

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES

“NATO IN THE POST-9/11 ERA”

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ABSTRACT

This Masters in Defence Studies thesis examines the responsibilities that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed in the Global War on Terror. It focuses on the significant role that the Alliance assumed in the days immediately following the terror attacks against the United States of America (US) and how NATO transformed to meet the evolutionary security challenges of the 21st century. In particular, this thesis emphasizes the dramatic changes that NATO introduced to its strategic focus in order to overcome the new global threat and to ensure the future relevance of the Alliance.

THESIS STATEMENT

Despite earlier successes, NATO faces an enormous challenge for survival as the Alliance continues its struggles in Afghanistan. The resistance of the US to include NATO in the planning and preparation of the invasion of Afghanistan sent a clear signal to the Alliance that transformation was once again a necessity. According to many in the defence sector, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan cemented the usefulness of NATO; however this thesis will argue that the relevance of NATO was not threatened by the events of 9/11 and the Alliance remains as strong as it has ever been.

METHODOLOGY

This thesis is developed through the use of primary and secondary research material. Official NATO documents, such as communiqués, Alliance declarations, and summaries from NAC and Military Committee meetings form the basis of research from

primary sources. Secondary sources used to support this thesis include journal articles from senior political and military leaders, as well as books and publications authored by professionals and experts in the field of defence and security. A great majority of the resources have been examined from print media; however extensive use of the world-wide web was used to provide further evidence to support the argument that NATO proved a relevant alliance in the days following the events of 9/11 and continues to be an important political-military coalition in the age of terror.

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NATO IN THE POST 9/11 ERA

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INTRODUCTION – NATO in the Post 9/11 Era

NATO has survived more than 60 years in pursuit of the defence and security of the member-nations that it represents. Historically, NATO is considered the most successful political organization and military alliance due, in large part, to its success during the Cold War.¹ The end of the Cold War signified the start of a new era for an Alliance that was not well-suited for anything but the grand confrontation with the Soviet Union. Transformation of NATO required an examination of doctrine and policy that guided the Alliance into the 1990s and the period of peace-support and crisis response operations, which mostly occurred in the Former Yugoslavia. Although Yugoslavia is on the European continent, the Alliance commitment signified the emergence of NATO “*out of area operations*” and a decision that would lead to further rounds of transformation to meet the changing security environment. In the aftermath of the Balkans wars, NATO found itself in the midst of transforming the Alliance in accordance with the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept when the attacks of September 11th shocked the world.

Despite earlier successes, NATO faces an enormous challenge for survival as the Alliance continues its struggles in Afghanistan. The resistance of the US to include NATO in the planning and preparation of the invasion of Afghanistan sent a clear signal to the Alliance that transformation was once again a necessity. According to many in the defence sector, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan cemented the usefulness of NATO; however this thesis will argue that the relevance of NATO was not threatened by the events of 9/11 and the Alliance is as strong as it has ever been. NATO relevance in the

¹ Dr. Klaus Naumann General (ret), “Renewing Transatlantic Partnership.” in *Towards a Grand Strategy* (Luntenen, Germany: Noaber Foundation, 2007), 74.

post 9/11 era is highlighted by the significant effects that the Alliance provided immediately following the events of 9/11, its unparalleled shift in strategic focus, and the confirmation of the NATO Response Force as the Alliance expeditionary reaction to global events. NATO has delivered a comprehensive modification to its force structure in order to meet Alliance objectives in combating the Global War on Terror (GWOT), nevertheless there remains further transformation in NATO doctrine, policy, and member willingness to lead the western world against a threat that provides great challenges to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. NATO has a unique opportunity to overcome these challenges with the approval of a robust 2010 NATO Strategic Concept that garners the full and unwavering support of the Alliance membership. This thesis will conclude with a detailed analysis of some of the main themes that the Alliance must approve within the NATO Strategic Concept in order to ensure the future relevance of the trans-Atlantic alliance.

NATO in the post 9/11 era will begin with an historical account of NATO from the birth of the Alliance to the GWOT. This historical perspective is important in order to set the stage for the main themes of the thesis, which relate to the importance of NATO in the post 9/11 era. The focus will then shift to an examination of the main issues surrounding the Alliance in the aftermath of the attacks against the United States on September 11th. In conclusion, this thesis will concentrate on four major issues of Alliance concern and how these concerns may be overcome within the new NATO Strategic Concept that will be unveiled at the 2010 NATO Summit.

CHAPTER 1 – NATO: “THE EARLY YEARS”

Introduction

Since its inception, NATO has often managed to resolve internal disputes and repel external condemnation. The notion of a grand alliance which spans the Atlantic Ocean seemed destined for failure in the face of an emerging communist threat.²

Throughout the history of NATO there have been many skeptics who have indiscreetly voiced their concerns over the ability of NATO to protect the sovereignty of its individual nations. Ted Galen Carpenter of the CATO institute stated;

“NATO is no longer an effective or, in most cases, even a credible security alliance. Certainly NATO in its current form does not advance the security and well-being of the American republic. It is time to terminate this increasingly dysfunctional alliance – or at the very least, extricate the United States from it.”³

Cynics, such as Carpenter, have been proven wrong on most occasions as NATO continues to successfully exercise power within Europe and now outside of its traditional borders due to the conflicts in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

There are also those that doubt the need for the NATO alliance since the fall of the Soviet Union. Jonathon Marcus, a BBC journalist, reported that an unnamed NATO official stated;

“NATO has lost the glue that once held it together.”⁴

² Rebecca R. Moore, “NATO’s New Mission.” (Westport Connecticut/London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 9.

³ Ted Galen Carpenter, “Policy Analysis: NATO at 60.” in *A Hollow Alliance* (CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No 635 (March 30, 2009).

⁴ Jonathon Marcus, “NATO Disagreements Still Simmer,” BBC Dec 3 2008; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7762601.stm>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2010.

In keeping with the reasoning of Marcus, others argue that alliances have no reason to remain united after the threat has been eliminated.⁵

This chapter, “NATO: The Early Years,” will examine the efforts of the Alliance members to develop an enduring institution and a legitimate organization within any security environment; not just a military organization to deter the Soviet threat. The advent of a political structure to guide the military apparatus will be examined in order to expose the ability of the Alliance to overcome internal obstacles and external criticisms. In essence, this chapter will argue that NATO, through its political and military institution, has an innate ability to inspire cooperation amongst its members in order to maintain a successful existence as a collective security mechanism. This chapter will focus on the period leading up to the establishment of NATO and will terminate at the early developments of the Alliance as an international institution.

Background

The end of Hitler’s tyranny and the fall of the Third Reich were joyously celebrated throughout the western world; however the end of WWII also laid the foundation for the bipolar era and the Cold War aspirations of the US and the Soviet Union.⁶ The birth of a new competition between those nations that supported democratic values versus those nations that advocated communist ideals commenced as the two super-powers fostered alliance-building to strengthen their political objectives. Soviet

⁵ Celeste A. Wallander. Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War. *International Organization* 54, 4, (Autumn 2000) 705.

⁶ Julian Lindley-French, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” *The Enduring Alliance*. (London/New York, 2007), Foreword XI.

aspirations were led by Joseph Stalin, while US President Harry Truman embarked upon an alliance that would support the views of democracy and resist communist proliferation.

Truman initiated the thoughts of a grand alliance between western European nations and North America to ensure peace and security on the European continent.⁷ Backed by economic prowess, US military might, and an American citizenry that was unwilling to consider another blood-bath in a land far from their shores, this alliance seemed a necessity in post-WWII affairs. The destruction of Europe during WWII, coupled with the emergence of the communist threat, enforced the requirement for a strong alliance of nations with common values and beliefs.⁸ Through Truman's initiatives, the notion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a march toward freedom, security, and democracy was launched in April, 1949.⁹

The Birth of an Alliance

The North Atlantic Alliance was formalized in Washington, DC on 4 April, 1949 by the 12 original members of the Alliance.¹⁰ The treaty between Western Europe and North America is considered the successor to the Brussels Treaty signed 17 March, 1948 by the Benelux nations, France, and the United Kingdom in order to deter a Soviet

⁷ Peter Duignan, "NATO: Its Past, Present, and Future." (Stanford University, 2000) 2.

⁸ Rebecca R. Moore, "NATO's New Mission." (Westport Connecticut/London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 14.

⁹ Sir Nicholas Henderson, "The Birth of NATO." (Bolder Colorado: Westview Press, 1993) 112.

¹⁰ The 12 original members of NATO were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States.

military attack and provide mutual defence in case deterrence should fail.¹¹ The NATO accord became known as the Washington Treaty and provided the guiding principles of the Alliance. The proclamation of the Treaty was paramount to European leaders as it would ensure that, unlike what occurred during WWI and WWII, the United States would maintain a physical presence on European soil to prevent or guard against the possibility of a third world war on the continent.¹²

The Treaty was envisioned to contain the Soviet threat; however it was also preordained to eliminate US isolationism in the lead up to the two world wars.¹³ The approval of the Treaty and the establishment of the NATO Alliance created a major shift in foreign policy as US leadership accepted the lead role to rebuild European Allies and defend western democracy against the threat of Soviet aggression.¹⁴ The agreement demanded a substantial commitment by all of the signatories as the Treaty ensured a common ideological framework between the geographically separated partners of North America and Western Europe. It would not be long before this common ideology would be tested as the embryonic Alliance membership faced its first encounter with communism as the Korean War erupted in June 1950.

¹¹ Celeste A. Wallander. Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War. *International Organization* 54, 4, (Autumn 2000) 712.

¹² Peter Duignan, "NATO: Its Past, Present, and Future." (Stanford University, 2000) 2.

¹³ David S. Yost, "NATO Transformed." (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 29.

¹⁴ Richard E. Rupp, "NATO After 9/11." in *An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 46.

The Development of an Enduring Alliance - Korean War

Fourteen months after the formation of the NATO alliance, the Korean War erupted and provided what was believed to be the beginnings of the next “big war,” pitting communist values against western democratic beliefs.¹⁵ The proxy wars of the post-WWII era commenced with US support to South Korea and Communist endorsement from China and the Soviet Union for North Korea, led by Kim Il-Sung.¹⁶ Although NATO was not directly involved in the Korean War, the conflict demonstrated the Soviet ambition to extend communist ideals to counter the advent of NATO and western political philosophy.

The effects of the Korean War did not directly impact NATO; however over the course of the war, US involvement became further entangled in an effort to support democratic South Korea. Despite large-scale US involvement in Korea, the progression of the Alliance was not hindered as the initial planning stages continued without a well-defined and truly developed military force structure or political dimension. In the three years of the Korean War, NATO advanced the structures as detailed in the Treaty and grew from an Alliance of infancy into a mature and dedicated partnership for the collective defence of Europe.

In the midst of the Korean War, the Alliance development proceeded feverishly with the expansion of a political and military institutional structure to lead NATO into an uncertain future. The advent of the NATO political structure was initiated to govern the parliamentary and administrative matters on behalf of the member-states. A Secretary

¹⁵ Cold War 1945-60. <http://www.thecorner.org/hist/europe/coldwar.htm>. Internet; Accessed 25 January 2010. Para E.

¹⁶ Peter Duignan, “NATO: Its Past, Present, and Future.” (Stanford University, 2000). 7-8.

General, chosen from within the European states, would lead the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and administer the Alliance. The NAC is the principle political decision-making body of NATO and provides the leadership required to guide the political and military institutions that form its existence. The second of the two major NATO bodies was formed by the Military Committee, led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and comprised of military representatives from the member states. Unlike the Secretary General, SACEUR is also exercised by the commander of U.S. Forces in Europe.

Although a major war was being fought between Communist North Korea and US-backed South Korea, NATO managed to develop the political and military structure to launch the Alliance and build toward the future to protect Europe from communist aggression. The Korean War depicted the ability of an emerging alliance to overcome major distractions as it provided the foundation for future cooperation that would be required to defend Europe from an external threat. The Alliance was not simply built upon a defence mechanism to defeat or deter the current threat; NATO provided an instrument, with political and military leadership, to foster relations amongst states to build towards peace and prosperity in any security environment.¹⁷

The Korean War effected the NATO alliance in two major ways:

- 1) The spread of communism on the Korean peninsula forced the Alliance members to develop integrated civilian and military staffs; and
- 2) The attack by North Korea into South Korea forced the NATO members to elevate military force levels, including the initial US commitment to deploy forces onto the European continent.

¹⁷ Celeste A. Wallander. Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War. *International Organization* 54, 4, (Autumn 2000) 706.

With the NATO political devices in place and the military structure developed, NATO transformed into an institution and not just an alliance to defend against a common threat. Although the new structures were in the developmental stages, the Alliance was providing the necessary means to be a competent and long-lasting institution. The ability to communicate and cooperate played a major role in the early successes of NATO; however the institutional mindset and administrative controls played a major role in the successful attainment of Alliance goals during the Cold War. These institutional values would be long-lasting and would lead NATO transformation from the Cold War to the emergence of instabilities and ethnic upheavals amongst states in the post-Cold War era. NATO transformation beyond the Cold War will be discussed later in this thesis, nevertheless it is important to consider these early institutional advances to understand how a loosely aligned coalition remained integral and committed throughout the Cold War and how this institution persevered after the attacks of 9/11.¹⁸

¹⁸ Celeste A. Wallander. Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War. *International Organization* 54, 4, (Autumn 2000) 713.

CHAPTER 2 – NATO: “SURVIVAL AGAINST ALL ODDS”

Introduction

The war on the Korean peninsula provided the rationale for the swift development of the NATO alliance. Communist advances in North Korea and China brought the Alliance to realize that the threat to Europe was intensifying and the need for collective defence was no longer a luxury, but a necessity. With the initial institutional structure established, the integral functioning of the Alliance would require leadership to guide the political and military compositions. This chapter will examine the development of NATO throughout the major events of the Cold War in order to depict that NATO survival was based on a solid institutional structure that dutifully adapted to the changing security requirements.

