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The Canadian Forces and Private Military Companies: A Possible Partnership in the Arctic?

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ABSTRACT

Prime Minister Harper's declaration of Arctic sovereignty as a priority for his government signaled the start of a new era in Canadian defence. In his view, the Canadian government had failed to appropriately demonstrate its sovereignty over this region. If Canada was to retain its Arctic territories and their resources, the Canadian approach to sovereignty assurance had to change.

This research paper examines what the Canadian Forces (CF) will be asked to do in supporting the government of Canada's position in the Arctic. It examines the issue of Arctic sovereignty and its close link to security. A brief history of threats to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and the CF role in responding to those threats is provided. This is followed by an exploration of current and developing threats to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and what possible roles the CF may be called upon to perform in defending Canadian interests. The CF overstretch problem – that of too many tasks for too few personnel – is developed through an analysis of the policy decisions that led to the problem, followed by an examination of the factors making it difficult for the CF to overcome it. Private Military Companies (PMC) have figured prominently in CF operations during the past decade and they may present an option to the CF in accomplishing their Arctic responsibilities. A brief study of the types of PMC, their evolution and their use by the CF to date is also provided. Finally a troops to task assessment is presented offering roles in the Arctic where PMCs could offer some much needed respite for the CF.

INTRODUCTION

> You don't defend national sovereignty with flags, cheap election rhetoric and advertising campaigns...You need forces on the ground, ships in the sea and proper surveillance.[1] – Prime Minister Stephen Harper

Canada's Arctic region has enjoyed an increase in interest in the last decade. Much of this renewed interest has been as a result of the impact of climate change, for which many experts agree the Arctic serves as the proverbial canary for the remainder of the world. Prime Minister Stephen Harper made Arctic sovereignty one of his party's priorities in the 2005 election campaign that brought the conservatives back to power in early 2006. With an electoral speech that included words such as "use it or lose it", Harper laid out the direction his government would take in making the Arctic an issue of greater importance to Canadians. In his view, the Canadian government had neglected its responsibilities towards this great region for too long and he signaled his intent to have the Canadian Forces at the forefront of demonstrating Canadian sovereignty there.

The Arctic was once a great frozen expanse, largely neglected by most of the world as it offered little in way of recoverable economic resources. Furthermore, it was not a navigable sea route and was distant from world economic centres. Indeed the only real consideration given to the Arctic during much of the 20th century was that it represented the shortest distance between the two superpowers. Now that the Arctic has become more accessible due to climate change and technological advancements, this region is the subject of greater discussion.

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[1] Andrew Mayeda and Randy Boswell, "Tough Talk Taps into National Pride," *Canwest News Service*, http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/features/arcticambitions/story.html?id=352b8bf7-b6b3-46a3-8334-29712adb43ce; Internet; accessed 15 April 2009.

Recent analysis of Arctic issues by scholars such as Rob Huebert and Franklyn Griffiths have defined the Canadian Arctic to be Canadian territory north of the 60th parallel. This region is bounded to the west by the Yukon-Alaska border, to the east by the Atlantic Ocean and Greenland and includes the three territories as well as the northern reaches of Québec and Labrador. While this is a huge expanse, the most contentious portions of the Canadian Arctic in terms of sovereignty have been the Arctic Archipelago and Canada's Arctic waters.

Although the government of Canada has indicated that it desires a greater national presence in the Arctic to demonstrate sovereignty, it is important to consider the ability of the CF to undertake this endeavour. Considering the fact that the CF has been undergoing a period of unprecedented operational tempo and that the Forces have only recently begun to recover from the drastic reductions of the 1990s, it is clear that the CF are overstretched – there are too many tasks for too few personnel. Given this overstretch situation, it is unclear whether or not the CF alone will be able to comply with the government's desire for greater presence in the Arctic.

Indian and Northern Affairs Canada is the lead federal agency responsible for the Canadian Arctic. Other federal agencies that have a role to play in the Arctic include the Department of National Defence (DND), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian Coast Guard, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Environment Canada, Transport Canada and Public Safety Canada. Therefore, the CF are not the only federal agency with Arctic responsibilities, but they are the largest federal department, with the greatest number of resources (as stretched as they are) and arguably the best ability to play a security role.

The overstretch of the CF in recent years has led to the increased use of Private Military Companies (PMC) to assist in fulfilling the CF's missions abroad as well as in training CF members. This trend has proven to be common among western military forces who have had to resort to using PMCs to assist in sustaining operations the world over.

Given that PMCs are now being used extensively by the CF for operations overseas and that the CF overstretch problem is expected to continue for some time, the CF would be prudent to consider using PMCs to assist in the accomplishment of its tasks in the Arctic.

In order to evaluate this possibility, a thorough understanding of the issues at stake will be required. First, the issue of Arctic sovereignty and security will be addressed, with an explanation of the historical threats to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and the CF's response to these. This will be followed by an examination of the current situation and an elaboration of developing and future threats to Canadian sovereignty and security in the Arctic. Next, the CF's overstretch problem will be addressed in greater detail in order to better understand why the CF may not be able to fulfill all assigned tasks in the Arctic on their own. A definition of PMCs will ensue, including a description of the types of services that these companies can provide, a brief examination of their evolution and an explanation of the CF experience with PMCs. Potential risk or problem areas associated with the use of PMCs will also be addressed. Finally, an assessment addressing which CF tasks in the Arctic hold the most potential for the employment of PMCs will be provided.

THE ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION

In order to understand the challenges associated with sovereignty in the Arctic and more specifically with security, it is important to define these two terms. First, sovereignty will be defined in the broad sense of the term. The present challenges to Canadian sovereignty in its Arctic region will then be examined. Second, a definition of security as a component of sovereignty will be provided. Finally, a brief history of threats to Canadian security in the Arctic will be provided along with a synopsis of the Canadian military response.

Daniel Philpott described sovereignty as the "... supreme legitimate authority within a territory... Supreme authority within a territory implies both undisputed supremacy over the land's inhabitants and independence from unwanted intervention by an outside authority."[2] Therefore, an independent state such as Canada must take certain steps for its sovereignty to be recognized. For instance, it is necessary to have defined borders that are recognized by most other states. Furthermore, the said territory must be inhabited and the state must be prepared to defend it. Only then would the international community recognize sovereignty.

While there has been much publicity over the last several years over Canadian Arctic sovereignty, the official position of the government of Canada has been made clear: there is "no threat to ownership of lands, islands and waters of the arctic. They are Canadian and will remain so."[3] Furthermore, other countries have recognized Canada's

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[2] Daniel Philpott, "Sovereignty: an Introduction and Brief History," *Journal of International Affairs*, 48, No. 2 (Winter 1995): 357.

[3] John Hannaford "Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy" (presentation given to JCSP 35 at Canadian Forces College, Toronto, ON, January 30, 2009), with permission.

sovereignty in the north with President George W. Bush stating at the 2007 Montebello summit: “The United States does not question Canada's sovereignty of Arctic islands, and the United States supports Canadian investments used to exercise its sovereignty.”[4]

While the United States does not question Canada’s sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago, the same can not be said for the much debated North West Passage which links the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, going through Canada’s northern reaches. Despite the term “passage”, it is often considered to be as many as five separate possible routes (see figure 1). The Americans maintain, as was reiterated as recently as January 2009 by President Bush, that “the Northwest Passage is a strait used for international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for international navigation.”[5] However, Canada’s position is that all of these waters are Canadian internal waters. As internal waters, Canada has the right to control all maritime traffic through the passage. This forces foreign naval vessels who wish to transit to do so under the conditions of “right of innocent passage”. This also meant that submarines could not transit the waters below the surface.

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[4] Comments made by President George W. Bush 21 August 2007 at the North American Leaders Summit held in Montebello QC. These comments clearly state that there is no dispute of sovereignty over the islands, but falls short of recognizing sovereignty over all waters, with the US maintaining the Northwest Passage is an international strait. Comments drawn from CTV.ca news article available from http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070821/summit_070821/20070821?hub=Canada ; Internet; accessed 10 February 2009.

[5] An excerpt from President George W. Bush’s new directive on the arctic, released eight days before the end of his presidency. Excerpt taken from: Mike Blanchfield and Randy Boswell, “Bush asserts U.S. sea power over Arctic straits,” *CANWEST News Service*, 12 January 2009; http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/Bush+asserts+power+over+Arctic+straits/1169847/story.html; Internet; accessed 18 February 2009.

Figure 1: Graphic depiction of the multiple sea routes of the Northwest Passage
Source: Maps of the Northwest Passage, available from: http://www.athropolis.com/map9.htm; Internet; accessed 18 February 2009.

Many other nations share the American point of view that the passage constitutes a strait used for international navigation. It is a delicate situation that diplomatic discussions have failed to resolve thus far. Although it has not yet developed into a major cause of concern, this situation needs to be resolved so that it does not become a problem. It is entirely possible that Canada may need to turn to other means to demonstrate and protect its sovereignty in these waters should diplomatic talks fail.

While the official Canadian government position is that there is no argument over Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, there remain some minor territorial disputes: Hans Island (with Denmark), an area within the Lincoln Sea (with Denmark) and an area of the

Beaufort Sea (with the USA).[6] These disputes are also being handled diplomatically and do not constitute an outright challenge to overall Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic at the moment. Nevertheless, they must be treated seriously as they give pause to entertain the possibility of future threats or conflicts. Diplomacy could fail and Canada must be prepared should this occur.

Clearly, the government's refusal to publicly acknowledge any immediate threat is meant for Canada to appear strong and unwavering in its sovereignty in the Arctic. It does not mean, however, that Canada takes the aforementioned concerns lightly. On the contrary, it must, and most certainly is, evaluating what steps it needs to take, and when, in order to show and maintain its sovereignty in the Arctic.

Security in the Arctic

The delicate situation developing in the Arctic, with so many countries tiptoeing around but not yet quite challenging Canada's sovereignty, makes it clear that security in the region is becoming more and more necessary. In the earlier definition of sovereignty, it was said that one of its components was the willingness and the ability to defend a territory. Herein lies the close relationship between security and sovereignty.

Security in terms of national responsibility is often understood to mean the protection of a nation's interests and values. Huebert draws a very close link between sovereignty and security, stating that "the two are not mutually exclusive concepts, but are different terms for the same requirement – regional control."[7] If security has to do with protection, it must then be protection against a threat of some kind. While the

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[6] John Hannaford "Canada's Arctic Foreign…

[7] Rob Huebert, "Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security?" *Canadian Military Journal*, 6, 4 (Winter 2005-2006): 21

possible physical, environmental and economic threats facing Canada's Arctic today and in the future will be detailed in the next chapter, it is important to know that the need for security in this region is not new. It is necessary to explore Canada's past challenges in securing the Arctic and the role the CF has played.

The Government Response in the Past: Economy of Effort

The Canadian Arctic as we now know it came to be when the rights to the Arctic Islands were ceded to the Dominion of Canada in 1880 by Great Britain. However, it was not until almost a decade later that the government saw a need for security in the region. As a matter of fact, the first Canadian military presence recorded in the Arctic was the establishment of the Yukon Field Force in 1898. This force was created to assist the North West Mounted Police in maintaining law and order during the Klondike Gold Rush.[8] It marked the beginning of the government's efforts to ensure security in the region, and therefore maintain its sovereignty in the region through a military presence.

Despite this initial display of strength, the government perceived no immediate or significant threat to Canada's security from beyond its northern border in the early twentieth century. Having no immediate hostile neighbour in the area, and with the Northwest Passage being almost impossible to navigate in that era, it seemed unlikely that any nation would choose to attack from that region. For this reason, Canada largely relied on the harsh Arctic climate and the sheer expanse of the region to serve as a means of defence against an unlikely attack by conventional land forces.

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[8] Peter Gizewski and Andrew B. Godefroy, "Force Requirements (Land)," in *Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic*, ed. Brian MacDonald (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2007), 98-99.

More interest in defending the Canadian Arctic began during the Second World War after Japanese military landings on the Aleutian Islands of western Alaska were discovered.[9] In the interests of defending the North American continent from further advances by the Japanese, the United States and Canada built what would become the Alaska Highway to allow ready deployment of personnel and equipment from the south into the North.[10] This constituted the start of a new partnership between these two countries in ensuring continental security.

The end of the Second World War brought greater threat, this time from the Soviet Union, and pressure from the United States for more Canadian involvement in the Arctic to ensure North American security. Soon, the Cold War saw the two superpowers trying to gain advantage over one another and positioning themselves across the globe. The advent of nuclear weapons and the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles saw both the US and the USSR designate potential attack routes across the pole. Furthermore, with advances in submarine technology, the two powers could also operate beneath the arctic ice in an attempt to get as close as possible before launching any attack.[11] It was becoming obvious that the shortest route between them was across the Canadian Arctic and thus its strategic importance was at its peak.

