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STRENGTHENING THE RESOLVE OF CANADIANS: CONSULTING CLAUSEWITZ TO MEET THE DEMANDS OF THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

Since 9/11, Western nations have entered into dangerous international conflicts that have shown that the reliance on strength in conventional warfare is not enough. As the Canadian experience in Afghanistan has shown, one aspect that requires attention is that of strengthening the resolve of the public to see their forces engaged in costly and dangerous operations.

An examination of the issues related to Western nations' involvement in 'small wars' proves that a different approach from that during the Cold War is required. A consultation of the teachings of Clausewitz demonstrates that the ability of governments to use their militaries on dangerous missions abroad depends upon the will of the people and in the new security environment this has become increasingly critical.

This paper focuses on the roles of media, the government and the military commander to show the lessons of the experience in Afghanistan that must be learned to protect the resolve of Canadians in future dangerous operations abroad.

STRENGTHENING THE RESOLVE OF CANADIANS: CONSULTING CLAUSEWITZ TO MEET THE DEMANDS OF THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

In 2002, the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Jean Chrétien declared Canada's commitment to the war on terror. After the transition from a Liberal to Conservative government in 2006, the Right Honourable Stephen Harper reiterated that commitment. In the first several years of the operation, Canadian public opinion was in support of the Canadian Forces taking part in the operation and this continued well after the Canadians moved to a more aggressive and dangerous mission in the Taliban heartland of Kandahar. Since 2007, public support for the mission has declined.

In 2007 the Honourable John Manley, a Liberal, was asked by Prime Minister Harper to Chair a panel that would study the choice to continue efforts in Afghanistan. In January 2008, the Final Report from The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan[1] was delivered. The Manley Report recommended that the Government of Canada continue operations in Afghanistan and Harper's Minority Government elected to follow their advice. This translated to a commitment to Afghanistan until 2011 when Canada will pull its forces out of Afghanistan regardless of what progress has or has not been achieved. This withdrawal, after nine years of exemplary service by Canadian Forces personnel, will occur because the support of the Canadian people for the mission

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[1] Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. Final Report. The Honourable John Manley, Chair (Ottawa, ON: Government of Canada, 2008), 5; http://dsp-

has steadily declined and has made it impossible for the Government of Canada to continue without serious political problems in the domestic arena. It is important to note that public support for the Canadian Forces is as high as it has been in contemporary times. But this popularity has not translated into public support for the mission. As Canada begins its withdrawal from Afghanistan, it will be added to the long list of Western nations that have failed to defeat an insurgent enemy and have been forced to withdraw due to the lack of will on the part of their home populations to continue a long campaign.

Western nations have prospered since the end of the Cold War. But the end of the Cold War has had a destabilizing effect on the world as well. Small wars, and the insurgent activity that is quite often associated with them, have continued. In 2001, the events of 9/11 sparked an engagement by the Western nations, led by the United States, in a global war on terror. Since then, 'small war' operations and counterinsurgency have become the main effort of the formerly conventional warfare militaries.

Compared to recent conventional conflicts, counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have been more costly, with limited identifiable progress and more casualties, three issues that have an impact on the home population's resolve to continue. If Western nations hope to continue to protect their interests abroad, then they will need to improve their ability to maintain popular support for what are often dangerous international missions.

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psd.communication.gc.ca/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf; Internet, accessed 24 February 2010. Hereinafter 'The Manley Report.'

This paper will show that Canada needs the capability to fight small wars including counterinsurgency operations and that a significant part of that capability is the ability to protect the resolve of Canadians to contribute troops to these operations.

The first section will describe the issues Western nations encounter in small wars that involve insurgent forces. It will demonstrate why Western nations must strengthen their ability to wage war in this type of operations. It will be shown that wars of this nature have a political dimension that needs to be addressed in the information domain.

The next section will explore the concept of Information Operations and will examine Canadian Forces doctrine in Psychological operations, deception and Public Affairs. The purpose of this examination is to ensure the definition of each is understood and to differentiate between these aspects of Information Operations.

The next section will examine the role of the media. The media are the main sources of information for Canadians. This paper will describe the role the media plays in influencing public opinion of military operations. It will be shown that the relationship between the media and the Canadian Forces has changed significantly for the better and that this relationship is important to help strengthen Canada's ability to participate in international conflict.

The next section will explore the role of the Canadian government in military operations. It will show that the Government did not initially deal with the Afghanistan mission properly with respect to maintaining the support of Canadians for the ongoing military effort because it did not lay out the specific objectives of the mission in relation to Canadian values. It will also show, however, that significant improvements were made

in response to the recommendations of the Manley Report but that these changes were not sufficient on their own to stop the decline of public support for the Afghan mission.

The final section will argue that the operational military commander at the national level has a duty to assist in strengthening the resolve of Canadians by explaining operations to the public so that military actions can be understood in context to the national objectives set out by government. It will show that the use of strategic communications and information operations can serve to inform the public and can do so in a way that will reach them on an emotive level. Several changes in the relationship of the senior military leadership to the public have occurred since 9/11, especially when General Rick Hillier was in that post. This paper will prove that, although Hillier went too far, the underlying factors that led to his ability to speak so publically still exist.

This paper is not suggesting strategies to justify unpopular choices but rather ways to maintain support when engagements have started with the will of the people on their side. None of the measures described in this paper are expected to create support for a war that is not popular with the people. But when there is public support for an international operation, and that operation involves combat or a high risk of casualties, then the actions described and supported by this paper will help maintain that support and slow the inevitable decline of support when the costs in time and lives increase.

Canada's mission in Afghanistan has demonstrated how important public support is to the strategic success of a counterinsurgency type mission. It is important to reflect on the experiences and issues encountered so that lessons can be learned that will assist in strengthening the resolve of the nation in operations of this type in the future. This paper will show that the combination of the appropriate engagement of the media, the proper

definition of objectives by the Government, and the ongoing explanation of military actions in theatre by the operational level military commander will strengthen the resolve of the Canadian people when it is necessary to send their soldiers on dangerous international operations in the future.

NATURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY AND 'SMALL WAR'

This section will examine the problem Western forces, and specifically the Canadian Forces, are encountering in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. The conflict in Afghanistan is not unique but is indicative of what we should expect in the years to come. The global war on terror was not advertised as a quick, localized war. The Cold War took a long time and this conflict will likely prove to be similar in duration. The main difference is that the global war on terror will require actual conflict throughout the spectrum of warfare and is not an all or nothing conventional conflict/stalemate. Military operations of varying length and duration will continue to be required as Al-Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations are transnational in nature and can not be defeated in a theatre of operations that is limited to a single country or region. These conflicts will almost always evolve to include irregular warfare because of the significant imbalance of power among the participants. Irregular, asymmetric warfare will also almost always include insurgency. This requires Western forces to create and maintain the skills required for counterinsurgency warfare.

As has already been shown in Afghanistan and Iraq, large powerful conventional forces are not guaranteed a quick successful outcome in small wars, especially in

counterinsurgency warfare. This is due, in part, to the fact that counterinsurgency is as political as it is military in nature and immediate results are therefore close to impossible. Western nations have come to expect quick decisive wars, such as was seen in the first Gulf War in 1991. Other factors that make Western nations less prepared for counterinsurgency operations include that democracies are risk averse and have become used to low casualty rates.[2] In democratic societies, the will of the people and their support for a given conflict has a much more direct effect on their governments' ability to continue to wage war. A dictator who wages war, for example, does not have to be as sensitive to the will of the people. Time is also a more sensitive factor in Western democracies.[3] Typically, the more time passes in a given conflict abroad, the less support it receives from the people. These factors place limits on the will of the Western democratic people to support international interventions. Time is on the side of the insurgent. This lesson was learned by the Americans in Vietnam. As Henry Kissenger, the former US Secretary of State, has stated, "the guerrilla wins if he does not lose."[4]

As Carl von Clausewitz, the great military historian and theorist, noted, there are three actors that are critical to prosecuting war effectively: the people, the commander and his or her army and the government. Any successful theory of warfare, he stated, must take all three actors seriously. Moreover, he warned, a "theory that ignores any one of them…would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would

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[2] Barry Cooper, *Democracies and Small Wars*; available from http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Democracies%20and%20Small%20Wars.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 January 2010, 7.

[3] *Ibid.*, 17.

[4] Kissinger, "The Vietnam Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs* 47 (Jan. 1969), 214 quoted in Cooper, *Democracies and Small Wars*…, 16.

be totally useless."[5] Canada's withdrawal from Afghanistan seems to support Clausewitz's warning. The Canadian public has lost its will to continue combat operations in Afghanistan.

Clausewitz described warfare as policy (politics) by other means[6] and insurgency, or 'people's war', as uniquely political in nature. Canada's ability to conduct operations in Afghanistan was dependant upon recognition of Clausewitz's warning about the lack of balance between people, commander and government. The will of the Canadian people is no longer behind the government and the military in the conduct of the operation.

Clausewitz said, "War is a continuation of political intercourse."[7] To understand the military requirements, one must always remember that war cannot be separated from politics. For that reason, the focus of conventional or counterinsurgency efforts must be understood in political terms.

A brief examination of the three 'actors' Clausewitz described is warranted to assist in understanding the concept more deeply. Clausewitz described the government perspective as the "element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone" and the "business of political aims."[8] In other words, when approaching warfare from the government perspective, a logical explanation is needed

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[5] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War.* ed and trans by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

[6] Clausewitz, *On War*, 605.

[7] *Ibid.*, 87.

[8] *Ibid.*, 89.

that describes why military force is required and must be based on political aims and reason.

The second perspective was actually termed by Clausewitz as "the commander and his army" but this paper will use the modified label of the commander to ensure the reader does not look at this issue through a narrow 'land force centric' lens. Clausewitz described this military point as the use of courage, talent and chance as they relate to "the particular character of the commander and the army."[9] This point of the Clausewitzian trinity relates to the aspect of the interplay of 'courage, talent and chance' and how these factors impact on the other two actors, the government and the people.

The most important actor in the context of this paper is the people. In referring to the public, Clausewitz noted that the "passions that are kindled in war must already be inherent in the people" and that there is an element "of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force"[10] His point here is since war is so costly, the will of the people must be fuelled by more than logical explanations of government objectives. The will of the people must have an element of emotional resolve to continue through trying circumstances. Without this, according to Clausewitz, the people will not support the costs of war. The lack of Canadian public support for continued combat operations in Afghanistan reinforces the Clauswitzian tenet that these three elements need to be maintained in balance for a continued effort.

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[9] *Ibid.*, 89.

[10] *Ibid.*, 89.

