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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

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**CIVILIANS ON OPERATIONS – CANADA CAN LEARN FROM THE PAST.**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Military forces have utilized civilians to support operations in various forms since antiquity. Civilians have been an enabler to these forces both in garrison and during expeditionary operations. These civilians have also generated costs that the Canadian Forces should consider in their use of civilians on operations. In order to highlight areas for consideration, this paper will assess the historical and contemporary civilian experience through three distinct perspectives: historical, contemporary American, and current Canadian. Each perspective will highlight the benefits, reasons for civilian reliance, and costs of using civilians on operations in order to demonstrate areas for consideration as the Canadian Forces continues to develop its reliance on civilians to support its operations. Considerations in the areas of training, the impact to military manning, the economic costs, command and control, and legal and ethical issues will be highlighted.

The research conducted for this paper concludes that civilians have provided great benefits to military forces, including the Canadian Forces, and have often been a force multiplier. It demonstrated that there are also significant costs that generated by relying on civilians to support operations. However, it is argued that these costs can be mitigated and should not negate the Canadian Forces continued use of civilians. In its continued use of civilians, the Canadian Forces should consider the following caveats. The Canadian Forces should consider the following four recommendations. First, the Canadian Forces should consider limiting the use of civilians to perform functions that are critical to the operation. Second, the Canadian Forces should maintain core

competencies that impact operations even if the function has been outsourced. Third, robust command and control measures should be maintained to ensure that performance and value are maintained in those areas that are completed by civilians. Forth, the ethical and legal dilemmas raised in this paper should be more carefully considered in order for civilian dependency on operations to survive public scrutiny.

## 1 CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Military forces have utilized civilians<sup>1</sup> to support operations in various forms since antiquity. Civilians have been an enabler to these forces both in garrison and during expeditionary operations. The civilians that have supported forces have either voluntarily accompanied them as private citizens, have been employed by the forces to perform specific roles or, as seen more recently, have deployed with the forces as an extension of the government's deployment. Throughout history, leaders, monarchs, states, and nations have gone so far as to hire mercenaries to augment their own forces and even to fight their battles outright. The role of civilians supporting operations has been extended to include tasks that had traditionally only been conducted by military members. The benefits that civilians provide the forces, the reliance the forces have on civilians, and the costs that civilians generate are of primary concern for this paper in order for the Canadian military to appreciate the implications of relying on civilians to support operations.

Commonly known as camp followers<sup>2</sup>, private citizens that followed a force from antiquity to the Modern Age offered desired goods and services in exchange for money or trade. They were not on the government's payroll and their role was far removed from

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<sup>1</sup> This paper defines a "civilian" as a member of a society that is not a member of his or her own state's armed forces.

<sup>2</sup> "...a term used to identify civilians who follow in the wake of armies and service their needs whilst encamped in order to sell goods or services that the military does not supply."

the direct conflict. As members of commercial firms, their role has evolved until the present day. They have come to work closer to the front line with responsibilities that include operating key weaponry and providing security. More recently, militaries have deployed with civilians normally engaged with other governmental agencies such as foreign services and international development agencies. Civilians have enabled modern forces to reduce the number of deployed uniformed soldiers and quickly obtain capabilities that were not immediately inherent in the military and increase their capacity.

The reliance of forces on civilians has also evolved over time. The changing conditions of society, conflict, and operations as well as the technological advances of modern forces have increased the dependency on civilians. The peace dividend stemming from the end of the Cold War led to smaller militaries, so Western forces increased their reliance on civilians as deployed operations increased. Peace support operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, followed by the War on Terrorism in both Iraq and Afghanistan caused many armies to rely heavily on the use of civilians in order to effectively conduct operations.

For all the benefits that civilians have brought to forces conducting operations, they have come with costs. Historically, the costs have primarily centred on disciplinary issues and force mobility. This has caused some forces to limit the quantity of civilians allowed to support them. More recently, issues in the areas of law and ethics, command and control, discipline, and cost effectiveness, to name a few, have become central to the considerations of forces using civilians to support their operations.

Canada's reliance on civilians for operations is relatively new. In the last two decades, the Canadian Forces have begun to utilize civilians more regularly. It is therefore prudent to examine the use of civilians that have supported other forces' operations throughout history. Doing so will provide Canadian Forces planners with a greater capacity to plan and mobilize civilian support for future operations as well as a greater ability to develop policy with regards to any permanent reliance on civilians. This paper will provide a holistic approach and attempt to examine all civilian groups that have supported or continue to support military forces. These include camp followers, mercenaries, locally employed civilians, public servants, and contractors.

In order to highlight areas for consideration, this paper will assess the historical and contemporary civilian experience through three distinct perspectives. First, it will use a historical perspective to examine how civilians were used, what capabilities they provided, and what positive and negative impacts they had on the military element from antiquity through to 2000. Next, the current practices of the dominant user of civilians in contemporary operations – the United States – will be considered. Third, the current use of civilians supporting Canadian operations will be explored. Each perspective will highlight the benefits, reasons for civilian reliance, and costs of using civilians on operations in order to demonstrate areas for consideration as the Canadian Forces continues to develop its reliance on civilians to support its operations. Considerations in the areas of training, the impact to military manning, the economic costs, command and control, and legal and ethical issues will be highlighted. The research shows that there



are considerable patterns with regards to the cost of using civilians on operations throughout history and with the current American use of civilians. Costs that have existed through time include discipline issues due to lack of command and control militaries had over civilians. Poor performance of civilians has also been a concern of militaries from antiquity to the present. This reality should compel military Canadian planners to learn from the experience of forces in history and the American forces as civilians are deployed in various capacities to support operations.

## **2 CHAPTER 2 - HISTORICAL USE OF CIVILIANS**

Modern beliefs that earlier armies were nearly all teeth with only minimal tail are very deceptive because such assumptions tend to forget the civilian logistic support that travelled with military forces.<sup>3</sup>

Christopher Duffy , historian, 2008

This chapter seeks to illustrate the positive and negative impacts of civilian involvement with military forces throughout history. It highlights lessons that were identified by the commanders of those forces with regards to the civilians that accompanied their forces. Those lessons will provide factors that should be considered by Canadian military planners when developing force structures, determining what functions should be conducted by civilians, and determining appropriate levels of reliance. This chapter is organised into three main periods of history: ancient history

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<sup>3</sup> John A. Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 135.

from 700 BCE to 600 CE; the middle ages from 600 CE to 1700 CE; and the modern era from 1700 CE to 1970 CE.

## **2.1 Ancient History 700 BCE to 600 CE**

There is not a tremendous amount of research on the involvement of civilians in antiquity as historians have tended to focus on the battles that soldiers were waging and the equipment they were using. Nevertheless, as far back as 700 BCE, civilians occupied a supporting role to expeditionary campaigns as empires fought to expand or defend themselves. Civilians provided a significant degree of capability to the force far removed from the combat zone. Namely, civilians carried supplies and provided: food, labour for construction, sundries, and welfare services.<sup>4</sup> However there was a cost to civilians providing these functions in the form of loss to discipline, and mobility of expeditionary forces. The benefits that civilians provided the force during this period will now be examined.

### **2.1.1 Benefits**

Camp followers provided vital support to most armies of antiquity. A historian concentrating on the study of camp followers, George Forty, goes so far as to say: “There have been camp followers of one type or another ever since there have been soldiers...”<sup>5</sup> The majority of camp followers were civilian traders of much needed supply items and

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<sup>4</sup> Forty, George and Forty, Anne, *They also Served* (Kent, UK: Midas Books, 1979), 21.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

services. Their motivation was to make a living, but they also provided the force with required and desired supplies that could not be (or had not been) gained by plunder or supplied by the military. Camp followers included both men and women and from earliest times women typically sustained the force with food and sexual services.<sup>6</sup>

There is also evidence to suggest that armies of antiquity hired niche civilian capabilities to support operations. These niche capabilities were primarily in logistics and construction support. Hired human porters were an important part of the carrying capacity of the logistics train of the armies of antiquity. The armies of Alexander, the Romans, the Indians, and the Chinese made extensive use of porters.<sup>7</sup> A case in point: Sargon of Assyria (721-705 BCE) took along thousands of workmen in his campaign against the Urartu. They were used to construct camps, roads, and bridges along his route of advance.<sup>8</sup>

During this period, city-states were also reliant on mercenaries. Many hired armed men to augment their forces or fight their battles entirely.<sup>9</sup> Many states did not have the population nor the societal conditions and values to allow them to build large state armies. Carthage was well known for employing and depending on mercenaries

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<sup>6</sup> Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe*; Miles, Rosalind and Cross, Robin, *Hell Hath no Fury* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2008), 126.

<sup>7</sup> Richard A. Gabriel, *Soldiers' Lives through History: The Ancient World* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2007), 103.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>9</sup> Fred Rosen, *Contract Warriors* (New York, New York: Penguin Group, 2005), 10.

from other states to fight their battles.<sup>10</sup> As a commercial society consisting of approximately 400 000 people in the third century BCE, Carthage depended on its citizens to support the economy.<sup>11</sup> With such a small population, the city-state could not afford to raise a large military force. Carthage's solution was to hire mercenaries from the surrounding area. The historian Richard Gabriel indicated: "Carthaginian recruitment agents became a common sight throughout the Near East, Italy, Greece, Gaul, and Africa, where they hired soldiers and complete military units from princes and kings."<sup>12</sup> The Battle of Gela in 405 BCE between Carthage and the Greek city-state, Syracuse, included large numbers of mercenaries on both sides. Of the 50 000 strong Syracusan Army, 2450 were mercenaries primarily from the Italian region of Campania.<sup>13</sup> The majority of the Carthaginian army of 300 000 was made up of mercenaries from Iberia, Balearia, Campania, Canaan, Libya, and Al Andalus.<sup>14</sup> During the Second Punic War between Rome and Carthage from 218 BCE to 202 BCE, the Carthaginian army commanded by Hannibal included a minority of native Carthaginians with the majority being hired mercenaries from Africa, Spain and Gaul.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, the Second Punic War marked the most extensive use of civilians on operations until the American invasion of Iraq 1990.

During this period, civilians provided the force significant benefits. They allowed

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>11</sup> Gabriel, *Soldiers' Lives through History: The Ancient World*, 103.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 258.

<sup>13</sup> Rosen, *Contract Warriors*, 47.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

the force to focus their manning the fighting capability or “teeth” arms with less emphasis on functions of support and construction. Civilians also provided the force with a quick capability and an increase to their capacity in the form of hired mercenaries. These benefits will resonate through history and into the benefits that the Canadian Forces are enjoying through their use of civilians on operations. Although civilians provided benefits to forces of antiquity, they came with costs.

### **Costs**

There is evidence, for example, that Roman commanders did not always regard all civilians as force multipliers due to their negative impact on discipline and mobility. Specifically, some Roman commanders regarded women and other camp followers as a threat, both to discipline and to mobility.<sup>16</sup> Although initially accepting of the camp followers for the benefits they provided, some Roman army commanders took a sterner line on camp followers and denied them access to camps during expeditions. In 134 BCE, while campaigning in Spain, the Roman commander, Scipio Aemilianus, banished the camp followers from the Roman camp and introduced a more disciplined regimen of military training.<sup>17</sup> By the fourth century, the Roman army had become progressively less mobile because of camp followers. As a result, in 306 CE, Emperor Constantine split his army into a mobile forces and a static force. The mobile force significantly

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<sup>16</sup> Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe*; Miles, Rosalind and Cross, Robin, *Hell Hath no Fury*, 126.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 126.

reduced the number of civilians while the static portion of his forces maintained large quantities of civilians.<sup>18</sup>

In contrast to Sargon of Assyria, who employed significant numbers of civilian construction workers to satisfy the Army's construction needs, the Egyptian, Alexandrian, and Roman armies required their own soldiers to construct whatever infrastructure was required.<sup>19</sup> These armies were only willing to go so far in the employment of civilians on operations. In order to avoid mobility and discipline problems, they relied less on civilians. Moreover, these states were in a better position to not have to rely on civilians for support as their societies were able to not only raise the "teeth" of their forces but also some of the support capability or "tail". This lessened some of the reliance on hired labour in support roles that were critical to mission success.