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[9] Rob Huebert, "Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security?" *Canadian Military Journal*, 6, 4 (Winter 2005-2006), 18.

[10] *Ibid*., 18.

[11] Rob Hubert, "Canadian Arctic Security Issues: transformation in the post-cold war era," *International Journal*, 54, issue 2 (Spring 1999); http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?index=0&did=413567451&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1235103649&clientId=23&aid=1; Internet, accessed 12 February 2009.

Even though Canada's reliance upon the Arctic environment as a deterrent had been sufficient in the past, the new threat from bombers and missiles required a fresh defence strategy. The US and Canada decided to further develop their alliance and the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) command was established to provide for collective continental security against the Soviet threat through surveillance and protection of the continent's airspace.[12] In particular, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line of radar sites was established across the Canadian Arctic (as well as Alaska and Greenland) to detect incursions into North American airspace.[13] The DEW line has been modernized since its installation and NORAD still plays a critical role in control of continental airspace.

Economy of effort has long been the CF's, approach to defence of Canada's Arctic. The primary asset allocated to land based defence of the Arctic since the end of the Second World War has been the Canadian Rangers. A volunteer force of reservists made up largely of northern indigenous peoples, the Rangers "are responsible for protecting Canada's sovereignty by reporting unusual activities or sightings, collecting local data of significance to the Canadian Forces, and conducting surveillance or sovereignty patrols as required."[14] Using the people who already lived in the Arctic was advantageous to the Rangers, and the CF as whole. First and foremost, the troops knew the region well and would be able to notice the subtle disturbances to the landscape that would undoubtedly accompany enemy incursions into the territory. Furthermore, the

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[12] North American Aerospace Defence Command, "About NORAD," http://www.norad.mil/about/history.html; Internet; accessed 25 February 2009.

[13] Rob Huebert, "Renaissance in Canadian …, 19.

[14] Department of National Defence, "Canadian Rangers," http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LF/ENGLISH/7_5_1.asp; Internet; accessed 14 April 2009.

indigenous peoples' traditional skills of survival and navigation ensured that little additional support would be required and their natural dispersion by virtue of their living in small communities across the north offered wide reaching presence.[15] The Rangers' have been the "eyes and ears of the north" and have served Canada well throughout their history. They have reported on unexpected incursions of various maritime vessels - from warships to foreign fishing vessels - in Canada's Arctic waters.[16]

Aside from the Rangers, the Land Force contribution to the Arctic was very limited throughout the second half of the twentieth century. The total number of personnel permanently stationed in the North from the 1970s onward did not exceed 500 personnel in total, including the permanent electronic intercept station at Canadian Forces Station (CFS) Alert and the Northern Region Headquarters in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories.[17] While the Canadian Forces did engage in some large scale exercises in the region during this period, these decreased in scale, frequency and importance as the Cold War came to an end.[18]

During the same period, the maritime service of the CF also deployed very few assets in the Arctic. This is somewhat surprising considering that "the naval staff also was fully aware in this post-war period of the growing importance of the Arctic to Canadian security"[19], as stated clearly in *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*. In

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[15] Rob Huebert, "Renaissance in Canadian..., 19.

[16] BGen Millar presentation to JCSP 35 in Iqaluit. 3 February 2009.

[17] Rob Huebert, "Renaissance in Canadian…, 19.

[18] *Ibid*., 19.

fact, as early as 1949, the Canadian Navy conceived of the requirement for eastern arctic patrols, using a Navy icebreaker. The HMCS Labrador was the first military icebreaker to be commissioned and it became the first Canadian military ship to successfully navigate the Northwest Passage in 1954. The glory years of the Canadian Navy in the north were short lived as the Labrador was transferred to the Department of Transport in 1957.[20]

By the 1960's foreign naval submarine incursions were occurring in the Arctic. Both the US Navy and Soviet nuclear powered submarines were detected in the Canadian Arctic. The Canadian government briefly contemplated naval action to counter submarine threats by purchasing American made nuclear submarines in 1965. High cost prohibited the Canadian government from acquiring nuclear powered submarines thereby allowing for foreign submarine activity in Canada's Arctic to proceed unchecked.[21] More than twenty years later, the government renewed its efforts to introduce naval activity under the Arctic ice. This time, its interest was articulated within policy documentation in the form of the 1987 White Paper.

In this document, the Mulroney government announced intentions to acquire up to 12 nuclear powered submarines to allow patrols of all three of Canada's oceans.[22] This capability would have offered significant deterrence against Soviet submarine patrols and would have given Canada greater awareness of allied submarine operations in the Arctic

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[19] Department of National Defence, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020,* (Ottawa: Chief of the Maritime Staff, 2001), 60.

[20] *Ibid.,* 60.

[21] Rob Huebert, "Renaissance in Canadian…, 20.

[22] Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1987), 53.

as well. Once again, the high cost of the submarine acquisition programme, this time coupled with the end of the Cold War, caused the programme to be cancelled ending the Canadian Navy's hopes of operating under the Arctic ice.[23]

The Air Force's primary commitment to the Arctic throughout the Cold War was through its NORAD responsibilities. As previously mentioned, NORAD was established to ensure the aerospace defence of North America and military personnel from the air environment were given a significant role. Given the realities of geography and technology however, this role could be carried out from farther south. The Air Force made significant contributions to NORAD HQ in Colorado Springs and designated Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Station North Bay as the Canadian alternate command centre for NORAD. In addition, the operation of DEW line radar stations in Canada was the responsibility of the Air Force and represented a significant portion of their responsibilities in the Arctic.

Air operations in the region were more limited. Throughout the Cold War, Soviet aircraft approaching from the North encroaching on North American airspace were intercepted by a mix of United States Air Force (USAF) and Canadian aircraft, but bases were all located well south of the Arctic region. Surveillance flights were conducted regularly commencing in the 1970s as a Canadian government policy response to the much publicized transit of the Northwest Passage by the American vessel Manhattan in 1969.[24] The Air Force also conducted regular flights with long range patrol aircraft through the 1970s and 1980s, reaching a high of 22 flights per year in 1990. However,

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[23] Rob Huebert, "Renaissance in Canadian…, 20.

[24] Rob Hubert, "Canadian Arctic Security Issues…

these numbers decreased rapidly following the end of the Cold War, dwindling to only one or two flight per year by 1995.[25]

The primary air presence in the Canadian Arctic, during much of the Cold War, was provided by search and rescue aircraft, none of which were permanently based in the region. Indeed, operational aircraft were first based in the Arctic in 1994 when 440 Squadron was moved to Yellowknife from Edmonton. Beyond search and rescue, the Twin Otters of 440 Squadron provided support to CFS Alert and other CF operations in the Arctic[26] In addition, the Air Force oversaw the construction of four Forward Operating Locations (FOL) across the Arctic. The FOLs were designed to allow for forward deployment of Canadian and American fighter aircraft to respond to threats from across the pole, but have only been activated occasionally to this day.[27]

Overall, the first century of Canadian ownership of the Arctic saw a slowly increasing interest in the region in terms of military activity. The sheer size of the Canadian Arctic and its harsh environment were relied upon to help deter what was perceived as an unlikely and limited threat to Canada coming across that frontier. As has been shown thus far, the Canadian government through most of the twentieth century did not see sufficient need to justify significant commitment of resources to securing the country's northern reaches. With the end of the Cold War, activity in the North reduced as the Soviet threat no longer existed. Furthermore, the Canadian Forces' budget and effective strength were reduced as part of the promised peace dividend gained from

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[25] Rob Huebert, "Renaissance in Canadian…, 20.

[26] Department of National Defence, "440 Squadron – History," http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/17w-17e/sqns-escs/page-eng.asp?id=419; Internet; accessed 19 February 19, 2009.

[27] Rob Huebert, "Renaissance in Canadian…, 20.

victory in the Cold War. Nearly two decades later, with the promise of vast energy and mineral resources discovered in the Arctic and with climate change contributing to increased access to this seemingly inhospitable area of the world, interest in the Arctic is increasing again. For the Canadian Forces the operational tempo has never been higher and resources (with manpower being the key resource) are in short supply to confront new challenges in the Arctic. What possible solutions to the security challenge exist given an operational tempo that does not appear to be diminishing?

CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS

The evolution of problems relating to the sovereignty and security of Canada in the Arctic will directly the CF. For this reason, it is necessary to detail what current threats to Canadian interests exist in the Arctic, and to identify expected trends with regards to these threats. Having already discussed the ongoing sovereignty disputes that exist between Denmark and Canada as well as between the United States and Canada, emerging and future threats will now be examined. The assessment of each of these threats will also consider the need for some form of response by the Canadian government, whether via the CF or its security partners in other government departments.

Climate change represents the greatest catalyst for change in terms of Arctic stability. The gradual increase in average annual global temperatures have led to the reduction in surface area and thinning of the sea ice pack in the Arctic. This change has also limited the season during which first year ice (ice that forms in Arctic waters each year) poses obstruction to maritime navigation. Some experts have now predicted that summer sea ice could disappear entirely as early as 2013, decades earlier than scientists had originally expected.[28] This change in predictions about the rate of ice melt in the Arctic highlights how little is known about how the Arctic environment is reacting to climate change.

The reduction in sea ice through the Arctic Archipelago, and in particular through the Northwest Passage, is at the root of the significant increase in traffic through Canada's Arctic waters. The statistics on shipping are surprising, with an increase in

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[28] David Ljunggren, "Arctic summer ice could vanish by 2013: expert," http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSTRE52468B20090305?feedType=RSS&feedName=environmentNews; Internet; accessed March 28, 2009.

shipping activity in the Arctic rising from only 55 different ships (of which 27 were foreign flagged) in 2004 to a nearly doubled total of 107 ships (61 foreign flagged) in 2008.[29] Furthermore, transits of the Northwest Passage totaled 17 in 2008, a significant increase from only 12 in 2007.[30] These statistics only reflect the known shipping traffic in Canadian Arctic waters. Due to a lack of surveillance in the region in recent years, it is likely that other ships went undetected. Moreover, little is known of submarine activity in Canadian waters in the Arctic as Canada has limited ability to detect subsurface traffic in the Arctic. There is no reason to doubt that submarines continue to be active there, as they have been in the past (most notably during the Cold War).

While the majority of the ships on record have been commercial vessels, there have also been multiple passenger cruise ships that have frequented the area. The risks involved with cruise liners in the Arctic are significant. It is only a matter of time before a cruise ship has an accident of some kind in the Arctic such as those that have occurred in the waters off Antarctica in 2007 and 2008.[31] In such a case, the Canadian Government would undoubtedly be expected to call upon the CF to intervene and launch or at least assist in a major search and rescue operation.

Additional calls for assistance could also result from the fact that international shipping could be a source of pollution, whether through accidental seepage of fuel oil or of cargo. Such an incident would have devastating effects on the fragile Arctic

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[29] Brigadier General David Millar, "A Perspective on Sovereignty in Canada's North" (presentation given to JCSP 35 at Iquluit, NU, February 3, 2009), with permission.

[30] *Ibid*.

[31] Cesar Illiano, "150 Abandon Cruise Ship in Antarctica," http://www.nzherald.co.nz/cruises/news/article.cfm?c_id=165&objectid=10478113; Internet; accessed March 28, 2009.

ecosystem. Furthermore, with higher numbers of ships transiting Canadian waters, there is the increased likelihood of the CF being called upon for search and rescue. Lastly, as international military maritime activity increases, there will be a greater need for presence patrolling in the absence of Canadian Coast Guard assets to do so. The potential increase in operations conducted in the Arctic by the CF is recognized in *The Future Security Environment 2008*-2030: "Increased access to the Arctic, brought about by climate change, will have sovereignty, security and environmental implications... that will result in increased CF engagement in the Arctic region."[32]

Canada's economy depends upon commercial shipping for import and export of goods. The opening of sea routes through Canada's Arctic will provide less expensive means of transporting goods to their destination than through the Panama Canal. This is true not only for Canada in particular but for the world in general. Opening of the Northwest Passage could lead to it rivaling the Panama Canal as a trade route to get goods from Asia to Europe as this northerly route is some 4000 nautical miles shorter than the route through the Panama Canal.[33] Additionally, as permanent sea ice continues to melt, a transpolar route will likely develop. This new route would be over 5000 nautical miles shorter than that through the Panama Canal. These shorter routes could represent cost savings for commercial shipping of up to $1 million per trip.[34]

The leadership of the CF has begun to realize that there are security implications to the melting of Arctic ice. In *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030*, it was

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[32] Department of National Defence, *Future Security Environment 2008-2030*, Draft dated January 27 2009, 38.

