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**POLICIES OF CHANGE AND THE CANADIAN FORCES:
AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS**

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ABSTRACT

Not unlike other organizations the Canadian Forces has experienced the pressures of change throughout its history. A number of major change policies have been adopted within the Department of Defence. Despite having been developed in a rational manner, these policies have met resistance for seemingly irrational reasons. A sociological method, W.R. Scott's framework for institutional analysis, provides a tool to better understand this resistance to change in the Canadian Forces.

This paper examines the most prominent change policies in the history of the Canadian Forces: Minister Hellyer's Unification, MacDonald's Management Review Group and General Hillier's CF Transformation. Examination of these policies using Scott's model for institutional analysis provides several insights.

First, it provides critical insight from a sociological perspective as to why these policies met resistance from the Canadian Forces. It demonstrates that these policies destabilized the balance between the Regulative, Normative and Cultural-Cognitive institutional pillars of the Canadian Forces. As a result, Unification and the defence policies of the 1970s did not achieve legitimacy and despite initial momentum, CF Transformation may not attain it.

Second, it identifies two main institutional forces that have resisted change in the Canadian Forces: the strong environmentally-oriented culture and a disparity in intellectual views between the military chain of command and the civilian authority.

Lastly, it validates institutional analysis as a tool to examine policies. Future change policies will be more likely to succeed if tools such as Scott's framework for institutional analysis are used to assist policy makers in identifying the sociological forces that are likely to resist change.

INTRODUCTION

Culture eats strategy for breakfast.¹

The above metaphor taken from Paul Andrew's "Leadership Coach" website, is composed of a few simple words, but speaks volumes about organizations. It is perhaps an oversimplification of the fact that sociological factors can foil a well-planned strategy within an organization. This can be extended to change initiatives within organizations. It is well known that bringing change to an organization is challenging. These challenges have resulted in considerable research on better understanding the impact of change on organizations and how to better implement change strategies. This research and the resulting methodologies provide an opportunity to review the impact of change initiatives on the Canadian Forces.

Not unlike other organizations, the Canadian Forces has undergone a number of change strategies during its history. One of the most prolific initiatives to change the Canadian Forces was Minister of Defence Paul Hellyer's unification policy. Another example is the Defence Policy of the 1970s that stemmed from the findings of the Management Review Group and resulted in the creation of National Defence Headquarters. Finally, the most recent example is Chief of Defence Staff General Hillier's policy of CF Transformation. These change policies are particularly significant as they occurred in a modern era and the proposed changes were all resisted to a certain degree.

It has been recognized that Hellyer's unification and the Defence Policy of the 1970s did not fully realize their envisioned goals.² Furthermore, despite having achieved

¹<http://www.theleadershipcoach.com/2009/culture-eats-strategy-for-breakfast-paul-andrew-executive-coaching-leadership-training/>, Accessed 13 April 2010.

some early results, the ultimate accomplishment of CF Transformation remains in doubt.³ These change initiatives appear to have followed rational strategies. Minister Hellyer founded his unification vision on prominent academic thought of the time and consulted the Defence Council.⁴ The Defence Policy of the 1970s that led to the creation of NDHQ was founded on a study conducted by business experts called the Management Review Group.⁵ Finally, General Hillier used the contemporary change process created by Harvard professor John P. Kotter found in his book *Leading Change* and consulted both the Liberal government and his fellow general officers in the development of CF Transformation.⁶

How could such seemingly rational change strategies not produce their envisioned results? These policies appeared to be grounded in logic. The application of studies such as the Management Review Group and the use of process-oriented models such as Kotter's in their development support this. To answer this question, this paper proposes a sociological approach in order to better understand the resistance of the Canadian Forces to these policies.

This paper will demonstrate that powerful sociological pressures in the Canadian Forces resisted these change policies. It will be shown that all of these policies

²Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek, "Managing Change Within DND," in *The Public Management of Defence in Canada*, ed. Craig Stone, 213-236 (Toronto: Breakout, 2009), 230.

³ General (Retired) Michael K. Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academic Press, 2009), 118.

⁴ Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1990), 147.

⁵Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek, "Managing Change Within DND," in *The Public Management of Defence in Canada*, ed. Craig Stone, 213-236 (Toronto: Breakout, 2009), 223.

⁶John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 21.

destabilized the Canadian Forces as an institution and did not achieve legitimacy. Furthermore, two prevailing institutional forces that resist change in the Canadian Forces will be revealed: the strong environmentally-oriented service culture and a disparity in intellectual views between the civilian authority and military chain of command.

METHODOLOGY

Sociological analysis of an organization provides a potent tool to better understanding the social forces that oppose change strategies. As depicted in the quotation at the beginning of the paper, sociological forces can be decisive in resisting the best planned strategy. Powerful institutional forces can explain the reasons why these rational policies met resistance when applied to the Canadian Forces. Through his sociological study, W.R. Scott has developed an institutional analysis framework that will be used in this paper to provide an explanation as to why the aforementioned change initiatives met resistance from the Canadian Forces.

Chapter One will describe W.R. Scott's institutional analysis framework, which will be used for the subsequent chapters. The unification policy that Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer instituted in the mid to late 1960s will be examined from an institutional analysis perspective in Chapter Two. Chapter Three will examine the defence policy of the 1970s that stemmed from Minister of National Defence Donald MacDonald's white paper and subsequent Management Review Group recommendations. Finally, an institutional analysis of Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier's CF Transformation policy will be conducted in Chapter Four.

SIGNIFICANCE

The analysis of the Canadian Forces through a sociological lens conducted in this paper will result in a number of significant findings. First, it will determine the root cause of the resistance to these change policies from a sociological perspective. Second, it will showcase institutional analysis as a diagnostic tool in order to better understand the impact of challenges and changes on an organization such as the Canadian Forces. These results are relevant as they will enable others to predict the likely reaction of the Canadian Forces to future challenges and change initiatives. Finally, this paper will provide a greater overall understanding of the Canadian Forces as an institution.

CHAPTER ONE – INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

In order to conduct a proper analysis of the Canadian Forces and understand why seemingly rational change policies have met resistance, a sociological framework will be used. Such an extensive field of study provides many theoretical alternatives. This paper will employ the institutional theory developed by W.R. Scott to form the basis for the subsequent analysis of the Canadian Forces.

This chapter will commence by more clearly defining institutions from a sociological perspective through the description of their characteristics. W.R. Scott's framework for institutional analysis will then be described. Specifically, the *Regulative*, *Normative* and *Cultural-Cognitive* pillars of Scott's analytical framework and how they interact will be explained. Finally, how legitimacy is achieved within an institution will be illustrated. The establishment of Scott's framework and supporting theory will set the stage for the analysis found in the subsequent chapters.

DEFINING INSTITUTIONS

Before discussing the analytical framework the definition of an institution is required. Through his study of the many theorists in political, economic and sociological

domains of institutionalization, Scott determined a number of key traits that define an institution⁷ :

- Central to his definition is the fact that institutions are social structures that are highly resistant to change.
- Regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements comprise institutions to provide a stable social life with meaning.
- Carriers such as symbolic and relational systems, routines and artifacts serve to transmit institutions.
- Institutions possess multiple levels of jurisdiction from the highest levels down to personal relationships.
- Finally, notwithstanding that institutions signify stability; they are constantly under the pressures of change.

The institutional traits listed above interact to create three key characteristics of institutions. The first characteristic is the fact that institutions resist change.⁸ Secondly, the institutional traits listed above tend to be recreated and sustained across generations.⁹ The final characteristic adopted by Scott from scholar Anthony Giddens is that “Institutions by definition are more enduring features of social life...giving ‘solidarity’ (to social systems) across time and space.”¹⁰ In summary, Scott arrived at the following definition of institutions:

⁷W. Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations Second Edition* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2001), 48-49. The five subsequent points paraphrase W.R. Scott’s characteristics of institutions found in this reference.

⁸Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Second Edition...*, 49.

⁹Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Second Edition...*, 49.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 49.

Institutions are comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life.¹¹

Having established the definition of institutions, the constituent sociological components will be defined in order to permit a full comprehension of the analytical framework. The basic elements of institutions are *Regulative*, *Normative* and *Cultural-Cognitive*.¹² These essential ingredients produce the foundation of institutions and the basis of their resilience.¹³ Scott's analytical framework considers these elements as the three *pillars of institutions*.¹⁴ These three pillars are central to the analysis of this paper.

THE REGULATIVE PILLAR

The first pillar of Scott's institutional analysis framework is the *Regulative Pillar*. This pillar is tied directly to the regulative element of institutions. It addresses the written and unwritten rules and regulations within an institution. Constitutive rules within an institution work both to limit and enable social behaviour.¹⁵ Directly tied to rules and regulations are sanctions that are equally formal and informal.¹⁶

¹¹ Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Second Edition...*, 48.

¹²*Ibid.*, 49.

¹³*Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁵W. Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interest* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), 52.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 53.

Senior actors within an organization are empowered to enforce their authority and impose their will through formal power distribution frameworks. These regulated frameworks both provide and limit the power of institutional actors.¹⁷ An excellent example of this is the organizational charts that create the framework for the chain of command in the military.

Another important concept to grasp concerning Scott's *Regulative Pillar* is the monitoring of the regulative components of an institution. Within an institution, the performance associated with rules and regulations is ideally monitored by a neutral third party.¹⁸ If the party is not neutral, the problem of institutions diverging from other societal entities can arise.¹⁹ Sociological scholars have argued that the state can play the role of neutral arbiter and enforcer for institutions.²⁰

Finally, it is important to grasp the interdependence amongst the pillars in Scott's model. Institutional actors can impose sanctions to regulate behaviour, but it is important to bear in mind that the ultimate goal is to legitimize the institution through normative acceptance.²¹ In this regard the *Regulative* and *Normative* pillars can reinforce one another.²² Behaviour and social cohesion initially formed within an institution by written rules and sanctions can transition over time to norms.

¹⁷Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interest...*, 53.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 53.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 53.

²¹*Ibid.*, 53.

²²*Ibid.*, 53.

THE NORMATIVE PILLAR

The next pillar in Scott's institutional analysis framework is the *Normative* pillar. The *Normative* pillar is based on the norms and values within an institution which prescribe behaviour in order to maintain social cohesion and order.²³ The *Normative* pillar is comprised of values and norms. *Values* define the desirable ideal against which behaviours and structures can be measured. *Norms* represent actions of individuals and activity patterns based on social pressures.²⁴

Normative behaviour in organizations is based on common beliefs and values rather than prescribed by rules. In simple terms it can be depicted as the routine 'way people do things' in an organization.²⁵ Transgressions of these normative values can evoke a strong emotional response. The reaction to the failure to adhere to these unwritten norms can result in a more visceral reaction than a violation of the regulative guideline to social behaviour.²⁶ In this regard, adherence to norms and values in an organization can be considered as more important to the social cohesion than adherence to rules.²⁷

It is also important to bear in mind the relationship that the *Normative Pillar* can have with the *Regulative Pillar*. Rules and regulations with origins in the *Regulative Pillar* can achieve ultimate legitimacy when they are socially accepted in the *Normative*

²³ Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interest...*, 54.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 55.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 55.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 55.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 56.