NATO Leadership: Lord Ismay and General Eisenhower

Initial NATO successes included the doctrinal approach to political and military leadership. Six years after successfully leading the Allies to victory in WWII, General Eisenhower became the inaugural SACEUR and Lord Ismay of Great Britain was appointed the first NATO Secretary General.¹⁹ Ismay was a true visionary as he saw NATO as the defender of democracy and the opposition to the Soviet machine. His perspective of Soviet expansion and western re-alignment was well understood as he

¹⁹ David Rudd and Jim Hanson. *NATO at 50: Successes, Challenges, and Prospects*. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. (Toronto, Canada 1999) 6-7.

famously stated that the goal of NATO was to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”²⁰

Ismay understood the reliance on the United States; therefore major political and military interests of the Alliance were accentuated by US national interests, such as communist containment to deter the Soviet threat through a committed and robust collective defence mechanism. The threat of Soviet aggression and communist expansion further enhanced the need for an alliance of democratic European states to support the economic and military dominance of the United States. The members who comprised the Alliance successfully established the institutional framework to lead NATO and managed to appoint the inaugural leadership. With the Alliance in place and the Soviet Union striving for military superiority, the requirement to re-arm Germany became paramount to the success of the Alliance.²¹

NATO Enlargement - Re-Arming the WWII Threat

The communist push into Korea and the will of the Soviet leadership to further communist expansion on the European continent meant that Germany would likely become a target to support Soviet objectives. Due to continued military commitments in Asia, the US sponsored the rearming of the Federal Republic of Germany in order to bolster the defence of Western Europe and strengthen the road to peace. US advances for the rearming of Germany were met with resistance from the European members of the

²⁰ David S. Yost, “NATO Transformed.” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 52.

²¹ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First 50 years*. (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999), 16.

Alliance as the memories of German domination were still fresh on their minds.²²

Although initially opposed to the rearming of West Germany, France would succumb to the reality of the security situation faced by NATO. French President Charles De Gaulle agreed to rearm Germany in exchange for an American commitment to maintain a physical presence within Europe under the respected leadership of General Eisenhower.²³ With reservation, once again from France, the Alliance authorization to rearm Germany in 1954 was followed in 1955 by full recognition of Germany into the NATO Alliance. NATO acceptance of Germany provoked the initiation of the Warsaw Pact; led by the Soviet Union and included eight communist states of the Eastern Bloc.²⁴ Ideologically, the rival alliances stood in stark contrast to each other and further fueled the arms race between the world's two super-powers.

Throughout this period of NATO enlargement, US political masters and European leaders disputed the relevance of West German acceptance into the Alliance. Tensions from Europe were eased through dialogue and commitment to the goals of the Alliance. Although a difficult ordeal to overcome, US leadership and European cooperation proved stronger than nationalistic agendas. The institutional processes that were put into action and the ability of the members to acquiesce individual objectives in the pursuit of Alliance strategic goals guided the success of NATO during the early years of the Cold War.

²² Kaplin, *The Long Entanglement...*,16.

²³ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 17.

²⁴ List of Warsaw Pact Nations - Soviet Union, Albania (until 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.

NATO Developed Through US Foreign Policy

The arms race between the two super-powers continued through the 1950s when newly elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower initiated the “New Look” policy of massive retaliation through strategic nuclear weapons to deter potential threats, nuclear and conventional, posed by the Soviet Union.²⁵ Eisenhower understood the importance of a strong NATO alliance and he ensured that alliance-building formed a key element of his “New Look” foreign policy.²⁶

In the early years of the Alliance, the Western European nations were still recovering from the devastation of WWII. It was not until 1955 that the European members re-emerged economically and militarily, thereby transforming a weak collection of nation-states into a strong regional alliance that was capable of defending against the Soviet threat. Eisenhower’s second term as President ended in 1960 and so did the “New Look” policy.²⁷ The 1960 election of President Kennedy ushered in a new US foreign policy that contrasted the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration. Kennedy’s foreign policy called for a flexible response of mutual deterrence through all levels of warfare with the use of conventional and nuclear forces.²⁸ The nuclear tensions of the 1950s grew into the following decade as the NATO alliance endured internal friction over French ambitions to abandon the NATO military structure and the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal.

²⁵ Stephen E. Ambrose, “Epilogue: Eisenhower’s Legacy.” in *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment* (Baton Rouge/London: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 248.

²⁶ Peter G. Boyle, *Eisenhower: Profiles in Power*. (UK: Pearson Education Limited, 2005), 44.

²⁷ Boyle, *Eisenhower: Profiles in Power...*, 44.

²⁸ “A New Direction.” in *Flexible Response*. <http://www.history.army.mil/BOOKS/Lineage/M-F/chapter11.htm>. Internet; Accessed 25 January 2010.

Overcoming Internal Strife within the Alliance - Suez Canal

The US and British abolished financial responsibility for the Aswan High Dam project in response to the Egyptian purchase of military equipment (tanks) from Communist Czechoslovakia. In response, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser elected to nationalize the Suez Canal and remove British and French influence from the region. Throughout this period, Egypt and Israel were in the midst of low-level military confrontations as Egyptian incursions into Israel territory were met with retaliatory raids by Israeli forces.

A decisive scheme to counter the Egyptian decision was devised during a meeting between Israel, France, and the United Kingdom. The meeting transpired at a location outside of Paris and detailed an Israeli invasion of Egypt with a British and French intervention force to settle the dispute. Nasser refused to negotiate with France and Britain; therefore the two NATO nations joined the Israeli invasion with a bombing campaign that commenced on 31 October, 1956. The tactical execution met little resistance, however the invasion was considered a strategic disaster as it forced the Soviet Union to condemn the NATO allies and pledge support to Egypt.²⁹

Reversing an earlier decision to support the invasion, US President Eisenhower forced a cease-fire between the warring factions. In the midst of a presidential election and with no appetite for increasing tensions in the Middle East, Eisenhower wished to avert tensions between the West and the Soviet Union. In order to appease the situation, Eisenhower threatened financial repercussions against Britain if the cease-fire was not accepted. Through tense diplomatic negotiations, the UN accepted the agreement and

²⁹ Laurie Milner, "The Suez Crisis," BBC History November 2009.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/suez_01.shtml. Internet; Accessed 2 February 2010.

fielded a UN force that was void of French, British, US and Warsaw Pact nations to maintain peace in the region of the Suez Canal. The Alliance was showing signs of dissention as the three largest members bitterly accepted the outcome of the Suez Crisis. The actions of the United Kingdom and France fell outside of the strict institutional rules of the Alliance. Their individual desires had the potential to trigger a Soviet declaration of war and NATO would have been forced to support its allies. The prospect of large-scale war was avoided, however NATO decided to examine the situation in order to ensure that member-nations refrained from taking future actions without Alliance support.

This examination was led by a tripartite of senior Alliance leaders, Lester B. Pearson (Canada), Halvard Lang (Norway), and Gaetano Martino (Italy).³⁰ Results from this committee, known as the “Three Wise Men,” reported that the successful future of the Alliance requires member-nations to understand that individual actions could produce strategic ramifications.³¹ The Alliance recovered from this episode and tensions between states were overcome in a resilient show of solidarity and deliberate acts of obedience to the institutional norms of the Alliance. The ability of the Alliance to overcome individual disputes played a major role in the successful attainment of NATO goals, however these disagreements would continue throughout the 1960s as France’s military commitment to the Alliance grew fragile.

³⁰ Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out of Area Problems Since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 58.

³¹ Lawrence S. Kaplin, History: Report on the “Three Wise Men:” 50 years On. NATO Review, Spring 2006; www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/history.html; Internet; Accessed 28 Jan 2010.

Alliance Resolve in Decline? - France Abandons NATO Military Alliance

By the end of the 1950s, France showed signs of great dissatisfaction towards the position that she held within the Alliance. France stubbornly opposed the NATO integrated force structure to highlight French frustration over the lack of allocated command positions within the Alliance.³² In 1959, France detached its naval fleet from the Mediterranean, thereby commencing a sequencing of military withdrawals over the next seven years to emphasize France's opposition to the doctrine of flexible response and US leadership on NATO strategic issues.³³

The NATO summit of 1967 approved the doctrine of flexible response formulated in 1962 by US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Due to the Soviet build-up of conventional and nuclear weapons, the western European nations of the Alliance accepted the idea that a limited nuclear war could be realized on the continent; however the notion of flexible response was not supported by all NATO member nations. France opposed the idea of flexible response and limited nuclear war to defeat the far-superior Soviet conventional military force. For this reason, France developed an indigenous nuclear deterrent and withdrew its military from the Alliance.³⁴

In 1966, all French forces were removed from the NATO command and control structure and all non-French military personnel were forced to depart France. All US and

³² Edgar S Furniss Jr., "De Gaulle's France and NATO: An Interpretation," *International Organization* 15, no 3 (Summer, 1961), 352-353; <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici+0020-8183%28196122%2915%3A3%3ADGFANA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W>; Internet: accessed 18 Jan 2010.

³³ Julian Lindley-French, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization." *The Enduring Alliance*. (London/New York, 2007), 32.

³⁴ Julian Lindley-French, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization." *The Enduring Alliance*. (London/New York, 2007), 34.

Canadian military aircraft were removed from French territory as was the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). SHAPE moved from Rocquencourt, France to Mons, Belgium on 16 October, 1967. This concluded the French military withdrawal from NATO; however France would remain a member of the Alliance and continued with the commitment to defend Europe from Soviet attack by placing French forces on German soil.

De Gaulle's insistence to remove France from NATO's military structure was not viewed as a condemnation of the Alliance, but as a clear declaration for French military independence.³⁵ Conversely, NATO adjusted its military posture and continued to operate within the Alliance mandate, thereby displaying internal resolve on matters that were considered grave to the success of the Alliance. The 1960s proved to be a decisive period in the evolution of NATO. Beginning in the second half of the decade, the war in Vietnam would cause a strain on the Alliance as the United States became further absorbed into the conflict. By 1968, the US deployed more than 500,000 troops to South-East Asia, which meant a decrease to US troop commitments on European soil.

Vietnam – Burden-Sharing to Meet Institutional Goals

As a military alliance and collective defence mechanism, NATO involvement in South-East Asia was clearly not present; however the effects of the Vietnam War were felt deep within the heart of the Alliance. European partners felt that the US commitment to Vietnam would decrease the ability of the Alliance to project the NATO forward

³⁵ Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out of Area Problems Since 1949* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, c1990), 224.

defence strategy.³⁶ US support to South Vietnam meant a drastic decrease in the military posture within Europe; however the war in Vietnam was also supporting the goals of the Alliance in the form of communist containment. A dichotomy that would elicit a debate within the Alliance concerning burden-sharing amongst the members.

Due to US actions in Vietnam, the discussion regarding burden-sharing returned to the forefront of Alliance wrangling. The US illustrated their frustrations of Alliance burden-sharing by insisting that the US continues to provide the majority of finances to support NATO in Europe and Alliance partners failed to understand the requirement to repel communist advances in Vietnam. With limited US support in Europe and a preponderance of the US military in Vietnam, the Alliance seemed sure to falter internally.

As was the case with earlier issues of instability, such as French military withdrawal from NATO and the US opposition to UK and French aspirations in Egypt, the Alliance persevered and recovered. Individual nation-states proposed methods to secure NATO requirements while supporting US support for democracy in Vietnam. Germany purchased a half billion dollars in US government bonds and the United Kingdom established Eurogroup in an effort to mitigate US redeployment of military forces from European soil.³⁷ Once again, an internal conflict within the Alliance was overcome by creative measures in the pursuit of Alliance goals.

³⁶ Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out of Area Problems Since 1949* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, c1990), 77.

³⁷ Gustav Schmidt, "Getting the Balance Right: NATO and the Evolution of EC/EU Integration" in *A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume II*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 3-28 (New York: Palgrave 2001), 14.

The issue of burden-sharing seems to have followed the Alliance since its inception. US demands of further support from European allies and Europe's insistence that the US is chasing nationalistic goals in spite of NATO commitments were always overcome by sound diplomacy and internal resolve. NATO has had disagreements since signing the Treaty and will likely continue to have disagreements into the future. In today's Afghanistan conflict, NATO is still squabbling over burden-sharing, particularly with the amount of troops offered for combat and the resources required to execute operations, such as medium-lift helicopters; however they have managed to overcome these shortfalls and continue to exist as a strong alliance in support of the Global War on Terror. The ability of the Alliance to move forward and resolve the issues associated with burden-sharing is due to the advent of an institutional structure in the developmental years of NATO.

Cyprus – NATO Allies at War

Throughout its short lifespan, it has been a theme that NATO finds meaningful methods to overcome internal issues; however the issue of Cyprus tested the ability of the Alliance to remain intact and protect the southern region bordering the Mediterranean Sea. Greece and Turkey were invited to join the Alliance in 1952 in order to defend against communist expansion to the south. The two nations were logical choices to join the Alliance, however their history with regards to Cyprus threatened the solidarity of the Alliance – or so you would think?

A former British colony, Cyprus gained independence in 1960 and introduced a power-sharing agreement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots who inhabited the

island. Each of the parties developed a small military force to defend nationalistic interests. The United Kingdom maintained two sovereign base areas within Cyprus in order to foster a peaceful relationship between the often antagonist NATO partners; however NATO envisioned British involvement as a means to support Alliance objectives in the Middle East region. Tensions caused by the two factions raised the ire of the international community in 1963, which resulted in unprecedented intervention by the United Nations to separate the two NATO members. The UN Security Council resolution 186 was adopted in March, 1964 which ordered the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) to the region.³⁸

The strength of the NATO alliance seemed to fade as the two newest members failed to overcome tensions; a situation that required immediate resolve as the Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union reached unprecedented levels. Just months before the Greek and Turkish dispute over Cyprus, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis occurred and nuclear war was narrowly averted. Khrushchev agreed to dismantle missile systems in Cuba that threatened the United States and in exchange, Kennedy ordered the removal of US missiles from Turkey. The resolve and cooperation of the Alliance members was paramount as the reputation of NATO was at stake.

Aggressive behaviour by both sides seemed to be quelled until Greek-Cypriots attempted to overthrow the government and annex the island in 1974, which exacted a military response from Turkey. The United States and NATO grew disenchanted with the actions of both sides as the region was strategically important to expel the prospects of communist expansion and protect Europe from the south-east. Although relations

³⁸ United Nations Resolution 186. <http://www.un.int/cyprus/scr186.htm>. Internet; Accessed 5 February 2010.

were strained due to the removal of the US missiles from Turkey during the Cuban Missile Crisis, US-Turkish relations labored further as American sentiment was not in favor of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The result was a US embargo of military equipment destined for Turkey and in reprisal; the Turkish government expelled all Americans from Turkish bases. Disenchantment continued within Greece as Turkey ended military operations with an occupation of the northern portion of the island.³⁹ The two nations have maintained a cynical stance towards the sovereignty issues surrounding Cyprus; however the strength of NATO required a cessation of hostilities in order to meet the Alliance Cold War objectives.⁴⁰

Cyprus provided another instance that depicted the internal power struggles within the NATO Alliance, but it once again displayed the ability of the Alliance to maintain its cohesion. The Cyprus question celebrated 25 years of NATO in-house disputes that were overcome with a sense of cooperation that continually revived a struggling Alliance into a resilient coalition. The beginnings of the Alliance and the institutional processes developed within the political/military staffs enabled the issues surrounding Cyprus to produce a minimal effect on Alliance cohesion.