Insurgency is more political in nature than military and is sometimes described as violent politics. Clausewitz commented on the nature of 'people's war'. "Any nation that uses it intelligently will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those who distain its use."[11] In his article, "Clausewitz and the Nature of War on Terror," Antulio J. Echevarria II, an extensively published expert on Clausewitz, argues that the current war on terror and the actions of the Islamic extremist adversary is not a move away from Clausewitz but rather a reinforcement of his tenets.[12]

Counterinsurgency operations are counterintuitive to modern conventional forces. Insurgent forces generally will avoid direct conflict with military formations as they are at a distinct disadvantage. Instead, insurgent forces will move amongst the local population, orchestrating ambushes and indirect attacks, such as improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, to inflict casualties on the enemy. These attacks result in casualties that are quite small in number from a tactical point of view but they serve as messages to the local population that the government and the military are unable to protect them and this erodes the support of the local population for their government. More importantly for this paper, these types of attacks and resulting casualties send a clear message to the troop contributing nations: counterinsurgency warfare will not be easy, and it will not be inexpensive.[13]

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[11] *Ibid.*, 479.

[12] Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Clausewitz and the Nature of War on Terror," in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-first Century,* eds. Hew Strachan and Andrea Herberg-Rothe, 196-218 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[13] Gordon Smith, "Canada in Afghanistan: Is It Working?" March 2007; available from http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Canada%20in%20Afghanistan%20Is%20it%20Working.pdf; Internet; accessed 24 February 2010, 21.

Mourning the loss of fallen troops has become a multi-day news story in the Canadian media.[14] The twenty-four hour news channels will normally carry the story on the day the death is announced, the day of the ramp ceremony in Afghanistan, the day the soldier's remains arrive in Canada and sometimes again during the day of the funeral. It is not the position of this paper that this is inappropriate, but simply that the news coverage of a fallen soldier spans days in Canada and this coverage directly relays the message from the insurgency to the Canadian people. The images of flag-draped coffins and sullen soldiers create a very powerful and emotional message.

During the Gulf War in 1991, the US outlawed media coverage of the return of their fallen. Based on Washington's experience in Vietnam, acknowledging wartime casualties was deemed too detrimental to ongoing public support for war. This ban was not lifted until early 2009 by the Obama administration.[15]

The images of the returning fallen soldiers do not only have an effect in Canada but also impacts how the operation in theatre evolves. Early in the conflict in Afghanistan, Canadian operations were to be shaped in accordance with the 'three block war,' where soldiers would be working alongside Afghan leaders to assist in governance and reconstruction.[16] However, as Canadian soldiers began to be killed in increasing numbers by IEDs, and as time in theatre increased, there was a tendency toward increased

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[14] Peter Worthington, "Canuck Casualties Magnified, Mourned," *The Edmonton Sun*, 09 November 2010.

[15] Ann Scott Tyson, "Pentagon to Lift Press Ban on Coffins at Dover," *The Washington Post,* 26 February 2009.

[16] Doctor A. Walter Dorn and Michael Varey, "The Rise and Demise of the "Three Block War"." *Canadian Military Journal,* Vol 10 No. 1, 2009, 39.

force protection.[17] This was not only to protect the soldiers themselves, but also to avoid the impact at home of continued losses that is so toxic to Western publics. Unfortunately, this strategy tends to be counterproductive in theatre as it alienates the military forces from the local population. This in turn leads to less cooperation by the local population against the insurgent. For example, in December, 2009 an IED killed four Canadian soldiers and one journalist. These deaths could have been avoided had the local who observed the device being planted reported it.[18] But why would a villager report insurgent activity putting his family in danger to protect a faceless foreign military that hides behind its armour? When the local population does not assist the counterinsurgency effort of the troops, this leads to less security for the military forces since the insurgent can conduct operations to lay IEDs without being reported. Inevitably, as the IEDs grow to become large enough to defeat the level of armour that has been used, troop casualties continue to occur.

As the Western militaries gain skill and experience in counterinsurgency operations, casualty rates eventually decrease. This was seen in Iraq after General David Petraeus changed US strategy in that operation.[19] This decrease in casualties serves to decrease the negative effect that protracted and bloody operations have on the 'home front.' This cycle was overcome by getting the forces dismounted and integrated into the

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[17] "Canada Sends Tanks to Afghanistan," *The Ottawa Citizen,* 09 September 2006.

[18] Matthew Fisher, "Massive Explosion Killed Canadian Journalist, Four Soldiers in Afghanistan, Military Says: IED 'deliberately' placed in a tunnel dug under road," *Canwest News Service*, 04 January 2010; available at http://news.globaltv.com/world/Massive+explosion+killed+Canadian+journalist+four+soldiers+Afghanistan+military+says/2405242/story.html; Internet; accessed 18 April 2010.

[19] Cooper, *Democracies and Small Wars*…, 36.

local environment. This caused an increase in casualties at first but soon showed a marked decrease in successful attacks due to the assistance of the local population.[20]

Upon taking over as Commander ISAF in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, an American general with a Special Forces background, conducted an initial assessment that was subsequently leaked to the press. It recognized that increased force protection was not a successful way to wage COIN warfare. In McChrystal's words, "ISAF must spend as much time as possible with the people and as little time as possible in armoured vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases."[21] Though it was recognized that this would very likely lead to increased casualties initially, it would be necessary to break the cycle that alienates the people from the coalition.

This change in philosophy sounded a lot more like what was described by Canada's former Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier in 2005 as the three block war.[22] This change that is being implemented currently in Afghanistan is expected to increase the troops' ability to gain valuable tactical information from the local population in their area of operations.

The impact of this support by the local population can ultimately lead to the defeat of the insurgency since the insurgent depends on the ability to live amongst the population to continue his operations. Resolve in Western nations to continue to support the deployment of their troops is expected to be strengthened by success. This is why

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[20] *Ibid*., 36.

[21] General Stanley McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment;* available from http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf; accessed on 14 January 2010, 2-12.

[22] Dorn and Varey, "The Rise and Demise of the "Three Block War"…, 39.

General McChrystal also described change as necessary to protect the public support for the mission domestically for the troop contributing nations of the coalition: "A failure to reverse the momentum of the insurgency will not only preclude success in Afghanistan, it will result in a loss of public and political support outside Afghanistan."[23]

Members of the Taliban in Afghanistan do not expect to 'win' a war of popularity amongst the Afghan people, even in the areas with the strongest tribal affiliations. What the Taliban expect is to outlast the political will of troop contributing nations so they can seize power once the Western forces leave. This is far from a new concept. This is the classic strategy of insurgents that has been used many times quite effectively against the will of Western nations. The Taliban are not the first to attack this exploitable weakness in Western conventional forces.

During the Second World War, the Japanese took control of Indochina. After the war, nominal French control of Indochina was restored but the notion that non-Westerners could defeat the French in that area had been established by the war experience. Between 1946 and 1954, France was involved in a major counterinsurgency operation in Indochina, with a commitment that grew to up to 450,000 troops including Vietnamese allies.[24] The ultimately successful strategy of the insurgents during that time is familiar when compared to the actions of the Taliban in Afghanistan and was summed up by Ho Chi Minh in 1947, "the key to the problem of Indochina is to be found in the domestic situation in France."[25]

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[23] McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment…*, 2-19.

[24] Windrow. *The French Indochina War 1946-1954,* 11 quoted in Eric Ouellet, "Ambushes, IEDs and COIN: The French Experience," *Canadian Army Journal* Vol. 11.1 (Spring 2008), 14.

This concentration on the strategic level of the nations providing counterinsurgency troops was also followed by the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algeria against the French from 1954 to 1962. As concluded by Eric Ouellette, a former Defence Scientist and professor at the Canadian Forces College, the FLN fought their war to win politically and diplomatically from outside Algeria. He also concluded from a study of that conflict that "the political elite can maintain a show of unity for a time, but in the long run, that unity will be seriously eroded."[26]

Currently in Afghanistan, the Taliban use IEDs in a similar strategy against the will of Western nations including Canada.[27] The Manley Report, published in 2007, recognized that one of the objectives of the Taliban was to discourage the populations of the ISAF countries.[28] The actions of the Taliban show that they recognize and are targeting the linkage between the military, the people that military serves, and the influence people have over their governments.

Once the public support is gone for a particular mission, then it is not easily, if ever, regained. James S. Corum in his book *Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency* contends that the strategy to defeat the counterinsurgency in Algeria was developed by the French but that it occurred too late. He additionally shows that the

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[25] Devilliers, *Histoire du Vietnam de 1940 a 1952,* 371 quoted in Ouellet, "Ambushes, IEDs and COIN: The French Experience"…, 14.

[26] Ouellet, "Ambushes, IEDs and COIN: The French Experience"…, 19.

[27] Ouellet, "Ambushes, IEDs and COIN: The French Experience"…, 7.

[28] The Manley Report…, 13.

US experience in Vietnam was actually turning to their favour in theatre but it was much too late because the will of the American people had already been lost.[29]

So if insurgents such as those in Afghanistan seem to be inferior to Western forces in conventional warfare and seem to have an advantage in insurgent operations, then why are Western nations working to defeat the Taliban in this manner? This is an idea that has been debated by some but, in fact, Western nations do not get to choose what type of warfare evolves in a given area. It is worthwhile to explore the differences in conventional and counterinsurgency operations to provide perspective for this paper.

In relative terms, conventional warfare is waged as a series of decisive battles and is over much more quickly than counterinsurgency warfare. Moreover, victory is more easily defined and recognized. Sun-tzu warned of long protracted campaigns: "No country has ever profited from protracted warfare."[30] This line of thinking, along with the Vietnam experience, led the US into a focus on conventional warfare. In accordance with the Powell doctrine, the US concentrated on "an all-or-nothing approach to warfare, with the ideal war being one in which the US wins with overwhelming force, suffers few casualties, and leaves immediately."[31]

However, the Powell Doctrine, or the exclusive use of conventional power followed by an immediate redeployment out of the area, fails "to translate combat success

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[29] James S. Corum, *Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency* (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2008) 265.

[30] Sun-tzu. *The Art of War.* Edited and translated by Ralph D. Sawyer with the collaboration of Mei-chun Lee Sawyer (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc, 1994) 173.

