurilateral pursuits designed to not only establish a unique national identity, but also to differentiate itself from the US and expand its international influence.

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[66]Maloney, *Memo to Canada: The World has Changed again . . .*, 99.

[67]Holloway, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest . . .*, 2.

Canada as a Trading Nation

One cannot discuss Canada as a trading nation without discussing its relationship with the US and the effects of globalization on this relationship. In the 1990s, Prime Minister Chrétien embarked on a Team Canada mission, designed to garner additional trading partners in order to mitigate the influence of the US on Canadian trade.[68] Andrew Cohen observed that prosperity and employment were key to Canadian national interests. As such, it was of paramount importance to have an international economy that was based on free trade and regulation.[69] In order to achieve this, it was necessary to connect to the world's growing markets such as China and India and to access markets that were previously closed as a result of the Cold War.

For Canada, however, the challenge was to find the balance between the search for international markets and the continental market. Roy Rempel remarked that "the Canadian economy is largely carried by its trading relationship with the United States."[70] The post-Cold War era saw a dramatic expansion of globalization. This meant that regardless of relatively closed economies such as the Canada-US, world events still had a major impact on global economics. Security and economics became even more interlinked as first world countries attempted to stave off the growing numbers of failed and failing states as their instability would inevitably have a global effect.

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[68]Keating, *Canada and World Order . . .*, 194.

[69]Andrew Cohen, "Canada in the World: The Return of the National Interest," *Canadian Institute of International Affairs* 52, no. 4 (Summer 1995), 8.

[70]Roy Rempel, "Canada's National Interests," in *Dreamland: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy has Undermined Sovereignty*, ed. Roy Rempel, 151-179 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 152.

Signed in 1988, the most significant economic event of this time frame was the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It guaranteed access to the critical US market at a time when the US was becoming increasingly more protectionist. However, there were a number of issues that were not resolved at the time of signing.[71] These issues, notably softwood lumber and cultural regulations, would become significant political leverage issues on the part of the US in the years that followed.

Canada's subsequent participation in NAFTA was not so much a decision to expand its trade interests as it was about a defensive manoeuvre to ensure that Canadian interests were considered as part of US-Mexico negotiations. The highlight of the negotiations from a multilateral perspective was the inclusion of an accession clause that would preclude additional negotiations of the agreement and facilitate an expansion of the membership as required.[72]

The security environment in the post-Cold War era saw the eruption of regional conflicts that threatened to destabilize not only the region, but posed a risk to economic stability. The Gulf War in 1991 was a prime example of this. The risk posed to the world economy, notably one that had become so tied to oil, was significant, particularly if Saddam Hussein had gained control of the oil reserves. As such, it was in Canada's national interest to deploy forces as part of the coalition in order to not only deal with this threat, but to also be a player in any resolution that came out of the conflict.

In this time frame, the world was still trying to come to terms with both the changing security environment and globalization. From a Canadian perspective, the

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[71]Holloway, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest* . . ., 208-209.

[72]Keating, *Canada and World Order* . . ., 193.

emphasis was on maintaining open markets in order to assure prosperity for Canadians. Cohen remarked that in 1994, Jean Chrétien reaffirmed Canada's position as a trading nation as well as its relative influence in the world. With respect to China's human rights issues, Chrétien conceded that since Canada's influence with China was irrelevant in this regard, Canada would contain its condemnations in favour of continued trade relations.[73] Cohen further noted that the Liberal government's dominant national interest was economics and that this appeared to be the basis of all foreign policy decisions.[74] Between growing pressures to reduce the national debt and adapt to the changed security environment post-Cold War, the transition from the Conservatives to the Liberals was marked by a reduction of defence capabilities. However, this did not preclude Canada from maintaining a continued presence on peacekeeping missions.

The mid-1990s saw an increased push by the Liberal government to expand trade markets beyond continental North America. Part of this was a desire to differentiate the Chrétien government's relationship with the US from that of Mulroney's, which many thought was much to close. The challenge presented to the Liberals was that the CF was facing significant 'rust-out' and was having difficulty maintaining overseas commitments as a result of the cut-backs of the early 1990s. 'Rust-out' is a term that refers to wear and tear of equipment over its physical life; the issue becomes critical if equipment is not upgraded and replaced in accordance with its life-cycle expectancy. The crisis comes when an increased amount of defence funding is required for operations and maintenance, leaving insufficient funds for capital replacement projects. In the case of

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[73]Cohen, *Canada in the World: The Return of the National Interest . . .*, 12.

[74]*Ibid*., 14-15.

the CF in the early 1990s, earlier budget decisions resulted in insufficient numbers of functioning equipment in order to fully equip expeditionary forces.[75] From an army perspective, this pressure was alleviated somewhat with the delivery of Light Armour Vehicles and heavy logistics vehicles in late 1990s.

The primary commitments at the time were concurrent deployment of forces to Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as maintaining a nominal presence on UN peacekeeping missions. As will be discussed later in the relationships between the US and Canada's other allied partners, it was necessary to maintain a presence. However, the scope of the commitment became so insignificant that it threatened to challenge Canada's claim as a relevant military power. As such, it was necessary for Canada to focus its efforts elsewhere in order to achieve the necessary influence, relegating the contributions of the CF to overseas missions as nominal tokens of participation.[76]

Hillmer and Granastein note that at the start of the twenty-first century, more than 85 percent of Canadian trade was with the US and 70 percent of Canada's GDP was dependant on trade. Furthermore, with one-quarter of the US exports coming to Canada, the two economies are inextricably linked.[77] The implication for Canada was that it was necessary to maintain a bilateral relationship with the US in order to maintain these trade numbers. On 9/11, the border closed and trucks were backed up for days on both sides of the border. When one considers that there is more than 1.5 billion dollars of trade moving between the two countries daily, this event highlighted the dependency of

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[75]Brian MacDonald, "The Capital and Future Force Crisis," in *Canada without Armed Forces*, ed. Douglas Bland, 25-54 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 34.

[76]Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, 2003), 162.

[77]Hillmer and Granastein, *For Better or For Worse* . . ., 309.

Canadian trade on the US.[78] Moreover, the events of 9/11 had a secondary impact on Canada's trade relationship. The US obsession with border security threatened to interrupt the flow of goods across the border leading the US to initiate the Smart Border Action Plan to increase security within Canada.[79]

The start of the twenty-first century saw a renewed effort toward Canada-US trade relations, as the events of 9/11 highlighted how crucial this relationship was to the prosperity of Canada. Despite the extensive efforts of the Chrétien government to expand trade beyond the boundaries of North America, the national interest once again returned back to the importance of the relationship with the US. Notwithstanding the excellent effort by the Chrétien government to globalize Canadian trade, the fact remained that solidarity within North America was crucial for Canadian prosperity.

Canada – US Relationship

As Robert Sutherland eloquently phrased in 1962, the geography of North America binds Canada to the US regardless of any differences between the two nations.[80] This has not changed since then and in fact with the end of the Cold War, globalization and NAFTA, one could argue that it has been even more interdependent. However, it is commonly accepted that Canada is much more concerned about the relationship with

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[78]Paul Cellucci, *Unquiet Diplomacy* (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 2005), 83-84.