Conclusion - NATO: "THE EARLY YEARS"

The Cold War period provided an abundance of tribulation within the NATO alliance. From the Korean War to the inter-alliance tensions over Cyprus, NATO has endured and remained dedicated to the founding principles of the Washington Treaty.

³⁹ Leigh H. Bruce, "Cyprus: A Last Chance," *Foreign Policy*, no. 58 (Spring, 1958), 118, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148655?seq=4>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2010.

⁴⁰ Leigh H. Bruce, "Cyprus: A Last Chance," ..., 118-119.

NATO was successful during the Cold War due to the ability to overcome times of tension through dialogue, cooperation, and to defend against the strategic threat of communism; however it was the initial Alliance framework that ensured cohesion amongst its members. As communist China and the Soviet Union made military gains in Asia, NATO was in the developmental stages of building an institution. The maturity of the Alliance, through the institutional processes of the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, ensured that NATO could transform from a collective defence organization into a successful collective security establishment in the post-Cold War era.

CHAPTER 3 – NATO AFTER THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION

Introduction – Is there a requirement for NATO in the Post-Cold War?

Critics in many circles believed that the fall of the Soviet Union should have induced the collapse of the North Atlantic Alliance; however this notion is simply too elementary in its wisdom. It is true that the primary menace was dissolved and the bipolar era transformed into an unstable unipolar world with regional alignments; however the uncertainties in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union stirred emotions within the western world. The threat of communism ended, which ushered in a new multi-faceted security environment. Ethnic tensions and civil strife would test the transformation of NATO; however the institutional processes that led the Alliance for four decades would prove invaluable in the post-Cold War era. The Rome Summit of 1991 asserted that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union introduced a new era without a single overwhelming threat.⁴¹ Without the direct threat from communism, NATO embarked upon a coordinated transformation of the Alliance through a revision of the NATO Strategic Concept.

NATO Strategic Concept - 1991

The 1991 NATO Strategic Concept refocused NATO away from collective defence and ushered in a movement towards collective security. Collective security efforts would take NATO away from planning for large-scale war against the Soviet Union and re-engineered the Alliance efforts to crisis management and intervention in

⁴¹ Manfred Worner, "NATO Transformed." *The Significance of the Rome Summit*; <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9106-1.htm>; Internet; Accessed 31 Jan 2010.

conflicts beyond the territory of the NATO Allies.⁴² The revised Strategic Concept addressed the notion of rapid reaction forces, a new multi-national force structure, and most importantly, a proposition to cooperate with former Warsaw Pact nations. Alliance members agreed to collaborate with non-NATO members to facilitate a peaceful political order in Europe.⁴³ The four major institutions or endeavors included: Partnership for Peace, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which replaced the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.⁴⁴ In 1997, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated:

“Now the new NATO can do for Europe’s east what the old NATO did for Europe’s west: vanquish old hatreds, promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and deter violence in the region where two world wars and the Cold War began.”⁴⁵

With new partnerships in the developmental stages, collective security transformation followed with enhanced military structures to meet the post-Cold War threats. The 1994 Brussels Summit envisioned the notion of NATO forces working in conjunction with non-NATO nations, including former Warsaw Pact adversaries. The major transformation of the NATO military force was the advent of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) that allowed for military cooperation of NATO and non-NATO forces in an effort to provide a security response to future threats.⁴⁶

⁴² David S. Yost, “NATO Transformed.” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 190.

⁴³ The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept 7 November 1991. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm. Internet; Accessed 8 January 2010.

⁴⁴ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed...*, 91-94.

⁴⁵ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed...*, 92.

⁴⁶ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed...*, 201.

The construct of the CJTF seemed a valuable method to instill cooperation within the NATO Alliance and between non-NATO nations, however the defence model found resistance from France and Spain.⁴⁷ The French concern resonated with an insistence that the West European Union reserved the explicit right to employ the assets of the CJTF and eliminate the possible subordination of the CJTF under the command of the United States. The Alliance membership made concessions to meet the concerns of France and Spain, thereby remaining committed to the role of the Alliance in the post-Cold War era. The CJTF construct was developed in response to the increasing internal threat from within nation-states. The ethnic upheaval in the Balkans would test the advent of the CJTF and the first non-article 5 NATO mission.⁴⁸

An Alliance Divided – The Balkans

The collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1970s released ethnic tensions within the Balkans region that grew into full-scale civil war and commanded the attention of the international community for the better part of a decade. The 1990s highlighted the new world threat that developed after the end of the Cold War as hostilities broke in the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East. The UN deployed a peace-keeping force (UNPROFOR) to the region in order to separate the combatants and provide stability; however the brutality of the war was too much for the undermanned, under-

⁴⁷ David S. Yost, "NATO Transformed." (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 201.

⁴⁸ NATO Handbook, *Role of Integrated Military Forces*.
<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1201.htm>; Internet; Accessed 25 January 2010.

armed, and ill-supported UN force. The new construct of the NATO Combined Joint Task Force was envisioned for such a mission; however the dissention within the Alliance prevented any such action.

Serbian dominance, coupled with independence-minded republics, pushed the Former Yugoslavia into a war that divided the NATO Alliance. Individual Alliance nations were sympathetic to the republics of the Balkans. Tensions were already evident between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus; however in the Balkans, Turkey supported the Muslim efforts in Bosnia, while Greece retained historical ties to Serbia. In addition, Germany supported the independence of Croatia and insisted on fast-tracked recognition of Croatia within the Alliance. The American stance envisioned the conflict as a strictly European issue and should be managed within the resources of the continent, albeit US sympathies rested with the Muslims and Croats and against the Serbs.

National agendas within the Alliance were diverse and support for all of the warring factions was present. NATO played a minimal role in the early parts of the war, specifically offering NATO ships to execute embargo operations in the Adriatic Sea. NATO also offered Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in order to enforce the no-fly zones over Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴⁹ NATO offered to execute air operations in response to major Serb aggressions against Muslims and Croats; however UN commanders resisted the use of aerial bombing until the events of 30 August, 1995.

On this day, Serb forces attacked an open market in the crowded downtown area of Sarajevo. The result was the death of more than 30 civilians and the start of NATO

⁴⁹ David Rudd and Jim Hanson. NATO at 50: Successes, Challenges, and Prospects. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. (Toronto, Canada 1999) 11.

bombing operations to suppress the Serbian onslaught.⁵⁰ Two weeks of constant NATO air operations in an effort to target Bosnian-Serb forces delivered the negotiated peace that was agreed to within the Dayton Agreement.⁵¹ The Dayton accord afforded NATO the follow-on peace-keeping operation to facilitate the dimensions of the agreement. The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed in December 1995 and was followed by NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the following year. The Balkans was successfully stabilized and NATO played a principal role.

Considering that the Alliance was divided at the outset of the war, NATO achievements highlighted the ability of the member-nations to support a common goal in the name of international peace and security. The Bosnian War emphasized the ability of the Alliance to plan and execute out of area operations through a UN mandated resolution. NATO transformation enabled the Alliance to execute collective security measures within the Balkans area of operations. Transformation of the Alliance and the new Strategic Concept gained notoriety from the successes of the Balkans, however the institutional processes developed in the 1950s remained a key element to ensure security through commitment and cooperation amongst the nations.

Eastern Expansion – NATO Enlargement

Military successes in the Balkans, namely Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, solidified the Alliance and demonstrated that NATO could effectively operate outside of

⁵⁰ David S. Yost, "NATO Transformed." (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 194.

⁵¹ Norman Hillmer and Dean Oliver, "The NATO-United Nations Link: Canada and The Balkans, 1991-95," in *A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume 1*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 71-84 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 82.

the traditional European sphere of influence. The pursuit of further NATO expansion and the desire of former Eastern Bloc nations to become Alliance members grew throughout the late 1990s. NATO advances towards the east were depicted as a method to strengthen Europe through economic and military stability; however the push towards the east would also signify the arrival of new members with great economic challenges and democracies in the infancy stages. Four main issues challenged the Alliance membership in the discussions to expand membership:

1. The Alliance struggled to make decisions on issues of importance; therefore the addition of more members could further hamper this process and impact Alliance cohesion;
2. Not all applicants could be chosen, thereby disappointing newly developed democratic nations that were searching for security and political stability;
3. The significant impact on the Alliance in the acceptance of new collective defence obligations of new members who were not fully developed to contribute to the NATO collective defence apparatus and
4. Most importantly, NATO enlargement would anger Moscow leadership and potentially risk unnecessary confrontation.⁵²

Madrid Summit and Former Eastern Bloc Membership

Deliberations from the 1997 Madrid Summit led the way for the first round of NATO enlargement. In Madrid, NATO invited Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary to join the Alliance. These three nations became official Alliance members in 1999 during an announcement at NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington, DC. NATO expansion was met with great resistance from Russian President Vladimir Putin as he

⁵² David S. Yost, "NATO Transformed." (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 117.

observed expansion as a direct threat against the Russian homeland.⁵³ Conversely, NATO envisaged the addition of the three new members as the catalyst to a larger NATO with a greater role in European security. With the eastern flank of Europe now defended by NATO members, Putin envisioned future NATO attempts to expand would include former Soviet states surrounding the Baltic Sea. NATO aspirations for further expansion were met with harsh criticism from Russia and initially strained relations between the Kremlin and Brussels.

NATO - Russia Relations and Challenges

In order to appease Moscow and mitigate tensions between NATO and Russia, the Alliance offered a mutual agreement to build closer relations between the Cold War adversaries. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security was signed in Paris on 27 May, 1997.⁵⁴ The agreement called on both Russia and NATO to build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy, cooperation and good will on all matters of security.⁵⁵ The major mechanism within the agreement was the institution of a Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which would meet twice per year in order to foster enhanced levels of trust, unity of purpose, and to build consultation and cooperation to overcome periods of tension. According to

⁵³ David S. Yost. *NATO Transformed*. 133.

⁵⁴ Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm. Internet; Accessed 1 March 2010.

⁵⁵ Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security...

the agreement, if divergences occurred, NATO and Russia would attempt to settle through friendly dialogue and mutual respect.⁵⁶

The agreement was challenged during the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbian forces in Kosovo. Russia withdrew from the pact in protest of NATO offensive military actions; however the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, worked closely with President Putin to rekindle the relationship. Cooperation between NATO and Russia grew deeper after the attacks of 9/11 as the Permanent Joint Council was re-engineered and re-named the NATO-Russia Council. This council brought together all NATO nations and Russia to convene and cooperate on matters of security to ensure stability in the region.⁵⁷

Throughout the initial era of post-Cold War NATO enlargement, internal dissent was overcome through mutual cooperation and unequivocal acceptance of expansion to secure a bond with former Warsaw Pact nations. Conversely, the ability of NATO to reach out to Russia produced the mutual cooperation that allowed for NATO expansion and a more secure Europe in the period leading up to the Global War on Terror.

Conclusion: “NATO: Survival Without a Direct Threat”

Internal turmoil and external criticisms have highlighted the NATO Alliance from the end of World War II, throughout the Cold War, and into the 21st century. NATO, and its partner nations, has historically found the means to overcome

⁵⁶ David S. Yost, “NATO Transformed.” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 143.

⁵⁷ NATO Russia Relations. <http://www.nato.int/issues/nrc/index.html>. Internet; Accessed; 23 January, 2010.

these times of turbulence through an unprecedented will for a secure and stable world.

Although NATO endured many obstacles during the first 60 years, four major themes

threatened the collapse of the Alliance from inception to the terrorist attacks of 9/11:

1. ***Internal Tensions:*** Divisions amongst the Alliance members were seen through many events in the history of NATO. Re-arming of Germany and acceptance into the Alliance was supported by the US, however met stark resistance from France and Spain. Further internal turmoil was mitigated during the quest for control of Cyprus. Armed conflict between member-states, such as Turkey and Greece, seemed impossible to overcome, however the resolve of the Alliance enabled conflict resolution without NATO collapse;
2. ***Alliance Resolve:*** The decision of President de Gaulle to remove French Forces from NATO and order Allied forces out of France attacked the NATO strategic centre of gravity – “*Resolve of the Alliance.*” In this regard, NATO leadership, in concert with the member-nations, stood strong during this tenuous period. Although French Forces were withdrawn from the NATO integrated military structure in 1966; the door was left open for the employment of French Forces to operate along side NATO Forces in the event of an attack against the Alliance;
3. ***NATO Expansion:*** Expansion of NATO membership was met with internal resistance and external resentment from Russia; however, the Alliance persevered and engaged in expanded collective security to meet needs of the post-Cold War period; and
4. ***Burden-Sharing:*** Although NATO has managed to overcome issues that threatened its very existence, the concerns over burden-sharing during the Cold War remain within the Alliance. NATO efforts in Afghanistan continue to be plagued by lack of burden-sharing by Allies in general and amongst troop contributing nations in particular. Combat operations in the south and east of Afghanistan are not fully supported by all NATO nations and the outcome has resulted in dissention amongst the nations.

NATO has managed to withstand the challenges of more than 6 decades of collective security through the coordination of national policies and the capacity building to provide a deterrent to international instabilities. The ability of a cluster of nations

(presently 28) to diffuse security situations has been attacked in some circles and praised within others. The early years of the Alliance were pivotal to the success of NATO. The early advent of institutional processes, set into motion through the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, compelled nations to cooperate and devise a common theme to overcome times of tension. The ability of the Alliance to move forward will depend upon the willingness of the member-nations to accept more demanding roles in the 21st century and move completely away from the traditional role of NATO during the Cold War.

The inception of the Alliance was envisioned to defend against the Soviet threat through collective defence; however the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War initiated the requirement for NATO transformation to include elements of collective security with a political-military organization to foster security cooperation.⁵⁸ NATO optimists argue that the Alliance defended the member-nations from the Soviet threat and successfully transitioned into the post-Cold War era. In the age of terror and the advent of adversaries without open support from a nation-state, NATO must, once again, be transformed. The events of 9/11 and the future of warfare is envisioned against failing or failed states with non-state actors, therefore NATO transformation must address the new security threat if the Alliance strives for survival. Chapter 4 will examine the NATO response to the terror attacks of September 11th and the role that the Alliance accepted during the Global War on Terror.