Pillar as ‘the way things are done.’ In this case, an institution that was initially legitimized in the *Regulative Pillar* could transition over time to legitimization in the *Normative Pillar*, thereby achieving a higher level of legitimacy.²⁸

THE CULTURAL-COGNITIVE PILLAR

The third pillar of institutional analysis that Scott provides is the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar*. This pillar addresses common thought patterns and world views within an institution that serve to maintain social cohesion and legitimacy. The *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar* emphasizes that meaning is created within organizations through shared ideas that comprise social reality.²⁹ It can be considered as the common lens through which an institution views the world. Psychological studies have shown that these cognitive frames shape how an individual receives, interprets and stores information, thereby affecting the individual judgement and perceptions.³⁰

Social roles and routines are another important aspect in the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar*. According to cultural-cognitive theory, roles and behavioural routines are governed by the common perceptions and thought patterns in an organization. This differs from the normative theory which proposes that individuals act in accordance with mutually reinforcing social pressures.³¹ From the cultural-cognitive perspective actions

²⁸ Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interest...*, 54.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 56.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 57.

³¹*Ibid.*, 58.

according to one's role and institutional routines have a 'taken for granted' nature to them; much like acting to an unwritten script.³²

Finally, it is important to understand that cultural beliefs in an organization are not necessary universally held at all levels. An individual's perception of a given situation and the ideal outcome can vary. The contestation of cultural beliefs is particularly prevalent in times of change and disarray within an organization.

LEGITIMACY AND THE THREE PILLARS

The final aspect of Scott's model for institutional analysis that is relevant is the role the three pillars have in relation to the legitimacy of an organization. According to Scott's model, organizations need more than just resources and technical information in order to be legitimate.³³ In order to achieve legitimacy, an organization must have credibility and acceptability to form a strong social environment and cohesion. Scott uses the three pillars to explain this phenomenon.

The three pillars act together in a supportive manner to create the legitimacy of an organization. They do this in different ways. In the *Regulative Pillar* legitimacy of an organization is based on its foundation and adherence to both written and unwritten rules.³⁴ This differs from the *Normative Pillar*, in which legitimacy is achieved by providing and rewarding adherence to idealistic and accepted values and norms.³⁵

³² Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interest...*, 58.

³³ *Ibid.*, 59.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 61.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 61.

Finally, in the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar*, legitimacy is achieved by the conformation to accepted world views and thought patterns within an organization.³⁶ Of particular importance to this paper is understanding that in the most stable organizations these three pillars all work in concert. Conversely, when the pillars are not stable and in balance, the cohesiveness of the institution can be threatened.³⁷ Understanding the impact of the policies examined in this paper to the stability of the Canadian Forces is central to this paper.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter established the theoretical baseline required for the subsequent institutional analysis of change policies in the Canadian Forces. Understanding the three pillars of social order in Scott's model and how they generate social cohesion and resilience in an organization is essential to conducting institutional analysis. Grasping how these pillars can work independently or in concert to create social stability is paramount to understanding the impacts of balance and imbalance amongst the pillars and the related impact on the cohesion of an organization. The impact of the change policies in this paper on the stability and balance of these pillars will indicate their level of acceptance and legitimacy in the Canadian Forces. Furthermore, the concept of how institutional legitimacy is assessed will be used later in the paper to explain dynamics at play that have impacted the legitimacy of the Canadian Forces.

³⁶ Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interest...*, 61.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 62.

CHAPTER TWO – MINISTER HELLYER’S UNIFICATION

INTRODUCTION

Having established an understanding of W.R. Scott’s framework for institutional analysis, this next chapter will address the first of the three periods of change for the Canadian Forces that will be studied in this paper; Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer’s unification. Unification was the first in a series of key policy initiatives in the history of the Canadian Forces that exerted significant change pressure on the organization.

The chapter will begin by establishing the basic historical context of the era of unification. The second section of the chapter will present an analysis of Minister Hellyer’s unification policy using Scott’s institutional analysis framework. This will be broken down into a separate analysis in the context of each of the three institutional pillars. Lastly, the impact of the unification policy on the Canadian Forces from a legitimacy perspective will be examined.

This analysis will shed light on the impact of this critical developmental period of Canadian Forces from an institutional perspective. The examination of Hellyer’s unification in the context of the institutional pillars will provide insight on the stability of the Canadian Forces as an institution and the legitimacy of the policy from an institutional perspective. Furthermore, it will showcase institutional analysis as a tool to determine why seemingly rational change policies such as unification meet resistance

from institutions. Finally, the analysis in this chapter will establish several prominent institutional forces that have resisted change in the Canadian Forces.

CONTEXT

Paul Hellyer's unification of the services was one of the most significant periods of change in the history of Canadian Forces. In March of 1964 Minister of Defence Hellyer released his white paper on national defence. His intent to reorganize the Canadian Forces was built on two main concepts: increasing operational effectiveness and reducing administrative inefficiency.³⁸

Minister Hellyer's assessment that the unification of Canada's three services into a unified force would produce greater operational effectiveness was built on a logical line of reasoning. He assessed that the gains of integrating the three services would be analogous to the gains in operational effectiveness the army had realized upon integrating the field artillery, infantry and cavalry into one army.³⁹ Minister Hellyer also argued the use of joint operations in World War II as a reason to unify the services in the Canadian Forces. He cited that although forcing the services to work together in an ad hoc manner had worked in World War II, the fact that they were not proficient at working together with common communications systems and a common lexicon had cost lives.⁴⁰ This led

³⁸Paul Hellyer, *The White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer 1964), 19.

³⁹Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1990), 40.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 41-42.

Hellyer to the deduction that unifying the three services into one force would improve interoperability and achieve greater operational effectiveness.

The second line of reasoning in Minister Hellyer's initiative to unify the three services in the Canadian Forces into a single force was based on administrative inefficiencies at the time. Prior to unification administrative services such as dental, pay and postal were provided independently by each of the three services, which Hellyer deemed to be inefficient.⁴¹ He also wanted to increase the efficiency and prioritization of military procurement by increasing the Deputy Minister's authority.⁴² In the end, this efficiency-based line of reasoning would be the main feature of unification that Minister Hellyer would emphasize in order to convince the Canadian Parliament to support his plan.⁴³

The results of Minister Hellyer's efforts were codified in several ways. The *1964 White Paper on Defence* explained the philosophy of unification and was widely regarded as a significant step forward in strategic thinking at the time.⁴⁴ In the white paper, Hellyer linked his proposed reorganization of the forces to the contemporary threat and the security umbrella provided by the United States and NATO.⁴⁵ Minister Hellyer then expanded upon his concept to reorganize the Canadian Forces in his *1966 Address on the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act*. In this address he re-iterated his justification for

⁴¹ Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes....*, 41.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 42.

⁴³ Douglas Bland, "Introduction to Hellyer's Reorganization" in *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2 Defence Organization* ed. Douglas Bland (Kingston: Queen's University, 1998), 96.

⁴⁴ Vernon J. Kronenberg, *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-72* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), 20.

⁴⁵ Hellyer, *The White Paper on Defence....*, 10-11.

the reorganization of the Canadian Forces, but put much more emphasis on the fiscal implications: “If we were to maintain useful forces to meet our national and international commitments we had two choices. We must greatly increase defence spending or reorganize our forces. The decision was to reorganize.”⁴⁶

Bill C-234 and Bill C-90 were the legislative result of the Minister Hellyer’s policy described above. Bill C-90 abolished the positions of the service chiefs of staff and established a single Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) with a Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) designed along more functional lines.⁴⁷ Bill C-234 put the reorganization of the Canadian Forces into law. It legally combined the former three services of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force into one single service henceforth called the “Canadian Armed Forces.”⁴⁸

So how did Hellyer’s reorganization stand the test of time? The success of Hellyer’s initiative has been regarded by scholars as debatable and not having achieved his desired effects.⁴⁹ There are those that argue that Hellyer’s initiatives although permanent in legislation have been overtaken by the resurgence of the separate environmental services’ power within the Canadian Forces.⁵⁰ The next section of this chapter will begin the institutional analysis of Hellyer’s unification starting with the

⁴⁶Paul Hellyer, *Address on the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer 1966), 13.

⁴⁷ Kronenberg, *All Together Now...*, 40.

⁴⁸Hellyer, *Address on the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act...*, 35.

⁴⁹Michael Rostek, Lieutenant-Colonel, “Managing Change within DND” in *Public Management of Defence in Canada*, ed. Craig Stone, 213-226 (Toronto: Breakout Education Network, 2009), 222.

⁵⁰Daniel Gosselin, Major-General, “Hellyer’s Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 years old - Part One,” *Canadian Military Journal* vol 9, No. 2: 8.

Regulative Pillar. This will shed light on why a seemingly rational policy to achieve logical goals such as unification encountered resistance from the Canadian Forces.

ANALYSIS

Regulative Pillar

The era during which Hellyer was the minister of National Defence was a period of notable regulative formation in the Canadian Forces. The fact that Hellyer exercised his regulative power as the Minister of Defence to impose his unification agenda on the forces offers little room for dispute. As mentioned above, Bill C-90 and C-243 formalized unification into national level legislation. Hellyer also took regulative actions within the department in order to bring about the reorganization of the Canadian Forces. This section of the paper will address some of these measures in more detail.

Specifically, the measures that Hellyer took to establish his authority, the formal frameworks cited above and sanctions against senior officers who were not in favour of unification will be addressed. Overall, it will be shown that Hellyer's reorganization of the Canadian Forces in 1966 relied heavily on the *Regulative Pillar*.

As the civilian authority over the Department of National Defence, Hellyer exercised his legitimate authority to reorganize the Canadian Forces in 1966. He did so in a number of ways. In order to establish his authority in office, one of his first acts as minister was to cancel the navy frigates that had been ordered by his predecessor Gordon

Churchill.⁵¹ He also scrutinized and adjusted the air force proposal to purchase additional CF-104 fighters.⁵² Having established his willingness to exercise his legitimate civilian authority over the military, Minister Hellyer moved on to addressing the operational and fiscal inefficiencies he saw within the Canadian Forces.

Prior to 1966, the Canadian Forces had operated as three separate services. Hellyer used his regulative power to change this. As mentioned earlier, Bill C-90 and Bill C-243 resulted in the creation of the CDS and CFHQ. Addressed in more detail however, the second order effects related to Bill C-90 and Bill C-243 reveal further impacts in the *Regulative Pillar*. The creation of the CDS resulted in the abolition of the three services “chiefs” (the Naval Board, General Staff and Air Staff) in favour of one joint staff under the Chief of Defence staff.⁵³ In addition, the power of the Deputy Minister was increased, particularly in the area of procurement. Finally, Hellyer’s creation of the CFHQ reduced the size of the military staff by thirty percent and decreased the number of committees within the military staff. Combined with the maintenance of the civilian staff at the same level, the intended second order effect of this was to increase the civilian power base in the department.⁵⁴ These measures decreased the traditional power base of the independent services and elevated the civilian power within the Department of National Defence. This redistribution of power away from the

⁵¹Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes...*, 33.

⁵²Douglas Bland., *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Brown Book Company Limited, 1995), 70.

⁵³Rostek, *Managing Change Within DND...*, 221-222.

⁵⁴Douglas Bland., *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947 to 1985* (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, Publisher, 1987), 46.

traditional military power base stressed the institution in the *Regulative Pillar* and contributed to the resistance of the Canadian Forces to unification.

