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MANAGEMENT DEFENSE STUDIES

Canadian Forces Transformation – Unification Round 2

By / par Major Darrell A Russel

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ABSTRACT

The Chief of Defense (CDS) General Hillier produced a CDS Planning Guidance in 2005 that stated *“Our military will become more effective, relevant, and responsive, and its profile and ability to provide leadership at home and abroad will be increased. The CF will become more effective by better integrating maritime, land, air and special operations forces. The CF will become more relevant, both at home and abroad, by adapting its capabilities and force structure to deal with threats that arise from the kind of instability that we have seen abroad, especially in failed states. The CF will become more responsive by enhancing its ability to act quickly in the event of crises, whether in Canada or around the world. The transformation of the CF will focus on the establishment of new integrated (joint) organization and structures, including a unified national command and control system. These goals demand that the CF move beyond traditional thinking to adopt a fully integrated and unified approach to operations”* As a result new commands were created such as Canada Command (CANCOM), Canadian Force Command (CEFCOM), Special Operation Forces Command (SOFOM) and Canada Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM). Has the introduction of these new commands created a chain of command that addresses and links C2 from the Strategic to Operational to Tactical level? Does it address “Joint” capability recognizing the unification of the Canadian Forces within the tri-service model? Has it created efficiencies or inefficiencies with command and control transformation? How does it address the too many Headquarter plethora created within the CF? Do we truly have one CF as identified by government policy with regards to unification? This paper will examine CF transformation by defining its definition. This will be followed by comparing transformation to unification understanding the history behind massive change within the CF and it’s Command and Control Structure. This paper will show how transformation as it was designed by the former CDS, General Hillier, is just another waypoint in the unification process. It will show where transformation is coming up short and make recommendations to address the issue. At the same time the paper will show how we can learn from others, specifically our American partners to the South. Transformation while headed in the right direction needs examination to provide “smooth sailing”, “straight flying”, “road running” joint capability building in order to be effective into the 21st Century.

INTRODUCTION

The former Chief of Defense (CDS) General Hillier produced a CDS Planning Guidance in 2005 that called for a variety of CDS Action Plans. Directly from the vision statement of his planning guidance he states

Our military will become more effective, relevant, and responsive, and its profile and ability to provide leadership at home and abroad will be increased. The CF will become more effective by better integrating maritime, land, air and special operations forces. The CF will become more relevant, both at home and abroad, by adapting its capabilities and force structure to deal with threats that arise from the kind of instability that we have seen abroad, especially in failed states. The CF will become more responsive by enhancing its ability to act quickly in the event of crises, whether in Canada or around the world. The transformation of the CF will focus on the establishment of new integrated (joint) organization and structures, including a unified national command and control system. These goals demand that the CF move beyond traditional thinking to adopt a fully integrated and unified approach to operations.¹

In order for his guidance to be achieved, General Hillier laid out his campaign plan with four lines of operations. The first line of operation set out to review the C2 of the Canadian Forces' (CF) at the strategic and operational levels. The second line would dealt with Force Development and Force Generation models that should be integrated to meet the operational needs of the new defence policy and CF vision. In particular, the second line was to remedy the acquisition process which senior leadership realizes is currently incapable of a joint or general-purpose approach to the acquisition of major pieces of equipment or capability.² The third line took a critical look at the CF current

¹ General R. J. Hillier, "CDS Planning Guidance - CF Transformation, 1950-9 (CT)," http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/cft-tfc/00native/cds-planning-guidance_e.pdf (30 November 2005).

² Ibid, p.2

operational construct. Finally the fourth line of operation was for this transformation initiative to take a whole of defence approach.³


For the first time in decades, a CDS (General Hillier) was empowered by government and supported through policy to make changes that would involve increases to manpower and equipment. The key government documents that have allowed transformation to occur in recent years includes the International Policy Statement 2005, released by the Liberal government and the Conservative Party's Canada First Defense Strategy signed by Prime Minister Stephan Harper and announced on 12 May 2008. Empowered from the International Policy Statement, General Hillier embarked on a bold transformation plan with the ambition of reviewing and transforming the Command and Control C2 structure beginning with the strategic Headquarters (HQ). After amending his own staff, the Joint (J) Staff within National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), he would mandate that a national operationally focused HQ be developed for both domestic and international operations. Further, based on geography and the division of Federal and Provincial politics he mandated regional Joint Task Force (JTF) to be developed. Ambitious but determined, his planned C2 structure was aimed at making the CF more responsive to crises within Canada and abroad while unifying command at the national level. Knowing that service parochialism still existed, General Hillier was quick to end his guidance with the statement: "These goals demand that the CF to move beyond traditional thinking to adopt a fully integrated and unified approach to operations". In doing so, he spoke to the creation of regional JTF HQs that will be discussed later in this paper.

³ Brigadier-General G. W. Nordic, "Can the CF Develop Viable National Joint Capabilities" In *Canadian Army Journal*, Vol. 8.2, Summer 2005), p. 66.

With General Hillier now retired, the job of continuing transformation belongs to the current CDS, General Walter Natynczuk. The second document mentioned above, the Canada First Defence Strategy, empowers the current CDS to continue down this path of transformation. From the Canada First Defence Strategy comes the commitment of government funding balanced across the four pillars of a modern first class military for the 21st Century:

The *Canada First Defence Strategy* is based on an extensive and rigorous analysis of the risks and threats facing Canada in the years to come, as well as the government's vision for defence. Through stable and predictable defence funding, including balanced investments across the four pillars upon which military capabilities are built – personnel, equipment, readiness and infrastructure – the Strategy will increase the size of the Forces and replace their core capabilities. It also presents unprecedented opportunities for Canadian industry in its reach for global excellence.⁴

Figure 1 below identifies the four pillars that transformation aims to build upon. This paper examines CF transformation to see if and how all four pillars have been addressed and where shortfalls may exist.



Source: Canada First Defence Strategy 2006

Figure 1: Four Pillars upon which Military Capabilities are Built

⁴ Privy Council Office Canada, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, [2006]).

Among the biggest problems with any transformation is having a clear understanding what exactly is trying to be achieved. Certainly there are many interpretations of the lexicons used when big changes are attempted. As Confucius once said:

If language is not correct, then what is said is not meant; if what is said is not what is meant, then what must be done remains undone; if this remains undone, morals and art will deteriorate; if justice goes astray, the people will stand about in helpless confusion. Hence there must be no arbitrariness in what is said. This matters above everything.

Confucius

In order to examine current transformation, this paper defines the lexicons like transformation, unification, integrated, combined and joint. This allows for a more conscientious overview when examining transformation with what has or has not been achieved.

When examining transformation and weighing its success, it is worthwhile reviewing past principles to compare what went wrong and how lessons learned can and should be applied. Given the major changes to the C2 structure that occurred during unification and comparing to current transformation, service parochialism still today causes delay and confusion in the process. Certainly many have compared General Hillier's transformation to Minister Paul Hellyer's unification in the 1960s. Brigadier-General Daniel Gosselin and Professor Craig Stone present an explanation of the differences in an argument meant to ensure that the reader is better educated, understanding that the circumstances surrounding the two men were much different.⁵

⁵ Daniel Gosselin and Craig Stone, "from Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the Fundamental Differences between the Unification of the Canadian Forces and its Present Transformation," *Canadian Military Journal* 6, no. 4 (Winter 2005-2006).

Although there were major differences surrounding transformation during the two eras, similarities show that both men were trying to transform the military. Transformation, particularly with the changes to C2, in regards to unification is an ongoing process.

In regard to current transformation, Hillier's four lines of operations have not been achieved in terms of his set objectives. In order to attain the objectives set out for the first line of operation General Hillier, through his CDS Action Teams (CAT), conducted a review of the strategic and operational C2 of NDHQ. Upon accepting the job of CDS he quickly came to realize that his staff within NDHQ provided him with functional command intertwined with civilian, military operational command. His guidance was to unify the national C2 system. In order to understand the problems associated with NDHQ and its ability to provide C2 to the CF as a whole, this paper examines the history of the NDHQ.

In comparison the unification process between 1964 and 1968 was very controversial and commenced a transformation viewed by many, particularly in the Conservative Party ranks as a downward spiral for the CF. However, there were positives that can clearly be linked to current transformation. Unification certainly caused Canada, perhaps accidentally, to truly be at the forefront of innovation in unifying a country's military machine. Unlike other Countries, Canada began a process of unified command and control toward a joint culture: "In fact interest in the scheme was considerable and a number of leaders from other countries visited Ottawa to be briefed on

the workings of unification.”⁶ At the time when Hellyer was trying to implement this type of change was when:

strongly held organization attitude is that ultimate unification is largely irrelevant because the elements of combat – land, sea, or air – are already predetermined and pose insuperable obstacles to any common military activity. The military skills required to master the technology of combat in any one of these elements, be it flying an aircraft, commanding a vessel, or directing a land battle with ground troops, already require many years of training to master. Hence neither enlisted men nor officers can be thought of as completely interchangeable parts.

However, to counter this argument Kronenberg in 1973 wrote:

The obvious gaps and weaknesses in this argument can be countered by a more sophisticated version of it. The greater interplay of the armed services in combined operations, the need for the senior military to be aware of the problems and capabilities of the different services, and the growth of technological combat systems appear to be eroding the elemental foundations of the three services are all recognized.

Recognized thirty some years ago, why did service parochialism inevitably continue to cause delay and hamper change. The terms have changed, perhaps in an attempt to dissuade parochialism, but the new culture recognized by most allied countries transforming is that of a joint culture. Although service parochialisms continue to delay progress, the inevitable path of transformation is Joint and Integrated. An examination of the past will show how parochialisms have always been prevalent in transformation but with the right leadership can be overcome.

