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Officer Professional Development – Reaching Out for a Comprehensive Approach

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ABSTRACT

This paper discussed CF officer professional development in the context of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) to operations. It explores how CA teams are formed, the core courses of CF officer professional development in development periods three and four, and then compares them to other government departments and non-governmental agencies. The paper then asserts that current attempts to link exercise and professional development activities – generally on CF courses and exercises - are valid but destined to marginal returns due to the structure of the other agencies. It further suggests that efforts to place CF officers in civilian graduate schools as part of either developmental period three or four is the only way to achieve deep and meaningful integration with OGDs and NGOs and thereby optimize CF officer PD to achieving the comprehensive approach to operations.

CHAPTER 1 – A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

It is an accepted truism that the Canadian Forces (CF) was on something of an

operational pause between the Korean War and the break-up of the former Yugoslavia.

The pause did not so much take the form of a cessation of operations, but was focused on

detailed preparation for a high-intensity, alliance based world war. The cold war saw

Canada's military preparing to fight in the European theatre, as part of the NATO

alliance. As such, the military was preparing to execute tasks in which the Canadian

policy was harmonized with the NATO policy to a sufficient degree that it became

invisible to CF officers. What was accepted as professional development, in many ways

degenerated into memorization of repetitive annual NATO exercises and time in rank

without challenge or examination.[1] The corollary of this cold war drift, is that the CF has

become isolated from its natural and appropriate partners who are also engaged in finding

agile solutions to security, stability and defence issues in the world.

BACK TO THE BASICS

Since the CF began operations in the Former Yugoslavia and Africa, and more

certainly since the CF's commencement of operations in Afghanistan, it has become clear

that the nature of conflict is substantially different than the way it was portrayed in the

'same as last year' culture and doctrine of the CF prior to 1993. Perhaps the core theme

of this change inside the CF has been the increasing awareness that military force alone is

not the solution to contemporary conflicts, and an increasing understanding that there is a

requirement to use force on occasion, if only to achieve a very narrowly defined security

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[1] Rodger Barrett. "Officer Professional Development – The Key to Army Transformation" Research Paper, Masters of Defence Studies. (Toronto: Canadian Forces College: 2004) 16-21.

piece of the solution space.[2] The success of current CF operations requires the

engagement and active support of multiple outside agencies. While the phenomenon has

multiple names, this study will characterize this phenomenon with the term

Comprehensive Approach (CA).

> Whilst there is not commonly accepted definition for 'Comprehensive
> Approach', there is broad agreement that it implies pursuing an approach
> aimed at integrating the political, security, development, rule of law,
> human rights and humanitarian dimensions of international missions.[3]

This paper will explore barriers to an effective CA methodology to operations, in

particular in education and culture. It is the position of this paper that the CF and

Canadian Government writ large have effectively ghettoised the government agencies

responsible for the key elements of comprehensive approach (DFAIT, CIDA, START,

DND) to the point that they see the world from perspectives so different as to often be

incompatible. In order to improve this situation, this study will review CF Officer

professional development systems and analyse the interconnectivity of the departments

and NGOs. The result will be recommendations of actions the CF can initiate to ensure

development occurs to overcome the ghetto effect and enable a differing but

complimentary ensemble, or compilation effect for the comprehensive approach to

operations in the Canadian context.

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[2] Lara Olson. "Fighting for Humanitarian Space: NGOs in Afghanistan." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies,* Fall 2006, Vol 9 Issue 1

[3] Briefing note FOUO. "Senior Leader Level International Seminar on "Comprehensive Approach: Trends, challenges and possibilities of co-operation in crisis prevention and management" Finish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Helsinki 17 June 2008)

CHAPTER 2 – DEFINING THE CHALLENGE

> The government of Canada expects that the Canadian Forces to "defend
> the country and be a positive force in the world, both today and in the
> years to come."[4]

It is in the second half of the Prime Minister's task statement that he sets the goal of

being a positive force in the world. While it is probably some of the boldest and widest

guidance which can be given to a military force, it also clearly intimates a level of

engagement which will require a broader skill set than only the management of violence.

Indeed, if war truly is politics by other means[5], then the military has always been

engaged in the interactions of the "*politicus*" or human society.[6] Simply put, the military

(the element of society that fights wars) is just another form of human societal

interaction. Therefore, it is natural that the Canadian military profession, manifested as

the Canadian Forces (CF), is part and parcel of the fabric of the functioning interaction of

the Canadian people both at home and abroad; at least in theory.

There remains a compartmentalized understanding that warfighting is on one side

of the shop and Operations Other Than War (OOTW) is a separate entity and CA is

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[4] The Right Honourable Steven Joseph Harper introduction to *Canada First Defence Strategy*. 2008.

[5] The often used Clauswitz quote of "war is politics by other means" is actually cited in the current
translation as "war is political intercourse, carried on with other means." Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*.
Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)
87. However, the commonly held phrasing of politics is what truly assists in understanding contemporary
conflict, as we will see below.

[6] politic (adj.) 1427, from M.Fr. *politique* (14c.) "political," from L. *politicus* "of citizens or the state, civil,
civic," from Gk. *politikos* "of citizens or the state," from *polites* "citizen," from *polis* "city" (see *policy* (1)).
Replaced in most adj. senses by *political* (1551). The verb meaning "to engage in political activity" is first
recorded 1917, a back-formation from *politics.* Cited in
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=politic accessed 18 Feb 09.

sometimes expressed as a link between the two.[7] However, the contemporary operating

environment expresses that concerns, other than strictly military ones, are crucial to

success both in conventional warfighting and OOTW.

CA is the expression of the reality that there is no switch, and that military

operations are by their very nature executed in a politicized manner because they are

achieving a political aim. Where the commander is required for mission success, to

interact with civilian leadership, they enter into the CA methodology of operations. At

which level of command this occurs defines the level of CA impact and the requirement

for training of that commander. This chapter will define that level and the scope of the

challenge.

STOVEPIPES AS CHALLENGES AND REALITY

The legal guidance and limitations to this involvement are contained in the

National Defence Act (NDA).[8] This document clearly articulates the reporting

relationship of DND and the CF. The CF, commanded by the Chief of the Defence Staff

(CDS) is clearly subordinate to the Minister and reports normally via the Minister to the

Governor in Council.[9] This structure clearly does not include other government

departments (OGDs). Indeed, the NDA specifies that direction to the CF (ie to military

forces) is to be issued by or through the CDS.[10] OGDs are run by other Ministers, and

subject to their own unique legislation. Despite this, CF activities often involve support

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[7] Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Mr. Peter Gizewski, and Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek. "Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces Operations" *Canadian Military Journal* Vol 9, No 1.

[8] Canada. National Defence Act. Accessed at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/N-5/index.html 13 Jan 09.

[9] NDA Art 12.

[10] NDA Art 18(2).

to other levels of government or OGDs. Stated succinctly, DND and the CF it contains are stove pipes by legislation, much like any other government department.

Where the legal framework, martial theory and contemporary direction meet in the Canadian context has been on remarkably consistent ground in recent years. All three of the *2008 Canada First Defence Strategy(CFDS), 2005 Canada's International Policy Statement (CIPS) and the 2004 Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy(CNSP)* show a broad correlation on a number of ideas. First, while DND and the CF have what is often perceived as a primary responsibility abroad, it also has substantial responsibilities domestically. Second, whenever any of these responsibilities is discharged, without exception it does so in concert with other government agencies.[11] Indeed, in the eight chapters of the CNSP, seven are set in the domestic context, all with OGDs as lead. Third, in the final chapter entitled International Security, it is clear that diplomacy, dialogue, capacity building and counter-terrorism are the key elements of Canada's approach to security. Primacy of place in the highlights of the chapter is the indication of national security being one of the top priorities in the policy review. This review was later published as the CIPS.[12] Finally, the CIPS is structured with an overview volume and four separate volumes: Diplomacy, Defence, Development and Commerce. So, even if one might think DND could be the lead agency outside of Canada, the CIPS puts that into perspective with DND being appropriately supporting to the overarching roles of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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[11] This is despite there being no legislative structure to guide this outside of direct coordination Minister to Minister – or higher. The majority of this coordination is done via the PCO, Interdepartmental MOUs or simply through direct and non-binding negotiation.

[12] CNSP.

(DFAIT). In summary, the CF is legally subordinate only to the centre, but almost always not the lead agency in any of its operating environments. It is clear then, that stovepipes are a challenge and a reality from an organizationally, and as we will see in later chapters, a relationship challenge as well. It would seem that this is a construct designed to cause friction[13].

WHO ARE THE PLAYERS?

Paul Chapin indicates that there are effectively more than a dozen partner Canadian OGDs in the foreign security field alone.[14] Taking the Afghanistan example, the Manley Report articulates that within the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) there reside representatives of the DND, DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP, Municipal Police Forces, Corrections Canada as well as US agencies.[15] The Manley Report makes repeated emphasis on the importance of the integrated team that is the KPRT. They go even further to say that the integrated nature of the team must evolve to include not only increased civilian participation, but that it should include increased local decision making and be placed under civilian leadership. The impression left by the Manley Report is clearly that the KPRT is an early and imperfect example of what the desired solution of the stovepipes in harmony. Based upon not only the multiple governmental agencies but the foreign ones as well listed by the Manley Report, it is fair to say that the combination of stovepipes may range substantially, perhaps even unpredictably in any given situation.

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[13] Paraphrased: Conflict is composed of long series of simple things, which are often individually difficult. As these difficulties accumulate, they can stop any forward movement. *On War* 119.

[14] Paul Chapin. "The Evolving Canadian Security Policy Framework" in *Canadians and Asia-Pacific Security*. Vimy Paper 2008, (Ottawa : The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2008) 19.

[15] Canada. The Honourable John Manley P.C. (Chair). *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan.* (Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008) 23.

If the goal remains to integrate multiple players in a team inclusive of the CF, why have we not already found a work-around despite the legal limitations? The problem it would seem is one of cultures.

THE RULES OF THE GAME

First, legislatively departments are headed by Ministers. Ministers are unlikely to accept being told what to do by a staff officer from an outside agency, especially if it happens to conflict with advice received from within their own department. A common staffer perception is that it happens enough from the PMO and via their DMs from PCO. Why create more problems for which there is no legal basis? Second, most issues already have designated lead agencies. Why create a lead agency to lead the lead agency? Presumably that is what PCO provides Cabinet already. Third and most critically, OGDs do not often exercise. Like police agencies, OGDs generally like spending their money on doing their job in real time, not practicing for what might happen. What might happen is Defence's problem anyway. This brings us to the nature of the problem: culture.

