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People and Networks: Understanding the Enduring Tenets of an Insurgency

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ABSTRACT

Examining irregular warfare of the past will not substitute for understanding the present but it does make us aware of some of the important dynamics of insurgencies. To fully understand this form of warfare, this paper will examine the root causes, characteristics and influences in an insurgency, showing that despite their recent resurgence, there are some enduring tenets that have remained unchanged and are present in all conflicts of this nature. To confirm the enduring tenets of an insurgency, this paper consists of three separate, yet supporting chapters.

Chapter 1 will examine insurgencies from a theoretical perspective, examining the works of prominent theorists to fully understand the nature, characteristics and deep dynamics of this form of warfare. Aided by two models, this chapter will conclude that insurgencies have two main tenets: control of the population and an inherently networked nature.

To show their validity, Chapter 2 is a case study of the Algerian insurgency. It will discuss the efforts to attain support of both the Algerians and the citizens of metropolitan France. This chapter will also examine the insurgency's internal networks as well as how the conflict was tied to external networks which affected the final outcome.

Chapter 3 will examine the many lessons which are provided by the Algerian conflict. Discussion will focus on the need for a coordinated civilian-military approach and the effects of the domestic population on the outcome of an insurgency. This will alleviate the perceived imbalance in the social order, increase popular support, improve the legitimacy of the government, and dismantle insurgent networks.

These problems of guerrilla warfare are of a very long standing, yet manifestly far from understood – especially in those countries where everything that can be called "guerrilla warfare" has become a new military fashion or craze.[1]

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the western world began a contracted struggle in what has been termed the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This "new kind" of war would not be fought on the open steppes of Western Europe against the former Warsaw Pact, but in the hills, mountains and villages of countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and, most recently, Pakistan. It would be fought against an elusive enemy who would choose not to fight by conventional means with large battles of manoeuvre and firepower. Retired American General Anthony Zinni identified this trend, noting that "defeating nation-state forces in conventional battle is not the task for the 21st century. Defeating transnational threats are the order of the day."[2] Unlike the former Warsaw Pact, this new enemy would not be interested in matching the West in terms of their ships, tanks or planes, but would be more interested in engaging in political rhetoric, aimed at gaining an advantage in the battle for public opinion.

This "new kind" of warfare has been the subject of much debate since the GWOT began. Although written some time ago, the opening quotation from Liddell Hart points to the continued significant discussion on the subject. Events in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that insurgencies are a threat to the security of the Western world, causing

[1]Basil Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. New York: Meridian Publishing, 1991, xv.

[2]Tom Clancy with General Anthony Zinni and Tony Kotlz, *Battle Ready* (New York: GP Putnam and Sons, 2004), 424.

the defence community to re-examine an old idea to adapt to a new enemy.[3] Within the

militaries of the West, the transformation of both structures and intellect was difficult, as

they had previously been optimized to fight a well-known and clearly identifiable

adversary.[4] They were organized and trained to conduct a form of warfare that was in

tune with the institution's role within the Westphalian nation-state construct, rather than

engaging non-state actors who were not constrained by the same international order.

What this means is that state-building and counter-insurgencies are a form of warfare that

will have more time and resources dedicated to preparing for that likelihood than

conventional conflict.[5]

    While the defence community comes to terms with this changing trend, history

provides us with numerous examples which indicate that this form of conflict is not new

and has been present for centuries. It dates as far back as Roman times, usually involving

a superior external military force confronting a seemingly inferior indigenous group

within a state.[6] As we anticipate the threats of the future, we can gain from a critical

examination of the past.   Examining irregular warfare of the past will not substitute for

understanding the present but it does make us aware of some of the important dynamics

of insurgencies.[7] To fully understand this form of warfare, this paper will examine the

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[3]Stephen Metz, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute Press, June 2007), 3.

[4]Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy*, (Ottawa: Communications Group, 2002): 4.

[5]Andrew Bacevich, "The Patraeus Doctrine," *The Atlantic* 302, no. 3 (October 2008):18.

[6]Robert Cassidy, "The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture," *Military Review* 85, no. 3 (May-June 2005): 53.

[7]John Lynn, "Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* 85, no. 4 (July-August 2005): 22.

root causes, characteristics and influences in an insurgency, showing that despite their recent resurgence, there are some enduring tenets that have remained unchanged and are present in all conflicts of this nature.

To confirm the enduring tenets of an insurgency, this paper consists of three separate, yet supporting chapters. Chapter 1 will examine insurgencies from a theoretical perspective, examining the works of prominent theorists to fully understand the nature, characteristics and deep dynamics of this form of warfare. Aided by models produced by Dr Kilcullen and R.G. Coyle, this chapter will conclude that insurgencies have two main tenets: control of the population and an inherently networked nature. To show their validity, Chapter 2 will be a case study of the Algerian insurgency from 1954-1962. Algeria provides an excellent example of how both insurgent and government forces fought to control a non-committed Muslim population through the use of violence, coercion and ideology. It also provides an example of the networked nature of insurgencies by examining links to a support network provided by like-minded neighbouring countries. The Algerian conflict provides many lessons which will be examined in Chapter 3 in greater detail, to project them forward to current Canadian operations. This will show that these hard-learned lessons are not lost to the history books. By studying insurgencies from a theoretical perspective, an in-depth examination of a complex case study and applying some of the lessons learned to current operations, the enduring tenets of an insurgency will be shown to be valid, and can be applied to any conflict of this nature.

CHAPTER ONE –THE THEORETICAL ASPECT OF INSURGENCIES

Martin van Creveld, a well regarded military futurist, predicted in advance of the events of September 11, that the future enemies of the West would be smaller and more agile, against whom superiority in technology and advanced weaponry would be of less and less importance. Specifically he states:

> War will not be waged by armies but by groups who we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves. Their organizations are likely to be constructed on charismatic lines rather institutional ones, and be motivated less by "professionalism" than by fanatical, ideologically-based, loyalties.[8]

The statement by van Creveld hypothesises that this is something new: a characteristic of the new millennium. However, this form of warfare or insurgency has existed for some time, engaging the armies of the West on a continual basis. In fact, this low-intensity conflict has been more common through the ages than the "conflict of nations represented by armies on the conventional field of battle."[9] To evaluate this further, this chapter will discuss insurgencies from a theoretical perspective to determine that there are some common, enduring characteristics against which future conflicts can be measured.

To show this, this chapter will consist of two distinct, yet supporting parts. The first part of the chapter will look at insurgencies from an academic perspective to get a basic understanding of the nature of this type of conflict. This will be done by examining

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[8]Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 197.

[9]John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 15.

the works of Galula, Mao Zedong, and Kitson in greater detail. Although there are

numerous theorists on this subject, these were chosen because of their prominence, their

balanced views, and their theories supporting the thesis of this chapter. They will reveal

the common characteristics in an insurgency as well as some which have been

overlooked and warrant further discussion. The second part of this chapter will apply the

principles identified by the theorists to two different insurgency models developed by Dr

Kilcullen and R.G. Coyle. These two models portray aspects of some, but not all of the

theorists' teachings. Finding an overarching model that accurately defines an insurgency

is difficult and better understanding will be achieved by studying the persistent

characteristics presented by the theorists, rather than relying on an inconclusive model.

PART ONE – EXAMINING THE THEORISTS

In order to fully understand the complicated nature of an insurgency it is

important to establish a foundation by providing some initial definitions to ensure a

common starting point. Beginning with Galula, followed by Mao Zedong, and Kitson,

discussion will move to some of the work provided by insurgency theorists. Unlike

conventional warfare, there is no "silver bullet" when it comes to understanding an

insurgency,[10] and they provide a balanced perspective from both the insurgent and

government forces point of view. While there are many similarities in their theories,

there are also subtle differences based on the education and experience of each theorist.

It will become clear however, that support of the local population is the one enduring

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[10]Peter Mansour and Mark Ulrich, "Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Centre of Gravity Analysis," *Military Review* 87, no. 5 (September – October 2007), 45.

characteristic that prevails throughout. It will also become clear that there is another concept not discussed by the theorists, and that is insurgencies are part of a network.

Low intensity conflict has existed throughout history despite its relative popularity since the end of the Second World War and more has been written on the subject in the last few years than ever before.[11] The term *guerrilla* or *little war* has commonly emerged with this type of conflict and was coined in the Peninsular Wars of 1808, when a Spanish uprising tied down more than 250,000 of Napoleon's soldiers in a ruthless and bloody conflict.[12] As Napoleon discovered, this type of war is a contest for control and is a challenge to authority.[13]

To fully comprehend an insurgency, it is important to accurately define what the term means as modern parlance regularly interchanges insurgent with terrorist and guerrilla. According to the Oxford Dictionary, an insurrection is defined as "a rising in open resistance to an established authority."[14] This definition is further clarified by Webster's Dictionary as "a condition of revolt against a recognized government that does not reach the proportions of an organized revolutionary government."[15]

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[11]Dr. David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux," *Survival* 48, no. 4 (2006): 1.

[12]John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam*, 15.

[13]Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency Redux*, 2.

[14]Katherine Barber, ed., *The Canadian Oxford Dictionary* (Toronto: Oxford University Press 1998), 731.

[15]Phillip Babcock Grove, ed., *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged* (Springfield, MA: Miriam-Webster, 2002), 1173.

Both academic definitions of an insurgency contain notions of revolution or revolt

forming part of a larger set of irregular activities which are a direct threat to authority and

stability.[16] In a Canadian Forces context, an insurgency is defined as:

> A competition involving at least one non-state movement using means that
> include violence against an established authority to achieve political
> advantage.[17]

From the Canadian definition, an insurgency is a competition involving non-state actors,

with the emphasis on an internal conflict rather than one between nation-states. Although

similar, the American definition of an insurgency is defined as "an organized movement

aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and

armed conflict."[18]

When comparing the definitions, the common thread is that an insurgency is

conducted primarily through the use of violence to change the political status quo, to

eject an occupying force, or to change the social structure of the state. What needs to be

understood from these definitions is that not all insurgencies are aimed at overthrowing a

government or changing the political status quo. An insurgency will arise when the

central government is not able to address the valid socio-economic grievances of the

population.[19] In failed or failing states where there is corruption, oppression and deep

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[16]Department of National Defence, B-GL-323-004 FP-003 *Counter-Insurgency Operations*.
(Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007), 1-2.

[17]*Ibid*., 1-2.

[18]United States, Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24 (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, December 2006), 1-1.

[19]Metz, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*, 5.

divisions in wealth distribution, an insurgency becomes more of a contest for changing the social order than achieving a change in political regime.

In the contest for changing the social order, the insurgent and the government compete with each other to prove their legitimacy. The government competes for legitimacy by being able to maintain power within their political and economic realm.[20] Legitimacy for the government depends not only on their ability to defeat the insurgent but also in their means to institute social reforms that are the root cause of the insurgency. Conversely, the insurgents' legitimacy is "based on their declared ability to improve the position of the oppressed"[21] As such, the insurgent attains legitimacy by weakening the authority of the government and convincing the population that they are the only ones capable of rectifying the social injustices of the country.[22]

Having examined the definitions of and insurgency, discussion will now move towards the theorists, the first of which is David Galula. A former Lieutenant Colonel in the French Army, Galula had significant experience in conventional and non-conventional campaigns in the Second World War, Algeria, and Indo-China. He identified insurgencies as a protracted step-by-step struggle where there was a requirement for a cause, a weak government or counter-insurgent forces, and a degree of external support.

Galula's first criterion is the requirement for a cause to mobilize the population and turn it against its own government. He felt this was the basic requirement for the

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[20]Jutta Bakonyi and Kirsti Stovoy, "Violence & Social Order Beyond the State: Somalia and Angola." *Review of African Political Economy* 104, no. 5 (2005): 361.

[21]Canada, *Counter-Insurgency Operations,* 2-17.

[22]Metz, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*, 6.

insurgent to "attract the largest number of supporters and repel the minimum of opponents."[23] It could be manipulated or tailored to suit the segment of the population that the insurgent is trying to target. A viable cause made the insurgent an invincible force, offering a symbol to the population and galvanizing them against their government.[24]

The next element of a successful insurgency according to Galula is a weak or failing government. This may seem self-evident, however the condition of a central government would have a definitive effect on how an insurgency can grow and survive.[25] In Galula's view, a state must be void of any problems and must be the legitimate representation of an accepted domestic social order.[26] If, for some reason, a state is deficient in any one of these areas, the conditions are created in which an insurgency has the potential to thrive.

The final characteristic of an insurgency recognized by Galula is the degree of outside support the insurgent receives from other governments and non-state actors. Insurgents are rarely able to achieve their goals without some form of external support, ranging from funding, technical expertise, and weaponry, to a sympathetic neighbouring country providing a haven in which insurgent forces stage their activities.[27] The more external aid an insurgent receives, the longer he is able to carry on his struggle. External

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[23]David Galula. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2006), 13.

[24]*Ibid*., 14-15.

[25]Colonel Chad Rozin, "Fighting a Global Insurgency Utilizing Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory" (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2007), 3.