Another cost to a force using civilians was that states that included civilians in their expeditionary campaigns were also forced to deal with the responsibility to protect the lives of those civilians supporting their operations. There are several examples of civilians being slaughtered during sieges, as ancient armies generally did not distinguish civilians from soldiers. In 413 BCE, Thracian mercenaries hired by the Athenian statesman Demosthenes sacked the town of Mycalessus and butchered the inhabitants, young and old.<sup>20</sup> This example illustrates the general treatment of civilians that were

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

<sup>19</sup> Gabriel, *Soldiers' Lives through History: The Ancient World*, 50.

<sup>20</sup> Mark Grimsley and Clifford J. and Rogers, eds., *Civilians in the Path of War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 3.

caught in the line of fire and often targeted. Civilians accompanying forces were as exposed to capture or being killed as military members as there was little differentiation between the force and civilians supporting the force. Although there was no Geneva Convention protecting civilians from direct attack, there were some armies that did recognize that civilians should be provided with more protection. The historian Paul Rahe indicates that: "...ancient Greeks may not have distinguished soldiers from civilians in the manner in which we do; they may not have subscribed to any formal notion of non-combatant immunity; but, at least in their wars with one another, they did concede to bystanders a moral claim."<sup>21</sup> Saying that, there are examples of civilians accompanying the force that were specifically targeted for their strategic value. In 333 BCE, the wife and daughters of Persia's King Darius, who were accompanying the Persian army, were deliberately sought out and captured by Alexander the Great's Macedonian army after the Battle of Issus.<sup>22</sup>

In summary, from 700 BCE to 600 CE, civilians provided goods and services through both a naturally occurring economy of camp followers that was allowed to continue in varying degrees over time and from state army to state army. Armies also benefited from civilians by contracting out certain niche services such as construction and the movement of supplies. There is further evidence of state reliance of varying degrees on hired mercenaries to bolster their own forces.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, the use of civilians was

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>22</sup> Miles, Rosalind and Cross, Robin, *Hell Hath no Fury*, 126.

<sup>23</sup> Gabriel, *Soldiers' Lives through History: The Ancient World*, 78.

not a panacea, as different armies used them to different degrees and different commanders limited their use primarily due to disciplinary and mobility issues. These costs and benefits set precedence in the use of civilians to support operations that can be utilized to make informed decisions in the Canadian Forces use of civilians on operations.

## **2.2 Middle and Medieval Ages 600-1700**

The analysis above demonstrates the reliance that ancient armies had on civilians to support their operations as well as their benefits and costs that should be used by military planner when considering the use of civilians on future operations. A similar analysis will be conducted during the Middle and Medieval Ages (600 – 1700). Similar to antiquity, state actors in the Middle and Medieval ages relied on civilians to sustain their forces. Indeed, based on the feudal system, this period also saw a greater degree of reliance on hired mercenaries than the majority of city states in antiquity.



### 2.2.1 Benefits

Camp followers were also a feature of middle and medieval warfare. They provided many of the foraging, cooking, and washing services essential to the maintenance of deployed European armies.<sup>24</sup> As the historian, John Lynn, indicated:

“During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when legions of women accompanied soldiers into the field, logistical realities determined strategy and operations, such as movements of armies on campaign and pillage of civilian communities in their paths. Women were significant factors and actors in this plunder –driven campaign economy.”<sup>25</sup>

The significant reliance on camp followers was demonstrated by the sheer numbers that followed the forces. The camp followers of this period often outnumbered the military force. For example, during the invasion of Italy between 1494 and 1499, 50 000 individuals were fed but only 20 000 were considered combatants.<sup>26</sup> In the early seventeenth century, a German military commentator, Jacob von Wallhausen, stated: “When you recruit a regiment of German soldiers today, you do not only acquire 3,000 soldiers; along with these you will certainly find 4,000 women and children.”<sup>27</sup>

The force benefited from civilians as they provided the function of sutler.<sup>28</sup> They sold food items, alcohol, tobacco and small luxuries to troops similar to present day

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<sup>24</sup> Miles, Rosalind and Cross, Robin, *Hell Hath no Fury*, 127.

<sup>25</sup> Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe*, 8.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>28</sup> Forty, George and Forty, Anne, *They also Served*, 57.

canteens or exchanges. The sutlers would set up their mobile markets under the supervision of a military authority. Sutlers filled the gap between what the state supplied and what the ranks needed or wanted.<sup>29</sup> As well as being sources of supply, the sutlers' market tents became the hand out for troops during off duty hours similar to welfare tents, or, in Canadian terms, the Canada House that is ironically also manned by civilians.<sup>30</sup> Sutlers had an immeasurable positive impact on morale and offered the troops a refuge more similar to home.<sup>31</sup>

Similar to the situation during antiquity, the Middle Ages were also full of examples where leaders used non-state armed men to fight their battles. In the feudal system that characterized this period, the crown persuaded local nobility to raise troops to augment any forces it might have to wage war. In his book *Private Sector, Public Wars*, the historian James Carafano indicated that during this period, warfare was primarily a private sector activity since the forces were largely hired. This was because Crowns at the time relied on local nobility to bolster their forces.<sup>32</sup> Carafano indicated that: "Switzerland, Scotland, and the German States, in particular were well known for exporting private armies."<sup>33</sup> The transition from the Middle Ages to the Medieval Ages saw a significant change to the nature of warfare. Feudal armies were replaced by more

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<sup>29</sup> Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe*, 135.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 136.

<sup>31</sup> Forty, George and Forty, Anne, *They also Served*, 58.

<sup>32</sup> James Jay Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat- Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts* (Wesport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 19.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

flexible, professional mercenary organisations. Forces based on mercenaries allowed the crown to increase his or her forces threefold.

Similar to the ancient history, military forces benefited from the use of camp followers, sutlers, contractors, and hired mercenaries to support and bolster their forces during this period. The Middle and Medieval Ages demonstrated an increase in the reliance of camp followers to support military forces. This period also demonstrated a significant increase to the use of private mercenaries that allowed monarchs to conquer more land and ensure their power status.

### 2.2.2 Costs

Although civilians provided the force with significant benefits during this period, there were also accompanying costs. Sutlers lived under increasing military regulation and supervision from the force they were supporting. The force believed these measures were necessary due to several reasons. Namely, there were instances of unfair inflation of prices; the quality of goods that were provided by sutlers were poor; and they caused a logistics burden on the force since the force was required to move these civilians.<sup>34</sup> In order to ensure the force was receiving good value, not only did the force increase their supervision, they also began to limit their numbers. What was once unrestricted, in the seventeenth century, the Swedish army only allowed one sutler for every infantry

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<sup>34</sup> Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe*, 138.

company and, for the same reasons, the French passed a law in 1653 to reduce the number of sutlers to four for every regiment.<sup>35</sup>

The unsupervised sutler created dissention in the ranks due to inflated costs and the poor quality of goods that were often essential items such as food that the soldier had no one else to turn to except the sutler. As a result, by the end of the Medieval Ages, several armies replaced the function that the civilian sutler was providing with military members by creating the quartermaster. These unethical practices conducted by the civilian sutler illustrate one of the costs that echo into the current use of civilians on operations supporting American forces.

In summary, the period of 600 CE to 1700 CE saw an increase in reliance on mercenaries to wage war but at the same time a forced reduction of sutlers and other camp followers to only those that were providing essential goods and services to support the soldiers. Similar to the smaller city states of antiquity who could not support a large citizen-based army, feudal societies forced Crowns to hire armed men to wage war. This period also demonstrated some of the limits placed on the quantity of camp followers that could follow forces. Moreover, command and control measures of civilians supporting the force were incorporated into their employment.

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<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 138.

### 2.3 Modern Age 1700-1970

The beginning of this period is defined by the growth of the concept of nationhood. In Europe, monarchs began to internalize their military forces and absorb them directly into the state's administrative structure. Military administration became centralised, disciplined, homogeneous, and bureaucratic.<sup>36</sup> The modern age saw a decrease of states' reliance on mercenaries and more on their own citizens to form their armies.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, the support that camp followers once provided forces at the beginning of the period was largely replaced by civilians hired and paid directly by the force – they were no longer volunteers. By the end of the period, forces decreased their reliance on camp followers in order to reduce the logistics required to support them and the negative impact they had on the mobility and overall discipline of their force. Nineteenth century British regulations, for example, applied limits to the number of women allowed to follow the forces. From previously unrestricted numbers, nineteenth century policy indicated that: “The number of women allowed by government to embark on service are six for every hundred men, inclusive of all Non-Commissioned Officers' wives.”<sup>38</sup> Significant quantities of camp followers that often outnumbered military members that existed in the previous medieval period gradually diminished to very few with the growth of professional, citizen-based armies during the Modern Age.

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<sup>36</sup> Christopher Kinsey, *Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq - Transforming Military Logistics* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 15.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>38</sup> Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe*, 1.

In the context of this study, the 1700-1970 period is distinct in part because one particular military – that of the United States – became the most critical in terms of their reliance on civilians to support their operations. As a result, all of the examples used in this section will be drawn from U.S. history, and the analysis will be based largely on U.S. policy. The American Revolution, the American Civil War, WWI, WWII, and the Vietnam War will specifically be examined.

### 2.3.1 Benefits

During the American Revolution beginning in 1776, civilians provided similar benefits to the force as the previous period, with the addition of allowing for the inclusion of a capability that was not inherent in the military due to technological changes. There was also an increase in their role in the field of health care.<sup>39</sup> These nurses were not professionals trained as they are today, but hired employees drawn from camp and neighboring communities. Without these civilians, both the American and British armies would have had to assign men to these chores, resulting in diminishing the ranks of soldiers.<sup>40</sup> During the US Civil War (1861-1865), both the Confederate and Union armies used civilians for much required labour and transport activities. Teamsters, packmasters, construction labourers, and mechanics all accompanied American forces on operations and were under contract by the American Army to move supplies. The

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<sup>39</sup> Holly A. Mayer, *Belonging to the Army: Camp Followers and Community during the American Revolution* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 13.

<sup>40</sup> Holly A. Mayer, "Women and Wagoners: Camp Followers in the American War for Independence," *History Now - American History Online* Issue Twenty One, no 1. September 2009, [http://www.gilderlehrman.org/historynow/09\\_2009/historian5.php](http://www.gilderlehrman.org/historynow/09_2009/historian5.php); internet; accessed 13 February 2010

steamboat and barge operators who moved equipment from port to port were all civilians.<sup>41</sup> The American Army's dependence on civilian operated railroad and telegraph services enabled the army to harness technologies yet to be used in warfare.

Civilians also provided specialized support. More than 5000 contracted surgeons and 12 000 nurses were employed during the Civil War.<sup>42</sup> Women were hired to provide laundry services and for kitchen duty that had previously been conducted by camp followers. Similar to the previous historical periods, limited civilian sutlers accompanied the army, selling supplements to the soldiers' rations and clothing, and enhancing their quality of life. Commanders also gained tactical intelligence through the use of contracted civilian detectives.<sup>43</sup> With the exception of mercenaries, this may be the first example of civilians being used in the combat zone.

During World War I, the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) made extensive use of foreign labour which in today's terms would be called host-nation support.<sup>44</sup> However, by this time, camp followers were obsolete as the support they once provided the force was completely replaced by hired civilians. The AEF found itself chronically

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<sup>41</sup> Vincent Demma, "Contractors on the Battlefield: An Historical Survey from the Civil War to Bosnia" (Essay, U.S. Army Center of Military History; Historical Support Branch, 1999). 4

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* ; 4.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*; 2..

<sup>44</sup> Moshe Schwartz, *Training the Military to Manage Contractors during Expeditionary Operations: Overview and Option for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services, 2008), 3.

short of service support troops resulting in extensive contracting of allied civilians.<sup>45</sup> Foreign civilians performed the logistical tasks of repair, cooking, administration, and translation.<sup>46</sup> In addition, approximately 34 000 foreign civilians were employed for general construction and work on railroads.<sup>47</sup> A small number of American civilians were also contracted to perform the role of switchboard operator as well as transport vessel operators who were contracted to operate the fleet of boats that ferried American troops and supplies across the Atlantic. At the peak, there was one civilian for every twenty American soldiers.<sup>48</sup>

During World War II, the American Army continued to rely heavily on foreign labour due to a shortage of military service support troops.<sup>49</sup> These civilians were primarily located at the staging bases in several theatres where the American troops were assembled and trained prior to launching offensive operations against Germany and Japan.<sup>50</sup> There were over 734 000 civilians serving to support the American war effort of approximately 5.6 million American soldiers - a ration of one civilian for every seven service members.<sup>51</sup> In the UK alone, the American Army employed over 100 000

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<sup>45</sup> Demma, *Contractors on the Battlefield: An Historical Survey from the Civil War to Bosnia*, 3.