For this reason in all of the documentation dealt with from the Government of Canada, (GOC) the CF and DND are more than simply encouraged to engage OGDs. The task statements and characterizations of their operating environment clearly mandate heavy integration into OGDs as a minimum, and as will be discussed later, perhaps beyond that into Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

THE MILITARY APPROACH

Interestingly, military culture trains and socializes minds to see a problem and want to develop, if not a templated and reusable solution, then doctrine and principles that answer the problem for the future. Once doctrine is developed, provided the

capability is important, training is carried out on a cyclical basis, as balanced against

other priorities. This cycle is clearly necessary as a violent environment generally

requires an immediate reaction, and often a simple plan, but one created without time for

deep reflection. This dynamic of constant training is so ingrained by the military culture

that it becomes difficult to understand other methodologies without dismissing them as

inferior or lazy.

Other agencies, governmental or not, may adopt the approach that each situation

is different, requires appropriate analysis and cannot be templated. This alleviates the

requirement for training, and allows the limited human and financial resources of that

agency to deal with "reality" rather than spend excessive time and effort creating a

template which they hope to apply to "reality" in the future.

In explaining his "Rubik's Cube" approach to contingency operations, Ken

Summers details standing force packages from DFAIT, DND, CIDA, Solicitor-General,

Fisheries & Oceans/Transport, and Public safety Canada. He then states the ability to

deploy this Whole of Government package would be possible if, "the departments had

trained together as envisioned earlier and if the Canadian response were deployed

rapidly, this would represent an example of a coordinated and timely response."[16]

Summers goes even further to state the requirement for a central Whole of Government

agency which would oversee, train and deploy these integrated teams on behalf of the

Government of Canada.[17] This is an ideal solution for Summers, and indeed most

conventional military minds. The difficulty is that it runs counter to all manner of human

[16] Ken Summers. "Expeditionary Command: Developing a Rubik's Cube Response Capability." Vimy Paper 2008, (Ottawa : The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2008) 115.

[17] Summers. 117

realities and the culture of many agencies with which the military must involve itself harmoniously in order for a Comprehensive Approach to work. As articulated above, this approach is unlikely to be fully embraced by OGDs and NGOs for organisational and cultural reasons. However to still succeed in functioning, and at times assist other agencies to function between each other, it is crucial for CF officers to understand their partners.

Chapin goes on to say "It is common to ascribe the problem to the cultural divides that historically have separated the military and civilian worlds, but the root of the problem is continued poor definition of the roles and responsibilities of entities with strong traditions of independence forced into intimacy because of common cause."[18] From a military perspective, this would seem sound. However, as was discussed previously, most government departments are the products of legislation in much the same way DND is. As such, it is likely inaccurate to describe the problem as one of military vs civilian, but rather that the problem should be viewed as a department vs. department one. In this context, DND is often the target of mistrust due to its size, budget and what is sometimes characterised as a tendency to try to "take over the show." For the purposes of this study, the assumption that the phenomenon is department vs. department will be followed, with the understanding that we are trying to improve the effectiveness of the comprehensive approach by doing things within the power of DND to unilaterally effect.

The requirement for integrated expeditionary and domestic operations is well laid out in all three major policy documents since 2004. However, the desire to change how

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[18] Chapin. 20.

these teams are assembled and led has not carried over into changing how the legislative bases of the government departments are structured. It is in an environment of accepting current legislative realities that this document will look for solutions.

THE REMAINING OPTIONS

The situation as it stands leaves two options for the conduct of complex operations which span the globe: the operations can be centrally micromanaged[19]; or operations can be conducted through initiative, coordination and understanding.[20] Neither solution is perfect, or uniquely workable in truth. It is self-evident that national level micro-management cannot effectively control a complex and fluid operation half a world away. Even with the most advanced of communications methodologies, some degree of delegation and initiative is required. An excellent discussion of these concepts is found in the *Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command* document.[21] Indeed an interesting corollary could be made for the army/air force divide of delegation versus central control to apply to the differences of command and control styles practiced in different agencies both governmental and non. Clearly methodologies will vary, but these variances, as will be discussed later, will need to be understood in order to harmonize effects.

The formal delegation structure for representing national will abroad was the creation of the posts of Ambassador or Expeditionary Force Commander (now often

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[19] Manley 28 – recommending a PM led central task force, since created in the PCO under a DM level public servant.

[20] Manley 29 – specifically in reference for central agencies to delegate decision making authority for risk exposure for deployed CIDA officials.

[21] Allan English and Colonel John Westrop (Retired). *Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command: The Human Dimension of Expeditionary Air Force Operations.* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007)

referred to as the Commander of a Joint Taskforce). Each is the manifestation of its stove pipe's mechanism for delegation. The current construct of the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) is an interesting evolution. As the Ambassador has no national peer once deployed, save the head of state, they can have no military peer. Hence, the RoCK completes two functions as being both the subordinate of the Ambassador in Kabul, and the DFAIT co-equal to the Comd JTF-Afg. Yet without authorities to give direction to all Canadian elements in a theatre, the two independent leaders could frustrate not only at the local level, but at the national level as disagreements half a world away are arbitrated at the highest levels in the home country. Clearly then, some degree of collegiality and coordination is required, and both centralized planning and decentralized, delegated execution are the key. To do so will require an intimate understanding from the uniformed mind and the civilian governmental and perhaps non-governmental agency at the strategic and operational/tactical levels. Indeed, these integrated teams with complex, ambiguous command and control arrangements leaving much to the deployed leaders to interpret are already upon us.

IS IT GOOD ENOUGH YET?

One example of the operational manifestation of this stovepipes in harmony is the command relationships of the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A) which were three fold; "assigned OPCOM (subordinate by Operational Command) to Comd JTF-Afg (Commander Joint Task Force – Afghanistan), under the general guidance of Canada's Head of Mission to Afghanistan; and responsive to GIRA (Government of the

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) ministry requests."[22]   The SAT-A is a team including at the time, over a dozen military officers and a handful of DFAIT and CIDA personnel to conduct capacity building and mentoring activities within the ministries of the GIRA. Commanded by a Colonel, the arrangements were subject to substantial discussion as evidenced by the traffic enclosed in the Op Order.[23]   The meaning of this official jargon is nuanced. First, the OPCOM relationship meant that the military members of the SAT were subordinate legally only to Comd JTF-Afg. However, the reality of DFAIT being the lead agency meant that the Canadian Head Of Mission (HOM) was truthfully the authoritative voice in nation building and diplomatic efforts. Yet as previously discussed, the HOM was incapable of taking OPCOM of the SAT as it not legislatively possible to do so under the NDA. As such, the Colonel commanding the SAT was to listen closely to the HOM's guidance, but would not be held to account under military law for a difference of opinion with the HOM. To complicate the issue further, the SAT commander was to be responsive to the desires of the Afghan government's requests as well. To summarise, the Colonel commanding the SAT was responsible to a Canadian General in Afghanistan, responsive to the Afghan government's requests, while sensitive to Canadian government foreign policy as locally interpreted by the Canadian Ambassador in Kabul. Clearly such a situation would demand more from that Colonel than an extensive background in military doctrine and some basic exposure to political theory.

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[22] 3350-165/A38 (J5) CEFCOM Force Preparation Order Op ARGUS – Rotation Three, 25 January 2008. p 11.

[23] IBID Letter Comd CEFCOM – ADM (Pol)enclosure.

SUMMARISED CHALLENGES

It is clear that DND and the CF it contains is a legislated stove pipe. While task forces, tiger teams and projects may come and go, the reality of the contemporary operating environment is that close cooperation between the silos of excellence is required. As articulated by all foreign policy and security direction there is no mechanism to force the key agencies together functionally, except in PCO taskforce shotgun weddings as the world and domestic political situations evolve. For large government departments to have no formal linkage is a reality of legislation. However, to continue to accept that there should be no systematic community building improving practices between these departments when all have substantial commonalities in personnel profiles seems more than unwise. As a community of government agencies, it would seem wise that we do all in our power to find linkages. As a recent CFLI document observed,

> …the various line agencies with the (PCO) Task Force (on Afghanistan) itself – DND, DFAIT and CIDA – have deliberately decided to engage with their counterparts in an attempt to "make it work" in spite of such institutional constraints. Together, representatives from these departments are trying to find ways to work around the legal barriers that exist, not through an illegal or unethical avenues, but rather through a greater degree of collaboration and a greater sense of corporate spirit.[24]

To find a military historical anecdote would be to cite military leaders of the past. Generals Marshal, Eisenhower and Powell understood how politics not only capped the powers of the military profession, but extended into it. Generals such as MacArthur and Patton, however brilliant, were eventually proved unable to complete their assigned

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[24] Craig Leslie Mantle, "How do we go About Building Peace While We're Still at War: Canada, Afghanistan and the Whole of Government Concept," CFLI TR 2008-02, (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2008) 26.

duties when they were unable to understand how and why the politics by primary means made itself felt. What sort of Colonels and Generals is the CF trying to produce: Pattons or Eisenhowers? Indeed, are these leaders only Generals, or more junior?

The next chapter will analyse how CA teams and communities are formed. This will illuminate not only how task forces and deploying teams might be assembled, but how the constituent elements of those teams speak to the larger communities which they represent.

CHAPTER 3 – FORMING THE TEAM

A Comprehensive Approach team is reflective of the skills and capabilities which are required to solve a certain security, stability or defence issue. As has been shown, these are issues of human interaction and as such will involve agencies which address many facets of human activity. They will often require structural or security intervention such as legal, policing, governmental or military intervention up to and including high intensity combat operations. They may require humanitarian intervention. They may require educational or capacity building intervention to name a few. As such, when Canada decides to become involved in a way which reflects the will of Canadians, there will need to be considered advice and opinion from each of the required Canadian agencies or bodies (not to mention NGO and foreign entities). To be coherent in execution, this team of experts will have to create a common understanding and common approach not only among the heads of each of the stovepipes as described in the previous chapter, but in a way which is supportable with subordinates and superiors.

Forming the team in the Comprehensive Approach can be discussed at many levels. Structurally, the challenges faced are principally those of legislation as discussed in the previous chapter. There are options of discussion at the Deputy Minister or Ministerial level, but it is unrealistic to assume all contact and decisions can be made at that level. In this vein, the Australian government defines five types of interdepartmental teams in their Whole of Government cornerstone document *Connecting Government*.[25] Some of these solutions would require legislative changes to be implemented in Canada,

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[25] Australia. *Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges*. (Canberra : Commonwealth of Australia, 2004) 42.

and some are already in place here. However, looking deeper into the document there is

substantial discussion beyond framework and into the culture inside these departments

and the teams which are created. This chapter will deal with commonalities of creating

those teams.

