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**Four CQ Domain Paradigm**

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Compte de mots :

## INTRODUCTION

In July 1918, Colonel T.E. Lawrence entered the city of Damascus with a band of 100 Bedouin and Arab partisan soldiers. His arrival at the city marked the successful culmination of a two year military campaign against the Ottoman Turk Empire during which time he organized a shapeless Arab revolt into an efficient instrument of war. Since the conclusion of his campaign, T.E. Lawrence has been recognized as one of the foremost practitioners of the art of irregular warfare. One of the features often identified as critical to the success of his campaign was his understanding of the impact of culture on the conduct of warfare.

Recent experiences with operations other than war (OOTW), specifically those associated with counter-insurgency and nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan, have reignited interest in the relevance of the cultural dimension of warfare. In response to this renewed interest, western militaries have started to address certain key questions about the effect of culture on the battle space: what is it, how can it be understood and how can it be used advantageously to multiply effects? To answer some of these questions, those developing doctrine have turned to the field of organizational psychology and have adapted much of the work conducted by organizational behaviourists to the military context. In the Canadian Forces, the examination of culture has become a focus for scholars working from the Canadian Defence Academy and the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI). In 2007, Dr. Emily Spencer, an associate

of CFLI proposed a four dimension paradigm that is a first step in determining how to apply cultural intelligence (CQ) in a military context so that it becomes a force multiplier. Before adopting this model as an integral part of the campaign planning process, further examination is warranted.

The purpose of this monograph is to establish the validity of Dr. Spencer's Four CQ Domain Paradigm, using the experience of T.E. Lawrence in the deserts of Arabia. Besides answering the central question of whether the four dimension paradigm is valid, the question of whether the Four Dimension Paradigm should be adopted as an integral the Canadian campaign planning process will also be addressed.

Section one of this monograph will consist of a review of the literature surrounding CQ in order to provide some context to the Four Dimension Paradigm and to establish the relevance of CQ as a field of study for military planners. Section Two, will consist of a synopsis of the events of the Arab Revolt and particularly Lawrence's role in them. The descriptive part of the case study is not an exhaustive description of events, places or people but rather tries to provide some context for the analysis which will be conducted in section three. Section Three is the nexus of this monograph and consists of an analysis of Lawrence's campaign. The goal is to determine whether Lawrence did apply CQ across the four domains suggested by Emily Spencer. The analysis will also attempt to determine whether the application of CQ contributed to Lawrence's success by drawing lines of causality between CQ and operational function. The final section will answer the questions posed in the introduction: Does the case study of Colonel T.E.

Lawrence validate the Four CQ Domain Paradigm and if so should it be adopted as a part of the Canadian campaign planning process?

## **THE APPROACH**

There is a long history and much debate in the social sciences surrounding the strength of different approaches. In the most basic sense, these approaches can be broken down into two types: quantitative and qualitative.<sup>1</sup> Quantitative approaches are based on the results of hard data that is gained through methods including polling, surveys, and statistical analyses. Qualitative methods focus on drawing inferences from causal relationships where hard data does not exist. Because of the nature of the topic being investigated and the lack of hard data on which to conduct statistical or empirical analyses, qualitative analysis was selected as most relevant.

Case Studies are a type of qualitative analysis that consist of a detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or “test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.”<sup>2</sup> Case studies are particularly useful for theory testing and development because they can be used to identify causal mechanisms. In doing this, it must be remembered that as a tool, they remain much stronger at assessing *whether* and *how* a variable mattered to the outcome than at assessing *how much* it

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<sup>1</sup> Alexander L. George and Andrew, Bennet. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. (London: MIT Press 2005), 5. Definitions of qualitative and quantitative approaches found in

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, 5.

mattered.<sup>3</sup> In other words a case study will be able to determine that something was a factor and what the impact was but it will not be able to determine its influence relative to the other factors.

Another reason that case studies are selected as a tool for analysis is that they can represent most/least likely scenarios or crucial scenarios. Crucial scenarios are defined as those “that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or conversely, must not fit equally well with any rule contrary to that proposed.”<sup>4</sup> It is asserted here that the case of Colonel T.E Lawrence and his campaign in Arabia is one of the seminal applications of CQ in a culturally complex, irregular warfare event and cannot be ignored in the development of theories related to the application of CQ. Emily Spencer suggests this by including Lawrence as a historical example of CQ in her article “Crucible of Success: Cultural Intelligence in the Modern Battlespace.” While, it is never explicitly stated, Lawrence’s biographers from Graves through to Barr have all described the importance of Lawrence’s understanding of Arab culture. In a review of Barr’s *Setting the Desert on Fire*<sup>5</sup>, Jennifer Clark notes that the primary theme is “a lesson on the importance of understanding the culture and geography of a foreign land when fighting there.”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, 25.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, 120.

<sup>5</sup> James Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006).

<sup>6</sup> Jennifer Clark, “Setting the Desert on Fire” *The Army Lawyer* (April 2009), 62.

In the social sciences, methodology and process are important when determining validity using case studies. While this case study does not purport to follow any methodology exactly, the process proposed by Alexander George and Andrew Bennet in *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* will be used to inform the approach suggested for this research.

According to George and Bennet, case study research consists of three phases. First, the objectives, research and the structure of the research must be defined. Second the case study is carried out in accordance with the design. Finally, the researcher draws upon the findings of the case study and assesses its contribution to achieve the research objective of the study. In the investigation proposed by this monograph, the research goal has been defined as attempting to validate the four CQ domain paradigm , so now it is necessary to determine an approach that will allow that to be done.

Spencer states that the The Four CQ Domain model was designed to “give Canadian Forces members a framework for applying CQ as a force multiplier.”<sup>7</sup> The derived implication is that applying CQ across the four domains will contribute to the successful achievement of military objectives at the tactical, operational and strategic level. The model will be evaluated against this standard – whether the application of CQ across the four domains can contribute to achieving objectives. In order to do this, Lawrence’s campaign between Jeddah and Aqaba will be examined to determine if there is evidence that the CQ was applied across all four domains. The campaign between

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
<sup>7</sup> Emily Spencer, “Crucible of Success: Applying the Four Domain CQ Paradigm” (Kingston: CFLI Technical Paper, July 2007), 33

Jeddah and Aqaba has been chosen for a number of reasons: first, it is a limited period of time which can be examined in some detail in the time allotted, second, the capture of Aqaba is a clearly defined objective and finally, the period was influenced less by the proximity and mutual support of British forces that characterised later operations in Palestine and Syria.

While finding evidence of the application of CQ in Lawrence's campaign will determine that Lawrence did apply CQ, the second part of Spencer's model requires that Lawrence used CQ to contribute to the achievement of military objectives. In order to do this, causal links will be drawn between the four domains of CQ and the five operational functions proposed in Canadian military doctrine. These functions are: command, shield, act, sustain and sense. Canadian doctrine suggests that the five operational function should be integrated at the operational level in order to conduct a successful campaign.<sup>8</sup> In the case of Lawrence's campaign it will be suggested that they were coordinated to achieve the objective of capturing the port city of Aqaba, a critical point in the campaign. The easiest way to explain the process to be used is through the diagram, included here as figure 1. It should be noted that each of the four dimensions may apply to more than one factor.

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<sup>8</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CFJP 5.0, Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CF OPP), Change 2. Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Defence Staff, April 2008. Art. 203.



**Figure 1 – methodological Approach**

The Case study itself will consist of two parts. The first part will be a detailed narrative describing the period between Lawrence’s arrival in Jeddah – effectively, the beginning of his participation in the Arab Revolt and will end with his arrival in Cairo, following the capture of Aqaba. The second part of the case study will be the analytical explanation, where links between the four dimensions of CQ and the 5 operational functions will be drawn.



## **REVIEW OF THE CQ LITERATURE**

### **Introduction**

The intent behind this section is to describe the current state of research in the field of CQ and specifically to address its application in the military context. An understanding of the concept of culture is critical to understanding CQ and will be the focus of the first part of this section. The second part of this section will attempt to demonstrate the importance of the concept of culture in the military context and will describe how military organizations are addressing its impact, specifically in OOTW. The section will end with a discussion of how militaries have attempted to take the concept of CQ from a theoretical concept to something that can be applied to achieve military objectives at the strategic, operational and tactical level. Emily Spencer's Four CQ Domain Paradigm will be examined as a potential model for the application of CQ in operations. At the end of the section it will be suggested that Spencer's model for the application of CQ can be validated and supported using evidence found in the crucial case study of T.E. Lawrence's campaign in the deserts of Arabia during the First World War.

## Culture

The task of studying and defining culture has been the realm of anthropologists and sociologists, most of whom have adopted an approach which describes culture as a framework which allows individuals and groups “to understand the ways in which historically transmitted patterns of meaning, symbols, conceptions, values, and knowledge influence attitudes, motivations and behaviours of groups of people.”<sup>9</sup> One of the important concepts associated with this is described by developmental psychologist Robert Kegan who asserts that culture is a tool used by individuals and groups to make meaning of the world around them. Individuals are informed by the common practises of those around them and in turn contribute to collective understanding through their own experiences, and interpretations. In other words, culture is the link between the individual and social group or organization to which he or she belongs.<sup>10</sup> Brian Semelski identifies some of the most commonly held tenants regarding culture. Specifically he identifies that it is learned, shared, patterned and transmitted across generations. It is multi-levelled and at the deepest levels consists of values, beliefs, expectations, emotions and symbols that range from the commonly recognized to those that are taken for granted.<sup>11</sup>

Given the complexity of some of these definitions, it is not surprising that those who are attempting to apply the concept to the function of organizations have opted for somewhat simplified definitions. As recently as 2006, culture was described in US

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<sup>9</sup> Karen D. Davis and Justin C. Wright, “Culture and Cultural Intelligence.” *Cultural Intelligence and Leadership* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press), 9.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>11</sup> Brian Semelski, “Military Cross Cultural Competence” RMC Centre for Security, Armed Forces and Society Occasional Paper Series – Number 1 (Kingston: RMC, 16 May 2007), 3.

Department of Defence documents as, “a feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are such items as roads buildings, and canals; boundary lines and in a broad sense legends on a map,”<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, this definition is of little utility when attempting to understand how people think, and why they believe what they believe. Most current definitions have adopted some form of the idea that culture includes “a set of beliefs and values about what is desirable and undesirable in a community of people and a set of formal and informal practices to support these values.”<sup>13</sup> Allan English describes this in a simple equation: culture is the combination of values and beliefs that leads to certain attitudes and behaviours or,

Values + beliefs => attitudes =>behaviour

Without suggesting that values, beliefs and attitudes are the only determinants of a group’s behaviour, understanding that that some fundamental group attitudes are comprised of belief-value pairing is useful in determining why certain groups do what they do.<sup>14</sup>

This understanding of culture has significant implications for military organizations. Planners cannot be content with a description of culture that simplifies it as, a “feature of the environment created by man.” To do so oversimplifies it as a concept

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>13</sup> Tony Teo, “Cross-Cultural Leadership: A Military Perspective” (master’s thesis, Canadian Forces College, May 2005), 20.

<sup>14</sup> Emily Spencer, “Crucible of Success: applying the Four Domain CQ Paradigm” (Kingston: CFLI Technical Paper, July 2007), 33.

and therefore the understanding of its ability to impact successful outcomes during operations. Military theorists have taken a more critical look at culture and developed an understanding that pays more than lip service to its importance in the battle space. Colonel Maxie McFarland, USA, amongst others has been at the forefront of adopting a more nuanced understanding of culture. MacFarland, has adopted the definition of Peter Katzenstein, who views culture as a set of norms or values, and cognitive standards such as rules or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and interrelate.<sup>15</sup> This greater understanding is reflected in the definition also used by the United States Airforce Center for Advanced Defense Studies which defines culture as a shared system of meanings, beliefs, values and behaviours through which experience is interpreted and carried out.<sup>16</sup> CFLI has adopted Dr. English's definition of culture as consisting a belief, value pairing supported by attitudes and behaviours of a group of people.<sup>17</sup> This understanding of culture is the one that informs Emily Spencer's four dimension paradigm and is the starting point for a discussion of CQ.

Before discussing CQ, there are several other ideas that are worth investigating. A number of studies over the past thirty years have attempted to describe the differences between cultures and how they approach common experiences. Most of these studies were conducted by organizational behaviourist who attempted to determine how ethnicity affected peoples approach to work and particularly leadership. In 1976, Hall reported that

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<sup>15</sup> Colonel Maxie McFarland, "Military Cultural Education" *Infantry* (May-June 2005), 41.

<sup>16</sup> Center for Advanced Defense Studies "Cultural Intelligence and the United States Military" (Washington, D.C.: Defense Concepts Series, July 2006), 1.

<sup>17</sup> Karen Davis and Justin Wright, 9.

a primary characteristic of cultures is the degree to which they are focused on the individual or on the group.<sup>18</sup> In 1994, Trompenaars was able to classify organizational cultures into two dimensions: egalitarian versus hierarchical and person versus task orientation. In perhaps the most referenced work on the dimensions of culture, Geert Hofstede identified five major areas in which cultures differ: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, and long term-short term orientation.<sup>19</sup> Others have added to this work including House who conducted the massive GLOBE project that included a quantitative study of 17, 000 managers in 950 organizations representing 62 different cultures. Building on the work of Hofstede and others they identified nine dimensions upon which cultures differ.<sup>20</sup>

The fact that different cultures approach organizational dynamics differently has huge implications for leaders and managers. As identified by Northouse, “a skilled leader cannot avoid issues related to ethnocentrism....and must be able to negotiate the fine line between trying to overcome ethnocentrism and knowing when to remain grounded in their own cultural values”.<sup>21</sup> In his work Hofstede noted that, “a key issue for organization science is the influence of national cultures on management...national and even regional cultures do matter for management...these differences may become one of

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<sup>18</sup> Peter Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice* (Thousand Oaks, Ca.: Sage Publications, 2007), 305.

