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MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES

AID ENHANCED SECURITY IN FAILING STATES

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AID ENHANCED SECURITY IN FAILING STATES - Abstract

One of the most destabilizing repercussions of the Cold War has been the deterioration of governing capacity in countries around the globe and the growing prevalence of failed and failing states. Terrorism, crime, mass migrations and health pandemics have the potential to jeopardize Canada's future prosperity and security. Through a combination of military, diplomatic, development and economic measures with a focus on failed and failing states, Canada has tried to reduce international insecurity. In order to be successful the Canadian government must develop a campaign plan for failing states that does not limit itself to the whole of government approach but that harnesses all available resources from previously untapped or ignored organizations. Since the terrorist attacks of 9-11, Canada's approach has changed dramatically, but success has been elusive. This paper examines how Canada's development efforts have attempted to improve international security. It outlines some of the major shortcomings of Canada's approach and examines the successful approaches of Canada's allies. It will explain why recent attempts by the Canadian government to unify and coordinate Canada's approach to failing states are likely to fall short. Ultimately it will demonstrate why Canada needs to move past its whole of government approach and adopt a whole of Canada approach that will give it the momentum required to assist failing states and remove the threat they pose to international security.

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AID ENHANCED SECURITY IN FAILING STATES

*“We must recognize that in the long run, the overwhelming threat to Canada will not come from foreign investments, or foreign ideologies, or even - with good fortune - foreign nuclear weapons. It will come instead from the two thirds of the people of the world who are steadily falling farther and farther behind in their search for a decent standard of living.”*¹ – Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau - May 13, 1968

Introduction

More than 40 years ago, Prime Minister Trudeau recognized an obligation to assist the citizens of countries that were less fortunate than Canadians. More importantly, he predicted that future threats to Canada would originate in these same countries if more effort was not made to close the gap between the rich and the poor. Regrettably, Trudeau’s prediction was remarkably accurate and has manifested itself in many of the world’s hotspots that are now becoming local and regional areas of instability. The Rand Corporation argues that, “The insecurity in the 21st century derives less from the collision of the powerful states than from the debris of imploding ones.”² The attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the subway bombings in London, and the train bombings in Madrid have shown that problems in the developing world can quickly become international threats to the richest and most powerful countries of the world. These same rich and powerful countries, including Canada, are now trying to cope with the security threat through diplomacy, military force and development aid. No one country has been entirely successful and each government is struggling to devise the ideal mix that improves its level of security at an acceptable cost.

¹David R. Morrison, *Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance*, (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1998), 15.

²Marla Haims, et al, *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle*, (Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), xi.

As a trading nation, Canada benefits from a stable international environment that facilitates the free flow of goods and services. The instability generated in failed and failing states is a direct threat to trade and Canada's long term prosperity. Following the Second World War, the Canadian government realized the necessity of actively promoting international stability and began to supplement its military contribution with increased diplomatic and development efforts. Canada has adjusted its approach substantially over the past sixty years but the threats to peace and stability have not disappeared. The most recent change to Canadian policy, referred to as the whole of government approach, has attempted to unify the efforts of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of National Defence (DND). This paper will examine the security threat posed by failing states as well as Canada's attempts to improve international stability using Official Development Assistance (ODA). It argues that recent changes have not gone far enough. In order for Canada to substantially contribute to international security the Canadian government must develop a campaign plan for failing states that does not limit itself to the whole of government approach but that uses a whole of Canada approach to harness all available resources from previously untapped or ignored organizations.

Definitions of Failing and Fragile States

Increasingly, citizens of the world's poorest countries are losing faith in their governments' ability to provide them with the necessities of life. When a government can no longer meet the needs of its citizens, or control areas of its territory, it establishes the conditions that can lead to the country becoming a failed state. Failed states increase

the risk posed to Canada and its allies because they make it easier for rogue regimes, terrorists, and criminals to operate with impunity. Once a country becomes a failed state it becomes exceedingly difficult to remedy the situation because, by definition, there is no functioning government to take a leadership role in acquiring the necessary international support to begin the rebuilding process. For this reason, any effort to prevent a state from failing will greatly reduce the effort and resources needed to decrease its threat potential.

The non-profit research and educational organization, Fund for Peace, defines failing states as states that exhibit an “erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.”³ The World Bank uses the phrase fragile states to describe “states characterized by economic and social deterioration, prolonged political impasse or crisis, post conflict burdens, and little hope for rapid improvement or development.”⁴ Put more simply, failing and fragile states are states that are on the edge of losing most of their governing capacity. Without outside intervention, many failing and fragile states will continue to deteriorate to the point that they become failed states.

Canada’s Response to Failing States

This paper will address what Canada can do to improve international stability and security by preventing failing states from becoming failed states. Given Canada’s limited financial, diplomatic and military resources, it is unlikely that the Canadian government would be able to restore a failed state to prosperity. Failed states create an environment

³Fund For Peace, “Failed States Index FAQ,” http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=102&Itemid=327#3; Internet; accessed 26 Jan 2009.

⁴Haims, *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle...*, 1.

that allows local problems to grow until they become international threats. Therefore, Canada must direct its effort towards preventing failing states from becoming failed states and avoiding the threats that occur as failing states deteriorate. Much of the research does not make clear distinctions between failing and failed states when it comes to the type of threats they pose to the international community. The first chapter of this paper will examine the major threats that can be expected to arise from either a failed or failing state and demonstrate why they need to be avoided. Subsequent chapters will deal with the Canadian and international responses to failing states. The final chapter will outline why Canada needs to expand its approach outside of the government realm in order to effectively address the threats of failing states and how to prevent them from becoming failed states.

The Failed State Index

The Fund for Peace is a non-profit organization with a mission to “prevent war and alleviate the conditions that cause war.”⁵ Each year they create a failed states index that ranks each country on economic, social, and political factors that have the potential to lead to war. Within these categories, twelve factors are given a score from zero to ten on the basis of reports and articles collected by the organization. The higher the score the closer a state is to failure. States with scores above ninety are considered to be experiencing some degree of state failure.

⁵Fund for Peace, “Failed States Index,” http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140; Internet; accessed 26 Jan 2009.

INDICATORS OF INSTABILITY

RANK	TOTAL	COUNTRY	DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES	REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS	GROUP GRIEVANCE	HUMAN FLIGHT	UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT	ECONOMY	DELEGITIMIZATION OF STATE	PUBLIC SERVICES	HUMAN RIGHTS	SECURITY APPARATUS	FACTIONALIZED ELITES	EXTERNAL INTERVENTION
1	114.2	Somalia	9.8	9.8	9.5	8.3	7.5	9.4	10.0	10.0	9.9	10.0	10.0	10.0
2	113.0	Sudan	9.0	9.6	8.8	8.8	9.3	7.3	10.0	9.5	9.9	9.8	9.9	9.9
3	112.5	Zimbabwe	9.7	9.0	10.0	10.0	9.6	10.0	9.5	9.6	9.8	9.5	9.3	7.0
4	110.9	Chad	9.1	9.2	9.7	7.8	9.1	8.3	9.7	9.4	9.5	9.8	9.8	9.5
5	110.6	Iraq	9.0	9.0	9.8	9.3	8.5	7.8	9.4	8.5	9.6	9.8	9.8	10.0
6	106.7	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	9.6	9.2	8.8	7.9	9.0	8.3	8.3	9.1	8.9	9.6	8.6	9.4
7	105.4	Afghanistan	9.1	8.9	9.5	7.0	8.1	8.5	9.2	8.3	8.4	9.6	8.8	10.0
8	104.6	Ivory Coast	8.5	8.3	9.5	8.4	8.0	8.5	8.9	7.8	9.0	9.2	8.9	9.7
9	103.8	Pakistan	8.0	8.6	9.5	8.1	8.8	6.2	9.5	7.1	9.5	9.6	9.8	9.1
10	103.7	Central African Republic	9.0	8.8	8.9	5.5	8.8	8.4	9.2	8.6	8.7	9.4	9.4	9.0
11	101.8	Guinea	7.9	7.4	8.5	8.3	8.6	8.6	9.7	9.0	8.9	8.4	8.6	7.9
12	100.3	Bangladesh	9.8	7.1	9.7	8.4	9.0	7.1	9.1	7.8	8.0	8.3	9.6	6.4
12	100.3	Burma	8.5	8.5	9.5	6.0	9.0	7.6	9.5	8.3	9.9	9.3	8.7	5.5
14	99.3	Haiti	8.5	4.2	8.0	8.0	8.2	8.3	9.0	8.8	8.9	8.9	8.9	9.6
15	97.7	North Korea	8.2	6.0	7.2	5.0	8.8	9.6	9.8	9.6	9.7	8.3	7.6	7.9
16	96.1	Ethiopia	8.9	7.5	7.8	7.5	8.6	8.2	7.9	7.5	8.5	7.5	8.9	7.3
16	96.1	Uganda	8.7	9.3	8.3	6.0	8.5	7.6	8.3	7.9	7.9	8.1	7.8	7.7
18	95.7	Lebanon	7.2	9.0	9.4	7.1	7.4	6.3	8.0	6.7	7.0	9.3	9.4	8.9
18	95.7	Nigeria	8.2	5.1	9.4	8.2	9.2	5.9	8.9	8.7	7.5	9.2	9.3	6.1
20	95.6	Sri Lanka	7.0	9.0	9.8	6.9	8.2	6.0	9.2	6.6	7.5	9.3	9.5	6.1
21	95.4	Yemen	8.6	7.2	7.3	7.2	8.8	8.2	8.0	8.3	8.0	8.2	8.9	7.2
22	94.5	Niger	9.5	6.0	9.2	6.0	7.2	9.2	8.4	9.1	7.9	7.5	6.7	7.8
23	94.2	Nepal	8.1	5.5	9.0	6.1	9.2	8.2	8.3	7.0	8.8	8.5	8.3	7.2
24	94.1	Burundi	9.1	8.2	6.7	6.5	8.8	8.0	7.1	9.0	7.5	6.8	7.8	8.6
25	93.8	East Timor	8.1	8.6	7.1	5.3	6.5	8.2	9.0	8.0	6.9	8.8	8.5	8.8
26	93.4	Republic of the Congo	8.7	7.7	6.8	6.1	8.1	8.0	8.8	8.8	7.9	7.9	7.2	7.4
26	93.4	Kenya	8.7	8.5	7.6	8.0	8.1	6.9	8.2	7.4	7.2	7.1	8.4	7.3
26	93.4	Uzbekistan	7.7	5.4	7.1	7.1	8.6	7.7	9.3	6.8	9.2	9.0	9.2	6.3
29	92.9	Malawi	9.0	6.2	6.0	8.2	8.8	9.1	8.0	9.0	7.8	5.4	7.6	7.8
30	92.4	Solomon Islands	8.7	4.8	8.0	5.1	8.0	8.0	8.7	8.5	7.1	7.7	8.8	9.0
31	92.3	Sierra Leone	8.6	7.4	6.9	8.4	8.2	8.7	7.7	8.2	7.0	6.4	7.5	7.3
32	91.3	Guinea-Bissau	8.0	6.5	5.4	7.0	8.6	8.2	7.9	8.5	8.0	8.4	7.1	7.7
33	91.2	Cameroon	7.4	7.1	7.1	7.9	8.7	6.1	8.7	7.6	7.4	7.8	8.2	7.2
34	91.0	Liberia	8.1	8.4	6.0	6.5	8.3	8.3	7.0	8.5	6.7	6.7	7.9	8.6
35	90.1	Syria	6.5	9.0	8.0	6.8	8.1	6.8	8.8	5.7	8.8	7.6	7.7	6.3
36	89.9	Burkina Faso	8.6	5.6	6.4	6.6	8.9	8.1	7.6	8.9	6.6	7.6	7.7	7.3
37	89.0	Colombia	6.8	9.2	7.4	8.4	8.4	3.8	7.9	6.0	7.2	8.0	8.3	7.6
38	88.9	Tajikistan	7.9	6.1	6.5	6.4	7.3	7.0	9.2	7.1	8.8	7.8	8.6	6.2
39	88.8	Kirgizstan	7.5	5.8	6.8	7.4	8.0	7.5	8.4	6.5	7.9	8.1	7.5	7.4
40	88.7	Egypt	7.5	6.3	7.7	6.2	7.8	6.9	9.0	6.3	8.5	6.1	8.4	8.0
40	88.7	Laos	8.0	5.7	6.8	6.6	5.7	7.1	8.2	8.0	8.9	8.2	8.6	6.9
42	88.0	Equatorial Guinea	7.8	2.0	7.0	7.4	9.2	3.9	9.4	8.3	9.5	9.0	8.5	6.0
42	88.0	Rwanda	9.1	7.0	8.5	7.5	7.4	7.3	8.2	6.8	7.3	4.6	7.8	6.5
44	87.4	Eritrea	8.6	7.1	5.6	6.0	5.9	8.5	8.4	7.9	7.4	7.5	7.2	7.3
45	86.8	Togo	7.7	5.6	6.0	6.5	6.5	8.2	7.2	8.0	7.9	7.8	7.5	6.9
46	86.2	Turkmenistan	7.0	4.5	6.2	5.6	7.3	7.1	8.7	7.7	9.6	8.3	7.9	6.3
47	86.1	Mauritania	8.4	6.2	8.0	5.0	7.0	7.8	6.6	8.1	6.9	7.2	7.6	7.3
48	85.8	Cambodia	7.8	5.7	7.5	8.0	7.2	6.6	8.3	7.6	7.1	6.2	7.2	6.6
49	85.7	Iran	6.5	8.7	7.3	5.0	7.4	4.3	8.0	5.8	8.7	8.5	9.0	6.5
49	85.7	Moldova	7.0	4.7	7.3	8.4	7.2	7.2	8.3	7.0	7.1	6.5	7.7	7.3
51	85.4	Bhutan	6.5	7.5	7.0	6.7	8.7	7.8	7.7	6.7	8.3	4.6	7.7	6.2
52	84.6	Papua New Guinea	7.5	3.5	8.0	7.9	9.0	7.3	7.8	7.8	6.1	7.0	6.7	6.0
53	84.4	Belarus	7.7	4.3	6.7	5.0	7.2	6.7	9.3	6.6	8.8	6.5	8.5	7.1
54	84.3	Bosnia	6.1	8.0	8.5	6.0	7.2	5.5	7.9	5.4	5.3	7.3	8.6	8.5
55	84.2	Bolivia	7.7	4.2	7.3	7.0	8.5	6.4	7.4	7.6	7.0	6.2	8.5	6.4
56	83.8	Angola	8.6	6.9	5.9	5.0	9.0	4.0	8.4	7.6	7.5	6.2	7.5	7.2
56	83.8	Georgia	6.3	6.8	8.1	5.7	6.9	5.4	8.4	5.9	5.9	7.7	8.3	8.4
58	83.6	Israel/West Bank	7.2	8.1	9.0	3.8	7.5	3.9	7.5	7.2	7.9	5.5	8.0	8.0
59	83.4	Philippines	6.9	5.7	7.0	7.2	7.6	5.9	8.3	5.9	6.8	7.4	7.8	6.9
60	83.3	Indonesia	7.0	7.3	5.9	7.5	8.0	6.3	6.8	6.7	6.8	7.1	7.0	6.9