> However, whole of government work is not just about structures. It is as
> much about the way things are done. Successful outcomes depend on
> power sharing, thinking outside the box and solving practical problems of
> information management and infrastructure, staffing, budget and
> accountability, and stakeholder relationships.[26]

It will be the assertion of this chapter and a central theme of the remainder of this

work that the building of a CA team is a very human rather than directive or mechanical

process. It may well manifest in multiple formats, but happens in two settings: deployed

and institutional. The teams at these levels are inherently different, with different focus.

The application of social science to define their functioning will therefore have different

emphasis. They will therefore be dealt with in sequence.

Deployed teams are those operating in a location other than the home of the

agency in question. These teams may be operating domestically or internationally, but

are essentially defined by their focus being the current activity in their area of posting or

deployment which keeps the team both physically and mentally in the local

operational/tactical context, with the CA team elements having some form of

communications link to their parent agency. An example of this in the domestic setting is

the 2010 Olympics WoG structure, or in the expeditionary context, a larger Embassy or

the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar.

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[26] *Connecting Government*. 20.

Institutional teams are those teams operating from an area where they are in closer contact (or even reside in their normal offices) with their parent agency. This facilitates regular communications and even physical contact with one of or all of the generating agencies, where contact with an operational/tactical context is through some form of communications link. An example of this would be the taskforce on Afghanistan whether in its previous DFAIT lead or in the current PCO lead.

Both of these groupings can be viewed through the optic of small group development dynamics research. This theme will be developed in greater depth in this chapter. However, it is both important and reasonable to accept at this point that the proximity to or connectivity with the head office will make a difference to the functioning of the teams in question. This then provides a third element in the team construct; that of the home agency. Whether deployed, or headquarters, the degree to which the team is focused on the team activity vice their parent agency, coupled with any difference of attitude between that parent agency and the attitudes of the team, will have a substantial modifying effect on the performance of the team.

To provide an analogy within CF leadership doctrine, the more task focused the teams would be analogous with leading people and the home agency focused would be analogous with leading the institution.[27] For the purposes of this work, the deployed and home agency settings of the teams will be referred to as the "two settings" of the Comprehensive Approach. An overarching theme in this work is a discussion of whether the cultures of the agencies providing elements to the CA team are in fact CA conducive

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[27] Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-004, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005) 48-49.

and whether that translates to efficient and effective teams when required. While the rating of various Canadian agencies is not within the purview of this paper, criteria for this assessment will become apparent in the course of this work.

An additional and substantial hurdle to this integration of teams is the CF officer's understanding of the organizational construct. While the CF will see the delivery of an effect in a deployed setting along a continuous chain of authority within the CF, OGDs and NGOs often have different departments and agencies at different levels. An effect can be mentoring a local official, training local critical professions and trades or constructing infrastructure, to name a few. Where DFAIT produces policy, CIDA and START deliver, or in some cases contract the delivery of effects. Coordinating these effects in theatre then require the CF officer to understand not only the inputs of DFAIT, CIDA or START, but also how the relationships between these agencies influence outcomes. This involves an understanding of the institutional as well as the personal forces at play, as described in previous paragraphs.

The goal of this chapter will be to discuss how the larger body of social science research on how teams are formed can be applied to the setting of CA. Commonalities for specific training criteria and critical lines of operation will be extracted from this body of research, and some assertions of critical agency traits and training objectives will be put forward for development in subsequent chapters.

A LONG GAME

Bruce W. Tuckman defined the developmental sequence in small groups as being forming, storming, norming and performing.[28] Applied to the discussion at hand, the order of these stages describes the initial forming of a CA team where the assigned participants initially interact politely, stating views and opinions in an attempt to define the team and the issues at hand. The storming stage represents when the individuals drop any initial politeness of distance and cease to skirt contested issues. Storming fades into norming as new roles, definitions and working views are formed and agreed to either formally or informally. Performing as a team only occurs once these roles are internalized by the team members and become a form of standard operating procedure. The translation of this model to a deployed team is clear, and it can then be used as an instructive, illustrative model. However, when the Tuckman sequence is applied to the headquarters model, additional complexity is introduced.

A critical element of the Tuckman model is that the first three phases vary in duration based upon the individuals, the issues and any pre-existing views. In the CA setting, the duration of the initial three phases is then unpredictable but heavily influenced by personnel selection and the culture of their originating agency. The Tuckman model is also based upon a fixed population within the team. Where team members change, the process must begin again with the severity of that restarting of the cycle dependant on the importance of the changed member(s) and the attitudes of the parent agency. There is a secondary element to this team forming which, if the teams are formed strongly enough and often enough, they will have an effect on the parent agency.

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[28] Bruce W. Tuckman. "Developmental Sequence in Small Groups" *Psychological Bulletin*. Vol 63 No 6 1965. 384-399.

More of this will be discussed later, but it is sufficient to see at this point that the

Tuckman sequence is a time consuming activity.

In crisis situations, the minimization of the period before a deployed team

achieves performing status is clearly critical. As discussed in the first chapter, if it is

accepted that CA teams will be formed in a task specific context, it is likely that this

forming period will only exist for planned activities, for example the 2010 Olympics. In

the event of a crisis, such as the Winnipeg floods of the last decade or a Non-Combatant

Evacuation Operation (NEO) such as last year in Lebanon, the creation of a team will be

condensed. If a standing CA entity does not exist, then the time available to form, storm,

norm and perform is limited to the period in which warning of the event can be translated

into willingness to act at the policy level and articulated in time at the team level to

prepare. This period may be brief indeed.

Institutional teams are also governed by the Tuckman sequence, but may never

proceed through the full cycle to performing, dependant on the relative importance

various agencies forming a CA team place in manning stability. In the National Capital

Region (NCR) it is extremely common for interdepartmental teams and meetings to

frequently have representatives or anybody other than the designated representative.[29]

This phenomenon has more to do with calendar turbulence due to the myriad of

competing elements on a senior leader's time. Postings or fixed deployments differ from

this phenomenon by the captive audience nature of the team while away from the minute

to minute influence of head office. CA agencies in the home sense are subject to career

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[29] Commonly held viewpoint. Based upon author's viewpoint from two years as the personal staff officer for two different Level 2 General Officer positions.

movements of the individuals. This re-initiates the small group developmental sequence each time. Logically, promotion within the team would offer some consistency, although this has not been researched in relation to the Tuckman model. This turbulence can leave the situation at head office somewhat transactional, with some hope offered by the theory of Vertical Transfer,[30] which will be discussed in depth later.

So far, teams have been demonstrated to take time to build, and that time is dependant not only on the individuals but their organization of origin. Both the individual's attitude and that of their parent organization bear heavily on the process. For a predictable task, in a deployed location, all the elements are present to see Tuckman's cycle through. As not every task is predicted, certainly not in the defence and security realm, it stands to reason that teams formed in the heat of crisis will be performing at a level which is governed by previous training and attitudes of their parent agency. So what is it teams have to be able to do?

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[30] Steve W.J. Kozlwoski, Kenneth G. Brown, Daniel A Weissbein, Janis A. Cannon-Bowers, Eduardo Salas. "A Multilevel Approach to Training Effectiveness: Enhancing Horizontal and Vertical Transfer. *Multilevel Theory, Research and Methods in Organizations*. (San Fransisco: Jossey-Brass 2000) 157-210.

WHAT DO TEAMS DO?

Methodologies such as formalized doctrine, cyclical training and exercises, as well as professional development can be used to facilitate and perhaps even accelerate the Tuckman sequence compared to just "hashing it out." However, they cannot actually eliminate what is essentially a human process in forming these human teams. A good characterization of the functions affected by the Tuckman sequence is Fleishman et al's four types of leader-directed team processes:

> - cognitive processes like information sharing and processing, and participative debriefs;
> - motivational processes integrated with team cohesion and a sense of collective efficacy;
> - affective (or team emotional "tone") processes like social imitation and interpersonal liking; and
> - coordination processes involving orientation functions, matching capabilities to roles, and team timing exercises.[31]

Numbering these four activities from the top, one can see them as thematic. The first is doctrinal and policy based. The second speaks to mission focus which will have a relationship with the sense of pressure and centrality of the task. The third is about human attitude and bonding. The forth is again somewhat doctrine based, but also about matching personalities with roles. These four functions are of increasingly dependant on human traits as interpreted and as such will be explored below.

Information sharing and data flow can and will be directed. When a CA team is created, its mandate should also be clear as to the nature and flow of information. Some of this information exchange will be limited by legislation such as the Privacy Act. Information from certain military and intelligence activities may not be accessible to law

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[31] E.A. Fleishman, M.D. Mmford, S.J. Zaccoro, K.Y. Levin, A.L. Korotkin and M.B. Hein. "Taxonomic Efforts in the Description of Leader Behavior: A synthesis and Functional Interpretation." *Leadership Quarterly,* Volume 2, 4, 1991, 245-287.

enforcement agencies. The inverse might also be true. The point here is that this process, although critically important, will be a directed one, and as such lies mostly outside the scope of this paper and in the realm of legislation.

Motivation and collective processes have been discussed well above under Tuckman's work and are almost completely subject to the sequence he describes. It will not need to be expanded upon here, except to indicate its interrelated nature with point three.

Affective processes are heavily integrated with subjective understandings of other persons and (in the CA setting) the agencies they represent. It is here that we discover the collective predisposition of an agency to produce officers open to inter-agency cooperation. Simply put, the Fleishman's affective processes in the CA context are governed to a substantial degree on how 'CA-friendly' an originating agency's culture is. The Australian government provides interesting criteria to measure how healthy a government agency is based upon its ability to open and rapidly share information vertically and horizontally in support of a common goal.[32] It is this comprehension of the common goal, and an openness to achieve it that is at the heart of the CA methodology. Fleishman's rather detailed expansion on the themes of cognitive, motivational, affective and coordination processes is a strong tool in assessing effectiveness, but as was outlined in the first chapter, assessing departments or interdepartmental groups is beyond the scope of this work.

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[32] Australia. *Agency Health: Monitoring agency health and improving performance.* 25 October 2007. 31-37.

Coordination function's delivery can be described as ensuring the right person, along with the right preparation (training and personal views) into the CA context at the right time. It is in these coordination functions and those CA team players from across government and outside, that we approach the sweet spot of facilitated short term and long term team training and team building. The idea of setting roles and mutual respect will be discussed below.