[79]Heather Nicol, "Resiliency Or Change? The Contemporary Canada-US Border," *Geopolitics* 10, no. 4 (2005), 784.

[80]R. J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long-Term Strategic Situation," *International Journal* 17, no. 3 (Summer 1962), 201.

Washington than Washington is about the relationship with Canada.[81] Historically, the trend appears to be that as long as Canada does not fundamentally oppose the US's actions and appears to be an intermediary link between the US and the rest of the world, the bilateral relationship will continue to succeed. Rempel reinforces that this does not mean agreeing with the US on every issue, but rather differentiating what is an interest and what is a policy based on ideology and emotion.[82] He further summarizes this belief in his article on national interests when he notes that "a really effective Canada-US relationship is the only thing *necessary* for Canadian prosperity and security."[83] In order to delve into the point on security, it is necessary to examine the defence relationship between the US and Canada from a national interest perspective.

The end of the Cold War saw the global balance of power shift from two superpowers to a unipolar power – the United States. While one could argue whether or not the US has evolved into a hyperpower or simply remains a hegemony, the fact remains that it does not change Canada's geographical proximity and subsequent defence interrelationship with the US. Bland and Maloney note that "Canada's defence relations with the United States should be premised on the idea that Canada *in the pursuit of its own interests* should be useful and relevant to the United States in matters of defence."[84]

The 1990s dawned in an era of high-tempo operations that ranged from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. Initially, the operational deployment for both

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[81]Denis Stairs and others, *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003), 7.

[82]Rempel, *Canada's National Interests* . . ., 164.

[83]*Ibid*., 155.

[84]Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security* . . ., 207.

Canada and the US were not primarily based on national interests, but rather were focussed on fostering regional security.[85] However, once the initial crisis in the Gulf region was addressed in 1991, it became apparent that in this post-Cold War era, there would be a change of employment for the CF. During the Cold War, the focus was on the defence of Canada within the framework of NATO. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed, this threat essentially disappeared, causing the politicians to question how defence budgets would be utilized.

Bland and Maloney note that in Canada's relationship with the US, political culture and social circumstances would be the driving factor behind future defence policies in lieu of strategic analysis or rational management.[86] In light of the randomness behind the use of the CF post-Cold War, this statement is well merited. The choice of operational deployments, particularly in the early 1990s, mirrored the political preferences of the times. The deployment of forces to the Gulf Region, Somalia and Bosnia were heavily influenced by the US backing of these particular missions; it was in Canada's best interest to also participate.

For the US, the end of the Cold War and their subsequent role as the remaining superpower brought with it many problems, either intended or unintended. Like many other nations in this time frame, the US sought out its role in the world. By the late 1990s, after initial attempts by the UN failed to address the evolving world crisis, the US began to establish coalitions with other nations who were capable of resolving the

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[85]Joel J. Sokolsky, "The Bilateral Security Relationship: Will "National" Missile Defense Involve Canada?" *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 30, no. 2 (Summer, 2000), http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=375896251&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 20 February 2010.

[86]Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security* . . ., 75.

evolving crises without the bureaucracy of the UN. Sands notes that while Canada was a crucial contributor on many fronts, it simply did not have resources to be part of them all. The unintended consequence is that at the end of the twentieth century, Canada's 'special' relationship with the US began to falter, adding to the increased pressure to demonstrate to the US that Canada was a viable ally.[87]

The events of 9/11 transformed the US's political arena indelibly, notably the sense that security would now trump all other matters, including economics. In consideration of the criticality of the US market to Canadian prosperity, this marked a new era for the Canada-US relationship. In 2003, the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute's paper on national interests cautioned that any concessions to the US in the interest of maintaining this relationship must be carefully thought out in order to understand the potential long-term consequences of the decisions.[88] In consideration of the other primary national interests – trade and multilateralism – it reiterated the challenge to the government to determine the appropriate balance.

The first issue post 9/11 was the deployment of CF personnel in support of the GWOT. As Sokolsky notes, in light of the events of 9/11, "geographic proximity, the economic stake and public sentiment, the government's decision [to deploy troops] was an easy one."[89] Thus, while President Bush had declared that all nations were either 'with us or against us', it did not preclude the fact that Canada had an obligation to the US to deploy. As a key trading partner and our closest ally, it was in Canada's national

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[87]Christopher Sands, "How Canada Policy is made in the United States," in *Vanishing Borders*, eds. Maureen Appel Molat and Fen Osler Hampson, 47-72 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000), 69.

[88]Stairs and others, *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy* . . ., 17.

[89]Sokolsky, *Clausewitz, Canadian Style* . . ., 8.

interest to deploy CF personnel. However, it was also in Canada's multilateral interest to ensure that the UN and NATO supported the GWOT, notably the actions against Afghanistan. This was not the case for the Iraq War.

Nelson Michaud notes that a priority for Canadian foreign policy needs to earn the respect of the US again as a close bilateral relationship is crucial for the maintenance of sovereignty.[90] While this may seem contrary, if one examines the actions of the Chrétien government, it was not quite a deliberate snub of the US, but very close to it. Chrétien's government focused on multilateral relationships, however, failed to recognize that the US and Canada are intrinsically linked together for trade and defence. As such, equal emphasis should have been placed on the bilateral relationship. Michaud remarks that the issue is not about becoming subservient to the US, but rather about ensuring the two countries are on the same wavelength. He purports that the issue is not indifference to the US, but rather a difference for the sake of demonstrating that Canada is not the US. He cites the war in Iraq as an example where Canada sat on the fence until public opinion determined that participation would be unpalatable. Michaud argues that to have declined based on national values would have been acceptable, however, the indecisive and wavering support for the mission actually had a negative effect on the relationship.[91]

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[90]Nelson Michaud, "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*, eds. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 341-356 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 349-350.

[91]*Ibid*., 350.

Canada's Political Autonomy

Canada has always striven to differentiate itself from the US, extolling that the values and interests of Canadians are fundamentally different from those of the US even though our cultures are so entwined. Canada perceives herself to be a multilateral country who promotes consensus building as a means by which to achieve world issues, whereas the US tends more towards a unilateral and interventionist approach to international affairs.[92] Historically, Canada has utilized the UN and NATO as a means by which this can be achieved. However, since its entry into the G-7 in 1976, this plurilateral forum has also been added to the list of means by which Canada can differentiate itself from the US.

Canada's rationale for commitment to these various multilateral institutes has changed with time, and post-Cold War they have become a venue through which Canada can pursue both economic and security actions. Interestingly enough, in his book on national interests, Holloway remarks that "to the extent that Canadian military strength depends on economic growth, then access to markets in Great Britain and other NATO countries is a security asset."[93] This correlates to the previous discussion on alliance theory, whereby Sandler and Hartley note that viable contributions to alliances will result in private benefits. This section will discuss Canada's multilateralist approach to foreign affairs with a view to determine the security and economic linkages.