[26]Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 17. Galula described the machines of state as the political structure, the administrative bureaucracy, the police, and the armed forces.

[27]Canada, *Counter-Insurgency Operations,* 3-14.

support, however, is a "double-edged weapon". Although external aid is easier for

government security forces to target, isolating the insurgent from his potential funding

and support base,[28] it can also be an extremely difficult task for government security

forces to identify and isolate an external funding source, as seen with the Tamils in

Canada.[29]

The main focus of Galula's work was on developing a number of steps that may

be taken by government forces to fight insurgents. Although an effective counter-

insurgency campaign is beyond the scope of this paper, there is one aspect of his findings

that is noteworthy: his belief that the support of the population is essential for both

government forces and the insurgent. In Galula's view, the population "becomes the

objective of the counterinsurgent [just] as it [is] for his enemy,"[30] against which the fight

is conducted.

The next theorist to be discussed is Mao Zedong who is considered one of the

founding experts on guerrilla warfare and insurgent activities. The basis for his theories

is found in *Yui Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare)* which he wrote during the Japanese

occupation of China. While the majority of this book is an anti-Japanese strategy, Mao

professed that an insurgency is fundamentally a political enterprise.[31]   The political

aspect of this type of war has its genesis when the central government fails to provide its

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[28]Mark O'Neil, "Back to the Future: The Enduring Characteristics of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," *The Australian Army Journal* 5, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 48.

[29]Stewart Bell, *Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World.* Etobicoke, ON: John Wiley and Sons Canada Ltd, 2004, 52.

[30]Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 52.

[31]Thomas Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St Paul: Zenith Press, 2006), 51.

citizens with the most basic needs or denies them a decent quality of life.[32] This type of

politically charged environment, aimed at changing the social order, serves as a breeding

ground for the development of insurgent activity.

Mao saw guerrilla warfare as a protracted conflict that consisted of three phases.

It begins with building political strength and establishing secure base areas, then

progresses to guerrilla attacks on government security forces in an effort to gain popular

support. The insurgents gain strength and popularity, consolidating their support and

administering their controlled areas. The conflict culminates in the commitment of forces

in a conventional style of warfare, seeking a quick and decisive victory. For Mao,

insurgency was a means through which one moved to conventional war and toppled a

regime. His phases were intended to be flexible enough to allow the insurgent to move

from one phase to another, should the situation warrant. Since Mao saw insurgencies as

protracted affairs, an immediate victory was not essential, but constant pressure on the

government would eventually lead to victory, in his opinion.[33] This was not the first time

this form of conflict had been used in history; however it was the first time that it had

been articulated and taught as a form of warfare having the ability to defeat larger,

stronger, conventional forces.[34]

Of all his three phases, Mao saw political mobilization as the most crucial to

achieving success. The war with the Nationalists and the Japanese had devastated the

countryside and introduced the Chinese peasant to new concepts of political identities,

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[32]Mao Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, ed and trans. Samuel Griffith (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 5. The reference is taken from the introduction and is the thoughts of Samuel Griffith, not Mao Zedong.

[33]*Ibid.,* 46.

[34]Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21ˢᵗ Century*, 51.

associations and purposes.[35] Knowing this, Mao placed significant importance on gaining the support of the population in order for the insurgency to survive. The insurgents became an army of the people, on the side of the population, uniting them against the government.[36]

Mao also saw the population not just as a source of supplies, but also as a potential reserve of manpower to build a revolutionary army. Specifically, Mao saw that "the fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is the masses of the people, who organize guerrilla units directly from themselves.[37] In his vision, the insurgent army would be part of the populace, able to strike out against government forces then blend back into the protection and anonymity of the peasantry.

The final theorist that will be briefly discussed is Frank Kitson. He was a British Army Officer who gained experience in counter-insurgency warfare in Malaya, Oman and Cyprus. While the majority of Kitson's work, *Bunches of Five,* details the actions to be taken by government forces, he saw insurgent warfare as a basic struggle for men's minds. In his view, the main aim of the insurgent was the removal of the current government through violent means, relying heavily on the population for shelter, money and supplies. He felt that to attain this support, the insurgent would target the population using political and economic persuasion, often through coercion, violence and terrorism.[38]

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[35]Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam,* 21.

[36]*Ibid.*, 22.

[37]Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 73.

[38]Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five* (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), 282.

Through examining Galula, Mao and Kitson it becomes evident that there is a unifying theme in their findings. All three believed that an insurgency was a lengthy protracted affair, which had at its root, an underlying political theme or struggle. But the common thread between them was the significance of gaining and maintaining the support of the population. This support is achieved by delegitimizing the current social order and promising the implementation of a new one. Whether it was the struggle for men's minds, or a politically charged peasantry, all three theorists saw the population as the target against which the main effort should be directed.

While there are similarities among the findings of the theorists, there is one potential characteristic of an insurgency that is not fully developed, and that is the degree to which they are part of a larger network. Achieving a change in social order can be a lengthy process and these networks are conduits through which authority, manipulation and resources pass.[39] The promises of changing the social order are the ties that bind this system together, representing a central symbol which inter-connects all members of the network.[40]

In his theories, Galula saw the significance of outside support, but only after the anti-government forces had tipped the balance of power.[41] This support was more in the form of guidance in setting up a replacement government rather than in the form of financial and ideological support, or being tied to a larger insurgency network. Similarly, Mao did not benefit from external support, relying on his own successes to train, equip,

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[39]Christopher Ansell, "Symbolic Networks: The Realignment of the French Working Class, 1887-1894," *The American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 2 (September 1997): 363.

[40]*Ibid.,* 373.

[41]Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 26. Galula believed that outside support was not critical in the beginning and would only arrive well after the insurgency had started.

and control his forces. Although Mao had a very stratified, hierarchical command structure,[42] further examination reveals that a networked-type of configuration begins to emerge. In order to keep close observation on his followers, party members were part of numerous groups forming an elaborate command and support network. No group was able to gain more power than the other and they were limited in their authority.[43] As the Chinese were looking to eject an occupying force, the symbol that connected Mao's insurgency web was changing the social order through the defeat of the Japanese or Nationalists.

This section examined the theoretical aspects of insurgent warfare to determine common characteristics for further study. Through closer examination of the works of Galula, Mao and Kitson it was discovered that the support of the population and their networked nature emerged as common characteristics of an insurgency. These are both connected to a need for the insurgent to seek legitimacy by showing the population their ability to change the social order. Having identified these features of an insurgency, they can be further investigated to show their enduring character to this form of warfare.

PART 2 – BUILDING AN INSURGENCY MODEL

While the previous section of this chapter dealt with definitions and theories, this section will examine the key themes identified in an insurgency to better understand the

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[42]Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 73.

[43]Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, 53-55. While the insurgents were interconnected, critical decisions were still retained by Mao himself and the network ensured that none of his subordinates had enough power to unseat him.

nature of this type of conflict. This section will also present two models developed by
Coyle and Kilcullen which examine insurgencies from two different perspectives. Each
model fully develops one aspect of an insurgency but does not fully expand on the other.
The intent of presenting these two models is to identify the complexity of an insurgency
and to portray the difficulty in developing a model that takes into account both the
support of the population and the networked nature of this form of warfare.

A FUNDAMENTAL – SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION

One of the fundamental aspects of an insurgency is the dependence on the support
of the population. This dependency applies equally to both the insurgents and the
government, and is used by both as the main focus of their operations. This section will
examine this concept in more detail. Specifically it will identify that the mobilizing of
the population depends on a popular objective or supporting cause,[44] and is influenced by
information operations or propaganda. It will also be shown that insurgencies are
characterized by violence and are affected by the type of terrain in which the population
lives.

Unlike a conventional conflict, which generally is focussed on the calculated
destruction of the opponent's ability to wage war, an insurgency is fought *within* a nation,
rather than *against* a nation. The population becomes a key factor in the campaign of the
insurgent and the government. The people within this society, more often than not, are
required to make a choice as to which side they will support. Gaining and controlling

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[44]Ansell, *Symbolic Networks: The Realignment of the French Working Class, 1887-1894,* 372.

their will "is more important than controlling the terrain."[45] Both parties will attempt to achieve control over the population and influence their activities and opinions through a promise of a change in the social order of the state.

If the population were to be considered across a spectrum, at one end is a small group of disaffected or disenfranchised citizens. This group of citizens is comprised of hard core insurgents and those members of the population who are either insurgent supporters or emerging insurgents themselves. For them, the government could do little to sway or influence their opinion and the risk of violence against the state within this group is extremely high. At the extreme other end of the spectrum is an equally small group of the population who are supporters of the state. As with the hard core insurgents, there is little that can be done to sway or influence their opinion towards violence against the state.

The polarization of the population to the two extremes leaves the majority of the citizens in the middle, neither strong supporters of the insurgents nor the government forces and not necessarily committed to changing the social order. This segment of the population will move to either extreme, depending on the success of the influence in either direction. What will move the population is the insurgents' legitimacy arising from a common and unifying cause, intended to build up and excite the population. Government and insurgents aim to convince the uncommitted population of their legitimacy and who is the rightful authority within the state.[46] A graphic portrayal of this popular disposition is portrayed as Figure 1.

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[45]Mansoor, *Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Centre of Gravity Analysis*, 46.

[46]Lynn, *Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 22.

Distribution of Citizens at a Point in Time

Figure 1 – Distribution of the Population
Source: Author's Interpretation of Popular Distribution[47]

The combatants are the people within the society, who, provided that their basic

needs are met, will require a strong, unifying cause to motivate them to take up arms

against the government.[48] In many cases, insurgencies arise in the developing world

where there is a long history of hardship, corruption and lack of economic growth. The

ability of insurgents to thrive in this type of environment depends heavily on their

underlying cause, legitimacy, and attractiveness to the population. To be successful, the

insurgent must present a promising alternative to the government,[49] which must be

simple, inspiring and convincing. More often then not, this cause is generally cloaked in

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[47]The basis for this diagram came from a 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group Professional Development Seminar, 9 November, 2007. The author was a participant. A similar model is presented by John Lynn in *Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,* 25.

[48]O'Neil, *Back to the Future: The Enduring Characteristics of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 46.

[49]Austin Long, *On Other War: Lessons Learned from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 22.

"freedom", "liberty", or some other popular slogan of unification, but is generally tied to changing the social order. The challenge to injustice and oppression has the broadest appeal which draws the insurgent and population closer together.[50]

While the majority of discussion regarding an insurgent's cause has had its roots in political rhetoric, economic factors caused by modernization and globalization affect the population and have the potential to move them closer to the insurgent. Developing countries have been forced to cope with rapid economic change having government institutions unable to keep pace, resulting in disorder, instability and a reduced standard of living. This insecurity has made the population vulnerable to influence by insurgent groups who use economic development and reduction of government inefficiencies as a unifying cause for changing the social order.[51] In many cases, the inability of the government to adapt to the rapid economic change within a country has been labelled by the insurgents as government corruption and can be seen as desperate measures to hold onto power. While modernization and economic development are not triggers for an insurgency, they set the conditions for anti-government and revolutionary forces to thrive.[52] Political and economic betterment are main themes used by both the insurgents and the government to show their legitimacy and form part of their persuasion tactics to influence the population.

The political or economic elements alone are not enough to sway public opinion in favour of the insurgent or the government. Both sides will utilize an information

[50]Julian Paget, *Counterinsurgency Campaigning*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 23-24.

[51]Long, *On Other War: Lessons Learned from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research*, 22-23.

[52]Sam Sarkesian, *Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1993), 5.

operations campaign to get the backing of the majority of the people.   Information

operations are taken in support of a nation to influence the decision makers of their

adversary through the exploitation of information.[53] This can be done in a number of

different ways including the use of propaganda, the treatment of the population, and the

use of violence.

The aim of any information operation will be to reduce the legitimacy of either

side in an attempt to gain influence over the people. At the beginning of an emergency,

insurgents will have an advantage over the government as they will have already spent

significant time and resources in what Kitson described as "whipping up hostile opinion

in order to get the trouble started."[54] While the government is also using methods to

influence the population, the insurgent has the advantage due to the significant time that

must elapse before the government has indications of support moving to its side.[55]

While both forces target the citizens, the ability to conduct a propaganda

campaign is an important aspect of influencing the population and gaining their support.

Some time before the information age, Colonel T.E. Lawrence saw the value of

propaganda and media in gaining popular support noting that "the printing press is the

greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander."[56] The difficulty of course

lies in the political capital that is required by a government to influence the way its

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[53]Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-010 *CF Information Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada 1998), 6.

[54]Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, 286.

[55]*Ibid.*, 286.