CA teams can be said to work together on an agreed to agenda towards a common goal. The perspectives of the elements may differ, but the acceptance of the leader (both individual and agency), and the openness of the elements to support the end state are critical. Once again, it is worth noting that it is rare indeed that defence is the lead agency.

THE SHORT GAME

As seen above, teams take time to become efficient, but there are ways to accelerate the natural processes. Team training and team building will be dealt with in this section. Team training is the gathering and developing of a CA team to conduct a fixed task. It can be on an exercise or actual task, but the key is that they are training to conduct the actual activity they will be conducting. Team building is a term made famous by a whole industry of activities in which a team would take on a non-role related task (sports or social) to become closer as a group.

Many agencies in recent years have partaken in activities collectively referred to as team building. Generally speaking, these are facilitated activities outside of the

normal work setting with a purported set of outcomes which were articulated by Salas[33] et al as: goal setting, interpersonal relations, problem solving and role definition.[34] This team building activity set is meant to improve performance in the normal work setting. They are in essence small group dynamics band aids. Salas found that despite the subjective belief these sessions created positive effects, when objectively measured only role definition activities actually produced improved performance.[35]

Conversely, team training actually does work. Team training, where the task is related to the work role with the CA team working together, whether in an exercise or real setting is highly productive. These activities improve cognitive outcomes, affective outcomes, teamwork processes, and performance outcomes.[36]

Team activities, where agencies inter-relate, at least in so far as they come to understand the role and purpose of the other agencies are therefore useful. If that activity can be one of realistic training or actual operations, the outcomes are even better. The key take away then, is that working together in the past translates to success in the future, whether exercise or reality. Even if this previous work provided theoretical or unrelated interaction, the achievement of common understanding of the roles of others, both as persons and agencies is clearly a critical enabler to the CA team.

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[33] Much of Salas' work is based on experiments with military subjects. However it is reasonable to extrapolate that as humans, this ability to learn team roles would expand to a wider humanity.

[34] Eduardo Salas, Drew Rozell, Brian Mullen, James E. Driskell. "The Effect of Team Building on Performance: An Integration. *Small Group Research*. Vol 30 No 3. June 1999. 309.

[35] Salas Team Building. 323.

[36] Eduardo Salas, Deborah Diaz Granados, Cameron Klein, C. Shawn Burke, Kevin C. Stagl, Gerald F. Goodwin and Stanley M. Halpin. "Does Team Training Improve Team Performance? A Meta-Analysis" Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 2008.

Recalling the references in chapter one to the legislative structure of the ministerial system which Canada inherited in the Westminster tradition, Canada does not currently have the appetite to rework the issue from a legislative perspective.[37] However, when one transplants any major mechanism from another system, it is important to remember how and why it works. It is often said in British history that a particular battle was "won on the playing fields of Eton," (a prestigious boys' prep school). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the role of the enduring British class system in the functioning of its military and foreign office, it is reasonable to say that the two have a relationship which is positive from a corporate understanding perspective. A class based system produces its senior leaders from a small segment of the population, who even if they did not know each other in person, will likely have attended the same schools, universities and private clubs and associations. Therefore, these persons when conducting an activity such as the CA approach to operations have increased shared understandings of culture, organizational models and methods of proper ways of doing business.

Where Canada has no class system, and our military and other government departments educate at separate institutions, there will therefore be fewer commonalities between a senior CF officer and a senior Canadian representative of DFAIT, or ICRC. It would seem this may be an opportunity lost, or at least a factor overlooked – a subject which will be discussed in later chapters.

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[37] Mantle 39.

Kozlowski defined two types each of vertical and horizontal transfer of knowledge.[38] Composition is roughly stated as members of a team doing similar tasks. A composite team would be soldiers in an infantry section, or hockey players on the ice. While there are slight differences between positions and experience, each team member brings something similar in terms of technical skills to the team. Compilation is members of a team doing dissimilar tasks but working towards the same goal (not unlike the PRT). With the hockey example, the franchise is a compilation setting, where the franchise accountant, team doctor, zamboni driver, general manager and team captain bring very different but clearly necessary skills to the group. Most of the social science research done to date speaks to horizontal transfer. However, while calling for further research, Kozlwski indicates that the perceived value to superiors as articulated through selection, performance assessment, management and reward systems applies to both horizontal and vertical knowledge transfer. Otherwise stated, if training which was CA-focused was the ticket to promotion, peers, subordinates and superiors would actively work to learn from those who have had the exposure.

Robert Dipboye made the key observation that there is more to a training program than the sum of its well-analysed (in this case Instructional Systems Design - ISD) parts:

> In summary, prescriptions of the ISD model are violated because training
> programs are used to express values important to both the culture and the
> institutional environment of the organisation. In contrast, an ISD
> approach tends to restrict the program to knowledge, skills, and abilities
> that are job-related, and tends to discourage the rich mix of behaviours

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[38] Steve W.J. Kozlowski, Kenneth G Brown et al. "A Multilevel Approach to Training Effectiveness: Enhancing Horizontal and Vertical Transfer." *Multilevel Theory, Research and Methods in Organizations*. Kathrine J. Klein and Steve W.J. Koslowski Eds. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000) 157-210.

that are important to maintaining and communicating the values of the organization.[39]

So how does this translate to the methodology of military personnel receiving the PD almost uniquely in uniformed, but degree granting institutions? Perhaps it is because there is not yet any crystal clear, tangible proof of value to the truism of "your classmates will be your references for the rest of your career" that there is limited success in bringing public service civilians into JCSP or NSP, or conversely the military out into civilian graduate schools. Perhaps again the value of this cohort producing methodology is overstated. Yet another option is that Dipboye's assertions are alive and well, and are being reflected in the current construct. If that is the case, the lack of a solid and substantial OGD presence on JCSP and NSP, and the converse of CF officers studying at civilian schools of government in DPs 3 and 4 indicate that those institutions have placed their emphasis elsewhere than the CA methodology of operations. Perhaps an answer can be found in the next chapter on how the OGS and Officer PD system is constructed.

These themes will be explored further in later chapters. It is sufficient for now to understand that learning for an individual can be learning for a whole organisation if the opportunities and support to spread the knowledge are there. It is also important to understand that education and training deliver not only knowledge and skills, but communicate to the institution its own values in how and who is trained in what.

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[39] Robert L. Dipboye. "Organizational Barriers to Implementing a Rational Model of Training." *Training for a Rapidly Changing Workplace: Applications of Psychological Research*. Miguel A Quinones and Addie Ehrenstein Eds. (Washington DC: American Psychological Association 1997) 52

COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE

Tacit knowledge is that knowledge which is effectively inexplicable, but is also influential in the understanding of facts. Communities of practice (CoP), which link people in a common field and Networks of Practice (NoP) which link those communities, are based upon shared tacit knowledge. This, somewhat contested theory, goes beyond the quantifiable data and understanding which forms the OGS and comes to define how a profession or any linked group can see a set of facts a certain way:

> Which interpretation is seen as appropriate depends not on the text, but on the nature of the community making the interpretation…the same knowledge is used in quite different ways in different occupation communities, much as the Bible finds radically different interpretations among different sects.[40]

According to Duguid, tacit knowledge is achieved by manner and in person. It is the way in which a person teaches a set of facts that also sets the manner in which they are understood. A school which teaches a set of facts as important, and does so in a methodical, even pedantic way, will therefore achieve graduates who work in that manner. Schools which teach in a relaxed, even flippant way will achieve graduates who work in that manner. Within a field, perhaps even of the same school, a defence lawyer may see the same article of law differently than a prosecutor. In this model, that is because the prosecutor and defence backgrounds of the lawyers could be characterised as being of different, although related CoP.

Following this model, it is reasonable to say that the military or perhaps sub-sets of the military are CoP. It would be fair in this model to say that a CF officer would see a news article on a failed state from a different perspective from a human rights lawyer,

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[40] Paul Duguid, "The Art of knowing: Social and Tacit Dimenstions of Knowledge and the Limits of Community of Practice." Information Society, Apr-Jun2005, Vol. 21 Issue 2. 113.

despite looking at the same text. This would be not only because of specific and quantifiable knowledge differences between the individuals' professional technical training, but because of tacit understandings and beliefs which the individuals have developed over time from their different CoP.

The forces of the common understandings of the global NoPs which link the CoPs of the various professions of arms could also be said to have an effect. The global diplomatic community, to which DFAIT officers could be said to belong, would influence that CoP in ways which may be different than the global NoP of the profession of arms. Going further, Duguid's articulation of CoP theory indicates that various CoP will hesitate to openly share or exchange certain segments of their body of practice – in particular concepts of "how" to do something as opposed to being more open about "what" needs to be done.[41]

The key applicability of the CoP theory to this text is that there exist communities of practice or group understandings which influence elements of the CA team. This is unavoidable, but must be understood and managed so as not to become a reinforcer of stovepipes and an obstacle to the forming of CA teams.

THE END GAME

Social science shows that high performing teams are time consuming to form. It shows us that those teams are influenced by structural factors and human factors. These human factors include the desire to understand our teammates and to value and allow for their differences in approach. Institutions, by setting training and rewards decide what

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[41] Duguid 114.

their people excel at, and as such will decide to what degree the CA methodology toward

operations will be a success.

CHAPTER 4 – CF PD STRUCTURE

The CF's professional development program is segregated into officer and non commissioned member systems. In the officer stream, development period one (DP 1) is the process of recruiting, training and employing a junior officer in a specific occupational field. DP2 takes that junior officer through intermediate employment and through initial contact with staff training, focused mainly on their own element or "service." DP3 then takes this now senior officer through sub-unit and unit command and exposure to joint (read multiple environments) staff training. DP4 is the development of Colonels and General Officers with training for formation and theatre level command as well as national level staff principals.[42] This paper will deal principally with DPs 3 and 4. This chapter will explore how those developmental periods correspond to the issue of the CA approach to operations as defined in previous chapters, in particular where an individual may be the senior military member of that CA team.

The CA methodology in operations informs all levels of military action. However, it is logical that the level of understanding must increase in complexity, perhaps by orders of magnitude for increasing levels of military leadership. However, this engagement is not just one of partnership. Sometimes this challenge passes from being a coordination and liaison challenge, to becoming a command challenge.

Chapter one demonstrated that a CA team was commanded and is currently co-commanded (with a senior public servant) by a Lieutenant-Colonel on operations in the

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[42] Canada. "Officer Professional Development." DPDLT 1992. 9-10. Hereafter OPD.

form of the PRT.[43] While many, one could say all, military commanders at all levels will

interact to some degree with OGDs and NGOs, it is clear that the CA understanding of a

PRT CO will be more acute. The PRT construct, while new in nomenclature has rough

antecedents in the military government detachments of armies throughout recent

history.[44] Given the history of the role, and that the Manley report has stated the PRT is

the centerpiece of the Canadian contribution to Afghanistan, it is reasonable to surmise

that the PRT model is one worth understanding.