Wagner argues that even before the end of the Cold War, "despite the popular conception of peacekeeping cherished by the Canadian public, peacekeeping missions

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[92]*Ibid*., 344.

[93]Holloway, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest* . . ., 65.

served to advance Canada's national agenda in a Cold War world."[94] This rhetoric is supported by Keating who remarks that at the end of the Cold War, Canada in its true multilateral fashion turned to the UN to address the increase in regional violence.[95] Many of the regional instabilities, such as Haiti, directly affected Canada. However, there was still a multitude of deployments, such as Cambodia or Rwanda that had no direct effect on Canadian national interests.[96]

The answer could be found in the good governance policies proposed by the Mulroney government which were adopted in 1991. These policies, while initially masked in the protection of human rights and democracy, focussed on how states managed their economies. They also addressed the rights of external institutions, be they other government or multilateral institutions, to intervene to protect or restore economic practices.[97] At the G-7 summit in 1995, Canada used it position as chair to push for reform of the international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The target was closer collaboration between these institutions and that of the UN. The aim of these reforms was to deal with the effects that these institutions had on states and the global economic climate.[98]

Holloway remarks that the 1995 Turbot War highlighted the importance of maintaining relationships with the European Union (EU), either collectively or

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[94]Eric Wagner, "The Peaceable Kingdom? The National Myth of Canadian Peacekeeping and the Cold War," *Canadian Military Journal* 7, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007), 48; http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vo7/no4/wagner-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 13 February 2010.

[95]Keating, *Canada and World Order* . . ., 168.

[96]Sean M. Maloney, "Helpful Fixer Or Hired Gun? Why Canada Goes Overseas," *Policy Options* January-February (2001), 63.

[97]Keating, *Canada and World Order* . . ., 174.

[98]*Ibid*., 199.

individually. The EU represents a market with sought after economic growth potential as well as a counterbalance to the dependency on the US.[99] The withdrawal of troops out of Europe as a result of the 1992 defence budget caused significant rifts in the relationship between Canada and the European NATO partners.[100] The participation in IFOR, and subsequently SFOR, represented the best of all worlds for Canada. As the mission was under an UN mandate, it represented Canada's traditional peacekeeping stance while the participation in a NATO-led operation maintained the necessary European connection.[101]

Justin Masse, who refers to this connection as 'Atlanticism', remarks that this relationship transcended internationalism in the mid 1990s and that this affected Canada's choice for troop deployment. He notes that Canada utilizes NATO as a means by which to maintain transatlantic solidarity in order to avoid the perception of Anglo-American unilateralism at home. This sliding preference toward NATO operations in lieu of UN operations demonstrates that Canada's relevance within the alliance was more important than the mission itself.[102]

Canada's participation in the G-7/G-8 in the mid 1990s was instrumental to its continued ambition to be recognized as a principle summit member. The 1995 Halifax Summit was fraught with concern over the pending Quebec referendum, however, the attitude of President Jacques Chirac toward the issue lent no comfort to the separatists. He clearly stated that France's support was behind Canada, not Quebec. This support

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[99]Holloway, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest* . . ., 245.

[100]Maloney, *Helpful Fixer Or Hired Gun? Why Canada Goes Overseas* . . ., 62.

[101]Keating, *Canada and World Order* . . ., 214.

[102]Justin Massie, "Making Sense of Canada's 'Irrational' International Security Policy: A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures," *International Journal* 64, no. 3 (2009), 641.

was reciprocated in the 1996 Summit at Lyon, with Canada eagerly supporting the priorities set by France as the summit leader. Of note was the priority on Africa.[103] This time frame coincided with Canada's agreement to be lead nation to a multinational UN mission to Zaire in December 1996.

Despite the absence of an UN mandate, Canada participated in the NATO air campaign against Kosovo in 1999 after determining that it was preferable to be seen to be part of the alliance rather than in opposition to it. This deployment of Canadian air forces reinforced our NATO 'credentials', which had truly come into question after the complete withdrawal of CF elements out of Europe. Keating remarks that the maintenance of solidarity is a long-standing element of Canadian multilateralism. This solidarity in Europe would not only display Canada's commitment to European security, but would also serve to advance Canadian interests in other areas.[104]

The deployment of forces, and subsequent participation in the 1999 Kosovo air campaign were a marked digression from Canada's traditional multilateral approach to foreign affairs. Starting as early as 1998, Canada expended a significant amount of diplomatic effort to get the UNSC to authorize use of force in order to prevent the Kosovo affair from spiraling out of control. Dashwood argues that this extends beyond human security issues and speaks to the dangers of regional instability and the potential

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[103]John Kirton, "Canada as a Principle Summit Power: G-7/8 Concert Diplomacy from Halifax 1995 to Kananaskis 2002," in *Canada among Nations: A Fading Power*, eds. Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, 209-232 (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002), 215.

[104]Keating, *Canada and World Order . . .*, 218.

for the conflict to expand to the territories of other NATO countries.[105] Canada did not want a repeat of the events previously experienced in the Balkans.

Despite repeated attempts by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, the resolutions passed by the UNSC in 1998 were insufficient to deal with the crisis. Concurrently, NATO members were concerned that the humanitarian crisis would not only cause a refugee and displaced person problem in the region, but that the fragile peace and stability in the region would be affected. As such, NATO passed an air activation order in October 1998 authorizing air strikes against Kosovo if situation did not improve as per the guideless of the UNSC resolutions. In March 1999, the Secretary-General of NATO directed SACEUR to initiate air strikes.[106]

The events in Kosovo highlights Canada's internal struggle with pluralism. At the forefront of the issue was the need to prevent human suffering – a key value to Canadians. However, Canada's commitments to its allies were tested by not only the risk of regional instability, but the ability of the UN and NATO to address the crisis. While Canada's staunch support of UN to resolve the issue should be applauded, the ineffectiveness of the UNSC in this conflict highlighted that Canada could not rely on the UN for resolution. In the absence of timely UNSC authorization to prevent the ongoing human security catastrophe, Canada willingly participated in the NATO-led campaign.

Michaud notes that "Canada's pursuit of its autonomy and its unshakeable belief in multilateralism has always been [the] cornerstone value of Canadian foreign

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[105]Hevina S. Dashwood, "Canada's Participation in the NATO-Led Intervention in Kosovo," in *Vanishing Borders*, eds. Maureen Appel Molat and Fen Osler Hampson, 275-302 (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2000), 295.

[106]*Ibid*., 286-287.

policy."[107] Since the end of the First World War, Canada's involvement in conflicts has always been on the condition of acceptance within a multilateral forum. In the case of the Iraq War in 2003, the unilateral actions of the US in creating a coalition to invade Iraq was contrary to the Canadian value of multilateralism. However, Massie argues that Canada's view of multilateralism was limited to support by Great Britain and France and that if France had acquiesced and deployed troops, then Canada would have also joined the coalition, similar to Kosovo.[108] Canada's decision to uphold its values in light of its interest to be seen as an autonomous nation was admirable, however, the anti-American sentiment propagated by the Chrétien government overshadowed an otherwise legitimate decision.