⁵⁸ Rebecca R. Moore, *NATO's New Mission*. (Westport Connecticut/London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 10.

CHAPTER 4 – NATO RESPONSE - GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Introduction – NATO – The Best Option for Success?

Earlier chapters examined the reasons why NATO has withstood the test of time. Through more than 60 years of existence, NATO has endured the Cold War deterrence of communist expansion, post-Cold War civil unrest, including the first out of area operations in the Balkans, and command of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. NATO has persisted through these tenuous years due the Alliance ability to transform to the current security environment. Transformation has not been a simple task; however NATO has managed to overcome decades of security issues due to the institutional foundation that the Alliance developed in the early years. NATO does not simply represent the only effective means for collective security; it remains the most viable option to command alliance efforts against the Global War on Terror. This chapter will examine the NATO response in the days following the attacks of 9/11 and outline how the Alliance has transformed to meet the future threat from failed or failing states and non-state actors with extremist ideologies.

The Attacks of 9/11

The planning, coordination, and execution of the 9/11 attacks against the United States radically changed how the world viewed security and defence. 19 terrorists, 4 hi-jacked airplanes, and approximately 3,000 people killed caused the world to react! In response to the attacks, President Bush initiated the Global War on Terror and called for the dismantling of radical Islamic extremists and the states that support them. Bush spoke to the world, through a speech to Congress on 20 September,

2002 and he vowed to defeat the perpetrators of the attacks. He promised to stop terrorism, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.⁵⁹ Bush clearly stated that the war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. Congress, the American people, and the rest of the world listened intently as Bush stated: “It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” During the same speech to Congress, Bush spoke directly to the Taliban and its leader, Mullah Omar. He insisted that the Taliban must forego support to al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden or share in their fate.⁶⁰

Operation Enduring Freedom

Taliban leadership resisted the demands of the US and the invasion of Afghanistan commenced. Operation Enduring Freedom launched the US assault of strike aircraft and Special Forces on 7 October, 2001. Initial forces were joined by Afghan warriors from the Northern Alliance, Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army in order to disrupt or destroy the terrorists and their supporting Taliban regime.⁶¹ US military actions were swift and degraded the capabilities of the Taliban and its supporters; however the operation was void of a NATO coalition in favor of a US-led alliance.⁶² More than a decade after the elimination of the communist threat, the role of

⁵⁹ President George W. Bush Speech to Congress 20 September 2002. <http://www.september11news.com/PresidentBushSpeech.htm>. Internet; Accessed 5 February 2010.

⁶⁰ President George W. Bush Speech to Congress 20 September 2002....

⁶¹ Donna Miles, Invasion of Afghanistan – 4 Year Anniversary. (American Forces Press Service 8 October 2005). <http://usmilitary.about.com/od/terrorism/a/afghanann.htm>; Internet; Accessed 31 Jan 2010.

⁶² Richard E. Rupp, NATO After 9/11: *An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 94.

NATO remained questionable; however the al Qaeda terrorist attacks on US soil would define the role of the Alliance in an age of uncertainty. The future success or failure of the Alliance was tested on the morning of September 11th and NATO relevance would be show-cased through an allied response to combat this new threat.⁶³ NATO reaction to the Global War on Terror and Alliance efforts to support the war in Afghanistan will be analyzed throughout the remainder of chapter 4 in order to examine the efforts of the Alliance and the necessity of NATO in the age of terror.

NATO Response to the Terror Attacks of 9/11

Within 24 hours of the attacks on US soil, all members of NATO condemned the terrorist attacks and the Permanent Representatives of the North Atlantic Council invoked Article 5 of the of the Washington Treaty.⁶⁴ In more than 60 years of the Alliance, this was the first time that the NATO governing body initiated Article 5. The proclamation of Article 5 meant that the attacks against the United States were attacks against the entirety of the 19 member-nations. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty makes the following assurances:

⁶³ Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 93.

⁶⁴ NATO Parliamentary Assembly. *Special Report – The War Against Terrorism*. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=247>; Internet; Accessed 2 Feb 2010.

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the UN, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area...”⁶⁵

Agreement to invoke Article 5 demonstrated the Alliance determination to come to the defence of the United States in response to the attacks of September 11th; however not all members of the Alliance were immediately certain that invocation of Article 5 was the best course of action for the Alliance. Germany, Norway, Belgium, and The Netherlands were skeptical of the Article 5 pronouncement as they felt that it would lead the Alliance in “*uncharted waters*.”⁶⁶

As the United States planned for the execution of military operations into Afghanistan, the North Atlantic Council initiated the requirement to provide support within a multi-spectrum environment. US requests for the use of airfields and airspace within the sovereign NATO countries were immediately granted in order to allow for the preparations of the US military response. Operation Enduring Freedom was initially supported by blanket over-flight rights and access to forward operating bases to facilitate the US force projection into Afghanistan. Enhanced intelligence sharing was also afforded by NATO nation-states during the preparation phases of the US efforts into

⁶⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Article IV. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm; Internet; Accessed; 31 Jan 2010.

⁶⁶ Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 95.

Afghanistan.⁶⁷ Although not assuming the lead role in the culmination of the Afghanistan war effort, NATO was prepared to fully support the US-led coalition to expel the Taliban and al Qaeda.

NATO Ground Force Commitment to Global War on Terror

“Coalition of the willing” became synonymous with the actions of the Bush administration during the planning stages of Operation Enduring Freedom.⁶⁸ Deliberate actions by US political and military leaders to design the coalition to meet the military operation was envisioned as a condemnation of the NATO alliance to execute operations in response to the 9/11 attacks. In retrospect, only three NATO nations failed to contribute to the initial assault into Afghanistan.

Lieutenant General Delong, Deputy Commander US Central Command, noted that 15 of 18 NATO partners supported the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and 11 of the NATO nations directly supported ground operations in and around Afghanistan.⁶⁹ Canada, Norway, Denmark, Australia, and Germany directly supported Operation Anaconda, the initial mission to detect and destroy the al Qaeda and Taliban networks within Afghanistan. US disclosure of which nations supported the Afghan incursion generated controversy within Germany and caused embarrassment to the Canadian

⁶⁷ NATO Parliamentary Assembly. *Special Report – The War Against Terrorism*. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=247>; Internet; Accessed 2 Feb 2010. Paras 12 and 33.

⁶⁸ President George W. Bush Speech to Congress 20 September 2002. <http://www.september11news.com/PresidentBushSpeech.htm>. Internet; Accessed 5 February 2010.

⁶⁹ NATO Parliamentary Assembly. *Special Report – The War Against Terrorism*. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=247>; Internet; Accessed 2 Feb 2010. Para 28.

Defence Minister as images of Canadian soldiers made front-page news in Canadian news media.⁷⁰

NATO Air Force Commitment to Global war on Terror

In addition to direct support by NATO troop-contributing nations to US operations in Afghanistan, NATO deployed AWACS aircraft to patrol the airspace over the United States. Deployment of the AWACS to Tinker AFB in Oklahoma allowed for US AWACS aircraft to deploy in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The NATO AWACS platform performed a major role in the protection of key US infrastructure and assisted the US security capacities that provide Presidential protection.⁷¹ NATO commitment of seven AWACS comprised 830 personnel from 13 NATO nations. NATO flew 360 sorties in direct support to the United States during the maiden Alliance anti-terror mission - Operation Eagle Assist.⁷²

NATO Naval Commitment to Global War on Terror

Alliance commitment to the Global War on Terror continued with the tasking of NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) to detect and deter terrorist activity and illegal trafficking in the eastern portions of the Mediterranean. STANAVFORMED formed the naval elements of Operation Active Endeavour and in

⁷⁰ NATO Parliamentary Assembly. *Special Report – The War Against Terrorism*. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=247>; Internet; Accessed 2 Feb 2010. Para 29.

⁷¹ NATO Parliamentary Assembly. *Special Report – The War Against Terrorism*. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=247>; Internet; Accessed 2 Feb 2010. para 32.

⁷² NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism – How Did it Evolve? *Response to 9/11*. <http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/evolve02.html>; Internet; Accessed 2 Feb 2010.

addition to its primary task; the fleet was responsible to provide escort duties for civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar. The limited passageway of the Strait of Gibraltar provides a viable choke-point for terrorists to launch attacks against civilian or merchant shipping; therefore the requirement for Maritime Interdiction Operations and anti-terrorist operations proved invaluable in the deterrence of terrorist activity in the region.⁷³

The second order effect of the NATO naval mission in the Mediterranean allows US ships to support operations in Afghanistan. NATO commitment to Operation Active Endeavour continues in the current security environment and provides NATO with a rapidly deployed maritime fleet to support the Global War on Terror and Piracy operations off the coast of Somalia.

Conclusion – NATO Reaction to Global War on Terror

NATO commitment to the Global War on Terror commenced with the invocation of Article 5 and an Alliance pledge to support US efforts in defeating al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the persons or states that support them. The culmination of AWACS support to US air sovereignty and the NATO maritime presence in the Mediterranean Sea depicted NATO's commitment to the American efforts in Afghanistan. These operations were not only a substantial contribution; they provided the foundation for NATO transformation from a euro-based alliance into a collective security mechanism with global reach and a military capacity to effectively defeat the current and future threats.

⁷³ NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism – How Did it Evolve? *Response to 9/11*. <http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/evolve02.html>; Internet; Accessed 2 Feb 2010.

CHAPTER 5 – NATO TRANSFORMATION

Introduction – NATO Prepares for the Multi-faceted Threat

Transformation is hardly a new concept to the NATO alliance. The end of the Cold War left the Alliance with no visible threat and therefore required an overhaul to the NATO structure and doctrine of its military force structure. The events of September 11th have forced NATO to make further changes in order to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. Essentially and philosophically, NATO transformation commenced moments after the attacks on the United States as Alliance members embarked upon efforts to deny the threat of terrorists and those that support them. The concentration of NATO transformation was approved during the Prague Summit on 21 November, 2002, and the major elements of transformation were directed in three distinct phases:

1. Transformation of the NATO strategic focus (Chapter 5);
2. Transformation of NATO's capabilities (Chapter 6); and
3. Development of the NATO Response Force (NRF)(Chapter 7).

Transforming NATO's Strategic Focus

In the months that followed the al Qaeda attacks, NATO member-nations carefully examined the future role of the Alliance. Transforming the strategic focus of NATO was paramount to the successful attainment of NATO goals and Alliance survivability. The military leadership within NATO developed three main themes in order to refocus NATO military efforts:

1. Military Concept for the Defence Against Terrorism;
2. Execution of "Out of Area" Operations; and
3. Redefined NATO Command Structure.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Richard E. Rupp, "NATO After 9/11." in *An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 116-118.

Military Concept for the Defence Against Terrorism

A NATO press release on 18 December, 2001, highlighted the notion of a NATO Military Concept for the Defence against Terrorism.⁷⁵ NATO Defence Ministers tasked the NATO military authorities with the preparation of the new concept, which required approval by the North Atlantic Council upon completion.⁷⁶ After much debate over the roles, limitations, and context of defence to include offensive actions within the new concept, military authorities requested clarity from the North Atlantic Council. Upon receipt of further NAC guidance, the final adaptation of the concept was accepted by the Alliance Heads of State during meetings in Reykjavik, Iceland on 14 May, 2002, and approved by the NAC during the Prague Summit in November, 2002. This was a monumental achievement for the Alliance as the new concept highlighted the authority to use NATO forces on a global scale.

“NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.”⁷⁷

Political guidance accompanied the new concept, which paralleled with the sentiments of the Alliance leaders. The North Atlantic Council asserted that in order to

⁷⁵ Prague Summit Declaration 21 November 2002. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>; Internet; Accessed 3 Feb 2010. Paras 2,7.

⁷⁶ Prague Summit Declaration 21 November 2002. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>; Internet; Accessed 3 Feb 2010. Para 9.

⁷⁷ Communiqué. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Reykjavik, 14 May 2002. Press Release (2002); <http://ls.kuleuven.be/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0205&L=natopres&D=1&P=1022>; Internet; Accessed 3 Feb 2010. 59.

defend against terrorism, NATO must embody a multi-faceted approach and Alliance forces shall be prepared to deploy wherever and whenever there is a requirement.⁷⁸

With NAC approval, the NATO Military Committee, chaired by Admiral Guido Venturoni, proposed four subsets of military operations to meet the goals established within the concept. Notwithstanding the requirement for NATO force protection throughout the spectrum of military operations, the Military Committee proposed the following four operations as essential for successful attainment of NATO goals:

1. Anti-terrorism;
2. Consequence Management;
3. Counter-terrorist; and
4. Military Cooperation.⁷⁹

Anti-terrorism

A strictly defensive concept, successful anti-terrorist operations rely upon multiple military facets; however none more important than timely sharing of intelligence between Alliance members to prevent terrorist actions before they occur. Although individual NATO nations have the responsibility for the defence of their sovereign territory, NATO must be prepared to assist if required. Assistance to NATO partners was exemplified during the early execution of the invasion of Afghanistan as NATO AWACS aircraft, with crew-members from many NATO nations, deployed to patrol the sovereign territory of the United States. Other components of anti-terrorist operations include the

⁷⁸ NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. Available at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>; Internet; Accessed 3 February 2010.

⁷⁹ NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. Available at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>; Internet; Accessed 3 February 2010.

provision of maritime and air protection as well as the development of the NATO standardized threat warning system to monitor the threat in order to execute operations to deter potential terrorist threats. The final responsibility within the anti-terrorism agreement includes a provision for NATO member nations to assist in the evacuation of another nation's citizens or military forces in case of an increased terrorist threat.⁸⁰

Consequence Management

NATO anti-terrorism responsibilities concentrated on preventative measures to defend against or deter the threat of terrorist actions before they occur; whereas consequence management provides a measure of reaction to mitigate terrorist acts and its devastating effects. A major responsibility of NATO consequence management rests with force generation and military planning of specialized NATO elements. To meet this new responsibility, NATO established the Multi-national Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Battalion. This new capability was envisioned to respond to and defend against the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against NATO nations or beyond the boundaries of the Alliance.⁸¹

Consequence management responsibilities went further than the development of specialized capabilities and introduced the creation of an Alliance registry of available military resources to react to terrorist attacks against Alliance members or NATO interests. Alliance cohesion was the main objective of consequence management as

⁸⁰ NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism, Available at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>; Internet; Accessed 8 Feb 2010.