<sup>46</sup> Stephen M. Blizzard, "Increasing Reliance on Contractors on the Battlefield; how do we Keep from Crossing the Line?," *Air Force Journal of Logistics* (2004), 2.

<sup>47</sup> Demma, *Contractors on the Battlefield: An Historical Survey from the Civil War to Bosnia*, 4.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> Blizzard, *Increasing Reliance on Contractors on the Battlefield; how do we Keep from Crossing the Line?*, 1.

<sup>51</sup> Demma, *Contractors on the Battlefield: An Historical Survey from the Civil War to Bosnia*, 4.



civilians in port operations and construction.<sup>52</sup> The majority of these civilians were foreigners. With the exception of technical experts and representatives from American defence contractors, few American civilians actually deployed overseas<sup>53</sup>.

The Vietnam War saw American forces relying extensively on foreign nationals. The American approach was critical to the successful sustainment of the US forces because of the dire state of the combat service support (CSS) functions inherent in the military. The problem with the CSS functions was created by a significant imbalance between CSS soldiers and combat soldiers. During the conflict, the imbalance was compounded by the imposed military strength ceilings which resulted in reduced CSS troop numbers as the priority went to maximizing the quantity of deployed combat troops.

The Vietnam War also saw the use of civilians operating in the combat zone to a degree that was unknown in previous wars. This requirement was created by the influx of technology, including helicopters and communication systems that the American Army had not yet trained to be able to support.<sup>54</sup> By 1969 there were over 2000 civilian maintenance personnel that spent a large portion of their time in the combat zone. The military learned to rely on the private sector and saved its own manpower for combat

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> D'Ann Campbell, *Women at War with America: Private Lives in a Patriotic Era* (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984), 23.

<sup>54</sup> Blizzard, *Increasing Reliance on Contractors on the Battlefield; how do we Keep from Crossing the Line?*, 1.

roles.<sup>55</sup> Although at a much reduced scope, the reliance on civilian maintenance personnel due to new equipment being deployed to a theatre of operations is echoed into the current Canadian reliance of similar maintenance contractors to support its newly deployed equipment.

### 2.3.2 Costs

Similar to other historical periods, discipline issues existed with the civilians that accompanied the force. As an example, during the American Civil War, the teamsters employed to move supplies over land often balked at military direction. As a result, greater quantities of enlisted men were employed to supervise teamsters to ensure that tasks were followed through. The problem was so severe that army logisticians at the time recommended that the capability that the teamsters were providing be completely militarized in order to obtain more reliable support. Commanders at the time also recognized that fraud was occurring within the civilian organisations that they were hiring. The owners of the chartered water vessels and operators were charging such exorbitant fees that critics suggested that it would have been cheaper for the Army to purchase and operate its own water craft.<sup>56</sup> Although officials recognized that the sutlers enhanced the soldiers' quality of life, they also believed that the quartermasters should increase their role to include the goods that the sutler were providing in order to protect the soldiers' best interest. There is evidence that the chain of command believed that the

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<sup>55</sup> Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat- Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts*, 43.

<sup>56</sup> Demma, *Contractors on the Battlefield: An Historical Survey from the Civil War to Bosnia*, 2.

cost of allowing civilians to support the army with goods was too great and an in-house solution would provide the army with a more economical and better method of receiving those goods.<sup>57</sup> As a result, in the 1820s, the Army created the Quartermaster and Subsistence Bureaus of the Army Staff.<sup>58</sup>

As was the case during previous periods, during World War I, certain groups of civilians lacked discipline. For example, in 1916, after several instances of vessel operators who were responsible for transporting troops and equipment between Europe and America refused to sail or left without notice in search for higher wages, the navy took over the role of operating and crewing the transport vessels.<sup>59</sup> This particular cost, that of a lack of command and control over civilians supporting the force, is consistent in all periods and continues to be an issue with the American Forces in Iraq. Therefore, this factor should prove to be an important consideration for Canadian military planners.

Civilians often caused the military to fail at achieving its objectives during World War II. Inefficient British labour practices and poorly maintained contractor furnished equipment caused delays in port operations which negatively impacted on the capability of the military to conduct operations. Higher rates of production occurred when military labour was used compared to civilian labour.<sup>60</sup> Military members were in better physical

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<sup>57</sup> Steven T. Mitchell, "Targetable Logistics: Contractors in Zones of Conflict - Backbone Or Underbelly?"(U.S. Army War College), 2.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*; 2.

<sup>59</sup> Demma, *Contractors on the Battlefield: An Historical Survey from the Civil War to Bosnia*, 6.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

condition and worked considerably longer days than the typical six hours of effort provided by civilian labour. Civilian labour also caused a loss of control of stock which created the conditions for significant emergency requisitions being demanded on the already taxed sustainment system. In the Australian theatre, even untrained American soldiers were capable of unloading ships five times faster than civilian supply and movement personnel.<sup>61</sup> In a survey conducted regarding vehicle accidents, it was found that civilian drivers had nine times more accidents than Army drivers.<sup>62</sup> The pilfering of military goods by civilian labourers was also chronic in all theatres. This caused army personnel to be re-tasked as guards to oversee the civilian workers. All of these issues amount to poor discipline caused by the inherent lack of command and control that comes with outsourcing the both the function and the responsibility. Poor discipline is also one of the costs that resonates through all periods including the present and therefore should be considered and mitigated by appropriate measures by Canadian military planners when designing civilian support structures.

Overall, the modern age saw the general reduction of Western reliance on certain civilians, specifically mercenaries. The birth of nations set the conditions for the capability to raise large citizen-based armies. The modern age also saw the disappearance of camp followers and the increased reliance on hired civilians. The costs of poor command and control and discipline of civilians was identified as significant considerations during this period.

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

## **2.4 Lessons Identified From a Historical Use Of Civilians On Operations**

Numerous lessons have been identified through the above examination of the use of civilians on operations beginning over 2500 years ago. History demonstrated a pattern of similar issues that can be applied to the Canadian Forces use of civilians on operations. It is unquestionable that civilians provided a significant capability to the forces from antiquity to the Modern Age. The historic use of civilians providing logistics, construction, welfare, and as armed civilians enabled the force to conduct expeditionary campaigns. Civilians allowed forces to focus on combat functions; have provided capabilities that were not immediately inherent in the military due to rapid technological changes; and have provided a quick increase to capacity to forces that were not robust enough.

The benefits that civilians have provided the force have been offset by several disadvantages. The lack of command and control and the resultant poor discipline is a significant cost to civilians supporting the force. It has been demonstrated that one civilian contractor does not always equal one soldier in terms of production and capability. Moreover, it is evident that outsourcing capabilities or functions does not mean that responsibility to oversee performance effectiveness can be excused.

### 3 CHAPTER 3 - CURRENT AMERICAN USE OF CIVILIANS ON OPERATIONS

As illustrated in Chapter 2, the American army has used civilians to support its military operations since the War of Independence. Moreover, their use of civilians specifically in the combat zone was evident as early the Civil War and continued into the Vietnam War. Today, the U.S. is more reliant on the use of civilians in Iraq than ever before and a greater proportion of those civilians operate in the combat zone.

A significant problem for the Americans after the initial attack on Iraq during the second Gulf War in 2003 was their insufficient troop numbers to fight a counter insurgency operation. The government had capped the deployed force at 135 000 uniformed soldiers at the beginning of the War and found itself incapable of meeting its military objectives with that number of troops.<sup>63</sup> The government could have chosen other options to resolve the shortage, such as withdrawing from the theatre; increasing the regular force, National Guard, or reserve contribution; or persuading allies to contribute more. All of these solutions were politically unpalatable.<sup>64</sup> The remaining and chosen solution was to rely on outsourcing functions that were normally done by uniformed soldiers to private military companies. There would be no outcry from the American people when this option was instituted. Contractor reliance generally went unnoticed by the public. When it was noticed, there was little reaction. Further, the public's reaction

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<sup>63</sup> Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008), 245.

<sup>64</sup> Mitchell, *Targetable Logistics: Contractors in Zones of Conflict - Backbone Or Underbelly?*, 4.

to the death of contractors was muted compared to death of soldiers.<sup>65</sup> The outsourcing option, therefore, proved to have little political cost and gave the force additional resources that it desperately needed.

This chapter begins by examining the benefits that civilian have provided the U.S. military in the War on Terrorism. Second, the reasons why the U.S. has become so reliant on civilians on operations will be studied. Finally, the costs of using civilians to support those operations will be identified. This examination will be used to further develop areas that should be considered by Canadian policy makers concerning the use of civilians to support operations.

### **3.1 Benefits**

During the War on Terrorism, the Americans' use of civilians to support military operations developed into an absolute necessity. There was a permanent shift in the use of civilians as they became an integral part of the structure of the military.<sup>66</sup> American forces used civilians in roles involved in technical and logistical tasks as well as in communication services, interpreters, base operations services, weapons systems repair, perimeter security, intelligence, and supervision of other civilians.<sup>67</sup> Moreover, civilians were used in arming state of the art weapons systems such as the stealth fighter and the

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<sup>65</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*, 244.

<sup>66</sup> Kinsey, *Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq - Transforming Military Logistics*, 48.

<sup>67</sup> United States Army, *Forged in the Fire: Legal Lessons Learned during Military Operations 1994-2006* (Charlottesville, Virginia: Center for Law and Military Operations, 2006), 26.

Apache helicopter. They also operated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and air defence systems from land and on board American Navy ships.<sup>68</sup>

There were many benefits to civilianizing military functions. First, outsourcing provided employment opportunities to the host nation that, more often than not, needed to employ its civilians in order to set the conditions for long term security. According to a 2007 Congressional Research Service report, "...most contracts supporting American operations in Iraq involve local companies and employees."<sup>69</sup> The employment of host nation civilians was in line with a key tenet in counterinsurgency doctrine: it created jobs and supported long term economic development. Moreover, from the coalition's perspective, it provided a better option for the local civilian compared to them joining the insurgency. Not only did multinational corporations that were hired by the U.S military to conduct numerous functions, such as Halliburton, hire local civilians, the U.S. government also hires local civilians directly. In 2005, the Sons of Iraq program was initiated by the U.S. government to unite Sunnis, some who were themselves insurgents, against Al-Qaeda.<sup>70</sup> Until 2008, the U.S. government paid their salaries to protect local neighbourhoods. As a researcher for the Institute for the Study of War, Farook Ahmed, indicated the benefits to the coalition: "These groups augment the Coalition and Iraqi

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<sup>68</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*, 247.

<sup>69</sup> W. Latham, "Not My Job: Contracting and Professionalism in the U.S. Army," *Military Review* 89, no. 2 (Mar/Apr, 2009), 40.

<sup>70</sup> Farook Ahmed, "Sons of Iraq and Awakening Forces," Institute for the Study of War, <http://www.understandingwar.org/files/reports/Backgrounder%2023%20Sons%20of%20Iraq%20and%20Awakening%20Forces.pdf>; internet; accessed 3 March 2010.



Security Forces by establishing checkpoints and providing tips on suspected insurgents as well as locations of improvised explosive device (IED) and weapons caches.”<sup>71</sup>

There were numerous other benefits that civilians provided the U.S. forces during the War on Terrorism. Under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) that was established in 1985 to provide timely and effective access to civilian support, civilians provided the force with the following benefits: they reduced the number of deployment some soldiers would conduct; maintained skill sets in high-technology and low-density equipment; allowed the eventual transfer of logistics personnel to combat personnel; and provided capabilities that the army did not possess.<sup>72</sup> LOGCAP was specifically designed to provide logistics support to deployed operations. It is generally regarded as an effective program and is integrated in most aspects of the supply chain.<sup>73</sup>

The War on Terrorism brought a new dimension to conflict. Western governments began to use soft power or a more comprehensive approach in order to defeat the insurgency in Iraq.<sup>74</sup> This approach included developing the country’s ability to provide its own security such as: training police forces, building infrastructure, and working with its government. This resulted in Western militaries deploying with

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<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> S. Haraburda, F. Bloom and R. Keck, "Contracting Agility in LOGCAP-Kuwait," *Army Logistician* 41, no. 4 (Jul/Aug, 2009), 3.