[56]Robert Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in History* (New York, William Morrow, 1994): 262, quoted in John Nagl, Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam,* 24.

citizens think. This could represent an erosion of the most basic of freedoms within a country, reducing the legitimacy of the government and fuelling the insurgent cause.[57] In the realm of propaganda, the insurgent too has the advantage as he is not bound by the same rules and regulations that govern media reporting. His propaganda campaign will be filled with half-truths, conjecture, and sensationalism aimed at influencing the opinion of the population to his cause and undermining the credibility of the government.[58]

Influencing the population is not achieved through propaganda alone and by their very nature, insurgencies are violent. The level of violence can range from low-level threats or coercion, to full scale ethnic cleansing and genocide.[59] In the application of violence to influence the population, the government is at a disadvantage in that they are bound by both international law and the laws of their state. Every action taken by the government in combating the insurgents must be legal. No citizen will stand idly by as the laws that regulate their country are ignored by their government.[60] The insurgents are not bound by these constraints, employing violence to achieve effects that are in excess of achieving a military or political objective. Violent acts conducted by insurgents may seem pointless or may actually harm their own cause, but go a long way in attaining support of the population through intimidation, terror, and coercion.[61] Government

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[57]Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, 287.

[58]Canada, *Counter-Insurgency Operations*, 1-19.

[59]O'Neil, *Back to the Future: The Enduring Characteristics of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 47.

[60]Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, 289.

[61]*Ibid.*, 283.

forces employing these same methods would have a contradictory effect, undermining their legitimacy, and driving the population to the insurgents.

The final element that will affect the support of the population is the type of terrain in which the insurgency is fought. Terrain will influence bases from which an insurgent operates and how he is able to generate the logistical supplies that he needs to carry out his campaign. Rural or mountainous terrain conceals insurgent preparations and is distanced from security forces that would disrupt their activities.[62] The insurgent can mobilize the population to his cause in this isolated setting with little risk of interference by security forces.

An urban environment provides the insurgent the same opportunity to build up his support base and equip his forces as found in a rural one. The risk for interference by security forces is higher but cities provide a concentration of disaffected citizens who have migrated there because of economic hardship or being forced from their rural homes by government forces. The urban environment provides a significant concentration of politicians, religious leaders, and government infrastructure for insurgents to target.[63] To maintain its credibility, a government must concentrate forces in both the countryside to isolate insurgent support bases, and in urban areas to demonstrate its ability to protect its citizens.

This section discussed one of the enduring characteristics of an insurgency: the support of the population which is critical to both the insurgent and the government. A population consists of citizens that are fanatical supporters of the insurgents as well as

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[62]Paget, *Counterinsurgency Campaigning*, 27.

[63] Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, 282.

those who are hard-line government supporters. Between the two are those whose

support both forces depend upon and will attempt to influence. To gain the support of the

people the insurgent must have a cause that attracts and motivates, presenting an alternate

to the government and a change to the social order. The insurent will use propaganda and

violence to achieve this cause. The subsequent section of the chapter will look at the next

enduring characteristic of insurgencies: they are networked and interconnected.

A FUNDAMENTAL - THE NETWORKED NATURE OF INSURGENCIES

> We're seeing a cellular organization of six to eight people armed with
> RPGs, machine guns, et cetera attacking us at sometimes, times and places
> of their choosing…they are receiving financial help from probably
> Regional Level leaders.[64]

The next fundamental of an insurgency to be examined is the degree to which

they are networked. Networks are defined as "particular patterns of relationships

between individuals and groups."[65] A network is not something new; it can be seen in

clan and tribal organizations which are as old as humanity itself. Insurgent networks are

not the result of globalization and the information age, rather they are enablers, allowing

individuals to be in contact anywhere in the world. For an insurgent, the issue is not so

much that they have the ability to communicate with each other, but that they are

connected by an intricate web of shared ideas and principles with other similar-minded

organizations. To examine the networked aspect of insurgencies, this section will look at

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[64]Anthony Cordesman, *Iraq and Conflict Termination: The Road to Guerrilla War?* (Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 2003), 3. Comments made by General Abizaid, Commander US CENTCOM, briefing 16 July, 2003.

[65]Ansell, *Symbolic Networks: The Realignment of the French Working Class, 1887-1894,* 360.

their formation and how this networked organization lacks a formal hierarchical structure. After examining the organizational aspects of a networked insurgency, discussion will then move to how the system works to the insurgents' advantage.

Prior to investigating the aspects of a networked insurgency, it is important to provide a foundation upon which further discussion can be based. In the early 1990s, in association with the RAND Corporation, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt studied terrorist and criminal organizations in detail. They observed an emerging form of conflict in which the participants use network forms of organization.[66] The combatants in this conflict are small dispersed groups, who connect, communicate and conduct their campaigns in an interwoven manner. Most will be non-state or even stateless actors who establish national or trans-national networks.[67]

The advent of the information age has accelerated this concept and countries are now measured on the growth of their information technology sector.[68] Citizens of developed nations are no longer bound by the limits of their nation state and can be part of the international community. Likewise, the citizens of the least developed nations are now able to get an insight into the difference in their standard of living as compared to those of the more developed countries. Information profusion in failing states raises awareness of the division between have and have-nots while these states are unable to improve the economic conditions to meet these expectations. This leads to increased

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[66]John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror Crime and Militancy,* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 6.

[67]*Ibid.,* 6-7.

[68]Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, 39.

resentment of the government for not instituting reforms to lessen the economic and social divide.[69]

The trend is for businesses, governments and militaries to move forward with flatter, more networked organizations which provide more complex services with increased efficiency.[70] What has not changed, however, is the way in which states interact with each other. They are still bound by formal relations between nation states, governed by international organizations and law. Nation-states form part of regional organizations, which in turn have formal relationships with other regional organizations. The influence a nation state exerts depends on its status regionally and internationally. Non-state actors, conversely, are not bound by these formal relationships and can exist as part of a trans-national network, across artificially imposed political boundaries that do not reflect ethnic or religious actualities.[71] External influence and information move across these networks along informal ethnic, religious or cultural links. A graphic portrayal of this difference between the relationships of nation-states is portrayed as Figure 2 and non-state actors is portrayed as Figures 3**.**

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[69]Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency*, 10.

[70]John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar and Information-Age Terrorism," in *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Understanding the New Security Environment. Readings and Interpretations*, ed. Russell Howard, Reid Sawyer, 96-109 (Connecticut: McGraw-Hill,2003), 97.

[71]Lynn, *Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,* 22.

Figure 2 – Nation-State Inter-Relationships and Influences
Source – Author's Interpretation of the Relationships and Influences of Nation States

**Figure 3 – Non-State Actor Inter-Relationships and Influences**
Source – Author's Interpretation of the Relationships and Influences of Non-State Actors

Having established some fundamentals of a networked insurgency, this next

section will focus on their organizational structure, with specific examination of their

leadership and unifying purpose. Insurgent networks are best characterized by their

"mobility, flexibility and fluidity."[72]   This refers to the fact that there is no recognized

hierarchical structure and the network consists of small cells working in concert with

each other. The result is a loosely aligned collection of nodes tied to numerous other

nodes, forming part of an independent network, rather than a single, unifying hierarchical

organization.[73] Networks become difficult to defeat as there is no centre of gravity and

no one node is vital to the network's survival.[74] Eliminating one of the nodes will not

cause the network to collapse, as one would expect when targeting a hierarchical

organization.

While there is no recognizable hierarchical structure, networks of this nature share

a basic set of common characteristics. First, due to their "fluidity", control and

communications are not formal, but emerge and change based on what task needs to be

completed. Second, the networks are usually complemented by links to external

individuals or organizations which tend to be informal and trans-national. Finally, the

links that bind the network, internally and externally are based on shared values and

equal trust among the individuals.[75] The end result is an adaptive, flexible organization

with a dispersed command structure that is difficult to track by government forces.

What makes this form of organization attractive to the insurgent is its high

mobility allowing them to be connected through a series of links. These links join

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[72]Shawn Brimley, "Tentacles of Jihad: Targeting Transnational Support Networks," *Parameters* 36, no.2 (Summer 2006): 31.

[73]Dr David Kilcullen "Countering Global Insurgency," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no.4 (August 2005): 598.

[74]Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency*, 12-13.

[75]Arquilla, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror Crime and Militancy,* 31-32.

insurgents through a shared sense of alienation or oppression by government forces.[76]

They allow the insurgent to share information quickly and efficiently between their cells allowing them to have the latest advantage over the government as quickly as it becomes known. In essence, it allows the insurgent to acquire, interpret and more importantly distribute information on the government forces quickly and cheaply. The information age has highlighted this support network and the internet contains sites with instruction manuals and video clips on how to attack government forces.[77]

The second aspect of this networked form of organization that makes it attractive to insurgents is its ability to function within an existing hierarchy. Insurgents are able to graft onto existing criminal structures which may have existed in the country prior to the start of any revolutionary movement.[78] This criminal organization consists of a series of safe-houses, smuggling rings, clandestine communications and travel systems. The insurgent is able to benefit from a like-minded system enabling them to move freely with a lower relative degree of risk from law enforcement agencies.[79]

The networked insurgent has emerged as a powerful opponent to government forces and remains an enduring component of this form of low-intensity conflict. As this section has shown, his loose collection of cells along a complex support and communication network makes him difficult to identify and target. With a flat structure, the removal of one cell by government forces will not necessarily eliminate or disable the

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[76]Kilcullen, *Countering Global Insurgency*, 600.

[77]Brimley, *Tentacles of Jihad: Targeting Transnational Support Networks*, 36. As a further example, there has been evidence of Taliban leaders travelling to Iraq to learn insurgent tactics for application in Afghanistan.

[78]Arquilla, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror Crime and Militancy*, 61.

[79]Brimley, *Tentacles of Jihad: Targeting Transnational Support Networks*, 30.

network. Globalization and the information age have enabled an insurgent network in which information and tactics are shared across national and trans-national groups aimed at upsetting the social order and removing the government from power.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSURGENCY MODELS

As was shown in the first part of this chapter, the basic tenets of an insurgency have largely remained constant. What has made this form of warfare more potent is the addition of revolutionary politics into the equation.[80] The end result is that modern insurgencies have become complex, interconnected systems in which politics, economics, demographics and criminality are all interrelated. This creates a multifaceted environment where state and non-state actors interact and compete for control. This section will look at two models that will bring all these complex variables together. The first model that will be examined is one developed by Dr Kilcullen and the second by R.G. Coyle. Both approach the issue of insurgencies in different ways which show the difficulty of one model accurately depicting all enduring characteristics of an insurgency.

KILCULLEN'S CONFLICT ECOSYSTEM

An expert in the field of insurgencies, Dr David Kilcullen has examined this dynamic environment in great deal and described an insurgency as a struggle for the control of a political space. In his article "Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency" he

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[80]Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife,* 16.

described this environment as a sort of "conflict ecosystem"[81] in which there were a number of independent actors within a contested political space. Examples of these are family or tribal groups, and political or economic organizations. Other external participants, such as foreign armed groups, criminals, and intervening military forces join the ecosystem at various stages as the security situation evolves. During times of relative peace, the ecosystem is an orderly arrangement and the actors within it work in partnership with each other, maintaining a healthy competitive relationship, common in most societies.

The security situation in the ecosystem begins to deteriorate when one, or more, of the actors look to change the social order, upsetting the natural balance. Normal competition has eroded, plunging the society into turmoil as each of these actors seeks to dominate the other in the chaos.[82] The actors within the ecosystem compete with each other for legitimacy in order to gain more power as the social order is changed and the ecosystem returns to stability. Complicating the ecosystem, are the foreign actors that flock to the area as they move from one global conflict area to another. They have no specific stake in the outcome of the change in social order, but rather will use it as a stepping stone to further their own idealistic global agenda. A graphical depiction of the conflict ecosystem is shown in Figure 4.

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[81]Dr. David Kilcullen, *"Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency,"* U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference (Washington DC, 28 September 2006), 2-3.

[82]*Ibid.*, 2.

Figure 4: Dr. Kilcullen's Conflict Ecosystem
Source: Kilcullen, "Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency," 3.

The model presented by Dr Kilcullen is an effective portrayal of an insurgency as an organism which he describes as "a dynamic, living system that changes in response to our actions."[83] He is accurate in his assessment that an insurgency is a complex system-of-systems that are in competition with each other for control of the battle space. His model accurately supports one of the main themes of this chapter in that insurgencies are networked, being conducted through "pre-existing social networks."[84]

Kilcullen falls significantly short in that the basis for his model is predicated on the idea that it is a struggle for political control of a contested space. What he does not do directly is to make the foundation for his model the control and influence of the population. One could suppose that all actors within his conflict ecosystem seek to

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[83]*Ibid.*, 3.

[84]Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency Redux,* 6.

maximize their longevity and influence over others as an extrapolation of seeking to isolate the population.

Although Kilcullen's model is loosely supportive of the networked nature of insurgencies, it has other failings. His model does not, in a direct manner, indicate that the fundamental crux of an insurgency depends on support of the population and that actors within his model are motivated by changing the social order of their environment. His model deals primarily with the dynamic forces interacting and "swarming" within an insurgency and the complex influences and relationships between them.

The intent of introducing Kilcullen's conflict ecosystem model was not to fully discuss the complex demographics within this environment, but rather to increase the awareness of the extreme complexity of conflicts of this nature. It provides a comparative background to the Coyle Model to show why this model was chosen over others.