The three service chiefs during Hellyer’s tenure were certainly discontented with the construct of a C2 that would see having the military represented with one commander. This would remove their direct access with the minister. Overriding this

⁶ Vernon J. Kronenberg, *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972* (31 Wellesley Street East, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs 1973, 1973), p. 101.

was Hellyer's aggressive leadership style in which one of the initial aims of having one CDS was to better integrate government and military. The introduction of NDHQ in 1972 would see further integration of civilian (DND) and military staff. However, at the same time it removed the CDS from being able to affect operations and typically allowed for component commanders to divert from a unified command and control structure. Upon review, CAT 1 recommended that a separation between strategic and operational command. In order for the CDS to be an effective commander the CAT teams recommended the creation of national operational commands that would effectively separate responsibility of Force Generation and Force Employment. Force Employment would belong to those commands overseeing operations and Force Generation would belong to the Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS). This achieves General Hillier's second line of operation by dealing with Force Development and Force Generation models by creating joint operational headquarters at the national and regional level exercising joint culture and C2 for domestic and international operations. Although this process has paved the way for a truly unified command, parochialisms continue to hamper the process.

In building a more responsive and effective CF, the first pillar, that of "personal" was perhaps the General Hillier's biggest change and challenge in terms of transformation. General Hillier wanted to create a C2 structure that provides effective operational C2. As a result, he ordered a review of the current command and control structure of the CF. The review was conducted by CAT, consisting of senior officers across the three services with a mandate of providing recommendations for transformation of the CF C2. CAT 1 review resulted in the creation of a joint strategic

staff dedicated and responsive to the CDS for effective C2 of the CF. The review also recommended the separation of strategic and operational commands and as a result new commands such as Canada Command (CANCOM), Canadian Forces Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), Special Operation Forces Command (SOFCOM) and Support Command (SUPCOM). Creation of these new commands created a chain of command that addresses and links effective C2 from the Strategic to Operational to the Tactical Level.

The original unification of the CF by way of mandating the integration of the three services provided for a National HQ that was intrinsically unified but was functional rather than operational. The process of unification continues with transformation. This time around, the military is more prone to adopt a joint culture; however, service parochialisms remain. In order to achieve the second line of operation in terms of turning the stove-piped service acquisition into joint acquisition and capability will require a true joint culture change and a joint “guerilla”.⁷ One way of ensuring that a military transforms is through strong leadership advocating a joint culture. Joint culture can be emphasized through joint policy, doctrine and training establishment.

While unification provided for one commander in chief for the CF, transformation through the creation of CEFCOM and CANCOM has provided the CDS with joint operational staffs overseeing operations at home and abroad. As a result, the concept of force employment and force generation has evolved by providing a distinct separation of responsibility and accountability. The employment of forces from a national perspective

⁷ General Beare, Commander of CFD in his presentation to the College suggested that perhaps the CF needs a Joint “Guerilla” for integrating Joint Doctrine of the three services.

for expeditionary forces is responsibility of CEFCOM while domestically it belongs to CANCOM. The three service chiefs have been relegated to the responsibility for force generation. For this to be effective the CDS has on several occasions stated the need for a CF joint culture. With the many aspects of change with transformation, the chiefs of environments, in many instances, have occasionally stepped across the boundaries of responsibility. The restructure of headquarters nationally and regionally have made the force more effective. At the same time, service parochialisms have created a plethora of headquarters and the desire to keep control. The creation of Regional Joint Force Headquarters was designed to further optimize the operational effectiveness of the military by aligning and assigning each region the responsibility of integrating with their provincial governments. For domestic operations, this arrangement greatly enhances the ability of joint forces to react in crisis. However, again service parochialism and the need to maintain control of certain headquarters brought some doubt as to the efficiency and effectiveness desired. The shortfalls of transformation in terms of the third line of operation in Hillier's campaign plan which was to have a critical look at the operational construct of the CF as to how best to ensure a joint culture.

Finally, joint has been used to describe the type of relationship required by servicemen and capability in order for a force of the 21st century to be effective and efficient and has also been identified as the way of the future. This paper will show how lessons learned from the United States who are arguably leading the way in transformation and Joint Doctrine can help to identify and correct some of the shortfalls in Canada. As was identified by General Stuart Beare, Commander of Canadian Forces Development, what the CF needs is a Joint "Gorilla". Only in this past year has the CF

identified the requirement for a joint doctrine organization. In the United States, the joint “gorilla” has already been identified through the creation of the Chairman Joint Chief of Staffs (CJCS) and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). JFCOM has the responsibility to force generate Joint Forces from across the services with a mandate of providing those forces for operations domestically and abroad. Further JFCOM is responsible for the production of Joint Doctrine. Until this past year Joint Doctrine within the CF was not easily recognizable or identifiable. Lessons learned from our partners can help us better understand the employment and generation of forces in the Joint Force construct as well as suggest recommendations for the way ahead.

In examining the effectiveness of transformation past and present we can determine a path of correctness. First, it is imperative that we properly define the definitions associated with transformation. As these definitions are commonly misinterpreted and used in different context it is import to at least understand the definition taken by the author as to follow the flow from unification to transformation.

CHAPTER ONE – DEFINING TRANSFORMATION

DEFINITIONS

In order to provide more clarity to the questions that come from examining transformation, one needs to provide proper definitions for many of the terms used, such as joint, integrated, interoperable, combined, unification and transformation. As the first point, it is worth examining the fact that even the leadership of the Canadian Forces (CF) tends to use these terms in different contexts that can often cause confusion about what is meant. The current vision from the Chief of Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk, describes “[t]he key to this more effective, relevant and responsive force is the

transformation process on which the Canadian Forces are now embarked.”

Transformation involves:

- adopting a fully integrated and unified approach to operations, by
 - transforming their command structure, which will include changing how they organize themselves for operations, thereby enhancing their ability to deploy at home and abroad, and
 - establishing fully integrated units capable of a timely, focused and effective response to foreign or domestic threats to Canadian security.
- evaluate their force structure on an ongoing basis to ensure that capabilities remain relevant
- improve coordination with other government departments and interoperability with allied forces, particularly the United States, through smart investments in evolving technology and doctrinal concepts, training opportunities, and exchange and liaison programs.

From this small excerpt we can see how terms such as *integrated and unified approach to operations*, *integrated unit*, *coordinated government activities* and *interoperability*, are terms that can be used and interpreted differently which can result in confusion.

In Allan English’s *Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and*

Concepts he describes how *confusion in terminology can lead to confusion in thought*:

One of the biggest problems with trying to understand and apply the terms most frequently used in the debate about the future of war is that there are a number of different interpretations of these terms, and that there is, as yet, no overarching theory to link them together⁸

Further, he quotes Andrew Krepinevich, a leading commentator on military affairs and a member of the United States 1997 National Defense Panel:

One of the problems with the transformation effort is that, three years into it, there is not a clear understanding at the pentagon of what the term

⁸ Allan English and others, *Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives - Context and Concepts* (Kingston: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2005). p.

means.... It's become more a generic buzzword for the ill-focused change.⁹

Retired Colonel Richard D. Downie states “[a]s military, interagency, and multi-national operations become more complex and integrated, we need to say what we mean...Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Richard Myers, USAF, has taken an important step to clarify some terms...” and “also mentions the requirement for standardization across the joint force to maximize effectiveness...and one of the first-and-easiest-things we can standardize is the terminology”¹⁰

Some of the key terminology must be understood as defined here using historic references and current doctrine. Vernon J Kronenberg’s as far back as 1973 noted that the terms unification and integration are not interchangeable and often misused:¹¹

“Unification means the merging of the armed forces and their supporting structures into a single organization with a unitary hierarchy.”¹² Integration is something which stops short of unification. At the very least it means devising structures that enhance coordination between the Department of National Defence, government and its agencies. This definition of integration suits the CF Transformation plan, as it can also be used to describe the aims of a “Whole of Government approach”. Canada’s International Policy Statement and the CDS vision for transformation states that the CF must become fully integrated with a variety of Federal, Provincial, local Government Departments and

⁹ Thomas E. Ricks and Josh White, "Scope of Change in Military is Ambiguous," *Washington Post* 2004.

¹⁰ Richard D. Downie, "Defining Integrated Operations," *United States Joint Force Quarterly*, no. Issue 38 (3rd Quarter 2005), p. 10.

¹¹ Kronenberg, *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972*

¹² *Ibid.*, p.9

Agencies and non-Government organizations.¹³ Integrated operations are defined by General Meyers of the US forces as to highlight the participation of entities other than military forces.¹⁴ Therefore with some subtle agreement, the term integrated describes coordination between military forces and governmental agencies and departments, whereas unified describes the merging of our military forces and their structures into a single hierarchy or chain of command.

Joint and Combined are basic terms which are similar when defined in NATO and the US Department of Defense (DoD) dictionary. The DoD dictionary defines Joint as two or more military services working together. The definition implies actions by the military services of a single country while combined operations is defined as an operation conducted by forces of two or more Allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. This can be somewhat confusing and overlapping as the DoD definition of Joint Operations are those operations conducted by more than one service working together which by definition can be confused with combined; however, for the purpose of this paper the difference to be assumed is that combined is inter-country while joint is inter-service.

Transformation is another term that has been thrown around loosely among militaries with little effort to actually define the term. In a US Center of Defense Information (CDI) article titled defining transformation, Colin Robinson, a US defence research assistant, writes:

¹³ Canada. Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement - A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: DEFENSE*, [2005].

¹⁴ Downie, *Defining Integrated Operations*, 10

The term 'transformation' has been increasingly used over the past few years to represent the broad changes the U.S. military must make in its structure and doctrine to meet the emerging challenges of the 21st century. But beyond the general idea that transformation may involve revolutionary change and incorporate new advanced technologies, no single concept has yet coalesced within the U.S. defense establishment. The lack of a coherent approach among the military services, the military leadership and top military civilians threatens to cheapen the transformation exercise to little more than rhetoric for business as usual, something that the country can ill afford at this juncture.¹⁵

Colin implies: "It is rapidly becoming apparent that a standardized, and agreed, concept is required in order for the U.S. military to start taking the steps necessary to do what is widely agreed as necessary: transform from today's Cold War posture and doctrine to a more agile fighting force for the 21st century." The Webster Dictionary defines transformation as "an act, process, or instance of transforming or being transformed." To transform is to "change completely or essentially in condition or structure; to change the outward form or appearance of; to change in character or condition." For the purpose of this paper and when defining current CF transformation, based on the CDS vision it would be safe to infer that when referring to transformation it will involve significant changes to the structure of C2, to include changes with equipment and capability.