[33] Brigadier General David Millar, "A Perspective…

[34] *Ibid.*

recognized that the opening of the Northwest Passage and other coastal waters of the Canadian Arctic will lead to more international shipping. It has been assessed that "the Canadian Government will likely call upon CF assets to help with sovereignty patrols, search and rescue operations, resource protection, and the monitoring of international military activities."[35] The CF has assessed that there will be a responsibility for protection of trade routes as well: "protection of both continental and international trade routes from disruption will be essential to Canada's economic well being."[36]

The effects of climate change in the Arctic are more far reaching than simply in the realm of maritime navigation. The thinning of Arctic ice and the reduction of its surface area (as well as recent technological advances) have led to increasingly viable extraction and exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic.

In addition, the Arctic represents the last reserve of significant fish stocks not yet commercially fished on a large scale. The new milder climate and the reduction in sea ice will see this change in the future as commercial fishing vessels are likely to set their sights on the Arctic as a significant source of fish. Nations with large commercial fisheries such as Japan, China and several European countries will, in all probability, look to the Arctic to provide for their national requirements.

Little is understood about the potential ecological impact of allowing a commercial fishery in the Arctic. Given the collapse of many fisheries around the world due to overfishing, such as with cod in Atlantic Canada, some governments are considering a moratorium on fishing until more research into the matter is conducted.

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[35] Department of National Defence, *Future Security Environment 2008-2030*, Draft dated January 27 2009, 44.

[36] *Ibid.*, 21.

The United States have already moved to ban commercial fishing north of Alaska to allow time to better research fish stocks and the potential impact of a commercial fishery.[37] Other governments, including Canada's, may follow suit with a similar ban in their territorial waters.

If Canada imposes such a ban, the CF can expect to be called upon by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to assist with surveillance of foreign fishing vessels. Furthermore, as indicated in *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030*, the harvesting of fish stocks across the world's oceans will intensify "to the point where access, stewardship and ownership may be possible sources of confrontation."[38] These predictions should not be surprising given that confrontations did occur during the so-called Turbot War of 1995, when tensions between Canada and Spain (and to a lesser extent Portugal) rose to a point where Canadian and Spanish warships patrolled areas in the same vicinity to defend fishing interests.[39] With similar situations likely to reoccur, "there will be greater demand for the maritime surveillance capabilities of the CF and for standing patrols of marine space under Canadian jurisdiction."[40]

Other Arctic resources that will likely be coveted by many nations include oil and natural gas. The rising global demand for oil in particular, and its associated price

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[37] McClatchy Newspapers, "US Regulators Vote to Ban Commercial Fishing in Arctic Waters," http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/feb/06/alaska-arctic-commerical-fishing-bering/print; Internet; accessed 28March 2009.

[38] Department of National Defence, *Future Security Environment 2008-2030*, Draft dated 27 January 2009, 39.

[39] Carleton Centre for European Studies, "Canada, Spain and the European Union in the Turbot War," http://www.carleton.ca/ces/EULearning/geography/turbotwar.html; Internet; accessed 28 March 2009.

[40] Department of National Defence, *Future Security Environment 2008-2030*, Draft dated 27 January 2009, 39.

increase, has made it economically feasible to seek out sources that were previously cost prohibitive to exploit. Arctic oil and natural gas reserves are estimated to account for up to 25% of the world's undiscovered energy resources.[41] Already, the United States, Canada and Russia have either explored for or commenced extracting oil from these reserves within their territorial limits. The vast amounts of resources available make sovereignty claims in the Arctic all the more important. For this reason, the Arctic nations have already laid claims to the Arctic seabed and the continental shelf extensions under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Furthermore, resource starved economies such as China and Japan, as well as the increasingly energy hungry European Union, have all demonstrated interest in developing Arctic oil reserves for exploitation.

As oil and gas reserves in the Canadian (and American) Arctic are exploited, means for transportation of these materials to southern markets will be required. While bulk crude could be transported by ship during the ice free summer months, this is not an ideal solution. The threat of an environmental disaster - similar to that of the Exxon Valdez twenty years ago - makes the use of super tankers in Arctic waters somewhat unpalatable. In addition, their use in the Arctic could prove problematic as the navigable season is quite short and many of the channels through the Arctic Archipelago are poorly charted or of insufficient depth for large tankers to pass.[42] Still, if tankers are eventually used in the area the Department of Fisheries and Oceans would very likely need

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[41] Matthew Carnaghan and Allison Goody, *Canadian Arctic Sovereignty*, (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2006), 9.

[42] Anne Casselman, "Will the Opening of the Northwest Passage Transform Global Shipping Anytime Soon?" http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=opening-of-northwest-passage; Internet; accessed 30 March 2009.

assistance from the CF for added surveillance of these vessels while they transit Canadian waters.

Whether or not tankers are used, an alternative means for the transport of oil and gas extracted from the Arctic is ground based transportation. Road, rail and pipeline transportation are viable methods, with some pipelines already in existence and others, such as the Mackenzie Gas Project, planned for the future.[43] Land transportation methods, pipelines in particular, are vulnerable to sabotage or terror attacks as was observed on three separate occasions on pipelines in British Columbia in 2008.[44] Security and protection of commercial pipelines may be a commercial responsibility, but with the environmental implications of such an attack, the CF could be called upon to provide surveillance over vulnerable points and assistance to Environment Canada in the event of a spill.

With gradually rising temperatures, mineral exploration in Arctic nations has led to the discovery of vast sources of mineral wealth. Canada's Arctic islands hold significant deposits of iron ore, nickel, copper, gold, zinc, chromium, uranium and lead.[45] The Arctic is expected to become a major source of these and other minerals in the future.[46] This will occur as new technologies for extraction in the harsh Arctic climate

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[43] The Mackenzie Gas Project is a proposed 1220-kilometre natural gas pipeline system along the Mackenzie Valley of Canada's Northwest Territories to connect northern onshore gas fields with North American markets. Description from http://www.mackenziegasproject.com/; Internet; accessed March 26, 2009.

[44] Lisa Rossington, "Third Explosion Rocks Pipeline in B.C." http://www.ctvbc.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20081031/BC_another_gas_explosion_081031/20081031?hub=BritishColumbiaHome; Internet; accessed March 26, 2009.

[45] Cameron French, "Canada's Arctic Heats up as a Mining Destination," http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USN1140649620071011; Internet; accessed 30 March 2009.

[46] *Ibid.*

are developed and as transportation of the minerals out of the Arctic by sea is made more feasible through longer maritime navigation seasons.

The risk of environmental degradation due to extraction of mineral wealth from the Arctic is high. The blight on the Alberta landscape that has developed as a result of the exploitation of the oil sands provides an apt example. Environmental regulation by Canada on methods for extraction of oil, gas and other minerals will be required to ensure the impact to the Arctic environment is minimized. Environment Canada will be the lead government department in regulating these activities, but with few resources for surveillance of industrial activity, there may be a call for the CF to assist in observing commercial activity.

The significant resource exploitation industry that will likely develop in the Arctic will have a direct effect on the demographic makeup of Canada's Arctic. The current limited population in the Arctic will not be able to provide sufficient manpower to work on the various projects. Consequently, many workers from the south will either migrate north or travel there temporarily for work. The influx of workers to small, remote Arctic communities will possibly bring with it higher crime rates. Since alcohol and drug abuse are already significant issues for Canada's Arctic aboriginal population, the increase and change in population associated with migrant workers could compound the problem. The RCMP has the lead for security in countering drug traffic in Arctic communities and may require CF assistance.

Organized crime is yet another problem that could potentially arise as the Arctic communities grow and change. Members of such organizations could see prospective markets in these remote communities, and take advantage of the readily available

commercial shipping that will accompany such development as a new route into Canada for their illicit cargo. While distant from large commercial centres in Canada, the remote communities of the Arctic represent easy entry points into Canada for highly profitable drug as well as human smuggling activity.[47] Once in the country, the merchandise could then be sent southward with relative ease using the growing number of commercial aircraft present in northern Canada because of its booming oil and gas industry. Control of entry into Canada is the purview of the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), a resource of the Department of Public Safety. With few resources in the Arctic, the Department of Public Safety could possibly turn to the CF for assistance in controlling such access to Canada.

The largely unregulated entry points into Canada through the Arctic are likely to be attractive to international terrorist organizations for the same reasons as they would be for organized crime. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the limited control over many of these by certain states, either through corruption or from failing governments, mean that some of these weapons could fall into the hands of terrorist organizations. While there are many large shipping ports that offer access to the North American continent with relatively little scrutiny, Arctic access would probably prove to be even easier.

Using Arctic entry points would make it possible for terror organizations to bring personnel as well as weapons onto the continent for onward distribution southward. Michael Byers, an Arctic expert at the University of British Columbia indicated that there

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[47] Natalie Mychajlyszyn, "The Arctic: Canadian Security and Defence," *Library of Parliament Info Series*; http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0813-e.pdf; Internet; accessed 30 March 2009.

was added risk without surveillance. In his opinion, the Canadian Arctic could at least become a route used for the trafficking of weapons towards other destinations: "There is a risk that the Northwest Passage will become attractive to those who wish to traffic in weapons of mass destruction, missile components, centrifuges and other things of both national and global security."[48] Increased surveillance of Arctic shipping, its origins and destination will be required. While control of commercial shipping accessing Canadian ports falls under the purview of Transport Canada, the CF would likely be called upon to assist.

Although the Arctic saw regular military activity throughout the Cold War, with submarine activity conducted by both superpowers as well as aircraft transiting the polar region, this level of activity had diminished in the two decades since the end of the Cold War. With the gradual opening of the Arctic through the effects of climate change and with the discovery of important energy resources in the area, international interest in the Arctic has increased. As Rob Huebert stated "Canada does not face a direct military threat as it did in the Cold War, but it will be faced with the increasing actions and activities of the rest of the world."[49]

Some countries have already begun focusing their defence spending on Arctic capabilities. For example, Norway has announced that northern security would be a key focus of its defence policy and has commissioned a new class of ice-strengthened frigates

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[48] Caitlin Harrington, "Eyeing up the new Arctic: competition in the Arctic Circle," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw080115_1_n.shtml; Internet; accessed 30 March 2009.

[49] Rob Huebert. "Canadian Arctic Security: Preparing for a Changing Future," *Behind the Headlines*, 65, No. 4 (August 2008), 20; http://www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org/publicatio/behindtheh; Internet; accessed 25February 2009.

to assist in that role.[50] Even more importantly Russia, long the dominant military power in the Arctic (and expected to remain so), with the bulk of its strategic naval assets along its northern coast, has publicly announced their intent to rebuild their naval forces.[51] In addition, Russia intends to aggressively conduct exploration for - and exploitation of - the natural resources found along its northern coast and throughout its continental shelf.[52] Russian Arctic territories are already responsible for 11 percent of its gross domestic product, a figure that will rise considerably if the reserves of oil and gas that are expected to exist within the Russian claimed areas of the Arctic materialize.[53]

Russian government officials, having recognized growing international interest in the region, agreed that "the Arctic must become Russia's main strategic base for raw materials.[54] Furthermore, the Russian government has just released its Arctic strategy containing some potentially explosive language. It clearly states that "it cannot be ruled out that the battle for raw materials will be waged with military means."[55] Russia is even developing new capabilities to assert its sovereignty over its Arctic claims. According to a news article by Alex Rossi, Russia is developing Special Forces to patrol the Arctic and serve as a deterrent to others attempting to gain influence in the region.[56] While this is

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[50] *Ibid*., 20.

[51] *Ibid*., 20.

[52] Matthias Schepp and Gerald Traufetter, "Riches at the North Pole: Russia Unveils Aggressive Arctic Plans," *Spiegel Online*, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,604338,00.html; Internet; accessed 24 March 28, 2009.

[53] *Ibid*.

[54] *Ibid*.

[55] *Ibid*.

unlikely to be meant as a challenge to Canadian interests in the Arctic, but rather a reflection of Russian concerns over Chinese interest in the region, the potential for conflict remains evident.

Russia's Arctic coast has long been the base for the majority of its nuclear forces. According to a foreign military classified publication from 2008, the coast will continue to be the base of Russia's substantial nuclear submarine fleet as well as its nuclear shipbuilding and refitting facilities. This will supplement the already significant number of decommissioned Soviet era nuclear submarines still in the area. The presence of the latter is important from an ecological perspective as they pose a significant threat to the Arctic ecosystem.

While many nations have called for an Arctic treaty similar to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the likelihood of such a treaty ever being signed is very slim. The Antarctic Treaty prevented the division of the Antarctic continent into zones of sovereignty, with the intent of limiting the use of Antarctica to peaceful purposes rather than resource exploitation or military activity.[57] The European Union Commission has stated that it does not see the need for an Arctic Treaty, while a US directive considering such a treaty modeled on the Antarctic Treaty indicated that this would be neither appropriate nor necessary.[58] On principle, the Arctic Nations[59] are opposed to such an

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[56] Alex Rossi, "New Cold War: Russian Forces to Patrol Arctic," *Sky News*, http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Russia-New-Kremlin-Military-Force-To-Protect-Arctic-Interests/Article/200903415250581?lpos=World_News_Carousel_Region_1&lid=ARTICLE_15250581_Russia_New_Kremlin_Military_Force_To_Protect_Arctic_Interests; Internet; accessed 28 March 2009.