<sup>73</sup> Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat- Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts*, 43.

<sup>74</sup> Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, "In Iraq, Combat Turns into Advise and Assist," *National Journal* (Dec 4, 2009), 1.

civilians to provided functions that were not normally conducted in previous conflicts and therefore were not inherent in existing military capabilities. There were also some functions that were conducted by military members that were likely better left to civilians. It can be argued that there are some things that military forces just are not good at. In the words of U.S. Army Captain, Phillip Carter, a reserve military police officer who was sent to Iraq in 2005 to advise Iraqi police: "...advising a civilian police force is one of them."<sup>75</sup> By employing civilians in positions that they have experience in, instead of military members who have no training or experience in, there would likely be a more successful outcome. The long term development of a society should be left to civilians who conduct this business in their home countries – namely public servants.<sup>76</sup> The force benefited from civilians conducting those functions that needed to be conducted in the counter insurgency operation but did not possess the capability in the military.

The benefits that civilians provide the force are significant. Civilians work alongside uniformed soldiers in the majority of roles and functions in both relatively secure areas and in the combat zone. The use and subsequent benefit of civilians supporting American forces has grown exponentially since the armies of antiquity.

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<sup>75</sup> Corine Hegland, "Why Civilians Instead of Soldiers?" *National Journal* 39, no. 17 (Apr 28, 2007), 33.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

### 3.2 Reliance

Between the Vietnam War and the Second Gulf War, the ratio of civilians (of which most were contractors) to soldier increased exponentially. The ratio of civilians to soldier during Vietnam was one to one hundred. Twenty years later, during the First Gulf War, it was one to fifty. Ten years later, when the second Gulf War began, there was one civilian to 1.6 soldiers.<sup>77</sup> There is an even greater use of civilians as a percentage of uniformed soldiers in Afghanistan. According to a 2009 report by the Congressional Research Service, as of March 2009, "...contractors made up 57 percent of the Pentagon's force in Afghanistan, and if the figure is averaged over the past two years, it is 65 percent...."<sup>78</sup>

An example that demonstrated American reliance on civilians to support operations occurred when the Iraqi government announced that it was revoking the operating license of Blackwater, now called Xe, to operate in the country after numerous incidents of improper escalation of force by the company resulting in Iraqi civilians being killed. The Secretary of State, Condelezza Rice, had to call the Iraqi Prime Minister herself to allow the company to stay so that the U.S. State Department could continue to be protected as there were no other options available.<sup>79</sup> America relies so much on civilians that it now finds itself without other options. A case in point: despite publicly breaking the contract

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<sup>77</sup> Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat- Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts*, 38.

<sup>78</sup> James Glanz, "Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, Sep 2, 2009, 2.

<sup>79</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*, 253.

with Xe, the State Department continued to award the company more than \$400 million in contracts in 2009 to fly its diplomats throughout Iraq, ensure the safety in Afghanistan, and train security forces.<sup>80</sup>

The unprecedented American use of civilians to support operations in the War on Terrorism is a manifestation of political, technological, and global security environments that developed after the Cold War. This reliance was due to several factors: first, the downsizing of the American Forces in the 1990s; second, an increase in deployed operations in the last two decades; third, government pressure to outsource in all departments; fourth, imposed manning caps of military members on operations; and last, the requirement for capabilities that were not inherent in the military.

At the end of the Cold War, between 1990 and 1995 the American military was reduced by twenty-five percent, or 861 000.<sup>81</sup> The majority of cuts were made to logistics staff which allowed the military to maintain a similarly capable combat force, albeit with a less capable logistic tail. In order to fill the gap created by this reduction in military members, capabilities were civilianized.

At the same time as the force was being downsized, American involvement in peacekeeping, humanitarian, and full spectrum operations increased. This challenged the

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<sup>80</sup> Landler, Mark and Mazzetti, Mark, "Company Formerly Known as Blackwater Still Working for C.I.A. and State Department; Blackwater, Now Xe, Still Working for U.S." *International Herald Tribune*, Aug 24, 2009,1.

<sup>81</sup> Rebecca R. Vernon, "Battlefield Contractors: Time to Face the Tough Issues" (The George Washington University Law School), 8.

capacity of the American forces to conduct operations in multiple theatres which exposed the need for additional manpower. Specifically, a series of political and humanitarian crises in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and elsewhere placed a heavy demand on America's military services. The Army saw deployments from 1990 to 1995 increase by 300 percent compared to the previous five years.<sup>82</sup> This strain was reduced by contracting out the necessary functions to fulfill all of the required commitments. Not only did outsourcing fill the gap of low troop numbers to perform the required tasks of the military, but it can also be argued that, in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, it filled gaps of relatively low contributions of troops from US allies.

Another factor which increased outsourcing was pressure from Washington. There was significant pressure from the government on all departments, including the Department of Defense, to outsource those functions that could be accomplished by civilians. The American Government ordered departments to outsource if the private sector was thought to be more economical and efficient. The order resulted in a Department of Defense policy to utilize commercial support whenever appropriate.<sup>83</sup> Moreover, when it came to procuring equipment, Department of Defense policy encouraged the adoption of the original manufacturer to support its equipment from cradle to grave.<sup>84</sup> This negated the requirement for the military to create and maintain its own trained staff. In 1999, the Pentagon imposed a formal strategy known as

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<sup>82</sup> Latham, *Not My Job: Contracting and Professionalism in the U.S. Army*, 40.

<sup>83</sup> Vernon, *Battlefield Contractors: Time to Face the Tough Issues*, 11.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.* 12.

“performance based logistics,” that was intended to ensure a high readiness of newly purchased equipment. This policy dictated that the manufacturer was responsible for not only providing the systems, but also the spares, test sets, and maintenance, with the intent of improving the equipment’s availability.<sup>85</sup> By policy, then, the Department of Defense was forced to increase its use of civilians to support its deployed forces.

A third factor that increased American reliance on contractors in operations was Congress, or the host nation, placing military manning caps on most operations. Under these manning caps the American contribution was only restricted in the deployment of military personnel and not on the number of civilians employed with the force. For example, in an effort to deter the long-term commitment of U.S. troops to peacekeeping and other operations, Congress imposed troop limits on deployments.<sup>86</sup> This caused American forces to deploy the required combat resources at the expense of military logistic soldiers and fill the gap with civilian contractors while still maintaining the total military force quantity below the imposed manning caps.

The American increase in reliance on civilians during the War on Terrorism also reflected a lack of needed skills in the military due to new technologies being introduced into theatre.<sup>87</sup> According to a report conducted in 2009 by a Congressional research group: “Some of the contractors have skills in critical areas like languages and digital

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<sup>85</sup> Latham, *Not My Job: Contracting and Professionalism in the U.S. Army*, 41.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>87</sup> United States Army, *Forged in the Fire: Legal Lessons Learned during Military Operations 1994-2006*, 26.

technologies that the military needs.”<sup>88</sup> Current military operations depend heavily on high-tech weapons systems. Without a significant investment in the training systems as well as an investment in the time it takes to train a military member to maintain and repair the equipment, contractors provide a viable solution capable of providing expert technical support. Increasingly technologically advanced systems in the American arsenal and the Gulf Wars’ impact on the rapid inception of these systems has created a vacuum in military operators and support staff as the training systems are unable to react fast enough to meet the demand. The solution to the problem has been to turn to contractors to provide the missing capabilities.

These five factors have combined to cause the American military to contract civilians at unprecedented levels over the last ten years. U.S. forces are no longer able to deploy and conduct successful operations without the civilians supporting them. The American reliance on civilians to support their forces is clear and is likely to survive into the foreseeable future. However, the benefits civilians provide the force come with several costs.

### **3.3 Costs**

The substantial increase in the use of civilians in a relatively quick period of time has resulted in numerous pitfalls that have put the American forces at risk in several areas. As has been the case throughout history, the benefits that civilians provided the

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<sup>88</sup> Glanz, *Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Afghanistan*, A10.

U.S. forces came with costs. Although the operation in Iraq could not have taken place without the use of civilians, three incidents that placed a dark cloud over the operation included civilians that were supporting the force. Not only did these incidents have a negative impact on support for the war from the American population, they also had an operational impact. They disrupted the U.S. operation by slowing the delicate negotiations of the status of forces agreement and fuelled the Sunni insurgency.<sup>89</sup> These incidents were the allegations of double billing and fraud by one of their primary contractors, Kellogs Brown and Root (KBR); the horrific death treatment of four Blackwater security members at the hands of insurgents; and abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib prison conducted by civilian interrogators.

This section will identify the costs experienced by the U.S. forces in depending on civilians to support forces during the War on Terrorism under the following themes: legal and ethical issues; command and control; training; negative impacts on the military human resource pool; and cost effectiveness.

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<sup>89</sup> D. Perry, "The Privatization of the Canadian Military: Afghanistan and Beyond," *International Journal* 64, no. 3 (Summer, 2009), 689.



### 3.3.1 Legal and Ethical

For want of a nail, the shoe was lost-  
For want of a shoe, the horse was lost-  
For want of a horse, the rider was lost-  
For want of a rider, the battle was lost.<sup>90</sup>

Benjamin Franklin

This quotation from Benjamin Franklin from over 250 years ago, although superficial, illustrates a chain of events that can lead to defeat. However, it also demonstrates an issue that legal authorities have recently debated over in determining when one begins to participate directly in hostilities. It is not necessarily just the front line troops that are direct participants; it could be the civilian who loads the munitions on the plane. This debate affects whether civilians are considered combatants, non-combatants, or civilians supporting the force under the Geneva Convention. It is but one of many legal concern that must be acknowledged when using civilians to support military forces on operations.

The recent monumental use of civilians on operations has raised numerous legal issues among lawyers and academics.<sup>91</sup> Nevertheless, the historian, Carafano, argues that: “The notion that contractors largely operate in some kind of shadowland outside the rule of law is largely [a] myth.”<sup>92</sup> Moreover, lawyers argue that insurgents in Iraq and

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<sup>90</sup> Moshe Kress, *Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), viii.

<sup>91</sup> Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat- Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts*, 47.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

Afghanistan are not state actors and therefore the coalition is not bound by the Geneva Conventions in their treatment. As some civilians are working along side troops in combat, they may be at risk of incidental attack by enemy forces and would be a legal target according to the Geneva Conventions as they are directly participating in hostilities. American policy has partially resolved this issue by listing those activities that civilians can do without participating in direct conflict.<sup>93</sup>

Civilian appearance is also an issue. Civilians are often permitted to dress in combats and carry weapons for self defence.<sup>94</sup> While their clothing suggests military integration, legal authorities are confident that the line has not been crossed. The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate has indicated that: “[contractors who are issued weapons for personal protection] run little risk of being classified as combatants or mercenaries under international law because they are only ensuring their own protection.”<sup>95</sup> Therefore, they are not taking an active part in hostilities. This may satisfy legal experts, but the insurgents may not be able to differentiate between civilian and military and therefore might just as easily unknowingly target civilians as military. Issuing firearms to civilians raises further issues such as: What are the criteria to determine which civilians are issued weapons? Who is legally responsible for training that must be conducted? What is the legal ramification on the force if a contractor misuses the government issued weapon?

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<sup>93</sup> United States Army, *Forged in the Fire: Legal Lessons Learned during Military Operations 1994-2006*, 28.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>95</sup> Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, *Legal Bases for Maximizing Logistics Support in an Operational Environment using Contracted Security* (Charlottesville, Virginia: Center for Law and Military Operations, 2004), 1.

The Center for Law and Military Operations' solution to these significant issues is that each must be dealt with by the combatant commander on a case by case basis.<sup>96</sup> This indicates that these questions have not been answered at the operational or strategic levels and are left to the tactical commander to work through. This is clearly not an ideal situation. It suffices to say that the legal and ethical issues that are created by civilians on operations need to be considered by the Canadian Forces when deciding when, where, and in what capacity to involve civilians supporting operations.