UNIFICATION – AN ONGOING PROCESS

Gosselin and Stone compare CF unification and the CF transformation:

Equating the 2005 CF transformation with the 1960's unification of the CF is erroneous. It is evident that this transformation is not the last chapter of the unification story. Rather, it is another important waypoint in the continued evolution of Canada's armed forces.¹⁶

¹⁵ Colin Robinson, "Defining Transformation," US Center for Defense Information, <http://www.cdi.org/mrp/transform-pr.cfm>

¹⁶ Gosselin and Stone, *from Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the Fundamental Differences between the Unification of the Canadian Forces and its Present Transformation*, p.14

They conclude that any attempt to do so is misguided. The article concentrates on the circumstances surrounding the two periods and the fundamental differences between transformation and unification. Although aimed at the fundamental differences the article shows how the two leaders involved were similar. Both leaders were charismatic and aggressive and were determined to improve on a CF structure that was considered inefficient or ineffective. When comparing what the two men involved were trying to achieve, and by way of showing how the unification process has been an ongoing, it is worth exploring what was similar and dissimilar in terms of their aims.

In context when “Minister Hellyer decided to reform Canada’s armed forces...he opted to make significant changes to the strategic decision-making processes at National Defence, to the structure of the National Headquarters.”¹⁷ In terms of integrating the military and government, Hellyer made it clear in the debates of 1964 in Parliament that the unification of services was required to make the department more functional. He indicated that without a unified defence staff, implementation of policy would be extremely difficult if not impossible.¹⁸ The option of a single CDS was considered the only solution that would achieve a more streamlined and efficient organization. This would be achieved by reducing manpower that was caused by duplications of having three separate services in the headquarters with separate command, training, logistics and support organizations. Further, unification strengthened the position of the deputy minister and his civilian staff, “who would only have to deal with one military

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 6

¹⁸ Kronenberg, *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972*, p. 30

organization rather than three.” Essentially his argument, as recommended by the Glasco Commission, was for military efficiency more responsive to government and bureaucracy. The two major influences for Hellyer at the time was the Glasco Commission and the statement of liberal defence in the 1964 White Paper. Although the Glasco Report did not make firm recommendations on integration it did extensively report on the inefficiencies in government and the dire economic state of the economy. The 1964 White Paper concluded that well-equipped, mobile troops under a single, unified command would better serve Canadian interests. It provided the groundwork for unified command and staff in the form of a single CDS. Hellyer believed that unification causing a reduction in manpower would allow overhead to be diverted to capital equipment. This would end the era of a Canadian military that has the best housed, best dressed, best fed, most poorly equipped troops in the world.¹⁹ Hellyer was determined to make the CF more efficient. Hellyer and Hillier both embarked on transformation set at unifying C2; however, the major difference between the two was their real concern beyond the strategic level. Hellyer even mentioned on occasion that he was not as concerned about the effectiveness but was all about efficiency.²⁰ Hillier wanted to expand this scope making the forces more effective. Stone and Gosselin elaborated:

Minister Hellyer’s primary reason for initiating changes to the CF in the 1960’s was centered upon achieving greater efficiencies, to create economies that could be directed towards capabilities. In contrast, General Hillier’s ideas are clearly focused on improving operational effectiveness...there is no mention of objectives, such as “controlling defence costs,” “improving management methods,” and “creating efficiencies in the 2005 defence policy.”²¹

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 23

²⁰ Ibid., p. 21

²¹ Gosselin and Stone, *from Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the Fundamental Differences between the Unification of the Canadian Forces and its Present Transformation*, p. 10

Where then did Hellyer come up short? Part of the problem associated with the implementation of Hellyer's plan was that there was little buy-in or support from the military as these changes were seen to be political in nature. They were highly controversial among parts of the leadership of the Canadian Forces. However, this did not sway Hellyer's decision, an aggressive leader he was determined to make the changes that would result in reduction of manpower through unified command. He saw that the only way to do that was through law and therefore passed his plan through Parliament in the form of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act. This was not without consequence and during the period between 1964 and 1967 two senior generals and seven admirals resigned in protest as well as Hellyer's own Chief of Defense Staff, Air Chief Marshall Frank Miller.²² Heavily criticized by the military, Hellyer implemented a plan that some in the military reluctantly adopted. The fact that the first CDS, Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller, resigned in protest meant that the concept and support for unification from the military would not there. Lack of support can further be examined through service parochialisms from the military, in particular the three environments. For the next several decades this would affect the CDS's ability to C2 the CF as a whole. This was further compounded by the fact that NDHQ has often been described as a matrix designed for administrative control rather than providing for an overarching command.²³ Unification as it was designed to initially provide efficiency through reduction of

²² Shaw, Dr. Geoffrey D. T., *The Canadian Armed Forces and Unification* The American Military University, [June 04, 2000]).

²³ Todd Fitzgerald and Dr Michael A. Hennessy, "An Expedient Reorganization: The NDHQ J-Staff System in the Gulf War," *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2003), p. 23.

manpower and unified command accomplished its aims but fell short of providing the CDS with effective C2 of the CF as a whole.

From the definition of integration, Minister Paul Hellyer believed that the mechanisms of civil control of the military needed change, and he accomplished this by having centralized control and administration by appointing the first CDS. This was in contrast to the previous arrangement of three service chiefs reporting directly to the minister. Integration, at this level, meant that government was now talking to one headquarters rather than three thereby streamlining the command and control structure of the CF at a level where strategy was designed and implemented. Although Minister Hellyer was guided by the Glassco Commission, he went beyond some of the recommendations in order to achieve his aim. In the 1964 White Paper on defence, while noting the criticisms of the Glassco Commission on strengthening the Chairman, Chief of Staffs Committee (CCOSC) went further:

...this solution does not adequately resolve the basic issues. If a single command structure is not established, co-ordination by the committee system will remain with all of its inevitable delays and frustrations... there is only one adequate solution. It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff. This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada.²⁴

Minister Hellyer's changes were politically motivated and aimed at streamlining the strategic decision-making process of the CF. Integrated, meant devising a structure that enhanced co-ordination between the Department of National Defence, government and its agencies. Douglas Bland describes how Canadian armed forces, during the Cuban

²⁴ Paul Theodore Hellyer and Louis-Joseph-Lucien Cardin, *White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Published by the Queens Printer,[1964]).

missile crisis “control of the armed forces passed briefly out of the government’s hand.”²⁵ Hellyer would not allow this to happen again. Hellyer was determined to unify the CF to the extent that the three services would become one. Although Hellyer is not credited for creating a joint structure one could argue through unification and by having one CDS he definitely started the process, now define, of a joint culture whether by accident or not. However, Hellyer’s aims were not focused on operational effectiveness, but rather on modernizing management methods and improving efficiency. Management between government and the CF and as a result championed the idea of an integrated defense department. In concentrating on management he stuck to the National level which perhaps allowed service parochialism to flounder at the Brigade, Squadron, Fleet and sub-unit level. Hellyer truly had political objectives with political focus enforcing political will at the national level. Despite the problems associated with unification, the position of CDS has continued with responsibility to command the CF. This allowed Hillier, given the circumstances surrounding his tenure and the opportunity, to further unify command while making the CF more operational and effective.

Other differences surrounding Hillier and Hellyer were the terms of their employment. General Hillier was described as a charismatic leader and a soldier while Hellyer a politician. Many newspaper articles have commented positively on General Hillier’s leadership. In particular Brian Stewart from the CBC is observed:

I’ve been struck in recent years by the emergence of a new breed of Canadian military officers: vigorous, supremely confident, and determined to see Canada make a greater mark in the world. Most are generals tempered by years spent guiding the service through draining budget cuts

²⁵ Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* In (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 2.

and tough service in the Balkans and in a half-dozen countries around the globe including, now, combat service in Afghanistan.

It is hard to overstate Hillier's towering status within the military - it's widely believed he's the most influential military figure in almost 40 years. Political masters are sometime uneasy about Hillier's popularity, but none of them denies his intelligence or commanding presence.²⁶

General Hillier, by virtue of being a well know respected soldier, received more support from the military for structural change. This speaks to the amount of support; however, it will be shown later that service parochialisms continue to hamper progress. However the most important difference was the circumstances surrounding their imposed change. Hellyer was facing economic pressure to effect change through manpower and defence spending reductions while Hillier was appointed during a time where defence was given opportunity to transform through increased defence spending and commitment.

Similar to Hellyer, General Hillier also opted to make significant changes to structure and the organization of the CF. Minister Hellyer was influenced by the 1964 White Paper and Glassco Commission. General Hillier was not necessarily influenced but rather given an opportunity from the 2005 international policy statement, which advocates a prominent role for Canada's military as part of Canada's International policy.²⁷ These documents as stated in Gosselin and Stones article provides the foundation for change that the CF leadership was seeking. Hillier's structural changes would be targeted at the operational level rather than the strategic. Changes to command

²⁶ Brian Stewart, "General Rick Hillier; the Jordan River - show # 6," <http://www.cbc.ca/ourworld/pastshows1-10.html> 14 - 15 October 2006).

²⁷ Gosselin and Stone, *from Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the Fundamental Differences between the Unification of the Canadian Forces and its Present Transformation*, p. 9

only required the authorization of the minister rather than reorganization through statute act that requires parliamentary approval.