[57] Gerd Braune, "Cold War in the Arctic? Countries Seek Piece of Pie," *Spiegel Online*, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-614900,00.html; Internet; accessed 23 March 2009.

[58] *Ibid.*

accord as it could infringe upon their rights and desire to exploit the resources within their own borders.

Without international agreements to limit the exploitation of Arctic resources, there is likely to be a run on the Arctic by other states. The opening of Arctic seas may lead to non-Arctic states such as China and Japan and potentially Korea projecting power into the region. While this may take the form of scientific expeditions, there is some expectation that naval forces may deploy to the Arctic as well. With China's economic power growing at a steady rate, it may very well wish to develop trade routes through the polar region, increasing the chances that Chinese naval deployments may occur.

Without question, scientists, economists and strategists alike agree that climate change is the driving factor behind environmental, economic and socio-demographic change in the Arctic. There is no doubt, as it has been demonstrated, that the vast amount of resources available in this region will make it more attractive not only to nations with Arctic territories but also to resource hungry economies such as China and Japan. While the CF will likely not be the lead government department for many potential threats to the Canadian Arctic, simple resource realities of other government departments will lead to requests for assistance from the CF in countering these threats. However, considering the already over-extended human resources of the CF at the moment, it can be assumed that these new requirements would put too much strain on the organization. The CF must then find alternate ways of answering the call of duty.

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[59] There exist many countries who have expressed interest in the Arctic region, but those that are considered to be Arctic Nations include Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and the United States.

INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE DEMANDS ON THE CF

The end of the Cold War signaled a new era in global reality and optimism. The previous bipolar reality of the world was replaced with a unipolar world where people hoped for peace. However, uncertainty prevailed and the United States – soon to emerge as a hyper power - were left with the responsibility to steer a new course in global politics. This was a significant time for Canada also as our relationship with the US has dominated much of our political and economic focus during the 20th century.[60]

This chapter will explore the current effort of the CF in ensuring the defence of Canada. This is best understood by examining the evolution of the demands placed on the CF by the government of Canada through the last two decades. The nineties were a decade of introspection for Canada, a country saddled with significant debt resultant of years of deficit spending by previous governments. The examination of priorities for Canada saw successive Foreign and Defence Policy statements that greatly changed the face of the CF. The evolving threats to Canada's security and the government's responses through the end of the twentieth century and the first decade of the new millennium will be described. Finally, the recent trend towards greater interest in the Arctic and its implications for the CF will be examined. These will lead to an examination of a new reality for the CF, that of increasingly high operational tempo and the lack of resources to accomplish all tasks leading to a significant overstretch in terms of capacity.

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[60] James H. Taylor, "Canadian Foreign Policy and National Interests," *Behind the Headlines* 56, no. 3 (Spring 1999); http://proquest.umi.com; Internet; accessed 10 November 2008

New Realities – The 1992 Canadian Defence Policy

The first post Cold War Defence policy - coincidentally the last of the Mulroney government - was released in April 1992. It reflected the new reality of the international community after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The government recognized that the replacement of the Soviet Union by newly independent countries significantly altered the strategic threats to the west and greatly reduced the requirement for conventional forces positioned in Europe to deter the Soviet bear. The government also recognized, however, that there remained significant strategic forces, including nuclear weapons, within the Russian arsenal.[61]

New trends were emerging and developing into potential threats to fill the void left by the disappearance of the Soviet Union. Ethnic tensions in countries that had been kept under control during the Cold War began to be felt, with nationalism fanning the long dormant embers of previous conflicts. Religious fundamentalism also was seen as becoming a greater threat, with the real possibility that weak or failing and failed democracies could be replaced with fundamentalist alternatives, in particular in the Muslim world.[62] This statement from 1992 was accurate in its assessment of future conflict, with the Middle East garnering the most attention from western nations since the turn of the century. Unfortunately, the statement did not predict the increased operational tempo for the military that would accompany this increased world tension – this would lead to decisions that would set the stage for the overstretch of the CF.

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[61] Department of National Defence, *Canadian Defence Policy 1992* (Ottawa: Queen's Printers, 1992), 2.

[62] *Ibid*., 2-3.

Further concerns of the government of Canada in 1992 included recognition of economic and demographic pressures that could "... lead to more illegal immigration, drug smuggling and terrorism."[63] Also recognized was the potential for future conflict between nations over economic resources. Historically, these have been the source of international conflict. One of the most recent examples is the 1991 Gulf War, arguably caused by the thirst for oil in the Middle East. Looking to the future, with the knowledge of economic riches in the Arctic, one might extrapolate and see the potential for conflict in that region.

Partnerships through NORAD and NATO were to continue – in spite of the decline in perceived threats to continental and European security respectively. However, Canada was to decrease its commitment to NATO by closing its permanent bases in Europe and reducing the number of personnel serving there. These changes were stated as being "...driven by the evolving international situation and the difficult fiscal circumstances we face at home."[64] The recognition that things would have to change given the mounting national debt was prescient of things to come.

The 1992 Defence Policy included significant budgetary reductions for DND ($2.2 billion) which added to previous reductions announced in earlier federal budgets ($3.4 billion in 1989-90). These reductions were in part funded by significant cuts in personnel, taking the Regular Force from 84 000 to 76 000 personnel.[65] What did not accompany the personnel cuts were corresponding cuts in tasks for the CF. The

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[63] *Ibid.*, 4.

[64] *Ibid.*, 6-9.

[65] *Ibid.*, 14.

government was essentially asking the military to do the same work, but with less resources.

Defence in the Arctic was an important consideration in the 1992 Defence Policy. Objectives for DND included ensuring Canadian sovereignty through "surveillance, demonstrating presence, helping civilian agencies cope with non-military contingencies and advising government on measures to deal with new challenges."[66] The intent of the government was to facilitate achievement of these objectives through an expansion of the Rangers, the purchase of three additional Maritime surveillance aircraft, the completion of the North Warning System upgrade and installation of a sub-surface acoustic detection system. Interestingly, there was even indication of plans for the construction of a permanent facility in northern Quebec to facilitate Arctic training.[67] Unfortunately, the plans for the acoustic detection system were cancelled shortly thereafter and the construction of a permanent facility in the North for training was also abandoned.[68]

Of further interest to addressing Arctic sovereignty was the indication that the Navy would replace its conventional submarines with up to six "modern" conventional submarines. This was the new course to make up for the cancellation of the promised nuclear submarine acquisition programme announced in 1987 but cancelled in 1988. The implications were important, however, as only nuclear powered submarines were capable of operating under the ice pack, which would leave the Navy with no ability to operate year round in the Arctic.[69]

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[66] *Ibid.*, 18.

[67] *Ibid.*, 18-19.

[68] Rob Huebert, "Renaissance in …, 21.

The Army also saw reductions that would be felt much later as operational tempo would increase. The most important of these cuts was the deletion of 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group from the Army's order of battle, representing a significant reduction in combat capability.[70]

The defence policy statement released in 1992 recognized the proud Canadian peacekeeping history as well as the recent commitments under the United Nations (UN). It also recognized that the call for peacekeeping forces throughout the world was likely to grow and that Canada intended to be involved. At the time of publication, Canada had been invited to participate in establishing a large UN peacekeeping force in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), although there was no prediction of the duration of the task (which as a large contingent was to last up to 12 years under the UN and NATO banners).[71]

The last significant prediction of the 1992 Defence Policy statement was that occurrences of regional conflict would increase. It recognized that the proliferation of sophisticated armaments throughout the world and in the Third World in particular would continue. Furthermore, without the presence of two super powers, the door was open to other powers to seek regional hegemony. Some of these nations with rapidly growing economies had the potential to develop or acquire long range weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction, further destabilizing the globe. Lastly, the growing trend for intra rather than inter state conflict was recognized, meaning once again that

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[69] Department of National Defence, *Canadian Defence Policy 1992* …, 22.

[70] *Ibid.*, 24. This deletion was concurrent with the closure of the Canadian Forces Bases in Germany.

[71] *Ibid.*, 32, 34.

peacekeeping forces would likely be required to deploy to more areas than before – and that Canada would participate.[72]

Following significant budget and personnel cuts in the waning years of the Mulroney era, the course was set for potentially more tasks than ever before. The mantra – doing more with less - would soon become popular in the Canadian Forces. The stage was set for the overstretching of the Forces.

Foreshadowing the Decade of Darkness - The 1994 White Paper

The 1994 White Paper on Defence was released by the new Chrétien Government little more than one year after coming to power. Some of the Prime Minister's election promises were to balance the federal budget and bring national debt under control. As DND had the largest budget of any federal department, it would come as no surprise that more cuts to the Forces would come.

The Liberal government came to power at a time when public debt was growing at an alarming rate and federal budgets were recording important deficits every year. It was the new government's position that "...although National Defence and the Canadian Forces have made a large contribution to efforts to reduce the debt... additional cuts are both necessary and possible."[73] Douglas Bland summarized the 1994 White Paper as follows: "Cutting costs and commitments – closing the commitment-capabilities gap the hard way – was... the essence of the White Paper."[74] The commitment-capabilities gap

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[72] *Ibid*., 33.

[73] Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence*; http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/newsite/downloads/1994%20White%20Paper%20on%20Defence.pdf; Internet; accessed 23 February 2009.

[74] Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 130.

referred to what occurs when capabilities and commitments are not concomitant, meaning either capabilities must be increased, or commitments decreased. Ultimately, the new liberal government went one further, reducing both capabilities and commitments. The commitments that were reduced were largely Cold War holdovers, commitments to NATO for defence against the Soviet Union, vice commitments to assisting on the international scene for security and stability. The direction laid out in the White Paper effectively set the conditions for further overstretch of the CF.

The international environment was recognized to have changed dramatically in the years leading to the release of the White Paper. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of many of its satellite republics caused a dramatic downward shift in the perceived threat from those forces.

Certain significant concerns highlighted in the 1992 Defence Policy were recognized as becoming more important. The world was experiencing an alarming increase in internal conflict, with many civil wars occurring in heretofore stable countries, often with ethnic or religious extremism as their root causes.[75] The government saw a role for the Canadian Forces in supporting what would be a time when the United Nations would take its place as a significant political power on the world stage, capable of resolving conflict through negotiation, oversight and military intervention under the UN flag.

Canadian sovereignty and the defence of Canada were priorities of the 1994 White Paper. The government went so far as to state that "...there is no direct military

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[75] *Ibid.*

threat to Canada..."[76] This did not mean that the CF were not to remain prepared to defend the nation, but rather that retention of the skills resident in all three services was required to ensure control over Canadian territory. The government's concern with sovereignty was limited, but catered to through the following statement: "In and of itself, maintaining the capability to field a presence anywhere where Canada maintains sovereign jurisdiction sends a clear signal that Canadians will not have their sovereignty compromised."[77] Among the stated objectives of the Forces was to "demonstrate, on a regular basis, the capability to monitor and control activity within Canada's territory, airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction."[78] The areas referred to in this objective were to include the Arctic.

Canada's contribution to international security was also a significant priority for the government. The 1994 White Paper elaborated direction for continued involvement in strategic alliances, including NORAD and NATO and continued work with the UN. Humanitarian assistance missions were envisaged for the Canadian Forces, seen as a means of demonstrating Canada's desire to be a good global citizen. Conspicuously absent from this iteration of defence policy was a recognition of the number of international peacekeeping and peace support operations ongoing at the time of publication, including operations in the FRY and Rwanda – yet some of these missions would last for another decade, contributing to Forces fatigue.

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[76] *Ibid.*

[77] *Ibid.*

[78] *Ibid.*

The final chapter of the 1994 White Paper reserved the not so subtle priority of the government: reductions in spending. Little was off limits to budgetary reductions "Most areas of defence will be cut – staff, infrastructure, equipment, training, operations – some substantially more than others."[79] The only service to see any growth was the Army, with modest increases to operational land forces, but other areas of the Army had to be cut to allow this to happen. The cuts announced in this budget were the start of dark days ahead for the Canadian Forces, a trend that would not be reversed until a decade later.