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Figure 1.1: The Failed States Index 2008

Figure 1.1 depicts the Failing State Index for 2008 and shows that 35 countries were rated as most unstable with scores above 90 and placed in the Alert category. It should be noted that all countries (even rich and developed ones) are given ratings in order to allow for meaningful comparisons. On the failed state index, the trend over the last few years has been deteriorating. The number of countries in the Alert category has increased and their instability scores have been increasing.

Recent Examples of Failed and Failing States

Failing states exhibit characteristics that make them vulnerable to continued decline with the potential to drag their neighbours down with them. For example, fledgling governments in Latin America have struggled to maintain order as armed groups and criminals have attempted take advantage of domestic instability in the aftermath of civil war.⁶ These regions will not repair themselves without outside assistance. One thing is known for certain - “Failed states do not disappear: they keep failing, often worsen overtime, and sometimes infect other regions.”⁷ As they continue to decline, the security threat spreads and, if left unchecked, it inevitably eventually reaches the developed world.

Nowhere is the spread of instability from country to region more prevalent than in Africa. In 2000 Robert Kaplan wrote in *The Coming Anarchy*, about how problems in Sierra Leone such as: “the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and

⁶Patricio Silva, “Epilogue: Violence and the quest for order in contemporary Latin America,” *In Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America*, ed. Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, 186-191 (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2004), 186.

⁷Haims, *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle...*, 3.

regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war”⁸ posed a danger to regional progress. Over the next eight years things continued to deteriorate and Rand Corporation officials predicted that “regions with failed states are at risk of becoming failed regions like the West African triangle from Sudan to the Congo to Sierra Leone.”⁹ Most recently in 2009, the head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in West and Central Africa stated, “West Africa has become a black hole where any kind of wanted person can come and operate or hide ... be they terrorists or other kinds of criminals.”¹⁰ The Eastern half of Africa is no better off. Conflicts in the Sudan have spread to Chad. Burundi and Rwanda continue to experience racial violence. Conflicts between Ethiopia, Eritria and Somalia have simmered for years and the failed state of Somalia has become an international problem as a result of the government’s inability to take action against pirates operating along its coast.

These problems did not occur overnight. They have been festering for years. While there has always been some level of poverty, violence and instability, things appear to have worsened lately. Recent reports in *Foreign Policy* indicate that the level of stability of countries in the ‘Failed State Index’ is worsening and that “weak states already close to collapse at the end of 2006 moved closer to the brink last year [2007].”¹¹

In order to have any chance of addressing these issues effectively and proposing long-

⁸Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War*, (New York: Random House, 2000), 9.

⁹Haims, *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle...*, 9.

¹⁰Pascal Fletcher, “West Africa is a crime, terrorism ‘Black Hole’: U.N. expert,” *Reuters*, 13 January 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL1345545020080113>; Internet; accessed 7 February, 2009.

¹¹Jim Lobe, “Weak States Got Weaker in 2007” Global Policy Forum, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/failed/2008/0623index.htm>; Internet; accessed 26 January 2009.

lasting solutions it is necessary to understand the root causes. How did things get so bad and who is responsible?

Setting the Stage for Instability

Poor countries are at once more vulnerable and more receptive to outside influence. This leads to situations where the aid or support being provided is not always in the best interest of the recipient. University of Massachusetts Economics professor, James Boyce, explains that “the more desperately the recipient needs aid, the greater the leverage of the donor.”¹² This was particularly true during most of the twentieth century.

During the Cold War, the overall level of poverty and violence in Africa appeared to be less pronounced but the symptoms were still detectable under the surface. As the United States and the Soviet Union competed for world dominance many of the world’s most underdeveloped countries became targets or pawns in the ensuing proxy wars. Canadian infantry Colonel Thomas Juneau summed up the impact of this competition on the security situation in a study for DND by noting that, “Through their endless efforts to contain each other, both Superpowers sought to intervene in most local conflicts, including seemingly remote ones, by arming or financing opposing parties.”¹³ Each superpower provided support to fragile states to influence them politically. Regardless of the intent of the donor nation, the support provided generally assisted in stabilizing the country’s government temporarily. The welfare of its citizens and their long term development did not always fair so well. The governments were sometimes corrupt and sometimes indifferent to the needs of the people, but they generally remained intact

¹²James K. Boyce, *Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 71.

¹³Thomas Juneau, “The Regionalization of Conflict: More of the Same,” in *Strategic Assessment 2006/07*, ed. Ben Lombardi, 43-46 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, December 2006), 43.

because of the stability they provided. When underdeveloped countries lost their strategic importance at the end of the Cold War, that stability suffered. A drastic reduction in aid from the developed world made it even more difficult to maintain stable governments and vibrant economies. James Boyce describes how aid was used to obtain political aims rather than to assist and protect the underdeveloped:

Far from promoting the peaceful resolution of social tensions, the Cold War rivalry between the industrial democracies and the Soviet bloc helped to fuel violent conflicts across Asia, Africa and Latin America. Officially donors on both sides readily embraced conditionality- not for peace, but for Cold War aims. Aid was one weapon in the global contest.¹⁴

Eventually the regimes established by the superpowers began to crumble as the level of support was reduced or stopped altogether. Groups that were unable to challenge the former regimes began to take advantage of the ensuing power vacuum. Citizens who endured a low standard of living during the Cold War became increasingly restless when those standards stagnated and began to fall. Short term political aims had been met and the long term welfare of the underdeveloped was not strategically important enough for the richer nations to dedicate sufficient resources. Eventually, the rising tensions began to create situations where violence and instability spread around the world and the developed world began to feel the effects.

Civil War

When the Cold War ended in 1989, the deadly combination of reduced aid and surplus weapons created a situation where violence became the preferred solution between groups struggling for their share of resources in a shrinking economy. In many

¹⁴ James K. Boyce, *Investing in Peace...*, 62.

countries the violence evolved into civil war. Regrettably, in many cases the countries of the developed world chose not to intervene.

Their neglect has resulted in an increase in the level of poverty and violence. Paul Collier's research quantifies the devastating impact that civil war has had on development, "Seventy-three percent of people in the societies of the bottom billion have recently been through a civil or are still in one."¹⁵ Once countries get caught in the civil war trap it becomes increasingly difficult to escape as violence and poverty tend to reinforce each other.¹⁶ Civil war does not just impact the citizens within its borders, but creates an environment which allows problems to spread regionally and internationally. As Paul Collier explains, "Civil war is development in reverse. It damages both the country itself and its neighbors"¹⁷ The fallout from the Cold War and neglect by rich countries in its aftermath have created a much less stable world where the threats are more numerous, more lethal and harder to rectify.

Threats from Instability

Prior to launching into a campaign to salvage failing states, it is important to understand the threats posed by failed states as many of the same circumstances may arise to a lesser degree in countries that have not quite deteriorated to failed state status. If intervention is not successful and the citizens of failing states continue to be subject to gross deprivation, OECD nations can expect regional instability to become a source of exported, terrorism, organized crime, pandemics, environmental degradation and mass

¹⁵Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 17.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 27.

migration.¹⁸ The next section will examine the major dangers that exist in failed and failing states as well as the potential security threat they pose to countries within the OECD.

Terrorism

The attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September, 2001 had a profound impact on the western perception of invulnerability. Prior to the attack, most western governments seemed to think that they could choose to ignore the rising tensions and violence world wide. After 9/11 it became obvious that problems in developing nations had the potential to spread regionally and internationally. The terrorist attacks in New York, Bali, London and Madrid brought the danger of ignoring failed states to the forefront. Terrorism became the first and most visible threat arising from the failing states of the world. Not taking action to prevent this failure will only increase the threat in the long term.

Terrorists need a safe area in which to train and plan prior to launching attacks on their enemies. Failed states provide terrorists with an ideal environment that offers concealment and some shelter against attack.¹⁹ As the instruments of government in failing states become less capable of meeting basic needs, there is even less focus on combating potential terrorists. Terrorists pose a complex security problem for the international community. States that allow their presence either support their motives or are powerless to force them to relocate. Either way the internal incentive to deprive terrorists of their safe haven is very low in failing states. If the terrorists are allowed to

¹⁸Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 80.

¹⁹Peter Johnson, "Urbanization," in *Strategic Assessment 2006/07*, ed. Ben Lombardi, 93-96 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, December 2006), 95.

stay for extended periods of time they may eventually overwhelm or replace the local government, as was the case in Afghanistan and Somalia.

Eventually terrorists in failed states become regional or international problems as they expand their influence. Canada's International Policy Statement (IPS) recognised this threat and the implied requirement to intervene before terrorists become powerful enough to threaten Canadians at home. As it explained, "Failed states – the location of many peace-keeping operations – are obvious breeding grounds for terrorist networks and organized crime, which can directly threaten the security of Canadians."²⁰

Organized Crime

Terrorism is not the only threat arising from failing states. In addition to being a threat in their own right, failed and failing states create an environment that attracts elements of organized crime. The threat may start as local criminals eke out a meagre existence in war torn or underdeveloped economies. Later, criminals form gangs and build networks that threaten local governments. Eventually, groups of organized criminals may join forces to expand their activities to more lucrative markets outside of failed states. USMC Colonel Gary Wilson and Los Angeles policeman John Sullivan identified the long-term implications when criminals and terrorists expand their influence: "Crime, tribalism and terrorism can be expected to become important elements

²⁰Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005), 13.

of future wars and insurgencies. In many cases, terrorists and gangs are increasingly becoming national and global security concerns.”²¹

Organized crime is one of the most pernicious threats to occur in failed states because the criminal activities directly sabotage the level of security needed for development. While terrorists may attack external enemies, criminals operate against the local population, eroding the trust that citizens have placed in their governments to protect them. In 2005 the United Nations described the impacts of crime on stability in *Securing a Dangerous World*: “International awareness has grown concerning the negative effects on development, security and human rights caused by transnational crime, including smuggling and trafficking of human beings, narcotics, and small and light weapons.”²² Criminal activity thrives in the power vacuum of failing states and works actively to undermine development in order to optimize the conditions needed to expand illegal operations.

Criminal Terrorist Links

Addressing the threats of terrorism and crime are difficult challenges even in states with modern, professional police and justice institutions. The challenges become even more complex in failing states where Wilson and Sullivan describe that terrorists and criminals are starting to cooperate: “Globalization, the growth of mega-slums, unstable and fragile states and technology are fuelling the potential for hybrid terrorist-

²¹Gary I. Wilson and John P. Sullivan, “As Gangs and Terrorists Converge,” [forum on-line]; available from <http://www.military.com/forums/0.15240.128818.00.html>; Internet; accessed 7 February, 2009.

²²The United Nations, *Securing a Dangerous World*, 2005 World Summit Press Release, <http://www.un.org/summit2005/presskit/Peace.pdf>; Internet; accessed 7 February, 2009.

criminal gangs.”²³ Criminal gangs have also demonstrated a propensity to support terrorists in order to maintain an ideal operating environment for their criminal activities. The arrangement between criminals and terrorists has become mutually reinforcing, as explained by David Kaplan of *US News and World Report*:

Growing numbers of terrorist groups have come to rely on the tactics and profits of organized criminal activity to finance their operations across the globe. An inquiry by U.S. News, based on interviews with counterterrorism and law enforcement officials from six countries, has found that terrorists worldwide are transforming their operating cells into criminal gangs.²⁴

Sometimes the combination of crime and terrorism push the state into such a level of deterioration that the experts refer to the situation as a ‘black hole’. The UK Standing Group for Organised Crime describes the Black Hole Theory as a “situation in which weak or failed states facilitate the convergence between transnational organized crime and terrorism, and ultimately create a safe haven for the continued operations of such entities.”²⁵ When criminals and terrorists are not actively working together, the UN confirms that they are still able to support each other financially.²⁶ The bleak prospect of criminals and terrorists cooperating should be enough to encourage Canada and other OECD countries to support failing states before they become failed ones. If not, the prospect that criminal activity can create optimal conditions for other potential threats such as mass migrations and pandemics should generate support for immediate action.