In 2006, terrorism again struck at the heart of the western world, this time in London, England, reinforcing to both Canada and the rest of the world that terrorism is in fact transnational. These actions took the GWOT beyond just being a US issue and reinforced the western world's commitment to maintain the fight. During his visit to London in July 2006, Prime Minister Harper reinforced Canada's multilateral commitment to the GWOT when he offered that Canadians would "stand shoulder to should with our British allies, to stay the course and win the fight."[109] This statement was all the more striking in consideration of the fact that Canadian soldiers were engaged in combat operations in Kandahar province alongside the British soldiers in neighbouring

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[107]Michaud, *Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-Making* . . ., 344.

[108]Massie, *Making Sense of Canada's 'Irrational' International Security Policy* . . ., 642.

[109]J. L. Granastein, *Whose War is it?* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2007), 48.

Helmand province at the time.[110]

Conclusion

While many will argue about what Canada's national interests and values are, there are recurring themes to all of these discussions. Canada, due to her geography and her export-based economy, is a trading nation whose very existence depends on the relationship with not only the United States, but also the rest of the world. The end of the Cold War saw the beginning of an era of world instability as the controls of the Soviet Union on many parts of the world collapsed, resulting in a rise of regional conflicts. These conflicts threatened regional stability, which caused significant concern in the emerging era of globalization and open markets.

For exporting countries, such as Canada, who were seeking new markets, this instability was of particular concern. This was complicated by the fact that Canada did not have the means by which to project military power in order to deal with this issue. Fortunately, these conflicts were also of concern to not only the US, but also to the UN and NATO, who both strove for balance in the world. Canada's close relationship with the US is marked by the sharing of similar values and interests. As such, the regional issues were very similar to that of the US, resulting in Canada's participation alongside the US in many of the deployments designed to re-establish regional stability.

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[110]Author's knowledge of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan as she was deploying into Kandahar province as a member of the National Command Element at this time.

The changing Canadian governments in the last twenty years influenced the focus of national interests. The Mulroney government's efforts were aimed toward a stronger North America, whereas Chrétien's targeted a more global audience. While it can be argued that Chrétien's approach was designed to be 'not-Mulroney', he did reaffirm Canada's multilateral interests and the importance that the UN and NATO played in the world arena. Since Chrétien, Canada has been struggling with a series of minority governments, whose task it has been to mitigate the anti-American sentiment propagated during the Chrétien era as well as balance Canadian multilateral commitments. However, all actions remain focused toward the same goal – economic security of Canadian interests to assure Canadian prosperity.

FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY

Government policy is designed to integrate a country's national interests into sound, well thought out direction. This direction can then be clearly conveyed to the bureaucracy for implementation. In Canada's case, policy is a bit like the joke about CF doctrine – one of the reasons that Canada is so successful at war is that the enemy never knows what to expect as Canadians do not follow their own doctrine. Canada is a country pulled in many different directions as the actions of the government are not always synchronous with the policy of the time.[111] John Kirton notes that the rationale behind this can be explained from a complex neo-realistic perspective. He argues that the departure of Canada's actions from their internationalist and dependant pattern can be linked to the dramatic change of the international system itself. This particularly applies to the decline of global hegemonic powers and the shifting balance of power.[112] In essence, his argument is about Canada taking whatever opportunities are afforded, in whatever forum available, in order to pursue Canadian interests abroad.

Post-Cold War, it is recognized that the affairs of the world changed and that the threat was no longer about global war between the two superpowers. The new challenge was to contain the rapid rise in failed and failing states throughout the world as they were directly affecting global stability. Bland and Maloney note that in order for Canada to effectively conduct stability campaigns, it was necessary for the federal government to

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[111]Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World . . .*, 2.

[112]*Ibid*., 82-83

spell out a broad definition of security to include subordinate policies on national defence, foreign affairs and economic security.[113]

This section will examine the various foreign and defence policy documents that have been issued since the Cold War. It will focus on the aforementioned definition of security and compare it against the actions of the government to determine the rationale behind their decisions. The argument presented will not only be an analysis of the policy statements themselves, but will incorporate external opinions to complement the discussion.

Foreign Policy

Canadian history in foreign affairs is a chequered one. After World War II ended, Canada's reputation as a key international member facilitated Canadian membership and roles in the creation of the UN and NATO. The following years, in an era colloquially known as the 'Golden Age', established Canada's role as a relevant player in diplomacy, development and defence. As noted by Adam Chapnick, while a small country in terms of population and global power relationships, Canada was punching above its weight in international affairs.[114] This changed in the late 1960s when successive Prime Ministers, notably John Diefenbaker and Pierre Trudeau, adopted an inward looking approach to

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[113]Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security* . . ., 200.

[114]Adam Chapnick, "The Golden Age: A Canadian Foreign Policy Paradox," *International Journal* 64, no. 1 (Winter 2008-09), 209.

resolve a number of domestic social issues.[115] When Mulroney came to power in 1983, at the end of a long-standing era of Liberal governments, he faced a challenge between balancing the inward looking demands of Quebec and the economic demands of Western policy.[116] What ensued was a refocussing on external affairs, particularly on the United States, in order to assure protection of Canadian interests at home.

In 1992, the Mulroney government offered significant troop contribution to both the UN mission in Bosnia and the UN mission in Somalia. Andrew Cooper assesses these offers from both an international and a domestic perspective. Internationally, this contribution reinforced Canada's desired image to be a committed nation in the international community, taking the initiative to help resolve these significant regional conflicts. However, he views the mission into the Balkans as an offset to the force withdrawal from Europe, noting that "if Canada was prepared to punch well below its weight on its direct commitment to collective security, it could deflect any criticism by showing that it was pulling more than its weight on peacekeeping."[117] Domestically, the involvement in peacekeeping operations after the Gulf War reinforced the preferred Canadian image of being a peacekeeper. This preference would be the downfall of an effective foreign and defence policy for the remainder of the 1990s.

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[115]Nelson Michaud, "The Prime Minister, PMO and PCO," in *Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy*, eds. Patrick James, Nelson Michaud and Marc J. O'Reilly, 21-50 (Toronto: Lexington Books, 2006), 40.

[116]Michael Lusztig, "The Evolution of Liberalization in Canada's Trade Policy," in *The Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy*, eds. Patrick James, Nelson Michaud and Marc J. O'Reilly, 83-104 (Toronto: Lexington Books, 2006), 93.

[117]Andrew F. Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1997), 184.

At the end of Mulroney's term in 1993, a private group, who called themselves the Canada 21 Council, formed a commission to determine what they perceived to be the future of Canada's international relations. They assessed that the end of the Cold War also ended an era where international power and influence would no longer be marked in military currency. More importantly, they argued that globalization would intrinsically link the world together and that economic and military resources needed to be collectively applied to achieve diplomatic results.[118] The gist of this report was that Canada's defence forces needed to be restructured and equipped for the defence of Canada, but that its expeditionary capability should be restricted to low-risk peacekeeping operations. This report notes that maintaining a peace enforcement capability would be of limited benefit to Canada.[119] The opponents to this report, namely the defence constituency, argued that in light of the unknown, and constantly changing threat, as a minimum it was necessary to maintain a general purpose combat ready force that could operate across an entire spectrum of conflicts.[120]

In 1995, the Chrétien government issued their long awaited foreign policy statement – *Canada in the World*. It was anticipated that this document would clearly lay out the differing priorities between his government and the previous Conservative government and provide a road map for the way ahead. Interestingly enough, this document was not superseded for the remainder of Chrétien's time in office until Paul Martin replaced it with *Securing an Open Society* in 2004.