[31] Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power,* (New York: Basic Books, 2002) 216 as quoted in Barry Cooper, *Democracies and Small Wars*; available from http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Democracies%20and%20Small%20Wars.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 January 2010, 47.

into strategic and political outcomes desired by winners of battles."[32] In the Gulf War of 1991, the US and coalition forces did achieve an undeniable victory by conventional means and by contemporary understanding of what winning was. But did that war achieve the desired effect strategically and politically? The answer lies in the fact that the US felt the need to return more than a decade later to finally remove Saddam Hussein from power. The use of the Powell doctrine in Gulf War 1991 fell short of total victory because it failed to achieve the desired political outcome.

As pointed out by Michael Mazarr, a professor at the US National War College, conventional warfare is still the basis of Western power and all other considerations must be secondary to "deterring and responding to major conventional aggression."[33] The ability to conduct successful conventional warfare is a significant advantage that cannot be relinquished. But relying on this conventional capability alone does not go far enough now that the Cold War is over.

During the Cold War, when the point was to avoid war by showing the capability to wage it, then strong conventional capability served the interests of the nations involved. Throughout the decade that followed the end of the Cold War, Western militaries continued to build their conventional capabilities to fight an enemy that would be similar to the old Soviet Union. Counterinsurgency was discounted as a 'lesser' type of combat skill and not the true purpose of modern combat forces. In fact, the ignorance of the lessons from Vietnam was so deliberate that the US Army destroyed all the

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[32] Cooper, *Democracies and Small Wars*…, 47.

[33] Michael J. Mazarr, "The Folly of 'Asymmetric Warfare'," *The Washington Quarterly* 31:3 (2008), 41 quoted in Cooper, *Democracies and Small Wars*…, 41.

material on counterinsurgency housed at the JFK Special Warfare Centre following the Vietnam War.[34] This led to little or no concentration on counterinsurgency operations and an almost total focus on preparing for conventional warfare leading up to 2001.

After the attacks of 9/11, Western forces continued to dominate in conventional warfare but were wholly unprepared for counterinsurgency operations. If modern forces continue to concentrate on conventional warfare exclusively, then operations to achieve political outcomes after the enemy has been conventionally defeated will continue to expose significant points of weakness that can be exploited by insurgent actions. General McCrystal's assessment of the slow progress in Afghanistan concluded that "our conventional warfare culture is part of the problem."[35]

The Western nations have national interests in countries that are not economic equals. 9/11 sent the message to the West that the wealthy nations cannot assume to be safe from the less powerful. They cannot afford to be incapable of exercising their power in any region when necessary, even in the developing world or in failed or failing states. Therefore, conflict will continue to involve a lopsided fight and ultimately lead to the enemy reverting to insurgent tactics as the Taliban has in Afghanistan.[36]

Since government interests of Western powers can not ignore the possibility of warfare in failed and failing states, counterinsurgency must be taken seriously.

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[34] Frank G Hoffman, *An Agenda for Research on Terrorism and LIC in the 1990's,* RAND Paper No. P7751 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1991): 2, quoted in Barry Cooper, *Democracies and Small Wars*…, 20.

[35] McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment*…, 1-3.

[36] Carl Forsberg, *Afghanistan Report 3 The Taliban's Campaign for Kandahar;* available from http://www.understandingwar.org/files/The_Talibans_Campaign_For_Kandahar.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 January 2010, 27.

Clausewitz warned that "the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."[37] As the situation changes, it becomes critical to have the flexibility to adjust from conventional to counterinsurgency operations. As pointed out by Sun-tzu, "one who is able to change and transform in accord with the enemy and wrest victory is tamed spiritual."[38]

Counterinsurgency operations generally will take more time than conventional battles and will undoubtedly cost lives. Therefore, having an ability to succeed in counterinsurgency operations involves not only changes to military doctrine but also preparation and education of the populations of troop contributing nations. As pointed out by Eric Oullette in "Ambushes, IEDs and COIN: The French Experience," if Western nations are to remain powerful, they must "strengthen [their] national staying power."[39] This staying power is attacked by the insurgent in the information domain and Western nations must become more sophisticated in countering these attacks by employing Information Operations (IO) at home to ensure the insurgent message does not stand unanswered.

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[37] Clausewitz, *On War*..., 88.

[38] Sun-tzu, *The Art of War*...,193.

[39] Ouellet, "Ambushes, IEDs and COIN: The French Experience"…, 22.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

According to Canadian Forces doctrine, IO are defined as "actions taken in support of national objectives that influence an adversary's decision makers by affecting other's information and /or information systems while exploiting and protecting one's own information and /or information systems and those of our friends and allies."[40] The 'use of information to influence' is part of the answer to the problem of creating and maintaining a counterinsurgency capability.

IO are broken down into two categories, defensive and offensive. As well, *Canadian Forces Operations* defines eight IO enablers. Included in these are deception, psychological operations and public affairs. These three need to be differentiated to avoid confusion. Deception is defined as "those measures designed to mislead the adversary decision-maker by manipulation, distortion or falsification of information to induce a reaction prejudicial to the adversary's interests." Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) are "planned activities designed to influence attitudes and behaviours, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives." Public Affairs is "a distinctive function within DND/CF that helps establish and maintain mutual lines of communications, understanding, acceptance and co-operation between an organization and its audiences."[41] In any discussion relating IO to information on the home front, it must be stressed that information released to the Canadian public must never be

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[40] Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 *Canadian Forces Operatons* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2004) 22-1.

[41] *Ibid.*, 22-3.

knowingly false and that is why a differentiation between deception and PSYOPS is critical. When using the term PSYOPS, it can sometimes be assumed by the uninformed layperson that this is a spreading of lies and propaganda to fool the audience into thinking a certain way. That is actually deception, not PSYOPS. Additionally, the difference between PSYOPS and Public Affairs, doctrinally, is that Public Affairs releases information "through uncontrolled media sources while PSYOPS uses controlled sources for information distribution."[42] This definition contributes to the confusion about Public Affairs and PSYOPS because the aspect of influencing public opinion is not as deliberately stated as it should be. Public Affairs professionals normally bristle at the thought of practicing PSYOPS but beyond the scary nature of the label, it is a fact that public affairs and PSYOPS both *influence* by the release and distribution of information. As stated by Robert David Steele in *Information Operations: Putting the 'I' back in DIME*, while speaking about modern IO, "It is about education, not manipulation."[43]

Canadian Forces doctrine does not specifically call for information to be released to the public in order to reinforce support for any given campaign, though information is certainly released in order to inform the public of the Canadian Forces as an institution. With the increasing involvement in small wars and the likelihood of continued engagement in COIN operations, it is necessary to fill this doctrinal gap to help the public understand the nature of the conflict. The Manley Report identified the need for the

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[42] *Ibid.,* 22-3.

[43] Robert David Steele, "Information Operations: Putting the "I" Back Into DIME," available from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB642.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 January 2010, 3.

government to rebalance "the Government's communications with Canadians…providing more information and analysis."[44]

In that report, evidence of real progress in Afghanistan is noted. For example, though Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, the Afghan economy is growing by 10 percent per year, school enrolment has tripled, and child mortality rates are improving.[45] In relation to the effort to maintain public support for Canadian participation in operations in Afghanistan, The Manley Report recognized the need for "sustained resolve" in Afghanistan.[46]

The focus of efforts in theatre to use influence operations varies depending on what command level is observed. At the tactical level, OPERATION ARCHER and ORION in Afghanistan both correctly identified the centre of gravity to be the public opinion in the region of Kandahar.[47] This is appropriate as the focus of the tactical level must be the area in which they operate. This also shows that the Tactical commander understood the political nature of counterinsurgency operations. This is not the level to focus on the will of the people of the troop contributing nations, though information products can be gleaned at the tactical level for the national effort at home. In this regard, they did try to establish messages through the public affairs chain that took Canadian opinion into account.[48]

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[44] The Manley Report…, 36.

[45] *Ibid.*, 7.

[46] *Ibid.*, 8.

[47] Major William H. Fletcher, "Counter-Insurgency Information Operations: A Study of Canadian Influence During Operation ARCHER Rotation 1" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course Paper, 2008), 46.

At higher levels, political opinion on the home front of troop contributing nations is seen as the centre of gravity. General McChrystal's initial assessment called for enhanced Strategic Communication (StratCom) coordination in order to support SACEUR's "strategic center of gravity…the maintenance of Alliance cohesion."[49] McChrystal's initial assessment document called for ISAF to "develop effective assessment architectures, in concert with civilian partners and home nations, to measure the effects of strategy, assess progress toward key objectives, and make necessary adjustments."[50] This direction contains two aspects that should not go unnoticed. The first is that these measurement criteria are not solely military ones, and they should be developed with the civilian partners. This concept relates to the 'whole of government' approach in Afghanistan which will be discussed later in this paper. The second is the acknowledgement that a distinction must be made with respect to home nations. The political will and objectives in each nation must be recognized to have their own nuances and can not be treated as a homogenous continuum across all the nations contributing to the NATO effort. This point will also be discussed later in this paper when the role of national senior military leaders is examined.

IO doctrine and application has developed and been recognized as a means of influencing combatants and more recently populations, both in the theatre of operations and on the home front. One of the main conduits of distribution, and arguably one of the sole methods at home, is the media.

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[48] *Ibid*., 44.

[49] McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment…*, D-2.

[50] *Ibid.*, 2-20.

MEDIA

In Clausewitzian terms, the people and their support for conflict have been shown to be critical to keep in balance with the will of the government and the military. The main method of communication with the people is the media and therefore a look at the media in this context is critical in understanding how the national resolve can be strengthened.

The relationship between the media and the Canadian Forces has improved significantly over the last several years, in particular since the post Somalia timeframe. This section will describe the effect the media can have and will explore the recent Canadian experience.

The Western nations do not have a monopoly on use of the media. In fact, transnational groups such as Al-Qaeda have proven to be increasingly capable in taking their message into the information domain. They currently have more than 4000 websites and the Al-Qaeda production company, As-Sahab, released an increasing number of videos over the last several years: 16 in 2005, 58 in 2006 and more than 90 in 2007.[51] They have used the internet as a medium to spread their message, recruit new followers and spread terror. A prime example of this is the video online that portrayed the beheading of captured American business man Nicholas Berg in 2004.[52]

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[51] Philip Seib, "The Al-Qaeda Media Machine," available at http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume6/july_2008/7_08_4_pf.html; Internet; accessed 21 February 2010, 1.