²³Wilson and Sullivan, 1.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 3.

²⁵Rob McCusker, “Organised Crime and Terrorism: Convergence or Separation?” *Standing Group Organised Crime Newsletter*, Vol 5, Issue 2, (12 May 2006) [e-newsletter on-line]; available from http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/standinggroups/crime/documents/SGOC_Vol5_2.pdf; Internet; accessed 7 February, 2009.

²⁶The United Nations, *Securing a Dangerous World*, 2005 World Summit Press Release, <http://www.un.org/summit2005/presskit/Peace.pdf>; Internet; accessed 7 February, 2009.

Mass Migration

When governments begin to fail, the population experiences a level of insecurity that makes it restless. Without safety and security, the citizens of failing states feel threatened and contemplate moving to safer locations. It does not matter whether the population is threatened by terrorists and criminals or naturally occurring events such as floods, famine or disease. As the situation in a failing state continues to worsen, increasing numbers of people with nothing to lose take the chance that moving elsewhere will improve their fortunes. In a report for DND in 2006, Brian Greene examined the security implications of mass migrations especially in Bangladesh where “annual floods, have compelled millions to flee their homes over the years. [Floods] are thus expected to generate even more mass migration during the next few decades.”²⁷ When thousands or millions of desperate people migrate, it puts immense pressure on regional governments. In many cases, these neighbouring countries do not have the resources to assist and the arrival of refugees places an added burden on an already weak or failing state.

When mass migrations occur, the refugees who flee hazardous conditions do not necessarily end up in a better situation, as Brian Greene observed in Haiti, “Not surprisingly, many rural Haitians have already become environmental refugees, preferring to take their chances in the country’s overcrowded and violent cities rather than toil its wasted land.”²⁸ In refugee camps and urban slums, overcrowding and a lack of sanitation lead to malnutrition and the spread of disease. Once illness and disease take hold in a refugee camp they can spread like wildfire among the thousands of people

²⁷Brian W. Greene, “Environmental Scarcity and Security,” in *Strategic Assessment 2006/07*, ed. Ben Lombardi, 97-99 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, December 2006), 98.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 99.

whose immune systems have already been weakened. Sickness can easily spread across borders to other countries.

Health Pandemics

Health pandemics may occur in overcrowded refugee camps but they are just as likely to occur anywhere that the conditions support it. Brian Greene summarized the threat in a report for DND in 2006: “Many analysts expect that the spread of pandemic disease will be accelerated and magnified because of the growing density of urban populations.”²⁹ Countries with rudimentary health care systems, large urban slums and undernourished citizens are ideal incubators for the spread of disease. Failing states are more likely to house the conditions that stimulate infectious disease, are less likely to have the monitoring systems necessary to detect outbreaks in time, and in most cases do not have adequate health resources to respond to this threat. In Africa, weak and failing states have been unable to stem the rapid spread of AIDS. This has had a destabilizing impact in many countries where AIDS has killed large segments of the demographic leaving countries without a substantial portion of its workforce.³⁰

Canada’s recent experience with avian flu and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) virus demonstrates the devastating impact even one health pandemic can have in a developed country. The avian flu outbreak resulted in the costly destruction of millions of birds on farms across the country. The SARS crisis in Ontario overwhelmed one of the best medical systems in the world, created panic among travellers, and crippled the tourist economy of Canada’s largest city for two years. Even

²⁹*Ibid.*, 98.

³⁰Stefan Elbe, “Should HIV/AIDS be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking HIV/AIDS and Security,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 1 (March 2006): 119.

though these outbreaks were isolated, Canada's highly advanced detection and response system was pushed to the limit in both cases. Dr. Robert Mandel raises the alarm that future pandemics could be worse and more widespread: "The rapid recent transmission of dangerous microbes seemingly immune to treatment has caused some analysts to call infectious diseases potentially the largest threat to human security lurking in the post Cold War world."³¹ Many experts suggest it is only a matter of time before another infectious disease leads to a major health crisis in North America. Attempting to postpone this crisis by limiting the growth of infectious breeding grounds that exist in failing states would seem to be a logical preventative step.

Downward Spiral

The most discouraging aspect of the failing state dynamic is that the major threats are mutually reinforcing. Mass migrations increase the likelihood of pandemics as large numbers of individuals live in close quarters and travel across borders. Paul Collier explains that "Wars create refugees, and mass movements of the population in the context of collapsing public health systems create epidemics."³² Pandemics and violence increase the instances of mass migration. Terrorists and criminal gangs benefit from a power vacuum. As their activities undermine government, their personal power and influence increase. If the challenge to failing governments were not already difficult enough it becomes complicated by that fact that failing states attract problems and these problems make it increasingly harder for the government to improve its performance.

³¹Robert Mandel, *Deadly Transfers and the Global Playground: Transnational Security Threats in a Disorderly World*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1999), 76.

³²Collier, *The Bottom Billion...*, 28.

Angel Rabassa of the Rand Corporation explains that as confidence in government decreases so does the likelihood that it will be able succeed and resist outside influences.

The more that states fail to produce public goods - public health services, education, social welfare services - and become dependent upon programs from nongovernmental organizations and private, volunteer organizations to provide these functions, the greater the probability that some assistance will be provided by organizations sympathetic to extremists, or that these programs will be exploited by terrorists. Therefore U.S. programs that help governments build capacity to provide these public goods would eventually reduce the scope of terrorist exploitation. Our concern is that if government is unable to provide such services, organizations with radical agendas-for instance, Saudi funded foundations in Somalia and Indonesia - might fill the gap.”³³

There was a time when moral persuasion was the most effective tool to generate public support to assist developing countries. Many activists still profess that we are morally obliged to help. While the moral argument still holds true it is no longer adequate to the task of generating sufficient support. Today’s problems are so numerous and complex that an additional approach is needed. The threats posed by failing states are so great that the continued prosperity of OECD countries is at stake. Citizens of the richer countries must be made aware of the threat of ignoring the problem so that action can be taken.

International Trends in ODA

There will always be a moral obligation to assist failing states because the level of poverty and human suffering within them is normally much higher than in donor countries. Traditionally, this desire to help fellow human beings has rarely been enough to generate the political will necessary to provide sufficient assistance to improve living

³³Angel Rabassa, et al, *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), 39.

conditions in failing states. Many donor countries are motivated more by national interest than by compassion. And many countries that have provided aid for years are disappointed with the level of measurable progress that it has provided. Failing states will not recover without some level of outside support. In most cases failing states will require substantial development assistance over many years. Any rational proposal to assist failing states must examine the impact of development assistance. This section will introduce recent trends in the provision of development assistance, including donors' motivation and some of the practises that have failed and succeeded.

Motivation

Rich countries by definition have always had the power to assist underdeveloped states. The degree of assistance these countries have provided was in large part due to their level of motivation. Developed nations have attempted to provide assistance in the interests of equality and humanity but this has never been the sole motivation. Rich countries have used aid to promote trade interests and as a political tool during the Cold War. As a result failing states received aid for various reasons that were subject to change as the political or commercial value of the developing countries changed.

More recently the focus has shifted to the potential impact that failing states can have on the developed world. Countries that were unenthusiastic about supporting stability through long term development commitments in the past have recently become more motivated as international instability has increasingly threatened their domestic security.³⁴ The Chairman of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and

³⁴Nicolas von der Goltz, "Global Development Policy after 9-11" [abstract on-line]; available from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apo_research_citation/0/9/9/8/9/p99897_index.html; Internet; accessed 26 Feb 2009.

Change encapsulated the need for action best when he reported in 2004 that, “Today, more than ever before, threats are interrelated and a threat to one is a threat to all. The mutual vulnerability of weak and strong has never been clearer.”³⁵ The security threat in failing states contributes to an environment where rich countries have more of a stake in improving the level of development and stability worldwide. Educating the general public about the link between development and stability can also increase their support for the establishment and refinement of programs that improve security through the provision of aid.

In addition to the motivation of fear, the growing list of unstable countries and the cost of dealing with their spill-over effects have encouraged developed countries to search for less expensive ways to provide the same level of assistance. The RAND Corporation has studied the costs of preventing violence and supporting failing states and determined that it is much less expensive to prevent conflict than to deal with its aftermath.³⁶ Academic Paul Collier estimates the cost of a civil war to the international community at \$64 billion.³⁷ Multiply that by the number of ongoing civil wars and the potential savings could fund substantial development initiatives. As a result of these recent shifts in international perceptions, it appears that there are new incentives for aid contributions. This motivation has been a factor in increasing the level of aid towards an all time high in 2005.³⁸ If this trend continues, it should create a climate where

³⁵Anand Panyarachun, *High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, [report on-line]; available from <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report3.pdf>; Internet; accessed 24 Jan 2009.

³⁶James Dobbins et al, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, (Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), 258.

³⁷Collier, *The Bottom Billion...*, 32.

³⁸Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Debt Relief is Down: Other ODA rises slightly,” <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/55/40381862.pdf>; Internet; accessed 21 March, 2009.

developing nations can reap the benefits of an interested and enthusiastic donor community.

Aid Targets

While aid has been increasing gradually in many OECD countries, the debate continues to rage over the ‘right’ level of aid. Governments, activists and NGO’s have been debating the ideal level of aid for decades. In 1969 former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson advocated an ODA target of .7% of Gross National Product (GNP) that was adopted as a UN resolution in 1970.³⁹ Since that time several countries have reached and exceeded the .7% target (now referred to as .7% of Gross National Income (GNI)) while others have insisted that obtaining the target will not be sufficient to eradicate poverty. Michael Clemens, writing for the Center for Global Development in 2005, argued against a .7% target when he stated that “It does not make sense to calculate the requirements of one set of countries based on an (almost wholly) unrelated indicator in a different set of countries.”⁴⁰ In his view, the level of ODA should be determined based on need, not on capacity to give. Despite the arguments on both sides, successive Canadian governments have recognized the desirability of reaching the .7% target eventually. In practice, Canada’s ODA contribution of .36% falls far short of the many European nations who exceed the target but above the United States, which contributes less than .2%.⁴¹ While the debate over the appropriate level of aid will likely continue,

³⁹United Nations, UNICEF, “.7% Background,” http://www.unicef.ca/portal/Secure/Community/502/WCM/HELP/take_action/G8/Point7_EN2.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 March 2009.

⁴⁰Michael A. Clemens and Todd J. Moss, “Ghost of the .7%: Origins and Relevance of the International Aid Target,” Working Paper 68 (Center for Global Development: 6 September 2005), 16

⁴¹Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2003), 177.

there is near unanimous agreement that money alone will not solve the problems faced by failing states.

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

In an effort to stimulate a global response to development and stability, the UN established the MDGs in September 2000 to shift the debate from funding levels to the effects of aid. The MDGs outlined a number of development targets that member nations agreed to address by 2015. The aim was to provide a framework to prioritize development issues, establish measurable targets, and garner public support to maintain donor momentum over the long term to meet the development aims. The MDGs identify eight development goals: (Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality rates; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development). Each goal contains quantifiable targets. The UN Secretary General has urged all nations to align their development programs with the MDGs.⁴² Countries have been quick to support the plan in principle, but changing the level of funding and realigning existing programs has taken more time. The leading donor countries in the EU have embraced the MDGs, committed to funding in excess of the .7% target, and have begun to align their development programs with the MDGs. Progress is slowly being made, but it is likely that without a much greater effort, the targets will not be met by 2015.⁴³

⁴²United Nations, *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007*, 3.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 4.

Implementation Challenges

Donor countries agree that improving aid delivery is critical to ensure that, whatever target is established, the aid is used to maximum effect. Achieving that effect is no easy task. The world's leading donors have identified several challenges that threaten to reduce the impact of international aid. Despite good intentions, and despite well funded programs, many developing countries continue to stagnate or decline. Martha Haims of the Rand Corporation explains how difficult it is to solve the complex problems that exist in failing states: "Just as security strategists have had no good answers to the violence in failed states, international development experts have been stumped by the resistance of such states to traditional development methods."⁴⁴ While it may be impossible to identify all of the impediments to development, one can not ignore the impact of not taking a truly holistic approach to solving problems. Aid agencies have a tendency to focus only on providing assistance and development while ignoring security concerns. Militaries focus on the security component and are less knowledgeable or enthused when it comes to supporting humanitarian tasks. This leads to a situation where everyone is working hard but no one is cooperating to identify the root cause of the problem. Each group has an organizational perspective that hinders its personnel from seeing the necessary contribution of other actors. The United Nations has encouraged potential donors to address the bigger picture and to consider the need to tackle security, development and human rights together as a package.⁴⁵ Recognizing the need to view all aspects of the failing state dynamic is the first step towards devising practical solutions.