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[118]Centre for International Studies, *Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Centre for International Studies, 1994), 13.

[119]*Ibid*., 62-63.

[120]Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* . . ., 115.

The opening lines of *Canada and the World* left little room for confusion over what the priorities of the Chrétien government would be. The paper notes that the influence of Canada increasingly depends on economic relations as world power is becoming defined in economic terms instead of military power. It also acknowledges that the nature of security itself has changed and that the security of Canada, notably our economic security, is increasingly dependent on the security of others. The promotion of prosperity and employment and the protection of our security are stated as key objectives. In order to achieve this goal, this policy statement outlines that it is necessary to maintain global stability and security.[121] As Andrew Cohen notes, this policy document posed a significant danger to Canada, notably that commerce would overwhelm all else in foreign policy and that our trade policy would become our foreign policy.[122]

Barrett, while making an argument about international human rights, notes that "in 1995, the [Canadian] government explicitly declared that employment and economic growth at home were its most essential foreign policy goals, and its emphasis on trade in its budgetary allocations reflected this prioritization."[123] However, while not discussed extensively in the section on national interests, a key concern for the Chrétien government in the mid 1990s was the Quebec issue and the maintenance of national unity. In this time frame, there was a push to strengthen Canada's membership in La Francophonie, a strategy designed to satisfy the francophone majority in Quebec. The

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[121]Government of Canada, *Canada in an Open World: Canada Foreign Policy Review 1995* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1995); available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/chap2-en.asp; Internet; accessed 17 March 2010.

[122]Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How we Lost our Place in the World* . . ., 116.

[123]Bethany Barratt, "Canadian Foreign Policy and International Human Rights," in *Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy*, eds. Patrick James, Nelson Michaud and Marc J. O'Reilly, 235-264 (Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 237-238.

impact was that this favoured international intervention to protect the security of francophones abroad in regions such as Central Africa and Haiti.[124]

The latter half of the 1990s saw Canada's rise to global leadership as a specialized power in niche areas, namely an advocate for issues that would be perceived as nationalistic agendas if introduced by powers such as the US or the UK.[125] Kirton argues that from a neo-realistic perspective, Canada's rise can be attributed to transforming international systems, specifically ones with an economic impact, with a view to addressing the issues which arose in a rapidly globalizing world, notably those microeconomic issues which affected trade.[126] As a trading nation, this is core to Canada's very existence and accounts for 90 percent of the gross national product.[127] The events of 9/11 brought to light that the focus on trade and the pursuit of trade agendas through international systems had come at the expense of defence capability that had been allowed to erode in light of the changing threat environment post-Cold War.

In 1999, Canada took a lead role within the G8to push for the deployment of forces into Kosovo in order to alleviate the burgeoning conflict that had the potential to once again disrupt the Balkan region. Kirton assesses that Canada chose this venue in lieu of the UN as there was no veto power amongst the members. It was thought that it would force Russia, as a newly introduced member to the G8 in 1997, to choose between

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[124]Kimberly Marten, "Lending Forces: Canada's Military Peacekeeping," in *The Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy*, eds. Patrick James, Nelson Michaud and Marc J. O'Reilly, 165-188 (Toronto: Lexington Books, 2006), 175.

[125]Patrick Lennox, *Canada as a Specialized Power* (Dalhousie University: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 24 January 2007), 11-12.

[126]Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World . . .*, 156,159.

[127]Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How we Lost our Place in the World . . .,* 112.

the plurilateral and powerful G7 group and their Cold War loyalties to the Serbs.[128] This enamour with the G8 as an international institution continued on into 9/11 when Chrétien suggested that support for an US-led response to the attacks be broadened to include the G8 membership, as Japan and Russia were not part of NATO.[129]

This approach to foreign policy changed in 2004 when the Liberals were elected to a minority government. In 2004, Paul Martin's Liberal government issued *Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, purporting that this is a 'first-ever' policy of its kind and one that emphasizes a more integrated approach to national security. This policy states that "a clear and effective approach to security is not just the foundation of our prosperity."[130] This signified a shift from the emphasis on economic security to that of national security. Further, this document focussed on the impact of terrorism on global security and Canada's role as a key participant in maintaining international security. The means by which this role is achieved, however, is not as clearly defined.

The policy states "national security concerns have influenced the types of assistance we provide to certain failing and failed states in crisis."[131] The discriminatory nature of this policy is reinforced in the segment which discusses the employment of the CF. It states that there is a requirement to determine "which efforts would be of greatest relevance to our national security interests."[132] The national security interests are

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[128]Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World . . .*, 169.

[129]*Ibid*., 170

[130]Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2004), 1.

[131]*Ibid*., 47.

[132]*Ibid*., 50.

delineated to be protection of Canada and Canadians, ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies and contribution to international security. However, they are still vague enough to allow the government sufficient manoeuvrability in its actions.

In 2005, Martin's Liberal government subsequently released the *International Policy Statement*, which comprised three sections: diplomacy, defence and development. Each one of these statements was released under the respective departments; diplomacy will be discussed in this section and defence will be discussed in concert with the other defence policies.

The intent of this policy was to build on the 2004 *Open Society*, creating a framework for the respective departments. Furthermore, it emphasized the need for integration between the various departments, reinforcing their interdependence. The policy remarks that the global environment has changed, causing Canada to embark on a new era of diplomacy that will adapt to this globalized world. This document laid out four priorities: fostering partnership with North America, making a distinctive contribution to Canada's efforts to build a more secure world, promoting multilateralism, and realigning bilateral relationships and building new networks.[133]

At first glance, the absence of any reference to economic security is striking, particularly from a government led by the former Finance Minister, Paul Martin. The section on North American partnership is void of any mention of economic activity with the US, our largest trading partner, nor of any future discussions of NAFTA. Rather the section focuses on shared global objectives as they pertain to the transformation of

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[133]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World - Diplomacy* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 2.

NATO and the UN. This dichotomy continues in the section on building a more secure world. Here, the policy highlights that Canada "remains firmly committed to the United Nations as the cornerstone of the multilateral system, and to [any] action under its auspices."[134] However, it is in this same year that Canada decided to withdraw its last major commitment to the UN when it transferred leadership of the Golan Heights to India. The remaining sections of the policy document continue to emphasize the importance of the UN and the need for dramatic transformation. However, the realities of the time were that as the US and the UK were focussed on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there was very little patience amongst the bigger players to focus on the tribulations of the UN. As such, there has been little progress.