<sup>19</sup> Geert Hofstede, “The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices and Theories” *Journal of International Business Studies*, vol. 14 (Fall 1983): 78.

<sup>20</sup> Peter Northouse, 305.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, 304.

the most critical problems for management.”<sup>22</sup> Both scholars are in agreement. In order to maximize productivity in a cross cultural environment, leaders must understand that their way of approaching group dynamics may not be the same as a group from a different cultural milieu. Leaders do not have to abandon their way of doing things but they do need to be flexible and sensitive to the legitimacy of other ways of doing things.

Military planners and practitioners have arrived at many of the same conclusions as social scientists: cultural complexity can impact outcomes in military operations across the spectrum of conflict. This has been particularly evident, since the end of the Cold War, when many military operations have been defined as OOTW. They have consisted of activities labelled peacekeeping, peace enforcement, stability operations and nation building. One of the significant features of these types of operations is the requirement for soldiers to interact with host nation institutions, multi-national partners, enemy forces, and to have an understanding of how these interactions will be perceived by a national “home” audience.<sup>23</sup> Nowhere has this trend been more evident than in the campaigns currently being conducted in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Even before the commencement of hostilities in Iraq in 2003, a report commissioned by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), indicated an understanding of the cultural complexity facing American planners in a post war Iraq. In their report they stated,

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<sup>22</sup> Geert Hofstede, 75.

<sup>23</sup> Emily Spencer, 10.

The administration of an Iraqi occupation will be complicated by deep religious, ethnic and tribal differences which dominate Iraqi society...The occupation of Iraq involves a myriad of complexities arising from the political and socio-economic culture of that country. This situation is further complicated by the poor understanding that Westerners and especially Americans have of Iraqi political and cultural dynamics....The possibility of the United States winning the War and losing the peace in Iraq is real and serious.<sup>24</sup>

In 2003, US Army Major General Robert Scales Jr., former director of the US Army War College briefed the House Armed Services Committee and provided a frank assessment of how a lack of cultural understanding was affecting US operations in the early days of the 2003 Iraq war,

It is about understanding the enemy as he is and then tailoring strategic and operational approaches that run his political framework to one's own advantage. Without this kind of political knowledge, which requires immersion in language, culture, and history of a region, the data gathered by technological means can serve only to reinforce preconceived, erroneous and sometimes disastrous notions.<sup>25</sup>

Senior officials and military officers were not the only ones to recognize the importance of culture to operations in Iraq. Officers operating at the tactical level also found themselves involved in a new type of warfare that emphasised a requirement to understand more than just the enemy order of battle. The following quotation from a battalion commander in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division demonstrates how current operations demand a new cognitive framework for understanding the implications of culture on warfare. He said,

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<sup>24</sup> James Gordon, "Cultural Assessments and Campaign Planning" (Monograph, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 26 May, 2004), 10.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, 11.

I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. I knew where every tank was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil. Only problem was, my soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing AK-47s and RPGs. Great technical intelligence. Wrong Enemy.<sup>26</sup>

Canadian soldiers conducting stability operations in Kandahar province, located in southern Afghanistan have faced many of the same issues as their counterparts fighting in Iraq. Failures to take into account the impact of culture have affected the success of operations in a significant way. Former Commander of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), multinational Brigad Sector South in Kandahar Admitted,

I underestimated one factor-culture...I was looking at the wrong map-I needed to look at the tribal map not the geographic map. The tribal map is over 2000 years old. Wherever we go in the world we must take into account culture. Culture will affect what we do. This is the most important map there is....I did not take that up front. Not all the enemy reported was actually Taliban – identification of the enemy was often culturally driven.<sup>27</sup>

The cultural dislocation that comes with this type of warfare is not unique to the Canadian or American experience. Other western nations have also addressed issues of culture although many have more experience from a historical perspective because of their colonial pasts. The Dutch, French and United Kingdom Armed Forces have all recognized the impact of culture on current

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<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, 44.

<sup>27</sup> Emily Spencer, 3.



modes of warfare and have revisited campaigns past. In his article, “Complex Operations in Africa: Operational Cultural Training in the French Military,” Colonel Henri Bore (retired), French Army, provides the French perspective on what he calls cultural-military operations (CMO) and the development of an anthropological approach to preparation for low intensity military campaigns abroad.<sup>28</sup> Lieutenant Robert Gooren, Netherlands Army, indicates that the armed forces of the Netherlands have also taken a historical perspective with respect to preparing for “post-conflict operations” that “require new skills.”<sup>29</sup> Like their social science counterparts, military analysts have quickly become aware that culture matters, particularly in the types of operations that are currently being conducted.

### **Cultural Intelligence**

With the recognition that “culture matters” when conducting operations in low intensity, highly interactive environments, military planners have looked to find ways to minimize the likelihood of cultural misunderstandings and maximize the benefits of cultural competency. The U.S. Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) is clear about its mandate,

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<sup>28</sup> Henri Bore, “Complex Operations in Africa: Operational Culture Training in the French Military” *Military Review* (March-April 2009), 65.

<sup>29</sup> Robert, Gooren, “Soldiering in Unfamiliar Places: The Dutch Approach”, *The Military Review* (March-April 2006): 54-60.

CAOCL does not teach culture for its own sake, or for a non-directed appreciation of or sensitivity towards foreign peoples. CAOCL executes operationally focused training and education in individual training, Professional Military Education (PME), and pre-deployment phases, reflecting current and likely contingencies and functions to ensure Marines and leaders deploy a grasp of culture and indigenous dynamics for use as a force multiplier.<sup>30</sup>

In most cases, militaries attempt to “teach culture” by generating a limited amount of procedural and declarative knowledge.<sup>31</sup> This includes providing language skills, pre-deployment briefings that stress awareness of cultural norms in areas where a force is to be deployed. In recent years, however, there has been a growing recognition that instilling cultural knowledge is just one part of the puzzle that allows soldiers to have successful interactions in cross-cultural circumstances. It is apparent that in addition to cultural awareness there are also cognitive capacities, skills and motivation that must be developed to ensure successful interactions. The combination of cultural knowledge, with cognitive competencies, motivation and specific behaviours are the building blocks of the concept defined as cultural intelligence (CQ). This concept of cultural intelligence, developed by David C. Thomas is a variation on the original concept proposed by Earley and Ang.<sup>32</sup> In order to fully understand how an individual applies CQ it is useful to explain the individual components – the explanation

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<sup>30</sup> Emily Spencer, 12.

<sup>31</sup> Brian Semelski, 1.

<sup>32</sup> Karen Davis and Justin Wright, 11-13.

provided by Karen Davis and Justin Wright in their chapter of Cultural Intelligence and Leadership will be used.<sup>33</sup>

Culturally specific knowledge includes awareness of sex roles, family structures, and status and is complemented by knowledge of strategic culture in the form of political, economic, religious and demographic trends. Cognitive capacity or competence refers to an individual's decision making ability, social perception and is related to the manner in which identity has been developed. A subset of cognition, or meta-competency is mindfulness. Mindfulness refers to a person's ability to bring to mind relevant knowledge, inhibit undesirable responses and edit responses to be consistent with goals. Mindfulness connects cognitive capacities to behaviour. Behaviour refers to skills such as language and other non-verbal communication. Motivation is indicative of an individual's willingness to employ knowledge and cognitive skills and is based on confidence, persistence, value congruence and affect for the new culture. It is important to note that all components of this model are necessary in order for an individual to have CQ. Knowledge of a culture without the motivation to use it or the cognitive skills to do so effectively does not constitute CQ.

The Thomas model of cultural intelligence is the one that has been adopted by CFLI. It has been distilled into the following definition, "the ability to recognize the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of a group of people

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, 12-13.

and, most importantly, to effectively apply this knowledge toward a specific goal or range of activities.”<sup>34</sup>

Western militaries have taken notice of the impact which culture and CQ can have on the conduct of modern operations. Many have started programs, and developed institutions which focus on training individuals in basic cultural competencies like language, customs, and religion. In recent years, there has also been increased attention given to how CQ is applied during operations. As noted by CAOCL, learning about foreign culture is done so that it can be used as a force multiplier. There needs to be a framework to provide some direction as to how CQ can be applied so that it becomes a force multiplier. Several American scholars have proposed that taxonomies which include the application of CQ at the host nation, enemy and coalition (international) level to improve function in these domains.<sup>35</sup> Emily Spencer has proposed the same domains for CF operations but has added the national domain because it is also relevant to CF operations. Emily Spencer’s Four CQ Domain Paradigm is the focus of the next section and is the focus of this monograph because she suggests that it can be an effective force multiplier in CF operations.

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<sup>34</sup> *ibid*, 9.

<sup>35</sup> Emily Spencer, 18.

## **The Four CQ Domain Paradigm**

In building the Four Dimension Paradigm of CQ, Emily Spencer's stated objective was to provide a framework that allows members of the CF to apply CQ so that it is an effective force multiplier. While it is never explicitly stated, her argument is that the effective application of CQ across the four domains will contribute to achieving successful outcomes at the strategic, operational and tactical level. To support her thesis, she uses the CF experience in Afghanistan as a case study. The following section will examine the four domains proposed by Spencer and will end by proposing that Spencer's model can be best evaluated and supported using evidence from a crucial case study in the field of CQ, that of Colonel T.E. Lawrence and his campaign in the Hijaz region of Arabia.

### **Host Nation Domain: Applying CQ in an Unfamiliar Environment**

Many of the missions that have been conducted by the international community in the past twenty years can be classified as low intensity conflicts or operations other than war. These missions have included peace keeping operations, stability operations, nation building and counter-insurgency. In these types of operations, winning the "hearts and minds" of the local population is critical to success. Theorists of insurgent and counter-insurgent warfare have long recognized that success in low intensity, insurgent and counter-insurgent warfare hinges on a force's ability to gain the support of the local population, to

the extent that many of these conflicts are characterized not as an engagement between two forces but as a battle for the support of the local people.<sup>36</sup>

Spencer focuses on the conduct of counter-insurgent operations in Afghanistan and she notes some of the difficulties faced by Canadian soldiers serving there. First, it is often difficult to differentiate civilians from enemy combatants. Soldiers often feel angry and betrayed because they believe that they are serving in Afghanistan, “to create a better society for its people, yet they are continually attacked by seemingly invisible antagonists who appear to operate effortlessly in the very Afghan society that the soldiers are trying to improve and protect.”<sup>37</sup>

Spencer also highlights the importance of interpreters and those with the ability to understand the nuances and messages behind what might be communicated explicitly. Of interpreters she says, “they are also able to explain nuances that are missed by those with only a basic understanding of the language and are able to translate these into more meaningful messages.”<sup>38</sup> Understanding cultural cues can also help to determine if an area is under the influence of

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<sup>36</sup> Emily Spencer, 23.

David Galula, *Counter-insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* New York: Praeger, 1964) 89.

T.E. Lawrence also expresses this sentiment in *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, 24.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, 24.

insurgents and whether the population is being coerced into supporting them or is doing so willingly. Again, these cues might not be explicit and the ability to read them can be critical.

### Enemy Domain

As with the other domains, Spencer relies on the Afghanistan mission and the context of the counter insurgency operations being conducted there to support her arguments. To start, she notes that in counter-insurgent warfare, understanding the enemy is very much related to understanding the host nation population. The enemy, for the most part, is from the same population and relies on their ability to move effortlessly amongst the host nation population. Unlike traditional Cold War enemies, they are asymmetric, and decentralized in their approach. They do not abide by international law and they follow no standard doctrine. They make no distinction between civilian and military and operations are conducted both among and against civilians and society at large.<sup>39</sup> In this battle for control of the population, Spencer notes the requirement to exploit the weaknesses of the enemy to achieve success. CQ becomes essential when trying to discredit particular opponents with a specific target audience or by attacking alliances or support along tribal lines, taking advantage of historic tensions and animosities.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, 26.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, 27.

## The National Domain: Winning and Keeping the “Heart’s and Minds” of Canadians

The innovative and new part of Spencer’s four dimension paradigm was the addition of the fourth dimension. Previous definitions of CQ had identified the international, host, and enemy dimensions, but notably absent was any reference to the requirement to apply CQ when considering the reaction of those at home to military operations abroad. Applying CQ in the national context, involves understanding the behavioural patterns, beliefs and institutions of the society at home (in Spencer’s example Canada) and acting in accordance with these in order to maintain public support. Spencer notes that a military that serves a democratic nation cannot be successful without the support of the public. In the age of modern media and embedded journalists, images and stories can be beamed home in seconds. There are very few parts of an operation that can be conducted without the scrutiny of the public. A population will not want to support a mission that that does not continuously reflect their beliefs, values and attitudes, even in parts of the world where the population clearly has different and opposing beliefs and values.<sup>41</sup>

While Spencer focuses on the impact of modern media, the impact of the national domain is evident even when all pervasive modern media is not evident.

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<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, 19.



Regardless of media scrutiny, the political-strategic level and the military strategic level are both informed by the expectations, values and beliefs of the national domain. The strategies that are developed in the political and cultural climate of the national domain influence the conduct of operations and will to a certain extent influence tactical objectives. While Spencer doesn't necessarily speak to this, the experience of Lawrence indicates how important it is for an operational commander to be aware of how the political and military strategic vision will affect operations – an experience which will be discussed in more length in chapters two and three.

International domain: Military Coalitions, Inter-governmental Organizations, Non-governmental Organizations and Host Nation partners.