While the 1992 policy statement indicated a reduction from 84 000 to 76 000 Regular Force but an increase in Primary Reserve personnel, the Liberal government went much further. The cuts resultant of the 1994 White Paper projected a strength reduction that would end with a Regular Force of only 60 000 personnel and a 23 000 strong Primary Reserve. These overzealous reductions coupled with increased operational tempo and growing uncertainty about the strategic environment set the CF on a downward spiral aptly articulated by Douglas Bland, "Unfortunately, the future brought a range of challenges that could not be met adequately with diminished resources, static policies, and political rhetoric."[80]

The Chrétien Years from 1994 to 2003

Unfortunately for the Liberal government, "The premises of the 1994 White Paper did not generally hold after 1995. The optimism over the place of the UN in global

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[79] *Ibid.*

[80] Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*..., 131.

security collapsed after the setbacks in Rwanda, Croatia, Bosnia and Somalia."[81] It is puzzling that, in spite of this situation, the Chrétien government did not alter the 1994 White Paper, nor did it issue a new defence policy statement of any kind for the remainder of his time as Prime Minister (a period lasting nearly 10 years).

In choosing to stay the course, the only constant theme throughout this period was to do more with less. Although the government's declared policy was to ensure combat capable forces able to protect Canadians and Canada's interests and values, the reality was that the Canadian Forces were called upon to deploy to more and more locations worldwide with limited connections to Canadian interests. Furthermore, these deployments were taking place with no increase to defence budgets, meaning that capabilities were further eroded, leading to equipment as well as personnel burnout.[82]

The list of operational deployments undertaken by the CF throughout the late nineties included deployments to nearly every continent on the planet. European deployments were focused on the FRY, with two infantry battle groups and a logistics battalion deployed under UN auspices from 1993 to 1995. These were replaced by a Multinational Brigade Headquarters and supporting and security elements (for a total of 1047 personnel) as the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was assumed by NATO.[83] After one year, the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) saw continued Canadian involvement, with a return to the battle group structure as the major contribution (this contribution was maintained until 2004). The air war against Kosovo saw significant air force

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[81] Sean M. Maloney, "Force Structure or Forced Structure? The 1994 White Paper on Defence and the Canadian Forces in the 1990s," *IRPP Choices*, 10, no. 5 (May 2004): 21; http://www.irpp.org/fasttrak/index.htm; Internet; accessed 25 February 2009.

[82] Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security...*, 135-136.

[83] *Ibid.*, 233.

deployments, with Canadian fighter aircraft seeing combat for the first time since the Gulf War in 1991. CF 18 effectiveness was affected by the reductions in defence spending through the nineties in that there proved to be a shortage in precision guided munitions and equipment as well as trained pilots for the bombings over Kosovo.[84] After the bombings of Kosovo ended, NATO deployed a mission to stabilize that area of the FRY and Canada contributed a reinforced battle group as well as a helicopter squadron, a contribution lasting one year.[85]

In Central America and the Caribbean, UN observation missions in Guatemala and El Salvador and a humanitarian mission in Honduras constituted fairly minor commitments. Haiti however, proved to be a further source of fatigue. Repeated deployments to Haiti through the nineties contributed significantly the Canadian Forces overstretch problem.[86]

Asia saw relatively minor deployments. After deployment of some 213 personnel to Cambodia from 1991 to 1993, the force was drawn down to a handful of mine awareness personnel through the rest of the decade.[87] In addition, the CF contributed some 273 personnel to the Australian led coalition that deployed to East Timor to restore peace and security.[88] This mission lasted only six months, but the vast distances

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[84] Sean M. Maloney, "Force Structure or..., 21.

[85] Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*..., 235.

[86] *Ibid*., 252. Multiple missions to Haiti included naval task deployments, training teams and at their height, a 1200 personnel task force of infantry, engineers, a tactical helicopter flight and support personnel for a period of two years.

[87] *Ibid*., 253. This force included observers, staff officers, mine awareness experts and logistics support.

[88] *Ibid*., 254. The heart of the Canadian land force was an infantry company group, accompanied by a 30 person construction troop and supported by logistics elements and led by a command element (a

involved for sustainment for a relatively small mission while Canada was still heavily involved in the FRY contributed to the strain on the CF.

Africa saw multiple deployments of varying sizes and success during the Chrétien years. A deployment of observation missions and headquarters staff to the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone and the Congo took place.[89] A force of over 600 personnel was deployed to Rwanda starting in the summer of 1994 under a UN mandate to contribute to the rebuilding and stabilization of that country following the genocide that took place earlier that year.[90] Finally, there was a relatively short traditional peacekeeping commitment to the disputed border region between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000. This force consisted of a mechanized infantry company group (which grew to 450 personnel with the necessary support and national command elements) which again had to be sustained while operations in the FRY were ongoing – more strain for the shrinking Forces.[91]

If the FRY was the main effort for Canada's international commitment through the nineties, the Middle East was a close second. The Canadian "peacekeeping tradition" was born in the Middle East following the 1956 Suez crisis and Canada contributed to each UN deployment imposing itself between Israel and its neighbours in the Middle East from then until the 1990s. The contribution of 200 to 300 primarily logistics personnel in the Golan Heights endured until 2006.[92] The mission was particularly significant in that

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total of 273 personnel). In addition to this, the Canadian contribution to the coalition included two Hercules transport aircraft and an Auxiliary Oil Replenishment vessel, HMCS Protecteur.

[89] Sean M. Maloney, "Force Structure or..., 21.

[90] Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*..., 246.

[91] Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*..., 249.

although the force was relatively small, it consisted of support personnel, whose operational tempo increased continuously throughout the Chrétien years and whose overstretch would lead to eventual outsourcing of support roles to civilian contractors. The Persian Gulf region was the other principal deployment in the Middle East. Following the 1991 Gulf War, the Canadian Navy maintained a contribution of one to three warships as part of the US led combined task force providing security in that volatile region. While the Army and Air Force had their hands full with nearly every other deployment, the constant operational deployments to the Gulf took their toll on the Navy as well.

The final large commitment of the Chrétien years was in response to the 9/11 terror attacks. Canada was to contribute to President Bush's so called war on terror in the form of increased naval deployments in the Gulf and the contribution of both conventional combat troops and Special Forces to Afghanistan under the auspices of Operation Apollo. The battalion group and reconnaissance squadron deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan remained for only seven months, but the strategic lines of communication required for deployment and support of that force necessitated assistance from US forces.[93] The Afghanistan experience was far from over however. In 2003 the Chrétien government committed nearly 2000 troops to the NATO led International Security Assistance Force in Kabul for a period of one year. The CF were nearing the breaking point by the time this mission was announced and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) indicated that the Forces were largely spent as a result of the continuous large

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[92] *Ibid.*, 243.

[93] Sean M. Maloney, "Force Structure or..., 22.

scale deployments.[94] In fact, CF capabilities had decreased to such an extent that it was necessary to resort to civilian contracted airlift as well as civilian contractors to support this mission.[95]

In short, by the end of Chrétien's time as Prime Minister, the CF were in a difficult predicament. After years of cuts to both their budget and personnel strength, the Forces were still called upon to deploy operationally on more missions than ever before. The CF were truly overstretched.

A National Security Policy and the 2005 International Policy Statement

Prime Minister Martin, the author of drastic budget cuts to the Canadian Forces as Finance Minister would ironically begin to substantially increase defence spending again. Years of government commitments overseas without a clear policy were soon to end. By April 2004, only five months after Prime Minister Martin took office, Canada's "first-ever comprehensive statement of... National Security Policy" was published.[96]

The National Security Policy statement foreshadowed a number of elements that would come to light through the international policy review conducted prior to publishing of the 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS). Among these, the government indicated their intent for the CF to remain in Afghanistan past the original end date of August 2004.

More thorough and providing clearer direction was the 2005 IPS, as it was the product of a lengthy international policy review conducted by the Martin government. It

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[94] Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*..., 27.

[95] Sean M. Maloney, "Force Structure or..., 22.

[96] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Queen's Printers, 2004), iv.

consisted of four component documents – Diplomacy, Development, Defence and International Commerce. The Defence portion of the 2005 IPS was in effect the first statement of Canadian defence policy since the 1994 White Paper. This statement came on the heels of the first significant budgetary increase for defence, with investments totaling $13 billion. The CDS at the time of publication of the IPS was General Rick Hillier and his contributions to this new defence policy were significant. Key policy announcements in this statement included increases in personnel and Canadian Forces Transformation.

Three broad roles remained for the Canadian Forces: "protecting Canadians, defending North America in cooperation with the United States, and contributing to international peace and security."[97] Whether or not the true extent of overstretch within the CF was recognized at the time of publishing the IPS, it was recognized that the CF were not sufficiently manned to carry out all their tasks. Personnel expansion was directed, with increases of 5,000 Regular Force and 3,000 Reserve Force personnel being the goals. Once complete, it was the government's position that the Forces would be able to "...continuously sustain up to 5,000 personnel on international operations."[98] Whether or not this was to be an accurate statement is not the object of this paper, but it is clear at this time that the Canadian Forces are reaching the breaking point even though the number actually deployed is somewhat below the 5,000 personnel objective.[99]

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[97] Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printers, 2005), 2.

[98] *Ibid*., 3.

[99] Jeff Davis, "Army Hurting From Afghan Mission: Generals," *Embassy*, http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/army_hurting-3-4-2009; Internet; accessed 5 March 2009.

As with other defence policy statements, the IPS briefly summarized the international security environment. It acknowledged the prominent destabilizing forces at play in the international environment, with failed and failing states and terrorism being the two largest. The 2001 terror attacks on US soil were watershed moments in international security. Combating terrorism rapidly became the focus of most western nations and national security concerns grew from this, including in Canada. Failed and failing states were seen as threats to international security because of their destabilizing effects regionally but also because of the possibility that these states could harbour terror organizations. [100]

The IPS proposed a new vision for the Canadian Forces, one of transformation to meet the challenges of the 21st century. It recognized the extremely high operational tempo of the Canadian Forces. Although the strength of the Forces had diminished through the 1990s, the number of increasingly dangerous missions abroad was greater as was the number of domestic emergencies to be dealt with. Figure 2 below depicts this increased operational tempo by graphically representing total strength of the Forces versus the number of personnel deployed from 1980 through 2004.

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[100] Department of National Defence, *Canada's International*…, 5-6.



Figure 2: Personnel Operational Tempo to Overall Strength 1980-20004
Source: Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printers, 2005), 7.

The IPS went so far as to recognize the overstretch being experienced by the CF, in particular for certain specialized occupations.[101] International deployments ranging from war fighting as in Kosovo in 1999 through peace support operations in the Balkans, Haiti and Afghanistan (in 2004), to humanitarian missions such as the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployments to Sri Lanka and Pakistan were recognized as having taken a toll. The increasing number of domestic operations contributed to the burnout as well. The Forces were employed in the conduct of

[101] *Ibid*., 8.

"...thousands of sovereignty and search and rescue missions."[102] Support to other government departments in the areas of fisheries control, countering drug and human smuggling activities and environmental protection were conducted. The Forces also assisted civilian authorities on numerous occasions in dealing with natural disasters, aircraft accidents and the millennium transition, not to mention significant contributions to security for the G8 summit in 2002.[103] Finally, an expanding CF role in the Arctic was recognized as the IPS stated "with demands of sovereignty and security in the North expected to increase in the next 10 to 15 years, the Canadian Forces will enhance specific capabilities for use in the region, including new aircraft and improved equipment for the Rangers."[104] All of these domestic activities, while less publicized than the international operations undertaken, also took their toll on the increasingly burdened Forces.

A new vision was proposed for the CF. Far from dictating a reduction in operational tasks given the overstretch experienced by the CF, the IPS indicated that there would be no decline in the demand for the CF on the international scene. Furthermore, it was assessed that the demand for increased operations domestically was likely to occur.[105] Ultimately, Canada was to maintain modern, combat capable forces, while improving their ability to operate effectively with coalition and alliance partners.[106] The military would "...become more effective, relevant and responsive, and its profile and

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[102] *Ibid*., 10.

[103] *Ibid*., 10.

[104] *Ibid*., 10.

[105] *Ibid*., 11.

[106] *Ibid*., 11.

ability to provide leadership at home and abroad will be increased."[107] This vision was to be implemented through transformation.

A focus on integrated operations was called for, where fully integrated units would operate in theatres operationally and domestically. Of particular interest was the fact that Canada would now be treated as a theatre of operations in itself and a renewed focus on national defence (or security) would be achieved by forming Canada Command, an operational level headquarters focused on Canada.

The defence of Canada and operations in the Arctic received considerable attention in the IPS. The rise in international paranoia over terrorist attacks in North America led the government to consider this a threat. National sovereignty and security were growth areas for all departments involved, particularly those departments involved in the Arctic. This was due to a combination of the relatively recent exploitation of natural resources including diamonds and oil as well as the expected increases in air and sea traffic in the Arctic due to in part to climate change. It was recognized that while the Canadian Forces were not the lead department in dealing with many issues in the Arctic,[108] it was expected that there would be an increase in search and rescue and surveillance activities. These activities would fall under the responsibility of Canada Command, conducting daily operations within Canada. Oddly however, while the new headquarters would be established, there were no indications of increases in personnel to assist with the higher domestic operational tempo – clearly overstretch was to continue to be a problem.