As both men use terms like unified and integrated when describing transformation it is easy to make links between unification and transformation. Gosselin and Stone summarize that “transformation is not the last chapter of the unification story. Rather it is another important waypoint in the continued evolution of Canada’s armed forces.” The waypoint for Minister Hellyer was that he had shaped the strategic Headquarters of the CF by having one Minister and one CDS responsible for the organization while unifying the Canadian Forces into a single service. The achievement of unification for Hellyer can be measured through the fact that one Headquarters for the CF has existed since. For Hillier, transformation is the next chapter in unification. For the current CDS, his challenge is to continue transformation and unification through creating a joint culture. This has been evidenced by the persistent message that has come from General Hillier through to the current CDS, General Natynczuk; that transformation is an ongoing process, one that is trying to create a joint culture.²⁸

CHAPTER 2 – COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE CF

A BRIEF HISTORY OF NDHQ

For the purposes of this paper, the C2 change process for the CF began with the creation of a single defence department created in the 1922 National defence Act that described the position of a Minister of National Defence. This was followed in 1946, when Brooke Claxton, then Minister of National Defence, amalgamated the separate


²⁸ General Walter Natynczuk, Chief of Defence Staff - *End of Year - Key Messages*, 10 November 2008.

service departments into a single department, creating the present DND. While this integration improved the Minister's business, some of Brooke Claxton reforms were contentious.²⁹ Unification of the 1960's under Paul Hellyer, as indicated earlier; the primary reason for initiating changes to the CF was centered upon achieving greater efficiencies, to create economies that could be directed towards capabilities. Making the focus then also on reducing manpower and unifying C2. To solve this, a Canadian Forces Headquarters was created. By having one CDS, the only solution in order to achieve a more streamlined and effective system, allowed the reduction of manpower due to reductions in duplications that previously existed by having three separate service HQs reporting directly to the Minister.³⁰ The mere fact that during Minister Hellyer's tenure the focus was on reduction, does not preclude the fact that he wanted to create an integrated decision making Headquarters at the strategic level. Another part of reducing manpower included strategic and operational staff being amalgamated. Figure one depicts the organization of the VCDS branch in 1968 showing the operational command at the National Strategic Level under the VCDS. Interestingly, the original plan during unification did not contain a VCDS branch but rather the terms of reference for the VCDS were for him to act in the absence of the CDS. Operational matters were to be handled by the Chief of Operational Readiness (COPR) under the general staff of assistant CDS acting as a staff rather than a line manager. The major reason for this not to occur was the "traditional authority of vice chiefs of staff that have derived from their

²⁹ Colonel Douglas L. Wingert, "National Defence Headquarters: Does it Work?" (, p. 39, <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/nssc/nssc4/wingert.htm>.

³⁰ Kronenberg, *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972*, p. 31

being the functional controllers of the military operations branch of their service.”³¹ This as intended by Hellyer created a functional HQ rather than a command headquarters. The result was acts of Parliament C-90 and C-23, when combined, which mandated the integration of the three services under one command structure and unified the CF into one service.³² This would be the start of what has been referred to as a functional HQ that was not responsive directly to the CDS but rather to his staff.



Source: (Kronenberg 1973) P. 54


Figure 2 – VCDS Branch Organization, April 1968

³¹ Ibid., p. 42-43

³² Wingert, *National Defence Headquarters: Does it Work?*

The next major change would come in 1972 with the creation of NDHQ that saw the amalgamation of civilian and military staff of the Department of National Defence into a single integrated headquarters. Figure 3 illustrates how the Department of National Defence was organized after 1972. With the amalgamation of the civilian and military staffs it has been argued that NDHQ “had not functioned effectively since it was created by amalgamating Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) and the civilian Departmental staff in 1972. Until Operation “Friction”, NDHQ could properly have been considered the administrative centre of DND, but it was not an operational command centre.”³³ It was not until 1990, following the Iraqi invasion, that action was taken to turn a part of NDHQ into an operational HQs. The newly designated J-Staff operated under the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS), who had been designated the J-3 Chief of Operations. The J-Staff drew together elements of the NDHQ Matrix that had an

³³ Fitzgerald and Hennessy, *An Expedient Reorganization: The NDHQ J-Staff System in the Gulf War*, p. 23




Source: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/repintsep05part2-e.htm>

Figure 3 – Department of National Defence Organization Chart

operations function, and put them into a direct line to the National Defence Operations Centre (NDOC). One of the problems that persisted, however, was that the organization was created without an increase in personnel; the members were already too busy with their primary functions. Further the “Matrix was hierarchical, but also consisted of many separate horizontal and vertically arranged boxes of responsibility that created stove-pipes and left a good deal of operational management to the environmental commanders and commands.”³⁴ Even though the establishment of a J Staff was short-lived, it showed possibility in an effective C2 tool for the CDS to become more operationally effective. The NDHQ J Staff that was used is demonstrated as figure 4. This was probably the first

³⁴ Ibid., p. 23

attempt to turn NDHQ from what was considered an administrative command into a strategic operational command.³⁵



Source: See Footnote 22

Figure 4 – The NDHQ Joint Staff System

NATIONAL OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

To achieve organizational change within the CF, the Chief of Defence Staff outlined in Fall 2005 in the “Situation Report” the progress to date for transformation and the immediate way ahead by phase in the following terms:

Phase 1: Development of a Unified CF Vision, which informs and shapes the writing of the Canadian Defence Policy Statement (DPS). Four CDS Action Teams were tasked to address major aspects of future CF organization, roles and structures. Those CAT reports were produced under accelerated timelines, and submitted in the early summer of 2005

Phase 2: Fundamental Restructuring of CF Operational Command and Control. The major outcomes of this phase are the separation of strategic and operational level staffs and the creation of the envisioned structures as shown in Figure 2, including the Strategic Joint Staff, the Canada Command, the CEF/COM, the SOG, and a new “Chief of Force development.

Phase 3: Alignment of Organizations and Functions, which are strategic and operational enablers, to the new “visionary” Structures.

³⁵ Ibid.

These strategic and operational enablers generate specific military capabilities that facilitate CF operations, and provide the broad-based service delivery functions to the CF as a whole.

Phase 4: Analysis and Recommendations on the Potential Evolution of CF Force Generation design and execution.

Six guiding principles, were intended to shape and imbue a new CF culture to match the CF vision, and are briefly described as follows:

1. **Canadian forces Identity:** Organizationally and culturally, this supersedes all previous tri-Service and other unit affiliations, etc.;
2. **Command-Centric Imperative:** This dictates that CF Command and Control must be optimized to facilitate the most effective and responsive decision and operational support to designated strategic, operational and tactical commanders. Importantly, this further establishes that capabilities must be grouped under the appropriate command best meet operational needs;
3. **Authoritative Responsibility and Accountability:** Must be clearly articulated to Commanders and their subordinate levels;
4. **Operational Focus:** This essentially “trumps” all other considerations. The ultimate measure is the CF’s ability to effectively execute and assign missions;
5. **Mission Command Leadership:** Is characterized by dynamic and decentralized execution of Operations through clear articulation of the overriding commanders intent; and
6. **An Integrated Regular, Reserve, and Civilian Defence Team:** This requires personnel more closely integrated to ensure the best utilization of appropriate skills and experience at every level – no matter what the uniform or lack thereof.³⁶

With these principles in mind, the CDS went on to state that when considering the options for CF C2, the need to “work more closely with the civil authorities (at the federal, provincial and local levels) to prevent serious threats to Canada from materializing, countering these threats if prevention fails, and helping mitigate the consequences of an attack should one occur”, requires that operational level commanders


³⁶ General R. J. Hillier, *CDS Transformation SITREP 02/057NDHQ*, [September 2005].

have immediate access to the required forces without having to appeal to other countries for their use.³⁷ This comment espouses two aspects of his transformation. The first being a whole of government approach at both the provincial and federal level. Second, it demands a more responsive and effective HQ aligned at both levels of government. In 2005 CAT 1 was created to review and provide recommendation to the current C2 structure of the CF.

At the core of the problem as discussed above was C2 at the national level within NDHQ. The problem identified by CAT 1 was that the current CF structure did not support the CDS. Instead, the structure of NDHQ supported primarily a functional headquarters with J Staff 1 through 8 spread across military and civilian control and in many cases double-tasked to provide operational and functional control: “This structure favors functional service delivery over operational mission output.”³⁸ In order to solve this problem giving clear C2 of the military back to the CDS, CAT 1 recommended that a Strategic J Staff be formed and report directly to the CDS. Instead of a joint staff spread across the spectrum of civilian and military control the CDS needed a dedicated J Staff to translate military policies and strategies into CDS command directives. A dedicated staff would ensure a single military authority for higher military strategic planning at the strategic level. The result would be as indicated in figure 5 below with a CDS HQ in the form of the SJS.

³⁷ Canada. Chief of Defense Staff, *CDS Action Team 1 (Command and Control) - Executive Summary and Key Recommendations*, [2005].

³⁸ Canada. Department of National Defence, *CDS Action Team 1 (Part II (Command & Control) - Impact of Proposed CF C2 Structure on NDHQ*, [2005].



Source: Strategic Joint Staff - Director General Operations Power Point Presentation 1 Dec 2008 Slide 7


Figure 5: Post Transformation Construct – “Command Centric”

The preliminary findings of CAT 1 discovered a serious overlap of command at the strategic and operational levels. This overlap can be attributed to a resource constrained period. Between 1989 and 1993, the CF saw reductions of \$14 billion dollars that forced defence to close installations as well as reduce military and civilian personnel by 14,000 and 3,000 respectively.³⁹ Further, there was still much competition between CF authorities for responsibilities.⁴⁰ As mentioned in the discussion of unification, the difference during General Hillier’s tenure was an increase in funding and manpower that provided new opportunities. The opportunity allowed Hillier to separate strategic and operational staff into separate staff functions. As a key recommendation from CAT 1, “the intended restructuring of the C2 structure is the requirement to clearly define, and

³⁹ Canada. Office of the Auditor General, “Expenditures and Work Force Reduction in Selected Departments,” <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9802ce.html>

⁴⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence, *CF Transformation: CDS Action Team 1 Final Report - CF Command and Control*, [29 June 2005].

then separate, strategic responsibilities from those of the operational level.⁴¹ Figure 6 illustrates the division strategic and operational command.



Source: Canada. Department of National Defence, *CF Transformation: CDS Action Team 1 Final Report - CF Command and Control*, p. 10


Figure 5: CAT 1 Proposed CF C2 Structure

Further, in order to separate the strategic command from operational command, responsibilities were identified where the strategic staff would be responsible for policies and process while the operational-level commands receive and execute strategic direction.⁴² The only commander at the strategic level under this concept was the CDS while the remaining were staff. Under this concept environmental chief's responsibility would be relegated to strategy, policy, doctrine and training for their specific environments. The operational C2 of soldiers would become the responsibility of operational commands at the national level. Two commands were created, one operational command for domestic operations and another for international operations. As a result, CEFCOM assumed in 2006 C2 for all operations outside of North America,

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Canada. Department of National Defence, *CDS Action Team 1 (Part II (Command & Control) - Impact of Proposed CF C2 Structure on NDHQ*, p. 1

and CANCOM for all operations inside North America. Figure 5 below depicts the current command and control structure of the CF. This organization from a chain of command perspective has enabled the CDS to be an effective commander at the strategic level.