⁸¹ "Launch of NATO Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion." Available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p031126e.htm>. Internet; Accessed 8 Feb 2010.

NATO embarked upon the creation of a training and exercise coordination cell in order to develop a multi-national response to attacks against the Alliance. Located in Brussels, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Centre is envisioned as the agency to lead NATO efforts in response to acts of terrorism or humanitarian crisis.⁸²

Counter Terrorism

NATO's ability to counter terrorism forms the third element of the Military Concept for the Defence against Terrorism and is designed as an offensive capacity to reduce the capabilities that terrorist organizations possess. The focus of NATO counter-terror operations is to deny the ability of terrorist organizations to establish bases of operations in order to plan, train, and execute operations. Alliance members agree that offensive operations will not be limited to terrorist organizations, but also to their sponsors or those that provide them refuge or a safe havens to act against western democracy. In order to be effective, NATO counter-terrorist operations require a joint focus and must exploit the use of psychological operations and information strategies in order to gain the trust of the local population. Alliance acceptance of offensive counter-terrorist operations involves two main roles for NATO; NATO in the lead and NATO in support.⁸³

⁸² Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52057.htm; Internet; Accessed 22 Feb 2010.

⁸³ NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. Available at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>. Internet; Accessed 8 Feb 2010.

NATO in the Lead

With NATO in the lead of counter-terrorist operations, the Alliance is empowered to ensure an adequate command and control structure and an intelligence apparatus to cope with the threat from terrorist organizations or non-state actors. Successful execution of counter-terror operations requires a well-trained military force that is exercised and maintained at appropriate readiness levels to react when required. The NATO concept argues that counter-terrorist operations require the same force structures and capabilities as Alliance joint operations, although there remains a requirement for NATO to accelerate the process of decision-making. In the successful attainment of NATO counter-terrorist operations, Alliance leaders will be required to make decisions in a timely fashion to facilitate the detection of time-sensitive targets and the execution of offensive operations to eliminate the threat. The facilitation of targeting terrorists will require the provision of forces that have the capability to conduct strike operations and the capacity of weapons, such as precision guided munitions, to defeat the threat.⁸⁴

NATO in Support

The provision of assets and capabilities by NATO nations highlights the Alliance requirements when counter-terrorist operations require NATO as a support mechanism. Alliance membership could potentially support counter-terrorist operations through the provision of host-nation logistical support or intrinsic NATO assets. Alliance support of this nature was observed during the planning of operations into Afghanistan and the execution of the initial invasion as NATO partners permitted over-flight rights and basing

⁸⁴ NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. Available at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>. Internet; Accessed; 22 Feb 2010.

of military forces. In addition to the deployment of NATO maritime forces to the Mediterranean Sea, NATO also committed a fleet of AWACS aircraft and fully trained aircrew and technicians to provide over-flight protection of US sovereign territory.⁸⁵ Additionally, NATO has proven itself effective in operational planning and force generation, which could provide the necessary means to support counter-terrorist operations.⁸⁶

Military Cooperation

Military cooperation within the Alliance forms the fourth and final pillar of the Military Concept for the Defence against Terrorism. The rise of terrorist actions and the advent of the non-state actors pursuing radical goals pushed the Alliance to examine the responsibilities of other elements to counter the threat of the 21st century. Alliance leaders insisted that military action alone will not overcome the threat from terrorists; therefore they agreed that diplomatic, economic, social, legal and information activities should compliment military operations in the fight against terrorism.⁸⁷ Military cooperation envisions the necessity for military and civil cooperation to enhance effectiveness in the common goal to defeat terrorism. In most Alliance nations civil authorities, such as law enforcement, intelligence and security services, and other national governmental organizations form the main agencies involved in countering the

⁸⁵ Richard E. Rupp, "NATO After 9/11." in *An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 103.

⁸⁶ NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. Available at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>. Internet; Accessed 8 Feb 2010.

⁸⁷ NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. Available at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>. Internet; Accessed 11 Feb 2010.

threat from terrorism; therefore NATO military forces will be required to operate in close coordination with these agencies and in some cases in direct support.

Cooperation with national agencies parallels the partnerships that NATO has built with regional and international organizations, such as Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the NATO/Russia Council, to name a few.⁸⁸ These initiatives or commitments to cooperate within an international setting improve the effectiveness to combat an enemy that is flexible and virtually invisible. The concept of military cooperation states:

“...trust, transparency, and interaction already developed through these relationships serve as an excellent vehicle for the further coordination of measures to combat terrorism.”⁸⁹

Conclusion - Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism

In addition to the implementation of the four key military components of the Military Concept for the Defence against Terrorism, Alliance military leaders identify the requisite means and processes for its effective implementation. Timely and accurate intelligence that is shared across the Alliance is a requirement for the successful execution of the military concept. Mission success against terrorism is directly linked to sound intelligence collection, analysis, and most importantly, dissemination to the widest distribution possible. Other major initiatives within the Military Concept focus on the provision of trained forces, which are deployable, CBRN defence, and effective engagement through precision-guided munitions to mitigate the risks of collateral

⁸⁸ NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. Available at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>. Internet; Accessed 11 Feb 2010.

⁸⁹ NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. Available at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>. Internet; Accessed 11 Feb 2010.

damage. The Military Concept guides the means to counter the terrorist threat; however terrorist activities involve minimal warning which limits the Alliance response time. In this regard, the Military Concept emphasizes the requirement to make Alliance decision-making as effective as possible to facilitate the deployment of appropriate forces to counter the threat.⁹⁰

Execution of “Out of Area” Operations

The second major shift in the NATO strategic focus after 9/11 centred upon the ability of NATO to embrace operations beyond the territories of the Alliance members in Europe and North America. NATO’s acceptance of the military responsibilities in the Balkans is considered it’s first “out of area operations,” however the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia transpired on the European continent and therefore had the potential for spillover into the territories of the Alliance. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty States:

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date

⁹⁰ NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. Available at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>. Internet; Accessed 11 Feb 2010.

when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.⁹¹

In accordance with Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Balkans interventions by NATO are considered “out of area” operations, however in the post 9/11 world NATO would be required to operate on a grander scale and well beyond the limits of the European continent.

Any questions regarding NATO’s commitment to “out of area” operations were silenced when the Alliance assumed the command responsibilities for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan. On 11 August, 2003, NATO took command of the UN-mandated operation in Afghanistan to foster a safe and secure environment in order to allow for the successful transition from Taliban control to a democratically elected government. In addition to supporting the political changes within Afghanistan, NATO also accepted the role of assisting the development of the Afghan Transitional Authority and training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).⁹²

In the beginnings, NATO member nations contributed the bulk of the forces required to execute command of the operation; however as the ISAF mission matured, the number of troop-contributing nations exploded to include non-NATO partners. ISAF command was alternated amongst NATO member nations on six month rotations until the United States accepted the commitment on a full-time basis in 2007 with the command appointment of General Dan McNeill (US Army). The inaugural command was assumed by the United Kingdom in December, 2001, with a force structure of 5,500

⁹¹ The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington DC 4 April, 1949). Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm; Internet; Accessed 11 Feb 10.

⁹² Diego, A Ruiz Palmer, “the Road to Kabul,” *NATO Review, Summer 2003*. Available at www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art3.html. Internet; Accessed 11 Feb 2010.

troops. In stark contrast to the original force structure in 2001, General Stanley McChrystal, the current COM ISAF, commands more than 85,000 troops from 43 troop-contributing nations (including 15 non-NATO nations).⁹³

The ability for ISAF to mature into the current combat force was due, in large part, to the ability of NATO to lead “out of area” operations from strategic leadership and direction to tactical execution of the Alliance members and non-NATO nation troop contributors. With NAC concurrence, General James Jones, then SACEUR, instituted a plan for NATO to enhance support to the ISAF mission by taking responsibility for the command, coordination, and planning of the operation.⁹⁴

In accordance with UNSCR 1510, this initiative instituted the expansion of NATO to regional commands North, West, South, East, and Capital. In the fall of 2006, stages three and four of expansion were completed to include Regional Commands South and East under NATO command and leadership. The NATO command structure instituted strategic direction from SACEUR, operational command from Joint Force Command Brunssum (The Netherlands), and an in-theatre operational command led by COM ISAF, with regional commanders to direct the tactical execution of operations.⁹⁵ With the entire mission under NATO command, “operational art” commenced as strategic direction empowers tactical successes through the operational command at ISAF HQ. In addition to the military command, NATO expansion throughout the country was

⁹³ ISAF and Afghan National Army Strengths and Laydowns February 2010. Available at <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf>. Internet; Access; 11 Feb 2010.

⁹⁴ Diego, A Ruiz Palmer, “the Road to Kabul,” *NATO Review*, Summer 2003. Available at www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art3.html. Internet; Accessed 11 Feb 2010.

⁹⁵ Under command of General McChrystal, COM ISAF 2010, the operational command at JFC Brunssum assumes a coordination and support role for the NATO mission in Afghanistan.

instituted to assist the Afghan government in the exercise of political influence beyond the area surrounding Kabul.⁹⁶

NATO Command Structure – “Combating the Post 9/11 Threat”

The third component of the NATO transformation demanded a restructure of the NATO command structure in order to meet the changing security environment. The Heads of States of NATO declared, through the Prague Summit of 1992, that the NATO command structure must be overhauled and stream-lined to become “*a leaner, more efficient, effective, and deployable command structure with a view to meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance mission.*”⁹⁷

Prior to the Prague Summit, the NATO command structure was a cumbersome, Cold War military structure that was established along geographical divisions. The new structure envisioned from the Prague Summit required a focus towards functionality, through a lean military institution. The efforts to transform the command structure into functional military authorities rested with the elimination of duplication through stream-lined integration of the existing military headquarters. Throughout the Cold War, a geographically focused NATO was required to defend against the potential threat from the Soviet Union; however since the collapse of Communism, the threat is more dynamic

⁹⁶ Institute for the Study of War. Available at http://images.google.ca/imgres?imgurl=http://www.understandingwar.org/files/ISAF-PRT_0_1.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/international-security-assistance-force-isaf&usq=__XV5hTOwNXTPC7oSuuCA5dITqEss=&h=325&w=513&sz=209&hl=en&start=1&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=sCxd3KNKQqoNEM:&tbnh=83&tbnw=131&prev=/images%3Fq%3DInitial%2BISAF%2B1%2Bforce%2Bstructure%2BDecember%2B2001%26hl%3Den%26um%3D1. Internet; Accessed; 12 Feb 2010.

⁹⁷ Prague Summit Declaration dated 21 Nov 2002, para 4b. Available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>. Internet; Accessed 14 Feb 2010.

as terrorism and non-state actors dominate the requirement for a collective security alliance that can react on a global scale.

NATO Command Structure – Allied Command Operations (Strategic)

To meet the post-Cold War threat, NATO transformed the command structure that stretched throughout Europe and the United States during the Cold War. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe provided the venue for Allied Command Operations (ACO), the lone strategic command headquarters to guide NATO operations. In the new structure, ACO is responsible to the North Atlantic Council for strategic advice and is responsible for the downward strategic direction to the operational command headquarters.⁹⁸

NATO Command Structure – Joint Forces Command (JFC- Operational)

Strategic direction from ACO is provided to three operational-level joint commands within the new NATO command structure. Command and control of operations would be appointed to two Joint Force Commands, located at Brunssum, The Netherlands and Naples Italy, and one Joint Command, located at Lisbon, Portugal. The separation of the strategic and operational entities delegated operational authority to the Joint Force Commands. In the current context of NATO operations, JFC Naples is the operational command headquarters of the NATO operation in Kosovo⁹⁹ and JFC

⁹⁸ Prague Summit Declaration dated 21 Nov 2002, Para 4b. Available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>. Internet; Accessed 14 Feb 2010.

⁹⁹ JFC Brunssum ISAF Operations. Available at <http://www.jfcbs.nato.int/operations.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 Feb 2010.

Brunssum provides operational command of the Afghan mission (ISAF).¹⁰⁰ Through transformation, each JFC is entrusted with a land, air, and maritime component to project NATO operations and provide functional expertise to support overall ACO operations. In addition, each JFC must be capable of commanding a ground-based Combined Joint Force Task Force (CJTF) and a less robust CJTF headquarters that can affect operational command from a sea-based vessel. Joint Headquarters Lisbon was envisioned to command CJTF operations from a maritime platform; however the headquarters is not expected to carry-out CJTF land-based operations.¹⁰¹

Conclusion – Transforming the NATO Command Structure

Transformation of the NATO command structure removed NATO from a fixed system of military headquarters with a geographical focus to defeat the Cold War adversaries. Re-organization within the NATO military system resulted in a decrease from twenty headquarters elements to eleven, which is a significant accomplishment in itself; however the true magnitude of the restructure can be seen in the flexibility of NATO to be more responsive and react to military deployments within the long-established NATO area of operations and now outside of the traditional focus of the Alliance. NATO successes in the Balkans and operations in Afghanistan have resulted largely from the new strategic focus and commitment to NATO transformation to command and support operations.

¹⁰⁰ JFC Brunssum ISAF Operations. Available at <http://www.jfcbs.nato.int/operations.htm>; Internet; Accessed 22 Feb 2010.

¹⁰¹ Prague Summit Declaration dated 21 Nov 2002, para 4b. Available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>. Internet; Accessed 14 Feb 2010.

CHAPTER 6 - TRANSFORMATION OF NATO CAPABILITIES

The threat from terrorism compelled the Alliance to re-examine the NATO strategic focus. However, these changes provided a monumental challenge to the member-nations as they prepared to transform to meet the new Alliance objectives. In order to affect the new strategic focus, Alliance members commenced the process to align national military doctrine and capabilities to include improvements to joint warfare and interoperability. In the age of terrorism, NATO has been slow to develop joint interoperability and to align commonalities associated with doctrine. As the United States continues to provide the bulk of the forces and the technologically-superior weaponry to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, a danger persists that exploits the inability of NATO to collectively defend the ideals of the Alliance and to secure the world from rogue states and terrorist groups. NATO efforts in Afghanistan highlight the fact that the Alliance is combating the current threats, even though only limited practical progress has been made so far in the transformation of NATO forces. Failing to deliver the enhanced capabilities envisioned through transformation will risk the Alliance becoming ineffective when combating the current world threats. During the Prague Summit, NATO Defence Ministers approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) to ensure that Alliance capabilities will effectively combat and overcome the threat of terrorism from non-state actors and rogue nations.