In order to enforce his unification policy in the face of resistance by senior officers, Hellyer had to resort to further regulative measures. Hellyer was more than willing to sanction officers who stood in the way of the reorganization of the Canadian Forces. For example, he was quoted as saying “I suggested officers should get enthusiastic about integration...or else turn in their badges and take the special benefits available to them.”⁵⁵ The fact that the beginning of the debate on Bill C-243 coincided with the announcement of the retirement of the CDS, VCDS and other senior generals is an example of those sanctions.⁵⁶ Hellyer’s dismissal of the outspoken Admiral Landymore for disloyalty to the policies of the government is another.⁵⁷ These examples clearly demonstrate Hellyer’s emphasis on the *Regulative Pillar* in order to establish his policy of unification.

Several important conclusions can be drawn from this *Regulative Pillar* analysis. First of all, by exercising his unification agenda using structure, rules and sanctions Paul Hellyer put into question the role of the Canadian Government as a neutral arbiter of Canadian Forces institution. His emphasis on a regulative construct to achieve unification resulted in the loss of voluntary participation of the key actors of the Canadian Forces in the process. Also, by reducing the military power base and increasing that of the civilians within the department and abolishing the separate services, Hellyer

⁵⁵J.L. Granatstein., *Who Killed Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd., 2004), 74.

⁵⁶Kronenberg , *All Together Now...*, 84.

⁵⁷Granastein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military...*, 79.

threatened the military institutional social cohesion. These actions led to resistance by the senior officers based on their concern for the survival of the three services.

The factors mentioned above undoubtedly contributed to the lack long-term acceptance and legitimacy of Hellyer's unification. These dynamics in the *Regulative Pillar* also created pressure on the social cohesion of the Canadian Forces and contributed to a tension between the civilian and military leadership within the Department of National Defence of that era. Moreover, this contributed to the difference in intellectual views between the civilian authority and the military chain of command that will be illustrated later in the chapter.

Normative Pillar

This next section will analyse Defence Minister Hellyer's policy of unification in the context of the *Normative Pillar*. The unification policy was counter to many of the established values and norms in the military of the day. Hellyer's policies ran against many of the long standing traditions of the independent services that had been established in times of war. The unification bill, C-243, removed cultural symbols, such as distinct uniforms for the three separate services that members of the Canadian Forces identified with. The disbandment of units in the militia is another example. Finally, by dissolving the service chiefs and creating a single Chief of Defence staff, Hellyer eroded the traditional power base of the three services. Analysis will show the impact that these policies had on the stability of the *Normative Pillar* of the Canadian Forces.

The defence policy that led to the unification of the Canadian Forces in 1966 by Bill C-243 was countered with opposition in the *Normative Pillar*. Hellyer's ideas of unifying the services agitated many of the norms and values that the three separate services had formed since their origins. Hellyer discounted many of these symbols and traditions as excessive and antiquated. He was particularly surprised by the navy traditions. He clearly illustrated this view when visiting a Canadian Naval vessel in 1964. Hellyer remarked on what he saw as excessive pampered treatment that was traditional according to navy standards, by stating "Such practices seemed an abuse of indentured labour reminiscent of the dark ages."⁵⁸ This exemplifies how Hellyer did not consider the traditional values and norms in the Canadian Forces as essential when he developed and imposed the policy of unification.

In spite of his seemingly set views on the matter, Minister Hellyer did allow debate on the policies of unification, but noted that in the face of vigorous resistance from senior officers that he never encountered a valid military problem with unification and that opposition was "purely emotional".⁵⁹ One of the main counter arguments to unification from a normative perspective was the impact on morale.⁶⁰ Hellyer discounted any such emotional arguments and labelled traditionalists as "anachronisms."⁶¹ The emotional reaction to unification and the lack of consideration Hellyer demonstrated for the existing norms and values of the Canadian Forces illustrate one aspect of its destabilizing effect on the *Normative Pillar*.

⁵⁸Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes...*, 61.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 147.

⁶⁰Kronenberg, *All Together Now...*, 25.

⁶¹Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes...*, 92.

Minister Hellyer continued to pursue the policy of unification and in doing so attacked many of the symbols and traditions of the Canadian Forces. The imposition of a common uniform for all services was a direct attack on a long standing institutional carrier of the three separate services. All three services were opposed, but the navy was particularly affronted by the change in uniform. A senior representative at the time poignantly summed up the sentiment in the navy on the loss of their distinct uniform in stating that it would result in the “loss of their identity” and make the Canadian navy “a laughing stock and virtual pariahs in naval circles.”⁶² The proof that this regulative measure never achieved normative status is the fact that the three environmental services of the Canadian Forces had their distinct uniforms reinstated in the 1980s.⁶³

Hellyer encountered a similar emotional reaction when he executed a reduction in the reserve units. Hellyer’s policy called for a cut in the militia from 51000 to 30000; a cost cutting measure that was part of the overall goal of greater efficiency in the department.⁶⁴ In order to accomplish this, entire units were decommissioned and placed on the supplementary order of battle.⁶⁵ This eroded the normative base of the Canadian army which had its origins in the militia. The result was a considerable backlash that spilled over into the political arena.⁶⁶ The regiments to be disbanded such as the Victoria Rifles and the Irish Fusiliers of Vancouver brought forward delegations and had

⁶² Kronenberg, *All Together Now...*, 81.

⁶³ Allan D. English., *Understanding Military Culture – A Canadian Perspective* (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 96.

⁶⁴ Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes...*, 101-102.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 103.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 103.

representatives make a pitch for their reinstatement.⁶⁷ Of particular note was the resistance of the Irish Regiment of Canada. In protest to the disbandment, the President of the Irish Regiment Veteran's association sent a telegram to the Queen asking that the regiment be reinstated.⁶⁸ Despite the high profile of some of these actions, Hellyer was able to contain them and press on with his policy, but he had certainly underestimated the impact of his policies in the *Normative Pillar*.

Unification also attacked the traditional separate service norms of conduct. Before the reform, the three services had developed a deep seeded competitive environment. Paul Hellyer noted that prior to unification that "Cooperation was given lip-service, but in reality the services were three separate fiefdoms, each jealous of its own terrain."⁶⁹ This competitive environment was in spite of the existence of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) prior to unification, which was supposed to be the body that coordinated the activities and priorities of the three services.⁷⁰ The service chiefs believed that they had the right to work directly for the minister without coordination as this had been the traditional norm. Hellyer's frustration with the attempts of service chiefs to approach him directly at the expense of the other services contributed to his desire to unify the three services.⁷¹ Minister Hellyer's abolishment of the three services in favour of a unified force with Bill C-243, went directly against these strong separate service norms and values.

⁶⁷Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes...*, 103.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 103.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 37.

⁷⁰Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*, 65.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 68.

In summary, Minister Hellyer's policy of unification clearly went against the established values and norms of the Canadian Forces in 1964. The unification policies appeared rational but undermined the traditional symbols and behavioural patterns of the Canadian forces of that era. The abolishment of institutional carriers such as distinct uniforms was against the core values of the distinct services. The reassignment of army militia units to the supplemental reserve was an attack on the traditional origins of the institution and elicited an emotional outcry that drew attention at the highest levels. The legislation of the three services into one went against the normative practices of the services operating as distinct entities with direct access to the Minister of National Defence.

Overall, this analysis has shown that the Hellyer's unification policy destabilized the *Normative Pillar* of the Canadian Forces. This instability in the social cohesion that this destabilization created undoubtedly contributed to the lack of long term institutional legitimacy of unification in the Canadian Forces. Clearly, Hellyer had underestimated the impact of unification on the *Normative Pillar* of the Canadian Forces. In addition, this section has further demonstrated the tension that developed between the civilian and military leadership in the Department of National Defence. This tension likely reinforced the disparity in intellectual views between the civilian and military leadership that will be examined in the next section. Finally, the analysis of the *Normative Pillar* in this section has illustrated the existence of the environmentally-oriented service culture as a powerful institutional element in the Canadian Forces.

Cultural-Cognitive Pillar

This third section of the chapter will conduct an analysis of the Canadian Forces during the unification period from a *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar* perspective. The perception of the unification policy will be examined in the context of the intellectual frames of the civilian and military minds of this era. The fact that there was acceptance of the unification policy by the civilian policy makers and initial acceptance by many retired and serving generals will be illustrated. It will also be shown that over time a majority of senior officers did not share unification as a world view for the Canadian Forces. This disparity in views led to an imbalance in the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar* during this era that inevitably contributed to the lack of success of many aspects of unification.

There was much intellectual debate in the 1950s and 1960s over whether or not the Canadian Forces should remain as separate services or be a unified single force.⁷² The culmination of this debate prior to Paul Hellyer becoming Minister of Defence was the Glassco Report of 1963. The commissioners of the report examined the concept of unification but stopped short of recommending it for the Canadian Forces. Instead they recommended greater efficiency through the integration of services but did not recommend complete unification of the services with a single Chief of Defence Staff.⁷³ Paul Hellyer did not find this innovative enough and went forward with the aggressive policy of integration leading to unification. By passing Bills C-90 and C-243, Minister

⁷²Daniel Gosselin, "A 50-Year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and the Strong Service Idea," in *Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives Context and Concepts*, ed. Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs and Laurence M. Hickey, 129-200 (Kingston: Canadian Defense Academy Press), 129.

⁷³Douglas Bland, "Introduction to the Glassco Report" in *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2 Defence Organization* ed. Douglas Bland, 51-55 (Kingston: Queen's University, 1998), 53.

Hellyer clearly demonstrated the Government of Canada's intellectual acceptance of unification.

Initially, there were a number of military minds who also accepted Hellyer's unification policy for the Canadian Forces. The Parliamentary Special Committee on Defence of June 1963 was provided evidence from both serving and retired senior officers who supported the idea of unification.⁷⁴ There was also early wide spread intellectual support for the White Paper of 1964. This is made evident by the comments made in Canadian Aviation magazine at the time "Defence Minister Hellyer's White Paper has been widely heralded as the most forward thinking defence document produced by any government for the past decade, and probably since World War II."⁷⁵ As mentioned earlier, Hellyer's reasoning for unification of improving the operational effectiveness and administrative efficiency of the Canadian Forces was a rational concept.

Most of the support however was at the policy level. Many general officers were vehemently against unification.⁷⁶ Differing from the emotional arguments in the *Normative Pillar*, they presented some logical counters to unification. Those who opposed the unification policy made arguments based on tactical and strategic themes. One such argument was that unifying the forces would degrade the service specific capabilities of the land, sea and air forces.⁷⁷ Despite some of these rational arguments, it has been noted that the main concern was protecting the existence of the army, navy and

⁷⁴Kronenberg, *All Together Now...*, 17.

⁷⁵Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes...*, 49.

⁷⁶Kronenberg, *All Together Now...*, 78.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 79.

air force.⁷⁸ From an institutional analysis perspective, this demonstrates that the *Normative* and *Cultural-Cognitive Pillars* were mutually supporting in their instability during this era.

Similar to the arguments presented in the *Normative Pillar* analysis, the common mental frame through which members of the Canadian Forces viewed the world in this era was one based predominately on the traditions of the strong independent environmental services. The views of the notably vocal commander of the navy, Admiral Landymore, clearly illustrate this view. When asked if the opposition to unification was based on tradition or tactics and strategy, Admiral Landymore replied:

I do not think it enters into the operational field. I think generally navies are very close to one another and their way of doing things and their manner of presenting themselves and in their identity. If there is a reluctance, and there is, it is due to that factor more than any other.⁷⁹

It is not surprising that the intellectual views of the senior officers were tied to the long standing values and norms found in the *Normative Pillar*. These pillars were also equally destabilized by unification. The above evidence clearly establishes that the cognitive frame at the senior level in the Canadian Forces at the time was in direct opposition to that of Minister Hellyer.