Working in coalitions with multiple partners from different cultural backgrounds is challenging. The challenge associated with this kind of work is not restricted to the military environment. Big business and multinational corporations must deal with many of the same issues. The studies conducted by Hofstede, Trompenaars and others were all conducted with this challenge in mind. These studies showed that different cultures have significant differences in almost all of the measurable dimensions of culture. Given this, cultural nuances in speech and behaviour can easily be misinterpreted. Leadership techniques appropriate to one nation can prove completely ineffective when dealing with another. Nations have different Rules of Engagement (ROE) that restrict where

they can operate and what types of operations they can participate in. While they represent political constraints, they also reflect culture.<sup>42</sup>

Although not specifically mentioned by Spencer, another element of the international domain that must be considered is what is referred to by some theorists of command and control as implicit intent. Dr. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann have studied the way that subordinates understand a leader's intent and have proposed that successful mission command is a result of commonly understood intent. In their words, "intent embodies a Commander's vision and will, and is inevitably the product of history, expertise and circumstance."<sup>43</sup> Commander's intent can never be entirely and completely stated explicitly. Subordinates will draw inferences about implied intent and many of these inferences will be based on a framework of understanding similar to that of the commander. This "framework of understanding" is based, in part on common cultural experiences and background, in short, a common national domain. Without a common framework, rooted in a common cultural background it is very difficult for subordinates to infer implied intent from a commander's explicit direction. The common cultural framework from which implied intent inferred is therefore critical to successful mission command.

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<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, 22.

<sup>43</sup> Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, "Clarifying the Concepts of Command and Control."; [http://www.dodccrp.org/events/1999\\_CCRS/pdf\\_files/track\\_3/019mccan.pdf](http://www.dodccrp.org/events/1999_CCRS/pdf_files/track_3/019mccan.pdf); internet; accessed 17 March 2010, 2.

The concept of implied intent also has the ability to affect the way that Commanders and subordinates interact across the international domain. Commanders must be aware that in a culturally diverse, coalition-type environment that challenges could arise even if intent is explicitly stated because subordinates with different cultures frameworks of understanding can infer different implicit intent from the commander based on their own, different cultural background. The potential for misunderstanding is increased in this type of environment.

Spencer concludes with a section ties together the four dimensions of CQ by emphasising the importance of coordinating interaction between them. She stresses that an individual does not need to be a cultural chameleon as they jump between each domain. Rather, individuals need to balance the knowledge that they acquire in each domain so that they can further goals and achieve national objectives. Balancing the four domains is critical because failure to show CQ in any one of them could be detrimental to the success of the mission.

Spencer briefly mentions the implications her model for those in positions of leadership (specifically CF leadership). She notes that CQ can be applied at the tactical, operational and strategic levels but does not elaborate further on how this should be done. In fairness, her paradigm focuses on the tactical level and the nature of her research in Afghanistan supported that focus. In this section she also touches on some of the methods that leaders have for ensuring improved CQ

amongst their soldiers. She focuses on training aids such as designated reading lists, travel books, sociological and anthropological studies and literary works as well as discussion and role playing exercises with veterans who have in-country experience. She concludes with the statement that all those involved in cross-cultural experiences should try to see the world through the eyes of the group that they are examining.<sup>44</sup>

While not specifically addressed by Spencer, the issue of whether CQ is culture-specific or can be engendered as “cross-cultural competence” is relevant here. Brian Semelski suggests that the efforts of militaries have been devoted to cultural knowledge and culture specific training when what is really needed is a broader approach that focuses on the development of cross-cultural competence that would allow soldiers to adapt or at least cope with a variety of culturally complex situations. This is particularly relevant for militaries that are currently training soldiers and commanders for deployments in culturally complex theatres. Semelski suggests that the current focus on culture specific training has had mixed results and that more emphasis on non-contextual training is required.<sup>45</sup> The experience of Lawrence speaks to this point and will be addressed during the final section of this monograph.

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<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, 29.

<sup>45</sup> Brian Semelski, 1.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter provides a review of literature associated with CQ and specifically, its application in the military context. Organizational behaviourists have long recognised the important role that culture can play in the world of business and political affairs. Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the importance of culture to military affairs and specifically OOTW. The CF has started to address how CQ can be applied as a force multiplier. Emily Spencer's Four Domain CQ Paradigm is a first step in determining how this might be accomplished.

Spencer's model is somewhat limited by the fact that it uses the evidence of Afghanistan as a single case study for the validity of her paradigm. It is possible to further validate Spencer's model using the crucial case study of T.E. Lawrence. It is suggested here that the case study of Colonel T.E. Lawrence can be used to support Spencer's paradigm and that it will be possible to find evidence of the application of CQ across the four proposed domains.

The discussion of Spencer's paradigm is a useful forum for discussing other issues highly relevant to the application of CQ. In the next sections several themes that were mentioned in the explanation of Spencer's model will be

addressed in the context of Lawrence. The importance of understanding the national domain, not just because of the impact of media, but also in the context of understanding a commander's implied intent will be discussed. Secondly, the Lawrence case study speaks to the relative importance of the various components of CQ, identified in the English model of CQ, particularly the role of motivation, and culturally specific knowledge in the application of CQ.

Before moving on to the analysis it is useful to briefly review the history surrounding the events which unfolded in the deserts of the Hijaz, in modern day Saudi Arabia during the First World War. These events will be the subject of the next chapter.

## LAWRENCE – JEDDAH TO AQABA

The purpose of this section is to provide some context for the analysis which will be conducted in section three. It is comprised of a synopsis of the events which took place between 1916 and 1918, during the Arab Revolt. This account of Lawrence's campaign is largely drawn from five sources. The first source and the primary one is Lawrence's own account furnished by his memoir *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. The other four accounts include, *Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E Lawrence and Britain's Secret War in Arabia, 1916-18* by James Barr, *Lawrence and the Arabian Adventure* written by Robert Graves, *T.E. Lawrence* written by Basil Liddel-Hart, and finally *Prince of Our Disorder* by John Mack. A number of other sources have been drawn upon in small measure and will be referenced as necessary.

As indicated in the introduction, the primary focus for this case study is the period between Lawrence's first arrival in Jeddah in October 1916 and the capture of Aqaba in July of 1917. Some background context will be given as it is necessary to set the stage for Lawrence's participation in the Revolt. The latter part of the campaign that extended between the capture of Aqaba and the fall of Damascus will be dealt with very briefly.

## Background

Thomas Edward (Ned) Lawrence was born in Tremadoc, North Wales on 16 August, 1888. He was raised in a number of locations throughout Britain and France. During his childhood, he developed an interest in the crusades and the Middle East; an interest that manifested itself during his time at university at Oxford. His thesis paper for his undergraduate degree focussed on the architecture of Crusader architecture in the Middle East and was supported by evidence he gathered on a three month walking tour through the Levant. It was during this time that his interest in Arab culture began. In a letter to his mother, written at the end of his sojourn in the Levant he wrote, “I will have such difficulty becoming English again, here I am, Arab in habits and slip in talking from English to French and Arabic unnoticing.”<sup>46</sup>

It did not take Lawrence long to return to the Middle East. After graduating with a first class distinction in history from Oxford, he travelled back to the Levant to conduct research for his graduate thesis. He joined a British Museum dig at Carchemish in December 1910 and it has been suggested that during this time he was recruited by British intelligence to report on the work of German engineers who were building a railway bridge nearby but there is little proof to corroborate this assertion.<sup>47</sup> Regardless of his reason for being at the dig, Lawrence was already developing his ability to

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<sup>46</sup> John E. Mack, *Prince of Our Disorder* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 75.

<sup>47</sup> H. St. J. B. “T.E. Lawrence: A Centennial Lecture”(October ,1988), 8.



successfully interact with the local inhabitants. One visitor to the camp remarked that he “knew more about handling Orientals,” than anyone he had met in Syria.<sup>48</sup>

Lawrence’s work at the Carchemish Dig was interrupted by the outbreak of war in September 1914. By the end of September, Lawrence was employed in the Geographical Section of the War Office in London working on the production of new maps of the Sinai and helping to compile the *1914 Military Report on the Sinai Peninsula*. Because of his ability to speak Arabic and his knowledge of the Middle East, he was transferred to Cairo to work for the Director of Intelligence in Egypt. In 1916, Lawrence was transferred to the Arab Bureau, which was a specialized organization that focussed exclusively on Arab affairs. In the Arab Bureau, Lawrence was in a good position to be involved in the events which were transpiring in the region of Arabia known as the Hijaz.

The Hijaz is located along the western edge of the Arabian Peninsula that forms the eastern shore of the Red Sea and contains a number of the holy cities including Mecca, Jeddah, and Medina (figure 2). The area was connected to Damascus by the Hijaz Railway, which was constructed in 1906, and had its terminus in Medina. The railway was built on the premise that it would be used to facilitate the movement of pilgrims on the *Haj*, but it was also a vital line of communication for the Ottoman Army garrisons located in the Hijaz. There were three regiments that were located in the Hijaz;

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<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

their headquarters were located at Mecca, Jeddah and Medina. The total force was approximately 45,000 and it had the advantage of occupying fortified positions.<sup>49</sup>




Figure 1 – The Hijaz<sup>50</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Basil Liddel-Hart, *T.E. Lawrence* (Oxford: Alden Press, 1934), 83.

<sup>50</sup> James Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006) xviii.

The ruler of Mecca, Sharif Hussein ibn Ali, not only controlled the holiest city in Islam but he also commanded the allegiance of most of the Bedouin tribes who inhabited the Hijaz. He was appointed Emir of Mecca in 1908, by Sultan Hamid who ruled the Ottoman Empire, but a series of events, including the construction of the Hijaz Railway, had led to discord between Hussein and Ottoman authorities. Arab independence movements had been active in the Ottoman Empire for many years. The outbreak of the First World War, was seen as an opportunity to secure Arab independence from the Ottoman Empire. British authorities in Egypt were aware of the de-stabilizing effect that an Arab rebellion would have on the Ottoman Empire and encouraged it with promises of support.<sup>51</sup>

### **The Strategic Context**

British support for an Arab revolt had originally been suggested by the British Agent in Egypt, Lord Kitchener in late 1914. In addition to destabilizing the Ottoman Empire, widening the divide between the Sharif of Mecca and the Ottoman Empire was seen as critical for maintaining stability in India. India's Muslims were bound by religious affiliation to the Sharif of Mecca. British authorities felt that Ottoman control of the Sharif and Mecca could be used to undermine the Indian government and their control over the Indian Muslim population. Widening the already significant divide

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<sup>51</sup> James Barr, 9.

between the Ottoman Sultan and the Sharif of Mecca was seen as a critical element of British strategy in the Middle East.<sup>52</sup>

Complicating the picture was the fact that the French also had territorial designs in the Middle East. Their historical claim in the Levant, including Syria and modern day Lebanon had led to an agreement known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The agreement divided the Middle East into two spheres of influence, which would be governed by France and Britain following the War. The exact boundaries of the spheres had not been delineated, and as always, there was jostling for ascendancy between the two powers. Lawrence did not become aware of the agreement until the Arab Revolt was well under way, and not surprisingly, it was the source of some distress for him, given that one of his primary motivations was to ensure the creation of a sovereign Arab state. Before he came to know of the Sykes-Picot agreement, Lawrence's assessment of French objectives was already well formed. His early research into crusader architecture had given him an "instinctive understanding" of the medieval roots of French ambition in the Middle East. As early as 1915, he wrote to an instructor at Oxford, discussing the potential for an Arab movement, "we can rush right up to Damascus, and biff the French out of all hope of Syria."<sup>53</sup>

The nascent independence movement in Arabia had attracted the interest of the French who recognized that control or influence in Mecca, directly translated into

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<sup>52</sup> James Barr, 10-11.

<sup>53</sup> T.E. Lawrence quoted in James Barr, 56.

influence over Arab populations elsewhere. The French were interested in building their influence in Mecca and this in part, spurred the British into action. While Lawrence was not aware of the Sykes-Picot agreement until late in 1916, he was certainly aware of how French aspirations in the region affected British policy and strategic thought.

Support for an Arab revolt by the British was intermittent and guarded right from the beginning. It was not until June 1916 that the British Agent in Egypt actually committed to supporting an Arab uprising. The amount of support was always limited and there was controversy over what form it should take.<sup>54</sup> Because of the extent of British engagement on the Western Front in Europe and the recent disaster at the Dardanelles, there was little appetite for committing large numbers of western troops to another 'Oriental' campaign.<sup>55</sup> With limited resources, the British High Command in Cairo was very reluctant to commit anything but the most modest amount of resources to the Arab Revolt.

There was also concern about the impression that landing white, Christian troops on the Arabian Peninsula might have. The Sharif of Mecca was negotiating for an autonomous state in the post-war period and did not wish to give the impression that he was trading sovereignty for support of the British. Christian soldiers fighting Muslim Turkish troops for control of Mecca and the Hijaz had the potential to become problematic for both the Sharif of Mecca and for the British in India. It was with a view

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<sup>54</sup> James Barr, 36-37.

to limiting British support to the Arab Revolt that Lawrence was first sent to the Hijaz. His mission was to prove that British troops were not necessary and also to do his best to undermine the French military mission there.<sup>56</sup> This exposure to the British political and military strategy in the region would later colour much of what Lawrence did as a leader and planner at the operational level.

## **The Revolt**

### The Early Days

On 5 June, 1916, Arab forces decided that the time was right to begin the Revolt but it began with mixed results. In Mecca, a weakened Ottoman Garrison was quickly overrun by a group of Bedouin tribesman but attacks at Medina were easily repulsed by Ottoman defenders. At Jeddah, a combined effort between Bedouin tribesmen and a British Naval force caused the surrender of the garrison there and other coastal towns were also captured in the same manner. After the initial successes, the two sides settled into a stalemate, with the Arab forces controlling Mecca and the coast between Jeddah and Yenbo, and the Ottoman forces controlling Medina and the areas surrounding it. The stalemate allowed the Arab forces time to reorganize and reorient their forces but it also allowed the Ottomans to wait for reinforcements.

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<sup>56</sup> James Barr, 58.

Shortly after the Revolt began, Ronald Storrs, a senior member of the Arab Bureau, and Lawrence travelled to the Hijaz to meet with Sharif Hussein to determine what kind of support would be required from the British during the Revolt. They landed in Jeddah but soon found that they could not ascertain the true state of the Revolt from the coastal city. Lawrence obtained permission to visit Hussein's son, Feisal, who was commanding the Arab forces in the vicinity of Medina. When he arrived in Feisal's camp Lawrence wrote, "I felt at first glance that this was the man I had come to Arabia to seek."<sup>57</sup> After having met Hussein and all four of his sons, Lawrence decided that Feisal was the most likely candidate to lead the Revolt.