In 2006, Martin's government fell and was replaced by a minority Conservative government. The Conservative Government of Stephan Harper has not issued any policy statements that unequivocally replace the 2005 International Policy Statement issued by the Martin government. However, in today's electronic age, the logical step to search for policy statements is to go to the DFAIT website in order to determine what in fact, is the existing policy. The website reveals two interesting things. Firstly, all of the Liberal government policy statements can only be accessed through the archives, which implies that they have been replaced. However, there is no document that cites supercession, but rather a website that lists four key priorities for Foreign Affairs: the pursuit of economic

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[134] *Ibid*., 9.

opportunity for Canada, with a focus on growing and emerging markets, the United States and the Western Hemisphere, Afghanistan and transformation of DFAIT.[135]

Embedded within this website are messages from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Stockwell Day at the time of the signing) that highlight the efforts that Canada will put forth. From an economic perspective, he advocates that

> in the face of rising international competition and profound difficulties in the global economy, Canada's future prosperity hinges on how well we collectively harness our competitive advantages to maintain our place as one of the world's great trading nations and most successful economies.[136]

This reinforces the importance of trade to Canada as well as recognizes the effort needed to maintain a role in the global economy. Similarly, the website emphasizes the relationship with the US, noting that "in the broadest political, economic and military sense, Canada's security is entwined with the United States."[137] While it continues to cite statistics of troop deployments alongside US commitments since World War II, this is not the key takeaway from the website. Rather, it clearly outlines that the priority of this relationship is to maintain a partnership with the US in order to engender the trading relationship that is so critical to Canada's very existence.

Defence Policy

The loss of a well-defined enemy in the form of the Soviet Union in 1990 left

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[135]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Our Priorities: 2009-2010,"; http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/priorities-priorites.aspx; Internet; accessed 19 March 2010.

[136]*Ibid*.

[137]*Ibid*.

Canada, similar to the rest of the world, searching for a defence policy as their strategic framework and rationale for current defence structures disappeared. The Western world struggled to determine the meaning of their alliances and what the changing roles would be. The successful international cooperation in the UN that facilitated a coalition response to the 1991 Gulf War appeared to herald the beginning of the age of the UN. However, the subsequent events in Bosnia and Somalia highlighted the problems that had plagued the UN during the Cold War, namely their inability to maintain peace once a state had already failed.[138]

The 1992 White Paper, issued by Mulroney's Conservative government, was a succinct, pointed document which clearly stated that the world had fundamentally changed. While the blooming democracies were a positive change, it assessed that this transition could have widespread political and economic issues that had the potential to destabilize regions and lead to wider conflicts. It reinforced the need to work closely with the US and Europe. Specifically, it cited that shared political principles and economic structures enabled close cooperation with a view to ensuring stability, which would then allow the pursuit of other interests.[139] The White Paper further noted that "where interests cannot be reconciled, trade issues may come to play a more prominent role in shaping international alignments."[140] The paper was a cautiously optimistic document that placed little emphasis on a significant military threat to North America.

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[138]Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security . . .*, 104.

[139]Department of National Defence, *1992 Canada Defence Policy* (Ottawa, 1992), 7. http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/newsite/downloads/CanadaDefPolE_all.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 March 2010.

[140]*Ibid*., 3.

Rather, it focussed on the need to maintain the bilateral and multilateral connections that would ensure Canada's interests would be met. Not surprisingly, the paper makes several references to interests, but at no time are they clearly delineated, leaving the employment of the CF open to interpretation.

The instability in the Former Yugoslavia, which really began to collapse in 1991, was highlighted as a key threat in the 1992 White Paper. It unequivocally stated that instability or conflict in Europe will have a direct effect on Canada. Further, it outlined that our most basic security interest is to prevent the use or threat of force.[141] As outlined in both the section on defence economics and national interests, Canada would have no choice but to respond to a conflict in Europe both in the interest of containing the conflict, but also to keep the European focus on trade versus war.

In 1994, the Liberal government issued their White Paper, outlining what they believed to be a realistic and affordable policy on defence. The paper, similar to the 1992 White Paper, notes that while it is still an unpredictable world, significant progress has been made in resolving numerous regional conflicts and disarmament. It states that Canada, in continuation of its proud history of contributing to international alliances, "continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security, especially since Canada's economic future depends on its ability to trade freely with other nations."[142] However, the striking difference of this White Paper is its constant reference to the cost of defence and the requirement to be selective in the choice of missions,

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[141]*Ibid*., 7.

[142]Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa, 1994) http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/newsite/1994%20White%20Paper%20on%20Defence.htm; Internet, accessed 19 March 2010.

ensuring that they have a clear and enforceable mandate. The paper states that "our prosperity – and with it our quality of life – is threatened by the steady growth of public sector debt."[143] The interpretation of this is that the government is unwilling to risk a long term involvement in a mission that would necessitate additional funding pressures for defence.

Colonel Peters notes that the 1994 White Paper emphasizes that "Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security, since Canada's economic future depends on its ability to trade freely with other nations."[144] However, as Bland and Maloney note, the 1994 paper also abruptly changed a fundamental of Canadian defence that had been customary since 1949. Canada's participation in international operations in order to uphold its multilateral commitments was core to Canada's perceived responsibility to its allies, both UN and NATO. The initial sense was that the government did not want to forego international commitments, but that they would do it in a matter that would be efficient.[145] The following several years saw an increase in operational tempo as the CF deployed around the world on operations. However, the cutbacks of the early 1990s and cancellation of many capital programs meant that the CF was unable to deliver a significant military effect on the ground. It rather seemed more about having the flag present at the mission. Bland and Maloney cite the government's unwillingness to reconcile its policy to the funding of a defence capability as the reason behind the failing of defence policy throughout the

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[143]*Ibid*.

[144]Peters, *Club Dues? The Relevance of Canadian Expeditionary Forces . . .*, 73.

[145]Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security . . .*, 131.

1990s. The only mantra that remained constant was 'do more with less'.[146]

The 1994 report of the Standing Joint Committee on Canada's defence policy outlined the criticality of the stable international system and that our national interest lies in a prosperous global economy. In a 2002 seminar on Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy, Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Evraire, remarked that this statement emphasized that the CF would be key to providing the 'insurance' that would allow this interest to flourish.[147] The significance of deploying CF personnel to Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s highlighted the validity of this remark. While recognizing that our military contribution was minor, the effect of participation facilitated this 'insurance'.

As previously mentioned, one of the sub-components of the *2005 International Policy Statement* (IPS) was defence. This policy statement was heralded as the first review of Canadian defence policy since the 1994 White Paper and supposedly addressed the reality of the changing global security situation post-Cold War and 9/11. The striking takeaway from this document is that it recognized the relevance and centrality of defence to the foreign policy agenda, a fundamental change from the Chrétien government. This document does not really outline fundamentally different tasks for the CF. It continues to emphasize that the first priority must be on the defence of Canada and North America, but that the CF must be capable of addressing security threats as far away from the border as possible. It reinforces that "security in Canada ultimately begins with stability

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[146]*Ibid*., 134.