These diametrically opposing views of unification between the military hierarchy and their civilian superiors demonstrate an imbalance in the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar*. As presented above, external to the military there was great support for the unification of the Canadian Forces. Internally, although initial support was indicated, it is clear that over time most members of the Canadian Forces intellectually opposed unification. This

⁷⁸ Kronenberg, *All Together Now...*, 79.

⁷⁹Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes...*, 156.

agitated against the acceptance and legitimacy of unification in the cultural-cognitive context. This imbalance also reinforced difference in intellectual views between the military chain of command and the civilian one within the Department of National Defence during this era. Finally, it illustrates the Canadian Forces' strong environmental service orientation from a cognitive context.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

As described in Chapter One, the three pillars must be mutually supporting for an institution to achieve optimal legitimacy. This was definitely not the case when Minister Hellyer applied his unification policy to the Canadian Forces. The *Regulative Pillar* during this era largely supported unification. This was evidenced by the formal structures adopted such as the creation of the positions of CDS and the CFHQ. It was also demonstrated by the sanctions undertaken by Hellyer against those who opposed unification. Unification was not, however, accepted as legitimate in the *Normative Pillar* as the policy went directly against many of the traditions, norms and values of the separate environmental services. Nor did unification achieve legitimacy in the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar* as there were two completely opposite world views on unification, one inside the military and one outside. There was a definite imbalance between the three institutional pillars within the Canadian Forces during the era of Hellyer's policy of unification that stressed and tested the resilience of the institution.

Several additional conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, the above arguments clearly demonstrate the fact that Minister Hellyer's policy of unification did

not achieve legitimacy within the Canadian Forces. In addition, the tension that unification caused between the military chain of command and the civilian authority in the Department of National Defence reinforced a disparity in intellectual views that will re-emerge in subsequent chapters. Lastly, this analysis has shown that the Canadian Forces possesses a strong environmentally-oriented service culture that resists change when threaten by policies such as unification.

CHAPTER THREE – MACDONALD’S MANAGEMENT REVIEW GROUP

INTRODUCTION

Through the use of Scott’s institutional analysis framework this paper has shown that Minister of Defence Hellyer’s policy of unification failed to achieve legitimacy in the Canadian Forces. This lack of acceptance of unification was attributed to the imbalance the policy caused in the pillars of the institution. The next major change initiative that stressed the Canadian Forces as an organization was the policy that resulted from Minister Donald MacDonald’s Defence White Paper – *Defence in the 70’s* and subsequent Management Review Group. This chapter will continue the institutional analysis using Scott’s model to study the impact of this policy on the Canadian Forces as an institution during the 1970s.

An overview of the *Defence in the 70’s* white paper, the recommendations of the Management Review Group and the actual resulting changes to the Department of National Defence will be outlined to put this era into context. The institutional analysis of the Canadian Forces during this era will then be conducted. The analysis of these policies in the context of the three institutional pillars will provide an understanding of their impact on the stability of the Canadian Forces during this era and the level of legitimacy achieved by these policies. As in Chapter One, this institutional analysis will demonstrate why these seemingly rational policies met resistance from the Canadian Forces. Overall, commonalities begin to emerge through the analysis of the Management

Review Group policy and creation of NDHQ and the institutional analysis of the unification policy conducted in Chapter Two.

CONTEXT

Not long after his election to power in 1968, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau commenced an inevitable review of defence policy. Not surprisingly, Pierre Trudeau had his own particular views on defence and the military. One of his beliefs was that the military was an expensive bargaining chip to be leveraged in relationships with the provinces and other allies.⁸⁰ He also questioned Canada's commitment to NATO⁸¹ and believed that that key to Canada's defence was the reliance on American nuclear deterrence.⁸² Trudeau's views naturally led him to conduct a review of defence. To this end, he assigned Donald MacDonald as the Minister of Defence and gave him the task of developing new defence policy.⁸³

Having requested the post of Minister of National Defence, Donald MacDonald vigorously set about developing a new defence policy. In 1971 he produced the *Defence in the 70's* white paper.⁸⁴ In the white paper, Minister MacDonald identified four major

⁸⁰J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette Pierre Trudea and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 235.

⁸¹J.L. Granatstein., *Who Killed Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd.), 117.

⁸²Granatstein, *Pirouette...*, 235.

⁸³*Ibid.*, 236.

⁸⁴Douglas Bland, "Controlling The Defence Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence," in *Canada's Defence Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century*, ed. B.D Hunt and R.G. Haycock, 211-225 (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993), 215.

areas of activity for the Canadian Forces: protection of Canadian sovereignty, co-operation with US forces to achieve the defence of North America, continued fulfillment of NATO commitments and international peacekeeping.⁸⁵

In addition to his 1971 white paper, Minister MacDonald appointed a civilian consultant study called the Management Review Group in order to evaluate the organization and management of the Canadian Forces.⁸⁶ The main task of the Management Review Group was to “examine all aspects of the management and operation of the Department of National Defence.”⁸⁷ The key findings of the Management Review Group were that there was a problem with basic management and organization within the Canadian Forces as it related to unification and that this had led to excessive personal demands on the Minister of National Defence and inefficient management of resources.⁸⁸ In addition, one of the major conclusions of the Management Review Group was that although the Canadian Forces was effective at conducting operations, it was in need of a headquarters and command structure that would better enable the management of resources.⁸⁹

Based on these findings, the Management Review Group made a number of recommendations. Chief among these was the reorganization of the separate legal entities of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence into one

⁸⁵Douglas Bland, “Introduction to Defence in the 70’s” in *Canada’s National Defence: Volume 1 Defence Policy* ed. Douglas Bland (Kingston: Queen’s University, 1998), 112.

⁸⁶Donald MacDonald, *Defence in the 70s* (Ottawa: Crown Printer, 1971), 42.

⁸⁷ Douglas Bland, “Management of Defence in Canada –The Report in Brief” in *Canada’s National Defence: Volume 2 Defence Organization* ed. Douglas Bland (Kingston: Queen’s University, 1998), 167.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 167.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 161.

entity.⁹⁰ The concept was to subordinate the Chief of Defence Staff and by extension the Canadian Forces to the Deputy Minister.⁹¹ In addition, Management Review Group recommended that the membership of the Defence Council be reduced and the responsibility of operations be separated from that of logistics and support.⁹² These radical changes and others would have meant opening and modifying the National Defence Act.

In the end, most of the recommendations of the Management Review Group report did not receive widespread support and were buried until the document was declassified in 1984.⁹³ The one recommendation that was instituted was the amalgamation of the CFHQ that had been created by Hellyer with the Department of National Defence into the unified National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). This new headquarters fused the two in practice and structure but not in law.⁹⁴ Despite the intent of greater management efficiency and by extension operational efficiency, this policy has widely been regarded as one that actually reduced the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces.⁹⁵

ANALYSIS

⁹⁰ Bland, *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2 Defence Organization...*, 162.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 162.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 162.

⁹³ Michael Rostek, Lieutenant-Colonel, "Managing Change within DND" in *Public Management of Defence in Canada*, ed. Craig Stone, 213-226 (Toronto: Breakout Education Network, 2009), 223.

⁹⁴ Douglas Bland., *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947 to 1985* (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, Publisher, 1987), 81.

⁹⁵ Bland, *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2 Defence Organization...* 164.

Regulative Pillar

Similar to Hellyer's unification, the changes made based on the recommendations of the Management Review Group were primarily instituted in the *Regulative Pillar* of the Canadian Forces. First of all, the structural goal of clarifying the distribution of power within the department through the creation of NDHQ will be examined. The structuring of staffs to be joint military-civilian in order to create greater management efficiency will then be analysed. Overall, the fact that this policy had a destabilizing effect on the Canadian Forces in the *Regulative Pillar* will be shown.

Management Review Group proposed that the command of the Canadian Forces and DND be unified into one single chain of command in order to alleviate these inefficiencies. In order to achieve this unity of command, Management Review Group recommended that the CDS be subordinated to the Deputy Minister.⁹⁶ Management Review Group recommended that this policy be formalized into law by amending the National Defence Act accordingly.⁹⁷ However, the National Defence Act was not amended and the result was that this policy only created more ambiguity within the department, specifically with regards to the relationship of the CDS and Deputy Minister. When asked the question of who was more senior in the department, the CDS or the DM, a Minister of Defence who served after 1972 stated "I didn't know and couldn't find

⁹⁶Bland, *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2 Defence Organization...*, 209.

⁹⁷Douglas Bland., *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Brown Book Company Limited, 1995), 97.

out.”⁹⁸ This clearly indicates an imbalance in the *Regulative Pillar* of the Canadian Forces at that time.

Another change in structure that did not achieve its aim was the creation of blended civilian-military staffs. The creation of NDHQ out of CFHQ and DND mandated that specific positions were to be filled by civilians and military personal to ensure a proper blend of staff. This structure was less than ideal. This was equally challenging for the military members employed in traditional civilian roles as it was for civilian staff in positions that had been traditionally military.

General Jacques Dextraze, the Chief of Defence Staff during the implementation of this policy, initially accepted the concept that military and civilians staffs could be combined under the new structure with either civilians or military members occupying positions.⁹⁹ What he initially discounted as “boxes and lines on a chart” became a thorn in his side as he realized that his ability to administer and control the Canadian Forces was greatly diminished.¹⁰⁰ General Dextraze would admit years later that his agreement to form joint civilian-military staffs in NDHQ was “the worst decision of my period as CDS.”¹⁰¹ The new structure of joint staffs in NDHQ that resulted from the Management Review Group policy recommendations clearly did not optimize operational performance of the Canadian Forces as was intended.

This was also poignantly emphasized from the civilian perspective by the comments of Deputy Minister of Defence Nixon in a speech he made to Canadian Forces

⁹⁸Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947 to 1985...*, 84.

⁹⁹Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*, 99.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, 99.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, 99.

Staff College in Sept 1981. During what was expected to be a routine speech, the Deputy Minister was critical of the policy of posting military officers into policy positions. He lamented the fact that “we are not staffing some parts of NDHQ with the type of individual to get the best performance.”¹⁰² He went on to describe that the positions were “designated as military and, therefore, subject to rotation and not filled by personnel with particularly appropriate background.”¹⁰³ These statements by Deputy Minister Nixon, who was arguably the most experienced defence official at the time, are a clear indication of the failure of the initial structure of blended staffs that was instituted based on the Management Review Group recommendations.¹⁰⁴ These comments combined with the comments of the CDS of that era above show that the blended civilian-military staffs in the newly NDHQ disrupted the institutional cohesion not only within the Canadian Forces but also within the Department of National Defence.

The combination of the CFHQ and DND headquarters into NDHQ using managerial principals clearly did not succeed in achieving the goals of efficiency and greater operational effectiveness intended by the Management Review Group. The amalgamation created even more ambiguity with respect to the Chief of Defence Staff and Deputy Minister’s seniority within the department. The concept of the staff fused civilian military staffs did not leverage strengths of individuals and led to a less effective department for both the civilian and military components. The intent of the amalgamation of CFHQ and DND into NDHQ was to create clarity and efficiency,

¹⁰² Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*, 118.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 118.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 119.

ironically the new structure created confusion and a newfound uncertainty that was not only at the top of the organization but through the entire mixed staff of civilians and military members. Overall, the creation of NDHQ greatly disrupted the balance within the *Regulative Pillar* of the Canadian Forces. This without a doubt contributed to a lack of acceptance of NDHQ in its 1972 form as a legitimate structure in the Canadian Forces as late as the 1980s.