Source: SJS Director General Operations Power Point Presentation 1 Dec 2008

Figure 6: Current CF Command Structure

Creation of a military staff directly responsible to the CDS inherently allows for a unified command structure. Further, the clean separation of strategic and operational commands has clearly enabled mission command by allowing strategy and policy to be produced separately from mission and execution. In terms of operational planning it has created organizations that can easily be integrated into other federal government departments. In terms of national operational command CANCOM provides an operational headquarters

easily identifiable as the single operational headquarters for Canada. Direction was clearly stated in the 2005 defence policy:

In improving their ability to respond to domestic requirements, the Forces will view Canada as a single operational area. In place of the current command structure, which is focused primarily on managing training and administration, the Canadian Forces will establish a single integrated structure that will be able to bring the best available military resources from across Canada to bear on a contingency, whenever it occurs, nationwide. The new structure will be linked to a smaller number of integrated regional headquarters.

Transformation has clearly made structural change providing joint and unified national C2 in CANCOM and CEFCOM. CANCOM would become more than just responsive to the CDS, but would also be mandated to integrate with Federal Departments like Public Safety and Security for military operations supportive of government departments in contingency planning for operations such as the 2010 Winter Olympics. CEFCOM, on the other hand, is responsible to integrate with agencies like Foreign Affairs and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) like those currently operating in Afghanistan.

If CANCOM was truly going to nationalize C2 and become the primary operational HQ for the defense of Canada, other considerations like North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the Canadian Commander Northern Region (CANR), who was also double hatted as the Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division (CAD). CAT 1 recommended that because CANR and 1 CAD both use the same infrastructure and share a single commander as well as common facilities equipment, processes and personnel should be combined as on a day to day basis, the two organizations essentially function as one entity.⁴³ Originally CANCOM was reluctant to assume C2 of these

⁴³ Canada, Chief of Defence Staff, *CDS Action Team 1 - Part III Domestic Environment CANCOM*, [2005].

organizations for two major reasons. First, the 1 CAD / CANR operations centre operated 24 hours, seven days a week and CANCOM was not originally designed to replace the functions of CANR and 1 CAD. Essentially, CANR and 1 CAD also provide the Canadian operations centre to NORAD of which all three are essentially an Air Command responsibility. Secondly, the politics of moving another headquarters out of Winnipeg following the departure of 2 PPCLI weighed significantly into the decision process. The consensus would be to create a Canadian Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), subordinate to CANCOM but also working as a direct link to NORAD. This concept is not original and is a proven concept as it was copied from American Joint Doctrine. As CANCOM is ultimately a Joint HQ, under American Doctrine, subordinate to the Joint Force Commander is the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) that performs an identical function that the CFACC would in terms of its subordination to CANCOM. In terms of operating through bi-national agreements CANCOM would assume a direct link with Northern Command and NORAD. Ideally, the air picture from the CFACC could be co-located within CANCOM but for now, because of due consideration it would remain located in Winnipeg. The construct for the moment works; however, if the CF is truly committed to creating effective operational headquarters, combined with its American partners, then this current construct will need to be reviewed at some point in the future. Although the current construct is arguably as effective it may not be efficient due to the duplication of effort required. With the increase of bi-national agreements being responsibility of CANCOM, operations dealing with those agreements should be in the heart of the HQ and not separated by time and space. Certainly, as will be discussed later, with CANCOM working at the same parallel

as the US Northern Command and NORAD further efficiencies can certainly be created while eliminating some of the service requirements perhaps caused by parochialism.

Two commands not discussed so far have been CANOSCOM and CANSOFCOM. These commands are the newest additions to the overarching plan. CANOSCOM supports all Canadian Forces domestic, continental and international operations. Support for the Canadian Forces at the national level was considered paramount in the planning process. Because the CF has national support organizations like the CF Depot in Montreal strategic support elements it would be essential that a command and control structure for support elements be centralized with the National HQ. They provide operational support in the form of theatre activation, sustainment and termination of CF operations. Further CANOSCOM provides a full range of combat service support such as military engineering, health services, military police, logistics, land equipment maintenance, personnel support, resource management, and communications and information systems. As well, CANOSCOM assumed command in February 2006 of the Canadian Forces Joint Support Group (CFJSG), the CF Joint Signal Regiment (CFJSR) and J4 Materiel. To avoid duplication and because support is a fairly large organization, in order to operationalize its effect, CANOSCOM was created as one command to support CANCOM and CEFCOM. The result was by uniting all its operational support organizations under one command, the CF quickly and effectively achieves relevant, responsive support to operations both at home and abroad.⁴⁴

As part of Prime Minister Paul Martin's concern for security he released Canada's National Security Policy in 2004. One of the priorities laid out was to create an

⁴⁴ Canada, Canada Operational Support Command, "Background Information," Department of National Defence, <http://www.canoscom.forces.gc.ca/bi-rg/index-eng.asp> (2009).

integrated threat assessment centre that would include staffs from a broad range of departments and agencies including Public Safety, CSIS, RCMP, Communications Security, Department of National Defense, Department of Foreign Affairs, the Privy Council Office, Transport Canada and the Canada Foreign Services Agency.⁴⁵ Further, the security policy mentions lessons learned from our allies, specifically the US and Great Britain, and says “we will follow suit” so that Canada can work with its allies. This is certainly a broad move for the government towards integrated operations within government departments and combined with our Allies. The importance of integrated operations would align well with transformation and in terms of public safety the CF would increase its capability with regards to strategic assets. As a result an increase to JTF 2 forces as well as creating a Special Operations Regiment. Certainly Strategic assets Command and Control at the National Level are essential. Therefore, the CF would create SOFCOM as another valuable asset to the CF structure to assist with government public safety and security.

Certainly the creation of the commands have increased the ability of the CF to be more responsive and effective to government through an entirely integrated approach forming what has been defined as a whole of government approach. This was clearly indicated in General Walter Natynczuk’s “Key Messages – End of Year Interviews” stating under the heading Transformation:

CDS: We have come a long way in a short period of time. Transformation has provided us with a new structure that has proven effective and able to deliver. Through it we are creating a joint culture which will be critical to our future success as we move further into

⁴⁵ Privy Council Office Canada, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office,[2004]).

integrated operations between our navy, army, air force and Special Forces. It will take time to rebuild the CF.⁴⁶

In his speech the CDS gives a promising message of a joint culture and an effective C2 that has been created by his predecessor and continued by him.

REGIONAL OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

The creation of Canada Command from a foundation in the 2004 National Security Policy and the 2005 Defence Policy Statement that states:

In improving their ability to respond to domestic requirements, the forces will view Canada as a single operational area. The CF will establish a single integrated structure that will be able to bring the best available military resources from across Canada to bear on a contingency, wherever it occurs, nationwide. The new structure will be lined to a smaller number of integrated regional headquarters.”⁴⁷

One of the key recommendations in CAT Team 1 (CANCOM) was “the creation of CANCOM and Canada as a single operational theatre will drive the requirement to form six Regional HQs to C2 routine and contingency domestic operations.”⁴⁸ With effective C2 established at a national level, part of CANCOM tasks provided in the CDS intent was C2 relationships with the six regional commands. Regional commands were developed based on existing area HQs and their infrastructure. These commands before becoming joint task forces were essentially environmental centric. For purposes of C2 this imposed a stove-piped solution in terms of employing forces within a region. When a Toronto Mayor in 1999, Mel Lastman, requested assistance, the MDN responded with


⁴⁶ Natynczuk, *Chief of Defence Staff - End of Year - Key Messages*

⁴⁷ Canada. Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement - A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: DEFENSE*

⁴⁸ Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces*, p. B 1

troops from the army base in Petawawa without a proper national chain of command in place to perhaps sway the media frenzy immediately following. There was no clear understanding of the process for a military call out. In order for CANCOM to apply effective C2 these regional headquarters would become responsive to and municipal request through a proper procedure but remain under command of CANCOM rather than their specific environmental chiefs. This would further ensure that force generation and force employment were clearly delineated and separated in terms responsibility and accountability. Rather than create a plethora of new HQs, regional Joint Task Force (JTF) HQs replacing existing HQ would allow for a realignment of C2 in terms of force generation and force employment. In terms of some preexisting coordination and liaison with provincial agencies, these headquarters already had existing relationships. Regional areas of responsibility were defined geographically using existing provincial borders. Figure 7 shows the Regional Headquarters and their areas of responsibility.

There still needs to be much work in terms of joint forces specifically within the regional construct. As an example none of the ECS have changed or relegated their primary roles or functions in terms of providing efficiency of having joint forces. As an example Maritime Atlantic (MARLANT) HQ has assumed the role of JTF HQ Atlantic; however, there is also a Land Forces Atlantic Area Headquarters and both Headquarters are maintaining their environmental missions. Further in terms of force employment Land Forces Atlantic Area maintains that they provide command and control of Land Forces in the Atlantic Region. Their mission as stated on their web site is “is to generate and employ combat efficient, multi-purpose land forces to meet Canada's Defence



Source: Joint Task Force West at http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LFWA/jtfw_purpose.asp

Figure 7 – Joint Task Force Regional Headquarters Area of Operation

objectives.”⁴⁹ There has been little effort to combine HQ creating efficiencies in personnel and “jointness”. As an example, Maritime Pacific (MARPAAC) HQ is also JTF Pacific and rather than combine all three services into one joint HQ both Maritime HQ operate maritime operation centres. Therefore, some duplication of effort and lack of efficiency is still taking place. Further, the environments themselves by giving two names and functions to HQs seem to emphasize an anti-approach to creating efficiency and joint culture. Certainly the lessons learned of several of the domestic operations that the CF have been involved over the past 20 years highlight us of the importance of

⁴⁹ Canada, Land Forces Atlantic Area, "Welcome to Land Forces Western Area," http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LFAA_HQ/lfaa.html (accessed 2 April 2009, 2009).

effective command and control, quick response and interagency planning and the importance of Joint.