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[107] *Ibid*., 11.

[108] As was previously indicated, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada is the lead government department in the Arctic.

Ultimately, while the IPS was the first statement of defence policy in 11 years, it was relatively short lived. The Martin government was defeated in a general election in January of 2006, less than one year after the publication of the IPS. Certain aspects of the IPS would be retained in the absence of a new policy, the new Conservative government having promised additional funding for defence during the election. General Hillier would also remain as CDS, thus ensuring a certain continuity of vision.

Into the Future - Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS)

The CFDS was the first defence policy statement to be published since the 2005 IPS. A significant amount of its content had been previously announced by the Conservative government, either during electoral campaigns or during various speeches by the Prime and Defence Ministers. The statement was intended to provide "a detailed road map for the modernization of the Canadian Forces."[109] CFDS was published after government formulation of a vision for the defence of Canada as well as an analysis of the threats currently facing Canada and threats that may develop in the future. Finally, in the government's words, it was to set "clearly defined roles and level of ambition for the Canadian Forces"[110] and ensure that the Forces were capable of carrying out this vision.

The CFDS' main focus was to place the defence of Canada and Canadians first, followed by the continued defence of North America through existing partnerships and finally to contribute to international security. According to CFDS, the government would guarantee "predictable and stable defence funding"[111] to ensure the CF were adequately

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[109] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/first-premier/June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf; Internet; accessed 25 February 2009, 3.

[110] *Ibid*., 3.

resourced to carry out all tasks assigned. Six core missions were defined for the military, three of which with direct relevance to this paper:

- Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD;
- Respond to a major terrorist attack; and
- Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.[112]

Each of these missions had a distinct domestic focus, in keeping with putting Canada first in defence planning. The specific mention of the Arctic was significant, and formalized in policy the promises by the Conservative government for a more active presence in that region.

The changing Arctic climate, its effects on the Arctic environment including the reduction in sea ice, was recognized as leading to an expectation of higher levels of international activity in the Arctic. The increased activity would include more frequent shipping and tourism as well as natural resource exploration and exploitation. The threat of increased illegal activity was also recognized with the potential for transnational organized crime groups or terrorist organizations using the Arctic as a potential entry route into Canada (and the North American continent).[113]

Ensuring the security of Canadian citizens and exercising Canada's sovereignty were key tasks reiterated in CFDS. The CF were tasked to work with other government departments to ensure surveillance of Canada's territory (including its maritime

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[111] *Ibid*., 3.

[112] *Ibid*., 3.

[113] *Ibid*., 6-8.

approaches), again with specific mention of the Arctic. This all to ensure threats to Canadian security would be detected and countered as early as possible.[114]

CFDS also included announcements of methods to ensure the CF would be capable of accomplishing these tasks (and all core missions). These included increases in personnel strength to 70 000 Regular forces and 30 000 Reserve forces, increased budgets and the acquisition of multiple new capabilities. Specific acquisitions that would have a direct impact on the defence of the Arctic included the purchase of a number of Arctic/offshore patrol vessels (AOPV), replacement maritime patrol aircraft, replacement search and rescue aircraft and eventual replacement of other surface warships.[115]

Further announcements on new Arctic capabilities have also been made. An Arctic training facility will be built in Resolute Bay by enhancing the limited CF footprint in the community (the FOL) and will provide a permanent staging base in the Arctic for Army capabilities. The stated goals of this facility are:

- To provide a multi-use facility capable of supporting the Army Advanced Winter Warfare Course; Army Sovereignty Operations and Canadian Forces Joint Exercises; Search and Rescue Technician Arctic survival training; Canadian Rangers training; and a command and control centre for regional military and civilian disaster-response operations;
- To increase the Canadian Military expertise and knowledge of operating in the Arctic, and the overall Canadian military's presence in the North; and
- To provide year-round training facilities and a location for pre-positioning training equipment and various types of vehicles in the High Arctic. [116]

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[114] *Ibid.*, 7.

[115] *Ibid.*, 4.

[116] Office of the Prime Minister, "Backgrounder – Expanding Canadian Forces Operations in the Arctic," http://www.pm.gc.ca/includes/send_friend_eMail_print.asp?id=1785; Internet; accessed 25 March 2009.

The government also announced the building of a naval docking and refueling facility in Nanisivik. This site will expand an existing deep water berthing area currently used by the Coast Guard, allowing for the staging of CF ships (including the AOPVs) for operations throughout Canada's Arctic waters as well as the continued use by the Coast Guard.[117]

In addition to the planned increase to the CF Rangers, a new Army Reserve unit will be formed in Yellowknife, the first Primary Reserve unit allocated to the territories. It will be given specific Arctic roles, including augmenting the Rangers and possible roles in response to emergencies in the region.[118] As it was recognized that the new reserve unit in Yellowknife would be quite small and would take time to create, four other militia units from across Canada were given Arctic responsibilities. These four existing units have been given the task of force generation of sub-units for an Arctic battalion that will have Arctic response tasks.[119]

While all of these announcements were positive for the CF, they do not represent a quick fix to the problem of personnel resource shortfalls in addressing tasks associated with securing the Arctic. An increase in personnel strength should eventually lead to a reduction in the overstretch problem of the CF, if these personnel levels can be reached. However, recent experience in attempting to increase personnel strength has shown this to be a slow process, as will be explained later. For the foreseeable future, overstretch

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[117] *Ibid*.

[118] Keith Doucette, "Mackay Announces Army Arctic Reserve," http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/491768; Internet; accessed 17 April 2009.

[119] David Pugliese and Gerard O'Dwyer, "Canada, Russia Build Arctic Forces: As Ice Recedes, Nations Maneuver for Control," http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4025065; Internet; accessed 17 April 2009.

will likely continue, meaning that adequate resources to secure the Arctic will likely not be available from within the CF.

CF Overstretch - The Personnel Problem

It has been established that the CF are experiencing an overstretch problem: there are presently too many tasks for the number of personnel available to the CF to accomplish them. The onset of the personnel shortage can be traced to the policy decisions of the 1990s that led to a rapid reduction in personnel strengths of the CF. While policies set by the first Chrétien government of 1993 led to drastic reductions in strength, these cuts were also accompanied by reductions in recruiting. The reduced manning levels would not be corrected until the new millennium (in recognition of the increased operational tempo), but the effects of personnel cutbacks would last much longer.

Unfortunately for the CF, cutting personnel was much easier to accomplish than adding has proven to be. Although successive Martin and Harper governments have both authorized increases to regular and reserve forces, the CF have been unable to attain the revised personnel ceilings. This inability to achieve personnel goals is due in large part to recruiting and retention difficulties.

The CF must recruit its personnel from Canadian society, with its primary recruiting base consisting of Canadians aged 16 to 30.[120] The challenge facing recruiters today is one of demographics. Canadian society is getting older, with young people rapidly being outnumbered by older Canadians. As the baby boom generation retires, employment opportunities will abound and all elements of industry will compete with the

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[120] Christopher Ankersen, "The Personnel Crisis," in *Canada Without Armed Forces*, (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 65.

CF for the same young men and women to fill their ranks. While this is not a new problem (the 1990s saw difficulties in recruiting) the challenge now is in actually increasing the ranks of the CF rather than simply maintaining numbers (which the CF failed to do in the 1990s).

Statistics Canada data for 2008 indicates that there are only 3.1 million Canadians between the critical recruiting ages of 18 and 24 while there are 13 million over the age of 44.[121] These young Canadians are targeted by the global labour pool, soon to be offering more employment than there are people to fill the jobs. The government has recognized the challenges it faces as indicated in its *Report on Plans and Priorities.* Under the rubric of military recruitment it has stated "CF recruiters compete in an increasingly global labour market characterized by a declining pool of young Canadians and a growing demand for technicians and professionals."[122] Young Canadians will have the choice of career options, making the task of recruiting that much more difficult for the CF.

Compounding the age problem confronting recruiters is the fact that a growing part of the population is made up of new immigrants to Canada. Census data taken in 2006 indicates that nearly 20 percent of the total Canadian population is made up of immigrants.[123] New immigrants have not tended to be good sources of recruits for the CF, possibly due to negative views of the military in their countries of origin.

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[121] Statistics Canada, "Canada at a Glance 2008," http://www45.statcan.gc.ca/2008/cgco_2008_001a-eng.htm; Internet; accessed 11 April 2009.

[122] Treasury Board Secretariat, "Report on Plans and Priorities – National Defence," http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2009-2010/inst/dnd/dnd02-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 11 April 2009

[123] Statistics Canada, "Canada at a Glance 2008," http://www45.statcan.gc.ca/2008/cgco_2008_001c-eng.htm; Internet; accessed 11 April 2009.

Furthermore, Ankersen indicated in *The Personnel Crisis* that CF recruiters did not employ strategies appropriate to the needs of the CF. Although the CF had notable shortages of specific technical trades, recruiters failed to hire enough candidates with the aptitude necessary to fill those shortages and instead hired too many personnel able to fill less technically demanding occupations.[124] These failures to recruit appropriately to correct shortages and over-recruiting in other occupations have tended to exacerbate the personnel problems of the CF.

If inadequate recruiting to increase the size of the CF is one part of the problem, the other key part is that of attrition. Studies have shown that historically, most personnel who left the CF have done so voluntarily and did so either during their first year of service or once they were eligible for a pension.[125] Further, while historical attrition rates have tended to be around six to seven percent, this rate has increased in the last few years to 10 percent.[126] This higher attrition rate is due in part to the high number of personnel nearing pension eligibility (20 plus years of service) combined with those approaching compulsory retirement age. This personnel "bubble" was caused in part by the targeted personnel reductions of the 1990s. The higher attrition rate is expected to last for at least another few years.

The overstretch problem has been the other key contributor to the higher than historical attrition rate. The CF's operational tempo has never been higher, with many soldiers having now served three or even four operational tours in Afghanistan during the

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[124] Christopher Ankersen, "The Personnel Crisis..., 69.

[125] Treasury Board Secretariat, "Report on Plans and Priorities – National Defence," http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2009-2010/inst/dnd/dnd02-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 11 April 2009.

[126] *Ibid*.

seven years of Canada's involvement in that theatre. This, combined with the previous decade of high tempo (in the Balkans in particular) has contributed to a high level of operational fatigue. Rising numbers of incremental tasks to fill the ranks of the training institutions of the CF to help train new recruits added further to the weariness of CF members. Years of personnel reductions had seen the numbers of staff in the CF's schools dwindle as priority for personnel had gone to operational units. For training to continue, schools had to rely on instructors from those same units. The unfortunate reality of this situation saw the same personnel returning from operational tours overseas tasked away from home for months at a time. These factors, combined with the additional tasks assigned to the CF by the government, have contributed to the higher attrition rate.

The recruiting challenges and the high attrition rate due to both the "personnel bubble" and overstretch have made it difficult for the CF to increase its overall personnel strength. The CF has been authorized to augment its Regular Force to 70 000 personnel, yet it does not expect to reach this level until the 2027-28 timeframe.[127] What this means is that, for the foreseeable future, overstretch will continue to be a problem for the CF. With additional tasks likely to be given to the CF with the world's increased interest in the Arctic, the CF must find another way to overcome its personnel resource shortfalls.

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[127] *Ibid*.

LOOKING FOR SOLUTIONS: PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES

The term Private Military Company (PMC) in popular parlance has come to be associated with the numerous private firms contracted to provide armed security in war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan. This association is already a significant step forward from the common misconception of the PMC as an organization of mercenaries, but it still fails to represent all of the possible tasks that a PMC can accomplish.

Prior to determining whether PMCs would be a possible option in lightening the burden of the CF overstretch problem, more needs to be understood about them. A definition of PMC and a classification of the types of PMC will be examined, which will include the types of capabilities or services that could be provided by these companies. By way of background, a brief history of PMCs and their evolution will be explored. Discussion will then focus on the CF experience with civilian contractor support, a recent phenomenon born of necessity. This examination will include the early instances of contractor support to CF deployed operations in the Balkans, followed by the Canadian Contractor Augmentation Program (CANCAP) in support of CF efforts in Afghanistan. Additionally, civilian contractors employed by the CF in roles that support force generation will be covered. Finally, some of the risks and problems associated with the use of PMCs will be explored.

Defining the Industry

PMC is a generic term selected by the author to encompass all of the possible types of company to be defined here. There exist many definitions and typologies for these organizations in the literature. One definition for PMC, provided by Goddard, is

"a registered civilian company that specializes in the provision of contract military training, military support operations, operational capabilities and or military equipment, to legitimate domestic and foreign entities."[128] This definition is quite broad and does not attempt to break down the various types of company that exists today.