Another legal issue that needs to be considered when using civilians is the ability of the relevant justice system to deal with their potential illegal activity that they may conduct. The American justice system has tried to exercise authority over civilians that have allegedly broken laws. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act extends civilian law to contractors supporting military operations overseas and the Uniform Code of Military Justice was amended in 2006 to cover contractors.<sup>97</sup> Nonetheless, the government has yet to prosecute a single case of killings by armed contractors supporting the U.S. forces on operations. In the Abu Ghraib abuse incident, although thirty six percent of the abuse incidents were conducted by CACI civilian employees, none of them have been charged while, at the tactical level, the few military members who were involved have been appropriately court marshaled for their crimes.<sup>98</sup> Even worse, an

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<sup>96</sup> United States Army, *Forged in the Fire: Legal Lessons Learned during Military Operations 1994-2006*, 29.

<sup>97</sup> Neal J. Couture, "Contractor Risk Shifted again?" *Contract Management* 47, no. 2 (Feb, 2007), 2.

Iraqi lawsuit in 2008 by Iraqi victims of torture at Abu Ghraib against American military contractors was dismissed by a federal appeals court because the companies had immunity as government contracted firms supporting the force. This was because, under the authority of a coalition provisional authority, non-Iraqi military, civilians, and contractors in Iraq were immune to being prosecuted by the Iraqi legal process as they were subject to the jurisdiction of the state they came from.<sup>99</sup> However, in 2009, as part of a new security agreement between Iraq and the U.S., immunity was only provided to U.S. military and government employees working with the force. As a result, this updated agreement gave the Iraqi Government overall jurisdiction over contractors.<sup>100</sup> This arrangement has significant shortfalls as it means that the U.S. is unable to prosecute civilians other than government employees working with the U.S. forces who have committed crimes. A system that allows the U.S. to prosecute civilians regardless of the sending state clearly needs to be developed.<sup>101</sup> This is also an aspect that the Canadian government needs to consider in its use of civilians.

A further legal issue identified by American forces in its use of civilians in Iraq is that there is no ability for the American government to pay claims caused by the civilians that they employ due to American legislation.<sup>102</sup> From the Iraqi claimants' perspective,

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<sup>98</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*, 251.

<sup>99</sup> "Privatized War," *International Herald Tribune*, Jan 12, 2010, 1 .

<sup>100</sup> S. Cullen, "Out of Reach: Improving the System to Deter and Address Criminal Acts Committed by Contractor Employees Accompanying Armed Forces Overseas," *Public Contract Law Journal* 38, no. 3 (Spring, 2009), 509.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 509.

the civilians supporting the American forces and the American military are one in the same and therefore simple denial to the claimant is not an appropriate solution from the claimants perspective. This issue is still not resolved and should be considered by Canadian Forces planners.

An ethical issue that should be considered when using civilians to support operations is how much risk to the civilian is acceptable to the force. As previously mentioned, the high degree of integration of civilians into the U.S. military structure has resulted in great numbers of civilians being employed in the combat zone and being exposed to high risk of being accidentally or intentionally targeted. It is estimated that over 1000 civilians supporting the U.S military have been killed and over 13 000 civilians have been wounded since the Iraq War began in 2003.<sup>103</sup> This means that the civilian collective supporting the American forces has suffered more losses than the rest of the coalition combined. This situation questions the ethical reasoning behind a state's use of civilians on the battlefield and the protection that forces afford them. What is more, there is evidence to indicate that civilians that are supporting the forces are specifically being targeted.<sup>104</sup> More specifically, the Taliban in Afghanistan have targeted locally employed Afghans that are perceived to support the coalition. In 2009, a Taliban spokesman, Qari Yusof Ahmadi, indicated that the Taliban intentionally ambushed and killed Esmail, a local who was hired by the American forces to deliver

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<sup>102</sup> United States Army, *Forged in the Fire: Legal Lessons Learned during Military Operations 1994-2006*, 29.

<sup>103</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*, 246.

<sup>104</sup> "Taliban Claim Killing Contractor Working for US Forces in Afghan South," *BBC Monitoring South Asia* (Feb 5, 2009), 1.

supplies to installations in Kandahar, when leaving his house to go to work.<sup>105</sup> It is suggested that this issue has a significant impact on public support and therefore impacts the ability of forces to conduct operations. Canadian Forces planners should take this into consideration when planning civilian support and their exposure to enemy action in order to reduce the influence civilian deaths may have on public support.

### 3.3.2 Command and Control

The second Gulf War demonstrated a lack of appropriate command and control of civilians supporting the force primarily due to ineffective structures and oversight of civilians and the fact that civilians could effectively quit with little ability for the military to impose penalties. Similar to the experience of forces from the historical perspective, the consequence of poor command and control being exercised over civilians was poor performance, a lack discipline, and corruption.

Poorer than expected performance of civilians was demonstrated during the Second Gulf War. Prior to the Second Gulf War, the American Army had contracting experience in short, large wars like the first Gulf War and in long, small (in terms of troop contribution) wars such as the Balkans. However, until the Second Gulf War, it had no experience in commanding and controlling long, large wars that were expensive and persistent.<sup>106</sup> The military structure that was developed was not up to the task of

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<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

providing appropriate level of command and control to a large quantity of civilians that were relied on during the Second Gulf War.<sup>107</sup> Field commanders had little visibility on contractors as there were not sufficient personnel to oversee the management of contracts which resulted in an inability to incorporate civilian support into operational plans. This resulted in poor statements of work being written, inefficiency and poorer than expected support, and cost overruns.<sup>108</sup> Carafano succinctly points out the underpinning issue in the command and control of civilians that existed: “Government can outsource many things, but it cannot outsource responsibility.”<sup>109</sup>

Poor performance was also demonstrated with the U.S. military’s experience with LOGCAP. LOGCAP provided the force with significant combat service support capabilities by providing access of civilian service providers to the military.<sup>110</sup> A degree of control was lost with the inception of LOGCAP compared to when the functions that LOGCAP conducted were conducted by military personnel.<sup>111</sup> Since there was no centralized location for requesting support, contractors received requests directly from

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<sup>106</sup> Mitchell, *Targetable Logistics: Contractors in Zones of Conflict - Backbone Or Underbelly?*, 5.

<sup>107</sup> Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat- Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts*, 47.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>110</sup> "KBR Awarded Major Task Order Under Logistics Civil Augmentation Program LOGCAP IV Contract," *Defense & Aerospace Week* (Mar 17, 2010), 78.

<sup>111</sup> Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat- Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts*, 44.

the user. This caused the contractor to shift from job to job prior to completion.<sup>112</sup>

Although the system improved response times by removing the bureaucracy of obtaining work from a contractor, in times when the amount of work exceeds the capacity of the civilian organization, priorities were required to be assessed and planning needed to occur. The LOGCAP experience demonstrated that civilianizing traditional military positions does not negate the requirement for military oversight in order for effectiveness and efficiency to be maintained.

Discipline issues were manifested in both refusal of work and poor behaviour of civilians at both the individual and corporate levels. Unlike soldiers, who have given up several liberties once they become part of the military and tend to follow lawful orders, civilians supporting the force decide who they want to work for and under what conditions.<sup>113</sup> Civilians can break their contracts with minimal personal repercussions. One could argue that a company that is not flexible enough to work in a wide range of conditions will lose future contracts, however due to the limited number of robust companies that are capable of supporting a large force, this is not always the case. This was demonstrated in 2004, when one of the larger contractors supporting U.S. operations, Contrack International Inc., refused to complete its contract in Iraq due to the security environment. It was later awarded a sixty three million dollar construction contract in Afghanistan after withdrawing from Iraq midway through their Iraq contract.<sup>114</sup> This

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<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>113</sup> Nathan Hodge, "'Coordination,' Not 'Control' of Security Contractors in Iraq: Report," *Defense Daily International* 6, no. 32 (Aug 12, 2005), 2.

<sup>114</sup> "Contractor Leaving Iraq Gets Afghan Job," *New York Times*, Dec 25, 2004, 1.



example demonstrated that there was little long term negative impact to civilian companies who failed to deliver their end of the contract as their demand exceeded the supply of the service they provided. In 2003 and 2004, there were incidences of individuals and entire companies refusing to work. Commensurate with an increase in violence and kidnapping, there was a surge in private firms delaying, suspending, or ceasing their operations that had a negative impact on the overall mission.<sup>115</sup> This inherent lack of command and control of a military force over civilians significantly hampered operations in Iraq. This phenomenon was not confined to the U.S.. Similarly, the UK experience in Iraq demonstrated that the UK could not always rely on civilian support in regions with high threat levels. Risk levels in the Gulf affected some civilians' willingness to deploy with the force that resulted in at least two instances of civilians refusing to deploy or remain in theatre.<sup>116</sup>

Several examples of companies and individuals demonstrating poor behaviour due to a lack of command and control also exist. Poor behaviour of companies is illustrated by KBR's actions in 2009. Since the contractor is primarily motivated by profit, safety and proper operating methods were often compromised. A case in point was detailed in the journal, *Pain & Central Nervous System Week*: "KBR utterly disregarded the safety of the troops when they chose to use open air burn pits and failed to use incinerators and other safer methods of waste disposal."<sup>117</sup> At the individual level,

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<sup>115</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*, 253.

<sup>116</sup> United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence., "Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future," (2003.), 44.

an investigation by the Senate Armed Service Committee also found that military contractors engaged in reckless behaviour and carried unauthorized weapons. Another example is illustrated by frequent quarrels between Americans, British and other nationalities that were employed in the private security business supporting the American military.<sup>118</sup> This behaviour can have an obvious negative impact on the force. The committee's chairman, Senator Carl Levin said, "Misconduct by contractors ... undermines U.S. efforts [and] if we are going to win that struggle we need to know that our contractor personnel are adequately screened, supervised, and held accountable".<sup>119</sup> Uncontrolled and undisciplined contractors worked against goals of the armed forces. Moreover, unsupervised guards from private security companies undermined the ability of the American forces to win Iraqi support.<sup>120</sup>

The pressure to rebuild Iraq, coupled with the inexperienced and undermanned contracting organisations, set the conditions for corruption between the various levels of contractors and the military. To illustrate this point, consider how a former struggling Iraqi baker became rich through American contracts. The Americans contracted a local construction company, whose owner was a former banker, and offered it \$700 000 to build a police station. In order to protect the station from not being destroyed by the local Al-Qaeda leader, the construction company paid the Al-Qaeda leader \$350 000. Once

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<sup>117</sup> Burke O'Neil, "KBR Exposes Soldiers and Contractors with Toxic Burn Pits," *Pain and Central Nervous Week*, 2009, 335.

<sup>118</sup> Torcuil Crichton, "Living Life on the Edge in Wild West Green Zone," *The Heradl*, 2009, 1.

<sup>119</sup> August Cole, "Senate Slams 'Reckless' Contractor," *Wall Street Journal* .2010, 1.

<sup>120</sup> Editorial, "Privatized War, and its Price," *The New York Times*,2010, 1.

the project was completed, the owner of the construction company gave the name of the Al-Qaeda leader to the U.S. forces. The leader was subsequently arrested and the owner of the construction company kept the entire \$700 000.<sup>121</sup>

Poor command and control over civilians has led to significant discipline problems that have negatively impacted the American military operation in Iraq. However, unlike Scipio in antiquity, who could replace the civilian capability with state raised military and remove the civilians from his armies, the Americans are unable to take such drastic measures. They are now so reliant on contractors that the issue must be resolved by improving the command and control structures are able to effectively oversee contractors and integrate them completely into their operations.

### 3.3.3 Training

Another cost of using civilians to support the force is the requirement for their integration into training. Civilians must understand the force that they are supporting and the military must understand the capabilities and specific requirements of the civilians supporting it. Moreover, military members must be trained in the intricacies of dealing with contracts and contractors to ensure they are capable of utilizing their capability to the fullest. Although the first Gulf War saw the Americans embrace the concept of “train the way you fight,” for the uniformed members of the force that set the conditions for their success in combat operations in the first Gulf War, they did not

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<sup>121</sup> Mark Santora, "Where there's War, there's Profit to make Once a Struggling Baker, Iraqi Contractor Cashes in on Ties with Americans," *International Herald Tribune*, 2009, 1.

include contractors in their training. Although in 2008, doctrine on contracting had been added to American military publications, there is still no cooperative training involving the military and its contractors.<sup>122</sup> Therefore, DoD has not addressed how a substantial workforce of contracting officers oversee and integrate large scale contractors on operations into a campaign.