Normative Pillar

The defence policy of the 1970s that stemmed from the Management Review Group's recommendations was equally destabilizing to the Canadian Forces in the context of the *Normative Pillar*. Through analysis of the reaction of key players in the Canadian Forces it will be shown that they resorted to normative practices in the face of a policy that went against the traditional values and norms of the Canadian Forces. Overall, the fact that the amalgamation of the CFHQ and DND into NDHQ caused a destabilization of the Canadian Forces in the *Normative Pillar* and that it did not achieve legitimacy as a policy will be illustrated.

During his interactions with Management Review Group, General Jacques Dextraze had initially accepted the concept of forming joint staffs that could either be headed by civilian or military personnel.¹⁰⁵ His assumption was that he would be able to control the new joint military-civilian staff through force of his personality in spite of any

¹⁰⁵Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*, 99.

new structure, just as he had always done.¹⁰⁶ He discovered that he could not control the staff as he had previously in his military career.¹⁰⁷ Despite the fact that senior civilian and military members of the staff were structurally obliged to serve the chain of command whether or not they were a civilian or military officer, their loyalty always defaulted to their original sub-culture.¹⁰⁸ In the face of structural changes that impacted the social cohesion of their respective traditional sub-cultures, the military and civilian staff defaulted to their normative behaviour based on past behavioural patterns. These actions of loyalty to the unwritten normative hierarchy directly contradicted the new regulated structure. This behaviour illustrates another example of the disruption in the *Normative Pillar* that the formation of NDHQ caused.

Similar to Hellyer's policy of unification the Management Review Group targeted the Canadian Forces strong service tradition. The Management Review Group was highly critical of norms and values that had a negative impact on the management of Canadian Defence in their view.¹⁰⁹ In this assertion, Management Review Group was often referring to the military way of doing things.¹¹⁰ The tradition of the strong service as specifically targeted:

...operational (i.e.) land, sea, air and functional loyalties are often maintained at the expense of loyalty to the organization as a whole; a widespread acceptance of organizational accountability in lieu of

¹⁰⁶ Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*, 99.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹⁰⁹ Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947 to 1985...*, 71.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 71.

individual accountability makes for ineffective and irresponsible
perform ance...¹¹¹

The Management Review Group proposed that the restructure and institution of a more managerial style would alleviate the perceived inefficiencies. More specifically, the policy targeted a supposed lack of efficiency of the traditional military way of operating and intended on creating more departmental loyalty within the Canadian Forces instead of the traditional environmental service oriented one. This observation confirms a few interesting points.

The enduring strong service culture in 1970s demonstrates that this normative feature of the Canadian Forces had endured Hellyer's unification policy. Similarly, it shows that the attempt to further dilute the environmental services by integrating staffs with not only the other services, but with civilian personnel was unlikely to receive acceptance in the normative context, which it did not.

An excellent assessment of the impact of these policies in the normative context can be found in the findings of the Task Force Review on Unification that was formed in September of 1979 by Defence Minister Allan McKinnon and led by G. Fyfe, a civilian with a naval background.¹¹² The testimony of senior service general officers during this review of policy clearly demonstrates that the strong environmental service tradition was still alive and well in 1980 despite unification and creation of NDHQ.

The least aggressive of the senior service representatives during the review was the commander of maritime command at the time who simply requested that the environmental staffs in Ottawa be improved and that environmental commanders have a

¹¹¹Bland, *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2 Defence Organization...*, 198.

¹¹²Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*, 102.

place in Defence Council and Defence Management Council.¹¹³ The commander of Air Command, General Mackenzie was more emphatic in his assertions. He stated that the main problem was a lack of influence of the environmental commanders within NDHQ and that this was caused by “the absence of an adequate formal interface between the functional commands and NDHQ.”¹¹⁴ In describing the future construct to solve this problem, he asserted that “environmental representation at NDHQ should be provided at the 3-star level by three chiefs of staff.”¹¹⁵

The most aggressive in his assertions to re-establishment of the strong environmental service power base within the Canadian Forces was the Force Mobile Commander General Paradis. He went so far as to say that an “Army Commander” be established who would be solely responsible for this service.¹¹⁶ Also, he proposed that NDHQ be reorganized completely on services lines instead of functional lines and that only a small unified staff be maintained to manage common issues.¹¹⁷ This opinion, when combined with the above comments of the of the senior air and maritime commanders at the time clearly indicate that the normative tradition of the strong environmental service orientation within the Canadian Forces was alive and well in spite of unification and the Management Review Group. In addition, it demonstrates that by attacking the power of the environmental services through policies such as amalgamated civilian-military staff, the defence policy of the 1970s was attacking the traditional

¹¹³ Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*, 104.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 104.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 104.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 104.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 104.

structure of the forces just as unification had in the 1960s. This once again elicited resistance to these policies in the Canadian Forces and contributed to a lack of their acceptance as legitimate from an institutional perspective.

Perhaps an even more accurate representation of the values and norms of the Canadian senior military leadership as of 1980 can be found in the Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces. This report was commissioned in May of 1980 subsequent to the aforementioned Task Force Review on Unification. This task force was comprised of senior officers, chaired by Major General J.E. Vance and reviewed by the CDS General R.M Withers. It provides excellent insight into the beliefs and values of the Canadian Forces senior leadership at the time.

The task force made explicit representations with respect to Canadian Forces identity, specifically regarding institutional symbols and carriers. The first example is the recommendation that the three environmental services re-adopt distinct uniforms.¹¹⁸ The task force also recommended that the navy rank nomenclature be recognized throughout the forces.¹¹⁹ This was noted in the Fyffe review, in which it was stated that the navy desired to re-adopt the “executive curl” for officer ranks.¹²⁰ Other examples include the recommendation that “further identification be provided in the Canadian Forces for environment, ship, squadron or unit (and) trade badges be authorized.”¹²¹ Not all these recommendations were accepted, but their existence in a written report generated by

¹¹⁸Department of National Defence, *Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: National Defence, 1980), 42.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, 42.

¹²⁰Bland, *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2 Defence Organization...*, 311.

¹²¹Department of National Defence, *Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification...*, 42.

senior Canadian Forces officers clearly indicates the importance of these symbols in the values and norms of this era. This emphasis on institutional carriers such as distinct uniforms in 1980 illustrates that the policies of unification and the defence policy of the 1970s that espoused a “joint” culture, were not accepted as legitimate in the *Normative Pillar* of the Canadian Forces.

In summary, when addressed in the context of Scott’s institutional analysis framework, the policies proposed by the Management Review Group and realized by the creation of NDHQ clearly destabilized the *Normative Pillar* of the Canadian Forces. The attempt to create better management and greater efficiencies by combining military and civilian staffs did not take into account the impact of the cultural loyalties of both groups. Directly targeting the strong environmental service tradition of the Canadian Forces offered the new amalgamated NDHQ structure little chance of acceptance in its 1972 form. This was made evident upon examination of the testimony of the senior environmental commanders to the Task Force Review on Unification of 1980 and reinforced by the Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces.

Overall, analysis of the *Normative Pillar* has shown that the creation of NDHQ did not achieve legitimacy and further contributed to the tension between the military and civilian elements in the Department of National Defence. This undoubtedly exacerbated the disparity in intellectual views that will be illustrated in the next section of the chapter.

Culture-Cognitive Pillar

As disruptive to the *Normative Pillar* of the Canadian Forces as the creation of NDHQ was, the conflict within the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar* during the time of the Management Review Group was even more pronounced. Analysis using Scott's institutional framework will show that Minister MacDonald's lack of consultation of senior military members was a flagrant display of a lack of acceptance of their world view. This was exacerbated when he placed business leaders in charge of the review group that did not have the military background necessary to place the managerial principles in a defence context. This created a conflict between a command versus management style with the opposite imperatives of operational effectiveness versus managerial efficiency. It will be shown that these conflicting world views during the 1970s era of Canadian defence policy led to instability in the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar* and contributed to the lack of institutional legitimacy of 1970s defence policies such as the formation of NDHQ.

When he began to review defence policy in 1971, Minister MacDonald deliberately chose not to consult senior military officials.¹²² He deemed any questions on Defence policy from defence officials as "obstinate rebellion".¹²³ Instead he assigned business leaders to the Management Review Group who considered the correction of "management inefficiencies" to be the main feature of new defence policy.¹²⁴ The fact that Minister MacDonald did not consult senior defence officials during the defence policy and in fact considered any dissenting opinions as rebellion, clearly establishes the

¹²²Rostek, *Public Management of Defence in Canada...*, 223.

¹²³Bland, *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2 Defence Organization...*, 160.

¹²⁴Rostek, *Public Management of Defence in Canada...*, 223.

disparity between his view of defence policy and that of the Canadian Forces senior members at the time. The fact that he chose business experts to examine policy reinforces this difference in intellectual views.

Not surprisingly, the business-oriented consultants in the Management Review Group arrived at business oriented solutions to perceived policy shortcomings in Canadian Defence. The prevailing belief amongst the members of Management Review Group was that by correcting the management shortcomings of the department would improve the departmental “end product” which was considered to be the efficiency and operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces.¹²⁵ Unfortunately, this managerial approach failed to bear fruit in the way it was intended. This likely resulted in an increase of the influence of the civil servants and a corresponding decrease in focus on operational issues. Command authority and responsibility were reduced and the end result was a Canadian Forces that was significantly less operationally effective.¹²⁶

These conflicting views of managerial-efficiency focused versus command-operationally focused are further illustrated upon examination of the Task Force Review on Unification. During the review it was noted by senior commanders that NDHQ did not address the commands’ operational requirements, specifically in the areas of force development and tactical doctrine.¹²⁷ The report of the Review Group produced in August 1980 further reinforced the contradiction to the managerial approach that had been established in the 1970s by recommending that “operational effectiveness be

¹²⁵Bland, *Canada’s National Defence: Volume 2 Defence Organization...*, 243.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, 164.

¹²⁷Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*, 106.

identified as the governing criterion in monitoring progress and in identifying improvement in all areas of CF endeavour.”¹²⁸ Also, the report raised major concerns with respect to the civilian managerial techniques that had been employed for the past eight years. The report openly questioned the managerial-efficiency focused philosophy of the 1970s by proposing a new metric for defence policy: “will it work in conflict?”¹²⁹ This new operationally focused outlook proposed in 1980 illustrates that the management world view had failed to establish itself as the primary one in Canadian Forces.

In summary, through analysis of the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar*, it was shown that the creation of NDHQ had a destabilizing effect on the social reality of the Canadian Forces. Minister MacDonald’s exclusion of senior defence officials from the creation of defence policy and assignment of civilian consultants illustrated an initial disparity in the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar* during this era between civilian and military elements in the Department of National Defence. The 1980 Task Force Review on Unification report revealed that the managerial approach was never intellectually accepted within the Canadian Forces and actually led to a decrease in operational effectiveness. Overall, it was shown that the defence policies that stemmed from the Management Review Group such as the creation of NDHQ and the managerial approach did not receive legitimacy in the Canadian Forces. Furthermore, this again demonstrated a disparity in the intellectual views between the civilian authority and military leadership during this era.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

¹²⁸Department of National Defence, *Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: National Defence, 1980), 3.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, 4.