Lawrence remained in Feisal's camp for several weeks before he returned to Jeddah and penned his report on the situation in the Hijaz. In it, he advised against sending British soldiers to the Hijaz, worried that the Bedouin tribesmen would be suspicious of British motives and apt to leave the fight in protest. The report was accepted by British General Staff in Cairo and a decision was made not to send British soldiers to the Hijaz. However, an Egyptian artillery unit under the command of Egyptian officers as well as a flight of aircraft were sent to take part in the conflict. The value of having someone on the ground in the Hijaz was recognized by the Arab Bureau and by the General Staff in Cairo. Lawrence was given permission to remain in the Hijaz to assist with intelligence gathering.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. (London: Jonathon Cape Ltd, 1926) 92.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, 74.

During this period, the Arab Revolt suffered a number of setbacks. By December 1916, Feisal had been forced to retreat from his position near Medina, all the way to the coastal town of Yenbo. Feisal's coalition of tribes was under strain, there was infighting between the various tribes and many of the tribesmen were drifting back to their homes. Lawrence reported the Feisal was fast becoming a "tribal leader, not a leader of tribes."<sup>59</sup>

The Turks advanced behind Feisal as he retreated and soon he was forced into a defence of Yenbo. Luckily, five British destroyers were at sea behind the town, and using their searchlights, they illuminated the plain between the town and the Turks' position. The sweep of the searchlights revealed the barren openness of the plain that the Turks would have to cross in order to capture the town and the prospect was enough to convince them that the gain was not worth the risk.<sup>60</sup> After threatening Yenbo for a while longer, the deteriorating state of the Ottoman soldiers and their vulnerability to British aircraft that were now operating from Yenbo, led to a decision to withdraw towards Medina.

Wajh

The Turkish withdrawal from the area around Yenbo was not understood by Feisal and his British advisors. At first they believed that Ottoman forces were moving towards Rabigh, in order to cut off Yenbo and that they were also going to move towards

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<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, 76.

<sup>60</sup> James Barr, 77.



Mecca. In order to relieve the pressure on Rabigh and Mecca, it was decided that Feisal, with the assistance of several British warships, should move north along the coast to the town of Wajh. The movement to Wajh would have several effects. First, Wajh was located just 150 miles south of the Hijaz Railway. This proximity meant that Feisal's force could threaten the Ottoman's most significant line of communication. Secondly, the march to Wajh was designed to demonstrate the strength of Feisal's force to the local tribes and hopefully bring more support from them. The addition of extra fighters was expected to force the Ottoman garrison at Wajh to surrender.<sup>61</sup> At the same time as Feisal's main force marched north, a force of approximately 400 tribesmen would be embarked in a British ship and would move North to conduct a coordinated attack against Wajh from the sea. Along the way they would resupply Feisal's main force with water.

Feisal's force did not arrive at Wajh at the expected time and the seaborne attack was conducted without the support of the land-based element. With the support of the ships and aircraft spotting, the sea-based force overran the defences at Wajh and forced the surrender of the garrison. Feisal's force arrived too late to participate, almost two days after the initial attack and was left to mop up the remaining Ottoman forces in the area. While the battle was a tactical success, Lawrence was not happy with the number of casualties that the Arab landing force had taken. He recognized the effect that even a relatively low casualty rate would have on the tribal forces. He wrote, "An individual

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, 87.

death, like a pebble dropped in water, might make but a brief hole' yet rings of sorrow widened out therefrom. We could not afford casualties.”<sup>62</sup>

Wajh's proximity to the Hijaz Railway, meant that it was the perfect base from which to launch raids. Lawrence and several other British officers began leading parties of locals in the conduct of raids against the railway line and began a period characterised by the intensive destruction of the Ottoman forces' primary line of communication. While there is some debate over the actual effect of attacking the rail line, there can be no doubt that they are some of the most iconic images of the Revolt. From his short time observing Feisal's force, both in its advance to Wajh, and during the attacks against the railway, Lawrence began to make deductions and developed a theory about how the Revolt should be conducted if it was to be successful. Lawrence's theory was based on his observations on the strengths inherent in the traditional Bedouin warfare and the materiel and doctrinal weaknesses of the Ottoman approach to counterinsurgency.

### Lawrence's Strategy<sup>63</sup>

Lawrence recognized that the Arab's strength lay in their strategic depth, that they controlled the vast majority of the Hijaz and that the areas controlled by the Ottoman Army were strategically unimportant. The Bedouin's chief strength was their mobility, particularly their ability to move on short notice across great distances with very little

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<sup>62</sup> T.E. Lawrence, 199.

<sup>63</sup> T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*...195-202.

logistical support. This mobility made them difficult to engage in decisive battle which was the strength of the Ottoman Army. Lawrence decided to use this strength to avoid battle and to retreat when attacked. He realized that the Arabs would not win in sustained combat and that forces should only be concentrated to achieve momentary tactical superiority. The focus of offensive action was to be materiel, not defeating massed groups of Ottoman soldiers. By focussing on lines of communication, Lawrence realized that Ottoman units could be pinned down in their bases.

Lawrence developed most of his strategy shortly after the capture of Wajh, while travelling North to visit Abdullah, whose force was still located in the vicinity of Medina. He had gone there at the behest of the British General Staff who wished him to convince Abdullah to attack Medina. British forces were preparing for an offensive in Palestine and there was concern that Ottoman forces there would be reinforced by the garrison at Medina. The British were focussed on ensuring that the Ottoman forces in Medina remained there. It was at this point that Lawrence made one of the more significant operational decisions of the Arab campaign. Instead of convincing Abdullah to attack Medina, he encouraged him to conduct attacks against the railway in the vicinity of Medina, and even led the first few. The attacks against the railway had the effect of pinning the Ottoman garrison in Medina, the same effect that the British General Staff had hoped for. In fact, Medina was never attacked by Arab forces for the remainder of the war. The garrison was left intact and remained so until 1918.

## Aqaba

Lawrence returned to Wajh after several weeks with Abdullah's forces. During his time away, several other British officers had used the proximity of Wajh to the Hijaz railway to conduct attacks against it. The British officers were having a difficult time operating with the Bedouin tribesmen and many were becoming discouraged. Despite having worked with the Bedouin for a long time, they felt that attacking the railway and holding a position along it was the logical next step. Lawrence opposed this move as he felt that a concentration of Arab forces would give the Ottoman Army somewhere to attack. The whole concept of holding a position was in contravention of Lawrence's strategy of operating in depth and never providing a front along which the Ottoman forces could attack. Instead, Lawrence was far more interested in spreading the Arab Revolt into the north; he knew that to do so, he would need a base from which the Revolt could be supplied. He saw Aqaba as the solution to both the problems of resupply and of how to move the Revolt north into Palestine and Syria. The location of Aqaba was critical to his plan. Aqaba could be resupplied by sea but it was also relatively close to Egypt; Cairo could be reached quickly by way of the Sinai Desert. The critical geographic feature was that it was almost unassailable from the east, as no conventional force could hope to attack successfully across the barren wastes that covered its landward approaches. A lightly armed Bedouin force could, however, make the crossing and achieve tactical surprise.

In convincing Feisal that the plan was feasible, Lawrence had to deal with the influence wielded by a number of other national elements who had access to Feisal. The French had maintained a military representative in the Hijaz throughout the Arab Revolt. Lieutenant-Colonel (LCol) Edouard Bremond was charged with representing French interests and he did so in the case of Aqaba. French interests were based on a historical claim in the Levant, one which dated back to the crusades. Lawrence was aware that French ambition in Syria was a major obstacle to Arab self-determinations in the region. He believed that the French wanted to contain the Arab Revolt in the Hijaz and thereby preserve their claim to the Syria at the end of the War. LCol Bremond continuously advised Feisal to focus on Medina as an objective and he also tried to convince Feisal that instead of using Arab forces to attack Aqaba, a combined Anglo-French force should do it. This would effectively put Aqaba under French and English control instead of Arab control and would limit the spread of the Arab Revolt to the North. Lawrence realized that this was the impetus behind French offers of support at Aqaba and he advised Feisal not to accept the offer. Feisal rebuffed LCol Bremond when he offered French forces and accepted Lawrence's plan to capture Aqaba with an Arab force.

Lawrence was supported in his Aqaba plan by Feisal but the critical element in the adventure was that a local, tribal chief, Auda abu Tayi was also strongly in favour of the mission. Auda was the leader of the local Howeitat tribe and could raise a local force of fighting men as well as the camels, and supplies required to cross the eastern approaches to Aqaba. As Lawrence and Auda set off for Aqaba they were accompanied by two Syrian members of Feisal's entourage. During their time in Feisal's camp they

had become seized with the idea of moving the Revolt north into Syria at the first possible opportunity. They did not see the necessity of Aqaba and wanted to bypass it and move directly to Syria. Lawrence realized the danger of such a move and used all of his persuasive ability to ensure that Auda remained focussed on Aqaba. He was successful and the Syrians were sent north to conduct a “strategic reconnaissance” with promises of support at a later date. Lawrence and Auda continued in their original mission to capture Aqaba.

Lawrence and Auda made their plan to attack Aqaba and moved north from Wajh to begin their preparations. Auda set about gathering his fighting men, a process which involved travelling to the various areas where they were grazing their camels and sheep. Lawrence meanwhile set about conducting a reconnaissance of the area to the north of Aqaba, and secured the right to operate in its approaches from the local chief who also controlled the area. Although there is no formal record, it is reported that Lawrence also travelled north all the way to Damascus on an intelligence gathering mission. The stated goal of his reconnaissance was to “explore the strategic possibilities of his intended post-Aqaba step and to take sounding among the Syrian tribes...”<sup>64</sup>

Upon his return, Lawrence found that Auda had gathered the Eastern Howeitat and that they were ready for the assault on Aqaba. On the way towards Aqaba, a number of smaller Ottoman bases were passed. Some were raided and destroyed but those that were too large to destroy were left alone. Lawrence had learned that the Ottoman troops

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<sup>64</sup> Basil Liddel-Hart, 193.

would exact terrible retribution against the local population after a raid or attack and was not willing to subject the locals to retribution unless he was sure that there was no chance of reprisals.

After an exhausting trek across the desert to the east of Aqaba, Lawrence and Auda were finally in a position to attack Aqaba. Ottoman defences were mainly focused seaward because it was the only direction that an attack was expected from. Several small garrisons defended the eastern approaches to Aqaba and after the first and largest one was overrun, the others surrendered without much resistance. Lawrence, Auda and fifty tribesmen entered Aqaba on 6 July 1917.

#### The Impact of Aqaba

Lawrence did not waste any time in Aqaba. Almost immediately he set out for Cairo to report his success and request resupply. Once in Cairo, he became aware that command of the Palestine campaign had been turned over to General Allenby, to whom Lawrence reported immediately. In Allenby, Lawrence found someone willing to support the Arab Revolt, largely because of the fact that it would tie up the Ottoman forces on his right flank as he moved into Palestine. Lawrence and Feisal had demonstrated the utility of the Arab Revolt and as a result received immediate support, in the form of money and supplies.

The capture of Aqaba proved to be a decisive turning point in the Arab Revolt. Previously, the Arab Revolt had been confined to the Hijaz and the Arabs' ability to have a military effect was viewed with suspicion by those in the British General Staff. After Aqaba was captured, the Arab Revolt was viewed as a viable and useful as a part of the greater British campaign in Palestine.

#### The Campaign after Aqaba

As Allenby's campaign progressed and his soldiers fought their way into Palestine, the Arab Army of the North (AAN), as Feisal's force came to be known, secured the right flank of his advance. Lawrence and Feisal were present when Jerusalem fell and were amongst the first into Damascus when it was captured in 1918. Feisal assumed control of Damascus and controlled most of the territory between Mecca and Damascus. This did not last long as the French and British divided the Middle East in spheres of influence and the French ousted Feisal from Damascus.

Following the War, Lawrence continued to champion the Arab right to self-determination. He accepted the position of special advisor to the British Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, during the negotiations at Versailles. While the French ultimately retained control of present day Lebanon, Feisal became the king of Iraq, and Abdullah, his brother became king of Trans-Jordan. Hussein was eventually overthrown by the house of Saud, members of which formed the modern state of Saudi Arabia.



## Conclusion

Lawrence's early years were characterised by the opportunity to develop a great deal of culture-specific knowledge. His time in the Middle East as a student, archaeologist and surveyor gave him a reasonable ability to speak Arabic and a solid understanding of Bedouin, and Ottoman culture. As important as his cultural knowledge was his affinity for Arab culture. Lawrence respected Arab culture and from a young age believed in the value of self-determination for the Arabs. These two factors would influence his ability to apply CQ

At a relatively young age and while relatively junior in position, Lawrence was involved in British Intelligence and the Arab Bureau, organizations which influenced British strategic direction in the Middle East. While Lawrence was employed as a map-maker and surveyor, his intelligence and keen interest in Arab affairs meant that he was involved with the Arab Bureau and thus had an awareness of British strategic thought with respect to the Middle East and was aware of the strategic implications of the Arab Revolt for Britain. He was also keenly aware of French intentions in the Middle East, a fact that would later influence how he designed his campaign.

## **ANALYSIS**

As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this study is to validate the Four CQ Domain Paradigm by looking for examples of its application by Colonel Lawrence during the Arab Revolt. In order to do this, several of the cultural elements that were important in the context of each of the four domains will be identified. Subsequently, it will be demonstrated that Lawrence's understanding of these cultural elements contributed to the five operational functions, and therefore, the capture of Aqaba. The results of this investigation reveal that Lawrence was particularly well versed in host nation culture but he also applied cultural intelligence across the enemy, international and national domains as well.