Moreover, since the function of contracting is a specialized role and not one that is practiced to any large degree in garrison, the expertise does not reside among the core of military members. Many soldiers and leaders have their first experience with contracting when they arrive in theatre. As Major John Caudill notes in the *Army Logistician*, after his tour in Iraq as the Branch Chief of the Contract Coordination Cell: “the 1st Sustainment Brigade found that changes in organization and training are needed to meet the challenges of contracting.”<sup>123</sup> The Canadian Forces can use this experience to consider the inclusion of civilians during work-up training for operations as well as the inclusion of competencies for those military occupations and ranks that would most likely be involved with civilians during operations.

#### 3.3.4 Impact on Military Manning

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<sup>122</sup> J. Caudill, "The 1st Sustainment Brigade's Contract Coordination Cell," *Army Logistician* 41, no. 4 (Jul/Aug, 2009), 38.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.

Outsourcing services to civilians can be a double edged sword. Although contracting can provide the force with an almost immediate benefit of having trained workers provide specific functions and support, that worker is often an ex-military member.<sup>124</sup> Often he or she provided similar services to the force when in uniform. A large percentage of military members are prematurely retiring from the military to join the contractor family in search of more pay or other personal or family advantages. Therefore, contracting often becomes a self-perpetuating human resource problem. The significant degree of reliance and use of contractors in Iraq has negatively impacted the ability of the U.S. forces to retain talented soldiers who have been invested in using public money.<sup>125</sup>

The U.S. military found itself losing its members to the corporations it has hired. Moreover, the more military functions the government outsourced, the greater the demand for those military skills were in the private sector. As Lieutenant Colonel William Latham, an instructor for sustainment, force management, and military contracting at the U.S. Army Command and Staff College indicated: “Many American corporations, including those specializing in military contracting, aggressively recruit both active and retired military personnel already screened and trained at government expense.”(Latham 2009, 40) A case in point, Kellogs, Brown and Root (KBR), which is the largest contractor currently in Iraq, required most positions to be filled with applicants possessing a security clearance – something that military members would already have –

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<sup>124</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*, 257.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 257.

and prior military service.(Latham 200945) This phenomenon was not confined to the U.S. The UK's Minister of Defence, Tony Geraghty, indicated in 2003: "...[ I am] distressed by the loss of regular soldiers to the private sector."<sup>126</sup> This slippery slope of contractors feeding off of military human resources erodes the expertise in the military and has blurred the distinction between essential military tasks that were traditionally only carried out by uniformed soldiers."<sup>127</sup> One could theorize that this issue could be mitigated if the military outsourced an entire skill that was not linked to other skills. However, this, consequently, would increase the reliance on contractors even further as the capability would become obsolete in the military. A possible solution is for this, is for civilians to augment the roles that military conducts where possible as opposed to replace them entirely.

### 3.3.5 Economic Impact

Often, there is a perception that contractors are hired to save money. It has been proven that contracted work in civilian industry regularly provides a cost savings since requirements are often well defined and remain consistent.<sup>128</sup> Moreover, private companies competing in an open market consistently seek opportunities to realize cost and qualitative efficiencies. The situation in the military, however, is different.

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<sup>126</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Operations in Iraq - Lessons for the Future* (London, UK: Directorate General Corporate Communication, 2003), 44.

<sup>127</sup> Peter W. Singer, "Can't Win with 'Em, can't Go to War without 'Em; Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency," *Policy Paper no. 4* (2007), 16.

<sup>128</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*, 252.

In 2007, it was estimated that contractors accounted for forty percent of the operating costs of the American war on terrorism in Iraq. To put this into perspective, in 1997, ten percent of the operating budget went to civilian contractors supporting American operations in the Balkans.<sup>129</sup> Carafano indicated that, “By some estimates, a little over half the Pentagon’s budget goes to pay private contractors.”<sup>130</sup> The surprisingly large proportion of operating costs going to contractors supporting American operations does not indicate the cost effectiveness of using contractors over military or vice versa. It does indicate the significant cost of using contractors on operations and the trend towards a seemingly endless reliance on contractors. It is difficult to calculate any savings that outsourcing may offer in the fog of war, where requirements and priorities are constantly changing. Peter Singer, an industry expert, indicated that: “There is simply no comprehensive study that we can look at and say that [using contractors], saves us money.”<sup>131</sup>

Outsourcing services to support military operations do not necessarily meet with the same economic advantages in the private industry for several reasons. First, priorities are not as stable on operations as they exist in a civilian organisation due to the ever changing conditions on the battlefield. These conditions cause the military to continually change the work that is required by the contractor, or single source contracting which

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<sup>129</sup> Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat- Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts*, 11.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>131</sup> Neil J. Harris, "Contractors and the Cost of War: Research into Economic and Cost Effectiveness Arguments" (Naval Post Postgraduate School), 2.

leads to being charged additional fees for change orders and work being done that potentially no longer needs to be completed.

Secondly, in large contracts such as LOGCAP, there were only a few companies capable of fulfilling the requirements of the contract due to the necessary capital investment required in resources to accomplish the tasks set out in the contract. In essence, this was therefore a single source contract because of the natural monopoly size of the contract produced as no other company could compete with KBR. It did not allow for a competitive bidding condition which would have resulted in economic advantages.

The rationale for using contractors to save money would seem to be a rational prospect in a contingency operation context since these operations are expected to be short lived. This allows a force to use human resources for a short period of time and pay them for only the short period that they are employed. Compared to the military where salaries, benefits, and maintenance of military resources all eat into the budget to support a capability whether it is needed or not. The solution that the American forces rightly used to support contingency operations was to outsource when required and reduce forces to the minimum. Where contracting becomes more expensive than force generating military positions is when contingency operations develop into extended time frame conflicts that one can argue has occurred in the Second Gulf War. It is difficult to say at what length of time it would be more economically feasible to have force generated military members.



Using the U.S. military's recent reliance on civilians in the War on Terrorism, this chapter has identified numerous benefits that contractors provided and has also explored the factors that have increased Washington's reliance on contractors. There is no doubt that contractors provided the U.S. military with significant capabilities. Nor can it be disputed that the U.S.' reliance on contractors has grown exponentially in the last two decades. These benefits and the significant reliance on contractors have come at numerous costs that the Canadian forces should consider when planning the level of civilian support on its deployed operations.

#### **4 CHAPTER 4 - CANADIAN CURRENT USE OF CIVILIANS**

Like the United States, the Canadian military also uses civilians to support its operations (albeit on a much smaller scale). Moreover, the Canadian Forces has followed the American trend of increasingly civilianizing military functions. However, the use of large numbers of civilians to support Canadian operations is a relatively new phenomenon dating back to only 2000. This chapter will assess Canada's use of civilians on operations over the last decade and will focus on the benefits civilians have provided as well as Canada's increasing reliance on them. This chapter will also seek to identify the costs that should be considered by planners considering the future use of civilian support to the Canadian Forces. The Canadian Forces relies on civilians as DND employees, other government employees, contractors, and locally employed citizens to support deployed operations.

#### 4.1 Benefits

The benefits that these civilians provide the Canadian Forces will now be demonstrated. The Canadian Forces benefit from the contributions made by civilians on operations in a number of ways. Currently, civilians provide the force with welfare amenities, assist in CSS functions, provide political advice, train operators and maintainers on new equipment, conduct construction tasks, provide security for forward locations and personnel, and provide interpreter services.<sup>132</sup> The benefits that the Canadian Forces receives from these civilians are numerous. First, the use of locally employed contributes to the economy which benefits the force by gaining the trust of the local population in a counter insurgency operation. Second, there is a reduction in deployed military members. Third, there is an increase in services. Finally, the Canadian Forces gains capabilities.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, using local civilians to support the force has a positive impact on the local population as the money that is injected by exchanging services from locals for money improves the local economy. As the principle engineer advisor to the Canadian Commander in Afghanistan, LCol David Gowdy, has indicated, the positive impact of using local civilians in construction of numerous infrastructure projects has been significant: “That’s a good example of cash for work where the

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<sup>132</sup> David Perry, "Contractors in Kandahar, Eh? Canada's 'Real' Commitment to Afghanistan," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* Vol. 9, no. Issue 4 (2007), 8.

contract-management company is going out and getting several hundred people working on projects in a village.”<sup>133</sup>

As early as 2004, the Canadian Forces, as part of the Whole of Government approach to winning a counterinsurgency conflict, began embedding several Political Advisors (POLAD) in various levels of headquarters. POLADs generally attempt to strengthen collaboration at the intersection between diplomacy and defence. Specifically, POLADs inform military commanders of the potential diplomatic and political impacts of military plans and provide a link back to the department of foreign affairs. According to several commanders on operations, POLADs are extremely effective and are an invaluable asset to the commander and the success of an operation.<sup>134</sup> They bring an expertise to the operation that is not inherent in the capabilities of the Canadian Forces.

Other civilians that provide expertise not inherent in the military as well, while also reducing the size of uniformed soldiers required to deploy, are DND civilians in the Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency (CFPSA). As Jim Peverley, the director of deployment support for CFPSA, indicates:

The CFPSA develops and delivers morale and welfare programs, activities and services to members of the CF and their families, in Canada and overseas. Its goal is to enhance the quality of life of the military

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<sup>133</sup> Bruce Ward, "Contractors Busy in Southern Afghanistan; Projects Employing Villagers." *CanWest News* (Sep 27, 2009), 1.

<sup>134</sup> Army Lessons Learned Repository, <http://lfdts-allc.kingston.mil.ca/MOL/default.aspx>; Internet accessed 10 February 2010.

community and, thus, contribute to the operational readiness and effectiveness of the Canadian Forces.<sup>135</sup>

CFPSA staff provide welfare support to the deployed force, a role that was fulfilled by military members prior to the Afghanistan deployment. The deployment of CFPSA personnel to a theatre of operation occurred in 2003 and included approximately fifty civilians per rotation.<sup>136</sup> CFPSA staff also fill a variety of functions that require expertise not inherent in the military. They operate canteens, travel offices, and welfare centres, cut hair, operate gyms, conduct entertainment shows once per rotation<sup>137</sup>, and operate the Tim Horton's that deployed to Afghanistan in 2006.<sup>138</sup>

The employment of CFPSA employees also reduces the number of Canadian Forces members needed to deploy since some of the functions that they provide had traditionally been conducted by military members, including welfare, canteen, and travel functions. The employment of CFPSA staff has also significantly increased the span and capacity of the functions that were once completed by military members.<sup>139</sup> As an example, up until 2000, the Canadian Forces was only able to support a small canteen managed by two to five military members that sold a few sundry items and sodas. Today

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<sup>135</sup> "National Defence/Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency and Tim Hortons Brings a Taste of Home to Troops in Kandahar," *CCN Matthews Newswire* (Jul 1, 2006), 1.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>137</sup> "CFPSA: Canadian Entertainers to Perform for Military in Afghanistan," *CCN Matthews Newswire* (Apr 26, 2006), 1.

<sup>138</sup> "Media Advisory/National Defence: Last Interview Opportunity, Deployed Operations Training Civilian CFPSA Employees in Kandahar, Afghanistan," *CCN Matthews Newswire* (May 11, 2006), 1.

<sup>139</sup> Frances Bula, "Support Staff Want Same Tax Breaks as Soldiers," *The Vancouver Sun*, Apr 5, 2004, 1.

in Afghanistan, the CFPSA staff of approximately eight, stock and manage a small version of a CANEX which has the ability to link back into the purchasing expertise of the distribution network of the Canadian CANEX stores.<sup>140</sup> The CFPSA staff also make a deployment more like home as they are all Canadians providing Canadian like services.<sup>141</sup>

The Canadian Forces has also benefited from the use of contractors. Similar to the U.S., after the Cold War, the Canadian military reduced its numbers and experienced an increase in international missions. This resulted in the Canadian Forces initiating the contractor support project in 2000 to provide logistics support for the NATO stabilization force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That process subsequently developed into the Canadian Contractor Augment Program (CANCAP) in 2002.<sup>142</sup> Prior to 2000, locally employed civilians were individually hired to augment military members in functions such as tire repair, carpentry, cleaning staff, kitchen staff and the provision of fresh food. The strategic intent of CANCAP was to provide the Canadian Forces with operational flexibility through an enhanced support capacity through a responsive contractor.<sup>143</sup> As a result, civilians replaced military personnel of the contingent, thus allowing a smaller military force to deploy. Indeed, in 2002, approximately one hundred military positions

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<sup>140</sup> Matthew Fisher, "'Taste of Canada' in Kandahar," *National Post*, June 23, 2006, 1.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.; Matthew Fisher, "Afghan Tim Hortons a Hit in any Language; Outlet Gives Soldiers a Taste of Home," *Times - Colonist*, Mar 30, 2008, 1.