The use of the internet by Al-Qaeda is a key enabler. According to Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad), an Al-Qaeda online magazine, "Orchestrating attacks against Western targets is important, but the main objective remains that of mobilizing public support and gaining grassroots legitimacy among Muslims."[53]

Western governments have not been able to combat these types of information campaigns with a direct message to counter the effects of the Al-Qaeda message. As noted by Seib in The Al-Qaeda Media Machine, "The inadequate responses to Al-Qaeda's media messages heighten the danger. Even a flawed argument has appeal when we allow it to stand in an intellectual vacuum."[54]

Recognizing the effectiveness of the IO campaign being waged by the insurgency, the US expended considerable effort in Iraq to halt media operations by the enemy. As stated by General Patreas, "the war is not only being fought on the ground in Iraq but also in cyberspace." Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda use videos of IED attacks in the information environment to "inflate perceptions of insurgent capabilities."[55]

As members of the Taliban are reported to say, 'they have the watches, we have the time' and they are able to monitor foreign media to get feedback on the effectiveness of their efforts to target the will of the populations of the troop contributing nations.[56] In

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[52] *Ibid.*, 2.

[53] *Ibid.*, 3.

[54] *Ibid.*, 6.

[55] *Ibid.*, 5.

[56] Major William Fletcher, "Counter-Insurgency Information Operations: A Study of Canadian Influence During Operation ARCHER Rotation 1" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff College, 2008) 32.

other words, the Canadian media is being monitored by the enemy to gauge the effectiveness of the IED campaign on Canadian public opinion.

For those who question whether the use of the media is appropriate in IO, it is helpful to refer to an article published by Pierre Pahlavi, an assistant professor at Canadian Forces College. In "The 33-Day War: An Example of Psychological Warfare in the Information Age," he reiterates the sentiments of some French officers when referring to the counter-revolutionary efforts in Algeria, "it is absurd and dangerous not to use the same technologies as the enemy." He concludes that in response to the PSYOPs of the enemy, modern armies must "re-learn to retaliate using psychological action."[57]

The media and public opinion are very closely connected and can influence one another. Cheryl Desroches, in "An Assessment of the Influence of the Media on the Public's Perception," argues that the information overwhelmingly supports the idea that the media influences public perception and public opinion.[58] This public-media relationship seems to be a two way street. A study of media coverage of the Gulf War in 1991 in the US has shown that public opinion also led the media. For example, in reaction to the high public opinion of the military and the wave of patriotism during that time, the media was observed to shy away from reporting anything that would be seen as negative towards the troops.[59]

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[57] Pierre Cyril Pahlavi, "The 33-Day War: An Example of Psychological Warfare in the Information Age." *The Canadian Army Journal,* 10.2 (Summer 2007): 22.

[58] Cheryl DesRoches, "An Assessment of the Influence of the Media on the Public's Perception," in *The Outside Looking In: Media and Defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 155-210, 155.

[59] *Ibid.*, 179.

The Canadian media coverage is not always exclusively Canadian as was proven in a study by T.Y. Ismael, a professor of political science at the University of Calgary and John Measor, a doctoral candidate at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter. They found in their research that the Canadian media failed to assess the crisis of 9/11 on their own. "The US led and the Canadian media followed," according to their 2003 study.[60]

Traditionally, the relationship between militaries and the media has not been without difficulties. The military and the media are two different types of people/cultures[61] and this has sometimes led to friction between the two. For example, Commanders want complete control in the battle space, the media want unfettered access.[62]

The media and the military have another distinct difference in the fact that the military serves the people by being subordinate to the elected government. In contrast, one of the defining attributes of the media is that they are not subordinate to any other institution and 'freedom of the press' must never be challenged.

There are some who argue that the press is actually owned by a very few of the elite in society and that this causes the media to be influenced by the elite.[63] Nonetheless,

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[60] *Ibid.*, 162.

[61] Lieutenant Colonel Margaret H. Belknap, "The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?" (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2001) 12.

[62] *Ibid.*, 2.

[63] DesRoches, "An Assessment of the Influence of the Media on the Public's Perception"…, 160.

the media are in the key position to alter the reality to correlate with the "attitudes of those who control the political and economic levers of the country."[64]

The problem of providing information without endangering operational security has long supported the argument for keeping the media away from military operations. Recently, however, the media have come to understand the need for operational security and are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their understanding of operations at the tactical level likely due to the embedding practice. This increased understanding in the media of the complexities of a contemporary war zone has been nurtured through the frequency of operations since the fall of the Berlin wall and also due to the practises of inclusion of the media up to integration of the media into combat units. Once this understanding exists, the self regulating media has a way of its own of dealing with those that cross specific lines. Major-General (Retired) Lew MacKenzie tells of a certain member of the media being run of the war zone by other members due to his indiscretion.[65]

Regardless of the many differences between the cultures of the media and military, the relationship has improved quickly as the media and military have learned more about working together. As Lieutenant Colonel Margaret Belknap stated in her paper entitled "The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?": "Most military commanders would have to agree that the media coverage of Desert Shield/Desert Storm was balanced and generally favourable where cooperation, patience and tolerance were

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[64] *Ibid.*, 170.

[65] Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis W. MacKenzie, "The Media as a Tool of the Military Commander," in *The Outside Looking In: Media and defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 229-240, 236.

evident."[66] The military has learned that working with the media is the best solution and the key for the operational commander is to inform fully without endangering the mission.[67]

In his research for an occasional paper commissioned by the Center for War, Peace and the News Media, Robert Hackett studied the media's impact on the nation preparing for war. In respect to the importance of the media he states, "Their impact on public opinion makes them almost as important in mobilizing a formally democratic society for war as an army and an industrial base."[68] General (Retired) Colin Powell, the Chief of the Joint Staff during the Gulf War in 1991 and subsequently the US Secretary of State during the return to Iraq in 2003, agrees: "Once you've got all the forces moving and everything's being taken care of by the commanders, turn your attention to television because you can win the battle or lose the war if you don't handle the story right."[69]

Post Somalia, the Canadian Forces recognized the need to change their relationship with the media. Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) 2008 were issued in 1998, permitting CF members to speak to the media 'in their lane.' The Canadian journalist, Carol Off, argues that the "current high status of Canadian public opinion regarding the military" is directly related to the new media relations policy.[70] These improved media relations have resulted in good exposure for the CF and

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[66] Belknap, "The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?"…, 9.

[67] *Ibid.*, 13.

[68] Robert A. Hackett, "Engulfed: Peace Protest and America's Press During the Gulf War," an occasional paper for the Center for War, Peace and the News Media, New York University, 1993 in DesRoches, "An Assessment of the Influence of the Media on the Public's Perception"…, 168.

[69] Belknap, "The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?"…, 12.

have boosted the public opinion of the military a great deal. Junior soldiers, when commenting to the media, can be "the best advertisement for our profession and the country" as Major-General MacKenzie has observed.[71]

Canadian media attention becomes fixed on the mission in Afghanistan during times when Canadian soldiers are killed. This is one unfortunate opportunity, however, to get the message of the mission out to the Canadian public. After the death of Sergeant Faught in January 2010, Major-General (Retired) Lew McKenzie was interviewed on CTV and delivered some good information that helped inform the people about the IED battle and the fact that about 80 percent of IEDs in Kandahar were being reported and/or discovered compared to a few percent about three years earlier.[72]

However, this method of reporting on progress is poor for two reasons. The first reason is that the emotional component of the message, the death of the Canadian soldier, works against the message of the government to continue the mission. The second reason is that the message is a reaction to the events caused by the enemy rather than a proactive delivery of the information. It is well understood by those in the communications field that it is important to be the first with your information. This is a concept that is similar to the concept in warfare that initiative is important. A tactical directive was issued to all troops on 01 July 2009 that amongst other things, calls for ISAF to deal with issues in

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[70] Carol Off, "Winning the Public Trust," in *The Outside Looking In: Media and defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 91-106, 93.

[71] MacKenzie, "The Media as a Tool of the Military Commander"…, 237.

[72] Video on CTV at http://ottawa.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20100116/afghan_soldier_100116/20100116/?hub=OttawaHome.

theatre, including negative ones such as civilian casualties by being "first with the known truth."[73] This policy is in line with the idea that it is very important to get your message out first, and have the Taliban IO effort in reaction mode. The tactical directive notes, "it is far more effective to release a factual statement with the known details early, and then a follow-on statement with additional clarification at a later stage."[74]

The media can be a strategic enabler to communicate the objective and end state to a global audience, to execute effective PSYOPS, to play a major role in deception of the enemy and to supplement intelligence collection efforts.[75] Media can help in the show of force. Truthful showcasing of the power can lead to enemy decision to back down.

Reporters who are embedded at the tactical level have the ability to report the 'on the scene' type of information but they do not have ready access to the operational level perspective, that is the context of those operations as they relate to national strategy.

Some account for current Public Affairs policies as morale building for CF members and their families and this is true. Stories about the war from the soldiers' perspective such as *Fifteen Days* by Christie Blatchford are helpful to assist in the Canadian support for the troops but support for the troops has not helped Canadian support for the mission.

The ability of the Canadian Forces to work with the media has gained significant ground since 1998. On operations abroad, the inclusion of the media has grown and the embedding program in Afghanistan illustrates the new relationship.

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[73] McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment*..., E-3.

[74] *Ibid.*, E-3.

[75] Belknap, "The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?"…, 15.

In December 2009, four Canadian soldiers were killed in operations in Afghanistan and in that same blast, Michelle Lang, a journalist from the Calgary Herald was also killed. She had been travelling with the soldiers in order to be able to tell the story of the Canadian military efforts in the region. During this tragic time, the close working relationship between the military and the media was demonstrated by the reaction of the Canadian Forces to her loss. Major-General MacKenzie had all along described the media as part of friendly forces[76] and this was evident in the case of Michelle Lang. She was the first civilian in Canadian military history to receive "the same repatriation honours as a soldier who died in the line of duty."[77]

In summary, this section has shown that the media is an important element in communication with the people. The Canadian Forces has developed an improved relationship with the media since the post-Somalia timeframe and this is a relationship that will continue to be important in the future. But use of the media solely in reaction to the enemy's actions is not sufficient. As Canada embarks on inevitable international operations, some of which will include dangerous missions, the military-media relationship will prove to be a fundamental element to the preservation of the will of the people to support the deployment decisions of Government.

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[76] Mackenzie "The media as a Tool of the Military Commander"…, 405.

[77] "Funeral Details Announced for Slain Reporter," *CBC News,* 7 January 2010.

GOVERNMENT

The role of government in war must never be overlooked. Clausewitz commented on this fact as follows: "(W)ar cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense."[78]

This section on Government will show that the Government has a significant role to play in protecting the will of the public to continue long campaigns such as the one in Afghanistan. This role is essentially to articulate policy based on the grand strategy of the nation and make the argument that the resulting government policy shows the involvement in the conflict is in the best interests of the nation. Canada has made significant advances in laying out its objectives in Afghanistan but has done so very late in the operation.