Emphasizing many of the joint requirements for domestic operations can be seen through the lessons learned of “Op Grizzly” which was the military support to the Kananaskis G8 summit. General Fenton, Commander Land Forces Western Area identified his centre of gravity for the operation as:

Comprehensive civil military coordination, effective coordination and timely decision making between the CF and Other Governmental Departments are key to effective support without trespassing on civilian responsibilities.⁵⁰

Consistent with the aim of creating regional joint task forces this centre of gravity can be applied to all Joint Force Headquarters. Interestingly, General Fenton’s Chief of Staff, Colonel Barr and also the author of the lessons learned document is now the Chief of Staff for “Op Podium” which is the CF support to the 2010 Winter Olympic Games. Originally Colonel Barr was appointed as the Commander Joint Task Force Games; however, he declined that position because the 2010 winter games were being held in Vancouver.⁵¹ In terms of jurisdiction or perhaps inter-service wars, Colonel Barr suggested that because the games were in JTF Pacific’s area of operations and in accordance with direction for the creation of CANCOM that the Commander JTF Pacific would be the right commander. On August 30, 2007 the CF officially stood up Joint Task Force Games (JTFG) as its lead group responsible for planning the execution of

⁵⁰ Land Force Western Area Headquarters. (Ops 174), *Operation Order 002 — Op GRIZZLY*. 22 May, 2002. pp. 1-2. Although quoted from the final version of the Op Order, BGen Fenton consistently stated this as his Strategic Centre of Gravity for the Planning and Preparation Phase as early as September, 2001.

⁵¹ During a presentation to the Canadian Forces College 27 April 2009, Col Barr explained his reasoning for keeping Joint Task Force responsibility in tact.

what the military has dubbed “Operation Podium”. This organization will fall under CANCOM and is being led by Rear-Admiral Tyrone Pile, the head of Joint Task Force Pacific.⁵²

One of the important lessons learned from Kananaskis “Op Grizzly”, an RCMP lead agency on the security side supported by CF was the integration of federal, provincial and military departments. The operation centers of each department were separated by time and space. The chief planner stated:

By not integrating our two planning teams, the JTF ended up essentially one planning cycle behind the RCMP. The RCMP planners would develop their plan, making a number of assumptions as to the support available from the CF and its capabilities, then upon completion of that planning cycle, they would “task” the CF for the already integrated support required. JTF planners would then have to begin their planning cycle, seeking authority to employ the assets requested by the RCMP, re-aligning assets where required to better match capabilities to tasks.... A truly joint planning team, fully integrated from its inception, would eliminate this “planning lag”.... We expended a great deal of time and effort by not integrating these teams fully....⁵³

It should be noted that when Kananaskis was taking place the JTF West did not exist and as a result the Land Force Western Area headquarters was given the task. However, the task force was considered a JTF even though from the onset it was land-centric. Many of the lessons learned recognize that a truly unified JTF HQ is what is required for complex operations rather than environment exocentric. As the Kananaskis security planning happened and because the original HQ was very land centric accountability and responsibility seems to have been separated into land and air HQs. As an example the

⁵² Darcy Knoll, "Operation Podium: The CF Prepares for the Vancouver Olympics," *Esprit De Corps* (1 November 2002).


⁵³ Colonel David Bar, "The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study into Interagency Operations," *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2003-2004), p. 41.

Air Defence Anti-Tank System was torn between two commanders. First it was an integral army military system that should have been under the C2 of LFWA, but because of its ability to shoot-down aircraft it was under the C2 of the Defence Counter Air (DCA) organization that was also in a separate location. This created problems in communication and information sharing between the land and air elements involved. As the stand-up of JTF Regional HQs is now a part of the construct of CANCOM many of these issues of coordination and integration should be solved by having a permanent JTF Regional HQs responsible to prepare and react to domestic crisis and capable of interagency coordination between government agencies and the military. Another important lesson learned from Kananaskis is the timely response that can be produced having unified command. The RCMP Chief Superintendent Mr Hickman stated that it is absolutely essential to have all planners located in the same facility.⁵⁴ Although this suggests a single interagency operations centre it certainly implies that the benefit of a joint unified HQ being able to provide that unity of C2 and be effective and efficient during domestic operations is certainly what is required.

Air Force assets, specifically everything that flies, are affected through centralized control and decentralized execution. This means that air assets are normally controlled at the highest level. In terms of the current construct, this would mean that CANCOM through the CFACC controls all aircraft within Canada. This is due to the limited air assets across the country ensuring that aircraft missions are effectively prioritized. As discussed earlier with the CFACC for CANCOM being in Winnipeg, he or she is responsible for all air assets providing centralized control; however, in order for regional

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 44

headquarters to have air assets in priority as they need them, the CFACC created Regional Air Coordination Elements (RACE) in each of the Regional JTFs. This allows each regional headquarters to have a dedicated air C2 element with communications to the CFACC in order to advise the JTF commander of all air assets available for his missions. An example of how this was coordinated for Operation GRIZZLY is given in Figure 9 below.



Source: Kananaskis G8 Summit Organizational Relationships

Figure 9: Kananaskis G8 Summit Organizational Relationships

In figure 9 the Air Component, which is essentially the RACE, provides coordination with the CFACC who is in direct communication with NORAD and CANCOM in case of a requirement for immediate air action.

Further, it is important to note that the lessons learned from Kananaskis are being incorporated into “Op Podium”. This is mainly due to the fact that the Chief of Staff for both events is the same person, Colonel Barr. However, it also serves to show that the joint lessons learned are applicable and tells us how in the early stages of creating Regional JTF HQs, they can be properly developed to be more effective which is what transformation of C2 seeks to do. The Joint Force construct is ideal for the winter games as the Joint Task Force will involve maritime assets patrolling the waters, air assets protecting the skies, land forces protecting the ground activities all effectively under a unified C2 structure created through Regional JTF HQs subordinate to CANCOM.

CANADA – A JOINT FORCE

A JOINT CULTURE

Joint in a single service CF, is perhaps one of the biggest buzz words in North American military forces since integration describes a nation’s military force services working together. The term joint has been used at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. It has been used to describe the type of relationship required by servicemen and capability in order for a force of the 21st century to be effective and efficient. The DOD definition of a *Joint Force* is “a general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. A *Joint Force Commander* is defined as “a general term applied to a combatant commander, sub-unified commander, or joint task force

commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. A statement in Donald Rumsfeld's Quadrennial review of 2006 read that the "Department to focus more on the needs of Combatant Commanders and to develop portfolios of joint capabilities rather than individual stove-piped programs."⁵⁵ "Moving towards a more "demand driven" approach should reduce unnecessary program redundancy, improve joint interoperability, and streamline acquisition and budgeting processes. The Department is continuing to shift from stove-piped vertical structures to more transparent and horizontally-integrated structures."⁵⁶

Certainly the current transformation plan for the CF espouses a distinctly joint culture. Most recently, the current CDS in his speech to the Empire Club 10 November 2008, stated: "[t]hrough it we are creating a joint culture which will be critical to our future success as we move further into integrated operations between our navy, army, air force and special forces." So where is the CF in terms of joint culture.

Among the most serious obstacles preventing meaningful reform in transformation however, is service parochialism. Service parochialism, as defined by Owens in *Lifting the Fog of War* constitutes a service member's "traditional loyalty to service or military specialty over the armed forces as a whole, whatever his or her rank or position"⁵⁷ To counter service parochialisms Major C.L. Cloutier contends a knowledge champion is required to change the CF to a joint military culture: "the most effective

⁵⁵ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *the Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,[2006]).

⁵⁶ Donald H Rumsfeld, *The Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,[2006]).

⁵⁷ William A. Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War / Admiral Bill Owens with Edward Offley* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), p. 151.

approach is the appointment of an individual with sufficient credibility, autonomy and knowledge to ensure the efforts and decisions needed for an effective transformation are brought to the attention of the Government and the Canadian public.”⁵⁸ General Hillier was perhaps that champion who was hand picked by the Liberal government, in particular Prime Minister Paul Martin who funded and authorized the military to transform.⁵⁹

Interestingly a CBC news article in 2008 suggested that Hillier may be leaving with unfinished business can be interpreted as not finishing transformation.⁶⁰ Hillier who was effective at changing the C2 structure may have come up short in not providing an organization to champion joint culture. Douglas MacGregor suggests that “[t]ransformation, strategy, jointness, and even readiness are inextricably intertwined.”⁶¹ Transformation and unification are ongoing processes that need to be continuously developed. It is the institutionalization of managing change and coordinating innovation that needs to go beyond Hillier within the CF in order for a true transformation to continue.

So how serious is the CF at continuing to manage transformation and jointness? The Americans, our main allies, are extremely serious in championing transformation and have even dismissed military leaders who did not accept transformation and joint culture. In 1990, Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael J Dugan was fired in by the Secretary

⁵⁸ Major C. L. Cloutier, "Exercise New Horizons - *the Need for a CF Knowledge Champion*," (10 April 2004), p. 21.

⁵⁹ Unknown, "Transforming the Military," *The Council of Canadians* (11 June 2007), http://www.canadians.org/peace/issues/Marching_Orders/military.html (accessed 2 May 2009).

⁶⁰ Tom Hansen, "*Candour and Combat - Departing General Leaves a Deep Legacy in Afghanistan and Canada*," *Canadian Press* January 11 2008, http://www.canadians.org/peace/issues/Marching_Orders/military.html.

⁶¹ Douglas A. MacGregor, ""Transformin Jointly" in *Transforming America's Military*" In , ed. Hans Binnendijk Washington DC: National Defence Univerity Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2002).

of Defense Dick Cheney, because Dugan spoke out of turn and he belittled the other services--the ground forces, Marines and Navy. The goal of the military during this time period was to coordinate the different services so as to present a unified strategy.⁶² The answer is perhaps within the question of determining who can properly champion the knowledge. The newly created Canadian Force Development department is probably best position to be that person.

CANADIAN FORCES HUMAN CAPACITY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Any examination of the major structural changes done through transformation has to be weighed by the personnel capacity available. The increase of forces has so far been a mere 8000 personnel. In terms of major transformation how does this add up to personnel requirements? In order to create the conditions for transformation success, leaders must ensure that actual implementation is executed properly. This requires three different initiatives:

First, there will be a political campaign, which should create strong and lasting support for the desired change. A Second initiative will be a communication campaign, ensuring that all the major stakeholders understand and share the idea of change and are committed to the principles, and consequences behind it. Finally, there will be a rationally planned campaign that makes sure that the human and material resources necessary for a successful change are available.⁶³

One could argue that transformation is still in the second initiative period according to this theory. But for examination of transformation as whole requires appreciation of the entire picture. The next major step in the CF transformation plan is to ensure that human

⁶² Jeffrey R. Smith, "Chief of Air Staff Fired; Dugan Discussed Targeting Bagdad, Suddam," *Washington Post* 1 September 1990.