<sup>142</sup> Perry, *The Privatization of the Canadian Military: Afghanistan and Beyond*, 693.

<sup>143</sup> Perry, *Contractors in Kandahar, Eh? Canada's 'Real' Commitment to Afghanistan*, 12.

were replaced by CANCAP employees.<sup>144</sup> CANCAP provided the framework for the military to more formally divest several functions at once to a contractor, including the management of the additional capabilities. The employment of contracted civilians on operations has met the intent as it has saved thousands of military support personnel from being deployed since CANCAP was initiated and has allowed uniformed CSS soldiers to support combat operations in the combat zone.<sup>145</sup>

Because CANCAP did not include all of the functions that the Canadian Forces could civilianize, locally employed civilians and other contractors were used to fill the gap. The locals work in construction, sewing, in the operation and maintenance of new equipment, in interpreter services, and in security.<sup>146</sup> The Canadian Forces benefited from civilians conducting these tasks as it has gained a capability that it had previously lacked. Also, in the case of security contractors, the use of civilians reduced the number of military members that would have been needed in order to maintain the same combat power. The employment of private security firms by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan has reduced the number of soldiers assigned to defend certain terrain and freed them to conduct more offensive operations. The Canadian Forces struck made several arrangements with private security contractors to provide security at Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) as well as for the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in downtown Kandahar.<sup>147</sup> This freed more soldiers up to conduct other tasks such as patrols and

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<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>145</sup> Perry, *The Privatization of the Canadian Military: Afghanistan and Beyond*, 689.

<sup>146</sup> Perry, *Contractors in Kandahar, Eh? Canada's 'Real' Commitment to Afghanistan*, 12.

offensive operations. In 2006, this resulted in the Canadian Forces being able to redeploy to new areas and continue expanding safe areas in Afghanistan.<sup>148</sup> In essence, the use of private security contractors was a combat multiplier for the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. Without increasing the quantity of military members in Afghanistan or seeking assistance from coalition forces, both of which were not politically feasible, the only other option would have been to abandon certain FOBs. However this could have allowed the insurgents to retake ground that had already been secured. The Canadian Forces would have given up terrain that they had previously fought over, had they not employed private security companies to maintain a presence in several FOBs.

A second order effect of Canada using private security is that it has a positive impact on Canada's partners. Christopher Spearin, an associate professor in the Department of Defence Studies of the Royal Military College, points out that the Canadian Forces' use of private security companies may also be beneficial to improving Canada-US relations. He succinctly states:

Because combat is inherently risky and potentially costly in terms of blood and treasure, Canada-US relations are arguably best served by the Canadian forces working where the benefits will be highest: in parallel or together with US forces in risky endeavors.<sup>149</sup>

The Canadian Forces reliance on civilians will now be examined.

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<sup>147</sup> Jonathan Monpetit, "Canada Denies Bribing Taliban in Efforts to Bring Stability to Kandahar," *The Canadian Press* (Oct 16, 2009), 1.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>149</sup> C. Spearin, "The Changing Forms and Utility of Force: The Impact of International Security Privatization on Canada," *International Journal* 64, no. 2 (Spring, 2009), 488.

## 4.2 Reliance

Like the United States military, the Canadian Forces is reliant on the majority of the civilians that are currently supporting the force (albeit some more than others). The Canadian Forces' reliance on civilians stems primarily from manpower shortages. However, other reasons for the Canadian Forces' reliance also exist. There are some civilians that provide services and expertise that are simply not inherent in the military such as POLADs, interpreters, and FSRs. However, with regards to other civilians, the military's reliance is based on the inability of the force to generate the required number of soldiers to fill all of the functions over repetitive tours.<sup>150</sup> Nevertheless, one could argue that there is capacity for the Canadian Forces to deploy without civilian support, but only for short periods of time.

The Canadian Forces has become completely reliant on civilians to fill the capability gap when new equipment is delivered to theatre. In this case, Field Services Representatives (FSRs) are deployed to support the equipment from the original equipment manufacturer.<sup>151</sup> Often, operators and maintainers first see equipment that they are required to use and maintain when they arrive in theatre. Since military members have not been trained on the new equipment, civilians are often used to provide the required training and fill the capability gap.<sup>152</sup> Further, having purchased small

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<sup>150</sup> Perry, *Contractors in Kandahar, Eh? Canada's 'Real' Commitment to Afghanistan*, 9.

<sup>151</sup> Major Mark Penney (Camp Services Officer Afghanistan 2006), conversation with author, 4 February 2010.



unmanned aerial vehicles (SUAVs) that are expected to deploy in summer 2010, the Canadian Forces will once again rely on civilian assistance.<sup>153</sup> According to the contract, civilians will be responsible for training military members in the maintenance, engineering, and operation aspects. The contract also includes the manufacturer to be responsible for launching the SUAVs and performing checks after takeoff before handing them over to Canadian Forces personnel to operate them in a mission.<sup>154</sup> These examples demonstrate the impact of accepting and using new equipment in theatre on the increased reliance of civilians to support the systems.

The reliance on civilians has also increased due to low manning levels. Prior to 2000, the Canadian Forces' reliance on civilians to support operations was minimal. During the deployments to Bosnia prior to 2000, and similarly to Kosovo in 1999, approximately 100 locally employed civilians were employed in general labourer tasks such as maintenance, warehousing, cleaning, tire repair, construction and food services. In 2009, CANCAP employed over four hundred civilians to conduct similar functions to support a larger force in much more dangerous conditions.<sup>155</sup> The Canadian Forces has saved close to one hundred positions thanks to the civilian help.<sup>156</sup> Successive deployments to Afghanistan have strained the Canadian Forces' ability to man all the

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<sup>152</sup> Major Mark Penney (Camp Services Officer Afghanistan 2006), conversation with author, 4 February 2010.

<sup>153</sup> David Pugliese, "No Rest for Troops Until Summer," *The Ottawa Citizen*, Feb 22, 2010, 1.

<sup>154</sup> "New Contract for Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (SUAV) Will Boost Economy," *Marketwire* (Apr 6, 2009), 1.

<sup>155</sup> Spearin, *The Changing Forms and Utility of Force: The Impact of International Security Privatization on Canada*, 482.

<sup>156</sup> Perry, *Contractors in Kandahar, Eh? Canada's 'Real' Commitment to Afghanistan*, 12.

positions required to conduct operations. In particular occupations and ranks, to alleviate the strain of manning shortfalls, the Department of Defence has gone so far as to recruit retired military personnel to assist in training Afghan officers.<sup>157</sup>

Not only has the Canadian Forces become more reliant on civilians but it has have also employed them more in the combat zone then ever before. Civilians had typically been restricted to filling CSS roles, as this was where manning shortfalls existed. However, in 2006, the Canadian Forces began to hire civilians to fill roles traditionally only filled by combat arms soldiers, including the provision of security, a civilian task which is now common practice in Afghanistan.<sup>158</sup> In fact, between April 2008 and June 2009, approximately eight million dollars was spent on private security.<sup>159</sup> One military spokesman explained: “They [security contractors] are integral to the security of Canadian personnel and enable the Canadian forces to focus their efforts on those duties where they provide the greatest value to the mission. The guards free Canadian soldiers to patrol or train Afghan troops.”<sup>160</sup>

Another example of Canada’s increased reliance on private security contractors involves its promised involvement in the Dahla Dam. In 2008, the government of

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<sup>157</sup> Pugliese, *No Rest for Troops Until Summer*, A1.

<sup>158</sup> Spearin, *The Changing Forms and Utility of Force: The Impact of International Security Privatization on Canada*, 479.

<sup>159</sup> "Canadian Military in Afghanistan Spending Millions on Private Security," *BBC Monitoring South Asia* (Nov 18, 2009), 1.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

Canada announced that it will support the refurbishment of the Dahla Dam.<sup>161</sup> As part of the contract, the winning bidder is expected to provide its own security with only limited support from the military.<sup>162</sup> Not only is Canada now more reliant on civilians, Canada is also more willing to place them in more dangerous environments.<sup>163</sup>

### 4.3 Costs

The Canadian Forces has experienced similar costs compared to the U.S. in the involvement of civilians supporting its operations. This fact only strengthens the idea that the Canadian military should study the American use of civilians on operations in order to learn from their model. This should enable the Canadian Forces to utilize civilians in a more efficient and beneficial manner. Thus far, the Canadian experience has been less problematic because the CF has not relied on as many civilians to perform as many tasks. Nevertheless, costs in the areas of training, command and control, legal, impact on military manning, performance and availability, and the impact on local population, should be considered.

#### 4.3.1 Legal and Ethical

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<sup>161</sup> Spearin, *The Changing Forms and Utility of Force: The Impact of International Security Privatization on Canada*, 484.

<sup>162</sup> Andrew Mayeda, "Afghan Dam Contractor must Hire its Own Guns; Canadian Troops Won't Provide Security, Construction Bidders Warned," *Edmonton Journal*, Jul 15, 2008, 1.

<sup>163</sup> Spearin, *The Changing Forms and Utility of Force: The Impact of International Security Privatization on Canada*, 483.

The American perspective highlighted several legal and ethical issues from which both the Canadian government and the Canadian Forces can benefit. The Canadian Forces has experienced some of the same issues and some that are unique. For example, Canada's policy regarding the use of private security continues to develop. The policy has been revised to ensure contractors abide by international humanitarian law, which prohibits attacks on civilians.<sup>164</sup> However, it would seem that the Canadian Forces that are deployed in Afghanistan are making decisions that are not yet fully supported by policy. Under the Access to Information Act, the Canadian Press uncovered that Canada's military secretly armed Afghan civilians hired to secure a FOB due to an unforecasted operational requirement.<sup>165</sup> This issue raises numerous considerations such as: what is the Canadian Forces', and by extension the government's, responsibility in the event of inappropriate action by private security firms hired by the Canadian Forces; in the event of inappropriate use of a weapon by an Afghan guard using a Canadian weapon; and in training the contractor? These ethical issues should be resolved if the Canadian Forces intends to continue to use armed civilians.

Canada's legal responsibility to civilians supporting Canadian operations also needs to be resolved. Like the United States, Canada struggles with the uncertainty of who has legal authority over civilians supporting the force. The 2005 status-of-forces agreement between Canada and Afghanistan suggests that contractors are governed by Canadian, not Afghan, law since they are considered Canadian who are immune from the

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<sup>164</sup> *Canadian Military in Afghanistan Spending Millions on Private Security*, 1.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 1

Afghan justice system.<sup>166</sup> However, a 2007 contract to provide security at the PRT indicated specifically that the civilian employees would not be considered Canadian personnel as defined in the 2005 agreement.<sup>167</sup> Going further, the legal authority over unlawful activity amongst locally employed civilians is not clear. The lack of clarity was evident in 2008 when an Afghan interpreter allegedly stabbed another Afghan interpreter.<sup>168</sup> It remains unclear whether Canadian or Afghan law has jurisdiction over the incident and those involved.

#### 4.3.2 Command and Control

The American and historical perspectives demonstrated that poor command and control led to disciplinary issues at both the individual and corporate levels. The Canadian experience reinforces this trend. An example of how poor command and control over outsourced functions from a Canadian perspective occurred in its reliance of strategic sea lift to an ad-hoc contract in 2000 to bring equipment back from Kosovo. Because of a contractual dispute between a shipping company and the Canadian Government, one third of the Army's equipment was held hostage for over a month and the majority navy spent weeks sailing in circles while negotiations were occurring.<sup>169</sup> As

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<sup>166</sup> Andrew Mayeda, "Military Revised Contracts with Private-Security Providers," *Leader Post*, May 27, 2008, 1.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>168</sup> Mike Blanchfield, "Major Canadian Contractor in Afghanistan Cited for Management Deficiencies." *CanWest News* (Jun 3, 2008), 1.