⁴⁴Haims, *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle...*, 3.

⁴⁵United Nations, "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for all," <http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2005/issue1/0105p4.html>; Internet; accessed 24 January 2009.

Having identified the need to work holistically, the more challenging task becomes coordinating the effort among the many actors. In the rush to assist, some areas are missed and others are given too much attention. The RAND Corporation reports that money is wasted due to the lack of coordination and that “[p]olicies tend to be narrowly devised to treat specific security or economic problems without sufficient regard for the connections between them that drive the failed state cycle.”⁴⁶

These inefficiencies can be overcome nationally and internationally through the adoption of better coordination and administration measures. While many countries in Europe have revamped their aid delivery systems, the UK has arguably improved the most rapidly. The UK government of Prime Minister Tony Blair instituted an overhaul of its aid delivery system immediately upon taking office in 1997. It recognized that despite many players both inside and outside of government “efforts were rarely coordinated or focused on a common set of objectives.”⁴⁷ In an effort to improve its effectiveness the UK government introduced its Comprehensive Approach (CA) to harmonize strategic processes, planning and objectives across all instruments and agencies. The CA not only encourages each government department to understand each others’ aims, it mandates their cooperation in planning and execution at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.⁴⁸ With better strategic guidance from their governments, the UK and other EU donor countries have identified several approaches that have improved results and should be considered by Canada.

⁴⁶Haims, *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle...*, 3.

⁴⁷United Kingdom, Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, *The Comprehensive Approach*, Joint Doctrine Note 4/05. Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2006; 1-1.

⁴⁸United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note 4/05: The Comprehensive Approach*, Swindon: The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, Jan 2006, 1-1.

Best Practices

Despite the overall downward trend in stability among failing states, different approaches by donor countries have contributed to some major successes. Some countries in western Africa have shown remarkable improvement in their standing on the failed state index in just three years (Cote d'Ivoire down to 8 from 1; Sierra Leone down to 31 from 6; and Liberia down to 34 from 9).⁴⁹ These countries have been pulled back from the brink of failure and some of the lessons learned can be applied in other developing nations. More importantly, the lessons learned by some international donors have the potential to fast track development if applied in all donor countries. Some of the most successful improvements have resulted when changes have been made to improve focus, partnerships, coordination, planning and policy.

Focus

Creating a lasting impact requires that ODA be more focused and consistent so that both donors and recipients can work on long term meaningful goals. Focus is achieved when a donor nation recognizes that it cannot help everyone and makes a conscious choice to assist in fewer countries and in fewer sectors. The most successful donor countries have concentrated their aid so that they become major players in the recipient country. Some of the EU's leaders in ODA, such as Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, have maintained ODA funding levels above .7%, but reduced the number of countries and programs they support. Additionally the donor country can utilize a larger

⁴⁹The failed state index rates every country in the world on social, economic and political indicators, giving a maximum of 10 points for each of the 12 indicators. The higher the score the closer a country is to failure. In 2008, Canada ranked 167 of 177 countries and received a score of 26.3. Somalia ranked 1st with a score of 114.2.

share of the ODA budget in each targeted area to enable it to tackle larger projects or longer term issues. When donor countries focus their resources they are able to address more than one challenge at a time and they do not have to wait or negotiate with other donor nations prior to starting a project.

Partnerships

The requirement to develop long term partnerships between donor and recipient countries has been established in the MDGs as a necessary first step to progress in other areas. NGO's and aid experts have renounced the 'donor knows best' policies of the past and embraced the concept of partnering with recipients to leverage their knowledge and experience. According to the CCIC's Code of Ethics, partnerships should be vehicles for long-term accompaniment that support the rights of peoples to determine and carry out activities that further their own development options.⁵⁰ Partnerships allow the recipient country to participate in the decision process and to identify the most critical issues to address rather than enduring the imposition of temporary outsiders who may have little understanding of the local situation. In partnership with the donors, aid recipients can suggest methods to achieve results that are based on the local conditions and take into account local history, traditions and culture. Success is more likely when the recipients have been consulted about where aid money should be spent and are made an integral part of the development process. In keeping with this principle, OECD donor nations

⁵⁰Brian Tomlinson, "Determinants of Civil Society Aid Effectiveness: A CCIC Discussion Paper," Canadian Council for International Co-operation, http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_aid_2006-11_cida_aid_effectiveness_and_csos_paper.pdf; Internet: accessed 22 February 2009, 3.

pledged in 2005 to improve cooperation by building stronger and more effective partnerships.⁵¹

Planning and Policy

Planning is critical to providing successful ODA. Good intentions are not enough when it comes to solving complex and enduring problems. The first step is deciding what the target of the national aid program should be. Once that is established, plans need to be created that allocate the ODA budget to projects and NGOs that achieve results in the chosen partner country. Some of the most successful donor nations have a long term vision for their aid programs. Australia, Norway and Denmark have aligned their policy aims with the UN and OECD and identified alleviating poverty as the most important aspect of their development activities.⁵² The United States places heavy emphasis on economic globalization and conflict prevention.⁵³ Canada by contrast, has not had a consistent unifying theme that links its aid policy to government strategy.

Knowing what you want to achieve is only half the battle. Every country needs experts who can translate government wishes into tangible results. Some of the most successful and innovative donor countries have aid staff dedicated to developing plans and policies to improve the delivery of aid. They try to incorporate lessons from other countries, encourage public debate of aid issues, and accept criticism of national policies and practices. A robust group of academics and practitioners regularly contribute ideas to

⁵¹Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, *Effective Aid by 2010? What it Will Take: Key Findings and Recommendations*, [Report on-line]; available from <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/7/41549348.pdf>; Internet; accessed 6 February 2009, 3.

⁵²Ian Smillie, "ODA: Options and Challenges for Canada," [report on-line]; available from http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_policy_2004-03_oda_options_smillie_report.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 February 2009, 1,7 and 11.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 10.

help improve and innovate the delivery of aid. Canada is severely lacking in this aspect of policy development. The RAND Corporation emphasizes the importance of policy in any attempt to rescue failing states: “What is decisive in saving failed states is not the scale of aid but how it is applied and the policies it supports. Funds are often wasted when appropriate policies are not in place.”⁵⁴ Laurie Garrett, author of *The Collapse of Global Public Health*, has shown that aid initiatives, particularly in the health sector, that are not adequately planned can be ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst.⁵⁵ Providing aid without a proper plan undermines credibility of the donor nation, complicates matters for other donors, and may erode public support for future aid projects.

Coordination

Once partnerships and development priorities have been established, the real work of ODA begins. Attempts to assist failing states can falter without adequate coordination even if based upon an effective policy framework. In 2006, the OECD surveyed the progress of its members and noted that, “The cost of uncoordinated aid is very high. There are too many actors with competing objectives, especially in the poorest and most aid dependent countries, leading to high transaction costs.”⁵⁶ Coordination must be conducted on several levels, internationally among donors and recipients, nationally among different departments, and tactically on the ground among the workers who execute the overall development plan.

⁵⁴Haims, *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle...*, 3.

⁵⁵Laurie Garrett, “The Challenge of Global Health,” *Foreign Affairs* 86 no.1 (Jan/Feb 2007), 14.

⁵⁶Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Aid Effectiveness: 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: Overview of the Results (2007)*, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/28/39112140.pdf>; Internet; accessed 22 February 2009.

Internationally, donor countries must ensure that their aid agendas do not adversely impact each other in order to ensure that their strategies are coordinated and productive.⁵⁷ The last thing donors and recipients need is for turf wars and coordination squabbles to detract from the development mission. All donor nations want influence over the aid recipient but not all donors are able to provide equally. The aid recipient can pit donors against each other forcing them to make unreasonable concessions or to compete with each other for local resources and expertise. Even in a cooperative environment, donors can unintentionally establish programs that undermine another donor's aims, bid up local prices or undermine indigenous efforts to achieve the similar goals. Donor countries need to clearly communicate their aims publically and seek to understand the intentions of others so that they can coordinate a plan that avoids unnecessary competition, duplication or confusion. Establishing a lead donor nation within functional sectors can help in this regard.

Efficient coordination requires knowledgeable people on the ground in recipient countries who can make decisions. These field workers are more effective at creating partnerships with the recipient nations. A shortage or absence of field workers forces donor nations to outsource their development resources to other nations or NGOs who may not have the same goals in mind. This creates a system that is less responsive and may lead to a tendency to over centralize the decision making. Many of the leading EU donor nations such as Britain and Denmark have pushed more of their aid workers out of their national capitals into underdeveloped regions where they can more closely observe

⁵⁷Haims, *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle...*, 13.

and adjust the development programs. The trend for successful donor nations has been to increase the percentage of field workers over time.⁵⁸

Nationally, there is a requirement to ensure that each government department knows and understands the aims of the other government departments so they can work together to pursue development and stability aims. Much effort is required to break down the barriers that have been established over time between practitioners of aid, diplomacy and defence. Recently, the challenges of fostering stability in failing states have helped to push national departments to work together. Development and security have become more interdependent forcing better coordination and understanding.

Coordination at the tactical level has always existed to some degree but it has typically been infrequent and has occurred after a department tired of doing things unsuccessfully alone and was forced to request outside support. A combination of education and experience has improved the understanding that national departments are more successful when they coordinate their operations early in the process. The UK government has been particularly proactive in the level of coordination using their CA. The requirement to work closely with the other departments is mandated in military joint doctrine and the government has been pushing the CA in its most recent operations. The UK's Department for International Development has been "recognized as one of the leading development agencies in the world."⁵⁹ Many of DFID's successes can be attributed to having a clear vision of what is required and the determination to coordinate with other departments to get things done.

⁵⁸Danielle Goldfarb, *Effective Aid and Beyond: How Canada Can Help Poor Countries*, (CDFAI, December 2006), 12.

⁵⁹Anne Richard, George Rupp, "The 'DFID Model': Lessons for the US," *The Wave: Current Trends in Transatlantic Policy*, February 2009 (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2009) http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/Publications/DIFD_Model_final.pdf; Internet; accessed 21 March 2009.

Implications for Canada

Historically, there has always been an international desire to assist the world's poorer nations to become more prosperous and stable. More recently it has become common knowledge that threats in failing states can spill over to become threats to more developed countries. These international trends have encouraged international aid donors to increase their level of aid and to improve the efficiency of its delivery. The delivery of aid is a complex process with many stakeholders and divergent opinions. Several European nations have invested substantial intellectual effort in revamping and refining their aid delivery systems. Those nations who have been able to examine aid delivery with a critical eye have been largely successful in increasing both the quantity of aid delivered and improving the quality of results for their aid partners. Recent international trends in ODA should be considered by Canadian officials as they develop a national system to address international development and promote stability in failing states.

Canadian Trends in ODA

Canada has traditionally been a strong advocate pushing for reforms that assist developing countries. Unfortunately, it has been more successful at promoting changes to aid policy than it has been in implementing successful strategies in its own development frameworks. Canada has identified a need to reduce the threat of instability from fragile states but has struggled to make progress in addressing these threats with its ODA budget. Academics and policy experts have been highly critical of Canada's ODA record. Many have suggested changes to improve the delivery and effectiveness of its aid programs. The next section will examine how Canada has administered its ODA and

what changes need to be made to better support the aim of increasing international stability through development programs.

Good Intentions

Canada has been a leader in improving international stability by providing political support and resources through various venues such as peacekeeping, multilateral institutions and international treaties. Over the years Canada has demonstrated that it has the ability to influence the most powerful countries in the world and mediate potential disputes among them. Canada's support of multilateral institutions has been a constant source of pride for Canadians. As the inventor of the modern UN peacekeeping concept and a frequent contributor of peacekeeping troops, Canada has chosen to emphasize the military component of its contribution to international stability.

Despite a national propensity to advocate on behalf of developing countries and failing states, Canada is not a leader in the provision of ODA. Canada lags behind many donor nations in terms of the quality and quantity of its aid, the coherence of its policy and the innovation of its aid delivery system. Successive Canadian governments have espoused the need to improve the quality and quantity of aid, but Canada continues to lag behind many European countries that are demonstrating remarkable advances in both the size and efficiency of their aid delivery. The next section will describe briefly how Canada's aid delivery has been administered in the past and summarize the major criticisms that critics argue will continue to reduce the effectiveness of Canada's response to promoting stability in failing states.

Canada's ODA History

Canada has a long history of providing aid to developing countries. After the Second World War, providing ODA was considered a temporary measure to help counter the influence of the Soviet Union, and was therefore not necessarily part of a master plan or the purview of one department. Eventually when it became apparent that providing assistance would become a longer term endeavor, the Canadian government established the External Aid Office (EAO) in 1960. This organization was expanded to include its own President that reported to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and was renamed the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 1968.⁶⁰ Currently CIDA is responsible for the administration of the bulk of Canada's ODA and reports directly to the Minister of International Cooperation.⁶¹

Grouping ODA within one department or under one cabinet minister does not guarantee that the overall effort will be successful. Developing countries need assistance, but assistance on its own has not been enough to tip the scales towards development. The RAND Corporation reported in 2008 that, "generous financial aid, in most cases, has not transformed failed states into successful ones."⁶² This has been the experience of many of the world's leading donors. In fact, many of the traditional recipients of Canada's ODA still require substantial amounts of aid despite years of continued support.⁶³ This is not solely the fault of CIDA - other countries have experienced challenges in aid delivery

⁶⁰Morrison, 6.