[147]LGen (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, "What is Security: A Canadian Viewpoint," in *Vision into Reality: Towards a New Defence and Security Concept*, eds. David Rudd, Nicholas Furneaux and Jim Hanson, 27-38 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002), 30.

abroad."[148] Similar to the 1994 White Paper, it stipulates that Canada must retain the capability to operate across the full spectrum of warfare in order to be able to effectively operate with our allies.

From a multilateral perspective, the IPS emphasizes that a strong military is "necessary to achieve foreign policy goals and advancing our place in the world."[149] It notes that our participation in expeditionary operations has enhanced our status as a contributing member to the UN and NATO. The IPS notes that in light of the many threats facing Canada, the most critical one is that of failed and failing states. Moreover, it is necessary to restore order as economic development cannot take hold in these societies without the stability and security that only military forces can provide.[150]

In 2008, Harper's Conservative government issued the *Canada First Defence Strategy* (CFDS). It emphasized the need to rebuild the CF into a modern military capable of affecting Canada's desire to once again be an influential country on the world stage. The CFDS clearly outlines that the CF will be provided the resources to support their three roles: defending Canada, defending North America; and contributing to international peace and security.[151] This document essentially assesses that a multi-role and combat capable force will have the flexibility to address a vast spectrum of evolving security requirements. The CFDS states that "as a trading nation in a highly globalized world, Canada's prosperity and security rely on stability abroad. As the international

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[148]Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World - Defence* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 2.

[149]*Ibid*., 3.

[150]*Ibid*., 26.

[151]Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008), 7.

community grapples with numerous security threats, Canada must do its part to address such challenges as they arise."[152] In short, today's threat environment is global and if Canada wants to re-establish its influence on the world stage, it must be seen to doing its part to address this global threat. This is the underpinning of the CFDS; it recognizes that Canada wants to be a world player once again, but without 'boots on the ground', the ability to influence the affairs of the world will be negligible.

Conclusion

The foreign and defence policy of Canada both required significant adjustment after the end of the Cold War. As the physical security threat changed and the effects of globalization began to be better understood by the government, the 1990s saw the start of significant entwining of the two policies. While always related, the growing importance of bilateral and plurilateral institutes forced the government to assess the tools available to influence their position of power within these institutions.

Foreign policy, particularly with the Chrétien government, shifted to a trade-based policy. This was understandable in light of the significant public debt and the need to ensure a stable global economy in which Canada could pursue trade, the most significant element of its gross domestic product. The events of 9/11 fundamentally changed the perspective of the western world, particularly as it forced a re-examination of potential threats to international security. The employment of the CF needed to be in line with the other nations, ensuring that collective security interests were being maintained. The

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[152] *Ibid*., 8.

secondary effect of open trade with Canada's trading partners could then be realized as a result of participation in these security efforts.

From a defence policy perspective, the CF was required to 'do more with less', which meant that there was not a significant military contribution being deployed. Rather, it appeared a sense of tokenism and participation for the sake of having the flag flown alongside Canada's partners. Conversely, this changed with Harper's Conservative government. They recognized that in order to be seen as a major international player in the new security environment, it was necessary to be able to deploy robust forces as part of force packages and share the defence burden. The simple act of being present at a conflict would no longer suffice if Canada wanted to maintain its ability to influence its national interests abroad.

CHAPTER 5 - DISCUSSION

Canada has always struggled to find its place in the world. Part of this challenge is that because of the size of the country it is not possible to be everything to everybody and as such, it is necessary to pick and choose what needs to be the priority. However, the effect of not being a major player and always having to justify a seat at the table means that there is a significant amount of compromise that is required in order to have sufficient influence on the international stage. This is constantly overshadowed by our proximate relationship to the US.

This paper argued that the greatest security threat to Canada is economic security and that as a trading nation, it is the basis of our foreign policy. However, in today's global society, it is also necessary to be a viable member of various international institutions in order to be seen to be doing one's part in the world. This is the balance that Canada must seek – how to protect its trade interests, but also contribute to these various institutions. As was extensively discussed, the one international capability that Canada has to influence these interests is the ability to deploy expeditionary forces. In a global environment that has seen a rise of failed and failing states post-Cold War, regional security and stability are a priority for all nations so that they may then pursue their own national interests.

The examination of CF deployments from post-Cold War onward had a common theme whether the perspective was from that of defence economics, national interests, or policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union saw the remainder of the world breathe a sigh of relief. Likewise, the goodwill toward each other at the end of the Cold War was

demonstrated with the willingness of the UN to support the 1991 Gulf War. There was subsequent euphoria with the collective world having the resolve to address the minor conflicts, assuming that this was just short time frame fallout from the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was widely believed that world order and balance would be regained, enabling an expansion of trade and globalization. However, as this order and balance was not realized, it also brought into question what the best means were to achieve this effect. The mid 1990s saw Canada move away from the UN to NATO as a means by which to achieve its objectives. By the end of the twentieth century, the preference then became coalition operations. Regardless of the reasons behind the deployments, this transition remained constant throughout the analysis of the framework.

From a defence economic perspective, the ongoing challenge to Canada's military role in today's security environment is to be a viable member of the UN, NATO and any coalition operation that sees Canada contribute forces. Post-Cold War, there is very little international tolerance for the 'free-rider' of defence. All Western countries faced the same budgetary challenges that resulted from the peace dividend and, for the most part, share similar national interests as Canada. Using the alliance theory, countries that are part of any alliance in today's international environment will reap the benefit of collective defence. However, the jewel of alliances is not the public benefits, but rather the private benefits that accrue as a result of being a key contributor to international conflicts, thus sharing the defence burden.

Canadian national interests, while often difficult to define, have generally remained the same throughout this time period. The NIP was clearly integrated into both foreign and defence policy statements, always coming back to the same message – the

prosperity of Canadians is what is most important to the country. While it can be argued that this is no different from any other country, Canada's reliance on trade for its GDP gives trade a heightened priority. Thus, as the physical threat to Canada is relatively minor, Canada could be a minor player in the activities of alliances. However, it is understood that these alliances are much more than just defence; they are forums by which other agendas could be pursued.

The rising public debt at the end of the Cold War had a significant influence on Canadian foreign policy. Fully recognizing the resulting increase in failed and failing states around the world, the foreign policy priority became the protection of Canadian interests abroad. The 1992 and 1994 White Papers emphasized the economic impact of regional instability on Canada and the requirement for the CF to mitigate this impact. Charles Doran offers competing realism views of security and economics, supporting those offered by Joel Sokolosky in 2004 at a lecture he gave at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre. In his lecture, Sokolosky argued that "economics and security are intertwined such that economics is impossible without security, and security is impossible without economics."[153] This view contrasted starkly with that of the US post 9/11 who deemed that security was a priority far ahead of trade and tourism.[154] This caused a marked concern to a country that had spent the last decade supporting global free trade and open markets in the interests of Canadian prosperity. This forced the government at the start of the twenty-first century to cease their inward looking concern for domestic

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[153]Charles F. Doran, "Canada-U.S. Relations," in *The Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy*, eds. Patrick James, Nelson Michaud and Mark O'Reilly, 389-410 (Toronto: Lexington Books, 2006), 391.