PCC objectives focused on specific military capabilities and highlighted the requirement for the strategic level of NATO to modify the method of how the Alliance trains its forces and how NATO operates within this unstable environment. Military

capabilities require vast improvements and in accordance with PCC direction, joint operations require enhancements to Alliance critical areas, such as:

1. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defence;
2. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR);
3. Air to Ground Surveillance (AGS);
4. Command, Control, and Communications (C3);
5. Precision Guided Munitions (PGM);
6. Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD);
7. Strategic air and sea lift capacity;
8. Air to air refueling; and
9. Deployable combat ready forces with combat support.¹⁰²

Dedication to the PCC intentions is critical to the future relevance of NATO and during the Prague Summit; NATO Defence Ministers were resolute in their political commitments to acquire the capabilities envisioned within the PCC.¹⁰³

In order to implement transformation in NATO capabilities and strategic effectiveness, Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was established and commanded by a four-star General/Admiral. Located in Norfolk, Virginia, ACT is co-located with the United States Joint Force Command. Transformation, interoperability, and capabilities enhancements within the NATO military structure are the primary functions that ACT provides to the Alliance members. ACT offers the resources to ensure that NATO forces are appropriately trained and equipped to defend Alliance interests and defeat the challenges posed by the 21st century security threat. The focus of ACT rests primarily with the training of commanders and staffs, conducting experiments to assess new concepts, and promoting interoperability throughout the Alliance.

¹⁰² Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 203-207.

¹⁰³ Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11...*, 189-190.

“ACT will provide NATO commanders with up-to-date scenarios, the latest lessons learned, realistic mission rehearsals, and well-trained staff. As the command in charge of training, standardisation, concept development and experimentation, ACT will have a huge and positive impact on how NATO trains and prepares for future crises.”¹⁰⁴
(Lord Robertson – NATO Secretary General)

ACT responsibilities to develop and execute these competencies are essential to the current training requirements of the personnel that form NATO headquarters in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Kosovo (KFOR).¹⁰⁵ Of note, ACT has developed the training of ISAF headquarters’ staffs operating at ISAF HQ Kabul and Regional Command staff elements operating throughout the ISAF area of operations. Through mission rehearsal training (MRT), Alliance headquarters’ elements unite for the first time to exercise in a synthetic environment. This critical training is conducted in Stavanger, Norway at NATO Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) and establishes the headquarters element as mission-ready prior to deployment to the NATO operation. ACT has also been the driving force behind specialized training and doctrine development, particularly the enhancement of intelligence training to ensure that all member-nations are operating at the same level of intelligence knowledge prior to deployment.¹⁰⁶

Sharing of intelligence within the Alliance has hampered NATO operations from the Balkans crisis to the present-day ISAF mission. National caveats and legal obstacles have impeded the ability for troop-contributing nations to share intelligence within the

¹⁰⁴ Lord Robertson Speech at the Inauguration of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) , 19 June 2003; Internet; Accessed 14 March 2010. <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030619b.htm>

¹⁰⁵ Allied Command Transformation. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52092.htm; Internet; Access 22 Feb 2010.

¹⁰⁶ Personal accounts from the author through three years of employment as the JFC Brunssum ISAF Chief of Intelligence Planning and Exercise training.

NATO areas of operations. Currently within ISAF, there is an abundance of intelligence sharing agreements, which include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Global Counter-Terrorist Task Force (GCTF);
2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO Eyes Only);
3. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF);
4. Australia, Britain, Canada, and America (ABCA or 4 Eyes);
5. Canada-US (CAN/US Eyes only); and
6. National “*no foreign*” – Intel for national consumption only.¹⁰⁷

Understanding that intelligence-sharing continues to hinder ISAF operations, ACT produced the ISAF Intelligence Operations Course (I²OC) in order to meet the demand to contribute intelligence to all mission partners. I²OC is just one of the successes of ACT as NATO transformation matures. As described above, ACT is a proven leader within the Joint Education and Training process of NATO; however at the official unveiling of ACT in 2003, the NATO leader in transformation was also envisioned to deliver four other Alliance core transformation processes:

1. Joint Education and Training (JET);
2. Strategic Concept, Policy, and Interoperability (SCPI);
3. Joint Experimentation, Exercises, and Assessments (JEEA);
4. Defence Planning (Def Plan); and
5. Future Capabilities Research and Technology (FCRT)

SCPI was designed to introduce and maintain Alliance interoperability, implement doctrine, and provide a level of standardization throughout NATO. ACT enabled the JEEA process in order to effectively conduct and evaluate combined warfighting experiments in a joint military environment. Outcomes from JEEA experiments provide the methodologies for implementation throughout the NATO force

¹⁰⁷ Personal accounts from the author through three years of employment as the JFC Brunssum ISAF Chief of Intelligence Planning and Exercise training.

structure. The NATO Defence Planning Process identifies requirements and synchronizes the development of required military capabilities throughout the Alliance. Last of all, FCRT facilitates future NATO research programs to promote Alliance military capabilities.¹⁰⁸

In deliverance of the NATO transformation core processes, the organizational structure of ACT was originally sub-divided into three distinct commands that coordinated and delivered the five core processes; however present-day ACT is structured with a headquarters element situated in Norfolk Virginia and five sub-command formations located throughout the NATO membership. These are:

1. **Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) – Stavanger Norway:** JWC provides NATO training that drives Alliance operations, including current-day operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo;
2. **NATO Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) - Bydgoszcz, Poland:** JFTC supports collaborative training of NATO forces and partner-nations to enhance tactical interoperability;
3. **NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC) - Souda Naval Base, Crete, Greece:** NMIOTC conducts combined Alliance maritime training in order to execute anti-surface (ASuW), anti-sub-surface (ASW), anti-aerial (AAW) surveillance, and special operations activities in support of Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO);
4. **NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURC) - La Spezia, Italy:** NURC provides ACT and NATO with research in the maritime domain in an effort to defend maritime forces and naval installations against terrorism. NURC also provides secure networks and a common operational picture to enhance situational awareness to NATO commanders; and
5. **NATO School Oberammergau (NSO) – Oberammergau Germany:** The mission of NSO is to prepare and deliver Alliance military and civilian education in support of the current and developing NATO strategy

¹⁰⁸ Allied Command Transformation. Available at <http://www.act.nato.int/content.asp?pageid=302>; Internet; Accessed 13 March 2010.

and policy. NSO provides instruction in four main areas to support the Alliance: Operations and Plans, Joint Operations, WMD threats, and Policy.¹⁰⁹

At the outset of this thesis, a description of the Alliance and the inability of NATO to lead the western world against those nation-states or individuals that oppose democracy, peace, and freedom depicted an Alliance that was ineffective to execute its mandate of collective security. Ted Galen Carpenter labelled the Alliance as dysfunctional and he suggested that the United States should extricate itself from this ineffective security coalition; however the introduction of ACT would provide opposition to the beliefs boasted by Ted Galen Carpenter in his analysis depicted in “NATO at 60: A Hollow Alliance.”¹¹⁰

The formation of ACT and the co-habitation with the United States Joint Force Command ensures that NATO will remain closely synchronized with the Alliance’s primary resource, the United States military. The synergy produced between ACT and US Joint Force Command provides an institutional unity of effort that provides benefits to both commands; however NATO enjoys the benefits of the worlds most technologically advance military to drive future Alliance operations. The creation of ACT occurred due to the 2002 Prague Summit and until 2009 the command of both ACT and US Joint Force Command was a US General Officer. The advantages of a US General to lead both Commands allowed NATO the privilege normally only accustomed within the United States military; however in 2009, NATO and the United States agreed

¹⁰⁹ NATO Command and Control Organization. Available at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/structure.htm>. Internet; Accessed 13 March 2010.

¹¹⁰ Ted Galen Carpenter, “Policy Analysis: NATO at 60.” in *A Hollow Alliance* (CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No 635 (March 30, 2009)).

upon a non-US Commander to assume ACT command responsibilities from General Mattis.

General Stéphane Abrial (French Army) became the first commander of ACT to be appointed from a NATO country other than the United States. As NATO continues to support the US-led war on terror and fight the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, it will be imperative for the US military to continue strong support of NATO transformation. The future of ACT will require a cooperative and synergistic approach with US Joint Force Command in order to instil effective NATO transformation and the evolution of the Alliance capabilities. Transformation success will also be dependent upon the European allies to reform the structure of their Armed Forces to enhance their expeditionary ability and to muster the political will to eliminate the caveats that limit their operational employment in ISAF and elsewhere. Major capability initiatives since the 2002 Prague Summit are highlighted by the commitment of the NATO membership to the idea of the NATO Response Force (NRF).

CHAPTER 7 – NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF)

During the 2002 NATO Defence Ministers' meeting in Warsaw Poland, US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, proposed the formation of a rapid reaction force that would serve NATO interests around the globe. Rumsfeld insisted that the future of NATO depends upon such a force to prove the Alliance as a relevant military structure to meet the continued world-wide security demands. Rumsfeld envisioned this standing military force, later to be known as the NATO Response Force (NRF), as the cornerstone of NATO transformation and a method for NATO to play a major role in the war against terror.

“If NATO does not have a force that is quick and agile, which can deploy in days or weeks instead of months or years, then it will not have much to offer the world of the 21st century.” US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld.”¹¹¹

Rumsfeld maintained that the NRF would need to be sustainable, fully interoperable within the Alliance, and supported by all member-nations. This agile force would comprise combat ready forces on a rotational basis and deploy globally to defend NATO interests in all categories of military response. From high intensity combat operations, such as Afghanistan, to small-scale operations, like the Haitian earthquakes, the NRF would be destined to become the military force of choice.¹¹²

Rumsfeld's commitment to the NRF was unanimously approved during the Prague Summit in November, 2002 as the Alliance members declared:

¹¹¹ Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 118.

¹¹² Rebecca R. Moore, *NATO's New Mission*. (Westport Connecticut/London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 89.

“The NRF will consist of technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable force to include land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the council.”¹¹³

The NRF embodies the military structure required for the Alliance to meet the security demands in the post-9/11 security environment. The force structure and the command element provide a high readiness military component to overcome the asymmetrical nature of warfare in the 21st century. According to the Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones:

“The NRF embodies NATO’s ongoing transformation and is vital in order to meet the new and very dangerous threats of the 21st century that are so different from those of the Cold War era.”¹¹⁴

The NRF mandate is 12 month rotations between JFC Brunssum, JFC Naples, and JC Lisbon. Within the 12 months, two distinct iterations of combat-ready forces are responsible for six month operational readiness periods. NRF 1 became operational on 15 October, 2003, and was commanded by Joint Force Command Brunssum, The Netherlands. General Sir Jack Deverell, UK Army, accepted the responsibility of NRF from General Jones in a ceremony that highlighted the future relevance of an Alliance in reform. General Jones addressed the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen/Women, and the dignitaries who witnessed the transformation of the Cold War military structure to an effective force to tackle unrest anywhere in the world.

¹¹³ Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 118.

¹¹⁴ NATO Launches Response Force. Available at <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/10/i031015.htm>. Internet; Accessed 16 March 2010.

“The passing of the colours of the NATO Response Force today marks what I consider to be one of the most important changes in the NATO Alliance since the signing of the Washington Treaty over 50 years ago.”¹¹⁵ General James Jones.

Under the command of General Deverell, NRF 1 and 2 were the prototypes that would shape the composition of the force until full operational capability in the fall of 2006.

Subsequent NRF commands focused on the command elements and the ability to project the NRF force anywhere that NATO interests are threatened. During the summer of 2006, the training and force build-up of NRF 7 and 8 led to the validation and full operational capability of the NRF. Exercise Steadfast Jaguar provided the scenario and Cape Verde provided the venue to certify the NRF as fully capable to accept NATO missions anywhere in the world. Exercise Steadfast Jaguar provided a live-fire exercise with coordinated Air, Land, Sea, and Special Forces elements operating in a simulated hostile environment. The command element was led by a ship-borne Deployed Joint Force (DJTF) Commander and staff element, who executed the tactical fight while taking operational direction from the JFC Brunssum Commander, General Gerhard Back (German Air Force).¹¹⁶

The validation of the NRF and the 20,000 member force achieved full operational capability (FOC) that included Air, Land, Maritime, and Special Force elements operating in a coordinated manner to achieve the NRF mission.

¹¹⁵ NATO Launches Response Force. Available at <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/10/i031015.htm>. Internet; Accessed 16 March 2010.

¹¹⁶ As a member of the NRF, Major Bland was the Chief of Intelligence planning for NRF 7 and 8 as well as Exercise Steadfast Jaguar. 2006.

NRF Land Forces

A brigade-size land force, consisting of artillery, air defence, engineers, psychological operations units, and a mix of light infantry, comprise the NRF land force structure. NRF land forces are drawn from NATO high readiness units already established within the NATO command structure. For example; NRF 7 land forces were led by Euro Corps and NRF 8 was led by the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC) Turkey from Istanbul.¹¹⁷

NRF Air Forces

The NRF air forces provides the full range of air operational tasks, including anti-air warfare, precision-guided munitions operations, airborne electronic warning, and tactical airlift in order to support COM NRF missions. At FOC, NRF air elements comprised tactical assets from Component Command Air Ramstein (CC Air), the standing air component for JFC Brunssum.

NRF Maritime Forces

Full-spectrum maritime forces, including a sea-borne command element, are afforded to NATO in support of COM NRF missions. NRF maritime elements provide inherent air capabilities through helicopter operations and carrier strike group air forces. Maritime forces provide NATO with an agile and fully deployable force with surface warfare ships and sub-surface combatant submarines so as to force project to world events that require NATO intervention. At FOC, NRF maritime forces were provided by

¹¹⁷ NATO Response Force 7 and 8 Rotation available at http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_rotation.ppt; Internet; Accessed 20 March 2010.