### **The Five Operational Functions**

The five operational functions were chosen to demonstrate how CQ was connected to achieving campaign objectives, in this case, the capture of Aqaba. The five operational objectives were selected for a number of reasons. First, Canadian doctrine recognizes the importance of the functions to campaign success. Second, the five functions are a foundational part of Canadian doctrine and given the objective to assess the Four Domain CQ Paradigm for its applicability and utility in Canadian doctrine it seems relevant to use them. Finally, they are broad in nature and are applicable not just across his campaign

but also across any campaign, far more so than selecting lines of operation, specific to Lawrence's campaign. In order to provide some clarity on how CQ affected the operational functions it is necessary to define and discuss them in greater detail.

### Command<sup>65</sup>

The Command function includes the requirement to start and stop action, set objectives direction, priorities and parameters of the campaign endeavour. Parallel with and complementary to the command process is the exercise of control which includes the processes and structures put into place to effect command. Dr. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann make some important distinctions about the exercise of command and control in their article "Reconceptualizing Command and Control." They identify authority as one of the three key elements that a leader uses to command. Authority can be divided between legal authority and personal authority. Legal authority is that which is assigned from external sources while personal authority is that which an individual earns by virtue of personal credibility. It is important to note that Pigeau and McCann suggest that in some groups like guerrilla groups and para-militaries, command authority is achieved almost exclusively through personal authority.<sup>66</sup> Lawrence's ability to develop his personal authority through his understanding of culture was of critical importance to his success and will be discussed in more depth later.

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<sup>65</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CFJP 5.0, Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CF OPP), Change 2. Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Defence Staff, April 2008. Art. 203.

<sup>66</sup>Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, 59.

## Shield<sup>67</sup>

The shield function includes the responsibility to conserve the fighting potential of the force through both active and passive measures so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. At the operational level, commanders take measures to protect the force from enemy operational manoeuvre. Understanding enemy intent, motives and methods is critical to successful conduct of this function. The shield function also includes measures to keep soldiers healthy and maintain fighting morale. Conserving the fighting force was particularly important for Lawrence as he was fighting with limited resources and with a force that was prone to fracture, disagreement and competing agendas.

## Act<sup>68</sup>

Operational Act relates to the activities of a force that have a direct bearing on the achievement of an objective, a decisive point or a desired effect. It includes the whole range of military operations such as manoeuvre, firepower, and information operations. In a conventional conflict, manoeuvres may include encirclements, flanking movements

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<sup>67</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CFJP 5.0, Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CF OPP), Change 2. Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Defence Staff, April 2008. Art. 203.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, Art. 203.

or deep penetration.<sup>69</sup> In insurgent warfare, manoeuvres are more likely to consist of raids against enemy installations, and attacks against lines of communication. In deciding on what types of manoeuvres to conduct a commander must consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of forces, and geographic position and in the case of Lawrence, cultural factors.

### Sustain<sup>70</sup>

Sustainment comprises those logistical and support activities required to sustain campaigns and major operations. Procurement of resources, prioritization, and allocation of assets are strategic matters but ones that require consultation with the operational commander. The campaign commander's concept of operations must be supported by the concurrent development of a concept of sustainment. Sustainment often limits or enables options for manoeuvre and is, therefore, critical to determining how objectives will be achieved. Understanding ones own options for sustainment is critical but understanding the enemy's sustainment process is also important, particularly if it is a relative weakness. Lawrence understood how to match his own force sustainment strengths against Ottoman weaknesses, by understanding of culture and its impact on how warfare was conducted by the two groups.

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<sup>69</sup> Vego, Milan N. "Operational Maneuver" and "Operational Fires" in *Joint Operational Warfare* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007) VII-53 – VII-68.

<sup>70</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CFJP 5.0, Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CF OPP), Change 2. Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Defence Staff, April 2008. Art. 203.

Sense<sup>71</sup>

The sense function relates to the management of information that is important for the operations at the tactical and operational level. Tactical intelligence is collected to provide information on enemy capabilities and the environment as they affect combat in the short term. Operational intelligence reflects a broader perspective on operations. It focuses less on current combat and more on forecasting future enemy capabilities, intentions and options but also on the battle space environment. Operational intelligence focuses on these factors over a longer period of time than does tactical intelligence. Lawrence's understanding of culture was critical to his ability to collect intelligence at the operational and tactical levels. He used his contacts with Bedouin to gain knowledge of the battle space environment and his understanding of Ottoman culture to build his knowledge of the enemy, particularly when forecasting their intentions and options.

The following analysis will demonstrate in more detail that the successful conduct of the five operational functions contributed significantly to Lawrence's success in capturing Aqaba, one of the most significant military objectives of his campaign. All of the operational functions were enabled through the application of CQ across all four domains suggested by Emily Spencer. The first area for discussion will be that of the Host Nation domain.

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<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, Art. 203.

## Host Nation

Lawrence wrote at some length about the culture of the Bedouin tribesmen with whom he was operating. Using his description, it is possible to identify several characteristics of host nation culture and determine how he used those to contribute to the conduct of his campaign. The elements of Bedouin culture that will be referred to are: language and dress, the hierarchical and tribal nature of their society, their religion, and their traditional method of warfare.<sup>72</sup> Lawrence's knowledge of these aspects of culture and his ability to apply it contributed significantly to how he executed the five operational functions.

## Bedouin Culture<sup>73</sup>

In 1916, the Bedouin of the Hijaz still existed in a largely tribal society. They were nomadic pastoralists who lived in some of the most austere conditions on earth. They moved their herds through specific areas of territory that were clearly delineated. They owed their allegiance to one tribal sheikh, and no other. They were constantly involved in bitter warfare with their neighbouring tribes; warfare that was sustained by blood feuds which lasted for generations. Because of the level of conflict, and their distrust of neighboring tribes, members of a tribe rarely left the security of the land controlled by their tribe. Tribal society was very hierarchical and a tribe was under the

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<sup>72</sup> T.E. Lawrence. "The 27 Articles of TE Lawrence" *Infantry* (November-December, 2007), 10-12.

<sup>73</sup> T.E Lawrence, *Seven Pillars...*31-35.

control of a sheikh. Tribal sheikhs owed allegiance to the Sharif in Mecca. The relatives of the Sharif also held considerable power and were often given important assignments. This is evident in the role assigned to the Sharif's son, Feisal who was in command of the Arab Army of the North.

## Command

As an advisor, with limited formal authority, Lawrence recognized that if he wished to influence events, and exercise control, he would have to find ways to influence Feisal and the other power brokers in the Arab Army. The hierarchical nature of Arab society meant that if he could influence Feisal and certain other key figures, then he could control the conduct of the campaign. Lawrence also recognized that to establish strong relationships and be trusted, he would have to observe certain cultural sensitivities. In 1917, he published his *27 Articles* that outlined how culture should be taken into account, in order to build credibility and influence. Some of his principles included, "building his prestige at your expense before others when you can."<sup>74</sup> Other examples included,

Treat sub-chiefs of your force quite easily and lightly. In this way you hold yourself above their level. Treat the leader, if a Sherif, with respect. He will return your manner and you and he will then be alike, and above the rest. Precedence is a serious matter among the Arabs, and you must attain it.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> T.E. Lawrence, "The 27 Articles...", 10.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, 11.



By applying the 27 principles, Lawrence was able to develop a close relationship with the Arab leaders of the Revolt and was able on a number of occasions was able to influence outcomes. In one striking example, he convinced Feisal not to heed the advice of the French representative in the Hijaz, Colonel Bremond who wanted Feisal to authorize a combined Anglo-French landing at Aqaba. Bremond did his case no favor when he suggested that Arab soldiers would climb the mountains behind Aqaba “like goats” – a comment that demonstrated Bremond’s lack of CQ. Feisal was visibly upset, at what is considered a very pejorative term in Arabic and asked Bremond if he had ever tried to “goat” himself.<sup>76</sup>

It was not just the French representative who struggled where Lawrence was able to succeed. Other British advisors were unable to adapt to the cultural environment with the same success as Lawrence. One contemporary of Lawrence, Colonel Stuart Newcombe was in constant conflict with his Bedouin subordinates. According to one observer, Newcombe arrived in the Hijaz under the impression that he was to be the Arabs’ commander-in-chief whereas Lawrence always knew that he was an adviser, rather than a leader.<sup>77</sup> Lawrence criticized the approach taken by Newcombe and another British adviser, stating, “Hornby spoke little Arabic; and Newcombe not enough to persuade, though enough to give orders; but orders were not in place inland.”<sup>78</sup> The

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<sup>76</sup> T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. (London: Jonathon Cape Ltd, 1926), 174.

<sup>77</sup> James Barr, 116.

<sup>78</sup> T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars*, 246.

challenges that Newcombe experienced when dealing with the Bedouin culminated when he was shot at by the Bedouin tribesman that he was supposed to be leading.

Another item, highlighted by contrasting Lawrence against his contemporaries was the issue also alluded to by Graves when discussing Lawrence and China; that of motivation. Unlike Lawrence, neither Bremond nor Newcombe were motivated by the same intense affinity for Arab culture. Nor were they able to identify with the Arab aspiration for self determination that so clearly motivated Lawrence. This suggests the importance of motivation in the successful application of CQ.

## Shield

One of the major challenges that Lawrence faced when he arrived in the Hijaz was the reluctance of the Bedouin to leave their tribal territory. Lawrence was forced to adapt and a unique solution to the problem was developed. Instead of using a standing army as the basis for the Revolt, Lawrence used local Arab volunteers whenever he conducted operations. As the Revolt moved, he released non-local tribesmen and engaged locals. This had a number of effects, not the least of which was that it helped to prevent inter-tribal rivalries from boiling over. Using this method of sustaining his manpower, it was reported that Lawrence took Aqaba with less than 50 men from the Hijaz in his force, and when he entered Damascus, less than 100 of the original force from the Hijaz still accompanied him.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> St. J. B. Armitage, 19.

The shield function also includes the requirement to maintain the morale and fighting integrity of the force. The potential for disruptive feuds between the different elements of his force always existed. On one occasion Lawrence was forced to intervene in a particularly distasteful manner, in order to prevent a blood feud that had the potential to undermine his force. During a journey from Wajh to Abdullah's camp near Wadi Ais, an Algerian in Lawrence's force murdered a local tribesman after a quarrel. Lawrence recognized that if he allowed tribal justice to be meted out, the murderer would have been killed on the spot by the tribesman's relatives. He understood that this would lead to a blood feud between the Algerians in his force and the tribesman that had the potential to spiral out of control. He managed to convince the tribesmen that he would deliver justice, and to avoid a blood feud within his own force, summarily tried and then executed the Algerian by his own hand.<sup>80</sup>

Religion also played a significant part in Bedouin life. Lawrence realized that there would be a significant objection on the part of the Bedouin to landing a Christian force in the Hijaz and that there was a good chance that the Bedouin would not fight in common cause with British soldiers if they were sent. Lawrence became aware of this sentiment when he was witness to a conversation between tribal sheikhs in Feisal's camp, shortly after his arrival in the Hijaz.<sup>81</sup> He later applied this knowledge when he actively

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<sup>80</sup> T.E. Lawrence. *Seven Pillars...*, 186.

<sup>81</sup> Basil Liddel Hart, 113.

petitioned the British General Staff not to send British soldiers to the Hijaz because of the effect that it would have on the Revolt.<sup>82</sup>

Act

Lawrence understood, unlike the British officers who had preceded him, that it would be very challenging to change the Bedouin style of fighting. Previous attempts to organize the Bedouin along traditional lines had ended in disaster much to the frustration of previous British advisors.<sup>83</sup> In contrast, Lawrence recognized that victory could be achieved by retaining the traditional Bedouin fighting units. These units usually consisted of no more than 100 loosely organized, camel mounted warriors which limited the kinds of manoeuvres that could be conducted and the types of objectives that could be considered. Lawrence realized that the traditional Bedouin unit would be successful only if it conducted manoeuvres that played to its strengths – long range attacks against poorly defended and supplied Ottoman outposts, and raids against the railways and other lines of communication. Massed attacks and traditional conventional engagements that would have the Bedouin either defending positions or attacking defended positions in long drawn out engagements were to be avoided at all costs.

The influence of Lawrence's vision for a war based on traditional Bedouin strengths was evident in his response to requests from British General Staff's to direct the

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<sup>82</sup> James Barr, 72.

<sup>83</sup> See example of Colonel Stuart Newcombe and Colonel Pierce Joyce described in James Barr, 77-79, 114-116, 139.

Arab Army towards an engagement at Medina. Instead of conducting an attack against the fortified garrisons, he encouraged the local Arabs to conduct raids against the railway and to attack lines of communication and supply that supported the Medina garrison. These actions generated the effect desired by the British staff in Cairo; that of preventing the Medina Garrison from moving and reinforcing the Gaza front.

### Sustain

Lawrence's operational plan depended in large part on the Bedouin ability to sustain themselves in the harsh and unforgiving conditions that characterised the deserts of the Hijaz. Centuries of surviving in the desert and adapting to its conditions meant that the Bedouin had local knowledge of where food, camels and most importantly, water could be found. Tribal networks meant that they could rely on local resupply and assistance when required. Traditional survival skills and tribal networks meant that the Bedouin could travel without encumbering lines of supply and communication, extending their range, speed and ability to move at short notice. Conventional forces like the Ottoman Army were unable to do this and Lawrence took advantage of this relative strength.

Because sustainment of his force depended on the support of local tribes for both men and materiel, before Lawrence could move the Revolt or re-orient the campaign, he was required to ensure that the logistical support would be in place. Because he depended on the local sheikhs for men and materiel, he conducted in-depth reconnaissance prior to

every operation to ensure that both were in place. Examples of this include the journeys that he made prior to the move between Yenbo and Wajh, prior to attacking Aqaba and before moving the Revolt north from Aqaba. In all of these cases, Lawrence ensured that camels, water, and food would be available. He also understood the value of these items to the locals and the fact that supplying them would greatly enhance the local economy. One of the reasons that Auda was so keen to participate in the attack on Aqaba was that the event would strongly benefit Auda's tribe and increase his prestige.<sup>84</sup> Lawrence took advantage of Auda's support for the attack and the fact that he could supply the requisite men and supplies for the mission.