Similar to Hellyer's unification policy, the formation of NDHQ and managerial approach adopted based on the recommendations of the Management Review Group created an imbalance amongst the institutional pillars of the Canadian Forces. It was shown in the context of the *Regulative Pillar* the new structure of NDHQ that was supposed to create greater efficiency and less ambiguity actually achieved the opposite, thereby destabilizing the institutional balance. In the *Normative Pillar*, the combined civilian-military staffs caused members to act in accordance with loyalties to their respective group of origin rather than according to their position, causing further destabilization. The Task Force Review on Unification report findings showed that the normative tradition of the strong environmental service affiliation in the Canadian Forces remained as strong as ever despite the unification policy and the creation of NDHQ. Analysis in the context of the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar* illustrated a conflict of world views within the department between the military members who were command and operationally focused and civilians who were management and efficiency focused.

Overall, the above analysis demonstrated that the defence policies instituted in the 1970s caused instability to the pillars of the Canadian Forces institution. Similar to the policy of unification this led to a lack of legitimacy of these policies within the Canadian Forces. Furthermore, this analysis reinforced powerful institutional forces revealed in Chapter Two that resist change in the Canadian Forces: the disparity in intellectual views between the civilian authority and military chain of command and the prevalence of the strong environmental service oriented culture.

CHAPTER FOUR – GENERAL HILLIER’S CF TRANSFORMATION

INTRODUCTION

Having looked at two of the most prolific periods of change for the Canadian Forces in the previous two chapters, this final chapter will look at the most recent change initiative that the Canadian Forces has experienced: General Rick Hillier’s policy of CF Transformation. It was shown in Chapters Two and Three that the policies of unification and the defence policies of the 1970s caused instability in the institutional pillars of the Canadian Forces and because of this did not achieve legitimacy. This raises the question of the institutional reaction to General Hillier’s CF Transformation. On the surface it appears to be different: it was operationally driven and generated by a senior officer of the Canadian Forces as opposed to the civilian initiatives studied in the previous chapters. This final chapter of the paper will conduct an institutional analysis of General Hillier’s CF Transformation initiative using Scott’s model.

First of all, the conditions under which General Hillier took over as CDS will be put into context. His acceptance of the position and the relationship he had with the Liberal government leadership prior to initiating his CF Transformation Policy will be described. Also, General Hillier’s actions and the timeline of key events in CF Transformation from February 2005 until his departure in June 2008 will be outlined.

The analysis of CF Transformation using will be conducted as it was in Chapters Two and Three. Examination of CF Transformation in the context of the three institutional pillars will expose some differences, but more importantly a remarkable

number of similarities to the analysis of the previous chapters. It will show that some of the same institutional pressures that resisted change in the past have been active in the Canadian Forces resistance to CF Transformation. Finally, when combined with the analysis of the two preceding chapters this chapter will provide critical insight into whether or not CF Transformation will achieve institutional legitimacy.

CONTEXT

The story of CF Transformation begins with General Rick Hillier's selection for and acceptance of the position of Chief of Defence Staff in 2005. Unlike many of his predecessors, even before being appointed as Chief of Defence Staff, General Hillier enjoyed an excellent relationship with the Minister of National Defence, Bill Graham.¹³⁰ General Hillier demanded support from the government before accepting the job of CDS. Unlike during the time of Defence Ministers Hellyer and MacDonald, he received this support and a commitment to allocate the appropriate funds to help transform the CF.¹³¹ By gaining this support, Hillier established CF Transformation as a military-led initiative, unlike the periods of change studied in the two previous chapters. With this support in hand, General Hillier set about the task of transforming the Canadian Forces.

General Hillier launched the process leading to CF Transformation as soon as he took command of the Canadian Forces February 4th 2005. He generated four CDS Action Teams (CAT). These teams were assigned four specific areas of the Canadian Forces to

¹³⁰General Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First - Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2009), 2.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, 11.

study and make recommendations on. The CAT team assignments were as follows: Command and Control (CAT 1), force development and generation (CAT 2), operational capabilities (CAT 3) and institutional alignment (CAT 4).¹³² In March of 2005 General Hillier held his first Armed Forces Council (AFC), during which he began to describe the scope of transformation to his subordinate generals and flag officers.¹³³

Subsequent to the AFC, General Hillier began to organize transformation. In April 2005 he made the decision to form the Canadian Forces Transformation Team (CCTT) and in June assigned then Major-General Natynczyk as the Chief of Transformation. The Chief of Transformation and the CCTT essentially had the task of developing an overall plan for the implementation of CF Transformation. General Hillier emphasized the need to map out an implementation plan and to create “irreversible momentum” on transformation.¹³⁴

On 18 October 2005 General Hillier issued his CDS Planning Guidance – CF Transformation. In this document he issued his intent, from which several key themes can be drawn. First of all General Hillier intended on creating a Canadian Forces that was “...more effective, relevant and responsive, and its profile and ability to provide leadership at home and abroad will be increased...”¹³⁵ This part of his intent was closely

¹³²General (Retired) Michael K. Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academic Press, 2009), 25.

¹³³Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation...*, 25.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, 26.

¹³⁵Department of National Defence, Chief of Defence Staff, CDS Planning Guidance – CF Transformation, 18 October 2005., 3.

tioned to the Liberal defence policy statement issued in 2005.¹³⁶ General Hillier also emphasized the integration of the three traditional services and special operations forces and the establishment of “...new integrated (beyond joint) organizations and structures, including a unified national command and control system.”¹³⁷ Finally, the principles of Gen Hillier’s CF Transformation help to further comprehend his intent to change the Canadian Forces. General Hillier’s CF Transformation principles are summarized below:

- *Canadian Forces Identity.* This principle laid out the intent that all Canadian Forces members would look past loyalty to their unit and environment and that their first loyalty would be to Canada and the Canadian Forces.¹³⁸
- *Command Centric Imperative.* This principle emphasised the fact that the Canadian Forces command and control structures would be designed with optimal decision making and operational support to commanders at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.¹³⁹
- *Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountabilities.* The intent of this principle was that all commanders were to be provided with a clear assignment of their responsibilities authorities and accountabilities.¹⁴⁰
- *Operational Focus.* This principle stressed that operational support and operations would have priority over all other aspects of the Canadian Forces.¹⁴¹

¹³⁶Department of National Defence, Liberal Defence Policy Statement. (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 4.

¹³⁷Department of National Defence, Chief of Defence Staff, CDS Planning Guidance – CF Transformation, 18 October 2005., 3.

¹³⁸Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation...*, 121.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, 123.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 125.

- *Mission Command.* This principle reinforced that a mission command style of leadership continue to be developed within the Canadian Forces. This specifically addressed the clear understanding of commander's intent in order for subordinates at all levels to conduct a "dynamic and decentralized execution of operations".¹⁴²
- *An Integrated Regular, Reserve and Civilian CF.* This final principle outlined that civilian, reserve and regular force members of the Canadian Forces be better integrated at all levels of the CF structure in order to better optimize their respective skills and experience.¹⁴³

General Hillier's intent and principles for CF Transformation clearly show the grand scope of his vision for the Canadian Forces.

The first key milestone for CF Transformation was achieved with the dissolution of the DCDS Group and the activation of the operational commands (Canada COM, CEFKOM, CANSOFCOM and CANOSCOM) on 1 February 2006. Transformation would then encounter headwinds as the Conservative government was elected January 2006 and took over 6 February that same year. General Hillier was presented the challenge of reconciling his CF Transformation vision for the Canadian Forces with new Conservative defence policy. While there was common ground, there were many conflicting priorities as well. As budgetary limits precluded fully realizing both the Conservative policy and CF Transformation, General Hillier had to compromise in some areas. One such compromise was the suspension of the Standing Contingency Task

¹⁴¹Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation...*, 125.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, 126.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, 126.

Force (SCTF) that had been a main feature of CF Transformation. This was a notable set-back to the realization of Hillier's vision.

Transformation then entered a period of review and correction in mid 2006. In order to achieve this, General Hillier engaged three retired senior officers, Lieutenant-General R.R. Crabb, Vice-Admiral L.G. Mason and Lieutenant-General F.R. Sutherland to conduct the Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Command Structure. Chief among the findings of the report was that CF Transformation was largely dependant on the CF leadership at the time and that Transformation be reassessed after the 2010 Olympics.¹⁴⁴ This caused Hillier to re-engage on Transformation re-affirming his intent to general officers in May 2007.¹⁴⁵ After this point however, CF Transformation has largely consolidated until present day.

ANALYSIS

Regulative Pillar

Having established the overall background of CF Transformation, this section will begin the analysis of Hillier's policy in the context of the *Regulative Pillar*. Similar to Hellyer and MacDonald, General Hillier intended on restructuring the Canadian Forces command structure as part of CF Transformation. He also used the power of his position to advance CF Transformation in the face of resistance. Analysis will show that Hillier's

¹⁴⁴Department of Defence, *A Report on the Validation of The Transformed Canadian Forces Command Structure* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence 2007), iv.

¹⁴⁵Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation...*, 36.

actions had a disruptive effect on the *Regulative Pillar* of the Canadian Forces as an institution. His aggressive restructuring would result in a reduction of the power base of the distinct environmental services and would conflict with the traditional power of the government when the Conservatives took power in 2006. It will also be demonstrated that whilst not as aggressive as Hellyer in sanctioning senior officers, Hillier applied his regulative power against those who resisted CF Transformation through succession planning. Overall, it will be shown that General Hillier's regulative measures had a disruptive effect on the institutional cohesion of the Canadian Forces.

In order to accomplish CF Transformation considerable restructure was required. Unlike the policies of Hellyer and MacDonald studied in the previous chapters that involved restructure at the strategic level of the organization, Hillier's restructure was at the operational level of the CF.¹⁴⁶ Because of this, unlike the restructure of Hellyer which required amendments to the NDA, the creation of the new commands (Canada COM, CEFCOM, CANOSCOM and CANSOFCOM) only required Minister of National Defence approval, which Hillier quickly obtained.¹⁴⁷

The establishment of the new operational commands was designed to optimize operational decision making and support in accordance with Hillier's intent and principles described earlier. There was however the ancillary impact of reducing the power of the Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS). Before CF Transformation, the ECS had been responsible for the operations of their respective environmental services within

¹⁴⁶Brigadier-General Daniel Gosselin and Doctor Craig Stone, "From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding The Fundamental Differences Between The Unification Of The Canadian Forces And It's Present Transformation," *Canadian Military Journal*, (Winter 2005-2006): 11.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 11.

Canada. With the creation of Canada COM, this ended and the ECS primary function became that of Force Generation.¹⁴⁸ In addition, it has been noted that through restructuring the CF as part of Transformation and by force of his own personality, General Hillier elevated the power of the position of CDS to an unprecedented level and as a result further reduced the power and influence of the ECS.¹⁴⁹ This disruption of the service power base that had slowly been re-established since the time of Hellyer's unification likely created resistance against the legitimacy of Hillier's CF Transformation.

General Hillier also caused stress within the *Regulative Pillar* of the CF during transformation by standing up the new operational commands just prior to the newly elected Conservative government being sworn in February 2006. Having received approval from the previous Liberal government, General Hillier went ahead with the public announcement of the new commands just days before the new government took office. The new Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor was upset that he was not consulted.¹⁵⁰ By not consulting the new Conservative government, General Hillier caused tension in the traditional power dynamic between the CF and the government authority. This disruption in the *Regulative Pillar* likely contributed to a divergence in the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar* that will be addressed later in the chapter.