Component Command Northwood, the standing maritime component to JFC Brunssum. Included in the maritime force structure are the Standing Maritime NRF Group and a sea-borne command and control platform. NRF 7 and 8 utilized the US command ship USS Mount Whitney as the command platform for COM DJTF to execute the tactical fight.¹¹⁸

With full accreditation of the NATO Response Force, the fully operational capable force is expected to be able to rapidly deploy, within 30 days, anywhere in the world. The types of missions that NRF is responsible to execute correspond with the NATO task list and include, but are not limited to crisis response (Sudan), consequence management (Haiti earthquakes), peace enforcement (Kosovo), non-combatant evacuation (Lebanon), and embargo operations (Operation Enduring Freedom). NRF is also expected to undertake high-intensity operations, such as initial entry operations (Ex Steadfast Jaguar) and support to counter-terror operations (Operation Enduring Freedom Maritime Operations support).¹¹⁹

At the 29 November 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, Latvia, the NATO Response Force was declared fully operational capable (FOC) to conduct all NATO missions.¹²⁰ This announcement was expected to herald in a new era in Alliance military force projection; however the NRF has experienced great difficulties in force generation since the announcement of FOC. Just eight months after the Riga Summit, SACEUR (General Bantz Craddock) informed the NATO Secretary General that the required forces

¹¹⁸ As a member of the NRF, Major Bland was the Chief of Intelligence planning for NRF 7 and 8 as well as Exercise Steadfast Jaguar. 2006.

¹¹⁹ NATO Response Force Expeditionary Capabilities. Available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/10-colorado/briefing02.pdf>. Internet; Accessed 20 March 2010.

¹²⁰ Riga Summit Declaration. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-84DC5419-7A16E0A5/natolive/official_texts_37920.htm?selectedLocale=en. Internet; Accessed 8 April 2010.

were not generated through the Alliance membership. With a 66% fill rate to the NRF Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), SACEUR made the realization that the NRF was incapable of conducting any of the seven generic NATO missions that the force was responsible to execute. In addition, subsequent NRF force projections were also not supported by the Alliance nations; therefore General Craddock removed the declaration of NRF FOC.¹²¹ The official statement from NATO was that the NRF was declared a “credible force” and the NRF has yet to regain the FOC designation. Although believed to be the cornerstone to future NATO successes, NRF force generation support was lacking from the Alliance membership. Without the full support of the 28 nations, the NRF will remain incapable to protect NATO interests and project Alliance military capabilities.

Conclusion – NATO Response Force

The ever-changing global security environment has forced NATO to continually transform to meet the challenges to provide collective security. The terrorist attacks on the United States introduced a greater threat to the Alliance and launched a war against a transnational enemy that is virtually invisible and extremely flexible. In the age of terror, the advent of the NRF is considered a key component of the Alliance transformation and the vision to the future relevance of NATO. The Atlantic Alliance will be continually challenged to field an expeditionary force to meet the challenges posed by the 21st century menace. In order for the NRF to remain agile, flexible, and deployable, the

¹²¹ Jens Ringsmose, Taking Stock of NATO’s Response Force; Research Division – NATO Defence College, Rome, No. 54 – January 2010. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-42E2C9C3-8722613F/natolive/opinions_8494.htm?selectedLocale=en. Internet; Accessed 10 April 2010.

member-nations must fully support the NRF with the forces and equipment required to execute NATO responsibilities. As a concept, the NRF provides a great resource to project Alliance objectives as a global player; however without the full support of the members, the NRF will likely fail and the relevance of NATO will once again be debated in the nations' capitals.

CHAPTER 8 – NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT – 2010

The successful development of the NRF is considered the cornerstone of NATO transformation since the beginning of the Global War on Terror. The fact that NATO was not utilized in the planning and execution of the invasion of Afghanistan has forced NATO to modify policies and procedures to meet the demands of the 21st century. NATO has reacted in a very proactive manner through its transformation initiatives. The creation of Allied Command Transformation (ACT), a shift in the strategic focus of NATO, a leaner command structure, and the formation of the NRF constitute revolutionary changes. However, the future of the Alliance will be judged by the contents within the new NATO Strategic Concept and the willingness of the nations to fully engage in the requirements to implement this grand strategy. The Secretary General of NATO has tasked a Group of Experts, chaired by the former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, to examine the future of NATO and propose recommendations for the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept.¹²²

During the 2009 NATO Summit, Alliance Heads of State proclaimed that NATO must continue to evolve in order to lead the Alliance into the future. They endorsed the Declaration on Alliance Security to ensure the continued adaptation of the Alliance to meet the challenges of the global security environment. The Summit Declaration insisted that the new NATO Strategic Concept must correspond to the drastic changes in global security since the issuance of the current NATO Strategic Concept, which was approved

¹²² Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. “*Security in an Uncertain World.*” Calgary, Alberta. April 2010.

at the 1999 Rome Summit.¹²³ The new NATO Strategic Concept is in the developmental stage and will be unveiled in the fourth quarter of 2010 during the NATO Summit Meeting in Lisbon, Portugal.¹²⁴ It can be expected that the Group of Experts will likely recommend an abundance of modifications to the old Strategic Concept, thereby limiting the ability of this thesis to address them all. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the new NATO Strategic Concept with a view to examine a number of the major issues that will guide the future of the Alliance. The Strategic Concept will be examined in a case study format through an analytical assessment of the military and political requirements that will prove successful for the future guiding framework. The case study will highlight the necessity for the member-nations to explicitly endorse the new NATO ideology and fully resource the capabilities required to execute Alliance objectives. In essence, the case study will examine the following issues that currently plague the Alliance:

1. What must the Alliance do to overcome the issues that have plagued NATO since the commencement of the Global War on Terror?
2. How must the Alliance members modify national interests in order to project NATO as a strong and powerful leader in the war on terror?

¹²³ NATO Strategic Concept. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_56626.htm. Internet; Accessed 20 March 2010.

¹²⁴ NATO Strategic Concept. <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/roadmap-strategic-concept.html>. Internet; Accessed 20 March 2010.

Building Towards Increased Global Security
“The Future of the North Atlantic Alliance”

At the outset of this thesis, a key theme highlighted the perceptions of those persons, such as Ted Galen Carpenter,¹²⁵ who described NATO as the “weak-link” in the provision of global security. As highlighted within this paper, sceptics of the trans-Atlantic Alliance need only to examine the history of NATO to appreciate the remarkable transformations that the Alliance has gone through to meet the ever-changing security requirements of the past 60 years. From the post-WWII conception of a political apparatus with a military structure to deter the threat of Communism, to the Global War on Terror, NATO has proven to be a legitimate alliance to defend western ideology through democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. This does not presume that NATO is without its share of problems as the Alliance matures into a new age of transformation to uphold western values and beliefs against an enemy that uses terror to defy the very existence of the Alliance philosophy. This thesis has highlighted the ability of NATO to continually transform to satisfy the historical and current requirements of the trans-Atlantic coalition; however it is the future actions of the 28 nations that will dictate Alliance relevance in the age of terror. This case study will detail main themes that the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept will likely address in order to preserve the solidarity of the Alliance and defeat the challenges that lay ahead.

¹²⁵ Ted Galen Carpenter, “Policy Analysis: NATO at 60.” in *A Hollow Alliance* (CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No 635 (March 30, 2009)).

“In every country, and at all times, we like to rely on certainty. But in a world of asymmetric threats and global challenges, our governments and peoples are uncertain about what the threats are and how they should face the complicated world before them.”¹²⁶

General (Retired) Klaus Naumann – Former German Chief of Defence and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

The above quote, by Dr. Klaus Naumann, highlights the state of the world since the attacks of 9/11. The rise to power of potential nuclear states, such as Iran, and the enormous increase in radical non-state actors has provided a degree of uncertainty that clouds the world. Individual nations do not possess the capabilities to overcome the threats that are posed in this uncertain world, therefore collective security remains the most viable avenue to alleviate the uncertainty that exists. The North Atlantic Alliance provides the international political organization with a military mandate that is capable of confronting the world of uncertainty, albeit further institutional changes are necessary in order to effectively execute the future of Alliance operations.

This case study will examine four main themes that have plagued the Alliance since the end of the Cold War and have been further highlighted since the events of 9/11. These Alliance issues, along with many others, will likely garner considerable debate as the delivery of the new NATO Strategic Concept approaches. In order to successfully move forward in the global security atmosphere that we currently face, the new NATO Strategic Concept will likely address the following tenants and members-states must provide full endorsement.

¹²⁶ Dr. Klaus Naumann General (ret), “Renewing Transatlantic Partnership.” in *Towards a Grand Strategy* (Luntenen, Germany: Noaber Foundation, 2007), Executive Summary.

1. How can an Alliance that works on the principle of consensus, stream-line the organizational decision-making process?
2. What can the Alliance do to improve upon resource commitments to military operations?
3. What processes must be initiated in order to improve burden-sharing amongst the Allies?
4. How can NATO make more efficient use of Command and Control?

Alliance Decision-Making Process

One can easily argue that there has never been a more successful alliance than NATO, which boasts a political decision-making body that approves, plans, and directs Alliance military operations on behalf of the member-states it represents. NATO symbolizes the grand leadership in collective defence and security, albeit there is no other similar alliance that currently exists. When all 28 nations of NATO unanimously consent to the deployment of a military force to execute security operations, it simply happens; however to enable all 28 nations to support the employment and sustainment of combat forces is often plagued with NATO bureaucratic details and individual national interests. If the Alliance continues to be burdened by bureaucracy, individual nations will continue to form their own alliances to defend western values. NATO bureaucracy and Alliance reluctance to approve combat missions provided the basis for the United States decision to execute Operation Enduring Freedom without a NATO mandate. NATO decision-making is hampered by processes that date back to the Cold War era, therefore emphasis

must be placed within the Strategic Concept to reverse this mind-set in decision-making and replace it with more robust methods to overcome defence and security challenges.¹²⁷

Issue One – Decisions by Consensus

Ultimately, and justifiably so, high level decisions are reserved for the North Atlantic Council through the consensus of the membership. The approval of the NATO mission into Afghanistan serves as a great example of the requirement for NAC consensus; however once the political leadership approves the mission and dictates the Alliance political objectives and rules of engagement, the operational commander must be provided with the resources and personnel to execute the mission. High-level consensus, such as the authority to approve military operations and commit national resources, must remain within the NAC, while taking into account the advice of the Military Committee. However lower-level decisions within subordinate NATO committees do not necessitate the requirement to undergo the process of consensus as this has the potential to hinder the successful outcomes of the mission.

Issue Two – Equally Weighted Votes on Decision-Making

The second issue of Alliance decision-making rests with the fact that each nation receives one vote that is considered equal in all respects. High fidelity Alliance issues emanating from ISAF HQ permits an equal vote to those nations that are contributing very little to the mission. Conversely, those nations that are accepting the bulk of the risk and providing the majority of the finances to execute the mission are not afforded

¹²⁷ Dr. Klaus Naumann General (ret), “Renewing Transatlantic Partnership.” in *Towards a Grand Strategy* (Luntenen, Germany: Noaber Foundation, 2007), 125.

additional leverage in the decision-making process. A prime example of equal votes on high-level decisions was envisioned in 2007 when a small NATO nation broke silence¹²⁸ on the key issue of inherent NATO “Full Motion Video” capability, a key enabler in the fight against the insurgency in Afghanistan. Although the commitment of this nation to the Alliance efforts in Afghanistan is greatly respected, the small European nation provides very few forces (no combat forces) to the ISAF campaign. Within the NATO mandate, this national delegation carried the same weight on this decision as did the United States, Canada, The United Kingdom, and The Netherlands, who are facing the lion's share of the risk and paying for their commitment in the blood of their soldiers.

Strategic Concept Resolution – Alliance Decision-Making

The issue of consensus decision-making will almost certainly remain contentious within the Alliance; however, it is highly likely that the “*group of experts*” will propose changes in order to stream-line NATO decisions. In all likelihood, the Strategic Concept will address decision-making by adopting a method whereby decision-making by consensus is only accomplished at the NAC level on decisions of *political* importance. Lower level committees, where a great majority of the critical work is accomplished, must be afforded the ability to make decisions without the requirement for consensus of the members. This is not meant to infringe upon the ability of an Alliance member to veto an important political issue. It is designed to allow for lower-level committees to make decisions on NAC approved issues that pose no political impact to any of the Alliance members. This will ensure that NATO bureaucracy is mitigated, national

¹²⁸ To “break silence” on a decision within NATO means that the nation does not support the motion that has been presented.

agendas are prevented, and issues that require immediate decisions can be promulgated in a time-effective manner.

“...there is no need for unanimous decisions at all subordinate levels... If there are occasions on which allies disagree, the reasons for disagreement will, in the end, always be political in nature... therefore, be brought to the only body that can take political decisions in NATO – the NATO Council.”¹²⁹

The Concept must also address the issue of equal vote for each of the member-states. The decision to give weight to the vote of the nations that accept the most risk and provide the equipment and resources will be more difficult to approve into the Concept; however, the Alliance should examine the prospects of eliminating the votes of those nations that have no stake in issues that require NATO endorsement.¹³⁰ If the political leaders of an Alliance nation decide that they will not commit forces to the NATO Response Force, then those nations should be limited in the decisions to deploy and employ the force. Equally weighted voting within the Alliance can be easily overcome, however it will mean that each member-nation fully commits to the resource and personnel requirements for approved NATO operations.

Alliance Resource Commitment

Approvals for NATO military deployments are often decreed without the foresight of the necessary resource allocation and personnel requirements to fulfill the mandate of the mission. Through the Joint Operational Planning Process, military

¹²⁹ Dr. Klaus Naumann General (ret), “Renewing Transatlantic Partnership.” in *Towards a Grand Strategy* (Luntenen, Germany: Noaber Foundation, 2007), 124-125.

¹³⁰ Dr. Klaus Naumann General (ret), *Renewing Transatlantic Partnership...*, 125 and 126.

planners conduct war-game scenarios in order to determine the optimal resources and force structures required to achieve the Alliance objectives.¹³¹ Once the operational Commander develops the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), the plan is sent to higher HQ for strategic approval and political endorsement. At the strategic level, requests for the resources and the personnel are sent to the troop contributing nations (TCN). As agreed to by all members of the Alliance, the individual nations are responsible to provide the personnel, resources, and financial commitments to support the missions that are approved through the NAC; however the onus has often been shifted back to the Alliance leadership to plea for support.

Issue 1 – National Commitment to Resource the NATO Force

Although every Alliance nation must approve a NATO mission through the NAC, the commitment for resources and personnel is often lacking. A current example of an under-resourced NATO operation is ISAF; the most important issue on the current Alliance agenda and the *raison-d’etre* for the negative attitude towards NATO. The past four ISAF Commanders have begged the TCNs to provide operationally-essential helicopters and much needed combat forces to operate in the volatile regions of the Southern and Eastern provinces of Afghanistan. The requirement was not resourced by any of the TCNs; however in 2009, the United States deployed combat forces and medium-lift helicopters in order to execute NATO operations in Afghanistan.

¹³¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Guideline for Operational Planning Version 2005.