⁶¹Canadian International Development Agency, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-829101441-JOC>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2009.

⁶²Haims, *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle...*, 3.

⁶³Senate, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Overcoming 40 Years of Failure: A New Roadmap for Sub-Saharan Africa*, February 2007, [report on-line]; available from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/fore-e/rep-e/repafriFeb07-e.pdf>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2009, 6-7.

– but it does point to the difficulty in advancing the needs of failing countries with money alone.

Criticisms of the Canadian Approach

If good intentions were sufficient to promote development and international stability in failing states, Canada would be considered a significant contributor worthy of admiration. Unfortunately, Canada's record does not stand out in comparison to similar-sized donors.⁶⁴ Other countries have contributed more than Canada both in terms of total aid provided and as a percentage of their Gross National Income. Even countries who have not been able to match Canadian contribution levels have distinguished themselves by concentrating their aid and effort in order to achieve measurable results in more limited venues. By contrast, Canada has been criticized for having an aid delivery system that spreads its aid too thinly across too many recipients and for not having a firm policy framework. Where other donors have been able to improve their focus, planning and policy, coordination and partnerships, Canada has not organized its efforts sufficiently to achieve comparable results.

Focus

A successful development program requires a donor nation to focus on a limited number of objectives in order to have sufficient resources and oversight to ensure results. Canada has traditionally failed in this area by spreading its aid too thinly. CIDA confirms that “Canada has consistently been the least concentrated of all the donor

⁶⁴Robert Greenhill, *Making a Difference? External Views on Canada's International Impact*, (Toronto: CIIA, January 2005), 16.

countries of the [Development Action Committee] DAC.”⁶⁵ A random approach that surges small amounts of money into almost every country in the world does not lead to long term development. As development expert John Richards of Simon Fraser University explains in an interview with journalist Robert Sheppard, “You have a negligible impact if you’re just dribbling out your aid... The rationale for aid is not just to dole out money but to have influence over the host countries.”⁶⁶ While it may seem unfair or politically difficult to favour one developing or failing state over another when providing assistance, trying to please everyone has the opposite effect. In order for ODA to be effective it needs to be targeted as part of a long term development plan.

In 2005, Canada announced significant steps to focus its ODA. Much has been written about Ottawa’s decision to reduce the number of countries receiving aid in order to make more significant contributions to the remaining recipients. As John Richards explains “It sounds a bit neocolonial. But if Canada wants to be any kind of actor in this game, it has to step up and become a significantly important donor.”⁶⁷ In support of this idea CIDA has stated that it wants to target its aid in core countries of interest in order to become among the largest five donors.⁶⁸ If Canada manages to focus its aid in the manner it has announced, it will elevate Canada’s influence in the targeted countries; however, it may prove difficult to cut countries off the recipient list.

Canadians can be short sighted and impatient when it comes to aid. Problems with aid effectiveness and accountability play into this perception and make it more

⁶⁵Canadian International Development Agency, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/aideffectiveness>; Internet; accessed 21 February, 2009.

⁶⁶Robert Sheppard, “Is the Harper government changing the aid game?” [background on-line]; <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdngovernment/harper-aid.html>; Internet; accessed 14 April 2009.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸CIDA, “2008-09 Report on Plans and Priorities for the Canadian International Development Agency” <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2008-2009/inst/ida/ida01-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 7 February, 2009.

difficult to sustain effort. A scattered and temporary approach is self defeating. It ensures that Canadians are constantly reminded of all the problems in the world but does not put enough effort into one area long enough to celebrate success.⁶⁹ The effectiveness and coherence of aid policy become increasingly questioned and this focus on the problems prematurely shifts the debate from strategic concerns to tactical ones. Instead of identifying worthy aid partners and long term objectives, effort is spent debating 'how' to spend the money even before the ultimate aims of the aid are established.

Planning and Policy

Taking the time to properly plan aid delivery and to establish the policy to support a long term vision is a critical requirement for any attempt to improve international stability through ODA. This area has traditionally been a strategic weakness of Canadian ODA because CIDA has not been encouraged to make long term plans. In fact, "Canada has never had a legislated basis for its development assistance."⁷⁰ The former President of the Canadian Association for the Study of International Development described CIDA's policy deficiencies when he characterized CIDA "as a 'policy-taker' rather than a 'policy-maker.'"⁷¹ In Canada, ODA is not distributed according to a national strategy or theme. Rather it is influenced by short term political thinking and policy generalists. Long term planning is therefore difficult. As a result, Canada's impact is reduced because there is no long term strategy linking projects and assistance recipients.

CIDA's lack of planning is largely a result of the influence of the Canadian government. ODA suffers from the short-term plans of junior politicians who either do

⁶⁹Morrison, 136-37.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 10.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 7.

not stay in the position long enough to understand the issues or do not have the influence to get a long term plan approved by Cabinet.⁷² David Morrison, in *Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance*, wrote that the combination of government directed “disbursement pressures, regulatory controls, and the privatization of the delivery have had a major impact on shaping the aid program and limiting its developmental effectiveness.”⁷³ With frequently changing priorities and funding levels, it is no wonder that long term planning suffers. In order to be effective, CIDA needs to be given a long term intent from government so that it can plan its projects in support of a larger strategic effect.

CIDA is often criticized for its lack of policy development and this hinders its ability to improve its aid delivery over time. In a report on Development Policy in Canada, Caroline Pestieau noted that, “CIDA does not see research as part of its mission,” and discovered “a widespread belief that CIDA gives a low priority to learning and intellectual enquiry within the Agency as well as in its relations with outsiders.”⁷⁴ Based on extensive research in the development field, Danielle Goldfarb and Stephen Tapp conclude that “CIDA invests comparatively little in research, particularly of strategic or long-term value. The agency tends not to encourage debate or draw effectively on external feedback.”⁷⁵ In effect, CIDA has been given inconsistent direction from the government, chosen not to develop its own aid policy, and ignored the voices of outsiders. Effective development programs will be critical to any national

⁷²Adam Chapnick, “Canada’s Aid Program: Still Struggling After Sixty Years” *Behind the Headlines* Vol 65, No 3, (Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2008) 10.

⁷³Morrison, 451.

⁷⁴Caroline Pestieau, and Saskia Tait, “Academic Research and Development Policy in Canada,” *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, Volume XXV, No. 1 2004, 126.

⁷⁵Danielle Goldfarb and Stephen Tapp, “How Canada Can Improve its Development Aid: Lessons from Other Countries,” *CD Howe Institute Commentary* 232 (April 2006) 1.

effort to improve the plight of failing states. Given the current policy and planning environment at CIDA, it is unlikely that the government will achieve the desired effects any time soon.

Partnerships

The MDGs and recent trends in donor countries point to the importance of establishing partnerships between donor countries and the recipients of ODA. Canada's efforts have lagged those of the international community and CIDA has failed to create the long term connections that will be critical for effective development in the future. Canada has failed in this respect due to a lack of effort and a lack of resources. Canada has not made searching for partners a priority. The reluctance to search for long term partners results from the lack of planning and policy consistency previously described. Conservative policy advisor Roy Rempel argues that, "it is reasonably clear that assisting real long-term development, or aid effectiveness, has not been the most important criteria in selecting Canada's principle aid partners."⁷⁶ With constantly changing priorities and an excessively large number of recipients it is understandable that establishing meaningful partnerships would be difficult.

Additionally, the dispersal of Canada's ODA budget over numerous countries leads to a situation where the level of funding is reduced to such a low level that the incentive for either side to invest in long term partnerships is questionable. For example in 2005, of Canada's top ten aid recipients only one (Mali) received 6% or more of its aid

⁷⁶Roy Rempel, *Dreamland: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill University Press, 2006), 105.

from Canada. The other nine aid recipients received 3% or less.⁷⁷ Even if Canada were actively seeking development partners, it might not be worth it to the recipient country to alter its procedures to satisfy Canadian donors when other countries are contributing substantially more. Without a substantial reduction in the number of Canada's aid recipients, this trend is likely to continue. Given Canada's past performance, the prospect of establishing meaningful partnerships that can be leveraged to enhance the prosperity and stability of failing states will be limited. This diminishes the effectiveness of ODA because it forces Canada to revert to a 'donor centric' form of aid delivery that puts less emphasis on the needs of the aid recipient.

Despite the lack of partnerships, Canada continues to deliver ODA, but does so by means that are not as responsive to the recipient country's aims. In Haiti, for example, the minister responsible for CIDA confirms that "the Canadian government delivers all aid meant for Haiti through NGOs and multilateral partners such as the United Nations."⁷⁸ None of the aid to Haiti passes through the Haitian government making it very difficult for the government to develop the skills required to prevent it from failing. Having failed to establish meaningful partnerships Canada is forced to strive to meet development goals through proxy organizations. This does not tailor aid to the needs of either the recipient or the donor and it runs the risk that the manner in which Canadian aid is being spent may not support the aims of other Canadian federal organizations that may be working in the same recipient country. In any case, ODA as it is currently being delivered is not as

⁷⁷Mike Harris and Preston Manning, "International Leadership by a Canada Strong and Free" (Canada: The Fraser Institute and Montreal Economic Institute, May 2007), 97.

⁷⁸Joanna Smith, "Oda visits impoverished country for meetings to discuss 'accountability and transparency' issues," <http://canadahaitiaction.ca/?p=696>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2009.

effective as it needs to be to assist failing states in their quest for development and stability.

Coordination

While Canada's ODA program suffers from several outside influences, it is in the arena of coordination that CIDA has the most direct control over its own efficiency and effectiveness. Successful aid coordination could help compensate for the lack of policy direction and planning if CIDA was able to demonstrate that it was successfully administering the aid program despite changing priorities. CIDA is not recognized as world leader for its coordination efforts either. Canada's administration costs for aid delivery (by percentage) are the highest in the OECD.⁷⁹ In addition, Canada has the lowest percentage of field workers in recipient countries. These personnel normally coordinate with other donors, adjust aid delivery to meet recipient needs, and assess projects. The large percentage of aid workers in headquarters (80percent)⁸⁰ leads to a controlling and risk-averse climate where even the few field workers employed in underdeveloped countries do not have enough authority to make the decisions that should be made at the lower level. Coordination of Canadian ODA is on the lowest end of the scale for almost every measure in comparison to other donors of the DAC. The consequence of poor coordination is that even firm direction in the policy, focus or partnership domains will not quickly result in improvements. Coordination issues will continue to impact aid delivery until substantial change in aid delivery is undertaken by CIDA.

⁷⁹Goldfarb and Tapp, 12.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*

Danger of Inaction

Canada has clearly indentified that modern day threats to Canada are likely to emerge from failing states. Canada allocates taxpayer money through its ODA program with altruistic intentions but also to achieve the benefit of a more stable world. Regardless of intentions, the government wants to obtain the maximum amount of development and stability for a given budget. Recent assessments of CIDA's operations by many researchers have indicated that many improvements are required to improve the effectiveness of Canada's aid delivery. Canada's ODA program suffers from a lack of focus and a failure to establish partnerships. It has a weak policy and planning capability and little inclination to create one. Canada trails most other nations in its ability to effectively coordinate its aid delivery. In summary, a review of recent trends in Canadian ODA indicate that improvements are not likely in the near future or even at all without some radical change. Canada needs to make better use of the resources it allocates to ODA if it wants to be successful in preventing failing states from becoming failed ones.

The Whole of Government Approach

The Canadian government has recognized that it is not as strong diplomatically as it was in the period immediately following the Second World War. The journalist Andrew Cohen has documented this slide from respected world power to minor player in his book, *While Canada Slept*. He argues that through short sightedness and neglect, Canada has not allocated sufficient resources to defence, aid or diplomacy. Instead, it has attempted to influence others on the basis of its war reputation. Over time, the level of experience and credibility of the people working in international circles began to pale in

comparison to Canada's traditional allies. According to Cohen, Canada's decline in relative stature resulted from a combination of Canadian neglect of its diplomatic and defence capabilities and the advancement of other world powers where more investment was made in their national institutions.⁸¹ Canada became concerned enough about re-establishing its influence and international reputation in the early 2000s to make comprehensive changes to its foreign policy execution. Government officials planned to increase Canada's effectiveness by unifying the approach of key federal departments to international issues. The result was the International Policy Statement (IPS) of 2005 which directed that the Canadian government departments responsible for defence, development, diplomacy and international trade cooperate more closely to achieve government objectives. The IPS has several important implications affecting how Canada will address the threat posed by failing states.

Recognizing Shortfalls

The attacks of 11 September 2001 were a wake up call for the leaders of many developed countries who began to realize that determined individuals operating within failed or failing states could effectively strike the most powerful countries of the world at any time. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien even went so far as to suggest that he thought the 9/11 attacks were partially motivated by poverty and American foreign policy.⁸² While many criticized his public admission, the Prime Minister's words emphasized that traditional responses to external threats would have to change to meet the dramatic shift in international power politics. Traditional methods of settling

⁸¹Cohen, 177.