As illustrated earlier in the chapter, General Hillier's unique relationship with the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Deputy Minister of Defence at the beginning of

¹⁴⁸Gosselin, *From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier...*, 11.

¹⁴⁹Major-General Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 years old – part one," *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 9, No.2, 13

¹⁵⁰Hillier, *A Soldier First...*, 397.

his tenure gave him arguably unprecedented power and influence as the CDS. When the Conservatives came into power however, right from the beginning they set about rebalancing this dynamic in favour of the government authority. The Conservatives would gradually reduce Hillier's power and influence as CDS until his retirement in 2008.¹⁵¹ A poignant example of this is when Minister O'Connor informed General Hillier that "we (the government) want to see less of you."¹⁵² Minister O'Connor's message was a direct assault on Hillier's large public persona and by extension his powerbase. This instability in the *Regulative Pillar* and lack of support from the conservatives on many of Hillier's initiatives, such as the purchase of C-17s against his advice, definitely impacted the legitimacy of CF Transformation.

The final aspect that will be addressed in the *Regulative Pillar* analysis of CF Transformation is Hillier's use of succession planning as a regulative measure. Whilst not aggressive as Hellyer's "Golden Handshake" policy, Hillier used his authorities and structural changes to adjust the senior officer cadre.¹⁵³ Hillier believed the merit process of the Canadian Forces was overly driven by formula and not subjective enough.¹⁵⁴ Accordingly, General Hillier set about changing the merit system at the executive level and shaping the General and Flag Officer Corps to suit his vision of CF Transformation.¹⁵⁵ As a result a number of senior officers retired, many of whom took an

¹⁵¹Philippe Lagasse, "A mixed legacy – General Rick Hillier and Canadian defence, 2005-08," *International Journal* (Summer 2009): 623.

¹⁵²Hillier, *A Soldier First...*, 403.

¹⁵³Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes...*, 163.

¹⁵⁴Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation...*, 93.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 93.

early retirement.¹⁵⁶ General Hillier certainly used succession planning as a regulative measure to further his policy of CF Transformation, thereby putting stress on the tradition power base within the Canadian Forces, specifically at the executive officer level.

In summary, General Rick Hillier's implementation of CF Transformation had a definite impact on the stability of the *Regulative Pillar* of the Canadian Forces. Similar to Hellyer and MacDonald, Hillier was heavily reliant upon regulative measures to restructure and redistribute the power in the Canadian Forces. Not unlike the analysis in Chapters One and Two, this emphasis on the *Regulative Pillar* caused stress to the Canadian Forces institution.

Overall, from an institutional analysis perspective General Hillier's use of power and authority were disruptive to the *Regulative Pillar* of the Canadian Forces. It is doubtful that an ambitious initiative such as CF Transformation would have made any progress without General Hillier's aggressive use of authority and power. That said the disruption of the Canadian Forces in the *Regulative Pillar* CF Transformation has caused likely negatively impacts the chances of its long-term success and legitimacy, especially with the retirement of General Hillier. Finally, this analysis of the *Regulative Pillar* illustrated once again the disparity in intellectual views between the military chain of command and the civilian authority and the resistance of the strong environmental service oriented culture in the Canadian Forces during this era.

Normative Pillar

¹⁵⁶Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation...*, 93.

As described earlier in the paper, one of Hillier's principles of Transformation was CF identity, which directly targeted the values and norms of Canadian Forces members. This next section will analyze the impact of CF Transformation from the *Normative Pillar* perspective. First, the great success General Hillier had in instilling pride in the Canadian Forces and restoring the warrior ethos will be examined. Second, Hillier's intent to change the loyalty of the Canadian Forces members to the CF and Canada above all else and his intent to change CF culture to be operationally-centric will be addressed. Finally, the backlash in the *Normative Pillar* to CF Transformation by the traditional Canadian Forces environmental service oriented culture will be illustrated. Overall, it will be shown that General Hillier initially reinforced the values and norms of the Canadian Forces by re-instilling pride and a warrior ethos, but over time the resistance of the environmental service oriented culture caused instability in the *Normative Pillar* with respect to CF Transformation.

General Hillier undertook a number of initiatives to change the Canadian Forces identity both within the forces and in the eyes of the Canadian public. He wanted to rebuild the ties within the Canadian Forces between the army, navy and air force and build new ties with the Canadian public. Hillier used a strategy called "Recruit the Nation" to accomplish this connection between the Canadian public and the Canadian Forces.¹⁵⁷ He also wanted to re-establish the fact that the Canadian Forces was different from other departments in public service because the job of the Canadian Forces was to kill people if necessary.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷Hillier, *A Soldier First...*, 329.

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 331.

Hillier went on to conduct an aggressive campaign of activities such as Canadian Forces appearances at sporting events and “support the troops” rallies. As a result, the Canadian Forces were raised from relative obscurity to become the focus of attention at the national level.¹⁵⁹ Hillier’s campaign was a success. Opinion polls at the time showed that the Canadian public opinion of the Canadian Forces was steadily increasing. In fact opinion increased to the point that two years after the campaign began a Strategic Council poll reported that the Canadian Forces was rated as “Canada’s most trusted and admired public institution.”¹⁶⁰ The reaction internal to the CF was just as favourable. While reporting in Afghanistan, reporter Christie Blatchford noted that many of the soldiers had the opinion that General Hillier “made it respectable to be a soldier again.”¹⁶¹ This very favourable feedback on the “Recruit the Nation” campaign, both from within the Canadian Forces and from the Canadian public, indicates an increase in the legitimacy of the institution. This policy undoubtedly reinforced the Canadian Forces in the *Normative Pillar*, but did not necessarily imply institutional support for the legitimacy of the greater policy of CF Transformation.

Hillier’s initial campaign of “Recruiting the Nation” without a doubt reinforced the Canadian Forces as an institution in the *Normative Pillar*. His greater goal of re-engineering Canadian Forces’ culture to one loyal to Canada and the CF above the environments and units would prove more difficult. In the Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Structure, it was noted that “...while the organizational

¹⁵⁹Lagasse, *A Mixed Legacy...*, 610.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 610-611.

¹⁶¹*Ibid.*, 611.

dimension of Transformation is progressing reasonably well, a key element of the Transformation Process – specifically culture change is not.”¹⁶² The report noted that the Canadian Forces culture still contained “a considerable degree of parochialism and, in some cases, an even more serious lack of trust confidence and respect.”¹⁶³ The report fell short of directly identifying the resistance of the environmental service focused culture to CF Transformation but it is likely that this is what it was alluding to.

There were further indicators of the resistance of the independent environments to CF Transformation. The ECS were concerned about the reduction in status of the ECS that the new operational command structure had created.¹⁶⁴ The air force and navy were particularly concerned with Hillier’s vision that many perceived to be “army-centric.”¹⁶⁵ Hillier himself had contributed to this perception prior to becoming CDS, when as CLS he wrote a well-known memo to the CDS. This memo was interpreted by some as suggesting that any increases to the defence budget augment the army at the expense of the navy and air force.¹⁶⁶ Hillier even admitted that this caused nervousness on the part of some when he became CDS.¹⁶⁷ These factors inevitably worked against Hillier’s initiative to change the Canadian Forces culture to one that was more “joint” and operationally-centric.

¹⁶²Department of National Defence, *A Report on the Validation of The Transformed Canadian Forces Command Structure...*, 58.

¹⁶³*Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁶⁴Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Michael K. Jeffery, “Inside Canadian Forces Transformation,” *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 10, No. 2, 15.

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁶⁶Hillier, *A Soldier First...*, 3.

¹⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 4.

There have also been other more recent indications of an enduring environmental service oriented culture within the Canadian Forces. In an interview with TVO 2 November 2009, the Chief of Maritime Staff Vice-Admiral McFadden stated that the Canadian Forces has necessarily grown the capacity to conduct land operations and supporting air mobility capabilities at the expense of developing maritime capabilities in order to support the effort in Afghanistan.¹⁶⁸ The Vice-Admiral went on to state that the navy has not been successful enough at “selling” its capabilities.¹⁶⁹ Also the term “maritime blindness” has been used by senior Canadian navy officers recently to describe what they perceive as a lack of understanding and appreciation of the Canadian navy’s capabilities, both by the Canadian Forces and the public.¹⁷⁰ There has also been a recent motion to resurrect the navy curl for naval officer ranks.¹⁷¹ The motion to return this institutional symbol can be directly related the desire of the navy to resurrect it in 1980, as noted in Chapter Three.

Another example of the reinforcement of the environmental service oriented culture in the Canadian Forces is the recent celebrations that both the air force and navy have conducted for the anniversaries of their original separate services. The navy has dedicated the year 2010 to celebrating the “Canadian Navy Centennial” and has activities

¹⁶⁸McFadden, Vice-Admiral Dean. TVO Interview, <http://www.tvo.org/TVO/WebObjects/TVO.woa?videoid?47870420001>; Internet; Accessed 5 April 2010.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Blakeley, Darlene. “What the Admiral said: The importance of being visible.” http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/10/10-a_eng.asp?category=57&id=605; Internet; accessed 5 April 2010.

¹⁷¹ Canada. Parliamentary Proceedings, Private Members’ Business, Canadian Navy (13:35), <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3&DocId=4332869#TOC-TS-1335>; Internet; accessed 7 April 2010.

during the entire year to celebrate.¹⁷² The air force conducted similar celebrations in 2009 commemorating the 85th anniversary of the air force.¹⁷³ While these celebrations seem perfectly harmless, they are an indicator that the norms and values of the Canadian Forces still rest with the separate environmental services. There is certainly no celebration held commemorating the anniversary of Hellyer's unification. These examples clearly illustrate that five years after the initiation of Hillier's vision to change the Canadian Forces culture, the environmental service oriented values and norms of the CF endure, just as they did through Hellyer's unification and MacDonald's formation of NDHQ.

In summary, CF Transformation has impacted the *Normative Pillar* in several ways. Hillier's "Recruit the Nation" strategy definitely had a positive impact on the norms and values of the Canadian Forces and the relationship with the public. Also, Hillier's public reinforcement of the Canadian Forces as a war fighting organization that had the job of killing people if necessary, brought back a much needed warrior ethos and pride to the CF. These initiatives served to reinforce the legitimacy of the Canadian Forces as an institution, but did not extend to the legitimacy of CF Transformation. In contrast, Hillier's vision to re-orient the Canadian Forces culture away from loyalty to units and environments and instead instil loyalty to the CF and Canada above all else did not take hold. The engrained environmental service oriented culture of the Canadian Forces resisted Hillier's effort just as it did Hellyer's and MacDonald's. Overall, despite initially reinforcing the legitimacy of the Canadian Forces with initiatives such as

¹⁷²Canadian Navy, "Canadian Navy Centennial," http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/centennial/3/3-c_eng.asp?category=68; Internet; accessed 13 April 2010.

¹⁷³Canada's Air Force, "RCAF 85th Anniversary Celebrations," <http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/16w-16e/nr-sp/index-eng.asp?id=8293>; Internet; accessed 13 April 2010.

“Recruit the Nation”, Hillier’s cultural reform policy contained in CF Transformation caused disruption in the *Normative Pillar* and does not appear to have attained legitimacy.