The role of the government in democracy is critical to the ability of the nation to embark on dangerous operations. As stated by Corum, "The national leader of a democracy has to craft a strategy that will be supported by a majority of the peoples' representatives, or he will fail" [79]

Dean Acheson, former US Secretary of State, was quoted as saying that 80 percent of the job of foreign policy was "management of your domestic ability to have a policy."[80] This is true in a state generally, and it is certainly true in the case of Canada.

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[78] Clausewitz, *On War*…, 605.

[79] Corum, *Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency*…, 264.

Canada spans four time zones and has many unique regions. This fact ensures that Canada has many 'cleavages' in the political landscape of the nations. In political science terms, a cleavage is a "deep, persistent division in society that has significant implications for the political system."[81] According to *Canadian Politics: Critical Issues,* the main Canadian cleavages include geographic regions, ethno-cultural and linguistic groups, and socioeconomic classes. Most importantly, however, is that the nature of the birth of Canada involves the colonies of two former great powers, England and France. Resultant echoes have continued to survive in the Canadian experiment in what some refer to as the 'two solitudes.' When forming policy, the Canadian government must always consider the impact that policy will have on each of these communities.

The notion put forth in 1937 by Escott Reid of the Department of External Affairs addressed the idea of the importance of the support of Canada's many unique regions and groups. In indentifying seven principles guiding the foreign policy of Mackenzie King, he said "the (first) guiding principle in the formulation of Canada's foreign policy should be the maintenance of the *unity* of Canada"[82] and that no policy decision should be made on controversial issues unless there is a substantial majority in "each important section of Canada. Otherwise…the continued existence of the dominion of Canada may be gravely endangered."[83]

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[80] Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, "Grand Strategy for a Divided America," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 82.

[81] Rand Dyck, *Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches* (Toronto: Thompson Nelson, 2008), 9.

[82] Stéphane Roussel, "About Solitude, Divorce, and Neglect: The Linguistic Division in the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy," in *Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective,* ed, Lana Wylie and J. Marshall Beier, 155-174 (London: Oxford University Press, 2009), 163.

[83] *Ibid.*, 163.

As Louis St Laurent recognized in his 1947 address, "We in Canada, of English and French origin, have embarked on the joint task of building a nation. One aspect of our common enterprise is our external relations."[84] It is under this inward looking philosophy that he went on to describe his first general principle in the formulation of policy to be that "our external policies shall not destroy our unity."[85]

The fact that *unity* was related to foreign policy since Canada was created is well summarized by Stéphane Roussel in *About Solitude, Divorce, and Neglect*. He argues that the first divisions were notable in the debates about Canada's contribution to the South African War and the creation of the Canadian Navy in 1910 but that "the real crisis took place in 1917-18, when conscription measures ignited a major clash between French Canadians and Ottawa's political class."[86]

A similar type of reaction was feared by some during the first deployment of the 22ieme Regiment to Kandahar in 2007.[87] These worries actually did not materialize[88] into anything significant though support for the war does not enjoy the same support in Quebec as it does in the rest of Canada. In fact polls taken by The Strategic Council, amongst others, will usually differentiate the support in Quebec relative to the rest of Canada because this rift is well understood.[89]

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[84] Louis D St Laurent, *The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs*, Duncan & John Gray Memorial Lecture, (Toronto ON: University of Toronto Press, 1947), 15.

[85] *Ibid.*, 19.

[86] Stéphane Roussel, *About Solitude, Divorce, and Neglect*…, 162.

[87] Bruce Campion-Smith, "Now It's the Van Doos' Turn to Carry the Load," *The Star,* 12 May 2007.

[88] "Support for the Afghan war Effort Stable, Poll Reveals." *The Ottawa Citizen,* 24 August 2007.

The decision to use military forces to conduct operations begins theoretically at the grand strategy level. This grand strategy is developed at the highest political levels and it is the genesis of foreign and defence policy. For example, in the case of Canada, our defence involves close ties with the United States and the belief that our southerly neighbours would ultimately ensure our security. As described by Robert Sutherland, a government analyst, in his paper entitled *Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation,* Canada's foreign policy could be formed based on several "invariants." Included in these invariants was that the geography of Canada causes the United States to be "bound to defend Canada"[90]. Another related invariant is that the economy has "forged an even more powerful bond."[91] Sutherland states that these two facts make the United States and Canada a "single target system."[92] Due to these factors, the grand strategy for Canada includes that our security is linked to the United States. In 2005, Canada's *International Policy Statement* (*IPS)* clearly recognized that "Canada's security has become more closely linked than ever to that of its southern neighbour-and vice versa."[93]

National level strategy, or grand strategy, in Canada is not well communicated and in fact it is even debated whether a country the size of Canada has a workable grand

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[89] "A Report to The Globe and Mail and CTV: Trusted Canadian Institutions, Afghanistan, and Foreign Ownership," available at http://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls/2007-05-18%20GMCTV%20May%2014-17.pdf ; Internet. Accessed 12 April 2010, 5.

[90] R.J Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation", *International Journal,* vol 17, no. 3 (Summer 1962): 202.

[91] *Ibid.,* 204.

[92] *Ibid.,* 204.

[93] Department of National Defence, "Canada's International Policy Statement," http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/newsite/Canada_Defence_2005.htm; Internet; accessed 23 November 2009, 21.

strategy or if that is solely the business of superpowers such as the United Kingdom in the 18th century or the United States, Russia or China today.[94]

As described by the Honourable David Pratt in a lecture regarding grand strategy in Canada, "for a state's grand strategy to be successful, it must enjoy a high level of acceptance by political leaders of all persuasions and indeed the general public. It must have a clear conception of that state's interests and values and must convey a unity of purpose that includes both clarity and predictability."[95]

Canada's deployment of forces on the war on terror was a government decision and even to those who may argue it was to secure good favour with the US, the decision was based on the strategic interests of Canada. In line with the idea that Canada's security is related to the US, it was important from a grand strategy level for a response to the attacks of 9/11. Other strategic interests of Canada include a strong commitment to alliances such as the UN and NATO[96] and the deployment to Afghanistan aligns with these as well.

In order to establish who in Government is responsible for the deployment of Canadian Forces on international operations, it is useful to briefly review the role of government. There has been some debate whether a vote in the House of Commons was

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[94] The Honorable David Pratt, "The 2007 Ross Ellis Memorial Lectures in Military and Strategic Studies: Is There a Grand Strategy in Canadian Foreign Policy?" available from http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Is%20There%20a%20Grand%20Strategy%20in%20Canadian%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf; accessed on 11 March 2010, 4.

[95] Pratt, "The 2007 Ross Ellis Memorial Lectures in Military and Strategic Studies: Is There a Grand Strategy in Canadian Foreign Policy?"…, 10.

[96] Department of National Defence, "Canada's International Policy Statement"…, 25.

necessary prior to the commitment of troops to the war in Afghanistan. This debate, and the implications of the Government's decision, warrants some examination.

As pointed out by Philippe Lagasse, in "Accountability for National Defence: Ministerial Responsibility, Military Command and Parliamentary Oversight," in Canada, "matters of war and peace and decisions related to the disposition of armed forces are executive prerogatives of the Crown."[97] It is not legally required for the House of Commons to be consulted. One argument to continue this approach holds that if the House of Commons is held generally responsible, then the accountability of the Minister would be diluted and therefore overall accountability weakened. Another view, however, is that the deployment of troops should only come after a vote in the House of Commons and in the opinion of Preston Manning, for example, this should be a free vote.[98]

In the past, including when Canada went to war against Germany in 1939, the Prime Minister has as times chosen to consult Parliament with a non-binding vote prior to exercising the Crown prerogative to declare war. This is not necessary in law and has not always been followed, such as the case with Louis St Laurent before committing Canadian troops to the war in Korea.[99] In the case of going into small, complex conflicts, such as the war in Afghanistan, it is likely that a vote in the House prior to Government commitment to the war could serve to decrease the amount of criticism from the opposition while the troops are deployed.

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[97] Philippe Lagasse, "Accountability for National Defence: Ministerial Responsibility, Military Command and Parliamentary Oversight," *IRPP Study,* No.4, March 2010, 6.

[98] *Ibid.*, 13.

[99] *Ibid.*, 14.

As pointed out by Lagasse, in addition to the weakened accountability problem, if the House of Commons vote was to ignore Canadian treaty obligations, such as article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, or if the House voted to withdraw troops earlier than indicated to our allies, then Canada's international reputation would be severely damaged.[100] In deciding to send troops to Afghanistan in 2002, the Canadian Government did not elect to consult Parliament with a non-binding vote.

This effort in Afghanistan was designed to be a 'whole of government' approach, recognizing the importance of reconstruction and the '3 D' approach of diplomacy, development and defence. Although all these things were not out of sync with the general understanding of the public of what they would like the military to do, it was not completely clear to Canadians *why* their military personnel were in the region in the first place. Unfortunately, as stated by Sharon Hobson of *Jane's Defence Weekly*, "The Government failed in its duty to explain the "why"- the rationale behind the commitment."[101] This point was subsequently driven home in the Manley Report.

The Manley Report states that "While public support for the Canadian troops is strong, Canadians have been uncertain about Canada's evolving mission in Afghanistan. To put things bluntly, Governments from the start of Canada's Afghan involvement have failed to communicate with Canadians with balance and candour about the reasons for Canadian involvement, or about the risks, difficulties and expected results of that involvement."[102]

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[100] *Ibid.*, 17.

[101] Sharon Hobson, "The Information Gap: Why the Canadian Public Doesn't Know More About its Military," available from http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Information%20Gap.pdf; Internet, accessed 15 January 2010, 3.

In their recommendation for continued Canadian military presence in Afghanistan, the Manley Report made some specific comments on what the panel perceived as necessary. In order to move forward with sufficient support from Canadians, the Report acknowledged the requirement to inform the public of the national objectives. "The panel believes that this information deficit needs to be redressed immediately in a comprehensive and more balanced communication strategy of open and continuous engagement with Canadians."[103]

The blame for the lack of information was not something that could be pinned on any specific party as the Liberals and Conservatives had each been in power during the early years of the war. As pointed out by The Honourable David Pratt, "there has been a general failure to communicate Canada's strategic objectives in Afghanistan. And regrettably I think the responsibility for that is shared by both the Liberal and Conservative governments."[104]

In order to address the 'continuing engagement with Canadians' requirement, The Manley Report called for departmental coordination at the strategic (Ottawa) level; led by the Prime Minister with a supporting cabinet committee and staffed by a single full time task force.[105] Departmental coordination is a reoccurring theme in the allied nations since the attacks of 9/11. This has proven to be an exercise that is not trivial and has been accomplished in varying degrees of success. Hoffman argues that a comprehensive

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[102] The Manley Report…, 20.