⁸² Shawn McCarthy, "PM says US attitude helped fuel Sept. 11," *Globe and Mail*, 12 September 2002, available from <http://www.ctv.ca/special/sept11/hubs/canadian/mccarthy01.html>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2009.

international disputes were becoming less effective. Diplomatic efforts centered on state to state dialogue proved inadequate in dealing with non-state actors. Similarly, military force proved to be an instrument that was too blunt to use when the enemy operated within states where the local government was unwilling or unable to control the actions of its residents. The possibility of future terrorist strikes was deemed to be high as instability in some countries created ideal conditions for non-state actors to plan and launch future attacks.

The 9/11 attacks, despite their impact, were not the sole (or even primary) reason for an adjustment of Canadian foreign policy. It had been recognized for years that federal departments did not always work toward common aims. As with all large bureaucracies, it was difficult for officials from one department truly understand the objectives and priorities of another department and there was no policy to encourage coordination across departmental boundaries. As foreign policy advisor and author, Roy Rempel, pointed out “increased spending on defense, foreign aid, or diplomacy for instance, will not matter if the political commitment is temporary or if it is set on a weak policy foundation.”⁸³ He also observed that “All too often in the past, attempts to reinvigorate the country’s international influence have foundered for exactly those reasons.”⁸⁴ This lack of coordination posed a danger: officials from one department could be unknowingly undermining the work of their counterparts in another department. This lack of synergy hindered the government’s efficiency and effectiveness. The federal government recognized it was time for substantial changes in its approach to foreign policy and launched a review that culminated with the release of the IPS in 2005.

⁸³Rempel, 3.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*

The International Policy Statement

In his foreword to the IPS, Prime Minister Paul Martin outlined that a foreign policy review was necessary due to the influence of ‘traditional and emerging giants’ and the risk that a middle power like Canada could be ‘swept aside’ if it did not adjust to the emerging economic and security environment. Canada, he maintained, could make a “real difference in halting and preventing conflict and improving human welfare around the world”⁸⁵ if it planned and prepared effectively. Canada had to refocus its foreign policy approach to work smarter, not harder. The IPS referred to the constant challenge of ensuring efficiency when several organizations try to solve complex problems in the same area. The fundamental theme of the IPS was that common aims needed to be pursued at a ‘Whole of Government’ level. The IPS outlined specific roles for diplomacy, defence, development, and commerce in this process.

Failing States and Instability

The Whole of Government Approach is a comprehensive plan to unite the efforts of many departments in support of a common foreign policy. Each department is expected to lead in its area of expertise while ensuring that the interests of the other departments are not sacrificed. Supporting international stability by assisting failing states is one of the clearest examples of an issue where every department has a major role to play. This is important because development is the most powerful tool in assisting failing states to obtain stability. The military is well suited to helping prevent a country from sliding towards failure but it is limited in its ability to establish the institutions that

⁸⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: Overview*, (Ottawa: Canada 2005), Foreword 1.

underpin a stable society. A lasting approach to stability in failing states requires the type of national institutions that aid programs are best equipped to build or strengthen.

Conservative Whole of Government Approach

The Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper has continued to support the principle of whole of government outlined in the IPS, but has shifted its focus. His government has elevated the importance of Afghanistan by making it one of four key priorities for DFAIT.⁸⁶ Acting upon recommendations in the Manley Report⁸⁷, to provide better oversight and more consistent policy direction, the Harper government has aggressively consolidated government leadership by establishing a Cabinet committee on Afghanistan⁸⁸ and creating two new senior positions to oversee the mission in Afghanistan. The Representative of Canada in Kandahar (ROCK) was made responsible to direct the actions of all civilians in Kandahar. A new Deputy Minister Afghanistan Task Force was appointed to coordinate all aspects of the Afghanistan mission from the Privy Council office and support the decisions of the Cabinet Committee. The increased focus on Afghanistan by the Conservative government has resulted in a three-fold increase in the number of civil servants employed in the country and an increase in the portion of aid spent in Kandahar province from 17 to 50 percent.⁸⁹ In addition the Harper government has augmented its efforts in Afghanistan with

⁸⁶Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/priorities-priorites.aspx; Internet; accessed 14 April, 2009.

⁸⁷Government of Canada, *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, http://dsp-psd.tpsgc.gc.ca/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf; 34.

⁸⁸Government of Canada, Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan, http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/approach-approche/ccoa-ccsa.aspx?menu_id=72&menu=L; Internet; accessed 19 April 2009.

⁸⁹Government of Canada, *Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: Quarterly Report*, <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/q108/summary-resume.aspx?lang=en>; Internet accessed 20 April 2009.

increased funding for military equipment and development projects that support the mission. Outside of Afghanistan, the Conservative government approach has adjusted the course of Canadian foreign policy to support countries that are closer to North America and that have a greater potential to contribute to Canada's national interests.⁹⁰ Given the high priority of the Afghanistan mission, the government effort to synchronize the work of its departments is less pronounced in other countries. Recent comments from the International Cooperation Minister, Bev Oda, indicate that in the future Canada may be more likely to provide development aid to countries that have a closer trading relationship with Canada.⁹¹

Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START)

As part of its agenda to improve its capability to respond to crisis, the Canadian government created a Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force to respond to failed and failing states with military and/or development support on short notice. The Conservative government continues to support START as an ideal vehicle to unify and coordinate government actions on short notice. The underlying premise for START was that the best way to address the threats posed by failed and failing states was to prevent state breakdown.⁹² START was designed to give the government the capacity to intervene rapidly to stabilize the situation on the ground and restore security for the local

⁹⁰Lee Berithuame, "CIDA Shift Married with Foreign Policy Priorities: Oda," http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/cida_shift-3-25-2009; Internet, accessed 22 April 2009.

⁹¹*Ibid.*

⁹²Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: Overview*, (Ottawa: Canada, 2005), 13.

population. One of the key aims of START was to demonstrate the benefits of an integrated military and civilian response.

START also filled a critical policy gap that was identified as one of the major weaknesses of Canada's ODA program. It provided oversight and direction to "ensure coherent policy development and integrated conflict prevention, crisis response, and post-conflict peace building and stabilization initiatives."⁹³ START was mandated to bring together representatives from DFAIT, CIDA, DND, RCMP, the Privy Council Office, Justice Canada and Public Security and Emergency Measures Canada (PSEPC) to ensure that these departments were working together to enact the government's agenda in response to significant international crises.⁹⁴ START has only recently begun to take charge but having a group of experts drawn from the key government departments with the mandate to coordinate and lead is a promising step toward better coordination. To this point, apart from the government's own (self-serving) assessment, little has been written about START's effectiveness. The approach looks promising but it is too early to evaluate if it is having a positive impact on the ground in failing states around the world.

Canada Corps

The formation of Canada Corps was designed to improve international stability by encouraging Canadians to volunteer for overseas service and by providing an organization that could channel expertise to development projects in support of Canadian foreign policy goals. Based on a model that was similar to the US Peace Corps, Prime

⁹³Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) Mobilizing Canada's Capacity for International Crisis Response*, (Ottawa: Canada 2005), available from http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/assets/pdfs/library/START_brochure_EN.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 March 2009.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*

Minister Paul Martin envisioned a Canada Corps that would “effectively match the skills and talents of Canadians - including youth - to help nurture democracy and the rule of law in fragile states in the future.”⁹⁵ While its mandate was not as ambitious as the Peace Corps, the introduction was praised by several development organizations as an ideal vehicle for encouraging youth involvement in development issues.⁹⁶ Canada Corps proved to be an effective organization that was able to coordinate hundreds of volunteers and send them abroad to monitor elections in Ukraine, Haiti, Lebanon and several other countries.

CIDA eventually assumed the responsibilities of Canada Corps when the Office of Democratic Governance (ODG) was created on October 30, 2006.⁹⁷ The original Canada Corps mandate has been curtailed and the ODG objectives are now primarily focused on supporting: Human Rights; Accountable Public Institutions; Freedom & Democracy; and Rule of Law.⁹⁸ The most tangible result of the ODG has been the provision of election monitors. This governance focused approach gives Canada a leading role in a critical aspect of nation building but it does not confine its activities to failing states. The shift in focus of the ODG created a gap in responsibilities that has resulted in other objectives of the Canada Corps concept not being met. Canadian volunteers are no longer being recruited for areas outside of democracy support leaving no venue for those who would like to participate in other development projects.

⁹⁵Prime Minister Paul Martin, PCO News Release, “Prime Minister announces co-chairs of Canada Corps and major contribution towards initiative to combat aids,” available from www.longwoods.com/view.php?aid=17247; Internet; accessed 20 March 2009.

⁹⁶Heather Creech and Carolee Buckler, “Contributing to Global Solutions – How Canada Corps can make a difference,” *International Institute for Sustainable Development Commentary*, December 2004, available from http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/commentary_kc1.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 March 2009.

⁹⁷Canadian International Development Agency, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NIC-54102116-JUN>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2009.

⁹⁸Canadian International Development Agency, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/RAC-12143311-QXA>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2009.

Approximately 6000 election monitoring volunteers who have expressed an interest in election monitoring greatly exceed the 400 positions that are required each year.⁹⁹

Additionally, ODG tends to surge in and out of countries in support of elections.

Between elections there is little Canadian involvement which makes establishing long term partnerships difficult.

Uneven Progress

While the IPS established the whole of government theme it was only the first important step on the road to efficiency and effectiveness. Canada now has an effective plan for each department to work together but the details have not been worked out or implemented. Under pressure from the current government, officials from each government department appear to work well together at the lower level, while senior officials are still struggling to coordinate the activities of their respective departments.

In Kandahar, teams from CIDA, DFAIT and DND are collaborating as part of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to establish development projects that will help achieve stability across the province over the long term. The government's willingness to push the whole of government approach forward is remarkable in such a dangerous environment where even soldiers are not sufficiently protected to ensure their safety. The Kandahar PRT experience has been instrumental in demonstrating the power of harnessing expertise from several government departments to tackle the many challenges that arise in failing states. A detailed evaluation of the challenges and successes of the Kandahar PRT would have implications for future PRTs and the whole of government approach but have not been examined in this paper.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*

Despite cooperative working relationships in the field, there remain many points of friction and instances where better coordination is required. The Manning-Harris report to the Fraser Institute documents that of the \$44 million in aid provided to Afghanistan as of 2006, only 1/15th or \$3 million went to Kandahar where the vast majority of Canadian soldiers are located. While there has been a recent shift to allocate more money to southern Afghanistan, the soldiers have been in country since late 2001 and have been focused on Kandahar since 2005. In addition, many development projects conceived locally have been delayed while waiting for funding from CIDA.¹⁰⁰ While many of these observations were made before the recommendations of the Manley Report were implemented, they do indicate that more work needs to be done to concentrate Canada's efforts among soldiers, aid workers and diplomats to ensure government objectives are being met.

The Conservative government has reacted quickly to tighten the focus on Afghanistan. It has announced increased aid funding in support of its Afghanistan benchmarks to the tune of \$821 million dollars over the next three years.¹⁰¹ In most cases the additional aid funding has been an increase to CIDA funding rather than a reallocation of it. The Conservative approach is refreshing in that it forces all government departments to work together in support of the government's most important international priorities. The appointment of David Mulroney as the Deputy Minister Afghanistan Task Force confirms the government's intention to drive the whole of

¹⁰⁰Harris and Manning, 107.

¹⁰¹The Canadian Engagement in Afghanistan website breaks down proposed Canadian expenditures in six priority areas: Security Training 99M; Basic Services 210M; Humanitarian assistance 111M; Border security 32M, National Institutions 355M; and Reconciliation 14M. available from http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/priorities-priorites/index.aspx?menu_id=15&menu=L; Internet; accessed 20 April 2009.

government agenda rather than to let it evolve gradually. This has had a positive impact on government unity in Afghanistan, but because it is country specific it does not ensure tighter coordination in other countries where no government lead has been appointed.

The concentration that has been imposed in Afghanistan has not been observed in Central America, Europe or Africa. Perhaps the most glaring inconsistency occurs when one compares Canada's troop deployments to its aid spending. Outside of Afghanistan, Canada tends to provide aid to countries in Africa and Central America and send its military to others (Middle East, Balkans). In Haiti, where the security threats are undermining the development efforts, Canada has opted to send only a few staff officers on an infrequent basis. Despite a recent reduction in African aid recipients, a large portion of ODA is still being spent there and there has only been one major military mission (Eritrea 2000-2001) since 2000. The rest of the military effort in Africa in 2006 consisted of individual staff officers, observers, and small groups providing training and equipment support.¹⁰²

The early coordination problems could be just growing pains as each organization struggles to find common ground in increasingly complex environments. Learning to cooperate will take time because the solutions for Afghanistan coordination do not necessarily transfer directly to countries in Africa or Central America. If the level of cooperation and efficiency does not continue to improve as each department learns more about the other departments and they work together to align their activities, the Conservative government may impose a solution by appointing senior country or regional directors.

¹⁰²Harris and Manning, 109.