[154]Hillmer and Granastein, *For Better or For Worse . . .*, 311.

policies. It also refocused efforts on a foreign policy that would achieve optimum balance that would maintain Canadian prosperity.

While there were many commonalities among the three case studies, there were also marked differences. Foreign and defence policies are the cornerstone for the employment of the CF and the projection of national interests. However, there are many actions that do not support the stated policies. The most striking difference is the continued reference to the importance of the UN. However, for an institution that is supposed to be the 'cornerstone' of our multilateralism, Canada contributes very little to achieve its major raison d'être for existence – global security. Over the time frame analysed, Canada systematically placed its level of effort with the G8 and NATO. This is most likely because of the ineffectiveness of the UN to take any key action and the fact that the necessary players were members of these other institutions. In a smaller forum, these leaders could determine the way forward and then influence the larger institutions. Canada, as a country striving to establish its power position in the world, needed the bigger players more than they needed Canada. As such, Canada found itself a niche role in these institutions that allowed for private agendas to be pursued.

The relationship with the US was also one of contrast. Both foreign and defence policies highlight the importance of the bilateral relationship for the security of North America and how a positive relationship with the US is key to a unified North America. However, a reduced defence capability, compounded by an overextended CF, begs the question of the sincerity of Canada's contribution to North American security. While it can be highlighted that Canada's overseas commitments are also in the US' interests, it does not offset the fact that domestically, Canada is a significant defence burden. Yet, it

is one that the US has accepted over the last twenty years in exchange for coalition support.

Examining Canada's alliance commitments, Canada needs to determine its focus post Afghanistan. Since the move to Kandahar in 2005, Canada has been able to wave the flag of significant troop contribution to the ISAF mission in all forums. They have used it at the UN as an excuse to why Canada cannot address the situation in Africa. As well, it has been used at NATO to demonstrate that Canada is one of the key nations in the Alliance and is doing more than its fair share. This combat role has given Canada a renewed importance not seen since World War II. The challenge for Canada is to use this influence wisely and not squander it away on mission choices that are irrelevant to both the US and our other allies. It is crucial to ensure that the CF is deployed such that its national interests, specifically prosperity to Canadians, are maintained.

CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

After almost 150 years post Confederation, Canada is still seeking its role in the world. While everyone will agree that it is not easy sitting in the shadows of the United States, Canada has shown historically that it is capable of great things and that the foundation of its society is its people. Since the end of the Cold War, Canada's behaviour can be likened to an identity crisis. The increased global instability and the rise in transnational terrorism did little to change the fundamental behaviour of Canadians. However, it had a dramatic effect on the rest of the world, leaving Canada wondering what its role should be. It is often pondered if, and how, Canadian behaviour will change if there was a major attack on Canadian soil, truly threatening sovereignty and prosperity of Canadians, values that we hold dearly. Until that point in time, the Canadian focus will continue to be on forwarding Canadian economic interests to ensure prosperity and wealth. Concurrently, the necessary platitudes toward global security will be demonstrated in order to maintain our relationships with the US and the rest of the world.

The degradation of the Canadian military was in a continuous down-slide since the end of the Cold War when the pressures for peace dividends and competing debt issues at home forced budget reductions. The increased funding, which started with the Martin government and dramatically increased with Harper's Conservative government, was a welcome relief, however, it was a little too late. The budget increases essentially became a stop gap measure to resolve the years of insufficient funding for infrastructure and spare parts and major capital procurement was not focussed on the many long-

standing projects, but rather targeted equipment that was deemed critical for soldier survivability in Afghanistan. The CFDS was a shining light, promising a deliberate investment plan that would integrate industry into the needs of the CF and allow for subsequent capability development. However, as shown in the 2010 Budget, Canadians are amenable to increased defence expenditures in times of budget surpluses however, when the belt gets tight, their preference continues to be on social and economic programs. Thus, once again, the CF will be funded just enough to maintain the semblance that they are fully capable of achieving the missions laid out in the CFDS. While this will be effective in the short term, it is not sustainable.

The challenge with this topic is that while the research clearly supported the thesis, there appears to be a reticence to blatantly declare that the CF are being used primarily to promote and protect Canadian economic interests. There was significant discussion about human security, and the responsibility to protect, however, this does not correlate with the major CF deployments in the last twenty years. While one can argue that this was the situation in Bosnia and Afghanistan, when it is compared to the conflicts and genocides in Africa, they pale in comparison. The use of the term 'human security' is used sparingly in foreign and defence policy documents. It is possible that it is because of the nefarious nature of this term, but more likely because it creates a challenge to justify the deployment of the CF in one region of the world in lieu of another. There is no question that both Canadians and the greater world understand that the expeditionary capabilities of the CF are limited. However, the choices for deployments seem much more in line with the private benefits that can be achieved versus the public good of providing defence.

Post-Afghanistan, Canada needs a mission that will enable them to achieve all of their national interests plus meet the needs of the CF. The Canadian Army is more than tired from an 8 year stint in Afghanistan - it is exhausted. It is not only the people that are tired, but also the equipment. While an operational pause is being sought after 2011, the reality for the CF is that it will not come. The global security situation continues to worsen and there is increasing pressure to address the situation in the Horn of Africa. However, a mission on the other side of the world will continue to place the same pressures on the CF, from both a personnel and a budget perspective. The author proposes a solution closer to home.

The recent earthquake in Haiti presents an ideal opportunity to both the Canadian government and the CF. Haiti will be in a rebuilding phase for the foreseeable future, however, the security situation is relatively benign in comparison to other parts of the world. From a Canadian government perspective, a lead nation role in Haiti would provide much needed relief to the US, enabling them to focus elsewhere in the world. This assistance would be heralded in the UN, and even though Haiti is not in Africa, many of the social issues facing the country are similar. This has the potential to be seen to be addressing poverty and human security. For our Allied partners, it would be understood that we need to address this humanitarian crisis in our backyard and prevent this failed state from becoming a hotbed of terrorism. From a CF perspective, it would enable the deployment of forces complementary to those in Afghanistan, notably increased participation by the Navy and the Air Force. As well, the equipment demands of a reconstruction mission would be starkly different from that of Afghanistan. This would provide the opportunity for tired equipment to be reconstituted and refurbished.

Most importantly, the sustainment costs for the mission would be dramatically less than a mission in the Eastern Hemisphere, alleviating some of the forecasted budget pressures.

In summary, Canada needs to determine its role in the world. While a seat at the table of the relevant forums – the UN, NATO, G8 – will always be there for Canada, the challenge is being heard. The mission in Afghanistan has demonstrated to Canada that it must be a viable member of these forums in order to have influence in not only the decision making, but also in the development of policies and agreements that will positively affect Canada. As a trading nation, Canada's existence is dependant on the freedom of global markets and it is in its best interest to do what is necessary to ensure that freedom. Canada's prime security need is economic security, not physical security. Until there comes a point where that changes, all efforts will be focussed toward achieving this.

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