Cultural-Cognitive Pillar

Similar to the *Normative Pillar* analysis conducted in the previous section Hillier’s CF Transformation policy had a promising start in the context of the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar*. First, the fact that Hillier had an initially unprecedented common view with leadership within the department and at the strategic level will be demonstrated. Second, the fact that General Hillier also achieved an initial common view with his fellow senior officers will be illustrated. Subsequent analysis will show however that this common view degraded over time due to the election of the Conservative government in 2006 and due to the belief amongst senior officers that many of the goals of CF Transformation were not achievable. Overall, the fact Hillier initially achieved an unprecedented common view at all levels within DND that was lost over time will be shown.

Hillier did not want to undertake the daunting task of CF Transformation or the position of CDS without the support from his political superiors. During the interview process, both with the Minister of National Defence Bill Graham and Prime Minister Paul Martin, General Hillier clearly communicated his requirement for support from the government. He was assured that the Liberal government would support his future vision

for the Canadian Forces.¹⁷⁴ This shared view between the CDS, the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence was unprecedented. General Hillier's intimate involvement in writing the Liberal defence policy exemplifies this.¹⁷⁵ Hillier referred to this relationship as the "triumvirate" but recognized its uniqueness.¹⁷⁶ He acknowledged a similar level of compatibility and common world view with the Deputy Minister of National Defence at the time, Ward Elcock.¹⁷⁷ This initial common view of CF Transformation at the strategic level set the conditions for success and acceptance of the vision within the Canadian Forces as legitimate from a cultural-cognitive perspective.

Having gained full support at the strategic level, General Hillier communicated CF Transformation to his subordinate general and flag officers at his initial seminar in February 2005. The initial reception was very positive and enthusiastic.¹⁷⁸ His subordinate officers were excited by the prospect of change and the creation of a Canadian Forces that was more modern and relevant was accepted.¹⁷⁹ When combined with the common view he had achieved with his political masters, the initial acceptance of CF Transformation by his fellow general officers provided Hillier with an unprecedented level of acceptance in the context of the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar*. At this point in time it appeared that CF Transformation would achieve legitimacy in the Canadian Forces from a cultural-cognitive perspective.

¹⁷⁴Hillier, *A Soldier First...*, 11-12.

¹⁷⁵Hillier, *A Soldier First...*, 346.

¹⁷⁶*Ibid.*, 352-353.

¹⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 353.

¹⁷⁸Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation...*, 56.

¹⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 56.

This common view did not last however. As early as the second General and Flag Officer seminar in June 2005, senior officers began to voice concerns over Hillier's vision.¹⁸⁰ It has even been proposed that Hillier had never truly attained a shared vision for CF Transformation amongst this cohort.¹⁸¹ The navy and air force were particularly apprehensive about the vision as it focused on failed states, most of which involved land operations. The belief that Hillier's vision was "army-centric" was still present.¹⁸² This intellectual view undoubtedly worked in concert with the social pressure observed in the *Normative Pillar* analysis to create resistance to CF Transformation. As a result, General Hillier ended up adjusting his vision subsequent to his May 2007 General and Flag Officer seminar in order to make it more inclusive, but momentum in the cultural-cognitive domain amongst his senior officers had clearly been lost.

CF Transformation experienced a similar loss of momentum in the cultural-cognitive domain when the Conservative government was elected in January 2006. As mentioned in the analysis of the *Regulative Pillar*, Hillier started out the relationship with the new government with conflict (if not actual, perceived on the part of Minister O'Connor). Hillier no longer enjoyed the "triumvirate" with Paul Martin and Bill Graham and with its loss had lost the unprecedented common view at the strategic level.

The new Conservative government came in with a new defence policy with some aspects that were amenable to Hillier's Transformation and others that were in conflict with it.¹⁸³ Hillier had to compromise accordingly. An example of Hillier's compromise

¹⁸⁰Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation...*, 56.

¹⁸¹*Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁸²*Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁸³Hillier, *A Soldier First...*, 401-402, 405.

is the purchase of the C-17 strategic aircraft, which was not part of his vision but was in the Conservative election campaign.¹⁸⁴ Other projects such as the procurement of tactical airlift and new trucks for the army were also delayed as a result.¹⁸⁵ By 2006, just as he had lost the common view amongst his fellow senior officers at the operational level, Hillier had clearly lost the common view for CF Transformation he had had with the Liberal government in 2005. With this loss of support, Hillier had lost the unique stability in the cultural-cognitive domain in support of CF Transformation that he briefly held in 2005. This also demonstrated a return to the intellectual conflict between the military chain of command and the civilian authority seen in Chapters Two and Three.

In summary, the analysis of the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar* has shown that General Hillier initially achieved an unprecedented common view both within the CF and with his political superiors for his vision of CF Transformation. However, this initial stability within the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar* was fleeting. The navy and air force believed that Hillier's initial vision was "army-centric" and support from these services waned, forcing Hillier to re-engineer his vision to be more inclusive in 2007. With the election of a new Conservative government in 2006, General Hillier lost his special relationship and shared view with his political masters. Overall it was shown that General Hillier's CF Transformation did initially enjoy legitimacy with the CF from a cultural-cognitive perspective. This acceptance was brief however and has continually degraded over time. Finally, the disparity in intellectual views between the military chain of command and the civilian authority and the resistance to change by the strong environmental service oriented culture in the Canadian Forces were reinforced through this analysis.

¹⁸⁴Hillier, *A Soldier First...*, 398.

¹⁸⁵*Ibid.*, 410.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter analysed General Hillier's CF Transformation initiative from an institutional analysis perspective using W.R. Scott's framework. In contrast to Hellyer's unification and the policies of the 1970s, CF Transformation appeared to have initially achieved balance amongst the institutional pillars of the Canadian Forces. Its acceptance as legitimate from an institutional perspective appeared very possible. It was shown that this acceptance eroded steadily over time however.

Analysis in the context of the *Regulative Pillar* demonstrated that Hillier elevated his authority as CDS to an unprecedented level and by his creation of the operational headquarters reduced the power base of the environments, causing imbalance in the regulative domain. The initial acceptance in the *Normative Pillar* to the "Recruit the Nation" campaign and the re-establishment of the Canadian Forces warrior role in the eyes of Canada gave way to the resistance to CF Transformation due to the enduring environmentally oriented values and norms. Finally, analysis of the *Cultural-Cognitive Pillar* revealed that CF Transformation initially achieved an unprecedented level of acceptance as a common view amongst Hillier's political masters and fellow senior officers, but this was lost over time.

In summary, when weighed against Hellyer's unification and the defence policy of the early 1970s studied in Chapters Two and Three, CF Transformation initially achieved the greatest stability amongst the institutional pillars and therefore had the greatest chance of achieving legitimacy in the CF. This initial stability amongst the

pillars and potential for legitimacy unfortunately eroded over time. Ironically, CF Transformation has experienced similar adversaries to that of unification and the policies of the early 1970s: the resistance to change by the environmental service oriented culture and the difference in intellectual views between the civilian authority and military leadership. Lastly, the departure of General Hillier in 2008 puts into serious question the future of CF Transformation.

CONCLUSION

This paper examined several critical periods of change in Canadian Forces history through the sociological lens of institutional analysis. Chapter One described W.R. Scott's model for institutional analysis that was applied in the subsequent chapters. Chapter Two examined Hellyer's unification policy. Chapter Three analysed the defence policies of the 1970s that stemmed from the Management Review Group and resulted in the creation of NDHQ. Finally, Chapter Four conducted an institutional analysis of Hillier's CF Transformation.

Though this institutional analysis, this paper demonstrated that powerful sociological elements in the Canadian Forces resisted these change policies. It was shown that all of these policies destabilized the Canadian Forces as an institution and failed to achieve legitimacy. Two major institutional forces that resist change in the Canadian Forces were identified: the strong environmentally-oriented service culture and a disparity in intellectual views between the civilian authority and military chain of command.

The intent of this paper was to discover why these critical periods of change met resistance from the Canadian Forces. The analysis revealed a greater understanding of why these seemingly rational change policies did not achieved their envisioned results. There are a number of conclusions that are drawn based on this analysis. These conclusions fall into two broad categories: those specific to the policies studied and broader lessons on the value of institutional analysis.

In the context of the policies examined, this paper clearly demonstrated the sociological forces that resist change in the Canadian Forces. Minister Hellyer did not consider the sociological impact of forcing the unification policy on the Canadian Forces. He leveraged regulative measures to enforce unification, but discounted the instability that he caused to the *Normative* and *Cultural-Cognitive Pillars*. The defence policy of the 1970s that stemmed from the Management Review Group and resulted in the NDHQ suffered a similar fate. Despite restructuring the headquarters, personnel continued to operate in accordance with normative practices. The defence policy of the 1970s also served to reinforce the disparity in intellectual views between the military chain of command and the civilian authority in the Department of National Defence. General Hillier's CF Transformation appeared to have the greatest chance of success from an institutional analysis perspective, but has since suffered setbacks that were also related to instability in the institutional pillars.

Furthermore, this paper identified two fundamental institutional forces that have resisted change in the Canadian Forces. First, there has historically been stiff opposition from the strong environmentally-oriented culture to anything that threatens the individual services. Second, in all three cases the difference in intellectual views between the military chain of command and the civilian authority proved to be a powerful force of resistance to change. The recognition of these two institutional forces could greatly aid in the development of future policies. Accounting for the reaction to new policies in the context of these institutional forces would permit policy makers to forecast the likelihood of their legitimacy. It would also allow policy makers to mitigate the impact of these factors by considering them during policy development.

The second set of conclusions relate to the value of institutional analysis. This paper has showcased institutional analysis as a powerful tool of study. It demonstrated that by using Scott's analytical framework, one can delve deeper into the difficult topics of social pressures and structures in an organization. Often when sociological aspects of an organization are raised, this complex issue can be oversimplified with conclusions such as 'it's a cultural thing' or it's 'just the way things are done.' Institutional analysis provides a methodology to understand this complex topic. It offers a method by which the social framework of an organization can be distilled into its constituent components and analyzed against external pressures.

The unique and valuable analytical tool that institutional analysis offers should be applied to other aspects of the Canadian Forces. Other defence policies could be studied using this method to provide a greater understanding of their impact from a sociological perspective. For example, the core tasks identified in the *Canada First Defence Strategy* could be analysed to determine their legitimacy within the Canadian Forces. This would provide critical insight into the impact of these tasks on the pillars of the Canadian Forces and the prospects of their long-term legitimacy. In addition, institutional analysis of historically controversial tasks such as peacekeeping and the current counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan would provide a greater understanding of their impact on the Canadian Forces. Such research would ultimately provide a greater overall understanding of the Canadian Forces as an organization and greatly aid in the development of future policies.

In spite of the effectiveness of institutional analysis demonstrated in the paper one, must also be aware of its limitations. This harkens back to the second part of Scott's omnibus definition for institutions found in Chapter One in which he proposes that the pillars "...together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life." This speaks to also studying the resources and activities of an organization. Ultimately, all aspects of an organization must be examined to when developing policy. Examining the more empirical elements of institutions combined with the sociological perspective that institutional analysis provides would present a formidable analysis.

While not the panacea to understanding all things institutional, Scott's framework definitely offers one of the fundamental aspects. The value of the analysis in this paper to better understanding the Canadian Forces speaks for itself. Institutional analysis of historical examples provides insight into the reaction to past policies and enduring organizational traits. These sociological factors are difficult to measure and assess. This tool is particularly valuable in assessing future change policies. One thing remains certain; bringing change to organizations will remain a challenge. It behoves us to understand all aspects of institutions, especially the oft misunderstood ones in the sociological domain.

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