THE COYLE MODEL

An alternative insurgency model was developed by R.G. Coyle in 1985 to show the internal and external factors that influence both insurgents and government forces during a crisis. An insurgency can be viewed as any functioning organization with a persistent and well patterned way of thinking, performing, learning, and adapting. As such, it could be expected to exhibit the same basic traits and characteristics of any organization, and studied in the same way.[85] This section will take a comprehensive look

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[85]Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife,* 5.

at the Coyle Model showing how its core is based on the rate at which the population moves to support the insurgent or government forces. It will conclude by investigating where the Coyle Model is deficient and needs further development.

Coyle himself was not an expert in the field of insurgencies; he was a scientist with a specialty in management sciences and operations research. He felt that any problem facing an organization was better explained and understood if it was recreated in the form of a model, promoting better comprehension and discussion. Based on his experience in organizational behaviour, he felt that it was possible to dissect an insurgency down to its most basic parts.[86] It could be possible to identify the basic mechanisms at play "by which the two opponents seek to influence each other in the direction of the satisfaction of their respective aims"[87]

Although the thesis presented by Coyle has a definite business flavour to it, the term "respective aims" is taken to mean two things: the change in the social order for the insurgents and the return to status quo for the security forces. He determined that insurgencies are not an isolated economic or political matter in which achieving "respective aims" is realized through the control of the population.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the popular support of the indigenous people will always be the centre of gravity for both the insurgent and government forces during a time of crisis.[88] Using this as a basic premise Coyle took an ordinary population which

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[86]R.G. Coyle, "A System Description of Counter Insurgency Warfare," *Policy Sciences* 18, no. 1 (March 1985): 56. While not an expert in the field of insurgent warfare, Coyle had studied many of the leading theorists on the subject, looking as far back as the Boer War to build his model.

[87]*Ibid.*, 56.

[88]Kalev Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* 85, no. 3 (May-June 2005): 9.

would be divided into two distinct categories: those who support the insurgents, and those who do not.[89] The basic connector of these two groups is the rate at which ordinary citizens transition from supporting the insurgents to supporting the government, and vice versa. Small inter-connected communities mean that internal transfer will accelerate quickly, particularly when it is based on a cause or symbol.[90] Coyle referred to this ebb and flow as the Transfer Rate, which the government should strive to keep as low as possible with a negative Transfer Rate indicating that the population is moving away from the insurgents.[91]

Figure 5 – The Coyle's Transfer Rate of the Population
Source – R.G. Coyle, *"A System Description of Counter Insurgency Warfare,"* 61.

In building the next stage of his model, Coyle considered the multiple factors that affect the Transfer Rate depicted in Figure 6. The factors he considered were the rate at which insurgents could build up their forces as well as the military options available to the government to counter them. In his view, the government could do one of two things: reduce the flow of recruits or conduct military operations aimed at killing or capturing insurgents.[92] The extent of a pure military response will be affected by the ability of the

[89]Coyle, *A System Description of Counter Insurgency Warfare*, 60.

[90]Ansell, *Symbolic Networks: The Realignment of the French Working Class, 1887-1894*, 363.

[91]Coyle, *A System Description of Counter Insurgency Warfare*, 61.

[92]*Ibid.*, 62.

government to anticipate the growing insurrection and the security forces available. This

military-only approach is generally unsuccessful and without other efforts to persuade the

population, it will have an adverse effect on the Transfer Rate.[93] To prevent this, the

government response should be both military and socio-economic based on the needs of

the population. Without this response the population will move towards the insurgents,

who could potentially provide what the government has not.[94]


Figure 6 – The Influences on the Population
Source - R.G. Coyle, *"A System Description of Counter Insurgency Warfare,"* 64.

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[93]Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife,* 28.

[94]Coyle, *A System Description of Counter Insurgency Warfare*, 65. In this model, Coyle chose good governance and the food supply, but in essence it is the basic needs of the population.

The Coyle Model, as it has been developed, is a comprehensive and graphic portrayal of the rise of an insurgency. It uses as its base component, the support of the population and builds on the influences at play, both from a government and insurgent perspective. These influences affect the rate at which the ordinary population transfers from support for the government to support for the insurgent. From this perspective, the Coyle Model completely supports one of the main tenets of this chapter, that any insurgency is dependant on attaining the support of the population. It is however, deficient, in that it is a linear model and does not address the networked aspect of an insurgency.

The Coyle Model does, in an indirect manner, consider the external influences on the population that supports insurgents, specifically, the inflow of supplies and external recruits, depicted in Figure 6. As Hammes has indicated, citizens of any state are no longer limited to interact within their own local hierarchy; they can be connected, influenced, and interact with other external actors.[95] This inflow of personnel and materiel depicts a build-up or decline of the strength of the insurgents, rather than making the argument that they are networked, either locally or trans-nationally.

Another deficiency with the Coyle Model is that it represents an insurgency as a linear process as the population is mobilized to the insurgents' cause. It does not integrate the deep dynamics associated with the desire for a change in the social order and a bid for legitimacy by the insurgents. This adhesion to the changing social order or status quo is a matter of symbolism, appealing to an individual's conscience and affecting

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[95]Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, 40.

his motivation.[96] Mobilizing the population is a complicated process and can not be defined as a simple measure of positives and negatives.

The Coyle Model is also deficient in that it assumes, at the outset, no significant change to the population in terms of numbers. Coyle makes an opening assumption that the population levels will remain constant during the crisis.[97] As the security situation is degraded, there is the expectation of a change in the overall population caused by an exodus of citizens leaving the area, or from an in-flow of refugees from other afflicted areas. The end result is that the population base, which both forces are trying to influence, will continue to change.

The models presented by Kilcullen and Coyle are effective at portraying the extremely complex nature of an insurgency. While there are some similarities, there are some fundamental differences. The Kilcullen model accurately depicts the external actors and influences that are at play to change the social order during an insurgency. Conversely, the Coyle Model uses as its primary building block the population and the linear rate at which they move to support both sides. The similarities and differences of both models portray how complicated an insurgency environment is and how diverse actors and influences are.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

To identify those enduring tenets of an insurgency this chapter examined the works of prominent theorists who identified the deep dynamics surrounding an

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[96]Ansell, *Symbolic Networks: The Realignment of the French Working Class, 1887-1894*, 363.

[97] Coyle, *A System Description of Counter Insurgency Warfare*, 61.

insurgency and the need to either change or preserve the social order. This change is achieved by both forces identifying the population as the centre of gravity and the focus of all their actions. By controlling the population the insurgent adds legitimacy to their cause and gains support. Likewise for the government, separating the insurgent from the population isolates him from his support base, reduces his legitimacy, and causes him to fail. The theorists understood the importance of external support, but did not further develop the dispersed nature of these networks and their integral part of the insurgent organizational structure. The networked nature of insurgencies allows loosely connected nodes to operate trans-nationally with little power from a central controlling body. This allows for rapid transition of ideologies along links that tie the insurgents into a larger global struggle. The end result is that these networks become difficult for security forces to dismantle as eliminating one node will not cause the organization to collapse.

Insurgencies have been shown to be complicated with deep social and economic roots, and no one model accurately reflects the complicated dynamics involved. The next chapter will be a practical application of the main tenets of an insurgency that were identified in this chapter through an historical analysis of the Algerian conflict.

CHAPTER TWO – A CASE STUDY OF THE ALGERIAN INSURGENCY

Having identified in Chapter 1 that the fundamentals of an insurgency are the

support of the population and their networked nature, this chapter will apply these

findings through a detailed historical analysis and a critical examination of the Algerian

conflict. The choices for an analytical case study are extensive: the insurgencies of

Vietnam, Malaya, Oman, and the Philippines all provide excellent examples of the

enduring tenets that were identified in Chapter 1. Some, such as Malaya, offer concrete

examples of counter-insurgencies that were successful. Others provide cases of

insurgencies that were highly successful for the insurgent, as in Vietnam.[98] While these

conflicts have their merits, Algeria was selected because of its complexity and its

shattering divisiveness. It offers an example of the French and Algerian forces repressing

and emancipating the population in an effort to gain their support. It was an insurgency

so brutal in its conduct that it terrorized both Europeans and Algerians across North

Africa and the European continent; it bitterly divided a nation and brought France to the

brink of civil war. Citizens of metropolitan France found themselves divided over

supporting the policy of *Algerie francaise* or conspiring against their government by

supporting the rebels.[99] The Algerian insurrection was one in which the actors were not

simply the insurgents and French soldiers, but politicians, anti-war activists, writers and

Middle Eastern leaders. The conflict expanded well beyond the borders of Algeria and

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[98] Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam,* xxii.

[99] John Talbot, *The War Without a Name, France in Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1980), 2. *Algerie francaise* refers to the policy of retaining Algeria as an integral department of the French Republic. *Algerie Algerienne* refers to the policy of severing Algeria from France and granting her self-rule.

its effects were connected to the remainder of North Africa, Egypt and metropolitan France. Through a detailed examination of the Algerian conflict, this chapter will show the support of the population and their networked nature are enduring tenets of an insurgency.

This case study will begin with a brief discussion on the background of the Algerian situation, providing the context upon which the insurgency started. It is not the intention to provide an historical account of the conflict, but an understanding of the background of the country and a lead into the discussion of the arguments supporting the thesis of this chapter. Discussion will then focus on the first enduring tenet, that insurgencies are based on the struggle for the control of the population. This aspect will be discussed in two separate, yet related aspects: support of the Algerian population, and support of the population of metropolitan France.

After discussing the efforts taken by the insurgents and the government to influence the population, this chapter will then focus on how Algeria represents a networked insurgency. This will be done through an examination of the insurgency's internal network based on the tribal nature of Algeria as well as how the conflict was tied to external networks which had an effect on the final outcome.

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

France acquired Algeria in 1830 and achieved full control over most of the territory by 1847. The creation of the Second Republic in 1848 proclaimed Algeria as an integral part of France and the regions within it were designated as departments in the

National Assembly. The large number of European immigrants and its close proximity to

France gave the country a much more emotional and cultural attachment to Algeria than

it did to any of her other overseas possessions.[100] At the outset of hostilities, there were

approximately 1 million Algerians of European descent, representing 10 percent of the

population. Of these, over 400,000 were of Spanish or Italian lineage while the majority

were of French decent, many of whom were born and raised in Algeria.[101] In 1954, this

group represented the most powerful political and economic segment of the population,

controlling the majority of the wealth of the country.[102] Regardless of their ethnic origin,

all Europeans were made French citizens by the Cremieux decree in 1870.[103]

The conquest of Algeria began an ominous relationship between the French and

Algerians. The French took deliberate steps to marginalize the large Muslim population

and deny them the political rights equal to most Europeans.[104] The majority of the labour

force was Muslim, working in French owned and subsidized industries. In the

agricultural sector the majority of the work was carried out by Algerians while the

Europeans owned 90 percent of the prime farmland. By 1957, all European children

received schooling compared to less than 20 percent of Muslims. This disproportion was

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[100]Alistair Horne, *Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962* (London: MacMillan, 1977), 23.

[101]Joseph Kraft, *The Struggle for Algeria* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1961), 31.

[102]Lou Dimarco, "Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionaire in the Algerian War," *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 66.

[103]Kraft, *The Struggle for Algeria*, 31-32.

[104]Dimarco, *Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionaire in the Algerian War*, 65.

due in large to dominant Europeans who thought that "education of the natives is a veritable peril."[105]

The Algerian insurrection began suddenly and violently on 1 November, 1954, with over 70 incidents across the country.[106] They were scattered and consisted of ambushes, acts of arson, and attacks on government installations. At the outset, the insurrection was carried out by badly trained, apprehensive and poorly armed groups of men who had aspirations of seizing control of army camps and prisons.[107] The initial French assessment was that this was a tribal feud resulting in the dispatch of a small number of troops. The interest by the Muslim population was muted, as few knew the insurgents or their aims, watching the incidents unfold with perplexed curiosity.[108] Emerging as the dominant non-state actor, The Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) absorbed or crushed other nationalist groups. The spread of Algerian nationalism quickly took hold as the FLN stepped up their campaign against French rule, ending on 19 March, 1962, when Algeria gained its independence. The interim period marked a campaign that was dominated by violent clashes, coercion of the population, acts of terrorism, and brutal torture. After almost eight years of fighting, over 150, 000 insurgents and 20,000 Muslim civilians were killed.[109]

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[105]Kraft, *The Struggle for Algeria,* 38.

[106]Edgar, O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1967), 39.

[107]Constantin Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1964), 6.

[108]O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62*, 40.

[109]Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 2.

PART 1 - MUSLIM CONTROL OF THE POPULATION

> The only valid interlocutor at the present time is the FLN, which has been able to muster behind it the Algerian people, almost to a man.[110]

The Algerian insurgency represents an example of a conflict where the control of the population was a fundamental objective of the insurgent. This section will examine this aspect in greater detail, looking at how the FLN sought to increase their legitimacy by changing the social imbalance of the country. Discussion will also focus on the efforts taken by the FLN to acquire this support at the grass-roots level through persuasion and indoctrination. As well, the FLN's embarkation on a campaign of terror and coercion to dominate the population, with wide use of propaganda to influence the people, will be examined.