[103] *Ibid.*, 20.

[104] Pratt, "The 2007 Ross Ellis Memorial Lectures in Military and Strategic Studies: Is There a Grand Strategy in Canadian Foreign Policy?"…, 37.

[105] The Manley Report…, 28.

global effort against terrorism "would embrace several elements: including a clear strategy, a defined structure for implementing it, and a vision for inter-government agency cooperation and a unified effort to guide it."[106]

This coordination amongst multiple government departments and agencies has been necessary in Canada along a few different lines. For example, this type of coordination amongst various intelligence communities was established with the stand up of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) as a result of the increased intelligence demands of the post 9/11 era.[107] Also, in response to the new security concerns several governmental agencies were integrated under one minister in the formation of Public Safety Canada in 2003. The agencies under Public Safety Canada include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, the Canadian Border Services Agency and Correctional Services Canada with the intention of "better integration among federal organizations dealing with national security, emergency management, law enforcement, corrections, crime prevention and borders."[108] These changes were in direct response to the changes in the security environment post 9/11. Though the requirement of some of these governmental changes was identified early after 9/11, the changes relating to public support for dangerous international military action were not as obvious. However, by 2007, when the panel for

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[106] Bruce Hoffman, "Combatting Al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat." Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities on February 16, 2006, as quoted in Lt Col Scott J. Erickson, "COIN goes "GLOCAL": Traditional COIN with a Global Persepective: Does the Current US Strategy Reflect COIN Theory, Doctrine and Principles?" available at http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=1275&CISOBOX=1&REC=19; Internet; accessed 22 January 2010, 46.

[107] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005) 68.

the Manley Report was formed, the need for public support as an enabler to dangerous international operations was recognized.

Another recommendation of the Manley Report was the tracking and assessing of progress in Kandahar. "Only by measuring the practical effects of policy, and understanding changing realities on the ground, can current and future Canadian commitments be productively deliberated or decided."[109]

The Report acknowledged the 'whole of government' nature of the Canadian commitment in Afghanistan and their recommendations with regard to better informing Canadians was not constrained to the military portion. "This new Canadian policy approach should include a rebalancing of the Government's communications with Canadians about our activities in Afghanistan-providing more information and analysis on the diplomatic and reconstruction-development dimensions. The Government must engage Canadians in a continuous, frank and constructive dialogue about conditions in Afghanistan and the extent to which Canadian objectives are being achieved."[110]

To support their recommendation for continuing the mission, the Manley Report related the mission to the things that Canadians support. "We like to talk about Canada's role in the world. Well, we have a meaningful one in Afghanistan. As our report states, it should not be faint-hearted nor should it be open-ended. Above all, we must not

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[108] The Public Safety website at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/abt/wwa/index-eng.aspx.

[109] The Manley Report…, 36.

[110] *Ibid.*, 36.

abandon it prematurely. Rather, we should use our hard-earned influence to ensure the job gets done and gets done properly."[111]

From the beginning, the Governments' strategic communications should have drawn direct connections from the national grand strategy to the mission in Afghanistan. The strategic communications plan should have been formed with sensitivity to the things that resonate with the public, including their willingness to assist the weak and disadvantaged, their support to the NATO alliance and their belief in the UN and as such the value of a Canadian mission operating under a UN Security Council resolution.

The Honourable David Pratt, a former Liberal Minister of National Defence, agreed with the idea that more public discussion was required for an increased public support of the Canadian effort. "(T)he public debate to this point-especially as it relates to the Afghan mission and its wider strategic implications-has been largely superficial. The entire discussion requires a deeper and more rigorous analysis by all concerned – the Government, the Opposition and the national media - to lay the groundwork for a more informed discussion. One can only hope that a better understanding of threats, interests and values will lead to the establishment of a broader consensus."[112]

In his 2007 Ross Ellis Memorial Lectures, cosponsored by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, David Pratt made the case for the implications of a Canadian withdrawal from Afghanistan. "The current prospect of a unilateral Canadian withdrawal

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[111] *Ibid.*, 5.

[112] Pratt, "The 2007 Ross Ellis Memorial Lectures in Military and Strategic Studies: Is There a Grand Strategy in Canadian Foreign Policy?"…, 37.

from Afghanistan, however, would seriously undermine the unity of purpose Canada has displayed in the past and would do serious damage to the Canada-NATO relationship which, as we have seen in the past, has been the cornerstone of Canadian grand strategy since World War II."[113] This assessment draws direct lines between the Canadian mission in Afghanistan and the grand strategy of the nation.

In response to the advice in the Manley report, the Committee on Afghanistan has been publishing reports on the progress in Afghanistan. On March 17, 2010, the Government of Canada tabled in Parliament the Seventh of these quarterly reports, covering the period ending December 31, 2009. They are reporting the measured the progress in the region with good connection to policy objectives. The reports are the start of what is required. This type of information, produced by the government and tabled in Parliament, provides the information that was so lacking in the earlier days prior to the Manley Report. Sometimes, the reports can show that progress has not been as strong as desired, but even in this case, members of the public are better informed and can make up their own minds as to whether the mission should continue.

The quarterly report contains benchmarks and measurements of success that can be used to gauge progress. This type of measurement is helpful in a situation where the withdrawal of troops will depend on certain conditions rather than a timeline. Without this type of measurement, and its connection to the Canadian goals, a discussion or debate about withdrawal conditions is difficult for policy makers, never mind the general public.

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[113] *Ibid*..., 38.

The Canadian withdrawal is currently still planned for the 2011 period, approximately when the current term of the pact on Afghanistan comes to an end. Information alone has not reversed the decline of public opinion in support of the war. This information is not having the emotional effect that would counter the emotion felt for the loss of Canadians in the conflict. A study by Joseph Fletcher, Heather Bastedo and Jennifer Hove of the University of Toronto of Canadian support for the mission has shown that the majority of Canadians accepted the Government's message[114] but that support for the mission did not increase much.

In this particular study, they differentiated between those who felt that the role of the Canadian Forces includes full combat, they called this group the realists, and those who felt that Canadian Forces should be used only as peacekeepers. They show in their study that following the Government's renewed information campaign in early 2007, support for the mission rose amongst both groups. The analysis showed that it was not the difference between those who are realist or peacekeeping oriented but that the level of pride the respondent felt for the role the military was taking in the mission correlated to support for the mission. They concluded that it is the emotional aspect that is important. "The Canadian government began a conversation with the public about Afghanistan but failed to connect on an emotional level. As a consequence they won some minds but too few hearts."[115] The Government has not been able to relay the emotional component of

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[114] Joseph F. Fletcher, Heather Bastedo and Jennifer Hove, "Losing Heart: Declining Support and the Political Marketing of the Afghanistan Mission," *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* 42:4 (December 2009), 911-937, 924 .

[115] *Ibid.*, 931.

the message to the Canadian people and to fill the gap; it should look to the military commander.

THE COMMANDER

Defeating the insurgent is accomplished by winning the hearts and minds of the local population. But winning the hearts and minds of the Canadian public is just as important, and according to Brigadier-General J.H. Vance, Commander of the Canadian Task Force in Afghanistan in 2009, Canadians are not hearing enough about the Canadian successes in the war.[116] This point is repeated in an article in the *Globe and Mail*, "Last Exit from Kandahar," in which a Corporal and Private are quoted. These junior soldiers are commenting on some positive stories of progress in Kandahar and that they do not feel that these stories are told to the broader Canadian public. "I think what they're missing is the progress, however slow and painful," says Cpl Steve Suke, 26. Pte Kyler Wilson, 22, shakes his head: "They just see the dead soldiers coming back."[117]

According to Sharon Hobson, "If the *military* wants Canadians to understand the broader outlines of what it is doing, *it* must be prepared to describe its activities and explain how that will accomplish the objectives. [emphasis added]"[118] As the previous

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[116] Ian Elliot, "Mission Will Be Accomplished," *The Whig-Standard,* 29 January 2010.

[117] Josh. Wingrove, "Last Exit From Kandahar," *The Globe and Mail*, 06 March 2010, 8.

[118] Hobson, "The Information Gap: Why the Canadian Public Doesn't Know More About its Military"…, 15.

section showed, the Government body, whether it is at the Prime Ministerial or Ministerial level, must articulate the nation's objectives for a given campaign. At the other end of the spectrum, news of operations at the soldier or tactical level has been effective at communicating the efforts of the troops. What is missing is the connection of those efforts, and the high prices that have been paid, to the national objectives. That is, the tactical level is reported and the strategic level objectives are published, but the connection of strategic objectives to tactical actions is missing.

It is left then to the Operational Commander to describe the tactical objectives and how they relate to the strategic objectives of the Government. This division of labour in the information domain follows the same line as any other component of military operations. This way, the Commander has the ability to explain the context of operations without deviating from the stated government policy. This need for context has been described as "an overriding concern for most observers."[119]

This is easier said than done, especially in the Canadian context. With some notable exceptions, the Canadian senior military leadership has been generally reluctant to say anything that may be seen as political in nature. According to a paper written by Philippe Lagasse and Joel Sokolsky, from the time Trudeau was Prime Minister, until the time Paul Martin came to power, the civil-military system in Canada was influenced, *inter alia*, by the perception that Canada's security was not significantly threatened. In this environment, the Government chose to maintain significant civilian oversight.[120]

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[119] *Ibid.*, 17.

[120] Philippe Lagasse and Joel Sokolsky, "A Larger "Footprint" in Ottawa: General Hillier and Canada's Shifting Civil-Military Relationship, 2005-2008," *Canadian Foreign Policy* Vol 15. No 2, 2009, 18.