Planning for the attack on Aqaba was based primarily on the advantages that a Bedouin force derived from their ability to sustain themselves and move long distances in relatively short periods of time. Auda's tribal network was critical to the endeavour and so was the element of surprise which was enabled by the attacking force's ability to cross the barren expanses to the east of Aqaba, a manoeuvre which the defending Ottoman forces were unprepared for.

Sense

The Sense function provides information that has an impact on the campaign and contributes to understanding of schemes, intentions, and future enemy capabilities.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> James Barr, 117.

Lawrence's reconnaissance trips were not just about checking logistic arrangements. He also used his journeys to gather information about the Ottoman forces, their dispositions and to gather intelligence about the willingness of tribes to join the Revolt. On one occasion, he conducted his reconnaissance alone, travelling as far as the outskirts of Damascus.<sup>86</sup> He used his ability to speak the Arabic, ride a camel and wear local dress in the correct manner to avoid detection. It could be argued that these intelligence collecting trips were the ultimate application of CQ because without an understanding of tribal dynamics, structure, language and dress, Lawrence certainly would have been identified as an outsider and would have struggled to conduct his mission.

## Conclusion

Lawrence is best known for his appreciation of host nation culture. As this analysis demonstrates, Lawrence applied his understanding of host nation culture across all five of the functional areas of warfare, suggesting that application of CQ in the host nation domain was an element that contributed to his success. Lawrence's experience is particularly useful though because of what it suggests about how to apply CQ in the host nation domain. In no particular order, these elements are: the importance of CQ in building personal authority, the effect that an individual's motivation can have on their ability and willingness to apply CQ, and the importance of culture specific knowledge.

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<sup>85</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CFJP 5.0, Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CF OPP), Change 2. Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Defence Staff, April 2008. Art. 203.

<sup>86</sup> Basil Liddel-Hart. *T.E. Lawrence*. (London: Jonathon Cape, 1934), 194.

CQ contributed significantly to the way in which he was able to build personal authority, a critical part of how he exercised leadership and controlled the campaign. As indicated by Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, the ability to establish personal authority is particularly important insurgent/guerrilla-type organizations. The importance of doing this was brought into stark relief when contrasted against the experiences of Lawrence's contemporaries, Bremond and Newcombe. Both Newcombe and Bremond were senior in rank to Lawrence and both held positions that were senior to Lawrence's.

Lawrence's success also demonstrated the importance of having culture-specific as opposed to having a more general level of cultural competence. Emily Spencer makes note of this highlighting the importance of, "understanding nuances in speech, and gestures."<sup>87</sup> She also suggests the importance of interpreters in doing this. The contrast between Lawrence and his contemporaries in terms of this detailed, nuanced knowledge was evident. Bremond may have had a lot of experience in North Africa and even spoke Arabic well, however, he did not possess the kind of specific Bedouin-specific knowledge that was a large part of Lawrence's success. Also of note, is the fact that Lawrence possessed the same kind of knowledge that Spencer would suggest an interpreter might have, however, his ability to apply it personally appears to have been another important part of his success.

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<sup>87</sup> Emily Spencer, 24.



The final item that Lawrence's experience highlights is the importance of motivation in the application of CQ. English's model of CQ suggests that affinity for the culture is an important part of the successful application of cultural knowledge expressed as "empathy, openness, and openness to learning."<sup>88</sup> The contrast between Lawrence and his peers, again highlights the importance of this element in the application of CQ. Lawrence was animated to a large extent by his affinity for Arab culture and the goals and aspirations of its leadership.

## **Enemy**

### Ottoman Culture

While Lawrence is best known for his understanding of Bedouin culture, there is also evidence to suggest that he was very familiar with the Ottoman culture. This is not surprising, given that during the time that he was developing his knowledge of Arab culture, he was in the Ottoman Empire, observing Ottoman culture as well. Because the Ottoman Empire was comprised of a number of different ethnic groups, it is difficult to highlight universal ethnic characteristics however, if one looks at the Ottoman Army, there are certain characteristics that defined its military culture. In particular, it is worth examining the fact that the Ottoman Army operated on a conventional, European model and was supplied with modern fighting equipment. Like a number of other conventional

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<sup>88</sup> Justin Wright and Karen Davis, 14.

armies of the time, it was an army where, “things were scarce, and precious, and men less esteemed than equipment.”<sup>89</sup>

Secondly, the Ottoman Army had a history of quelling insurgency and rebellion in a brutal and absolute way, demonstrated earlier in the century during the Armenian genocide. The conduct of counterinsurgency by Ottoman forces was described by Lawrence who witnessed their action against one rebellious Bedouin tribe at the outset of the Revolt:

...Suddenly he ordered them to carry it by assault and to massacre every living thing within its walls. Hundreds of the inhabitants were raped and butchered, the houses fired, and living and dead alike thrown back into the flames. Fakhri and his men had served together and had learned both the art of the slow and the fast kill upon the Armenians in the North.<sup>90</sup>

In addition to brutality and extreme violence, Ottoman counter-insurgency doctrine depended on conventional methods, with its reliance on lines of communication and strong points. Lawrence recognized this as he developed his strategy. He noted that the Ottoman approach to the war would be, “stupid; the Germans behind them dogmatic,” and that the Ottomans, “would believe that rebellion was absolute, like war, and deal with it on the analogy of absolute warfare.”<sup>91</sup> How Lawrence applied this knowledge and understanding can be highlighted by examining the operational functions of his campaign plan.

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<sup>89</sup> T.E. Lawrence. *Seven Pillars...*, 199.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid*, 94.

## Command

One of the critical elements of the command function is the requirement to determine which objectives will be of most value in the conduct of the campaign.<sup>92</sup> Lawrence used his understanding of Ottoman military culture to select his objectives. Two examples, that illustrate this calculation were: the decision to move Feisal's Army from Yenbo to Wajh, and the decision not to attack Medina.

The decision to move Feisal's forces from Yenbo to Wajh was carefully calculated to have a significant effect on the deployment of Ottoman forces throughout the Hijaz. There was a general understanding that the large, conventional Ottoman Army was heavily dependant on the Hijaz Railway for communications, and resupply. Wajh is a coastal town located 150 miles south of the Hijaz Railway, and unlike Yenbo, allowed Feisal's forces to threaten the railway. While Feisal's forces were in Yenbo, the Ottoman forces were not required to protect the railway and could spread out across the Hijaz, as they conducted their counter-insurgency. When the railway was threatened, Ottoman forces were forced to withdraw from the countryside in order to guard the railway. There were a number of operational and even strategic effects generated by this movement of Ottoman troops. First, as Liddel-Hart notes, every unit of force drawn north diminished

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<sup>91</sup> *Ibid*, 198.

<sup>92</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CFJP 5.0, Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CF OPP), Change 2. Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Defence Staff, April 2008. Art. 203.

the Ottoman power of retaliation. In addition, Ottoman forces could no longer be concentrated. Instead, they had to be parceled out among the many stations on the line, posted in wire-surrounded block houses.<sup>93</sup> Lawrence and Feisal understood that by moving the Arab force to Wajh, they could take advantage of the Ottoman dependence on the railway.

Lawrence exhibited the same kind of understanding of the Ottoman strengths as he did of their weaknesses. The decision not to attack Medina and other Ottoman strong points was largely predicated on his assessment that in pitched, conventional style battle, the Ottoman forces were far superior to his own. He stated, when referring to his own soldiers, “a thousand were a mob, ineffective against a company of trained Turks.”<sup>94</sup> Because of the overwhelming conventional strength of the Ottoman forces, Lawrence did not want to engage them in pitched battle and he selected his objectives accordingly. Despite concerted pressure from the British General Staff, he continued to advocate tactical and operational objectives that would be advantageous in light of enemy strengths.

## Shield

The shield function includes the requirement to preserve one’s fighting force. Another element of Ottoman warfare that has been discussed is the

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<sup>93</sup> Basil Liddel-Hart, 140.

<sup>94</sup> T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars...*, 140.

counter-insurgent doctrine that relied on brutality and suppression of rebellion by overwhelming force. Lawrence understood the impact that brutality would have on the Arab population.<sup>95</sup> He understood that they would not tolerate casualties and that violence of the kind perpetrated by the Ottoman forces was an effective tool in achieving submission.

Lawrence, unlike many leaders of insurgency, abhorred violence, even if it complemented his strategic plan. Rather than selecting objectives because they would excite the maximum kind of retaliation from Ottoman forces, the results of which could be used for propaganda, he was careful to limit his campaign in order to minimize the excesses of Ottoman doctrine. On a number of occasions, he recognized that his forces could not hold an objective and shield the population after the success of the initial attack. In light of this, he decided not to attack Turkish installations because he realized that the retaliation against the local population would be quick and brutal. One example of this kind of calculation was the decision not to attack the Ottoman strongpoint at Ma'an, when Lawrence and his force were on their way to Aqaba. On this occasion, he deliberately held back his forces from a relatively easy objective because he knew that it could not be held and the local population would pay a heavy price once the Ottoman forces recovered, as they surely would.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> *Ibid*, 199.

<sup>96</sup> T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars...*, 395.  
James Barr, 265.

Another example of Lawrence's application of CQ in the shield function was the way in which he dealt with those Arabs who co-operated with the Turks. Lawrence was aware that not all of the Arab tribes were able to support the rebellion. Such was the case for Nuri Shalaan who relied on the Turks to feed his people as a result of the widespread famine in Syria.<sup>97</sup> Lawrence recognized that Shalaan would continue to ally himself with the Turks and even encouraged him to tell the Turks of the Arabs location as a form of deception.<sup>98</sup> Lawrence recognized the position that Shalaan was in and that his loyalty towards the Ottoman was a reflection of the requirement to feed his tribe. Lawrence recognized that Shalaan would back Feisal once conditions improved and food was available and that he should not write him off as a potential ally who would be useful later.

## Act

The act function includes activities that have a direct impact on the achievement of an objective and include the types of maneuvers that a commander chooses.<sup>99</sup> In the same way that Lawrence assessed his own forces strengths when selecting objectives, he also made an assessment of enemy force

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<sup>97</sup> James Barr, 95.

<sup>98</sup> James Barr, 142.

<sup>99</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CFJP 5.0, Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CF OPP), Change 2. Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Defence Staff, April 2008. Art. 203.

weaknesses. His selection of maneuvers, that included raids and quick attacks against lines of communication, was based on his understanding that these types of engagements were difficult for a conventionally oriented force to defend against.

The example of the attack against Aqaba can be used to illustrate this point. In Ottoman minds, the only possible direction for attack against Aqaba was from seaward. The eastern approaches to Aqaba were impossible for a conventional force to cross because of the long distances without water. Because of this, the defences at Aqaba were all oriented towards the sea. The Ottoman Army, fixed in its conventional thinking could not conceive that an attack would come from any other direction. When developing his plan, Lawrence understood that the Ottoman defenders would not be prepared to defend against attack from the east and so he chose that direction to approach from. He understood that even a numerically and tactically superior force would be overwhelmed by a smaller force using the elements of surprise and speed, coming from an unexpected direction. Lawrence's assessment of Ottoman weaknesses at Aqaba was as important in his calculations as his own force's strengths and demonstrated how his understanding of Ottoman military culture could contribute to his campaign plan.

## Sense

The Sense function includes the requirement to determine schemes, intentions and future capabilities of the enemy. The importance of developing good intelligence about the enemy was recognized by Lawrence from an early stage of the Revolt.<sup>100</sup> To achieve this objective Lawrence took advantage of the composite nature of the Ottoman Empire. In the Ottoman Army, there were a number of Arab soldiers and officers who were extremely familiar with the structure, doctrine and capabilities of the Army. There was a degree of dissatisfaction amongst the Arabs in the Ottoman Army and Feisal and Lawrence made it very easy for them to join the Revolt, accepting them without question and employing them in the cause of Arab freedom. In this way, a small regular force of conventionally trained soldiers was added to Feisal's Army. The utility of this force was not just their fighting ability but also their knowledge of the enemy. Of the Ottoman trained soldiers Lawrence noted, "Our Arab officers had been Turkish officers, and knew every leader on the other side personally." He goes on to say that, "by practicing modes of approach upon the Arabs we could explore the Turks: understand, almost get inside their heads."<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> "The corollary of such a rule was perfect 'intelligence', so that we could plan with certainty." T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars...*, 200.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, 394.



Lawrence was also able to use his local knowledge and experience throughout the Middle East to gather intelligence during interrogations of captured Ottoman soldiers. Lawrence's success in eliciting information seemed uncanny. One biographer, Basil Liddel-Hart, noted that he frequently dumfounded his peers and superiors by his deductions from points of dress, manner and speech. Lawrence's explanation was, "I always knew their districts and asked about my friends in them. He added that after the prisoner's first few words, Lawrence was able to usually "put him within twenty miles of his home," and would then remark – "Oh, you come from Aleppo. How is - ? Then they told me everything." This kind of cultural knowledge and the understanding and how to apply it contributed significantly to the sense function.

## Conclusion

The application of CQ in the enemy domain contributed to the success of Lawrence's campaign. One of the elements discussed by Spencer in the enemy domain has to do with how soldiers will often feel betrayed and frustrated because the people that they are trying to help will often be helping the enemy.<sup>102</sup> These feelings of betrayal and frustration could easily be turned to a feeling of dislike for the local population, leading to a loss of affinity for the culture and a reduction in the motivational aspect of CQ.

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<sup>102</sup> Emily Spencer, 26.

Lawrence demonstrated a local population's motives must be understood, even if they are helping the enemy and thus enemy themselves. Lawrence's reaction to the situation that developed with Nuri Shaalan, demonstrated the importance of understanding that the imperative of survival will often force locals to assist the enemy. While this can be a negative Lawrence's patience and understanding and his ability not to take Shalaan's early betrayal personally, meant that he was able to reap benefits later.