Changing the Social Order

At the start of the insurgency, there was a clear imbalance in the social order of the country. Many of these inequities were the result of colonial French policy towards the management of Algeria.[111] Most of the French promises within their policies were not kept, violated, or outright rejected. The end result was social unrest of the masses and unrest of the political elite. Arising from this inequitable policy were Muslim political bourgeoisie who favoured a system that sought to correct this imbalance,

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[110]Kraft, *The Struggle for Algeria,* 80. Comment made by a former President of the Algerian Assembly.

[111]Alf Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 135.

decreasing the power of the Europeans while at the same time increasing their own power and wealth.[112] The views of the Muslim political elite did little to alleviate the growing divide and resentment between the Algerian peasant and the Europeans.

The Algerians were extremely poor compared to their European counterparts. The poorest 100,000 families in Algeria were all Muslim compared to the richest 10,000 families that were almost exclusively European.[113] The FLN gave these peasants a sense of hope and purpose, as well as an opportunity to eliminate the social divide in the country, and a long-awaited liberation from the oppressive rule of the infidel.[114] Joining the rebellion offered Algerian youth an opportunity to live up to the heroic exploits of their forefathers, potentially releasing their families from oppressive poverty and repression by colonial masters.

While there was an economic imbalance in the country, there was also political inequity. The extreme dislike of the Europeans and the colonial system created feelings of hatred which played an important factor in the underlying emotions in the insurrection. The FLN offered a chance to change a system that was aimed at forever maintaining the dominant position of the European settlers.[115]

In the initial stages of the insurgency, many peasant groups along the frontiers were not so much interested in the struggle as they were in indulging in banditry and smuggling for personal gain. The FLN used this to their advantage to eliminate any challenges to who would be better poised to change the social imbalance of the country.

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[112]Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 11.

[113]Kraft, *The Struggle for Algeria*, 38.

[114]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 135.

[115]Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 78.

In many areas, the FLN simply filled a power vacuum that was left by one of their rivals.[116]

Building a Support Base

> As the insurgency grew the rebels were more interested in gaining large masses of men than large masses of land.[117]

When the insurgency started, it was carried out by poorly armed and weakly trained insurgents. The fact that the initial incident was the catalyst for a series of events which mobilized the Muslim population is a testament to the support base that the FLN generated.

In 1954, the population of Algeria was growing rapidly and youths comprised a significant segment of the population. They became more enthusiastic about the nationalist movement and were spurred on by recent exploits by their Arab brothers in neighbouring Tunisia and Morocco.[118] The FLN exploited this and were able to create an extra-ordinary surge of popular nationalism. This was enhanced by the influence of the newly created Arab League and the popularity of the anti-European policies of Egypt's President Nasser, who pushed back an Anglo-French operation in the Suez in 1956. The

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[116]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria.*, 95.

[117]Kraft, *The Struggle for Algeria*, 70.

[118]Martha Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 53.

creation of a spirit of revolution gave the FLN the initial advantage in building a support

base amongst the population.[119]

Lacking arms, safe houses and recruits, the FLN began by building a support base

among the population that was separated from French control. The FLN understood the

tribal nature of the society they operated in and were able to exploit local customs, feuds

and rivalries to form groups that were loyal to their cause.[120] Having lived for

generations conducting smuggling and banditry in remote areas with no governmental

control, it was not difficult for the FLN to recruit a peasant who had never actually met a

European and were unaware of any oppression or injustices they may have committed.[121]

It is largely thought that the FLN followed a Maoist style insurgency, starting

with building rebel movement transitioning to open warfare. While there were numerous

clashes, the FLN were never able to transition past low-level guerrilla warfare.[122] What

they did was follow the *tache d'huile* strategy laid out by Lyautey.[123] While similar to

the Maoist strategy, the FLN began by inserting a few zealots into remote areas to dig in

with the local population, increasing their support and drawing recruits. This would set

the conditions for widening penetration of the FLN cause, allowing them to become more

organized, and increasing support as the *tache d'huile* grew. The tactics to achieve this

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[119]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 108.

[120]Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the 20th Century* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1969), 237.

[121]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 95.

[122]David Galula, *The Pacification of Algeria, 1956-1958* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006), 16.

[123]Kraft, *The Struggle for Algeria*, 70. The *tache d'huile* theory saw concentrating security and reconstruction forces in one spot. As the security and economic conditions increased, so too did popular support towards the government and away from the insurgent.

varied between villages, but generally a rebel leader would draft young men from local families, who were then made to participate in a subversive act. Having completed this rebellious act, the draftee was now an outlaw, and by default had implicated his entire family, bringing them under the control of the FLN.[124]

As the FLN built up its popular support base at the grass roots level, the French government had difficulty assessing the situation and fully coming to terms with the growing support that the FLN was gaining among the populace. This early confusion and ineptitude by government officials gave the FLN time to win over doubtful peasants. By miscalculating the severity of the situation, the French government had, unwittingly, contributed to the cause of the FLN.[125]

FLN Use of Terror and Coercion

While their support base was being built up in the countryside through persuasion, the FLN also began to build up their support base through the use of coercion and terror. As this section will discuss, the campaign of violence was aimed at those Muslims who were supporters of French rule and those who were, up to this point, uncommitted to the cause. The end result was that for Europeans, a trip to a market or restaurant could potentially end in death. For the Algerians, it meant that interacting with the Europeans or failing to support the FLN might result in their execution.[126]

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[124]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 95.

[125]*Ibid.,* 135.

[126]Talbot, *The War Without a Name, France in Algeria, 1954-1962*, 79.

The FLN began using violence to create fear and uncertainty within the population as a means to increase their power. This shift was a method of showing the uncommitted and scared population that the French were unable to protect them. While this violence was carried out by the insurgents, to the uneducated and terrified Muslims, it showed that the only force able to provide any security for them against these atrocities was the FLN.[127] By resorting to violence, the grass-roots approach that the FLN initially used, suggests that they were not totally successful at fully inspiring the bulk of the Muslim population to rebel against French authority.[128]

During the terror campaign from 1958-1960, the main targets for the FLN were those Muslims working for the French. These pro-French Algerians were attacked, their offices bombed, and their houses burned. The FLN began with a warning, either verbally or in the form of a letter, directing them to cease supporting the French or risk mutilation or death. If this was ignored, they would be assassinated. This methodology both impressed and frightened the Muslim population, forcing them into submission. At the same time, it was made abundantly clear to the Algerians that the FLN meant what they said.[129]

While the campaign of terror had its expected effect on the Algerian population, the FLN took other steps to further amplify the division between the Muslims from the Europeans. This was achieved by banning Muslims from going to newly constructed

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[127]Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the 20th Century,* 239.

[128]Christopher Moore, "Action and Reaction in Insurgent Conflicts: The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962," Annual Meeting American Political Sciences Association, 26-30 August, 2008, (Bethel University Press): 11; http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/7/9/0/9/pages279091/p279091-1.php: Internet: accessed 21 February 2008.

[129]O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62*, 54.

French schools, or from using French professional services, such as doctors or lawyers. At the same time, the peasants were forbidden to accept any land grants or to accept work from a French business.[130] Failure to comply with the directives of the insurgents by uncooperative Muslims would mean certain death or mutilation.

The final coercive action taken by the FLN to dominate the population was directed towards the electoral process. They were somewhat influential in preventing mass participation in the October 1958 Referendum. However, they completely upset the municipal elections of April 1959, issuing statements requiring all Muslim candidates, regardless of their party, to resign, withdraw, or risk execution.[131] Several Muslim candidates and electors were either kidnapped or executed.[132] This further demonstrated to the Muslims the power and influence of the FLN, leaving the population no choice but to support them.

FLN Use of Propaganda to Influence the Population

While the FLN used violence and fear to achieve control over the population, they were also effective in the use of propaganda, the main target of which was the Muslims.[133] This section will look at the FLN's propaganda campaign that attacked the legitimacy of French rule in Algeria and focused on the inequity and sacrifices of the Muslim population.

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[130]Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962*, 63.

[131]Michael Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1959), 239.

[132]Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 49.

[133]Dimarco, *Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionaire in the Algerian War*, *67.*

In order to nurture popular support, the FLN aimed their attacks at the French in an attempt to undermine their authority.   The FLN stirred anti-French feelings using radio addresses, newspaper articles, and pamphlets. This process attacked the racism and domination that typified the French colonial administration. Their propaganda attacked French laws which were ill-adapted to Algerian customs and proposed to replace them with a revolutionary code. This code promised a better day for the Muslims, playing on the resentment of their economic and social underdevelopment as well as the French view of their inferiority as a colonized people.[134]

While the FLN propaganda plan attacked the legitimacy of French rule, it highlighted the sacrifices of Muslims in their struggle against oppression. The FLN plan was to counter the claims made by the French army and to show the sacrifices being made by the insurgents in the name of a free Algeria. FLN leaders and press officers would always be present in a village when French forces conducted operations. In doing so, the FLN showed that it was an organization that cared for its citizens stricken by a cruel regime that used harsh tactics to oppress them. This had the effect of demonstrating to the Algerian people that the FLN was *their* army, fighting to reclaim *their* lost dignity and pride.[135]

In playing on Algerian pride and dignity, the FLN's propaganda also used the struggles in neighbouring Tunisia and Morocco as examples of a pan-Arab fight against oppression. They used these conflicts to bring out a swell of nationalism and to show the FLN's commitment to a greater Muslim cause. For those Algerians who were cautious of

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[134]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 103-104.

[135]*Ibid.,* 167.

the effects of a French departure, and with it, European investment and money, the FLN used Tunisia and Morocco as examples of countries that had been released from the yoke of French oppression. The FLN portrayed these two countries as highly prosperous nations, where French money and investment poured in well after they had achieved independence.[136]

In showing concern for their well-being, playing on national pride, and showing the brutality of the French, the FLN propaganda plan was successful in acquiring further support for their cause. The FLN tied this propaganda plan effectively to their Maoist style to build their popular support at the peasant level. Permeating this grass-roots approach was a campaign of brutal violence, not only aimed at the Europeans, but also at the Muslim population. The use of intimidation, threats, and terror, coupled with an extensive propaganda plan, demonstrated to the Algerian people the ability of the FLN, the viability of their organization, and highlighted the failings of the French.

PART 2 - FRENCH EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE POPULATION

The French effort to dominate both the Muslim population and the *pieds noirs* is a critical factor in the Algerian insurgency. To some degree, the French effort is an extension of the polarizing approach to governance that had dominated their rule of Algeria. While the last section dealt with the FLN's approach to gain control of a fickle populace, this section will examine what was done by government forces to achieve the same result. Further investigation into this subject will conclude that the French followed a policy of suppression, torture and violence, all in an attempt to isolate the FLN from its

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[136]Galula, *The* Pacification *of Algeria, 1956-1958,* 17.

support base. Popular films such as *The Battle of Algiers* portray an evil and tyrannical European power trying desperately to hold on to its once-grand glory. Further examination will reveal that the French government pursued an extensive policy of social, economic and political development to narrow the divide between Europeans and Muslims, giving them an expanded role in self-government in an effort to ensure their loyalty to France.

French Efforts to Isolate the FLN from the Population

The Algerian War forced the French army to fight two different types of campaigns. First, they were instruments of the government who had to fight for territorial control of an integral part of their country. Second, it forced them to try to control the activities and opinions of as many Algerians as possible. In doing so, the army was forced into an anti-guerrilla war that was aimed at the individual. With recent anti-guerrilla experience in Indo-China, the French had perfected a practice of *guerre revolutionaire,* the principle objective of which was to win over the allegiance of the population, by any means possible.[137] *Guerre revolutionaire* had five fundamentals: isolating the insurgent from support, improving local security, establishing French political legitimacy with effective indigenous political and military forces, using an effective intelligence capability, and striking the insurgents quickly and effectively.[138]

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[137]Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 6.

[138]Dimarco, *Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionaire in the Algerian War, 68.* While not fully established or accepted doctrine, *guerre revolutionaire* was widely accepted by most senior French officers.

The most important aspect of the *guerre revolutionaire* for this discussion is the action taken by the French government to isolate the population from the insurgent. To achieve this, the French instituted the *quadrillage* system that divided Algeria into sectors, permanently garrisoned by troops responsible for suppressing rebel operations in their assigned territory. This was a manpower extensive process and by the end of 1956, there were over 400,000 French soldiers serving in Algeria. Controlling the entire population in this manner was difficult and the Governor General, Jacques Soustelle, complained to Paris in the same year that there were not enough soldiers to do the job effectively.[139]

Within the villages and neighbourhoods, the French saw the Muslim population as a critical source of information. In their view, no rebel activity could be carried out without the knowledge of some, if not most, of the local population. Consequently, the French launched a campaign of forced relocation and indoctrination, in an attempt to isolate the FLN from their support base.[140] During the years 1955-1961, there were approximately 1.8 million Algerians forcibly displaced from their homes, placed in resettlement camps, and subjected to French indoctrination. Others escaped to already overcrowd urban centres, ripe with revolutionary dissent.[141]

Unfortunately for the French, this heavy handed suppression did not have the anticipated effect. The resettlement camps were badly managed and the living conditions were poor. Rather than protecting an easily swayed population from the FLN, it had the

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[139]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 102.