⁶³ Stewart Clegg, Martin Kornberger and Tyrone Pitsis, *Managing and Organizations: An Introduction to Theory and Practice* (London: SAGE Publications, 2005), p. 384.

and material resources necessary for a successful change are available. Is there even a plan?

The Canada First Defense Strategy announced what would seem like a plan when it stated that the CF would increase from 62,000 to 70,000 personnel. On the outside an increase of 8000 personnel for transformation seems to be sufficient, however, this increase of personnel has multiple purposes, none of what was originally planned to shape transformation. Further, a more complete examination of force structure has not been done for decades and how anyone in government does or the military know what is required to complete transformation. As well, it could be argued that because a full examination of force structure has not been conducted that even military leaders have a vague idea at what the CF looks like in terms of its establishment. The problem is exaggerated through operational requirements and the constant increase in capabilities that have occurred over the past several years. Units have been restructuring and retooling to meet operational requirements but have not reduced or increased personnel as a result. An example in the land forces could be the recent purchase of tanks. When Canada first decided that it was not going to have tanks, the armored units within Canada looked at their personnel and reshuffled accordingly. Any reductions in manpower were redistributed across the army. In the Air Force, in a similar vein, the introduction of UAVs as an operational requirement, has forced the Air Force to take pilots from existing positions and make them UAV operators. However, on paper there are no such personnel positions in Canada. If Canada plans to use this capability beyond operations in Afghanistan it will have to make some real decisions. With operational tempo so high the military continues to change capabilities with temporary fixes to personnel shortfalls.

The increase in numbers announced by government were randomly chosen as can be seen by the nice rounded figures and truly without a proper force structure review, it certainly would be hard to predict what in fact is required. The current way of tracking personnel to what job they do and the functions or qualification required to be employed are all indicated in the Resource Management Report (REMAR); however, this document is in constant change and is hardly up to date. The only way to keep it up to date requires a bottom-up approach. Units are constantly making changes to their establishment but not reporting the changes. As an example the Canadian Forces has nine infantry battalions that are suppose to be identical establishments but in reality they are not. In fact, when reviewing the REMAR in terms of numbers no two are even identical.

Nowadays, with transformation the problem compounds. The original increases in numbers of personnel of which 5,000 were given to the army were supposed to fill the gaps. In other words, before Hillier's transformation, the increase in numbers, as an example, would fill the infantry battalions to a level based on capability and would make them equal in numbers. The so-called "Hollow Army" represents another endearing problem:

The percentage of army personnel "left out of battle" – mainly because they are on either permanent or temporary medical leave – is approximately 15 per cent. Furthermore, the number of usable personnel for some units has dipped below 70 per cent because units carry personnel undergoing on-the-job training. The Army is also short in some key trades like vehicle technicians, which limit unit capabilities further. Essentially, the Army is operating at 25 per cent less capacity than advertised. It is a four-wheel vehicle running on three wheels creation of new headquarters As part of the transformation process, the CDS has ordered CFD to conduct a structure review... The Army looks stronger and healthier on paper than it is. The Army cannot sustain the active engagement in the

world that Canadians or the government might expect. There simply aren't enough people.⁶⁴

The "Hollow Army" and increasing capabilities are just the tip of the iceberg. The transformation of the CF C2 structure has created national headquarters that continue to increase the number of officers or staff required. Other factors include a number of new capabilities and capital projects, all of which increase numbers. For example, new capabilities like purchase of tanks, guns, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), strategic lift aircraft, Chinook helicopters, radars and engineering equipment will all in due process require hard decisions in terms of manning. All of this new equipment will require increases in establishments at some point in the future as few are replacement projects but rather new capabilities or enablers designed to enhance existing capabilities. Manning these capabilities as urgent operational requirements is further placing a burden on the human capacity problem. An example of taking on new capabilities with current structure is the helicopter situation. The CF has four Griffin Helicopter Squadrons (three operational and one training squadron). Under normal circumstances with a six month rotation, the average pilot can expect to be on operations, training for operation or in recovery. However, because they are flying Griffin Helicopters and a new capability with Chinook helicopters they have been required to do 9 month deployments. If Canada continues to have these assets in a theatre of operations outside the country fatigue or burn out of pilots will occur and as a result would be coming home just to find themselves gearing up for the next operation. Further, these new capabilities require training much of which is being done outside of country taking them away for even

⁶⁴ Canada, Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Executive Summary - "Wounded" Canada's Disappearing Option for Defending Canada at Home and Abroad* (Ottawa: ,[2008]), <http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/executivesep05-e.htm>.

longer. There seems to be no argument in defence that the operational tempo is extremely high; however, at some point a complete establishment review is going to be required in order to define what the forces will look like and how it will be manned, taking into account current establishments. Currently, the argument is that the CF, because of its tempo, has not the time to conduct a review of its establishment. Because there has been so much change to the structure, in order to be accountable, establishments will have to be reviewed and analyzed in order to assure human capacity is running at maximum efficiency. Further as mentioned earlier, with the creation of Regional JTF HQ and with the environments refusing to reduce duplication such as the Atlantic Region and Quebec the CF continues to be burdened.

CANADIAN FORCES TRAINING DEVELOPMENT

The Chief of Force Development in his mission states that CFD will harmonize, synchronize and integrate the force development activities of the Canadian Forces in order to develop the capabilities required to produce strategically relevant, operationally responsive, and tactically decisive military forces.⁶⁵

The CF, if it wants to continue its transformation process needs a Joint “Guerilla.” Joint Doctrine is definitely lagging behind CF Transformation. Until this past year Joint Doctrine in Canada was an ill-defined responsibility. In fact even in training where CF OPP is now applied at the Canadian Forces College, it uses a doctrine that was produced by the College and accepted by an operational command but was not identified as doctrinal responsibility of any particular department. The good news, however, is that

⁶⁵ General Beare, Commander of CFD in his presentation to the College suggested that perhaps the CF needs a Joint “Guerilla” for integrating Joint Doctrine of the three services.

Chief of Canadian Forces Development, General Beare in this past year has identified the requirement for a Joint Doctrine Branch with the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre (CFEC). This Joint Doctrine Branch will:

On behalf of the Chief of the Force Development (CFD), the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre (CFEC) shall develop and maintain an approved framework, with clearly established authorities and responsibilities, within Canadian Forces and Joint doctrine will be written, approved and kept relevant. Relevant doctrine must take into consideration the requirements of the environments as well as the the operational commands and other applicable level 1 organizations within DND and the CF. Relevant doctrine must also be knowledgeable of NATO, US, UK, Australian and New Zealand doctrine, and to extent possible interoperable and/or compatible with those doctrines.

Tasks specifically assigned to the Joint Doctrine Branch include:

- Conduct CF Joint Doctrine oversight;
- Coordinate the development, ratification, promulgation and dissemination of CF Joint Doctrine publications;
- Ensure the overall coordination of CF input into the development, review, ratification and promulgation of NATO joint doctrine;
- Plan, coordinate, manage and conduct the CF Doctrine Board; and
- Develop, coordinate and implement validation procedures to ensure doctrine issues are considered in CDS Directives and in professional development curriculum.
- Participate as member of:
 - NATO's Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG)
 - US Joint Doctrine Working Party
 - Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC)

Finally the objective listed for the Joint Doctrine Branch is the “Re-establishment of governance and management of the CF joint doctrine developmental process, resulting in a robust network of doctrine developers with a common understanding of CF and allied emerging doctrine.”⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Canada, Chief of Canadian Forces Development, "Role of the Joint Force Branch," <http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/sites/page-eng.asp?page=832> (accessed 05/02, 2009).

“The potential for revolutionary change and transformation arises from the integration of critical military capabilities across service lines.” It is clear that both Canada and the United States militaries are sending messages that the future of our armed forces requires that each develop a “Joint Culture” Early in his tenure of Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) in 2005, Hillier issued planning guidance for transformation: “The transformation of the CF will focus on the establishment of new integrated (joint) organization and structures, including a unified national command and control system.”⁶⁷ In terms of the American Forces they are much further ahead in developing a joint culture. In 1999 through the Chiefs of Defense, the United States created Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) with a mission to provide “mission-ready joint-capable forces and supports the development and integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the joint force.”⁶⁸

In terms of Joint doctrine development, specifically American JOPP, the Goldwater / Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for developing joint doctrine. Figure 10 provides a summary of the legislative and regulatory instruments which guide the joint doctrine development process. Needless to say, the American JOPP doctrine is fairly well developed as it has its own department in Defense ensuring its advancement. In terms of joint doctrine in Canada, there is no such comparable department. In fact, only recently in this past year has the Canadian Forces Development Department under General Beare

⁶⁷ Canada. Department of National Defence, *CDS Planning Guidance - CF Transformation*, [18 October 2005].

⁶⁸ United States, Joint Forces Command, "*Joint Forces Command Mission Statement*," <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/priorities.htm>

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS IMPACTING JOINT DOCTRINE

DOD REORGANIZATION ACT (SEPT 1986)

- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces.

DOD DIRECTIVE 5100.1 (APR 1987)

- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is tasked with the responsibility to develop and establish doctrine for all aspects of the joint employment of the armed forces.
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff will promulgate Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications (JCS Pubs) to provide military guidance for joint activities of the armed forces.

JCS PUB 2 (DEC 1986)

- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff has overall responsibility for Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.
- All Joint Doctrine will be coordinated with the Services, Unified and Specific Commands and Joint Staff.
- All Joint Doctrine will be approved by the CJCS.
- All Joint Doctrine and JTTP will be published as a distinct family of JCS Publications.
- Each Service will ensure that its doctrine and procedures are consistent with Joint Doctrine established by the CJCS.