Lawrence's application of CQ in the enemy domain also speaks to the importance of culture-specific knowledge. His ability to pin-point a prisoner's home district through nuances of speech and dress were an important part of his ability to generate intelligence for his cause. While this kind of knowledge could exist with an interpreter, the fact that Lawrence could ask the questions, gauge the reactions and apply pressure personally is indicative of how important culture specific knowledge can be.

Finally, Spencer suggests that, "enemy forces are not homogenous. They all have disparate beliefs, motives, incentives and rationales for fighting."<sup>103</sup> Because he did not perceive the Ottoman Army as a homogenous force, Lawrence was able to take advantage of the fact that many Arabs were dissatisfied and ready to join the Arab Revolt. Instead of judging the deserters and prisoners, he was able to use their knowledge of doctrine and tactics to his advantage.

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<sup>103</sup> Emily Spencer, 27.

## **International**

Emily Spencer includes the international domain of her model to take into account the fact that most military missions are currently conducted by coalitions of forces. Often these forces come from a variety of cultural backgrounds and to be effective, leaders must recognize how culture will impact the way in which different elements of a force will solve problems, react to unforeseen events and get along with each other when forced to work towards a common end.<sup>104</sup>

While Lawrence did not work within a formal coalition, he did face many of the same issues due to the diversity of the soldiers who participated in the Arab Revolt. Conventionally trained Egyptian artillery units, British advisors and aircraft crews, French military representatives, Arabs from across the Middle East, and tribal Bedouin were all components of the Arab force. Lawrence needed these disparate elements to work together towards a common objective. Understanding how he could use them, or not use them, in conjunction with each other was important. For example, Lawrence quickly became aware that mixing Bedouin and regular force soldiers on the same battlefield was not effective. Lawrence also had to understand that certain elements of his force were not necessarily motivated by the same objectives as others. In the end, Lawrence was required to use all of his cultural intelligence to contribute to the conduct of the

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<sup>104</sup> Emily Spencer, 53.

campaign in the international domain. How he did this will be examined using three of the operational functions: command, act and shield.

## Command

One of the critical elements of the command function is the requirement to determine which objectives will be of most value in the conduct of the campaign.<sup>105</sup> When selecting his objectives, Lawrence had to be aware that certain members of his “coalition” did not share his objectives. Why different groups had differing objectives was often culturally motivated. This particular challenge is best illustrated by analyzing how Lawrence dealt with the ambitions and objectives of French policy during the Revolt.

One of the most difficult relationships that Lawrence had to deal with existed with the French representative in the Hijaz, Colonel Edouard Bremond. In dealing with Bremond, Lawrence was very aware of the historical and cultural ties that the French representative was charged with protecting and he recognized that the French would try to influence his campaign to ensure that French interests in the Levant would be protected.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CFJP 5.0, Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CF OPP), Change 2. Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Defence Staff, April 2008. Art. 203.

<sup>106</sup> James Barr, 96.

In the main, French ambition in the Middle East manifested itself as an attempt to influence Feisal to attack Medina and to convince the British to land a combined Anglo-French force at Aqaba. The effect of this would be to confine the Arab Revolt to the Hijaz, limiting its spread to the North, into lands which Bremond and the French government perceived the French had a historical and cultural right to govern.<sup>107</sup> Lawrence understood Bremond's motivation and was determined to prevent the French from achieving their aims. To him, spreading the Revolt north into Palestine, Syria and present-day Lebanon was critical to its success. He understood that an Arab force had to be in control of Aqaba, if this objective was to be achieved. Aqaba was specifically selected as an objective for the Arab force because of its strategic position from which the Revolt could be spread north into Syria.<sup>108</sup> Instead of confronting Bremond with his objections to the plan, Lawrence used his considerable influence to convince Feisal that an assault at Aqaba by French and British forces was not in the interest of the Revolt. Because he understood the cultural background that informed French ambitions in the Middle East, Lawrence was able to pre-empt Bremond and effectively outmanoeuvre him. His ability to operate effectively in a complex political environment and still ensure that his objectives remained paramount was indicative of his leadership and ability to exert influence.

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<sup>107</sup> James Barr, 96.

<sup>108</sup> Basil Liddel-Hart, 182.

## Act

The Act function includes the requirement to combine different types of forces and capabilities to achieve effects on the battlefield. Lawrence was very aware that when combined, certain forces became completely ineffective. The inability of these units to work together was largely a result of differences in culture. Lawrence was sensitive to this fact and did his best to ensure that only the right combinations of forces took to the battlefield together.

Lawrence's perceptiveness on this matter is best illustrated by his unwillingness to use Bedouin irregulars combined with conventionally trained soldiers. In his 27 Articles, Lawrence advises not to mix Bedouin with trained soldiers, "for they hate each other." He goes on to suggest that he had never seen a successful combined operation. While he lays most of the blame at the door of "ex-officers of the Turkish Army" because of their narrow minded tactics, he also criticized them for their inability to adjust to irregular warfare, and their clumsy etiquette.<sup>109</sup>

There is particular evidence of the kind of cultural differences that existed between the Egyptian troops and the Bedouin. Lawrence noted that from the beginning of the Revolt, the two groups were incapable of getting along. He describes a situation where Egyptians were fighting against the Turks, for whom they had a sentimental

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<sup>109</sup> T.E. Lawrence, "27 Articles....", 12.

feeling, under the Bedouin, whom they regarded as savages. Under British officers the Egyptians had learned to be soldierly, to keep themselves smart, to pitch their tents in a regular line, to salute their officers smartly. “The Arabs were always laughing at them for all of this, and their feelings were hurt.”<sup>110</sup> When forced to fight together, the Arabs were apt to let the Egyptians do more of the fighting because they looked so military; they would even wander away in the middle of battle and leave them to finish it.<sup>111</sup> When combined with the Bedouins’ deep seated fear of aircraft and artillery, it became apparent to Lawrence that mixing Bedouin and conventional forces was not a good idea.

Lawrence’s concern and objections over having Bedouin and regular troops became most evident when he returned to Feisal’s camp after a prolonged absence to find British officers proposing a plan to sit astride the railway north of Wajh in order to cut off Medina. They were planning to do this with a combined force of Bedouin and Egyptian soldiers. Lawrence objected strongly to the plan because not only was it operationally unsound but also because he realized that that a mixture of Egyptian and Bedouin forces would be ineffective and unable to hold such a point.<sup>112</sup>

Lawrence’s ability to carry out the functions of command was significantly augmented by his understanding of the cultural composition of the forces which he worked with. His recognition of the French historical tie to the Levant led him to select

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<sup>110</sup> Robert Graves, 83.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid*, 109.

<sup>112</sup> Basil Liddel-Hart, 182.

Aqaba as an objective instead of Medina. He also recognized the divisions internal to his force and was made decisions that took cultural differences between the troops that he lead into account. In both instances, his cultural understanding that had been based and built on long experience in the Middle East was critical.

## Shield

The shield function requires that a commander take action to conserve his fighting force. Lawrence was able to contribute to this function because he understood how different elements of his force would approach different objectives. For example, Lawrence's primary objective, following the capture of Wajh was to occupy Aqaba. Some elements of Feisal's force, particularly the Syrian element wanted to bypass Aqaba and take Feisal's Army to Damascus immediately. Lawrence believed that capturing Aqaba was critical in terms of sequencing of the campaign and that trying to move the Revolt to Syria too soon would have disastrous consequences.<sup>113</sup> He stated that, "such vaulting imagination was typical of the Syrians, who easily persuaded themselves of possibilities, and as quickly reached forward to lay their present responsibilities on others."<sup>114</sup> In order to ensure that Aqaba would still be the next objective of the Revolt, he played upon the natural antipathy of the Bedouin towards the Syrian "townspeople." He used a number of incidents to widen this divide,

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<sup>113</sup> *Ibid*, 192.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid*, 189.



highlighting the “natural paradox of tribe and city; the collective responsibility and group brotherhood of the desert, contrasted with the isolation and competitive living of the crowded districts.”<sup>115</sup> The end result was that the majority of his fighting force, comprised of Bedouin, remained dedicated to the capture of Aqaba. The Syrian element left his force but they did so without the resources to conduct a significant operation. In this way, Lawrence took advantage of the cultural differences between elements of his force to ensure that his objectives remained paramount and the integrity of his force was maintained. It also demonstrated an understanding that a smaller more cohesive unit would be more effective than a larger one, divided by competing visions.

## Conclusion

There is a significant amount of evidence that indicates Lawrence considered the cultural dynamics that existed between the different elements of his force. This understanding influenced how he organized and directed his campaign (command), how he combined his forces in the pursuit of objectives (act) and how he conserved the integrity of his fighting force (shield). Operating in a ‘coalition’ force required more than just understanding of the individual cultures of the elements of the force. Lawrence understood how the cultures interacted, and how that could be used to contribute to the effectiveness of the campaign.

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<sup>115</sup> *Ibid*, 188.

As suggested in chapter one, the concept of implied intent is important in military organizations and understanding how it is affected by a multi-cultural dynamic is particularly important. Spencer writes, “understanding and acting on the cultural beliefs, values and attitudes and behaviours of other organizations and appreciating how your own may be viewed by others facilitates the achievement of unity of effort.”<sup>116</sup>

The experience of Lawrence illustrates this point. Lawrence and Feisal had a very specific vision for the end-state of Arab Revolt and for its conduct. Although there were elements that were nominally helping to achieve the goals of the Arab Revolt, Lawrence understood that their cultural imperatives meant that their objectives and end states and ways of conducting the Revolt were different. His interaction with different elements of the coalition, and his ability to out-maneuvre them with the goal of achieving unity of effort demonstrated how important this aspect of CQ is to success in the international domain.

## **National**

Applying CQ in the national domain requires commanders to understand the behavioural patterns, beliefs and institutions of the society which they represent and act according to these culturally acceptable beliefs in order to retain

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<sup>116</sup> Emily Spencer, 21.

public support for the mission.<sup>117</sup> Lawrence an ability to apply CQ in this form but more importantly he was able to understand how the strategic-political and strategic-military component of national culture impacted on his operation and aspirations for the Arab Revolt. Elements of Lawrence's understanding of the link between strategic-military and strategic political were evident in both the command, act and shield functions.

### Command and Sustain

The operational command function includes the requirement to select objectives. From the beginning of his campaign, Lawrence seems to have recognized where the Arab Revolt fit into the greater strategic vision of high level British policy makers at the political and strategic level. The Arab Revolt was largely unknown and not regarded as particularly significant and Lawrence would not have expected to receive significant support. With these factors in mind, Lawrence planned accordingly. He focussed on maximizing the effect that irregular, local fighters could have and this meant selecting manageable objectives, conducting resupply locally or with limited support from readily available British supplies.

Lawrence also understood that the Arab revolt was perceived as a relatively insignificant force at the operational level by those at the British headquarters in Cairo. Aqaba was selected as an objective by Lawrence in part

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<sup>117</sup> Emily Spencer, 18.

because of his understanding of British military culture and in particular the fact that the capabilities of irregular, tribal fighters were held in low regard.<sup>118</sup> He recognized that operational success was the only way to change the opinion of British General Staff, and secure the kind of support necessary for the continuation of his campaign. This consideration, contributed to the selection of Aqaba as a primary objective for the Revolt. He realized that investing Aqaba with an Arab force would secure the right flank of the British force in Gaza. He was aware that if the Arabs were able to do this, they were likely to receive more help, in material, from the British. As the mobile right wing, they would be valued more highly than as a remote distraction.<sup>119</sup> Lawrence was right. Following the successful attack at Aqaba, support was forthcoming in greater quantities than it had been prior to the attack.<sup>120</sup>

## Act

As a part of the Act function, Lawrence was charged with determining how the objectives of the Arab Revolt were achieved. The conduct of information operations is often included as a part of the act function. During the peace negotiation process that followed the war, Lawrence conducted an effective information operations campaign that targeted British and international audiences

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<sup>118</sup> James Barr, 139, 154-55.

<sup>119</sup> Basil Liddel-Hart, 192.

<sup>120</sup> James Barr, 154-55.

in support of one of his objectives; to secure self-determination for the Arab people.<sup>121</sup>

At the same time as the peace was being negotiated, Lowell Thomas produced the epic theatrical, *With Lawrence in Arabia*. The cinematic extravaganza detailed the exploits of Lawrence while he was involved in the Arab Revolt. The production was wildly successful but was filled with inaccuracies and embellishments. Lawrence, never one for the spotlight, was uncomfortable with the both the attention and the mistruths but actively supported the production because he understood the impact that it could have on public perception of the Arab Revolt. It has been suggested that part of Lawrence's motivation was to use *With Lawrence in Arabia* to secure public support for his efforts to secure self-determination for the Arab nations.<sup>122</sup> He recognized that Thomas's striking visual images presented the Arab Revolt as Lawrence wanted it to be presented, "a struggle against oppression and for national independence."<sup>123</sup> Coupled with Lawrence's appreciation that that British and international public inclination at the end of the First World War was to support the principle of self-determination.<sup>124</sup> As such, *With Lawrence in Arabia*, can be seen as a highly

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<sup>121</sup> Basil Liddel-Hart, 102.

<sup>122</sup> Joel Hodson, "Lowell Thomas, T.E. Lawrence and The Creation of a Legend," *American History* (October, 2000), 52.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid*, 52.

<sup>124</sup> James Barr, 128.

effective information operations campaign, conducted with the British and international audience as the target.

## Conclusion

The application of CQ in the national domain is at the heart of Emily Spencer's paradigm. There is evidence to suggest that Lawrence did take the national domain into account and that its consideration did contribute to how he achieved objectives. It is important to note, however, that Lawrence did not apply CQ in the national domain, in the way suggested by Spencer. Because of the fact that he was not under the spotlight glare of media scrutiny, he did not have to be as careful about his day to day actions as modern day soldiers are. However, as a commander, Lawrence was still required to understand how the strategic-military and strategic-political situation would affect his campaign. He did this appropriately by selecting appropriate objectives by developing a sustainment plan that required a limited amount of British resources.