Criticisms of the Whole of Government Approach

While the changes proposed in the whole of government approach indicate that the government is willing to focus more effort on its foreign policy, not everyone is in agreement. Critics argue that the changes do not go far enough or that the proposed changes require more resources. Aid purists have always been suspicious of too much government direction or perceived interference in what they consider to be a humanitarian domain. The whole of government approach has also been criticized by those who are afraid that the use of aid to counter security concerns will serve to shift the focus away from traditional aid priorities.¹⁰³ Additionally there is the fear that lumping aid policy with defence and trade policy will push it to become more interest based. Finally, advocates of independent aid policy have argued for years that the role of aid agencies will be tainted by close association with military forces.¹⁰⁴

Impact of the Whole of Government Approach

The government's decision to revamp its foreign policy and mandate closer cooperation among DFAIT, CIDA, and DND was a long overdue step to improve its ability to assist failing states. Each government department has been working in semi-isolation for years and the effect on the ground has been disjointed. The whole of government approach provides a framework to encourage more cooperation and cohesion within the federal government departments. The results so far have been mixed. Lower level cooperation has begun in earnest but a strategic alignment of the departments has

¹⁰³Cranford Pratt, "Competing Rationales for Canadian Development Assistance," *International Journal* 54, 2 (Spring 1999): 320.

¹⁰⁴Claire Pirotte, Bernard Husson, and Francois Grunewald, eds., *Responding to Emergencies and Fostering Development: The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*, (London and New York: Zed Books, 1999), xxii.

been slow and in some cases actively resisted. The Harper government has had to force the coordination in Afghanistan by appointing a senior representative to actively supervise the coordination. In addition, some criticisms directed at the IPS of 2005, that suggested more resources were required to meet its goals are still valid today, as outside of Afghanistan there hasn't been a substantial increase in ODA. Regardless of these criticisms, Canada's ability to counter the threats poised by failing states will not improve until each department refines its procedures to support common objectives. Even if all government departments perfect their approaches, substantial resources will be required to make a lasting impact in failing states.

The Whole of Canada Approach

The whole of government approach as outlined in the IPS was designed to improve the level of security and development in recipient countries, but it does not go far enough. While not supporting all aspects of the IPS, the Harper government has embraced the whole of government approach and pushed all federal departments to coordinate their actions, especially in Afghanistan. As departments of a medium power, the combined efforts that DND, DFAIT and CIDA bring to the table are insufficient on their own to create a lasting impact. A 'government only' approach does not contribute the level of resources to the problem that are needed to turn things around for a country on the decline. Failing states require massive amounts of resources and expertise. The Manley Report identified the need for a unifying plan and strong national leadership in undertaking the daunting task of assisting a failing state such as Afghanistan.

Separate departmental task forces are not the answer to inadequate coordination of Canadian activities. These coordinating efforts would have stronger effect, and achieve greater cross-government coherence, if

they were led by the prime minister, supported by a cabinet committee and staffed by a single full-time task force. Fulfilling Canada's commitment in Afghanistan requires the political energy only a prime minister can impart.¹⁰⁵

A whole of Canada approach would support the underlying principles that Manley advocated and would encourage Canadians to add their resources to those already provided by government. Andrew Cohen wrote about the need for Canada to give its development program clear direction and to “identify where it can do the most good for the most people and maximize its resources there.”¹⁰⁶ Foreign policies are about choices of where to act and where to apply resources. It is time for Canada to decide that it wants to make a difference in the world and apply its resources in a strategic way.

Contributing to international security by supporting failing states will require additional financial resources, better ideas, and sustained public support for an extended period. Canada needs to harness a larger segment of the population in a united effort if the government wants to establish conditions where its development agenda can create a lasting contribution to international stability and security. The following section outlines the steps that the Canadian government needs to implement to access the untapped resources that could make a substantial difference towards enhancing stability and ensuring that failing states do not become failed states.

Canada needs to develop a plan that engages the imagination of the public. The IPS made the first tentative steps in that direction. It proposed a framework where the federal agencies would work together to reach common goals. Prime Minister Harper

¹⁰⁵Canada, Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, “Final Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan,” (Ottawa, ON: Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, 2008), 25.

¹⁰⁶Cohen, 174.

attempted to generate more support for Afghanistan with several visits to the country and frequent spending announcements. His attempts were marginally successful but public support could not be sustained for what appeared to be primarily a dangerous military mission with little evidence of success on the CIDA and DFAIT fronts. The next step is to create a vision for stability that Canadians can understand and are willing support. Canadians' support for worthy causes was outlined by Prime Minister Paul Martin in the IPS when he stated that: "Those who donate want to know that their contribution is having an effect, that it is improving lives, that it is getting to those who so desperately need it."¹⁰⁷ Given their traditional support for development, Canadians would likely be more willing to support a cause when they can measure its success. It would be logical to assume that they would be even more enthusiastic towards a program that allowed them to contribute to and participate in that success.

In order to augment existing programs, the government needs to identify its goals for stability in failing states and recognize the vital role that Canadians can play in support of this effort. Academic Paul Collier argues that addressing the needs of the world's poorest people in failing states will require high level leadership and that: "The objective of development has to be elevated above the level of the development ministry. Because four different branches of government need to be coordinated, the only level of government likely to be effective is the top."¹⁰⁸ Developed countries can make a more effective contribution to alleviating the level of poverty in failing states if their aid and non-aid policies are coherent and mutually reinforcing. Specifically, government officials need to carefully pick a partner country, encourage the participation of

¹⁰⁷Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: Overview*, (Ottawa: Canada 2005), Foreword 3.

¹⁰⁸Collier, *The Bottom Billion...*, 188.

Canadians through a professional public awareness campaign, and identify key segments of the Canadian population with the necessary skills to assist failing states in their pursuit of stability and security.

Potential Partners

It has already been established that a middle power, like Canada, does not have the military or financial capacity to tackle the challenge of a failed state on its own. Canada needs to limit its search to states that may be failing but still have a government that is capable of cooperating with Canadian efforts. The DAC peer review team “strongly encourages the Canadian government to accelerate the concentration of bilateral aid on fewer countries and to disengage from countries where it does not have a comparative advantage.”¹⁰⁹ Canada can have a comparative advantage in many areas such as governance, health, or education to name just a few. More importantly, Canada can increase its chances of success by choosing to partner with a country that is supported by the Canadian population as well. Canada is also more likely to get the volunteers and experts it needs when the recipients are few and the development goals are clear.

In choosing which failing state to make a partner country there are several considerations that should be taken into account. While the chosen country may exhibit varying levels of local violence and instability in some areas, it cannot have deteriorated to the point that aid workers are targeted for killing or kidnapping by armed gangs. Military forces may be required to assist in dealing with armed actors but the situation should not be one that is likely to transform into a full scale war. The Canadian

¹⁰⁹Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Canada, Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review,” <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/61/39515510.pdf>; Internet; accessed 22 February 2009. 36.

government should not make the mistake of investing heavily in a failing state if it appears the belligerents are merely taking a break to rearm and train for future conflicts. The majority of former belligerents will need to agree to participate in a disarmament and demobilization program prior to being considered as a development partner. The selection of the first potential partner is critical because the public must be able to envision that its efforts are making a difference. Random outbreaks of violence that target civilians or the resumption of wide spread hostilities will threaten the support of Canadians before the plan has had time to generate its own momentum.

Careful country selection is the necessary first step in creating a climate that entices Canadians to become involved. As senior policy advisor and author, Roy Rempel, points out in his book on Canadian foreign policy, “true moral authority for Canadian foreign policy actions flows from the consent of the Canadian people.”¹¹⁰ The Canadian government needs to seek and cultivate that consent by challenging them with a worthwhile, long-term aid partnership that aims to bring a failing state to stability and prosperity. Parliament, supported by experts in DFAIT, should research the possible recipient countries and develop a short list for Canadians to consider. If possible, Canada should choose a country where hostilities have yet to occur and intervene before things deteriorate. If hostilities or war has already occurred, the factions must have agreed to cease hostilities and support a rebuilding effort. The partner country’s population needs to have recent memory of viable public institutions and a desire to work together with the donor country. The potential country should have French or English as one of its official languages. As well the country should have the future capacity to trade goods that are not common in Canada. While it is not absolutely necessary, a warm climate would be

¹¹⁰Rempel, 79.

useful to encourage Canadian interest and participation. Naturally, the better method of gaining consent is from engaging an interested and well informed population. For this reason, the federal government may want to conduct a plebiscite to select the country and form the basis of the awareness campaign. As with any government sponsored program, there will be some danger of oversimplification. It is possible that the public may choose on the basis of different factors than a development worker might. Given CIDA's poor track record in explaining its decisions and garnering the support of Canadians, this risk should be considered acceptable in return for gaining long term public interest and support for the development agenda.

Encouraging Canadian Participation

Once a country is selected the government needs to establish the guidelines for participation and act as a coordinator for public input. In the initial stages the government needs to be able to encourage ideas and manage expectations. Managing this scale of project will require substantial effort on the part of the key federal departments. DFAIT should take the lead by assembling members from CIDA, DFAIT and DND into an organization that can start planning and then expand with the scale of the project. A similar type of organization was introduced by the Conservative government to streamline and coordinate government action in Afghanistan. Additional personnel from other departments can be expected to assist, as the scope of Canada's international efforts shifts from many countries to fewer countries with a large main effort in the selected country. As the public becomes more interested, the first priority for the federal government will be to have systems in place to handle the influx of questions, volunteers, and expertise.

CIDA is frequently criticized for having poor public relations¹¹¹ that diminish the level of support for development among the general population. The Whole of Canada approach must be able to generate and maintain public support from the outset. Maurice Strong, former head of CIDA, stressed the critical role of public support in any larger international undertaking when he said that “Public understanding and support, therefore, are among the most urgent priorities for the very survival of the Canadian capacity to play a constructive international role.”¹¹² The Whole of Canada approach would obtain public support by making Canadians part of the process at every stage.

Cash Contributions

Canadians already donate their time and money¹¹³ to numerous charities and have identified that the most common reason for giving was to help those in need.¹¹⁴ While most donations are intended for domestic causes, the amount of money donated is twice as much as the government allocates to the entire ODA budget.¹¹⁵ The Canadian government could leverage this source of funding by giving Canadians the opportunity to support projects or ventures in the selected region or country. Rather than watching their donations allocated to dozens of countries Canadians would have a much clearer picture

¹¹¹Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Canada, Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review,” <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/61/39515510.pdf>; accessed 22 February 2009. 28.

¹¹²Maurice Strong, *Connecting with the World: Priorities for Canadian Internationalism in the 21st Century*, (International Development Research and Policy Task Force, November 1996), 7.

¹¹³Canadians donated \$8.9 Billion to registered charities in 2004, <http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/.3ndic.1t.4r@-eng.jsp?iid=69>; Internet ;accessed 2 March, 2009.

¹¹⁴David Lasby, and David McIver, *Where Canadians Donate: Donating by Type of Organization*, http://www.givingandvolunteering.ca/pdf/reports/Where_Canadians_Donate.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 March 2009.

¹¹⁵8.6 billion was donated for tax purposes in 2007, <http://www.envision.ca/templates/news.asp?ID=8467>; Internet; accessed 4 March 2009. 4.6 billion was allocated to ODA in 2006/2007, “Harper Budget Fails to Deliver on Commitment to World's Poor,” http://www.ccic.ca/e/004/news_2007-03-19_budget.shtml; accessed 4 March 2009.

of the recipient country's needs and its development goals. This is likely to create a personal attachment to the cause and foster a higher level of contribution.

While many Canadians may prefer to donate to their charity of choice the government should be able to stimulate interest through a public awareness campaign to suggest projects in the sponsored country that are already being sponsored by existing charities. Parents who are considering sponsoring a child in the developing world could be encouraged to pick a child in the sponsored country to further reinforce the national effort.

Volunteers

For the purposes of this paper volunteers will refer to those citizens who want to donate their time either in Canada or overseas but do not possess the level of skills that would classify them as experts or professionals. Students or adults who choose volunteer work that is not related to their education or work experience would be typical examples. Volunteers will be able to assist with routine tasks in support of individual projects or the campaign as a whole. Volunteers can become a vast resource of labour that helps to keep administration costs down and thereby ensure more financial resources are available to fund development projects directly. The Canadian government would be able to mobilize large numbers of volunteers as it currently does for election monitors under the CANADEM program.¹¹⁶ The recent trend in volunteer tourism has demonstrated that volunteers are willing to pay for the opportunity to assist in developing countries and

¹¹⁶Canadian International Development Agency, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/RAC-12143311-QXA>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2009.

dedicate their vacation time to do it.¹¹⁷ Canada would be wise to cater to this type of volunteer in order to advance development goals. The Canadian government could increase funding to NGOs who coordinate these volunteer activities. As a minimum the federal government could encourage them to volunteer in the same country or region where the Canadian government is working to assist failing states. The potential boost that volunteers could provide to existing government efforts is an opportunity that the government must seize if it is to be successful.

Professionals and Experts

Professionals and experts represent the largest untapped resource available to support government development initiatives. Most of the world's failing states suffer from the deterioration of national institutions that hold the country together. These national institutions become marginalized when more pressing needs like nutrition, shelter and security are in short supply. If left to decline for too long, eventually the supply of local experts will dwindle to the point that a country is unable to assist its own citizens. Simon Fraser University professor John Richards recommends that Canada maximize its contribution to international development by specializing in areas where it has a competitive advantage such as health and education. He predicts that in so doing Canada could "improve the quality of life for millions of people beyond our borders."¹¹⁸ Professionals and experts from Canada can play a key role in stemming the loss of expertise and propping up national systems of education, justice, health care and

¹¹⁷ Aaron Dalton, "10 Voluntourism Trips" Forbestraveller.com, available from <http://www.forbestraveler.com/adventure/volunteer-tourism-trips-story.html>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2009.