[140]Kraft, *The Struggle for Algeria*, 101.

[141]Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the 20th Century,* 240.

opposite effect, uniting them in their hatred of France. Resettlement failed to isolate the

population and the devastating social and economic effects forced many disaffected

peasants to seek out the FLN.[142] The lack of results of the *quadrillage* and displacement

programmes made it clear to French authorities that their tactics for fighting tribal wars

were ineffective and only served to alienate more of the Muslim population.

French Use of Torture to Gain Control of the Population

Coming to the realization that they were not embroiled in a tribal war as originally

thought, France resorted to other methods to gain control over the population. This led

the army to a more severe adaptation of *guerre revolutionaire* where the use of torture

was not only acceptable, but was the most effective way to deal with an insurgent.[143]

The use of torture as a method of controlling of the population was generally not

widespread until the Battle of Algiers. What had begun as a programme of protection of

the population, materialized as the use of terror to separate the average Muslim from the

FLN. The French response to FLN-sponsored terror was heavy-handed as the search for

information on rebels and their leaders became a major operation. The army resorted to

the use of torture using beatings and electric shock to extract information from average

Muslims and FLN alike.

During the Battle of Algiers complete political and judicial control was handed

over to General Massu, Commander 10th Parachute Division. To separate loyal Muslims

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[142]Moore, *Action and Reaction in Insurgent Conflicts: The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962,* 21.

[143]Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency,* xv.

from the FLN, a large number of guilty and innocent Algerians were brutally tortured by

General Massu's men in an attempt to uncover information on nationalist leaders. In

Algiers alone, it is estimated that over 24,000 Muslims were arrested and more than 3000

simply disappeared.[144] Between 1956 and 1957, approximately 40 percent of the adult

male population of Algiers was interrogated, tortured, or threatened with torture.[145]

While a large number of innocent Algerians were arrested and tortured, Massu remained

adamant that these actions were justified. The use of torture allowed the authorities to

uncover terrorist networks, saving other innocent lives.[146] While these tactics resulted in

most of the FLN leaders being captured or killed, it completely alienated the population

of Algiers, breaking their loyalty to France. Despite its success in suppressing the

population, the indiscriminate use of torture strengthened the FLN and unexpectedly set

the conditions for French failure.

Positive Effects by the French to Win Over the Population

While some of the heavy-handed actions taken by the French drove some

Muslims to support the FLN, there were other, more passive, initiatives taken by the

authorities, aimed at the moderate Muslim. The aim of these initiatives was to improve

Algerian economic and social status as well as giving them more self-governance. In

doing so, the government would sway those less nationalistic Muslims to align with

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[144]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria,* 241.

[145]Dimarco, *Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionaire in the Algerian War,* 72.

[146]*Ibid*., 234.

France, refusing to support the FLN, who appeared only interested in upheaval, ignoring the strategic good of the country.

This was achieved by placing both military and civil servants in remote tribal areas. These government officials worked on improving the villagers' quality of life through development projects and teaching law, order and governance. This served a dual purpose of preventing the peasants from providing information to the FLN, and affording a mechanism through which government control could be executed. French money was used for schools, hospitals, and for building infrastructure. Under this programme, over 120,000 Algerian children, many of whom had no previous access to education, were now able to attend school. Likewise, the French army employed over 920 military doctors in rural hospitals and clinics, providing medical care where none had existed before.[147] To improve security, the French employed *harkis*, locally hired men to provide self-defence for the village and intelligence on FLN activity. Over 180,000 *harkis* were employed, freeing up much needed soldiers for service elsewhere in the country.[148] The intent of these programmes was to create favourable conditions in the outlying rural areas and to significantly improve the peasants' quality of life so that it overshadowed the nationalist fervour offered by the FLN.

The positive effort made by the French government at improving education, medical care, security and governance to the average Muslim, were unfortunately overshadowed by the use of forced relocation and torture. While these efforts were

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[147]Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 44.

[148]Lawrence Cline, *Pseudo Operations and Counter-Insurgency Operations: Lessons From Other Countries*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), 97. There was nothing new in this approach, in that Muslim units had served in the French army for decades and by 1959 there were over 60,000 serving in uniform. The principle difference in the use of the *harkis* was for self-defence rather than expeditionary operations.

aimed at strengthening French loyalty and isolating the FLN from the population, it did

not have the desired effect. The long-term effects of relocation devastated the rural

economy and the widespread conduct of torture failed to sway the population in the

manner envisioned by the French. As this section has shown, the French clearly

understood that the collaboration of the population was critical to increasing loyalty to

their government and weakening the support base of the insurgent, but failed in achieving

it.

PART 3 - THE LOSS OF SUPPORT OF METROPOLITAN FRANCE

> The fate of Algeria was decided in metropolitan France. It was not
> decided on the battlefield.[149]

In Chapter One, it was determined that achieving the support of the

population should bolster support for the government forces and deny a recruiting

and aid base for the insurgent. The study of the insurgency in Algeria reveals an

interesting twist to this tenet. While the army eventually crushed the insurgency,

the citizens of metropolitan France lost support for their government's actions,

brought the demise of the Fourth Republic, and almost cast the country into civil

war. This section will examine this aspect of the insurgency in greater detail, first

looking at the war-weariness that was being experienced by French citizens.

Discussion will then focus on the indignation and disillusionment of the French

public at the publicized use of torture and brutality as a means to dominate the

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[149]Gil Merom, "The Social Origins of the French Capitulation in Algeria," *Armed Forces and Society* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 601.

Algerians. The effects of the French Left will be examined to determine the

critical role they played in causing defeat in Algeria.

Division on Where France Should Focus Her Efforts

The defeat in World War Two and the devastating loss at Dien Bien Phu had a

detrimental effect on the French national psyche. In addition, the newly gained

independence of Tunisia and Morocco had further undermined her eminence as a colonial

power. The Algerian conflict offered the government a method to improve on recent

events and re-assert itself as a major influence in Northern Africa. However, as the cost

of the war grew past 50 billion francs, the French population was becoming wary of the

rising expense of the war.[150] Even the army was divided on where their efforts should be

focused. There were those who were tired of the stalemate of colonial wars and were

eager to move France in a different direction by building a professional, mechanized

army that was a dominant western power.[151]

On the economic and political front, the views were equally split. There were

those who thought France should maintain Algeria at all cost. Others felt that France

should dispose of her colonial past and embark on a different path where preserving

national honour was not worth the cost of maintaining a colonial empire.[152] They felt

that the focus should be on building trade relations within the growing European

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[150]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 80.

[151]Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962*, 116.

[152]*Ibid.,* 117.

Common Market, and becoming a dominant economy in Central Europe. This same group began to grow distrustful of the "praetorian proclivities"[153] of the army and were interested in finding a quick resolution to the conflict.

Indignation toward French Conduct in Algeria

The Algerian conflict required an extensive commitment of soldiers which soon exhausted the resources available to the government. As a result, there were extensive call-ups of reserves and conscripts to serve overseas who approached the war with resentment. Aside from forced military service, this resentment also was fuelled by the fact that, in their view, their government lacked a coherent policy on Algeria.[154] Many were sent to remote areas to combat an elusive enemy and felt the Europeans did not respect the work being done by the army on their behalf.[155] On completion of their service, these soldiers returned to France and were resented by French society for having defamed it. They had a profound sense of abandonment by their government which did not treat them as they had soldiers of previous colonial conquests.[156] The conscripts were

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[153]Merom, *The Social Origins of the French Capitulation in Algeria*, 617.

[154]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria,* 80.

[155]Kraft, *The Struggle for Algeria,* 96. Some conscripts were involved in combating the FLN, however, in some cases, conscripts were sent to farms of Europeans to guard their harvests so they could not be seized by the FLN.

[156]Marina Lazreg, *Torture and the Twilight of an Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 2.

vocal in their sense of betrayal and disgust, causing mutinous demonstrations and unrest, dragging France further into chaos.[157]

The disruption caused by returning soldiers and the attention of the international press during the Battle of Algiers brought the war to the limelight.[158] The violence of the confrontation and the nature of the methods used by both sides bitterly split the population along ideological lines. The extreme right denounced the government's ability to conduct a successful anti-guerrilla campaign, while the extreme left displayed support for the FLN, demanding negotiation and abandonment of primitive methods of fighting.[159]

The French Left saw this as a campaign of "reciprocal violence",[160] where actions taken by the soldiers were in response to acts committed by the FLN. They failed to see how summarily executing prisoners was part of an overall plan to win over the Algerian population.[161] France, in their belief, was a cultured society, an historical champion of human rights, the liberator of the oppressed, and the civilizer of those less advanced. The

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[157]Horne, *Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962*, 231.

[158] Dimarco, *Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionaire in the Algerian War*, 73. While the conscripts caused significant disruption with their allegations of torture and misconduct, There were some senior French generals, such as General Bollardaire, who were disgusted with the conduct of the army and publicly resigned.

[159]Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 37.

[160]Moore, *Action and Reaction in Insurgent Conflicts: The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962,* 18.

[161]Talbot, *The War Without a Name, France in Algeria, 1954-1962*, 92. This process was often referred to by returning reservists and conscripts as "corvee du bois" in which suspected FLN activists were rounded up by the local commander murdered after an FLN attack on French forces. They were reported as shot while trying to escape.

use of torture violated this tradition, betrayed the principles upon which the country was formed and threatened the existence of their liberal democracy.[162]

French citizens were also concerned with the possible effect the disaffected returning soldiers might have on their society as a whole. It was feared that the soldiers, who, as agents of the government, used such brutality in Algeria, would be capable of using it back in France. Worse, they feared the soldiers possessed a lack of morality and would embark on a life of violence and crime.[163]

While there were those who opposed the conduct of the army in Algeria, there were others who were vehement supporters of it. They believed Algeria was an integral part of France to be preserved at all costs and saw the dominance of the Muslims as central to the defence of their colonial empire and part of the grandeur that was once France.[164]

Detrimental Effects of the French Left and French Media

For all those who opposed the war, the group that had the most detrimental effect on eroding the support of the French population was the French Left and the left-leaning media. It was the French Left that truly undermined the French government, turning their citizens against them. This section will investigate this aspect further, focusing on the effects the political left had on influencing the population, as well as the consequences of the left-leaning media.

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[162]Talbot, *The War Without a Name, France in Algeria, 1954-1962*, 102.

[163]*Ibid.,* 103.

[164]Lazreg, *Torture and the Twilight of an Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad*, 3.

Algeria had always been seen as a socialist preserve with most governors since 1945 being appointed by the Socialist Party, even when the party was not in power.[165] Ironically for the French Left, the socialist-coalition government at the time increased France's participation in the war and condoned its conduct. It was the coalition government led by Socialist Guy Mollet that sent the large numbers of soldiers to Algeria, sparking the dissent in French society.[166] The Communists and Socialists in particular feared and distrusted the army, playing a huge role in undermining the war effort. This was achieved through sabotage of munitions factories and organizing mass labour disruptions.[167] They openly encouraged conscripts to refuse service in Algeria and, on occasion, supported mutinous actions by soldiers.[168]

While the French Left did their part to erode support of the populace, so too did the left-leaning media. French papers were openly critical of the army, recommending less drastic measures for quelling the insurgency. The paper *Le Monde*, in February, 1957 condoned a general strike organized by the FLN, referring to it as "an essential right in the aggregate of fundamental democratic liberties."[169] Newspapers such as *Le Monde, France-Observateur,* and *Temoinage Chretien* demonized the conduct of the army but

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[165]Galula, *The Pacification of Algeria 1956-1958,* 13.

[166]Merom, *The Social Origins of the French Capitulation in Algeria*, 603.

[167]Walter Schrepel, "Paras and Centurions: Lessons Learned from the Battle of Algiers," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 11, no. 1 (2005): 79.

[168]Michael Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1959), 200. On October 1957 a mutiny occurred when conscripts from the 406th Artillery Regiment refused to load trucks to be taken to fight in Algeria. The soldiers damaged equipment and barracks and refused to comply with orders given by their superiors. The local mayor, a member of the Communist Party, arrived at the barracks encouraging the mutineers to continue with their struggle and continue with their dissent.

[169]Horne, *Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962*, 234.

failed to report on the atrocities committed by the FLN against their own citizens.[170]

The effects of these articles by the left-leaning media further polarized the French

population, deepening the divide over support of the war.