That oversight was achieved in various ways. The amalgamation of the National Defence and Canadian Forces Headquarters in Ottawa ensured that the senior levels of the government department and the senior levels of the Canadian Forces are working as part of the same organization. Additionally, the creation of a Deputy Minister position that would intervene between the Minister and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) also weakened the military influence. The establishment of Assistant Deputy Ministers who control key aspects of the management of the department, including most notably major capital programs, contributed to this weakening of the influence of the CDS.[121]

There are some, such as Douglas Bland, a former officer in the CF who is now a professor at Queens, who suggest that decisions made at the senior levels in National Defence Headquarters have blurred the line between military leadership and civilian management.[122] The integration served to make that communication link between the military and the government, through the civilian Department of National Defence, but it did so internal to the department, which has the danger of cutting the public out of the relationship. In other words, the public was not privy to the military's position but rather to the position of the Department. A follow-on effect of this was that there was a line established that prevented the views of the senior military officers from entering the public domain for fear of an appearance of disloyalty. This tendency of Canadian generals to remain publically silent in an effort to ensure the line is not crossed is a phenomenon discussed by David Bercuson as the senior leaderships' "lack of

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[121] *Ibid.*, *18.*

[122] David Rudd, "From the Middle Looking Out: Reflections of a Think-tank Commander," in *The Outside Looking In: Media and defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005),54-66, 57.

sophistication in dealing with the civil authority."[123] It has also been described as the Canadian general's failure to "lead publically."[124] Major General Lew MacKenzie agrees and believes that the structure of the organization, not the people, caused the "politicization of the senior leadership."[125]

At times, there has been a lack of sophistication on the part of the political leaders as well. The practice of being able to count on a politicized general corps has sometimes led to expectations that are unrealistic, if not unethical. A specific example of this is recounted by Scott Taylor in his article in Colonel Bernd Horn's book, *The Outside Looking In: Media and Defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership.* In February 1999, Prime Minister Chrétien was highly criticized for staying in Whistler on a skiing holiday when most world leaders were attending the state funeral of the King Hussein of Jordan. The Prime Minister's Office claimed that the reason was that the Canadian Air Force had failed to make the necessary preparations. According to Taylor, the Air Force had indeed made all the necessary arrangements; nevertheless, the CDS publically accepted the blame on behalf of the Canadian military out of a sense of loyalty to the Prime Minister.[126]

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[123] David J. Bercuson, "Canadian Military Leadership in an Era of Military Transformation," in *The Outside Looking In: Media and Defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 49.

[124] Chris Wattie, "Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership," in *The Outside Looking In: Media and Defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 70.

[125] Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis W. MacKenzie, "A Foot in Both Camps," in *The Outside Looking In: Media and Defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 76-90, 82.

General MacKenzie also recalls being taken to task by a serving Minister of National Defence, (he does not name the individual) because he had made a few statements that could be interpreted as support of government policy of the day. According to MacKenzie, the Minister chastised the General for his comments because he was afraid the General would be quoted and this could be damaging if the Government decided later to 'change its mind'.[127]

These two examples demonstrate the extreme that military subordination to government can take and further underscores the point that senior military in the past has been overly politicized. The expectation from political leaders in these examples was that the senior military officer was an extension of their political team expected to speak or not speak in ways that would favour them politically.

When Paul Martin came to power late in 2003, he and his Defence Minister, Bill Graham, both believed that their defence policy review should be "bold and conducted with a high degree of military input."[128] According to Philippe Lagasse and Joel Sokolsky, Martin wanted to differentiate himself from his predecessor and that a bold policy change could justify a potentially popular boost to the defence budget. Nevertheless, a reason why this was politically possible was because the strategic situation had changed with respect to the defence of Canada. The events of 9/11 had made the security of Canada a more serious concern. This, along with a budget surplus

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[126] Scott Taylor, "Taking the Middle Ground: A Unique Vantage Point." in *The Outside Looking In: Media and defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005),128-141, 138.

[127] Mackenzie "The media as a Tool of the Military Commander"…, 240.

[128] Lagasse and Sokolsky, "A Larger "Footprint" in Ottawa"…, 23.

and an under-resourced military, made a bold new approach to Defence policy an appropriate goal. These conditions, and the inability for the senior bureaucrats of the Department to provide the kinds of advice the Government was looking for, decreased the reasoning behind such a civilian dominated-and CDS muted- Defence Department. The requirement for Canadian military seniors to overcome this 'lack of sophistication in dealing with the civil authority' was made more acute by the changes in the security environment.

In warfare, the requirement and multiplying effect of strong leadership is obvious. In counterinsurgency operations, due to the highly political nature of these types of operations, this leadership requirement extends to the public affairs effort and the populations of the troop contributing nations. With government direction on the national grand strategy, the lanes are established that allow the senior military leaders to provide that strategic communications effort to put the costs of war in context. The military commander has the ability to be the face of the campaign to the people and to describe the operation and how it is important in achieving the government's wishes.

When the Conservatives took power in early 2006, the days of truly effective synergistic communications from the Minister and the CDS waned. The Conservatives, under Stephen Harper, chose to make several changes to the defence policy that Hillier had helped the previous government draft. When this occurred, clashes between Hillier and the Defence Minister, Gordon O'Connor, became public. After Hillier seemed to publically contradict the Minister several times, Harper was left with no choice but to make some changes. He was unable to relieve Hillier because of the CDS's popularity

with Canadians and had to replace O'Connor. Predictably, this event ultimately triggered the quieting of the CDS.[129]

From these events, one can draw a few conclusions. First of all, the active role of the general must never cross that line into policy debate. As stated by Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, the Chief of the Land Staff, "I often get asked…why are you there?...We're there because you sent us…As a soldier, it's not my job to explain why *you* sent *us*...The responsibility for that lies with the political leadership and those who sent us."[130] As Clausewitz wrote, the general must always be subordinate to the government: "Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political."[131]

Secondly, the security conditions that led to General Hiller being allowed to be more vocal publically still exist, regardless of whether he took things too far into the policies of the government. As already discussed, the security situation has changed and the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Afghanistan will do nothing to restore the security dynamics of the Cold war or even the pre 9/11 era. The likelihood of Canadian troops supporting dangerous international operations is high for the foreseeable future.

In their article, "A Larger Footprint in Ottawa: General Hillier and Canada's Shifting Civil-Military Relationship, 2005-2008," Philippe Lagasse and Joel J. Sokolsky

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[129] *Ibid.*, 30.

[130] LGen Leslie, to the Canadian Journalism Foundation conference on "The Media, the Military, and the Pollsters: Who's Got the Story in Afghanistan?", 07 December 2006 as cited in Hobson, "The Information Gap: Why the Canadian Public Doesn't Know More About its Military"…, 5.

[131] Clausewitz, *OnWar*..., 607.

argue that the Conservative quieting of the CDS and the restoration of a strong Deputy Minister post Hillier mark a return to the civil-military conditions that existed prior to Paul Martin's government. Their analysis concentrates almost exclusively on the impact that Hillier had in forming and publicly representing defence policy decisions. In this regard, their assessment that post-Hillier, the CDS position has lost its power to be publically involved in policy is correct. That is, the CDS should no longer be involved in the public debate regarding *if* or *why* troops are required to go into harm's way.

This is not to say that senior military officers should not be offering military advice to the government, but rather that this advice must be kept out of the public realm. As described by Lagasse, "when military leaders contradict or question a minister's preferences in a public forum, they violate a trust."[132] His position on this also should not be misinterpreted to mean that the military seniors should remain publically silent. Lagasse's article goes on to explain a few instances where public statements by senior military officials seemed to contradict the minister. His examples include Vice-Admiral Maddison's testimony regarding the timing of his briefing the Minister on prisoner transfers to American forces. His information contradicted the Minister but did so "on a matter of fact, rather than a matter of policy." Lagasse goes on to say that "these types of disclosures by senior officers are entirely appropriate, necessary for defence accountability and in keeping with the existing scope of answerability to Parliament."[133]

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[132] Lagasse, "Accountability for National Defence: Ministerial Responsibility, Military Command and Parliamentary Oversight"…, 25.

[133] *Ibid.*, 26.

The emergence of the Canadian general out of the silence seen in earlier years is a trend that needs to be steered and matured but not reversed.

When the Government decides to commit troops to dangerous missions in the future, due to the experience with Hillier and Afghanistan, Canadians will expect the CDS to have something public to say about *how* that mission is being executed. Though those future statements must not be insubordinate to government, or as proven by the Hillier experience, too far into the policy debate, the expectations of the CDS by the people of Canada have changed. The moral authority that the public and the Liberal government gave the CDS in his discussion of military issues was significant. In May of 2007, a poll by the Strategic Council showed that the military was the most trusted public institution.[134] Theory regarding marketing, or in military terms, influence operations, speaks extensively of the effect of the words of someone who is an accepted authority in the subject matter.[135] Just as post-Somalia, the CF needed a change in the way they related to the media, in this post-9/11 era, the Canadian senior military leadership needs to become more sophisticated, not silent, in the way they relate to the Government.

When referring to the obligation of the military to inform the media, David Rudd states, ensuring "the timely flow of information is a democratic duty-one that Canada's military leadership owes to those entrusted with the sacred task of public education."[136] By extension, this is a duty owed to the public itself, through the media or otherwise.

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[134] "A Report to The Globe and Mail and CTV: Trusted Canadian Institutions, Afghanistan, and Foreign Ownership," available at http://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls/2007-05-18%20GMCTV%20May%2014-17.pdf ; Internet. Accessed 12 April 2010.

[135] Department of National Defence. DRDC Toronto No. CR 2007-146, *Military Influence Operations: Review of Relevant Scientific Literature* (Toronto: DND Canada, 2007) 16.

Even for military members, it is difficult not to focus on the immediate and proximate events at the tactical level. This lack of operational level context is not uncommon. The same is true of the media, and Sharon Hobson argues that getting the story of the war exclusively from the embedded media exaggerates this.[137] Though embedding has evolved to work quite well, the story as delivered by the embedded journalist, without the operational level input to provide context linked to Canadian Government determined objectives that are aligned to the desires of the public, will continue to fail to fully answer the questions of why and how.

Command at the operational level in Afghanistan is a NATO function. This creates a dilution of the message of the operational commander to the home nations of the troops. Every nation has its own unique challenges and political terrain and the NATO commander will not be able to connect his operational commander's message directly to the national policies of the individual countries. Moving the operational level IO effort into the national structures would not be a unique practice in NATO operations. This is done in operational functions when it makes sense to do so. For example, logistics and supply functions on NATO operations are handled by national structures because the requirements are unique to each participating country. The operational commander's message to home nations must also be specific to individual nations. In the Canadian context, this message could be delivered at the CDS level.

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[136] Rudd, "From the Middle Looking Out: Reflections of a Think-tank Commander," …, 64.

[137] Hobson, "The Information Gap: Why the Canadian Public Doesn't Know More About its Military"…, 19.

Moving the NATO operations IO to national military leaders is not without its limitations. NATO operations are by definition a multi-national effort and each nation has its own unique sensitivities that they do not want revealed by another partner nation inadvertently in its public affairs efforts. Therefore, in NATO operations such as the one in Afghanistan, some information is kept in check for the purposes of partner nations.[138]

When Canadian troops are involved in international operations, even if the Canadian media, government, and military are relatively silent on the objectives that are to be achieved, the Canadian public will see and hear the American explanation in the American media. This can leave the Canadian public with nothing to go on but the US interpretation of the mission and an understandable perception that the Canadian contribution is serving 'American interests.'