¹¹⁸ John Richards, "Can Aid Work? Thinking About Development Strategy," *CD Howe Institute Commentary* 231 (April 2006), 25.

commerce in failing states. Advice and participation – if done properly and with sufficient cultural awareness – is a more efficient method of assisting developing countries as it empowers the people and is less likely to create a culture of dependency.

Supporting education is one of the greatest contributions that Canada can make as part of its development plan. Investments in education increase the capacity of the recipient country to solve its own problems and will reduce the likelihood that future generations will be tempted to join criminal or terrorist groups. Education allows a population to distance itself from the disappointments of the past and provides hope for the future. Canada can support this effort by encouraging teachers and school administrators to establish links in the partner country. Students and teachers can study modern problems in the context of a failing state. Student interest will lead to family discussion and more awareness. Canadian teachers overseas may be enticed to move from the countries that traditionally attract them to Canada's partner country to teach as part of a Canadian educational project. Teachers may also be more likely to spend a year away from the Canadian system and experience another culture if the federal government can convince provincial governments to guarantee teachers' jobs upon return or assist in making their transition easier.

The next major sector where Canadian expertise can have a lasting impact is justice. Much of the pessimism in failing states stems from the fact that citizens feel that their government is unable or unwilling to protect them. As outlined earlier, crime and violence tend to increase as the power of the government is reduced. The ability of the government to prevent violence and prosecute criminals can quickly help to stabilize the situation and enable other development projects to proceed. Establishing the rule of law

is critical to creating an environment where international aid workers can operate and locals trust the system enough to assist police and justice officials with information. Canadian police regularly send small contingents of officers to peacekeeping missions around the world. Unfortunately, their efforts are not always combined with those of other government departments. Much progress can be made when police, lawyers and corrections personnel work together to improve the administration of the justice system. Once again, professional exchanges could serve to increase the speed with which improvements can be made in the developing justice system.

The health sector is of critical importance to a country's ability to sustain itself. Citizens of developing countries need to be able to seek medical attention for the life threatening situations that are common in failing states. Eventually, as the immediate threats to life are addressed, the focus needs to shift to prevention. Canadian doctors, nurses and health administrators can play a vital role in improving the health system of the chosen country. Doctors currently donate their time and expertise to organizations like Médecines Sans Frontières without government support or active encouragement. By working closely with NGOs and provincial governments, Canada can have a substantial impact in failing states by supporting the exchange of doctors, nurses and other health care professionals.

The opportunity to work overseas or be part of a professional exchange program will benefit both the developing country and the individuals who participate. The cross cultural exchange will make future development projects easier to plan as the level of understanding grows over time. Exchanges have the potential to double the positive impact as foreign professionals can advance their skills in Canada while Canadians work

to improve public institutions in the developing country. The Canadian government can work to support existing exchange programs, ease the bureaucratic regulations that hamper exchanges and subsidize some of the expenses incurred by the developing country.

Consumers and the Business Community

The next significant neglected resource in Canada's approach to failing states is the average Canadian citizen. The impact that an influx of cash from Canadian consumers could provide is substantial. Canadians already spend billions of dollars on imports and travel. Most of this money is spread around the world and the destination varies with the individual tastes of the purchaser. A sustained marketing campaign that encourages Canadians to spend and travel in the sponsored failing state could transfer millions of dollars to support the local economy. This money is being spent already and many Canadians would consider shifting their purchasing patterns if it also supported a national project to help a failing state. Additional incentives could be introduced by the federal government to enhance the benefit of spending money in the chosen country. Expenditures in the chosen country could qualify for a partial tax deduction, import duties could be reduced, etc. The Canadian government may need to make the case to the World Trade Organization that exceptions to current regulations be relaxed for failing states in an effort to accelerate their development. The proposed exemption could be applied to countries that have a per capita GNI below a certain threshold. Supporting development goals while shopping or vacationing is a proposal that many Canadians would enthusiastically support. Also, one should not underestimate the positive influence that a warm climate can have on Canadian's willingness to spend. Canadians are going

to make these expenditures regardless of government policy. It would be wise for the government to shape the spending patterns of Canadians so that they reinforce rather than detract from the government's agenda.

For over twenty years, Canadian parliamentary committees have lamented that “the business community is the most underutilized resource in Canadian official development assistance.”¹¹⁹ Business leaders and investors could easily support the local economy as the security situation in failing states begins to improve. The large underemployed workforce in many developing countries offers opportunities for entrepreneurs to start businesses there or to partner with locals to do the same. Danielle Goldfarb recommended in 2006 that Canada should do a better job of including civil society and private sector involvement in their aid projects. She explained how the Dutch entrepreneurs are encouraged to visit aid missions to discover potential investment opportunities that will assist long term development.¹²⁰ Canada can encourage business partnerships by promoting trade from the partner country and reducing regulations that restrict the flow of goods, personnel and finances. As recently as February 2007, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade criticised the government's approach to providing aid in Africa. It endorsed a new approach that was based “on economic development that targets such areas as increasing agriculture productivity, improving access to micro-finance and developing small business development.”¹²¹ The active encouragement of consumers and businesses in Canada's

¹¹⁹Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *For Whose Benefit? Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on Canada's Official Development Assistance Policies and Programs*, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987), 99.

¹²⁰Goldfarb, *Effective Aid and Beyond...*, 13.

¹²¹ Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Overcoming 40 Years of Failure: A New Roadmap for Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, February 2007), xi.

development projects will go a long way to meeting these aims. In fact the recommendation has already been made by the committee for Canada to “play a leading role on the African continent by developing additional programs to help Canadian companies wishing to operate there. Direct support for private sector development needs to be strengthened.”¹²² In total, the cumulative contribution of Canadian consumers and entrepreneurs would provide a tremendous financial stimulus in the partnered failing states without removing a dollar from the existing ODA budget. The potential impact of this measure is desperately needed and too significant to ignore.

Increasing Effectiveness

There are many advantages to increasing Canadian involvement in one country. A Whole of Canada approach is more likely to uncover indications that aid projects are not working. Increased Canadian participation will provide more observers to assess which programs or projects are having the greatest impact. Feedback can be encouraged outside of the immediate aid delivery network if civilian volunteers, aid workers, or tourists feel confident to report perceived irregularities they uncover inadvertently through their local contacts. Instances of corruption, theft, and intimidation can be more easily discovered when donor agents are dispersed into many functional areas. With many Canadian supporters working in country there should be less fear that honest criticism of the donor’s policy will result in aid reduction.

Grouping Canada’s effort under one umbrella can reduce overhead costs for CIDA thereby targeting a larger portion of the ODA budget to projects on the ground. CIDA has long been criticized for having concentrated its staff in Ottawa and not in the

¹²²Ibid., 109.

countries where aid is required. Part of the argument is that it would be too costly to transfer CIDA staff to the field. While the cost of sending one staffer to a country to live alone may be cost prohibitive, the cost of adding one CIDA staffer to an existing diplomatic or military mission is marginal. With larger Canadian operations in the partner country, there will be many more opportunities for volunteers and aid workers to cooperate and share facilities. These savings would be in addition to the synergies generated when a large group of enthusiastic Canadians get together to work on a common national goal.

Working together under a whole of Canada approach also has significant implications for military forces. As conditions improve in the failing state, the number of soldiers deployed can be reduced, giving the government flexibility to deploy to other problem areas. If campaigns are not expected to last for ten years like they did in Bosnia, and are expected to last in Afghanistan, the government can afford to send larger contingents of soldiers at the start of a campaign when they are most needed. Larger troop contributions will make it quicker and easier to establish the security conditions that allow development workers and NGO's to operate in safety.

Increased Long-term Public Support

The potential for wide scale support of this new approach is encouraging. Even fiscally conservative politicians such as Preston Manning and Mike Harris have suggested in a report to the Fraser Institute that Canadians are willing to embrace new approaches to the delivery of Canadian aid. In proposing reforms that improve the level of international development and individual security, they predict that: "Your sense of pride in Canada as an international beacon of hope will be increased, as Canada assumes

greater responsibility for the defense of freedom and the eradication of suffering by building prosperity in poor nations.”¹²³ The Whole of Canada approach has the potential fill the gap that has existed in Canada for years. No longer will Canadian support and willingness to help be squandered on the realities of a fragmented development framework that is poorly executed.

The whole of Canada approach to assisting failing states is designed to solicit and maintain wide spread public support. Canadians want to help but they need better leadership and a framework for development that encourages them to be part of the process. Generating consensus is easy in a national emergency. When the government decides to take discretionary action it is much harder to get agreement.¹²⁴ Development is a discretionary endeavour that can easily be curtailed if the public loses interest. A successful long-term development plan needs to capture the imagination of Canadians and keep them interested. This can be achieved by encouraging Canadians to become part of the process and by making it easy for their everyday actions to contribute to the development goals they have set. The whole of Canada approach provides a much overdue development framework that can meet the needs of Canadians and the needs of those living in the failing states of the world.

Conclusion

Canadians are fortunate to live in a country that is prosperous and secure. They trust their government to develop policies and take action that will protect their interests and maintain Canada’s relative standard of living. Recent developments in the

¹²³Harris and Manning, 6.

¹²⁴United Kingdom, Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, *The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Doctrine Note 4/05*, (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2006), 1-2.

international environment have dramatically changed the nature of the threats facing Canada. Threats arising from failing states such as terrorism, crime, mass migrations and health pandemics have the potential to jeopardize Canada's future prosperity and security. Even if it were possible to insulate Canadians from all of these threats, Canada would still suffer if the instability of failing states negatively impacted Canada's allies or its trading partners. Canada needs to take decisive action in order to support its allies and trading partners, and make an acceptable contribution to assist the citizens of failing states who desperately need help from the developed world.

Canada's impact on the international stage has been dwindling gradually since the end of the Second World War. Canada continues to make a contribution but its efforts are being surpassed by allies and trading partners who have adjusted the workings of their national institutions to better achieve national aims. Canada may not have the economic or military power to rescue failed states, but it can make a significant impact by preventing failing states from deteriorating into failed states. Assisting failing states is a laudable goal that is necessary to protect Canadians and will also improve Canada's reputation internationally.

Any effort to assist failing states must contain a robust development plan. Canadian politicians and academics have conducted numerous studies over the past 40 years and made a myriad of suggestions on how to improve Canada's ODA delivery. Canada's development record pales in comparison to most countries in the OECD. The countries with the best development record have several characteristics in common. Firstly they have a long term focus that narrows the number of development partners and projects. They plan effectively and are open to new policy ideas, they coordinate

development plans nationally with other government departments, and they strive to develop enduring relationships with their aid recipients. Canada lags behind the leaders, in terms of total amount of aid, percentage of GNI allocated to ODA, percentage of personnel in the field, policy research and innovation and openness. Canada leads all OECD nations in the administrative costs of aid and aid dispersal, categories which are hardly indicative of progress.

In an attempt to reinvigorate Canadian policy, Prime Minister Paul Martin introduced the International Policy Statement in 2005. One of its many themes was to improve the direction and effectiveness of government policy by unifying the efforts of government departments through a whole of government approach. The Conservative government of Prime Minister Harper embraced the whole of government theme and changed the working relationships of the key departments and gave them firm direction to coordinate and cooperate in order to advance Canadian aims. In support of the Afghanistan mission, additional senior managers were appointed to expedite the transition and coordination. Much work remains to be done to obtain a similar unity of purpose in other regions and other failing states.

This paper has reviewed the application of the whole of government approach and suggested ways in which the efforts of the government could be improved by harnessing the will and skills of the Canadian public. Some experts express doubt that recent changes in the whole of government approach will go far enough to protect Canada from the threats inherent in today's unstable world. Unifying government efforts to confront the threats posed by failing states is a step in the right direction but better results are absolutely necessary. More resources are required to be successful because the threats

arising from failing states are real and growing. Canada needs to narrow its focus and form a partnership with one of the many failing countries so that every effort can be made to ensure its success. Canada needs more resources than it has currently assembled for this task. Ottawa must engage the citizens of this country so that they can contribute and make the difference. The potential financial resources, expertise, ideas, and volunteer effort that Canadians can provide to this project will prove to be the deciding factor. Canada needs to move past its whole of government approach and adopt a whole of Canada approach that will give it the momentum required to assist the citizens of failing states to become prosperous and secure.

Forty years ago Prime Minister Trudeau made bold predications about future threats coming from the developing world and he was proven correct. In 2007 former Foreign Affairs Minister, Lloyd Axworthy and author Duncan Brack underlined the necessity of meeting the needs of the developing world in order to promote peace by tackling it on two fronts. “The first front is a security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace.”¹²⁵ The Canadian approach to international security has changed greatly over the last forty years. Successive governments in Ottawa have adopted a more unified approach in harnessing the whole of government but as the prevalence of failing states has increased the goal posts have also moved. Canada needs to adopt an approach to international assistance and security that taps all national resources. The federal government must take a whole of Canada approach and harness all of the available resources in order assist

¹²⁵Duncan Brack, “Introduction,” in *Trade, Aid and Security: An Agenda for Peace and Development*, ed, Oli Brown, Mark Halle, Sonia Pena Moreno and Sebastian Winkler, 1-17 (London: Earthscan 2007), 1.

failing states and improve international stability. If more countries were to take this approach in the next forty years, the threat generated by failing states may be reduced to such a level as to greatly improve international stability and the chances of obtaining a lasting peace.

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