      The left-leaning media's criticism of the war came in forms other than newspaper

articles which had the same detrimental effect. A returning conscript, Jean-Jacques

Servan-Schrieber, published a controversial book, *Lieutenant in Algeria* which

graphically portrayed the abuse perpetrated by the army. Although Servan-Schrieber was

prosecuted as a demoralizer, the book had irreparable effects on the citizens of France.[171]

After the war, General Massu described books such as *Lieutenant in Algeria* as having a

huge demoralizing effect on the population. In his opinion, critical books such as this

were the turning point in maintaining support for the war in metropolitan France.[172]

      As the opening quotation in this section suggests, the war for Algeria was lost

more due to the erosion of support from the citizens of metropolitan France than from

defeat by the FLN. This section studied this phenomenon in greater detail and it was

determined that the government of France lost support for the war due to a severe

polarization of the population. One end of the spectrum was growing weary of the cost

of the war and felt France should focus her efforts at becoming a European power.

Others were appalled at the conduct of the war and the widespread use of violence and

torture to control the Algerian population. This division was amplified by the French

Left and left-leaning media, forming powerful political blocs which had a huge influence

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[170]Galula, *The Pacification of Algeria 1956-1958,* 12.

[171]Horne, *Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962*, 234.

[172]Talbot, *The War Without a Name, France in Algeria, 1954-1962,* 93.

on the population. While the French government expended considerable resources and effort to control and win over the support of the Algerian population, they failed to achieve the same with their own citizens, ultimately causing their defeat in North Africa.

PART 4 -THE NETWORKED NATURE OF THE ALGERIAN INSURGENCY

The ethnic mixture of the population and the location of Algeria meant that it was subject to the influences and pressures of many external sources. Its proximity to Europe and its large white population resulted in influence and control by forces on the continent. At the same time, its large Muslim population and the growing nationalism in Tunisia and Morocco led to an influence from a different source. The rising Arab League and the growing power of President Nasser in Egypt was an additional force that bore down on the country. This section will investigate these influences further in a discussion of the networked nature of Algerian insurgency. As this section will show, the Algerian insurgency was networked on two separate levels: internally and externally. The first part of this section will investigate the internal networks, focusing on insurgent organization, to include the support the FLN received from like-minded nations. This section will also show that the insurgency was externally networked to organizations in France and the remainder of the world, which directly or indirectly provided support for the conflict.

Internal Insurgent Organization

> Above everything else, it is organization that counts. With it you can do everything, without it nothing.[173]

The study of the networked nature of the Algerian insurgency must begin with the insurgents themselves. While many insurrections or revolutions focus on a single leader, the insurgency in Algeria is much more complex, beginning at the tribal level. Algerian society was still very much a patriarchal one, controlling all aspects of family, village and tribal life. Marriages existed for the continuation of the family and for strengthening alliances as opposed to the purpose of increasing personal wealth.   During their rise to power, the FLN had an acute understanding of this social network of family ties and alliances, exploiting it to their advantage.[174] The tribal aspect of the FLN's structure, however, created an aversion to one-man rule, causing dispersed decision making, and rendering rigid organization difficult.[175] While there were key rebel leaders who emerged during the course of the war, command and control of forces on the ground was given to the clan leaders who had joined the FLN. This meant that internal to the conflict, the FLN did not exist as one cohesive, unified pyramid but rather a collection of pyramids, broken down into smaller, loosely connected, semi-independent cells.[176]

For the French government, attacking and destroying this dispersed network was problematic. The cells within the network were too numerous to be defeated and as soon

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[173]Kraft, *The Struggle for Algeria*, 57. Comment made by young nationalist to Kraft during research for the book.

[174]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria,* 96.

[175]Kraft, *The Struggle for Algeria*, 57.

[176]Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the 20th Century*, 238.

as one was eliminated another materialized. Severing these ties was difficult, as no two cells were the same or had similar reporting characteristics.[177]

The large scale military operations launched by the army in an attempt to dismantle these cells, effected the organization of the FLN, causing them to change how they conducted the insurgency. Initially the FLN hoped to reorganize and replace the poorly equipped and dispersed cells with a more conventional organization. The increased pressure of the French military and the failure to gain control over certain areas of the population meant that this was not achievable. By 1956, the FLN realized that they could not attain conventional military parity with the French, further splintering them into smaller factions.[178]

Inadvertently, the French military successes made eliminating the FLN more difficult and failed to eliminate these networked, smaller cells. Instead of dealing with a large nationalist body, they now had to contend with fragments that walked freely among the population and could attack their forces at will. Many of the cells avoided open conflict with the French and any movement of soldiers was reported and passed from one cell to another. French presence was avoided and information regarding troop set up and movement was shared. In other cases, the information passed along through the insurgent network resulted in attacks on French soldiers.[179]

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[177]Jacques Massu, *Vraie Battaille d'Algiers* (Paris: Plon, 1971), 121.

[178]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria,* 174.

[179]O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62*, 51.

External Support from Like-Minded Nations

The Algerian insurgency can be characterized by the influences of networks in the region and support of like-minded neighbours. While the last section investigated the internal networked nature of the insurgency, this section will look at the ties the FLN had to networks in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Egypt. These countries provided an important network of supplies, recruits and nationalistic fervour that were of great significance to the FLN.[180]

The ties to Algeria's like-minded neighbours can be divided into two themes: political and logistical. On the political level, the granting of independence to Tunisia and Morocco meant that Algeria was bordered by two states having a favourable view of the FLN. This was further enhanced by the political support given by President Nasser who decreed on 1 November that "at one o'clock this morning, Algeria began to live a worthy and honourable life."[181] This broadcast was followed by others on Cairo Radio stating that the Arab League, the voice of the Arabs, was pledging full support for the insurgents against French imperialism. Broadcasts on this radio station exceeded the output of all stations in Algeria, making them impossible to be jammed by the French military.[182] As a result, the FLN was able to tie into an external network that promoted pan-Arab nationalism and elimination of French rule.

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[180]The search for external support was not limited to North Africa. Rebel leaders, such as Bella and Boudaif were key factors in this external network, soliciting support for FLN throughout Europe and pushing as far out as Latin America and Damascus in an attempt to drum up support for their cause. Boudaif personally travelled to parts of Europe to supervise the movement supplies and personnel to Algeria.

[181]Arthur Campbell, *Guerrillas* (Liverpool: C. Tingling & Co, Ltd: Liverpool, 1967), 230.

[182]Galula, *The Pacification of Algeria, 1956-1958,* 17.

The open support provided by Algeria's neighbours meant that an external

political network could be established that controlled operations at home. Tunisia

became the strongest supporter of the FLN, the nerve-centre for the insurgency, and a de

facto government in exile. This created an external ad hoc network that remained

relatively untouched, gaining importance in directing the war and becaming the symbol

of the struggle against France.[183] By the end of the war, this government in exile became

the spirit of a free Algeria, consisted of 2000 individuals and conducted the activities of a

nation.[184]

The external network in Tunisia and Morocco not only provided political support,

but was a source of significant logistical aid for the insurgency. After major attacks by

French forces, large numbers of FLN fighters and Algerian refugees sought sanctuary in

Tunisia and Morocco, forming large external support bases. What began as a

rudimentary supply system grew to an elaborate one, with large support depots in Egypt,

Libya, through Tunisia, and across the Algerian border. While many shipments were

intercepted, others reached the FLN, justifying the risks associated with such a

network.[185]

The existence of large external support bases represented a significant problem

for the French. In one region, there existed a force of 3000 across the border in Morocco

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[183]Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria,* 34. A similar ad hoc network was created in Cairo to support the war from Egypt where the overt support provided by Nasser was a source of inspiration for the FLN. It tied the FLN to a network of financial support provided by the Arab League. While Egypt provided support for the FLN, the issue was soon eclipsed by the Suez Crisis and FLN leaders were forced to concentrate other areas to stage operations.

[184]*Ibid., 127-128.* In Tunisia, the Gouverneument Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (GPRA) engaged those activities associated with ruling a nation such as defence, finance and social services as well as engaging in peace negotiations with France.

[185]Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 117.

that was able to cross into Algeria, hit government forces and then withdraw.[186] This

lead the French to construct, at great cost, a large scale, heavily defended fence along the

borders with Tunisia and Morocco to cut off the FLN's supply network. The Morice

Line, as it was called, was relatively successful. In 1957, 5000 men a week were able to

pass into Algeria. By May of that same year, the number had dropped to 1200 men, at a

cost of 700 FLN deaths. By 1960 the number had dwindled to only 40 men.[187]

        While the construction of the border fences reduced the flow of men and supplies

into Algeria, it also had an adverse effect. Due to the large French presence on the

border, the men and materiel travelling into Algeria were broken up into small cells that

were easily dispersed and difficult to track.[188] The French attempts at severing the

supply lines had caused the FLN to break into much smaller groups that were harder to

target and eliminate. While the Morice Line had tactical success, it inadvertently

dissipated the FLN ties to an external network, making the army's task more difficult.

External Networks of the Insurgency

        Having discussed the networked nature of the Algerian insurgency by looking at

the FLN's organization and the support they received from their neighbours, this section

will examine their ties to external networks in metropolitan France. The FLN's ties to

these networks can be investigated along two different lines: first, the role in which

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[186]O' Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-1962,* 48.

[187]Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria,* 35.

[188]*Ibid*., 49.

French Muslims played in France and Europe; second, by the role that the network of French academics, intelligencia and anti-war groups played in influencing the war. While these two networks were not directly connected, together, they offered the FLN an important external support base which greatly affected the manner in which the French government was able to execute the war.

The Soummam Conference, 1956

The basis for the FLN tying into a network of French Muslims and French academics can be traced back to the main principles of the revolution that materialized after the Soummam Conference. The clandestine conference was held on 20 August, 1956, in Algeria, having arms, recruitment and legitimacy of the FLN as its main themes.[189] The conference established four general goals for the revolution: to gain support of Muslims in and out of Algeria; to isolate and weaken the French in Algeria; to impress the struggle on metropolitan France and obtain support from its liberal elements; and to make the conflict an international issue.[190] Two principle goals of the conference focused the FLN's efforts on tapping into an extensive network of external resources to further their cause.

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[189]Kraft, *The Struggle for Algeria, 77*. The Soummam Conference can also be considered as a propaganda success as it was held clandestinely within Algeria under the noses of French authorities.

[190]Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962*, 37.

Network of Muslims in France

France had conquered Algeria and her neighbours in the early 1800s and had invested significantly in all of North Africa. As well, France had significant interests in central Africa which also had a large Muslim population. After more than a century of direct influence in Africa, there had been a migration of Muslims to France to support French industry. During the time of the rebellion, it is estimated that there were over 500,000 Algerians living and working in France, representing an external source of funds, equipment, and recruits.[191]

To manage the support provided by the network of French Muslims, the FLN established *La Federation de France*. Although innocent sounding, *La Federation de France* used similar tactics to those used in Algeria to collect funds, coerce support and eliminate informers.[192] French Muslim business owners and merchants were important nodes in this network. Through their ties to the Muslim community, they served an important intelligence function for *La Federation de France* as a conduit for information between Algeria and France. They were an important source of funds, funnelling money from sympathizers as well as deducting dues from the wages of their employees to support the FLN.[193] The *La Federation de France* leveraged the fact that, in France, authorities were not able to fight the same kind of campaign as in Algeria. Restraint was

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[191]*Ibid.*, 45. There was also a large Algerian population in Belgium, Spain and other parts of Europe that were also sympathetic to the FLN's cause, providing support to the insurgents.

[192]Horne, *Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962*, 236

[193]Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962*, 45.

required by the authorities, while the FLN could continue with an unabated crusade of terror and violence.[194]

The Network of French Intellectuals and Academics

As seen previously in this chapter, the war in Algeria was supported by elements of the French Left. Following the Soummam Conference, the FLN began to associate with the socialist movement and the highly organized French Communist Party. While support was left-leaning, the FLN was not fighting a communist based insurgency and its leaders were not influenced by communism.[195] However, there existed other organizations, which supported the FLN outside main communist or socialist streams. These consisted of French academics, intellectuals and the clergy who built up a substantial support network that actively opposed government policy in Algeria, while at the same time supported the FLN.

Manifesto 121, the Jeanson Network and the Catholic Church

The first of these organizations was a group of school teachers, professors, writers and artists. They made a declaration referred to as *Manifesto 121*, calling for an end to

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[194]Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 51.

[195]*Ibid*., 88. This is not to say that the FLN did not enjoy support provided by both Communist China and the Soviet Bloc. They were triumphantly received in Peking in 1958 and in Moscow in 1960.

the war and negotiations with the FLN without any pre-conditions.[196] This was a

conscious effort by *Manifesto 121* to live up to their self-proclaimed tradition of protest

and to defend the liberal principles on which they based their lives. The war had

degenerated such that the traditional obligations of members of the state no longer

applied. They considered it the duty of all well-educated citizens to give aid and comfort

to Algerians who had been oppressed in the name of France.[197] While *Manifesto 121*

never appeared in any major journal, it showed the growing network of support for the

FLN cause and the prominence of dissenters in France.