The Observer Manoeuvre Liaison Team (OMLT) is responsible for mentoring all

aspects of the Afghan Security Forces including civilian police. As such, the CO also has

an integrated CA team which must be responsive to the requirements of both. Above the

OMLT and PRT COs is the Commander of Joint Taskforce Afghanistan (JTF-Afg).

Integrated into his headquarters is a Political Advisor, a Development advisor and a

Police advisor. All these JTF Afg civilians are from CA OGDs.

This is not to say that it is the place of the CF to command a CA team in the

Canadian deployed context. Indeed, as has been stated before, it is generally the role of

the CF to support. However, there is a difference in the level of understanding of an

officer who must coordinate with a START contracted effect that is temporarily in his

area of responsibility, and an officer who is responsible for, coordinates daily with, or is

responsible for coordination to an OGD. To cite the examples above, these are all

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[43] Indeed, the historic Canadian tendency to send a large battlegroup (BG) instead of a small formation headquarters for two small BGs under a single Canadian formation HQ has routinely placed the BG CO in the position as being the Canadian face to the CA team.

[44] Regardless of who has one or occupied, military government organs existed throughout modern conflicts to provide different scales of reconstruction and government mentoring by Nazi, Allied or colonial powers. A historical discussion of what government agencies composed or led these teams is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is fair to say the PRTs are the OEF/ISAF manifestation of the requirement which is by no means new.

officers who are commanding (or co-commanding) CA teams. We must accept then, if

Afghanistan is to be any example of a future (as it can be argued as an example of a past)

operating construct, the integration of the CA methodology in the form of placing civilian

leadership, advisors and liaisons directly into both deployed units and formations is here.

What is more, the role of working the intergovernmental piece, on a permanent and

minute to minute setting has moved down the chain of command at least as far as

Lieutenant-Colonel. In summary, Afghanistan shows us leadership of a CA team is the

business not only formation commanders, but of unit COs. Did these COs receive

appropriate preparation before employment in these CA leadership roles?

Unit COs are the product of DP 3 and graduates of JCSP or its equivalent.[45]

Formation commanders are participants in DP 4, but may not have graduated from any

formal course, as NSP capacity and loading is not as strictly controlled as JCSP. Where

OPD indicates unit commanding officers "shall" have attended JCSP, NSP does not have

the capacity, to do the same for formation commanders. None of BGen Frasier, BGen

Thompson nor BGen Vance are graduates of NSP or any of its precursor strategic level

courses at CFC.[46] However, two of the three graduated the operational level Advanced

Military Studies Course, and are holders of Masters degrees from RMC. As such, the

focus will remain on DPs 3 and 4 and how the understanding of how both of the CFC

programs are either enabled, ignored or detrimental to the CA methodology of operations.

The key takeaway from this initial stage of analysis is that the last reliable stage in

professional development before command in a CA environment is JCSP and its

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[45] OPD 14. see also DAOD 5031-1, Canadian Forces Military Equivalencies Program, 28 Jul 06

[46] Chief of Military Personnel, Senior Officer Biography Website. http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dsa-dns/sa-ns/ab/gfo-oga/index-eng.asp?mLimit=Gen accessed 27 March 2009.

predecessor the Command and Staff Course (CSC). It will become apparent that the CF

PD structure can be said to be late to need with regards to effectively educating in CA

methodology.

THE KITCHEN REPORT

A helpful viewpoint from which to evaluate the current officer PD system are the

recommendations of the Kitchen report from 1985. The report was undertaken to look at

ways to improve officer PD by keeping it "current, related to rapid change, cost-effective

and responsive to Canadian needs."[47] His recommendations can be summarized as the

requirement to improve post-graduate links to Canadian universities through the

following ways (parenthetical notes this author):

    a. Expand out service training and provide credits to support it.
    b. Add un-linked PG positions and ensure it is not detrimental to careers. (positions exist but remain unused due to op tempo).
    c. Use CMCs, Canadian universities and allied intuitions. (Canadian Military Colleges and allied institutions principally used despite prioritization by Kitchen).
    d. Re-establish CF presence in Canadian universities.(not executed).
    e. Re-examine technical training (origin of LFTSP).
    f. Patriate and Canadianize training (NSP, LFTSP).
    g. Demographic survey on attitudes.
    h. Re-energize civilian PD in DND.
    i. Create a network of defence fellows for CF Officers.[48]

Recommendations regarding technical training, Canadianization and

demographics are outside the scope of this paper. Out service training was not truly

executed as those positions remain linked technical Masters degrees. Additional unlinked

PG positions were created under the purview of the Level Ones (L1s), but in recent years

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[47] MGen C.G. Kitchen. "Out Service Training for Officers: A special project for ADM(Per)." March 1985. Abstract.

[48]Kitchen 2.

the Advanced Training List (ATL) credits remain unused due to op tempo and well below strength manning in many military occupations. The control of these positions has been centralized to the same directorate in the Chief of Military Personnel responsible for all PG sponsorships.[49] The recommendation to deliver the PG training has generally been limited to Canadian Military Colleges (CMC), likely for convenience coinciding with Dipboye's theories. This will be expanded upon later in this chapter. The recommendation to re-establish DND in Canadian universities never happened. There is however, the DND sponsored Security and Defence Form which provides funding to specific schools. This funding provides support for chairs of defence studies, funds for graduate, and post-graduate studies and a small number of fellowships. This program is in its fourth decade of operation and is targeted at stimulating academic interest in defence issues, but in no way places a CF presence on Canadian campuses.[50] Put simply, it is cash to the civilians already there. While it does produce research and interest, the works cited in the most recent review are over half of a historical rather than contemporary nature. The importance of this recommendation and its non-implementation in the CA context will be expanded upon in chapters four and five.

To respond to recommendations to re-energise DND civilian PG and the creation of defence fellows, it is important to note that civilian leaders in DND come through important PD gateways in the Public Service which are unrelated to DND. More than half of the DM, Assoc DM and ADM level leadership of DND at the time of writing had no background in defence issues, although almost all had transited through PCO, TBS or

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[49] Email confirmation from DMCA 5-2, 3 April 2009.

[50] Department of National Defence. *Security and Defence Form, Year in Review 2006-2007.* Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007.

both.[51] A detailed review of PCO key personalities biographies would indicate a policy either explicit (which the author could not find) or implicit that requires civilian public service executives to be posed to multiple departments, and transiting multiple times through PCO or TBS in order to advance.[52] The observation from this is that DND does not as a rule create its own civilian executives, and the opportunity to provide our own senior leaders with exposure to the central agencies of government like the senior public service is limited to a single General Officer in the PCO. A more detailed examination of OGD PD will be provided in the next chapter.

The Kitchen report indicates that only about five percent of officers likely have the combination of intellect and educational background to undertake post-graduate training with reasonable prospects of success.[53] While this is dated, taking the JCSP 35 intake for example, only 95 of the 133 students attending JCSP 35 applied to complete the Masters in Defence Studies. Of those 95, only 65 were granted full status as students, with the other 30 having probationary or provisional requirements.   Thus it is likely that only slightly more than half of CF officers undergoing DP 3 could even compete for a position in a major graduate school to complete an MA. Of those, a certain percentage would likely not be accepted in a competitive entry year. Yet, assuming the success of the provisional and probationary students, 92 of the officers attending JCSP 35 will likely graduate with a Masters in Defence Studies, thereby fulfilling the succession plan

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[51] http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/about-notresujet/bio/index-eng.asp accessed 29 March 2009.

[52] http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=org accessed 29 March 2009.

[53] Kitchen 6.

requirement for an Masters degree. This then eliminates any requirement for actual success in the Kitchen sense of an academic MA.

ACADEMIC VS PROFESSIONAL MASTERS

As we have seen, the Masters in Defence Studies (MDS) is not an MA as envisioned by Kitchen. CFC clearly advises that the MDS is so clear and directed a field of study, that it fits the form of a professional Masters. As defined in one of the more concise sources available, a professional Masters is focused on the practical aspects of a field, where necessary at the expense of theory.[54] The MDS is also a terminal degree, which is one in which a practitioner has no requirement for further study for practice, even if a further degree were to exist.[55] Clearly then, the MDS is by definition the recognition of a Masters level of effort in a streamlined professional development program. As such, it is driven by the OGS to conform to the characteristics of both a professional and terminal degree. While this is sufficient for the promotion boards, and perhaps valuable for external recognition of the CF as a proper profession, it is clearly not what Kitchen was intending.

WHO LET THE CIVILIANS IN?

OGS recognized the nexus or interface between military officers other CA partners, although the phrase had yet to be coined. However, that linkage was assessed as a general officer competency and as such training for it was placed it in DP4.[56] Given

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[54] Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_professional_degree Accessed 19 April 2009.

[55] Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terminal_degree Accessed 19 April 2009.

[56] OPD 10.

the nature of DP3 command appointments in the contemporary operating environment, this is far too late.

The issue is indeed even more complex than articulated in the OGS specifications. The OGS, which dates from (1999) before the current evolution of expeditionary operations can be understood to under-assign another key complexity.[57] Indeed, the principal Officer Professional Development document dates from 1992.[58] As articulated in chapter one, the confusing triple command arrangement of the Military SAT commander in Afghanistan is demonstrative of a key reality. Military CA commanders need the understanding of OGDs and NGOs not only because they are commanding them, but because they are being directed by them despite not being under command. The exceedingly complex level of intellectual gymnastics this clearly requires is nothing short of a herculean feat. Selection, training and preparation for these posts must also be careful and methodical. Yet, as the number of CA command positions grows, it is becoming a larger section of CF commanders by the day.

Clearly, this training is important to leaders, indeed commanders of CA teams. Therefore an argument can be made to move this training to DP 3. This has happened with the concepts of WoG working its way into the JCSP syllabus in a theory and guest speaker level including the former Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan.[59] The scope of the course is defined as, "to educate military officers and other national security leaders in joint, interagency, and multinational operational-level planning across the full

[57] Canada. Canadian Forces Officers General Specification (Provisional). 24 August 1999.

[58] Canada. Officer Professional Development. DPDLT 1992.