Peter Singer, in his book *Corporate Warriors*, provides a more complete typology of PMCs. His typology is built around a "tip of the spear" metaphor where PMCs are classified based on how close a given PMC's service is to the fighting.[129] In brief, Singer created a system that includes three types of PMC: Military Provider Firm (MPF), Military Consultant Firm (MCF) and Military Support Firm (MSF).

MPFs are firms that focus on the tactical environment. The services they provide are those expected at the forefront of the battlespace, including the provision of personnel that will engage in actual combat or that will provide command and control of military units engaged in combat. Singer points out that these firms tend to be the most controversial of PMCs and their activity has tended to be that most closely linked with mercenary activities.[130] Since the writing of Singer's book, these firms took on greater prominence as they multiplied in number in war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Examples of this type of firm include Blackwater and Triple Canopy.

MCFs are firms that provide advisory and training services to armed forces. The advisory capacities they provide are normally limited to strategic, operational and

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[128] Maj S. Goddard, "The Private Military Company: A Legitimate International Entity Within Modern Conflict," (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College Master's Thesis, 2001), 8.

[129] Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 91.

[130] *Ibid*., 92.

organizational analysis and they are typified by their absence on the battlefield. Types of training provided can range from the training of commanders and their staffs in operational planning to training of soldiers in the operation of military equipment. Singer points out that they are most analogous to management consultants in many cases.[131] An example of this type of firm is MPRI (formerly Military Professional Resources Incorporated) which provides "...services, specialized products, and integrated solutions for education, training, and operations."[132]

MSFs are firms that provide "supplementary military services."[133] These services include everything from logistics, to intelligence support, technical support and maintenance of military equipment. These firms tend to garner the most lucrative contracts in terms of dollar value as they are generally resource intensive. They came to prominence largely from the need for military forces to reduce in size after the end of the Cold War and they took on the majority of the services that were "outsourced".[134] According to Singer's tip of the spear metaphor, these firms should have been those farthest from actual combat, but in today's non linear battlespace, they have often found themselves increasingly in the line of fire. One of the most prominent MSFs is now KBR (formerly Kellogg, Brown and Root), an American firm that benefited from enormous contracts to provide logistical support to US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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[131] *Ibid*., 95.

[132] MPRI Homepage, http://www.mpri.com/esite/; Internet accessed 1 April 2009.

[133] Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors*…, 97.

[134] *Ibid*., 98.

The Evolution of PMCs

In order to best understand the recent evolution of PMCs, a brief historical background is de rigueur. Some publications draw the history of PMCs back over 3000 years, with the employment of mercenaries by ancient Egyptians.[135] However, PMCs as defined by Goddard as a civilian company have existed for far less time. Companies most closely resembling Goddard's definition of PMCs came to exist during the colonial era. The employ of Privateers by the British Empire and the English East India Company are two examples of these. The privatization of violence diminished with the industrialization of war, where the state largely enjoyed a monopoly on violence. This trend continued until the decolonization period after the Second World War.[136]

Throughout the tumultuous decolonization period in Africa, private military activity grew in frequency. For the most part, the companies involved did not fall within the boundaries of Goddard's definition, but rather consisted of organized groups of mercenaries hired by the UK government (at arm's length) to assist in protecting UK interests in Africa. By the 1970s, PMCs as we have defined them, began to build in prominence as a means of providing security services to government agencies and multi-national corporations in response to the rise in international terrorism.[137]

The end of the Cold War was a time of significant change for armed forces around the world. The peace dividend sought by western nations in particular led to deep

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[135] Fred Rosen, *Contract Warriors: How Mercenaries Changed History and the War on Terrorism* (New York: Penguin Group, 2006), 45.

[136] Christopher Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 36-42.

[137] *Ibid*., 43-51.

cuts in military strengths including in Canada as has been seen earlier. In order to maintain the maximum combat power with diminishing strengths, a larger proportion of the cuts targeted roles that could be delivered by civilian industry. These roles were primarily in support and service roles, such as logistics, communications support and administration. While these roles were found to be filled adequately domestically and in peacetime, it remained unclear how they would be provided during combat operations. This would prove to be the private military industry's opportunity.

The 1991 Gulf War saw an international coalition go to war supported by many civilian contractors, with a rate as high as one contractor for every 10 soldiers deployed.[138] These contractors provided logistical functions such as supply, transportation, feeding and maintenance of equipment – primary services provided by MSFs. This forward deployment of civilians into a war zone on such a large scale was new territory for America and would mark a turning point for American PMCs. This trend would continue through the 1990s as most NATO nations deploying troops on peace support operations would hire civilian corporations to provide support. MSFs were growing at a startling rate.

The September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks sparked a string of actions by the US government that would lead to an explosion in the number of PMCs and their employment worldwide. The US and its allies found themselves at war first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, sustaining very large numbers of troops in austere environments. The post Cold War cuts to their support personnel forced the US and its allies to hire PMCs to help shoulder the load of conducting operations on a grand scale.

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[138] Jeremy Scahill, *Blackwater: The rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army* (New York: Nation Books, 2007), xv.

An unprecedented number of contracts were awarded, worth billions of dollars with all three types of PMC getting a part of the action. One of the most well known PMCs, Blackwater Incorporated, secured a large part of the market share for MPFs in Iraq. Blackwater's first important contract in Iraq proved to be the very public task of providing a security force for Paul Bremer, the US installed civilian administrator of a liberated Iraq.[139] Included in this contract, worth nearly $28 million, was a personal security detail for Bremer, complete with armoured vehicles and two helicopters.[140] This was only the first of many contracts that would see Blackwater deploy thousands of former military personnel as security contractors in Iraq, providing personal security for very important personnel (VIPs), convoy security and protection of key installations. Other MPFs were also contracted either by coalition forces or by multinational corporations seeking protection of their assets in Iraq. These included Control Risks Group, Armor Holdings Group, Global Risk Strategies, Erinys International, Triple Canopy and others earning hundreds of millions of dollars.[141]

MCFs also garnered a portion of the market share for PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, DynCorp was awarded a $50 million contract in 2004 by the US State Department to provide 1000 advisors to assist in organizing Iraqi law enforcement and criminal justice systems.[142]

MSFs, already the most readily used segment of the PMC market secured a large share of the contracts available to contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. KBR, among

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[139] *Ibid*., 47.

[140] *Ibid*., 69.

[141] Fred Rosen, *Contract Warriors*…, 149-155.

[142] *Ibid*., 153.

others, secured hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts to support US forces through the provision of logistical and construction services.[143]

The CF Experience

As already explored, Canadian Defence Policy after the end of the Cold war included considerable cuts to the CF, in particular in terms of personnel. Before addressing whether or not PMCs could offer some relief to the CF with regards to accomplishment of their tasks in the Arctic, it is prudent to examine the CF experience in employing PMCs thus far.

While the CF has used private corporations for provision of supply and transportation, materiel acquisition and related support in Canada for a long time, the use of private enterprises on operations has been a more recent experience.[144] The CF has used commercial shipping and cargo aircraft to support deployed operations for many years, but the actual employment of civilian contractors deployed on operations occurred for the first time in the Balkans. Under the Contract Support Project (CSP), the CF hired an MSF – ATCO Frontec of Calgary – to provide multiple logistical and other support services specifically to reduce the burden on over-tasked military occupations.[145] Interestingly, the CF at the time of the CSP believed that the use of civilians might not be suitable in all operational theatres. Furthermore, the CF indicated that where support

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[143] *Ibid*., 150.

[144] Christopher Spearin, "Not a Real State?: Defence Privatization in Canada," *International Journal*, 60, no 4 (Autumn 2005), 1095.

[145] Department of National Defence, "Balkans Rationalization – Contract Support Project," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=210; Internet; accessed 4 April 2009. Services provided under CSP in the Balkans included: warehousing, transportation, bulk fuel management, vehicle maintenance, food services, communications services, camp maintenance, electricity and water supply and distribution, waste management, facility operation and maintenance, fire services, and environmental protection.

personnel could be expected to encounter “armed belligerents”, CF personnel would supplant them.[146]

The successor to CSP was CANCAP. Building on the successful employment of an MSF in support of CF operations in the Balkans, a similar contract was awarded to SNC Lavalin/ PAE (another MSF) for support to potentially all CF operations. Under the terms of the contract, the MSF had to provide full time contingency planning staff to be employed in Canada, in addition to whatever support was required overseas. CANCAP has now been employed in Afghanistan since 2003, providing a multitude of support services within the confines of the main CF bases. This has effectively increased CF operational capability in theatre by allowing more personnel to be employed conducting operations rather than providing static support.[147] The employment of MSFs for deployed operations has become the norm for the CF and is expected to remain so for the foreseeable future.

The CF has also employed MCFs extensively in the last fifteen years. The CF NATO Flying Training in Canada (NFTC) program has operated since 2000 as a partnership between Bombardier and the Government of Canada. The NTFC serves to provide flight training to Canadian and NATO pilots, with Bombardier providing academic and simulator instructors among other services.[148] One benefit of the use of this MCF was that fewer qualified CF personnel had to be employed providing basic instruction to new pilots. Another benefit was that the CF did not have to replace its

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[146] *Ibid*.

[147] Department of National Defence, “Canadian Contractor Augmentation Program,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=1409; Internet; accessed 4 April 2009.

[148] NATO Flying Training in Canada, “Program Concept,” http://www.nftc.net/nftc/en/flash/nftc.jsp; Internet; accessed 4 April 2009.

ageing fleet of training aircraft - they simply included provision of aircraft by Bombardier as part of the contract. This saved the government not only the cost of acquisition of new planes, but also the technicians required to maintain the aircraft as these once again fell to Bombardier.

The Canadian Land Force has made possibly the most extensive use of MCF services within the CF. Through a series of contracts from the 1990s until today, Calian has provided a multitude of training services to the Army. These have ranged from fairly basic MCF services, such as driver training, to the provision of instructors to the Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics for technical trades training as well as information systems and cryptography training.[149] More advanced training support has come through the provision of simulation services for Army command and staff courses and formation level training.[150] In addition to training, Calian has participated in capability development activities. Simulation services as well as consulting and advisory services have been provided to the Land Force Doctrine and Training System for completion of experiments aimed at developing new capabilities and methodologies of employment of land forces.[151]

The employment of Calian in the provision of all of these services demonstrates full use of the realm of services normally associated with MCFs. The primary benefit to the CF has been the reduction in the number of CF personnel employed full time as

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[149] Calian, "Proposal for the Provision of Training and Capability Development Support Services for Canadian Forces Land Operations Department of National Defence. Section 1: Technical Bid," (Kanata: Calian Ltd, 2008), 4.

[150] *Ibid*., 4.

[151] *Ibid*,. 7-10.

instructors. This in turn allows a higher number of personnel to be available for force generation for operations.

Two capabilities recently added to the CF inventory in Afghanistan represent possibly the closest the CF have come to using MPFs. Commencing in November 2008, the CF began using rented MI 8 heavy lift helicopters to resupply troops at forward operating bases. These helicopters are operated solely by the contractor and ferry supplies forward to troops to reduce the frequency of convoys operated by CF members.[152] Also, in January 2009, a private firm began providing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) services to the CF in Afghanistan.[153] While the UAVs provided by MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates (MDA) are not armed and are meant for surveillance purposes, they can be used for targeting purposes and as such are considered a weapons system. Although the surveillance system is controlled by CF personnel, the aircraft is provided and maintained by contractors on the ground in Afghanistan. The distinction between MSF and MPF becomes harder to make in these cases.

Problems and Controversies

PMC use throughout history has not been without controversy and the dramatic increase in their use since September 11th 2001 has drawn much greater scrutiny upon these organizations. Before suggesting whether or not PMCs should be considered for use in the Canadian Arctic to help ensure sovereignty and security, it is prudent to examine the potential problems and implications of their use.

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[152] Major Jay H. Janzen, "First Canadian contracted helicopter flights deliver needed supplies," http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/news_e.asp?cat=114&id=7352; Internet; accessed 7 April 2009.

[153] David Pugliese, "MDA's UAVs up and running in Afghanistan," http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2009/01/27/mda-s-uav-up-and-running-in-afghanistan.aspx; Internet; accessed 7 April 2009.

MPFs have tended to be the market segment that has caused the most controversy since the rapid rise in PMC employment. This is due primarily to the fact that they have used weapons in their tasks and have not been restricted to purely defensive security roles, but have seen offensive combat as well. The legal use of violence has long been the purview of the state, with military and police forces around the world being the instruments of national governments. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to multiple instances where MPFs have been hired by governments for security purposes and they have been permitted to bear arms in the fulfillment of their contracts.[154] What has been missing however has been any tangible regulation or oversight of the MPFs' use of violence.