<sup>169</sup> David Evans, "Corporate Profit and Modern War: National Militaries are Now Merely the Paymasters for Private Corporations," *Peace Magazine* 21, no. 3 (Jul-Sep, 2005), 16.

a result, in 2008, the military took steps to improve the previously practiced ad-hoc contracting arrangements and established the provision of a dedicated charter vessel that remains at the beckon call of the military, albeit still at an outsourced solution.<sup>170</sup> This demonstrates poor discipline at the corporate level due to the command and control relationship the military has over civilians.

The Canadian perspective also offers a similar case experienced by the Americans concerning individual civilians' refusal to work in dangerous environments. After introducing CANCAP in Bosnia, the contractor struggled to find employees that were willing to work in more dangerous environments.<sup>171</sup> Furthermore, unlike Canadian soldiers, civilians were not liable to be charged with treason or something similar if they failed to follow orders even if they were within the requirements of the contract.<sup>172</sup> Similar to the lessons from history and the American perspective, consideration needs to be given to the risk associated with the employment of civilians in positions that may impact the operation unless appropriate laws are designed to deal with the possibility of these occurrences. To prepare for the continued reliance on contractors, in order to mitigate these command and control issues, the Canadian government must ensure the proper command and control of Canadian civilians supporting operations.<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Perry, *The Privatization of the Canadian Military: Afghanistan and Beyond*, 689.

<sup>171</sup> Evans, *Corporate Profit and Modern War: National Militaries are Now Merely the Paymasters for Private Corporations*, 16.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>173</sup> Perry, *The Privatization of the Canadian Military: Afghanistan and Beyond*, 687.

### 4.3.3 Training

Although it has been shown that forces have not invested in combined military/civilian training, it is only logical that there is a requirement to ensure effective cooperation and integration between the military and the civilians that support it. Therefore, the significant increase of the Canadian Forces' reliance on civilians should result in the requirement for the military to train with civilians prior to deployment. Similar to the U.S. experience, there is little interaction between civilians and the Canadian military, both in the field and in garrison to prepare for a deployment. What is worse is that there is no training with the civilians who will be supporting the force on operations during pre-deployment training.<sup>174</sup> The military and civilian members do not develop the same level of mutual trust they would had they trained together, do not understand each other's capabilities and limitations, and often struggle to establish mutually beneficial relationships. Not ideally, their relationships are finally forced to mature once civilians and military personnel deploy together on operations.

Although military members receive formal training to ensure that they understand the capabilities of other military occupations, they do not receive formal training on civilian capabilities. The situation with civilians is similar. Training would ensure a better working relationship and a more effective force. Following the concept of "train the way you fight," at some point during the six month work-up training period, the civilians that will be deploying with the force should train with the force that they will be

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<sup>174</sup> Army Lessons Learned Repository, <http://lfds-allc.kingston.mil.ca/MOL/default.aspx>; Internet, accessed 10 February 2010.

supporting. Of course this concept comes with costs as civilians would have to be employed earlier than had they simply meet the force on the operation. It is not suggested that all civilians that are expected to support the force train with the military for the entire six months. However, a certain number of representation of critical civilian positions should be incorporated at the appropriate time during specific training events. At the very least this should be considered by military planners. This concept should not only be applied to contracted civilians but also POLADs, interpreters, and CFPSA staff. Certain training should also be considered for designated military positions in the areas of the Canada Labour Code and contracting.

#### 4.3.4 Impact on military manning

Similar to the American experience, the Canadian Forces has also seen a negative impact that private military companies have had on manning retention. Private military companies take advantage of an already skilled pool of individuals at minimal expense as they recruit the ranks of publicly trained military members.<sup>175</sup> Although, in Canada, the loss to the private sector is difficult to calculate, the drain has become a concern of the Canadian Forces. As stressed in one Canadian Forces analysis, “The world-renowned reputation of JTF 2 as a [special operations force] unit has drawn attention from many of these security firms.”<sup>176</sup> Although, these private military companies will exist whether the Canadian Forces use them or not, undoubtedly, military members will network more

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<sup>175</sup> Evans, *Corporate Profit and Modern War: National Militaries are Now Merely the Paymasters for Private Corporations*, 14.

<sup>176</sup> Spearin, *The Changing Forms and Utility of Force: The Impact of International Security Privatization on Canada*, 489.



while on operations with those companies that they are working with. Inevitably, this will result in opportunities for employment for the military member.

#### 4.3.5 Availability and Performance

The availability of civilians that are required by a force may not necessarily always be guaranteed. Civilians from either the country providing the force or the host country are not an endless pool of resources that are necessarily able to surge at the beckon call of the military. The recent expansion in 2009 of the U.S. military in the South of Afghanistan, created a lack of available contractors in the area.<sup>177</sup> The principle engineer advisor to the Canadian Commander in Afghanistan, LCol David Gowdy, has indicated: "In general, the capabilities for the contractors in the region are being stretched because of the increased demand...[and] the contractors and trades people are hard to come by "<sup>178</sup> When the availability of skilled individuals does not meet the demand, the force experiences one of two unfavourable results: the non completion of the task or function, or the completion of the task or function at a lower standard than expected due to the private company relying on less capable individuals with little or no experience as it tries to quickly increase capacity and maximize profits.

The performance of contractors also needs to be considered when determining if functions should be outsourced. There are several examples where the performance of civilian contractors were less than what was expected. The Canadian Government noted

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<sup>177</sup> Ward, *Contractors Busy in Southern Afghanistan; Projects Employing Villagers.*, 1.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

serious problems with construction contracts in Afghanistan as far back as 2005, such as infrastructure that had not been started or left incomplete, even though the contractor was paid in full.<sup>179</sup> Moreover, many private security companies consist primarily of poorly educated, poorly trained local Afghans. In 2005, the Canadian military investigated whether shots from an Afghan private security contractor led to the death of a Canadian soldier. Another example of contractors not performing well occurred in 2005 when SNC Lavalin, the prime civilian contractor for the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan had to implement a get well plan to correct management deficiencies.<sup>180</sup>

#### 4.3.6 Impact on Local Population

As previously indicated, a benefit of using locally employed civilians to support operations is that it is one of the essential elements of winning an insurgency due to the positive effect on the population because of the positive impact to the economy. On the other hand, there have been cases of increased local hostility towards civilians supporting the force due to perceived favouritism with regard to certain contractors as well as the poor conduct of certain contractors towards the population.<sup>181</sup> Perhaps the most serious was against foreign private security companies because they were perceived to be able to work outside of Afghanistan law. In 2008, the Afghan newspaper *Hast-e-Sobh* underscored that the Afghan National Police were often forbidden entry into private

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<sup>179</sup> Evans, *Corporate Profit and Modern War: National Militaries are Now Merely the Paymasters for Private Corporations*, 16.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>181</sup> "US/Afghanistan: Private Contractors Play Stopgap Role," *Oxford Analytical Daily Brief Service* (Aug 22, 2008), 1.

security compounds and had no authority over them.<sup>182</sup> So, as Canada's reliance on civilian private security companies grows, local resentment towards them, and by extension, towards the Canadian Forces that employ them, will grow as well.

There is also a responsibility of the employing force to ensure that money paid to contractors is not funding questionable illegal activity, or even worse, funding the insurgents. In 2008, at least 29 Canadian Forces contracts, totaling \$1.14 million, were suspected to be controlled by a powerful warlord, Gul Agha Sherzai.<sup>183</sup> Although this fact alone is not proof that Canadian taxpayers' money went to funding questionable activity, it certainly highlights the requirement for military planners to consider the possible impact of employing contractors. Mitigation through oversight and strict controls are certainly called for.

The Canadian experience using civilians on deployed operations has been similar to the American one. It has also demonstrated that command and control issues and the resultant discipline issues that have resonated throughout history persist. The Canadian military's use of civilians to support its operations has also highlighted unique challenges that should be considered when contemplating the future use of civilians on operations. They include the potential for inconsistent availability of civilians to perform functions for the military and the potential negative impact of civilians supporting the force on the local population.

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<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

## 5 CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION

Civilians have supported armies on operations since antiquity. Civilians have gained a prominent place in the conduct of warfare due to their significant contributions that they have provided and continue to provide forces conducting operations. Their contributions to the Canadian Forces are also noteworthy. The benefits civilians have provided the force, the Canadian Forces' reliance on them, and the costs that civilians create, for the most part, have endured over time. However, the benefits, the reasons for the reliance, and costs of civilians supporting operations have evolved as societies have changed and technology has become a significant factor in warfare.

The benefits civilians have provided were initially logistical in nature but also included armed men as city states of antiquity and monarchs of Middle and Medieval Ages waged war with mercenaries that increased their own fighting capacity to expand their territory. In much the same way as they do now, civilians reduced the requirement for a nation to maintain a larger force and allow militaries to subcontract logistical responsibilities and focus on generating fighting forces. In current operations, civilians often replace positions that would normally have to be filled by military personnel. Civilians also allow forces to stay below enforced deployment numbers. As technology has continued to improve and become employed even more quickly on the battlefield, civilians have been essential to bringing capabilities to the force that are not inherent in the military. Technology has also created a new risk for civilians. Civilians supporting

new technology are exposed to the combat zone. Other capabilities such as political advice and government aid have been added to the force through the inclusion of civilians on operations as a more comprehensive approach to fight a counter insurgency has been adopted. Another phenomenon that did not exist historically, is the benefit that using local civilians can provide in the theatre of operations. When local civilians are used, a social connection is made between the coalition and the local population. There can also be economic gains from the money that coalitions exchange for civilian services.

The reliance of forces on civilians has fluctuated throughout history. It was at its minimum at the beginning of the Modern age when nations were capable of building professional armies. However, with the increase of large conflicts such as the two World Wars, significant reliance on civilians, primarily providing logistics functions returned. In the last two decades, forces have once again resorted to a reliance on hired armed men for security. Recent increased reliance has developed due to insufficient uniformed soldiers to conduct the operations that governments want militaries to conduct. This has been mitigated by civilians who fill the gap.

The benefits that civilians provide a force are balanced by costs. These costs should be considered when planning the use of civilians on operations and planners need to consider the amount of reliance that should be allowed when considering force structures. Underlying costs such as discipline, performance, and command and control can be traced back to civilians supporting forces of antiquity. They remain today. The legal and ethical aspects as well as training and negative impacts on the local population

also need to be considered when planning for civilian support to the Canadian Forces. Moreover, the economic costs (or savings) between filling functions with military members or civilians are difficult to ascertain. It is certainly a matter of the length of time that the civilian support is required – civilians being more economically practical for shorter periods.

The research conducted for this paper concludes that civilians have provided great benefits to military forces, including the Canadian Forces, and have often been a force multiplier. Moreover, in certain circumstances, such as the rapid employment of new technology, the use of civilians to support it is unavoidable. It demonstrated that there are also significant costs that generated by relying on civilians to support operations. However, it is argued that these costs can be mitigated and should not negate the Canadian Forces continued use of civilians. In its continued use of civilians, the Canadian Forces should consider the following caveats. The Canadian Forces should consider the following four recommendations. First, the Canadian Forces should consider limiting the use of civilians to perform functions that are critical to the operation. Second, the Canadian Forces should maintain core competencies that impact operations even if the function has been outsourced. Third, robust command and control measures should be maintained to ensure that performance and value are maintained in those areas that are completed by civilians. Forth, the ethical and legal dilemmas raised in this paper should be more carefully considered in order for civilian dependency on operations to survive public scrutiny.

Unlike the American military's necessary reliance on civilians to support its operations, the Canadian Forces has room to manoeuvre. The significant reliance of the U.S. on civilians to support the force, as well as Canada's experience, offers the Canadian Forces a wealth of practical experiences that Canadian Forces planners and policy makers can use when developing force structures and the civilian support model. This should allow the Canadian Forces the ability to maximise civilian support with positive impacts to operational success on deployed operations and avoid numerous pitfalls that come with relying on civilians.

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