[59] Canada. JCSP 35 Course Schedule.

spectrum of conflict."[60] However to integrate civilians on the course would be unlikely, as even a cursory glance at the JCSP syllabus shows the course to be a military training course, for which one can be accredited a Master's degree rather than the inverse. A course structure of Officership Studies; National Security, International Affairs and Defence Management; Joint and Combined Warfare Studies; and Defence Studies[61] is clearly not by design intended to be enticing to a desk officer in START. JCSP is after all military training to meet the requirements of DP3, but which has in the quality of delivery academic value.

However, where some minor success has been made in integrating civilian students on NSP, it is in large part to the flexibility which that course provides in terms of an elective term in lieu of core military subjects.[62] As yet these civilians have not included senior public servants at the Director or Director General level, and certainly not the ICRC. There are administrative reasons for this beyond the obvious niche nature of the CFC programs both JCSP and NSP which will be explored in the next chapter. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that recent history and common sense has shown that CA elements are unlikely to attend core military curriculum programs of a year's duration in large numbers, but may be interested in a more flexible format such as the new NSP syllabus with an elective term in lieu of the core warfighting subjects.[63]

Remembering back to Tuckman, there are other ways to build up CA skill, and that is ongoing operations, exercises and training. Logically, if the officer has had career

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[60] Canada. CFC 300. JCSP Syllabus 35. 1-3/6.

[61] Canada. CFC 300. JCSP Syllabus 35. 1-3/6.

[62] Canada. CFC 700. NSP Syllabus.

[63] NSP Syllabus. 2-1/2.

long development in CA methodology, they need not be instructed in it exhaustively at a

service institution. Yet, is this true of the CA commanders we are employing in theatre?

BGen Thompson was seconded to DFAIT for four years, between unit and formation

level command. However, neither BGens Fraser, nor Vance shows any substantial

outside of DND contact in education or employment in their biography.[64] Having arrived

at our formation commanders, let us now turn to NSP.

> The National Security Programme provides the national security executive
> with a suite of graduate-level courses that are professionally relevant in
> today's complex and uncertain security environment…Scenarios discussed
> are both whole-of-government as well as multinational and involving public
> agencies.[65]

NSP has substantially increased CA structure over JCSP, in accordance with the

requirements of DP4. Indeed, it also includes the functionality of an academic Master's

degree from RMC as an attractor to civilians to attend. With a core structure of: Strategic

Security Issues; Strategic Leadership and Management; and Security Operations[66] there

would be some cross-over to other OGDs, principally Solicitor General agencies. More

will be discussed on marketability in chapter four, but it is worthwhile to indicate that the

mechanism of instructing CF officers in CA broadly speaking is achieved in NSP as a

result of the above factors. However, it is also worth noting that senior Canadian public

servants from the key departments of DFAIT, CIDA and START have yet to appear as

students in large numbers.[67]

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[64] http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/about-notresujet/bio/index-eng.asp accessed 29 March 2009.

[65] NSP Syllabus. 2-1/2.

[66] NSP Syllabus 2-2/2.

[67] Of the two NSP serials to date there is one DFAIT student.

While the main stream programs at CFC are delivering a Masters level of training, the CA component of the education arrives too late, to too small an audience, without the key players. A careful review of the Kitchen report will show that the intent was not to accredit existing PD structures to fulfill the MA requirement. Kitchen saw the ability to succeed in the mainstream PD and the civilian world of graduate schools which produces our civilian senior public servants as the enablers of true CA leaders, before the term was even coined. So what of the unstructured PG program?

The unstructured PG program justified and strongly supported by the Kitchen report[68] has not been used in the CF in over three years.[69] The purpose of Kitchen's PG program was to expand the mind beyond the requirements limited to a military task or set of tasks, thus encompassing the broader challenges than those of a service institution. This is obviously related in a positive way to the concept of linking with outside agencies, although team building with OGDs was never mentioned. However, the equivalencies matrix for DP 4 is written such that a civilian PG program or fellowship would never be competitive for equivalency, indeed none has succeeded in the past four years with the exception of foreign war colleges.[70] This is likely in part because that there is no recognition of a correlation between a graduate level of education and the CFC qualifications, which are focused on military activities.[71] Hence, the graduate level of education, in so far as it is a training qualification for promotion it will be completed.[72]

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[68] Kitchen 33.

[69] Email from DMCA 5-2

[70] Email from SO OPD 4&5 8 April 2009.

[71] OPD 14.

[72] Department of National Defence. Army Selection Board Scoring Guide, Officers – Major 2008-2009.

However, where that training qualification can be met efficiently in an in-service institution, the added benefit that both Kitchen outlines and the CA advantages that this paper suggests appear to be being ignored or have been deemed superfluous.

WHAT IS SAMS?

The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) is the graduate program of School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). It is a subsequent year of academic studies, leading to a Masters Degree in Military Arts and Sciences for a small population of the JCSP graduate equivalents of the US military.[73]   While other programs exist at the various academies, the SAMS program at the US Army Command and General Staff College is the most well known. Nicknamed the "Jedi Knights", this is a program whereby officers are selected to attend a second year of study, due to talents displayed during the course of the mandatory curriculum. While a detailed study of the direct content of the SAMS program is beyond the scope of this paper, the methodology of identifying talented members of DP 3, and moving them into a second year of advanced training is one which will appear later in this work.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

As defined in the preamble to the package, the officer PD system in the CF is optimized for general purpose combat capability. However, the current emphasis on the CA approach is unlikely to fade given the contemporary operating environment. It then would seem important to explore avenues which integrate the CF's PD system with that of at least the OGDs, if not all the CA participants. In this vein, it seems surprising that

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[73] United States Army Combined Arms Centre Website. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/sams/ Accessed 18 April 2009

the unstructured PD system which Kitchen supported in 1985 would appear to have been de-prioritized in favour of increased isolationism. It is here that Dipboye's theme of training being a method of communicating institutional values comes back in communicating the CF's (and to a degree OGDs) values towards internal excellence vice linking with other arms of government. The defacto hiatus of the unlinked PD program sponsoring select CF officers to study at outside universities, which can only be seen as a CA enabling tool at both the operational and strategic level, speaks clearly. The current structure of DPs 3 and 4 indicate the CF is intent on pushing the general core combat capability and one size fits all PD. Where deviations from the CFC mainstream are tolerated for potential unit COs, it is only with the ABCA partners, with other country's PD systems producing staff officers rather than commanders. [74] This shows through Dipboye's theory that the CF is interested in getting along best only with others in uniform.

The above situation cannot be allowed to continue, and the following chapters will discuss ways to improve the current situation.

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[74] Department of National Defence. CF Military Personnel Instruction XX/08 – Joint Command and Staff Programme (JCSP) Candidate Selection. 2008. Sect 3.8. Amplified by Email D Mil CM 3-5 to Author 30 March 2008.

CHAPTER 5 – OGD AND NGO STRUCTURING

So you have real cultural differences among these three departments (DND, DFAIT, CIDA). To take those three cultures and get those three cultures to share information in real time, to plan joint operations effectively, is pushing against deeply rooted differences in all places….they talk different languages, they have different world views, they have different mandates, they've never really had to work together in an integrated fashion like this before anywhere in the world…[75]

The quote above is the net effect of the situation created by the legislative silos, years of status quo in international relations prior to the fall of the Iron Curtain, and the point of entry into most government agencies. Remembering our PRT example, DFAIT, CIDA, START, RCMP, CSC, Justice, Finance, CBSA, CSIS, Elections Canada, International Foundation for Election Systems and UNAMA were all present in the CA team.[76] This chapter will explore how the members of some of these agencies generally get to the position of deployed field officer or its equivalent, and how that correlates to the CF PD structure.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND CHANGE

The public service renewal process in its current incarnation was undertaken in 2007 to address perceived weaknesses in executive training which were noted as far back as the early 1970s.[77] The criticisms were that senior public servants did not understand the whole of how the public service and government worked. In increasingly broad

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[75] Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang quoted in Craig Leslie Mantle, "How do we go About Building Peace While We're Still at War: Canada, Afghanistan and the Whole of Government Concept," CFLI TR 2008-02, November 2008. 38.

[76] Craig Leslie Mantle, "How do we go About Building Peace While We're Still at War: Canada, Afghanistan and the Whole of Government Concept," CFLI TR 2008-02, November 2008. 32.

[77] A.W. Johnson, secretary of the Treasury Board, quoted in R.J. Evraire. "General and Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces" (Kingston: Queen's University, 1988) 7.

ranging efforts, through the 1990s intent on the broadening of the horizons of those selected for advancement was commenced. The action plan operates on four lines: Planning, Recruiting, Employee Development and Enabling Infrastructure.[78] This is linked to the career profile of senior public servants. What we see today at the ADM and DM level are products of this system.

The net effect of this procedural change is that civilian leaders in DND come through important PD gateways in the Public Service which are unrelated to DND and by extension the CF. More than half of the DM, Assoc DM and ADM level leadership of DND at the time of writing had no background in defence issues, although almost all had transited through PCO, TBS or both.[79] This effect is not limited to DND. Indeed a detailed review of PCO key personalities' biographies would indicate a policy either explicit (which the author could not find) or implicit that requires civilian public service executives to be posed to multiple departments, and transiting multiple times through PCO or TBS in order to advance.[80] The observation from this is that DND does not as a rule create its own civilian executives, and the opportunity to provide our own senior leaders with exposure to the central agencies of government like the senior public service is limited to a single General Officer in the PCO and a handful of staff officers in DFAIT.

As enablers to the WOG aspect of the CA approach to operations, two major undertakings by the public service are noteworthy. First is the Advanced Leadership

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[78] Canada School of Public Service. http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=clerk-greffier&sub=plan&doc=intro_e.htm Accessed 18 March 2009.

[79] http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/about-notresujet/bio/index-eng.asp accessed 29 March 2009.

[80] http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=org accessed 29 March 2009.

Program (ALP). Second is the inter-linked process of DM University Champion

Program and the Canada School of Public Service Fellowship.

Offered at the Canada School of Public Service, the ALP is attended by ADMs

and senior DGs as nominated by PCO. Designed to improve senior leadership across

government, it is conducted in three blocks of two weeks and a number of two day

sessions over the course of seven months.[81] A strong Whole of Government tool, the

course pre-requisites indicate it is loaded by the centre. It therefore works at the

institutional level as a team building, and perhaps team training level. While the ALP is

only in its third year of operation, it has a structure which replies in a later PD setting to

the issues raised in the first chapter of this work. CF General Officers have attended this

course.[82]

Previously this work outlined how CF officers are not attending civilian

universities at the graduate level in any numbers. Are they then attending at the

undergraduate level – which is to say DPs 1 or 2? The short answer is yes but the wrong

ones. There are 95 Universities listed by the Association of Universities and Colleges of

Canada.[83] It is worth noting there are 27 universities which have been singled out by the

Deputy Minister University Champion program as schools which the CSPS wishes to

improve contact with, increase recruiting from and additionally, source individuals to the

CSPS Fellowship from. Notably, the universities which the CF has the closest historical

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[81] Canada School of Public Service. http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/dpr/alp-pal/index-eng.asp Accessed 18 March 2009.