Source: US JOPP Doctrine Manual 5.0

Figure 10: Legislative and Regulatory Requirements Impacting Joint Doctrine

taken on the role for joint doctrine development. That said, the Canadian Forces College has also created the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP) Change 2, 2008 which has been released under the authority of the Department of National Defence. The book is the reference for teaching and learning CF OPP. As the future for the Canadian Forces is “Joint” it stands to reason that there should be a department similar to JFCOM that could champion Joint Doctrine.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE UNITED STATES

In the United States in terms of C2, a complete review of their structure and transformation was mandated through the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act in September 1986. Similar to Canada the context of the act was to fix problems caused by

inter-service rivalry. Prior to the act, the US military reported along up the chain of command through a service chief to the Secretary of Defense. This system was considered counter productive because inter-service rivalry led to the procurement and creation of doctrine in stove-piped manner. A manner considered in-efficient and in-effective and without a unified command impossible to solve. The first successful test of Goldwater-Nichols was the 1991 Gulf War "Operation Desert Storm", where it functioned exactly as planned, allowing the U.S. commander, Army General Norman Schwarzkopf to exercise full control over Marine Corps, Army, Air Force and Navy assets without having to negotiate with the individual services.⁶⁹

In terms of operational command and control, the change involved responsibility given to combatant commanders. Unified Combatant Commands were created based on geographical boundaries across the globe. Figure 11 shows the Area of Responsibility given to each Unified Combatant Command.

The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may transmit communications to the Commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands from the President and Secretary of Defense and advises both on potential courses of action, but does not exercise direct military command over any combatant forces. Under Goldwater-Nichols, the service chiefs (also four stars in rank) are charged with the responsibility to "organize, train and equip" forces for use by the

⁶⁹ United States, National Defense University Library, "Goldwater, Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 1986," United States, National Defense University Library, <http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html>

combatant commands and do not exercise any operational control over their forces once deployed.



Source: Map of United States Unified Command Plan from the US Department of Defense Web Site at <http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand/>

Figure 11: United States Unified Command Plan

In order to create a joint culture, revisions were made to the Goldwater-Nichols plan on Oct. 1, 2002:

- U.S. Northern Command – new combatant command assigned to defend the United States and support military assistance to civil authorities.
- U.S. Joint Forces Command – focus became transforming U.S. military forces;
- U.S. Space Command and Strategic Command merged into an expanded STRATCOM, headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska⁷⁰

In particular, Joint Forces Command controls more than 80 percent of the forces employed in the continent of the United States:

⁷⁰ Global com Security, "Defense," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/intro.htm>


As the Department of defence's joint force provider, U.S. Joint Forces Command assigns nearly all conventional forces based in the continental U.S., providing trained and capable forces to commanders in the field. Building a joint force requires a considerable degree of coordination with active, National Guard and reserve elements of the armed forces to ensure the deployment of a task-organized integrated team. A joint force may also include elements of the U.S. Coast Guard.⁷¹

Northern Command, similar to CANCOM, in 2002 became a separate command responsible for domestic operations with a mission of "anticipating and conducting Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests."⁷² Because of its mission it also became the operational headquarters of NORAD.

Not surprisingly, Canada's Security Policy was created looking at our main partner, specifically Canada's bi-national agreements including NORAD but has since expanded to bi-national agreements or memorandums of understanding for public security and safety. Figure 12 shows the relationships and links between personal, national and international security. Certainly, among of the advantages of CANCOM is similarity to the US Northern Command and the ability internationally to meet the requirements laid out in Figure 12. US Northern Command is an excellent example of a Joint Operations Headquarters combining Air, Maritime and Land Defence in order to be responsive and effective to the North American continent. These two HQs are certainly working more closely since the stand up of CANCOM and are certainly looking at joint and combined operations as neighbors preparing for the future.

⁷¹ United States, Joint Forces Command, "Command Mission and Strategic Goals," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/intro.htm>2009).

⁷² Ibid.



Source: Canada, Privy Council Office. Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, 2004

Figure 12: Links Between Personal, National and International Security

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

Although the United States has Joint Force Command, in terms of its joint doctrine, the responsibility is legislated to the Chairman Joint Chief of Staffs. The development and revision of joint doctrine follows a prescribed process which ensures full participation by the Services, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commands. Development and revision timelines have also been established that are similar to the Canadian Doctrine Development process establishing a revision as a minimum every 5 years. The US Doctrine Development Process consists of five steps as illustrated in figure 13. A description of the process for each step is as follows:


Step 1 **Project Proposal**

- Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs

- J-7 initiates Program Directives

Step 2 Program Directive

- J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCs
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate



Source: Joint Doctrine Development Web Page at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/joint_doctrine_development.htm

Figure 13 : Joint Development Process

Step 3 Two Drafts

- PRA develops two draft pubs
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA staffs each draft with CINCs, Services, and Joint Staff

Step 4 CJCS Approval

- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCs
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing

Step 5 Assessments/Revision

- The CINCs receive the pub and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director, J-7 will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each pub and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each pub is revised for approval as a Joint Publication.⁷³

In terms of lessons learned, certainly the former CDS General Hillier's experience in the United States while serving in III Corps Fort Hood most likely informed some of the ideas in terms of transformation of the CF. As we have seen Canada's current military command and control structure can be easily compared with that of the United States. Further, lessons learned through experience with our allies, specifically as we strengthen our relationships with the United States will serve us well as the CF transforms. Relationships with the United States grow continually. Certainly, the current CDS, General Natynczuk is no stranger to United States C2 arrangements. Like General Hillier, Natynczuk too is a former Deputy Commander of 3 Corps with the added experience of serving a tour in Iraqi Freedom in 2004 in an advanced war fighting Joint HQ. As the two militaries continue to learn from each other, the relationships and exchange of information and assistance grows in providing forces for the 21 century whether they be at home in North America or abroad. Truly, the CF is on a positive path of transformation learning from experience and strengthening is bi-national agreements through a common defence.

⁷³ United States, Joint Forces Doctrine Development, "Joint Doctrine Development Process," Joint Forces Electronic Library, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/joint_doctrine_development.htm (1 May 2009).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

General Hillier's plan to provide effective and efficient C2 through transformation portends change for the CF. Like Hellyer, Hillier was a charismatic leader. He was "[h]andpicked to become chief of defence staff by former Prime Minister Paul Martin and his Defence Minister Bill Graham. He burst into the public spotlight in early 2005 with his outspoken views, boisterous charisma and strongly enunciated vision for a new Canadian Forces."⁷⁴ As a part of his vision still continued under the current CDS was he advocated of a new era of joint culture as what was needed to fight in the future. Behind this effort to unify forces was part of his message but with a new buzz word, "joint". Similar to Hellyer, Hillier set his goals high and towards unifying the CF; however, in Hillier's case, transformation was an opportunity where the funds and government were both behind the effort. This was the opportunity to increase personnel and transform operational structure and effectiveness. Therefore, although there were differences surrounding their circumstances, like Hellyer cutting defense while Hillier enjoyed increases there were similarities. Both men, charismatic and strong leaders, were geared at creating Command and Control structures that would enhance efficiency and effectiveness of the CF.⁷⁵

So where does transformation stand? It is still early to tell the results and consequences. General Hillier through his CAT, C2 structures has put the CF on a path toward change with potential for greater effectiveness. The capacity to clearly separate

⁷⁴ Adam Day, "Fit to Fight," *Legion Magazine* (7 May 2008), <http://www.legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2008/05/chief-of-the-defence-staff-general-rick-hillier/> (accessed 4 May 2009).

⁷⁵ Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces*, p.26

strategic and operational command provides the CDS with the ability to write military strategy and issue direction that through his J Staff in order to give directives for execution by National Command Operational HQ. Further in terms of responsibility and accountability, delineating the boundaries of force generation and force employment empowers the CDS to ensure effective C2. By relegating the environmental chiefs to accept responsibility of strategy, policy, doctrine and training for their areas of expertise only he has set the conditions for a joint culture. However, joint culture requires a knowledge champion who can feed from the three services through their expertise in developing a doctrine that enables and provides buy in to transformation. As mentioned by Douglas MacGregor “[t]ransformation, strategy, jointness, and even readiness are inextricably intertwined.”⁷⁶

Transformation, like unification, is not without its problems. In terms of progressing transformation, some hard decisions need to be made. First, the CF needs to conduct a full structure review to determine the scope of the problem with regard to human capacity. Establishments are out of sync and not knowing the scope of the problem will not provide an adequate solution. The CF, on its current path of producing new capabilities without personnel augmentation or additions, is creating the potential for trouble. As taught at the Canadian Forces College, the key to solving complex problems is by first understanding the nature of the problem. The scope of the problem lies in understanding what our force structure actually looks like. Given that our REMAR is inaccurate, it certainly makes defining the problem more difficult, if not impossible. The CF has to have an accurate reflection of who is doing what in order to see where efforts

⁷⁶ MacGregor, *"Transforming Jointly" in Transforming America's Military*

are being duplicated. Once understood, the CF could embark on creating efficiencies through a joint and unified focus. At the regional level, environments are inept at cooperating with a joint program, which makes it difficult to create joint structures. The lessons learned on domestic operations as well as those in Afghanistan certainly provide the guidance to advocate further steps toward jointness.

The Regional JTF HQ are still very environment-centric. If the CF truly wants to advance jointness, the Regional JTF HQ concept has to be revisited. Certainly, planning for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games has, through lessons learned in past domestic operations, shown the requirement for Regional JTF HQs. In order to be effective they need to be coordinated and integrated between military and government agencies as well as joint providing the most effective forces the can be brought to bear in order to achieve the aim. At the national level, experience has highlighted the need to integrate at federal level with federal agencies and combine with US forces through bi-national agreements and memoranda of understanding. The requirement over the past several years in terms of cooperation for domestic operations such as the hurricane in New Orleans or the information sharing requirements for security of the Olympics have established a baseline of cooperation necessary for combined operations to be effective.

In 2005 Canada's International Policy Statement, and General Hillier's ability to adapt, enabled the forces to gain public support as it plays its role in securing Canadian interests at home and abroad. The Canada First Defence Strategy, signed by Prime Minister Harper in 2008, empowers the CF to continue transforming providing government spending and commitment towards building a modern, first-class military for the 21st Century. However, the CF needs to be mindful of the pillars that complete the

process, in particular the personnel and equipment problems need to be revisited and resolved ensuring that the correcting the current problem of inefficiency. Too many HQ for such a small CF means not enough personnel to manage the storm. Transformation is complex but for the CF is just another waypoint in the unification process.

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