The effect of Lawrence's "information operations campaign" in the post-war years is difficult to ascertain. Lawrence was aware of the international public's receptiveness to the principle of self-determination in the post war years. There is evidence that this was, in part, why he allowed his exploits to be embellished and glorified in *With Lawrence in Arabia*. This ability speaks to a

degree of mindfulness<sup>125</sup>, particularly, understanding the timeliness and appropriateness of the movie given the events that were unfolding at Versailles and in the Middle East.

### **Balancing the Four Domains**

An important part of Spencer's theory is the requirement to balance the CQ domains. She states,

Individuals need to balance the knowledge that they acquire of each domain and apply it in a manner that allows them to further their goals and to achieve the necessary and desired national objectives....In the end, their basic belief set does not need to change but they may have to alter how they represent themselves and the emphasis that they place on certain behaviours.<sup>126</sup>

Although Spencer dedicates just two paragraphs to balancing domains, the experience of Lawrence would indicate that it is a very necessary ability and one that can have serious consequences not just for the mission but also for the individual who is called upon to do the balancing.

Lawrence was motivated in part by his desire to see an independent, sovereign Arab state and his personal affinity for the Arab cause. It has been suggested that this was, in part, responsible for his exceptional ability to apply CQ. However, there is also evidence that Lawrence was also motivated by the

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<sup>125</sup> Discussed in chapter 1 as a part of Dr. Allen English's model of CQ. Justin Wright and Karen Davis, 14.

<sup>126</sup> Emily Spencer, 28.

strategic and political objectives of Britain and that he used his position of authority as a recognized representative of Britain to his advantage. This became particularly apparent when the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty became known to Feisal and other leaders of the Arab movement. Shortly after the documents fell into their hands, Lawrence was approached to explain Britain's intentions. Despite knowing that "if we won the war, the promises to the Arabs were dead on paper" Lawrence assured Feisal and others that Britain's intentions were good and that they were not being betrayed, knowing full well that they had been. In doing this Lawrence knew that, "in the East persons were more trusted than institutions" and that "the Arabs, asked me, as a free agent, to endorse the promises of the British Government."<sup>127</sup> Lawrence later stated that had he been, "an honourable adviser, I would have sent my men home, and not let them risk their lives for such stuff."<sup>128</sup> Not only did Lawrence make the decision to support his own national political-strategic objectives but he also used his position as a national representative to ensure that those objectives were achieved. In this case, the Arab Revolt continued and the fighting integrity of the force was maintained on the back of Lawrence's assurances, as a result of which he was, "continually and bitterly ashamed."<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars...*, 282-283.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid*, 283.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid*, 283.



The ability to balance the requirement of the national domain and the host nation meant that ultimately the Revolt continued and was a significant factor in British success in the Middle East. Had Lawrence not been able to balance his obvious passion for Arab culture and the Arab cause, the outcome might have been significantly different. What is apparent, is that Lawrence existed on a razor's edge; so much of his success was based on his ability to identify with Arab goals and aspirations and an affinity for their culture but at the same time he was entrusted with ensuring that the objectives of British strategy in the Middle East were realized.

Two deductions can be drawn from Lawrence's experience. First, the difficulties associated with serving two masters are almost impossible for individual's to deal with but in order to apply CQ effectively, it must be done. Secondly, the risk associated with having someone, so finely balanced, is immense. Lawrence had the ability to significantly affect the outcome of the Arab Revolt and the British campaign in the Middle East; luckily, for the British policy-makers his loyalty to Britain one the day. It was a close run thing.

The shame of having betrayed the Arab Revolt and its leaders haunted Lawrence until his death in 1935. A number of his biographers suggest that the stress of the event was responsible for the self-loathing that characterised his post-war years. The full impact of the event was most evident immediately afterwards when upon betraying the Arab cause he conducted a journey, alone into Ottoman

territory on a long and dangerous ride. Before leaving he wrote a note to his supervisor, “Clayton: I’ve decided to go off alone to Damascus hoping to get killed on the way. For all sakes try and clear this show up before it goes further. We are getting them to fight for us on a lie and I can’t stand it.”<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> T.E. Lawrence in James Barr, 137.

## ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS

### Introduction

The previous three sections attempted to address several key themes. The first section described the current state of research in the field of CQ, and specifically, its application in the military context. This examination revealed that the application of CQ has been identified by many of the leaders and soldiers who are currently operating in the complex cultural environments in Afghanistan and Iraq, as a critical skill. As a result, the question of how to apply CQ in support of military objectives has become important for military practitioners.

Emily Spencer's four dimension paradigm is an important first step in addressing this question. By identifying four dimensions across which CQ should be applied, Spencer has ensured that the focus of CQ has not remained solely on the application of CQ in the host nation and enemy domains. Spencer's focus on the CF experience in Afghanistan provides evidence that supports her thesis that CQ can be applied as an effective force multiplier. However, it was asserted further analysis was required and that it would be beneficial to apply the crucial case study of T.E. Lawrence and his campaign in Arabia as a tool for analyzing Spencer's model.

Section two was designed to provide some historical context for the reader and described the significant aspects of Lawrence's campaign between Jeddah and Aqaba, a

period selected because of its relatively short time frame, and the fact that specific objectives and end states could be identified. The capture of Aqaba was identified as particularly significant because it was a critical tactical objective that had major operational and strategic consequences, not just for Lawrence's campaign but also for the wider Middle Eastern campaign.

The third section sought to determine whether the critical elements of Spencer's paradigm were evident in the Lawrence case study. In this section, lines of causality were drawn between the application of CQ across the four CQ domains to operational function and the eventual capture of Aqaba. This analysis was the crux of the paper and demonstrated that Lawrence did apply CQ across all four domains and that this did contribute to the success of his campaign.

The fourth and final section of this monograph will consider the conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis, the contribution this thesis has made to the body of work surrounding CQ, and finally areas for further study and research. The thesis of this section is that the Four CQ Domain Paradigm is a valid and useful starting point for the application of CQ in the military context and that when combined with evidence from the Afghanistan conflict, should be incorporated into Canadian doctrine.

## Conclusions Drawn

The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the application of CQ across Spencer's four domains contributed to the success of Lawrence's campaign between Jeddah and Aqaba. All four domains were considered by Lawrence, and were important to his wider campaign but particularly in achieving the first major objective, capturing Aqaba. By the standards set for the measurement of validity in the introduction of this paper, Spencer's paradigm is indeed valid when measured using the crucial case study of Colonel T.E. Lawrence in Arabia.

Dividing the application of CQ into the four domains provided a useful taxonomy for assessing how to apply CQ. The experience of Lawrence would indicate that in a complex cultural environment, specifically one involving insurgency, where the hearts and minds of the people are at stake, cultural intelligence can contribute substantially to accomplishing the operational functions. Lawrence also demonstrates that even in an environment where at first glance it would appear that only one or two of the domains might be significant, all four were actually important in contributing to the success of his campaign.

The experience of Colonel Lawrence also amplified several of the major points suggested by Spencer in her theory. First was the importance of culture specific knowledge. Some, like Brian Semelski, have suggested that modern militaries should be focussing on the development of cross-cultural competence. The example of Lawrence

would suggest the opposite; his success in the host nation domain as well as in the enemy domain was due largely to specific, nuance knowledge that could not have been achieved without focus on Bedouin culture and Ottoman culture for an extended period of time. It is interesting to note that after the War, some pundits suggested that Lawrence might be employed “settling affairs in China”. His biographer Robert Graves noted, that Lawrence knew nothing of the Chinese nor was he particularly interested.<sup>131</sup>

Another point, relating to the host nation domain was the importance of building personal authority when involved in an un-conventional, insurgent or guerrilla type environment. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann make note of this and their observation is supported by the experience of Lawrence. Lawrence never held any position more substantive than adviser, and for the majority of the campaign he was a Captain in rank. He had no formal military training. He relied upon cultural intelligence to build personal authority and did so successfully. His success is that much more evident when compared to that of his contemporaries, LCol Edouard Bremond and Colonel Stuart Newcombe.

A second conclusion that can be derived from the analysis is that CQ can be linked to operational effect using the five operational functions: command, shield, act, sustain and sense. In the case of Lawrence, it was demonstrated that CQ could be applied so that it contributed to all five operational functions. The context of the situation will determine how a leader applies CQ and to which operational functions it is most relevant. Lawrence’s experience also demonstrates the requirement to balance and coordinate the

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<sup>131</sup> Robert Graves, 37.

four CQ domains. There is evidence to suggest that Lawrence was forced to make decide when and how to balance the host nation domain and the national domain. Spencer recognizes that the application domains must be coordinated and the consequences of prioritizing one or the other calculated.

Spencer's observations on the enemy domain proved to be germane to the experience of Lawrence. She emphasises the fact that the enemy is rarely homogenous, a fact which can be used to one's advantage. Lawrence recognized this fact and did his best to use it to his advantage. The Lawrence case study also brought another important element of the enemy domain into focus. It is a worthwhile endeavour to consider the motivation of those in the host nation who are helping the enemy. It is possible that they are doing so out of necessity and when and if their circumstances change. They may become useful allies later.

Working in co-operation with multi-cultural partners is a challenge that has been well documented by social scientists more many decades. Military theorists have recognized the challenges and Spencer does by including the international domain. The importance of this domain was evident in Lawrence's experience. Although commander's intent may seem common, culture informs implied intent and it is obvious from Lawrence's experience that this can lead to competing objectives within a coalition. Lawrence was able to outmanoeuvre and influence other members of the coalition because he understood their cultural background and was able to recognize how it would affect their approach to situations.

The national domain is of particular interest because it has not previously been considered as particularly important. Spencer proposes that the importance of the media in modern war has made soldiers accountable to the values, and beliefs of their home societies in a way not previously experienced. Lawrence's experience would suggest that the media of the day did not influence the way in which his campaign was conducted. The only possible exception would be the way in which his campaign was presented in the post-war period, through the cinematic efforts of Lowell Thomas. This is not to suggest, however, that Lawrence's campaign was not affected by the national domain. The Lawrence case study would suggest that the national domain includes the political-strategic and military-strategic levels of decision making and that to be successful, a commander must understand how his campaign will be affected by the highest level of decision making.

Finally and most importantly, Spencer suggests that the ability to balance the domains is particularly important. The evidence available from the Lawrence case study would suggest that this is true. However, it would also suggest that it is the most difficult part of effectively applying CQ. In order to be successful in the Bedouin environment, Lawrence effectively became bi-cultural, to the point that his loyalties were tested significantly. The torment that he faced, when asked to choose one of his loyalties over the other demonstrates one of the difficulties that can face an individual who is successfully applying CQ.



## Summary of Contributions

This thesis suggests that Emily Spencer's Four CQ paradigm is a useful and viable method for considering the application of CQ in the military context. Lawrence's successful application of CQ across the four domains contributed to his campaign objectives. The analysis would also suggest that considering how to apply CQ in support of the five operational functions is a worthwhile and will ensure that CQ is applied in for the purpose of achieving campaign objectives rather than in the pursuit of "a non-directed appreciation of or sensitivity towards foreign peoples."<sup>132</sup>

The analysis conducted in this thesis does highlight some of the areas which require more investigation and development. The four domains speak to when, where, and to whom CQ should be applied, however, there is very little in the theory which suggests how CQ can be applied successfully. The Lawrence case study would suggest that there are many more facets to the application of CQ that need to be considered before CQ and its application can be applied as an effective force multiplier in CF operations

In particular, two items stand out as particularly important. First is the amount of time and energy that Lawrence spent becoming familiar with Arab, Bedouin and Ottoman culture, prior to being employed in his mission. It was only with the years of exposure to these cultures that Lawrence was able to generate the nuanced, culture-specific knowledge that allowed him to build personal authority that he required to influence the

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<sup>132</sup> Emily Spencer, 12.

Arab Revolt in the way that he did. Second, it is obvious that Lawrence had an affinity for Arab culture and a belief in Arab self-determination that affected the motivation component of his CQ significantly. The importance of these two elements was highlighted by the comparing Lawrence against his contemporaries, Bremond and Newcombe, both of whom by any standard possessed a significant amount of cultural knowledge.

For an organization like the CF two things become evident. First, it is almost impossible to create an individual like Lawrence. He was a one-of-a-kind individual, who had the right skills for the job. The coincidence of his skill set, and the opportunity to apply it in the right environment seems to be very difficult to repeat. Lawrence was not developed by the British Army; the skill set that he applied came from a completely non-military set of experiences, and was co-opted by a British Army that was flexible enough in its approach to operations to allow Lawrence to apply the skills that he had.

It is obvious that developing individuals like Lawrence is beyond the scope of the CF. However, the relationship between Lawrence and his British Army superiors suggests that flexibility and a non-dogmatic approach to operations is preferable in irregular and culturally-complex scenarios. Individuals must be allowed to exercise initiative that would ordinarily exceed the scope of their rank and position. The British military accepted a degree of risk by employing Lawrence in the way that it did; the CF will have to do the same should it wish to employ individual's in these complex scenarios.

## **Prospects for Future Research**

The campaign conducted by Colonel Lawrence has some limitations when conducting analysis of theories relating to CQ, especially in the modern context. First, the events used for this analysis occurred between 1916 and 1922. Many of the factors and variables that affected Lawrence have changed in significance and effect. One notable example is the impact of media and modern communications. As the analysis of more recent events matures, there will be opportunities to examine theories of CQ using more recent case studies. There is no doubt that the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan are the most relevant in terms of modern day application of CQ. Further research in this area of CQ should focus on specific operations in these two campaigns. For example, an analysis of how the events of OPERATION MEDUSA were affected by the application or lack of application of CQ could provide insight into the modern operations. Again, the importance of establishing causal links between the application of CQ and the achievement of objectives should be a priority.

This analysis also suggests that there is still work to be done in the area of how CQ is applied. The debate between the utility of culture-general knowledge and culture-specific knowledge continues and there is room for research using quantitative or qualitative methods to determine the utility of both in the modern battle space.