[82] MGen Beare attended in 2008. Author was his personal staff officer at the time.

[83] AUCC Website. http://www.aucc.ca/can_uni/our_universities/index_e.html Accessed 18 March 2009.

relationship: principally the partners of the Canadian Virtual Universities,[84] plus Royal

Roads University are not listed in the public services' high impact program.[85] Dalhousie

is noteworthy in its presence in both groups. This is not to say that one set or another of

these institutions is better[86], only that when the CF has civilian university links, there is a

continued existence in two camps with respect to OGDs. Perhaps Dalhousie along with

Queen's and the University of Ottawa are among those which could provide the common

ground.

The 13 Security and Defence Form chairs populate nine of the CSPS

institutions.[87] While it is encouraging that DND funds are supporting an awareness of

security and defence issues, the process does not put military officers in civilian academic

institutions. The function of tacit learning or team building is clearly not being enabled

by separate schools for uniformed and civilian studies. Recalling the potential of

differences not only on material taught but the manner in which it is taught as described

by the tacit knowledge theory inherent to the Community of Practice (CoP) is profound.

The current situation is that universities will be almost completely separate is bound to

exacerbate the tendency of OGD and NGO CoPs being substantially different in outlook

to the CF. Indeed, while differences in perspective are required for different CoPs, the

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[84] CVU Website. http://www.cvu-uvc.ca/ Accessed 18 March 2009.

[85] Canada School of Public Service. http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/pbp/dmucp/cldmuc-eng.asp Accessed 18 March 2009.

[86] The DM's list clearly includes the largest and oldest universities in Canada, whereas the Virtual University list is one of younger institutions very flexible and therefore helpful in supporting the OPME and IBDP.

[87] Department of National Defence. *Security and Defence Form, Year in Review 2006-2007.* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007)

difference brought on by complete segregation in education beyond the secondary school level is awkward in the extreme.

CANADA'S FACE OVERSEAS

Most other government departments do not have the large professional development system resident in the CF. This has many reasons, and the key one is structural. DFAIT (including START) and CIDA for example hire management, policy and Foreign Service officers out of graduate school and then apply up to three years of occupation specific training.[88] Academically then, they can be said to have achieved what would be understood as DP3. Indeed, if DP4 is truly as unreliably delivered as has been asserted by Evraire[89] and Kitchen[90], Foreign Service officers are the academic and professional development peers of CF senior officers. Interestingly that is where it ends for DFAIT. The Auditor General found that they had no PD structure beyond this in their 2007 report.[91] It would seem an interesting corollary to the CF PD structure with ongoing attempts to remodel DP4. These efforts culminated in the recent launch of the year long, academic master's degree granting National Studies Program as a replacement for the National Defence College.[92] Where the NSP replaces the NDC, it will be

[88] DFAIT Recruiting Website: http://www.international.gc.ca/jobs-emplois/faq.aspx?lang=en#Training Accessed 18 March 2009.

[89] R.J. Evraire. "General and Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces." Queen's University ISP-MPA Master's Project. 1998. 4-12.

[90] Canada. MGen C.G. Kitchen. "Out Service Training for Officers." A special project for ADM(Per). March 1985.

[91] Canada. http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_200705_03_e_17478.html#ch3hd3a Accessed 18 March 2009.

[92] Canada. National Security Studies Syllabus. CFC 7000. 16 July 2008.

interesting to note if its program makes an impact on senior leadership, where less than half of the Canadians graduating NDC were ever promoted.[93]

A FEDERAL POLICE FORCE

The RCMP has an officer profile remarkably similar to the CF. Officer grades generally but not exclusively have BAs. Officer grades are promoted from NCO grades based upon competitive exams, tests and interviews. RCMP leaders are often employed in a military-like structure to plan complex operations domestically, and occasionally abroad in settings like the OMLT, PRT and JTF Afg HQ. To support the RCMP and other police agencies, the Canadian Police College, was created to be a national centre of excellence and an academic focal point for peace officer professional development.[94] However, the course syllabus of the institution is limited, and focuses on what appear to the development of future detachment commanders. A more interesting indication of the RCMP's intent to integrate with OGDs is their use of approximately 70 positions a year on assorted courses at the CSPS.[95] This note alone suggests value to CSPS as a location to interact with Canadian OGDs. This is a population which may be attracted by the offer of an academic master's degree and the broader strategic view of NSP. However, the overly "military-trade" specific nature of the JCSP may be a dissuader for the reasons discussed in the previous chapter.

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[93] Evraire 5.

[94] Canadian Police College Website. http://www.cpc.gc.ca/home_e.htm Accessed 18 April 2009.

[95] Auditor General. *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons.* Ottawa: Office of the Auditor general of Canada, May 2007.   Chapter 3.

THE LARGEST OF THE NGOS

It is accepted in most military circles that dealing with NGOs is problematic. It is also accepted in many or most NGO circles that dealing with the military is problematic. An excellent overview of this cultural divide from a contemporary perspective is available in the Olson article.[96] In it, Olsen explains that NGOs are a mixed population in which each agency, and to a degree each employee of the agency has differing aims, goals and motivations. While some agencies and individuals may be very pragmatic the differences are so widely ranging that there can be no solidarity and often no meaningful coordination even among NGOs. For the CA methodology this is perhaps the final frontier. To define the challenge here, a brief discussion of a few examples will be required, starting with one of the goliath NGOs.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has almost 1500 expatriates deployed operating their missions in countries around the world, controlling a workforce of many thousands of locally hired employees.[97] A subset of these persons are the managers, or in ICRC language; Delegates.[98] These individuals are the equivalent of an entry level officer, and possess as a minimum a baccalaureate degree (with concentrations in politics, or management) with a desire for applicants to hold a Masters. As there are generally less than 200 annual hiring to expatriate positions worldwide with over 5500 applications, it stands to reason that the level in question is achieved. This activity alone makes the NGO field leadership of Canadian nationality, fascinatingly

[96] Lara Olson. "Fighting for Humanitarian Space: NGOs in Afghanistan." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies,* Fall 2006, Vol 9 Issue 1.

[97] ICRC Website. http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5R4J73 Accessed 18 March 2009.

[98] ICRC Website. http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/fd-delegate Accessed 18 March 2009.

similar in profile to the DFAIT/CIDA/START population. More on this later, but first there is more to discuss about ICRC career progression.

The same ICRC HR website goes further to describe a ICRC head office director's textbook pedigree. Interestingly this is the same profile for a head of mission. This senior leader possesses a master's degree, and has completed at least three operational deployments as an ICRC, with the potential for more as many hop back and forth on contracts between NGOs before settling down into higher management. Interestingly the developmental process would make the ICRC head of mission or head office executive almost the doppelganger of a CF senior officer product of DP4. The two leaders in question could well have been to the same theatres and have seen the same problems. The one notable exception of course is that the NGO leader received his or her DP4 training prior to initial employment, and from a civilian institution. If they are Canadian, it was likely one of the 27 on the CSPC championed list.

ANOTHER NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Individual preparation as listed in Australian Public Service guidance is four pronged: interagency and cross-agency networking opportunities; seminars; mobility and temporary placements into other agencies or project teams; and learning and development.[99] When applied to the CF, current methods of delivery would read as:

- Networking: Graduate School / Alumni programs
- Seminars (multiple paths): ADM Seminar – run annually by PCO over two-three days (3-star); CSPS for Canadian OGDs; Peacekeeping centres for foreign national agencies and NGOs.
- Mobility and temporary placement: one GOFO in PCO, five LCol/Col positions in DFAIT.
- Learning and Development: ALP

From a purely programmatic perspective, Networking and Mobility appear to be two locations where improvements could be made.

Attendance within the 27 graduate schools which produce senior public servants would create two effects. First, the individual officers attending would become engaged in life of the program and in the alumni following on. Engagement through support of publishing internally or lecturing as available would provide a way to remain connected and both learn from the faculty and other alumni in a teambuilding and team training setting. Secondly, there is the horizontal transference within the groups of graduate students each year. These graduate schools will be provided with an operationally experienced military officer who is the academic peer of the main population of the masters students. Despite Kitchen's recommendation to increase the CF's presence on campus, this is currently lacking in most Canadian universities. The Norman Paterson

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[99] Australia. *Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges.* "The Connecting Guide," (Canberra : Commonwealth of Australia, 2004) 6.

School of International Relations director of admissions related "We have not had a military officer in the program in years. I think the last one was Ryan Latinovich" (an officer who attended classes in academic year 1997).[100] Whether this casual recollection is accurate or not, the observation is telling. The key is that the only officers of recollection attending NPSIA are pre-operational experience and infrequent. This highlights the lack of link between operational military leaders and schools of government student body in Canadian universities. Given NPSIA's status as a producer of public servants and NGO staffers, is it any wonder there is a divide?

Mobility to deploy for temporary duty between the operational commands and the key OGDs would seem an advantage. A similar program has already been undertaken in the US.[101] Yet, of the five positions the CF holds in DFAIT, only three are currently filled. Before embarking on negotiating a temporary assignment regimen, it would seem wise to fill these permanent positions for obvious team training results.

TWO POPULATIONS

The other CA partners can therefore be divided into two groups. The first group, consisting of the RCMP and any other agencies which recruit at the BA level or below, can likely be more efficiently attracted into the existing NSP system by their desire for a Master's degree and a broadening experience. This is provided their parent agency is capable and willing to allow for such a substantial PD absence. The second group, representing much of the public service and most officer equivalent NGOs, simply cannot be attracted to an MA lure alone, because it would be a redundant level of education.

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[100] Interview with the Author, NPSIA Head of Admissions, November 2007.

[101] Interview with the Author, Major Matthew Brown, USACGSC, 30 March 2009.

However, this interaction must still be sought out, as when the second group attends, it will be out of true desire to bring together the different Communities of Practice. While some success in integrating them into the CF's institutions has been effective and beneficial to all parties, to believe that the complete solution space of the CA supporting PD can be achieved in CF institutions is unrealistic. It is much more reasonable to assume that while the existing invitation approach must be continued, both populations of OGDs, in particular the post MA group, must be approached by going to them, rather than they to the CF. That is to say, the CF must attend their graduate schools of origin. The following chapter will explore how.