In Iraq it became commonplace for MPFs to guard supply convoys, key sites and compounds in place of military personnel. Rules of engagement (ROE) have tended to be quite lax or non-existent and the number of controversial shootings of local civilians were cause for significant concern. As Sarah Percy points out in her paper *Regulating the Private Security Industry*, "insufficient legal accountability remains a significant problem for the [PMC] industry."[155] It has been very difficult, if not impossible in many cases, to hold contractors (or their employees) accountable since there exists no international regulation scheme governing PMCs. As Percy explains, so far the accountability of the MPF employees has tended to be largely based on the goodwill of the MPFs in question.[156] Thus, legal accountability and regulation of the industry is one key problem

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[154] Robert Young, *Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror*, (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006), 73.

[155] Sarah Percy, *Regulating the Private Security Industry*, Adelphi Paper 384 (New York: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 2006), 23.

area associated with the use of PMCs. If PMCs are to be used within Canada, national regulatory measures governing their legal accountability would have to be considered.

Control of PMCs is another problem area highlighted by Percy. She argues that the privatization of military functions impacts the way in which states control military force.[157] Where many countries have legislation in place that dictates the way that armed forces can be used by a government, there is often no such legislation regarding the privatization of military functions, including the use of force. Through this absence of legislation, governments are able to contract PMCs to act on their behalf in a conflict, possibly allowing them to surpass troop ceilings set by legislative assemblies by deploying more contractors to increase their numbers. More importantly however is the actual control of the PMCs themselves. PMCs in Iraq have been hired by the US State Department, international corporations and others in addition to the US Department of Defence. What this means to the military commanders on the ground is that there is no single chain of command for the PMCs. The resulting effect is that more often than not there is little or no coordination between their actions and those of the military. Percy offers the option of regulation of control of PMCs as a possible solution to the problem of control. If PMCs are to be considered an option to assist the CF in fulfilling their Arctic responsiblities, clear delineation of the chain of command for which they would work would be essential.

The legal status of contractors as combatants (or not) in a theatre of war is a third problem associated with PMCs. Defining the status of contractors becomes important for

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[156] *Ibid.*, 23.

[157] *Ibid*., 15.

the protection of the civilian employees of PMCs in case of capture. If contractors are found to be unlawful combatants, they are not afforded the treatment guaranteed prisoners of war according to the Geneva Conventions and could be prosecuted for crimes by their captors.[158] Understandably, the legal status of contractors in the case of a counter-insurgency fight such as in Afghanistan or Iraq may be a moot point given that the insurgents are unlikely to abide by the Geneva Conventions. This however, does not remove the fact that the legal status of contractors must be considered. In the case of PMCs working on Arctic sovereignty or security tasks for the CF, their legal status under the Geneva Conventions are a less critical issue since they would likely not be combatants in an armed conflict – but should be considered nonetheless.

While PMCs as defined here can draw their lineage to the British companies of the 17th through 19th centuries, their true coming of age can be traced to the years following the end of the Cold War. As governments reduced defence budgets worldwide, western military forces had to outsource many services. This led to the increase in size of MSFs in the 1990s as they secured large contracts supporting military operations. The explosion in PMC popularity, in particular of MPFs, occurred with the military engagements following the September 11th 2001 terror attacks. The US and its allies realized quickly that they could not sustain large military forces deployed abroad for long periods of time and turned to PMCs to help shoulder the load.

Canada was not exempt from the trend towards greater use of PMCs to support operations and it would now be difficult for the CF to take on a new operation without contractor support. As the government of Canada calls on the CF to become more

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[158] *Ibid*., 19.

involved in the Arctic, PMCs may present a means of addressing the need while limiting the number of military personnel deployed to the region. This potential solution comes with its own set of problem areas that would need to be addressed. These include the need for proper control of PMCs through a clearly identified chain of command, the need for a legal accountability framework to regulate the industry, and the clear identification of the legal status of PMC contractors employed by the CF in the fulfillment of the government's priorities. If PMCs are to be used by the CF in the Arctic, one must carefully consider which tasks they would be best suited for.

ARE PMCS UP TO THE TASK?

The government of Canada has established sovereignty in the Arctic as one of its priorities. The energy resources alone believed to be recoverable there represent potential riches for Canada, but will draw significant interest from an increasingly energy starved world. The growing international interest in the Arctic is one of the reasons Prime Minister Harper made Arctic sovereignty a priority for Canada and for the CF.

As has been demonstrated, there already exist some minor sovereignty disputes in the Arctic. How Canada deals with these may well lead to further disputes with other nations who would not take Canada's claims over its Arctic territories seriously. To ensure sovereignty, one must be able to demonstrate the ability to control what goes on in a given territory and to defend it if necessary. A number of current and developing threats to Canada have been established. Canada will have to be prepared to counter these and the CF, as one of many federal agencies involved in securing the Arctic, will have a key role to play in doing so.

Given the overstretch problem that the CF is facing, its ability to answer the call will be severely tested. If the CF does not get assistance in accomplishing the multiple tasks asked of it in the Arctic, the overstretch problem will likely only be exacerbated. Having demonstrated the role that PMCs have already played in helping the CF accomplish its missions overseas, as well as in areas including training and capability development, a logical next step is to consider PMCs as a possible solution to CF needs in fulfilling its Arctic responsibilities. What will follow is an evaluation regarding which potential CF tasks, now and in the future, could be taken on in whole or in part by PMCs.

First to be considered is the Arctic training facility to be established in Resolute Bay. It will require instructors as well as support staff for maintenance of the facility and resources stationed there. Given the successful employment in the past of PMCs by the CF for provision of training as well as for support to operations, it would appear that this task would be a good fit. An MCF such as Calian would likely be able to provide instructors and capability development personnel to the facility, thereby reducing the number of CF personnel required as staff for provision of training. Furthermore, an MSF contract could be established for the provision of maintenance services for the facility and management of the training resources to be permanently positioned there.

Next for consideration is the Nanisivik docking and refueling facility. This hub will be a key enabler for CF naval activity in the region. This facility (to be used by both the Coast Guard and the CF) will extend the range of vessels of both services during the region's lengthening navigable season. An MSF could be engaged to provide the bulk of the services at the facility, thereby reducing the need for naval personnel to man the site. In fact, the provision of refueling services, supply management and minor repairs are all domains in which MSFs have shown proficiency in the past.

Much of the Canadian Air Force involvement in the Arctic in the past has consisted of surveillance flights in the region. Given the numerous threats that were explained earlier (including potential illegal fishing, shipping, smuggling and foreign naval activities) it is clear that aerial surveillance of the Arctic will continue to be a requirement. The CF overstretch combined with a lack of aircraft will make increased surveillance flights in the Arctic very difficult if not impossible to achieve without significant reductions in surveillance of the other approaches to Canada. PMCs could

play a role in augmenting the Air Force in accomplishing this task. One could argue that this has already been done as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and Transport Canada have both made use of civilian providers in augmenting their own resources for the provision of aerial surveillance off Canada's coasts.[159] Just as these federal agencies have done, the CF could engage an MPF for the provision of surveillance assets in the Arctic. These could consist of manned aircraft as has been the case in the example cited above, but could also include the provision of UAVs for this task as has been done in Afghanistan.

The purchase of AOPVs and the establishment of the Nanisivik facility will allow for increased maritime patrols in the region, but these ships will likely not be available for some time. Maritime patrols to monitor vessels transiting the Northwest Passage and other Canadian Arctic waters are an important part of demonstrating sovereignty in the region. Until the new ships are available to the CF, it may be possible to hand over some of these duties to an MPF. This could be accomplished by providing personnel aboard other government ships such as Coast Guard vessels or through the provision of entire ships and crews. Before allowing for contractors to be armed in the course of their duties, the legal considerations of having these conducting security or maritime operations including shipping verification would have to be carefully weighed. For this reason, their tasks may have to be limited to surveillance alone.

All of the potential opportunities for the employment of PMCs in the fulfillment of CF tasks addressed thus far have focused on the current and evolving situation in the Arctic. One more opportunity presents itself due to the simple reality of conducting

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[159] Christopher Spearin, "Not a Real State..., 1096.

operations in the Arctic: that of the provision communications. A reliable communications network is critical in ensuring robust command and control and timely passage of information. The provision of reliable communications for operations in the Arctic has always proven to be challenging. The combination of harsh environment and vast distances make the use of standard communications equipment problematic. Furthermore, the simple physics of satellite communications make the use of geostationary satellites for communications very difficult across the Arctic region.[160] The commander of Joint Task Force North, Brigadier General Millar, has stated that the lack of a reliable communications network significantly hampers CF operations in the region.[161] The provision of a communications system for use in effecting command and control in the Arctic is another task that should be considered for outsourcing to a PMC. MSFs have provided communications services to the CF on deployed operations in the past and have access to trained personnel for the provision of these. As communications personnel have also been affected by the CF overstretch problem, the use of an MSF for this service would appear to be logical.

Having previously demonstrated the increasing frequency with which the CF would likely be called upon to play a role in the Arctic, and given the current overstretch of the CF, it was necessary to examine which areas could be considered for outsourcing to PMCs. Having compared the requirements and PMC capabilities, it was determined that there may be a role for PMCs in assisting the CF. MSFs and MCFs in particular

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[160] In fact, the challenges involved with using these satellites for reliable high data rate communications, forced the CF to link CFS Alert to the south through a series of microwave links before retransmission by satellite links.

[161] BGen Millar presentation to JCSP 35 in Iqaluit. 3 February 2009.

could likely have the greatest role, through the provision of support, communication and training services for CF assets deployed to the region. Furthermore, it may be possible to employ MPFs for the provision of aerial and maritime surveillance. The legal implications of using armed MPFs in a maritime patrolling or security role must be considered carefully as Canada may not be prepared to entrust the use of weapons for security within its borders to other than military or law enforcement personnel. These implications would be a good area for further research.

CONCLUSION

Prime Minister Harper's declaration of Arctic sovereignty as a priority for his government signaled the start of a new era in Canadian defence. In his view, the Canadian government had failed to appropriately demonstrate its sovereignty over this region. If Canada was to retain its Arctic territories and their resources, the Canadian approach to sovereignty assurance had to change.

The effects of climate change have made the Arctic more easily accessible than ever before and, combined with technological advances, have also made the extraction of the region's wealth of resources more financially viable. Diplomatic efforts are attempting to resolve existing sovereignty disputes in the Beaufort and Lincoln Seas as well as over Hans Island, but the eyes of the world are on Canada – curious to see if Canada will defend her rights in the Arctic. The energy and mineral wealth, fish stocks and more economical shipping routes have all contributed to the rise in international interest in the Arctic. As has been described, other Arctic nations are providing their military forces with the equipment necessary to operate and defend their interests in the region. Prime Minister Harper has vowed Canada will do the same.

While Canadian Arctic sovereignty is not a new issue, the Canadian government response until the 21st century has been generally weak. This was due to the belief that our sovereignty in the Arctic was not threatened and with other pressing issues around the world, an "economy of effort" was the order of the day for the CF in the Arctic. As Canada has now made defending its sovereignty in the Arctic a priority, the CF is being asked to play a larger role in doing so.

As has been discussed, the CF are overstretched. Years of budgetary cutbacks and personnel reductions coupled with the highest operational tempo in recent memory have taken their toll on the ability of the CF to take on new missions. If the CF are to accomplish their new missions in the Arctic, innovative solutions to assist them must be explored.

As has been explained, modern PMCs have evolved into multi-billion dollar industries, offering all manner of services to the world's military forces to assist in accomplishing their missions. The CF's experience with CSP and CANCAP on operations and with MCFs such as Calian for training, capability development and force generation, amply demonstrate the value of PMCs to the CF. This is not to mean that PMCs are a panacea – there are problem areas associated with the use of PMCs. Three key risk areas to be considered were explored including: the need for proper control of PMCs through a clearly identified chain of command, the need for a legal accountability framework to regulate the industry, and the clear identification of the legal status of PMC contractors employed by the CF.

It has been suggested that there is the potential for successful employment of PMCs by the CF in the fulfillment of its responsibilities. Areas assessed to hold the most potential were associated with the new military installations in Resolute Bay and Nanisivik as the type of services required have already been provided successfully by MSFs to the CF elsewhere. Next, PMCs could play a role in assisting with aerial surveillance of the vast Arctic territories and its approaches. Assisting the CF through the provision of communications services to ensure robust command and control of CF assets in the Arctic also holds promise. Lastly, the provision of contractors on board

existing government vessels or of ships complete with crews for maritime operations represents a possible niche for PMCs.

Regardless of the role PMCs do play in the Arctic, the legal implications of their participation in the defence of Canadian sovereignty can not be taken lightly. This being said, with the CF overstretch situation as dire as it is, the real question is can Canada make do without them?

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