Having the Canadian senior military officer be the one to make the connection of policy to actions is critically necessary, not because we are like the Americans, but because we are different from them. Canada's reasons for being involved in a particular operation are different, even if slightly, than the reasons the US have committed troops. Also, the political will of the people and their values are actually quite different in the two countries.[139] The Canadian public deserves the interpretation of our military actions in a Canadian context, rather than having to rely on what they hear the American generals say to their citizens.

The study conducted by Fletcher, Bastedo and Hove pointed out that the emotional connection is important in convincing Canadians to support the government's

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[138] *Ibid.*, 16.

[139] Dyck, *Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches…,* 207.

message. It also, however, showed that pride in the mission was a very important factor whether it was pride from those who supported the combat role or pride in the Canadian accomplishments by the group that largely supported peacekeeping.[140] This emotional connection that the Government message fails to make was made quite effectively by General Hillier earlier in the war.

If the public reaction to General Hillier is any indication, the Canadian people can relate to a straight talking, charismatic general. In 2005 when Hillier was appointed CDS, he began a campaign to tell Canadians about their Canadian Forces and he openly represented his role as CDS to involve being the spokesman for the members of the military.[141] The public reacted favourably to his approach. Though his approach may have been a bit too much for some government officials it boosted support for the Canadian Forces to unprecedented levels. It also initially boosted public support for the more aggressive Kandahar mission.[142]

In his article "War Policy, Public Support and the Media," William M. Darley concluded that "the most important factor in tapping and shaping …public support for a conflict is aggressive, decisive national policy as reflected in bold actions to achieve clear, specific political and military objectives."[143] Additionally, a study of coverage of the Gulf war determined that technology allowed the military to "pre-empt the media in

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[140] Fletcher, Bastedo, Hove, "Losing Heart: Declining Support and the Political Marketing of the Afghanistan Mission"…, 927.

[141] Lagasse and Sokolsky, "A Larger "Footprint" in Ottawa"…, 24.

[142] *Ibid.*, 25.

[143] Darley, William M. "War Policy, Public Support, and the Media." *Parameters US Army War College Quarterly,* Summer 2005, 121-134, 132.

telling the story of the war"[144] using military briefings describing operations and in the use of video from weapons systems. Each of these studies indicates that more information from the theatre of operations can assist in the message to the public.

In recognition of the importance of connecting the home front with the mission in theatre, and the effect that visual products can have on the priority of a given story in the media, General McCrystal directed that visual imagery be made more readily available to support the strategic communications effort: "Every effort must be made to identify, declassify and exploit such material in a timely manner."[145]

A message to the Canadian people contains two parts, the logical/factual component and the emotional component. The ineffectiveness of the first without positive reinforcement with the second has already been established. With the current tendency of the sole emotional message in the news regarding Afghanistan to be the loss of Canadian soldiers, i.e. the Taliban's' message, the factual strategic message of the Government is undermined.

Use of video and visual products showing decisive Canadian operations in Afghanistan, both combat and certainly reconstruction, can lead to an explanation of these operations, and a connection to the overall objectives of the Canadian Government. The senior Canadian military commander, armed with the trust of the people, can explain to Canadians *how* military action is being conducted in support of government policy and the will of the people. In this way, the emotional component of the message can been taken back from the enemy.

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[144] DesRoches, "An Assessment of the Influence of the Media on the Public's Perception"…, 172.

[145] McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment*…, D-6.

One of the best examples of a senior military commander explaining dangerous operations to the public is the media campaign executed by General Norman Schwarzkopf during the 1991 Gulf War.[146] General Schwarzkopf conducted numerous briefings with the media during the course of the build-up and execution of the war. Though there are significant differences between the nature of that conflict and the nature of international operations that involve counterinsurgency, one fact remains. Due to this type of media interaction by a senior military commander, the public of the US and the other troop contributing nations had an operational level context of the military actions taking place in the theatre of operations.

The concept of the senior military officer explaining risky military operations to the public is supported by members of the media. According to Eric Schmitt of the *New York Times*, "In today's military, the combatant commander is expected to play a public relations role, no just fight the good fight. He must project a strong, reassuring presence to a nervous nation…and explain a war's objectives and risks." To address the difference between the 1991 Gulf War and operations today, he stated, "If ever the public needed reassurance, it is during this most unconventional of wars against terrorists hiding in caves and tunnels in faraway Afghanistan." [147]

As described by Michele Piercey in an article in the *Australian Defence Force Journal*, Schwarzkopf's intent was "to influence the media campaign proactively, rather than being shaped reactively…"[148] A similar approach must be taken by military senior

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[146] A video example of these can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZkl_rVHAoU&feature=related.

[147] Eric Schmitt, "Front and Center, Franks Faces the Media," *The New York Times,* 09 November 2001.

leaders in future dangerous international missions to establish that critical operational context.

In the Afghanistan operation, a senior Canadian military leader explaining operations in Kandahar, to include imagery of positive achievements such as the Dalia Dam project or the establishment of security in the model villages would be useful to Canadians. This type of mission description would include acknowledgement of the brutal Taliban efforts to undermine these UN mandated and NATO led activities and show the combat operations that are taking place to protect the humanitarian projects.

Brian Stewart, a veteran CBC reporter, commented on the relative dearth of information coming from the Canadian Forces relative to the Americans or British. He argues against the current Canadian practice of only discussing combat operations when they result in the death of a Canadian soldier. He states that the danger of operations not being understood raises the level of uncertainty with the public. According to Stewart, "when people start feeling they are not getting the full picture, that is when they begin to question the pieces they do have."[149]

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[148] Michele Piercey, "General Schwarzkopf: Shaping the Political Environment of the 1991 Gulf War." *The Australian Defence Force Journal,* Issue No. 165 (2004), 6-15, 10.

[149] Brian Stewart, "What Our Military Isn't Telling Us," *CBC News.* 18 March 2010.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this paper has shown that Canada needs the capability to fight small wars including counterinsurgency operations and that a significant part of that capability is the ability to protect the resolve of Canadians to contribute troops to these operations. The issues that Western democracies have in small wars, such as an expectation of low casualty rates, and quick and decisive battles must be overcome and Western nations must strengthen their publics' resolve in these types of operations.

A consultation of Clausewitz illuminated the three actors that are involved that need to be balanced for success in operations and these are the government, the commander and the people. Clausewitz warned of the loss of the will of the people and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan have challenged the will of Canadians to continue military efforts in that conflict. It was shown that small wars like the one in Afghanistan have a political dimension that needs to be addressed in the information domain.

An exploration of the concept of Information Operations helped define a few of the relevant concepts, including psychological operations, deception and public affairs. The point was made that influence can be made through the use of truthful information operations in Canada. This led to a detailed look as the media, the military-media relationship and the improvement of that relationship in Canada. The point was made that the media are the main sources of information for Canadians and that the media influences public opinion of military operations. Ultimately, it was determined that the media can have an impact in helping to protect the resolve of the Canadian people.

The role of the Canadian Government in military operations was reviewed, including some discussion of the choice of the Government to employ the Crown prerogative alone or to use a non-binding vote in the House of Commons before committing troops to dangerous international operations. It was shown that the Government did not initially deal with the Afghanistan mission properly with respect to maintaining the support of Canadians for the ongoing military effort because it did not lay out the specific objectives of the mission in relation to Canadian values. Significant improvements were made after the release of the Manley Report but these changes were not sufficient on their own to stop the decline of public support for the Afghan mission. It was determined that the part of the message that was lacking was the emotional connection to Canadians. In the battle for hearts and minds, the minds were won, but not the hearts. In future operations, the Government should articulate the objectives of the mission with measurement criteria in order to explain *why* it is necessary to participate in dangerous international operations. It must also be recognized, however, that this will not be sufficient on its own to protect the will of the people when casualties and time begin to take their toll.

The final section argued that the operational military commander at the national level has a duty to assist in strengthening the resolve of Canadians by explaining operations to the public. Once the Government has explained *why* a particular mission will be conducted, the military commander can explain the *how*. The use of strategic communications and information operations can serve to inform the public and can do so in a way that will reach them on an emotive level. A description of the traditional civil-military relationship in Canada was followed by a brief analysis of the changes that

occurred during the time that Hillier was CDS from 2005 to 2008. The ability of the senior military officer to have a voice in Canada changed.

This paper has proven that, although Hillier went too far because he was too publicly involved in specific government policy, the underlying factors that led to his ability to speak so publically still exist. It was shown that the trust and pride that the Canadian people now have for their Forces is at unprecedented levels and this makes the CDS or other senior military officers capable of reaching Canadians with the emotional part of the government message. It was shown that people react favourably to deliberate government actions and a description of military actions, including reconstruction, by a trusted senior military officer can help slow the inevitable decline of public support for long costly and dangerous international operations.

As stated in the introduction, none of the measures described in this paper are expected to create support for a war that is not popular with the people. But when there is public support for an international operation, and that operation involves combat or a high risk of casualties, then the actions described and supported by this paper will help maintain that support and slow the inevitable decline of support when the costs in time and lives increase.

Western militaries have needed to change their tactics when shifting from conventional to counterinsurgency operations. Western governments have also needed to adopt inter-agency cooperation strategies to react to the emergence of the new threat. A change in the way the public is informed of operations is also required to ensure the public's will is protected since the costs of small wars and counterinsurgency operations are significant.

Canada's mission in Afghanistan, and the planned 2011 withdrawal, has demonstrated how important public support is to the strategic success of a counterinsurgency type mission. The global war on terror, or whatever the label may become for the continued effort against transnational terror groups such as Al-Qaeda, does not seem to be any more near an end now than it was in late 2001. Al-Qaeda and other similar groups continue to exist and operate in many different countries and continue to pose a threat to the West.

For this reason, it is reasonable to conclude that Canada will likely need to embark on dangerous international military operation in the foreseeable future. When this occurs, it will be helpful for government and military leaders to consult Clausewitz and be reminded of the political nature of warfare, including insurgent or 'peoples war.' They would also be wise to review the nature of the balance that Clausewitz advised between the government, the commander and the people. They would be well informed to review the experience Canada gained in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2011, and to use the media, the government message and the senior military commander to ensure that the national resolve is protected as much as possible. In Canada, just as Clausewitz cautioned, the lesson has been demonstrated that a loss of public support represents a strategic loss of the ability of the government to execute policy through military means.

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