CHAPTER 6 – OPTIONS FOR CONTACT AND SYNERGY

In reviewing conclusions so far it must be remembered that the CA methodology of operations is not new. It is a reality that has resurfaced. As such, it is incumbent on the CF to plan for success in the contemporary operating environment. To make those teams function, this paper will articulate a plan to promote understanding through teambuilding and understanding through community building. This is clearly not an attempt to civilianize the profession of arms, only to link it to the people and agencies it serves. Formalized doctrine and directed coordination can only get the CF so far.

> Lastly, it may be worth remembering that too much effort may also be spent on coordination. Most actors in the field are stretched in terms of time, personnel and resources. That may be one incentive for engaging in a comprehensive approach, but it is also a limiting factor. The perfect plan does not exist, nor does the perfect coordination mechanism. There are limits to how much coordination one can and should be engaged in, in the midst of a crisis. Comprehensive approach is a means to an end, not an end in itself.[102]

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[102] Farsten Friis, Pia Jarmyr. "Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management." NUPI Report. (Oslo : Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Instutt, 2008) 20-21.

The DP3 and DP4 mandated training which is delivered in JCSP and NSP is validated by the OGS and ODP for the mainstream of the officer corps. It needs to stay the course of its current evolution for the majority of CF officers who will serve in staff positions. However, this is deficient for the challenges of those who will command in the CA environment in DP 3. That role needs to be given to those who are up to the military and intellectual challenges of the task. In that vein, this work makes three recommendations:

1. Push our future leaders into broadening their horizons and those of other CA leaders.
2. Accept the limitations of JCSP and NSP to achieve the secondary aim of CA facilitation.
3. Leverage every training and exchange activity with OGDs and NGOs.

BROADEN SELECT LEADERS

The observations enclosed in this document have outlined that command in the CA environment should be related not only to tactical level skills, but to an intellectual and even academic capability which is resident in a small percentage of officers. This is not new information, as it was outlined in the Kitchen report. However, the acceptance that selection and grooming on the academic skill set as a major enabler to the operational and strategic skill set is a deviation of the current mainstream approach to PD in the CF's current structure.

Taken to its mathematical extreme, the theoretical gateway would have a substantial number, if not all, commanders in an operational environment being graduates of a CA grooming, academic masters' program. What does this mean to the environments? In the land force, there are less than twenty units upon which to base a Battlegroup, PRT or OMLT. Only half change command each year. Similar numbers

exist in the other environments; therefore ten per environment means up to thirty COs graduate JCSP to command a unit which may deploy operationally. In practice, two each of PRT, Battlegroup and OMLT deploy annually. The JCSP class of approximately 110 Canadians could accomplish this by sending one graduate to each of the CSPS' 27 linked schools to complete an academic MA during a second year of ATL. Conceptually, this could be viewed as an out-sourced SAMS. This practice would prepare commanders for their demanding future commands, and linking our future commanders to the next generation of senior public servants.

The capacity to execute such a plan exists. The question remains whether we are ready to proceed beyond the perspective that all officers attending DP 3 and 4 are identical, and perhaps some remaining anti-academic sentiment.[103] The contemporary operating environment requires the added effort to make the CA methodology in operations succeed as best it can.

Recent organizational changes have caused the CF to plan towards an increase in ATL and an improvement to the JCSP capacity by two syndicates – approximately 22-24 persons. When the CF is smaller than the 1990s, it seems counter-intuitive that it should require more CFC graduates. Instead, those ATL positions could provide the tool to implement this plan as written, with appropriate allocations by environment for a second year, following JCSP and before command in the CA environment.

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[103] Bernd Horn, "Soldier/Scholar: An Irreconcilable Divide?" *Canadian Army Journal*. Vol 4 No 4 Winter 2001-2002. 3-7.

The question arises then if we do go into graduate schools with the aim of team building, are we not then going against the finding of Salas in his team building work?[104] The answer is no on two levels. First, it could be argued that working with the same population which will eventually populate OGDs and NGOs with a two pronged aim of team training, producing individual sensitization and the potential of future horizontal and vertical transference should not be overlooked. This transference would take place not only in OGDs, NGOs but in the CF, thereby augmenting the efforts of the mainstream delivery methods of JCSP and NSP. The second reason is that of the Salas finding itself, that even if the activity were viewed from a very narrow perspective of that of 'team building' that ensuring graduates of the major schools of government fully understand the role and capabilities of the Canadian profession of arms. This role clarification would ensure that future CA leaders understand the CF forms a normal part of Canadian society and an integral element of Canadian domestic and foreign policy.

INTERNAL SYSTEMS IMPORTANT WITH LIMITATIONS

The existing internal systems will succeed to sensitize at the JCSP level and provide some actual linkages to OGDs, likely principally law enforcement or legal agencies on NSP. Ideally, more CA impact should be brought to bear on both these courses; however their primary role as military training courses provides a governing effect on this. JCSP and NSP fill necessary roles in the OGS and as such can evolve but must not break from these requirements. The structure and manning of OGDs and NGOs make these courses unworkable options for further integration and this must be accepted.

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[104] Eduardo Salas, Drew Rozell, Brian Mullen, James E. Driskell. "The Effect of Team Building on Performance: An Integration. *Small Group Research*. Vol 30 No 3. June 1999. 309

However, continuing in the current methodology of ignoring the outside world of OGD and NGO production would be harmful. In the CF's current methodology it is engaged in the issue of the CA for operations. It sees the requirement to provide training and doctrine in this field, but wishes to do so only on its own terms. CA or more often WoG is incorporated heavily into the JCSP and NSP course of study, and is working its way into doctrine. However, as has been shown, to date the desired physical integration of these CA teams is appears to be sought only in one of the CF's own institutions or in harm's way. This is perhaps explained by Dipboye.

Dipboye articulates that there are a number of barriers to implementing a rational model of training. These are: Personal attitudes of users toward a rational approach, providing a good fit of the trainee to the job context, maintaining procedural and distributive justice, acquiring and maintaining power.[105] A thorough review of the wealth of documentation on specific skill sets and the depth of analysis of the PD system in the CF will show a fair structure in dealing with Dipboye's first two concerns. However, the importance of JCSP and the NSP and their foreign equivalents could be discussed as having an affect on the later two which will be discussed in turn.

Maintaining procedural and distributive justice in the Officer PD setting suggests that career gateways are awarded to those who fulfill certain criteria. That criterion is a generally accepted merit list. However, if a methodology from outside of the profession of arms limits the systems ability to provide the merit prescribed development to a member of the high-value stream. Could those selected for NPSIA and other graduate

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[105] Robert L. Dipboye. "Organizational Barriers to Implementing a Rational Model of Training." *Training for a Rapidly Changing Workplace: Applications of Psychological Research.* Quinones, Ehrenstein Eds. (Washington DC : American Psychological Association, 2002) 39-50.

schools by the CF PD system actually gain admission on competitive merit with other

undergraduate degree holders? This additional, outside check would frustrate the current

construct of the CF succession planning system. It is therefore a much safer approach to

have an in-house university award an in-house Masters' degree which can then provide

an appropriate development and merit board score to an officer selected for rapid

progression. This approach clearly indicates Dipboye's thesis, that the CF is not

interested in outside constraints in its succession planning despite the requirement

outlined in the Kitchen report.

TRAINING AND EXCHANGE

> Training is part of an impression management strategy in which
> organizations convince their constituencies and their employees that they
> are doing something that is beneficial. In many cases the symbolism is
> useful. When organizations confront poorly understood problems that
> require intuition, symbols provide a rich source of information that are
> used in understanding the situation.[106]

It has been well explained that organizations communicate their values through

their training programs. The same could be seen in the lack of CA training and exchange

in the CF. While examples of OGDs participating in strategic level exercises are known,

the CF has not habitually selected and then filled its existing positions in OGDs.[107] This

defacto level of manning communicates its value of these positions, and indicates the

enduring impression in a Dipboye way that the CF is projecting a view that the CA

aproach is in our house or probably not at all.

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[106] Robert L. Dipboye. "Organizational Barriers to Implementing a Rational Model of Training." *Training for a Rapidly Changing Workplace: Applications of Psychological Research*. Quinones, Ehrenstein Eds. (Washington DC : American Psychological Association, 2002) 52.

[107] ADM (Pol) Staff during discussions at CFC September 2008.

CHAPTER 7 – THE FINAL WORD

The CA methodology in operations will remain with the CF for years to come. The complexity of the contemporary operating environment ensures this. Resultantly, the recommendations of the previous chapter must be implemented along two lines of operation.

First, the CF must orient its professional development methodologies to support and encourage increased interoperability with the other CA partners. Leveraging ongoing interaction with existing institutions such as the CSPS, harmonizing curriculum at CFC and continued engagements peacekeeping training centres will provide some results. Efforts to exercise with any possible CA entity must be sought out and engaged in. However, it is unrealistic that this alone will be sufficient. To truly engage the Communities of Practice resident in the OGDs and NGOs, the CF must go to them. Clearly, the highest potential for payoff is to be found in the graduate schools which produce our civilian OGD and NGO leaders. Placing our brightest minds with fresh real-world experience in our graduate schools will benefit not only the CF and the CA construct, but improve the level of discourse in those institutions.

Secondly, this must be done while still maintaining the CF's vital ground of a general purpose combat capability as defined in the cornerstone document of the extant OGS. These two undertakings should be a good fit if the CF is interested in optimizing CA performance.

AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Towards the end of making the closest possible links with OGDs and key NGOs, there remain four areas of research to be considered. Each will enhance the balance and

implementation of the solutions defined in Chapter Six, and ensure that as time passes the methodology is responsive to the needs of the CF and Canada.

From Chapter One: Use Fleichman's four types of leader-directed team processes and/or the Australian assessment model to analyze the CA functionality of each major OGD and NGO partner of the CF. The objective of this analysis is to create a needs assessment which can be addressed in an outreach program in a bilateral setting through fine-tuning exercises or courses where appropriate.

From Chapter Five : Define needs of other more like agencies and compare to OGS and DPs 2-4, to see where commonalities in core CF PD delivery can be modularised to suit greater outside participation.

From Chapter Five: Define the graduate schools of origin internationally which produce key CA leaders for use in DP 4 and 5 delivery outside Canada.

From Chapter Five: Consider the functionality of an expanded core warfighting term on DP 3-5 delivery programs with the intention of allowing PD delivery to be condensed beyond the enclosed recommendation to civilian graduate school, plus one warfighting term at an internal institution.

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