Issue 2 – Resource Commitment

With the exception of a few NATO nations, the ability to deploy and sustain expeditionary forces over a longer period of time is lacking. NATO developed the NRF to execute expeditionary operations; however the newly developed NRF is also poorly resourced as nations are already over-committed to other military operations that are in the national interest, but also serve the wider interests of NATO as an international political body.

“Just last week, I met with the NATO Secretary General and he asked me what Canada was prepared to commit to the NATO Response Force? My response was that Canada’s commitment to the NRF is deployed in Haiti providing humanitarian relief.”¹³²
General Natynczyk – Chief of Defence Staff - Canada

General Natynczyk was commenting on the fact that Haiti was a global issue and required the military resources to support this humanitarian catastrophe, a key task that is within the mandate of the NRF. The Canadian mission to Haiti was in the Canadian interests; however it should also have been in the interests of the Alliance. The comments by the Canadian CDS highlight the fact that military resources are scarce and actions need to be swift in order to be successful and make a difference.

Strategic Concept Resolution - Alliance Resource Commitment

Although burden-sharing will be discussed later in this chapter, the central issues surrounding resource commitments and burden-sharing are considered to be interconnected. Due to the very high profile events of resource constraints in the Afghan

¹³² General Walter Natynczyk spoke to the Canadian Forces College Joint Command and Staff Programme. Feb 2010.

area of operations, it can be perceived that the new NATO Strategic Concept will highlight the requirement for Alliance members to fully endorse the resource and personnel requirements to execute NATO military operations. The Concept must also reiterate that it is a necessity for each nation to equally accept resource responsibilities in order to defend the interests of the Alliance. Equal acceptance of resource responsibilities does not necessarily mean the allocation of combat forces from every nation. Conversely, it does not excuse those nations that cannot put boots on the ground. Equal acceptance of resource responsibilities can take the shape of equipment, finances, or soldiers to execute the Alliance mission.

Once the NAC approves a NATO mission, the nations must be prepared to commit the appropriate resources to enable success. Member approval of the mission must come with explicit consent of the national resources in order to enable the operational planning to analyse the appropriate force structure, finances, and resource requirements.

Burden-Sharing within the Alliance

In the midst of a genuine threat during the Cold War and the need for the European Allies to rebuild and re-arm after the devastation of WWII, the burden of military requirements was bestowed upon the United States. This is simply not the case in 21st century collective security as the European nations have recovered economically and the threat from the Soviet Union dissipated more than two decades ago. NATO remains caught in the Cold War as the nations that contribute the bulk of the equipment and personnel must also carry the burden of the costs to execute security operations.

Throughout the history of NATO, the United States has provided the majority of finances, personnel, and equipment to conduct operations on behalf of the Alliance; however, the Alliance future will likely not succeed if this formula continues.

NATO is currently facing its greatest challenge in Afghanistan and burden-sharing amongst the Alliance members is straining the relationships between the nations. National caveats have incensed the debate surrounding burden-sharing, particularly the lack of support by some nations to accept direct combat roles in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, where success or failure of the mission, and likely the Alliance, will be decided.

Strategic Concept Resolution - Burden-Sharing

It is inconceivable to think that the new Strategic Concept will not address burden-sharing amongst the Alliance members. There are two major issues that the Strategic Concept will likely address; fiscal responsibility by all members and overall commitment, without national caveats, to the missions that have been approved by the NAC.

Within the new Concept, NATO will need to restructure the methods that are currently used to finance the missions that the Alliance undertakes. The old adage of “costs lie where they fall” will simply not continue to appease the nations that contribute the majority of the resources and accept the highest of risks.¹³³ In Afghanistan, those nations that are conducting operations in the South and the East are underwriting the costs to achieve the NATO mission on behalf of all of the other nations who have not

¹³³ Dr. Klaus Naumann General (ret), “Renewing Transatlantic Partnership.” in *Towards a Grand Strategy* (Luntenen, Germany: Noaber Foundation, 2007), 128.

fully committed to the mission or have chosen to limit operations to areas with less risk. In order to overcome this fiscal imbalance, it is imperative for NATO to develop a financial structure to ensure that all nations are held fiscally responsible for the operations that the Alliance approves. The Concept should address the issue of common funding to be achieved for all Alliance operations. Common funding will remove the financial burden away from the individual nation and put the onus on the entire membership to equally share the costs associated with NATO operations.

The second issue of burden-sharing that the Concept is likely to address is the insistence of national caveats by individual nations. National caveats limit the ability of the in-theatre commander to move forces and execute operations in the most efficient manner. Nations must be prepared to accept missions without restrictions; however if national caveats are required, they need to be issued prior to the planning of operations. In this manner, the force structure can be adjusted to meet the requirements to enable the success of the mission. Without national caveats, the operational commander has the ability to concentrate the force in a manner that produces the greatest results. In some cases, national caveats are introduced due to national laws and therefore, NATO must be in a position to accept the forces with some restrictions or search for alternate nations to fill the resource requirement.

The future of the Alliance is being tested by the war in Afghanistan; however it may be the internal conflict that causes its demise. Until all member-nations accept the burden of military operations, the Alliance will continue to be challenged. The new NATO Strategic Concept is the opportunity for the nations to rise to the challenge and meet the demands associated with global security.

Command and Control

NATO command of the war in Afghanistan has highlighted command and control deficiencies that were not completely evident in the pre-9/11 era. There are no discrepancies at the very top of the Alliance as the NAC provides the political guidance to the Military Committee (MC). The MC then converts the political guidance into a military campaign and guides the mission to a successful outcome. Command and control becomes fragmented at the lower levels of operational command and tactical execution. ISAF provides the finest example of how command and control can be misunderstood in the NATO environment.

COM ISAF, a Four Star US General, is appointed the operational commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan. The higher level HQ for ISAF is located at Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC B), The Netherlands. The JFC B commander is a Four Star equivalent German General who has been given the responsibility of operational command of ISAF. Finally, the strategic commander is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who is also a Four Star US General, located in Belgium. The main argument by some nations is that they see no effective use of a duplicate layer of operational command located away from the area of operations.¹³⁴

The fact that there is an operational level headquarters situated in the command structure between ISAF HQ and SACEUR seems redundant and provides very little operational efficiency. Unity of command is required for an operational commander to productively affect the battle-space in a manner that leads to the successful attainment of Alliance objectives. The maturity of ISAF into a Four Star HQ has enabled COM ISAF

¹³⁴ Conference of Defence Associations Institute; 2010. 49. Security in an Uncertain World. "A Canadian Perspective on NATO's New Strategic Concept."

to take strategic direction and produce tactical results – in essence provide the operational art required to win the military campaign. Although operational execution may be directed by the in-theatre commander, there remains resource management and force generation issues that are absorbed within the cumbersome NATO command structure.

Strategic Concept Resolution - Command and Control

It is highly unlikely that the Strategic Concept will make drastic changes to the NATO command structure as the Joint Force Commands at Brunssum and Naples have other responsibilities outside of Afghanistan and Kosovo. JFC Brunssum and JFC Naples provide the command element for the NATO Response Force on a rotational basis and the two headquarters have other standing NATO requirements, such as the NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM – I) to train police and military officers. What the Strategic Concept could initiate is the requirement for a more robust force generation policy that authorises the in-theatre commander to request forces and equipment directly to SHAPE, who is the direct liaison with the troop contributing nations.

ISAF is unlike any mission that the Alliance ever thought possible before 9/11. The uncertain world of today continues to provide an enormous challenge to western democracy. It is highly likely that NATO will be tasked with great security challenges in the future and a robust command and control will be required. If ISAF has taught the Alliance anything, it should be that unity of command is essential to the successful attainment of military objectives. The fact that there is an operational level headquarters between ISAF and SACEUR has only caused undue strain upon the mission; however, there lies a vital mission of force generation and long-term campaign planning that would

necessitate an operational headquarters away from the theatre of operations. In the case of ISAF HQ, JFC Brunssum is an ideal HQ to force generate, campaign plan, and augment with staff that examine the operation on a daily basis. As compared to the staff at ISAF HQ who deploy for 6 months, the staff at JFC Brunssum are positioned at Brunssum for 3 to 5 years and have the capacity to fully understand the ISAF mission over a prolonged period of time. This approach does not take away from the fact that unity of command must rest with the ISAF commander; however, it should alleviate some of the long-term requirements to win a protracted war against an enemy that is very capable and motivated to defeat the Alliance.

Conclusion – NATO Strategic Concept – 2010

There is no doubt that the Alliance is facing many challenges and that there are many skeptics who will continue to challenge the viability of the transnational partnership. The unveiling of the new Strategic Concept will mark the future for the Alliance and lead 28 nations into a period where non-state actors will likely continue to provide a threat that is difficult to detect and defeat. The Concept will tackle many more issues than were discussed in this case study; however, some of the main themes, such as burden-sharing, decision-making, and command and control will highlight the future of NATO. Without full endorsement from the 28 nations, the Alliance will likely move in one of two directions; it will collapse or it will be dismissed by future coalitions of the willing.

CONCLUSION – NATO IN THE POST 9/11 ERA

Since the creation of NATO in 1949, the global security environment has continually evolved. Just as the world was waking up to the defeat of the Nazi regime, the battle between the two global super-powers commenced as communism and democracy would keep the world on the verge of nuclear devastation for four decades. Within the Cold War years, Vietnam and Korea erupted into civil wars that propelled western ideology against communist aggression. The end of the Cold War brought great uncertainty as the bipolar era was reduced to a single superpower to police the world and the demise of the Iron Curtain initiated a distinctive period of warfare that saw ethnic warfare in the Balkans and Africa while the turn of the 21st century brought about the age of terror. The past 60 years have been filled with turmoil, conflict, and a world of uncertainty; however the main constant has always been a continually evolving NATO alliance to meet the changing security environment and lead the trans-Atlantic alliance. The fact that NATO was initialized as a security institution, and not just a military structure, played a key role in the survival of the Alliance. Although the Alliance has changed greatly over the years, its value as a collective security arrangement continues to guide the 28 nation coalition as NATO engages in the fight against terrorism.

Although NATO has continually adapted to revolutionary changes in warfare, the terrorist attacks against Washington and New York City fundamentally changed the international perception of security and precipitated the modification of the NATO strategic focus. Al Qaeda spoke loudly on September 11th and the world listened; essentially forcing a necessary wake-up call to NATO while galvanizing a common response to counter these acts of aggression. International peace and security on the

European and North American continents is predicated upon the mitigation of the terror threat which originates beyond the traditional area of responsibility for the Alliance. This posed a great problem for NATO which was frozen in an era of Cold War military infrastructure. In the days following the attacks, the Alliance military structure was unable to react to the newest strategic threat to western democracy. Not unlike the past 60 years, NATO, once again, commenced the transformation process. NATO would require further and more drastic changes in order to become relevant in the defence of the Alliance against those non-state actors that pursue aggression through terrorism and those nation-states that provide support to execute these operations.

NATO transformation was set into motion during the Prague Summit of 2002 when the Alliance Heads of State declared that NATO would transform to meet the global security challenges stemming from the terror attacks against the United States.

The Prague Summit Declarations states:

Terrorism, which we categorically reject and condemn in all of its forms and manifestations, poses a grave and growing threat to Alliance populations, forces and territory, as well as to international security. We are determined to combat this scourge for as long as necessary. To combat terrorism effectively, our response must be multi-faceted and comprehensive.¹³⁵

The Alliance leadership acted upon the promises made in the Prague Declaration; however there is still much more to accomplish in order to maintain Alliance relevance in the defence of NATO interests.

¹³⁵ Prague Summit Declaration. Available at www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm. Internet; Accessed 30 March 2010.

As argued within this thesis, NATO has dutifully and responsibly commenced the response to counter the global terror threat by shifting its strategic focus to include a more flexible and deployable force that can effectively execute operations outside of the traditional NATO sphere of influence. With full support from Alliance members, the NATO Response Force provides the focal point towards Alliance transformation as the fully operational force has the potential to provide NATO with combat-capable forces that can project military power on a global scale. If the nations continue to fall short of the CJSOR requirements, NATO political and military objectives will not be possible to achieve. The Alliance Concept for the Defence Against Terrorism highlights the shift in strategic focus as NATO assumed command responsibility of the ISAF mission and modernized the formation of its operational command with a leaner and more efficient Joint Force Command structure. NATO has utilized the components of the Prague Capabilities Commitment and Allied Command Transformation in order to establish the frameworks associated with the revised military capabilities.

Numerous facets of further NATO transformation will be addressed within the upcoming Strategic Concept, but few more important than the four shortfalls discussed within the case study of this thesis. The Alliance has historically been plagued by lack of timely decision-making due to the rule of consensus amongst the members. The reality of the current threat dictates that decisions must follow a more efficient approach where majority rules and weighted emphasis of the decisions are granted to the nations most affected. Resource commitments and burden-sharing amongst the members remains an issue of great contention that the Alliance must resolve in order to move forward. Nations must fully commit to approved NATO operations so as to ensure Alliance

resolve and successfully execute the mission. Lastly, NATO command and control requires further scrutiny in order to provide unity of command to the in-theatre commander, remove national caveats, and eliminate the requirement for a second layer of operational headquarters located on the European continent. As described within the case study, there remains a necessity for the Joint Force Commands in The Netherlands and Italy to command NRF and execute NATO standing military requirements. These issues, and many others, will likely be addressed within the new NATO Strategic Concept. The future of the Alliance is at stake unless the member-nations fully accept and endorse these far-reaching, yet very achievable, changes. A NATO alliance with effective leadership and full member support will be essential to defeat terrorism, remain relevant, and prevail against the security challenges of the 21st century.

Further Research for an Improved Alliance

On a global scale, the western values and interests of NATO have been successfully projected through the political/military institution that was initially developed during the conception of NATO in 1949. As the global security environment continues to evolve, the Alliance will also need to advance in order to combat the future threat. The advent of the “Group of Experts” to develop the new Strategic Concept provides an excellent method to gain consensus within the Alliance on how to overcome the issues of security concerns; however, future editions of the Concept should be proactive and not reactive to world events. In order for NATO to continually broaden its sphere of security influence, the Alliance should consider the “Group of Experts” as a permanent committee within the Trans-Atlantic structure. The group would represent all

nations and continually examine the issues surrounding world-wide peace and security with an emphasis to maintain an up to date Strategic Concept. The group would provide continual advice to the NAC on issues of strategic importance and work within the mandate prescribed by the nations. This approach would provide practical measures to evolving issues and it would also eliminate the need for hasty reactions to world events.

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