　　During the same time that the *Manifesto 121* network was discovered, another

FLN support network materialized. In 1960, police discovered a network founded by

philosopher Francis Jeanson operating out of Switzerland. He had become disillusioned

with fellow French revolutionaries and began to idolize the FLN. The *Jeanson Network*,

as it was known, was motivated by the shameful conduct of security forces, and worked

at generating funds and assisting those who opposed the war. In Jeanson's view,

assisting the FLN did not mean participating in killing fellow French citizens. Moreover,

he felt it was better to "be an active accomplice in a just cause than to be an active

accomplice in genocide."[198] In little time, the network was able to transfer more than

300,000 pounds sterling a month to the FLN as well as assisting over 3000 deserters.[199]

The same time that investigations into the *Jeanson Network* were conducted, police

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[196]O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62,* 158. It was referred to as Manifesto 121 as it was signed by 121 academics and individuals. While definitely left-leaning, they were independent from the Socialist or Communist Parties.

[197]Talbot, *The War Without a Name, France in Algeria, 1954-1962*, 171-172.

[198]*Ibid*., 167.

[199]O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62,* 159.

uncovered three additional groups with the sole purpose of supporting deserters and helping the FLN.

A third group that was extremely vocal in their anti-war sentiment was the French Catholic Church. Unlike some opposition networks that worked clandestinely, French Catholics openly criticized the war at its early stages, were sympathetic to the FLN, and were generally opposed to colonial expansion.[200] They were particularly vocal when the allegations of abuse and torture became more and more prevalent. Sympathy reached its peak in 1960 when the Assembly of French Cardinals and Bishops issued a powerful statement on Algeria. The Assembly disapproved of the conduct of the army and emphasized to all Catholics that any order of this nature should be disobeyed.[201] The Catholic Church was never directly connected to the FLN, nor did they provide material support like the *Jeanson Network*. What they did do, however, was to provide a network of sympathy and moral support to the FLN through their condemnation of French conduct. The moral support provided by the Church had the same effect on undermining the support of metropolitan France as did the movement of funds and materiel in other networks.

Examining the Effects

The study of the *Manifesto 121, The Jeanson Network* and the Catholic Church opinion identifies a different aspect of the networked nature of the Algerian insurgency.

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[200]Merom, *The Social Origins of the French Capitulation in Algeria,* 616.

[201]O' Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62*, 158.

These networks were completely separate, working independently, and connected only by a cause. There was no central leader or governing body coordinating or directing their actions that was directly responsive the FLN. *Manifesto 121* consisted of a number of academics who opposed the government and wanted an end to the war. It provided an intellectual support base for the FLN but most, if not all, of its members had never actually met or been actively involved with the FLN.[202] Similarly, the *Jeanson Network* operated clandestinely in France for over three years without ever receiving pay or direct orders from the FLN.[203] Although supporting the insurgents, the *Jeanson Network* existed separately from the FLN, having its own nodes and links, but no direct tie to what was perceived to be its unifying purpose. These networks represent the effects that a third party has in an insurgency: they had the ability to distract the French government while serving as a partner for the FLN and changing the basic dynamic and structure of the conflict.[204] Support and influence for the Algerian war flowed across these separate networks due to their sympathy for the FLN despite their lack of direct interaction with each other or the FLN.[205] These examples illustrate how external independent networks, working in parallel to the insurgent cause, and without face-to-face interaction, can have an effect on the outcome without ever being directly linked or connected to it.

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[202]Talbot, *The War Without a Name, France in Algeria, 1954-196*, 172.

[203]Horne, *Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962*, 238.

[204]Metz, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*, 15.

[205]Ansell, *Symbolic Networks: The Realignment of the French Working Class, 1887-1894*, 363.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The war in Algeria represents a divisive period in the history of France and its decline as a colonial power. It was a time when France, already shaken by the defeats in the Second World War and Dien Bien Phu, was desperate to retain one of the jewels in its colonial empire. As a result, they resorted to any means necessary to solidify their hold on Algeria. In the end, the war polarized the citizens of France and brought the demise of the Fourth Republic.

In examining the Algerian war, this case study sought to verify the enduring characteristics of an insurgency as identified in Chapter 1. The Algerian war was shown as complex with both state and non-state actors influencing the outcome. It was revealed that the support of the population remains critical for both parties involved in the conflict. In this case, the FLN rose among nationalist groups to become the main rebel force. Its movement began by building up grass-roots support for their cause among the undecided Algerian peasantry. By using ideological teachings, feelings of pan-Arab nationalism, violence and coercion, the FLN gained influence over the Muslim population. Similarly, French authorities resorted to torture and oppression as a method of quelling and dominating the insurgents. In doing so, the French government lost the war due to a loss of popular support in France. One may conclude from this that, in the case of an expeditionary insurgency, support of the non-indigenous population is equally as important as the support of the people directly affected by the insurgency.

The internal organization and the support received from neighbouring countries and in Europe gives credibility to the other enduring tenet developed in Chapter 1, that

insurgencies are inherently networked. The FLN enjoyed a vast support network from like-minded countries across North Africa which provided much needed weapons and recruits for their cause. At the same time, the FLN was supported externally from independent networks in France. In investigating the networked aspects of this case study, the Algerian war showed that independent networks, with separate links and control structures, have an effect on an insurgency, even when they are physically separated and not in direct contact with each other.

CHAPTER 3 – EXAMINING THE LESSONS FROM ALGERIA

Studying the Algerian conflict has proven the validity of the enduring tenets of an insurgency that were identified in Chapter 1. This case study also identified some key lessons regarding the loss of the war by security forces despite their ability to achieve success on the ground. This chapter will identify these lessons and, through the use of examples, project them forward to present day to offer guidance on how to tackle the complex issues of an insurgency and avoid the mistakes of predecessors. Discussion will focus on the need for a coordinated civilian-military approach in a modern context, a concept that was lacking in Algeria. This coordinated approach will alleviate the perceived imbalance in the social order, increase popular support, improve the legitimacy of the government, and dismantle insurgent networks. Discussion of lessons from the Algerian conflict would not be complete without addressing the effects of the domestic population on the outcome of an insurgency.

A COORDINATED APPROACH

To be successful in dealing with insurgents, government forces must adopt a coordinated approach to manage the conflict. The military should not be allowed free reign in the direction of the conduct of the operation. In Algeria, absolute control for quelling the insurrection was handed over to General Massu. His concerns were military in nature and focused on improving the security situation. While reconstruction-type

activities were conducted, they were controlled by the army and concentrated on gaining

information on the FLN rather than improving the quality of life of the peasants.[206]

In tackling an insurgency, it is paramount that direction of the counter-insurgency

remains under civilian control and a national strategy is developed to ensure

harmonization of effort, and guide military leaders and policy planners. As such, there

will be no dissonance between actions taken by troops in the field and direction by

national leaders.[207] Government forces must be vested with the power to formulate this

national policy into direction, controlling economic, social and military efforts in such a

manner that success can realistically be achieved. British successes in counter

insurgencies recognized the interdependence of these elements, uniting them into one

civilian command that developed a plan and allocated resources effectively.[208] This

unified command will lead to proactively addressing socio-economic concerns of the

populace, leaving the insurgent without a cause to exploit.[209]

In implementing this coordinated approach, the government must adhere to the

rule of law in order to maintain its legitimacy. Theorist Frank Kitson in *Bunches of Five*

stressed that no government will be successful in combating an insurgency unless the rule

of law is strictly adhered to.[210] In the case of Algeria, the army sank to a level of

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[206]Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 44.

[207]Colonel Craig Hilton, "Shaping Commitment: Resolving Canada's Strategy Gap in Afghanistan and Beyond," (Carlisle, PA, United States Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2007), 5.

[208]Cassidy, *The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture,* 56.

[209]Robert Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Parameters* 34, no.1 (Spring 2004): 22-23.

[210]Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, 289.

brutality that was outside the law yet was condoned by their government. Francois

Mitterrand, the Minister of Justice, was fully aware of the methods used by the army,

employing representatives to oversee their actions and was provided regular reports.[211]

Holding security forces accountable ensures that the state retains its legitimacy and is

essential for maintaining the public's mandate to conduct counter-insurgency

operations.[212]

A more modern application of this lesson can be found in an examination of

Canada's participation in Afghanistan. The Independent Panel on Afghanistan, after

studying Canada's role in that insurgency, advocated the military-civilian coordinated

approach. This would begin at the national-strategic level, with the appointment of a

high-level civilian representative of the Secretary-General who would ensure coherence

of international effort.[213] A similar report also recommended the appointment of a senior

civilian to Kandahar as a counterpart to the military commander, through which Canadian

economic, social and political efforts could be directed.[214] Civilian control will ensure

the legitimacy of the coalition and that Canada's efforts to address the root causes of the

insurgency are coordinated.

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[211] Paul Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria 1955-1957* (New York: Enigma Books, 2002),128.

[212]James Campbell, "French Algeria and British Northern Ireland: Legitimacy and the Rule of Law in Low-Intensity Conflict," *Military Review* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2005): 5.

[213]*Report of Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan,* The Honourable John Manley, Chairman (Ottawa, ON: Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 37. This report is more commonly referred to as The Manley Report and will be referred to in this manner.

[214]Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, *How Are We Doing in Afghanistan? Canadians Need to Know* (Ottawa, ON: Parliamentary Publishing Directorate, 2008), 94.

CONTENDING WITH NETWORKS

In order to isolate the insurgents, it is imperative that they are separated from internal and external support bases. The transnational nature of these networks requires a variety of political and social measures that vary depending on location. This will involve a global orientation with the ability to apply all elements of the state, relying on multilateral cooperation in dealing with networks which spread across multiple borders.[215] The Algerian conflict is representative of this, with moral and logistical support provided through a number of diverse networks, many of whom were not in contact with each other, or responsive to any central controlling body.

In order to contend with these networks, governments must have a clear picture of the nature of the external support provided to determine the best approach required to sever the links. This requires a system that accounts for every citizen and the designation of pro-government village chiefs who monitor activities of insurgent sympathisers. Success will depend heavily on the cooperation between civic leaders and the intelligence and security forces involved.[216] The French implemented this process through a combination of the *quadrillage* system, extensive use of human sources, and torture to acquire intelligence to dismantle FLN networks in Algeria.

Breaking external ties can also be attained without the use of kinetic action but instead through the use of diplomacy or other political means. This can be accomplished by economic or political sanctions against the nation supporting the insurgents, drawing

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[215]Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 188.

[216]*Ibid.,* 160.

the attention, and ire, of the international community. This will convince the supporting nation that it is not in their best interest to continue, while creating distrust between the insurgent and their supporters.[217]

To counter the support provided to the FLN by other Arab states, the army constructed defences along the border to sever these supply links. These logistical networks were disconnected but the French were never able to break the ideological network of support provided by Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. Instead, French authorities choose to portray the external elements of the FLN as living extravagantly in Tunis or Cairo while the average insurgent lived a risk-filled existence.[218]

The dismantling of insurgent networks from the Canadian experience in Afghanistan involves the Taliban, who are perceived to be supported by a logistical and ideological system connected to Pakistan. In looking at the mission, the Manley Report recommended that forceful diplomatic pressure be placed on Pakistan to cease supporting the insurgents and prevent the further erosion of regional stability.[219] Pakistan, it was felt, needs to take some responsibility for the war being orchestrated, trained, and financed from the relative comfort inside its borders.[220] Breaking this connection to an external network isolates the Taliban from its support bases, further eroding its potency and legitimacy with the population of Afghanistan.

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[217]Colin Gray, "How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?" *Parameters* 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 23.

[218]Galula, *The Pacification of Algeria 1956-1958*, 17.

[219]*Report of Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, 37.

[220]Janice Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto: Penguin Books Ltd., 2007), 295.

THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE POPULATION

The battle for the control of the population will be a constant struggle for both the insurgent and government forces in order to impose their will. Government forces must understand the cause of the insurgent, and institute reforms that address any social imbalance in the country. Conversely, insurgents must do the same, basing their legitimacy on their ability to improve the conditions of the oppressed. Should the insurgency be beyond the ability of the government to control, then other nations may join in to assist. The supporting nation's domestic population should now be considered as a centre of gravity in the insurgency, resulting in added competition to gain their sympathy by both sides.

The task for the supporting nation to maintain the backing of the domestic population is daunting. Governments aiding counter-insurgencies must strive to explain the requirement and legitimacy of the campaign to their public, particularly when the anticipated involvement will be lengthy and costly. Convincing the domestic population will be difficult in cases when involvement is perceived to be of questionable value and not necessarily in the national interest.[221]

Insurgents will also target the domestic population of the supporting nation to undermine their will and potentially force a withdrawal of support. Insurgents will do this directly by targeting those elements of the domestic population who are vocal in their lack of support for the mission and may have emotional, and at times, naïve

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[221]Bernd Horn, "Full Spectrum Leadership Challenges in Afghanistan," In *The Buck Stops Here: Senior Commanders on Operations*, edited by Colonel Bernd Horn, 191-209 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), 207.

understanding of what the insurgents hope to achieve and what is in the national interest.[222]

The Algerian conflict is an example of the competition between centres of gravity of both the people of Algeria and the citizens in France. The French spent significant effort to isolate the insurgents from Muslims, but in the end, it was their domestic population who lost support for the war, resulting in France's eventual defeat. As well as raising the financial and social cost of the war to untenable level[223], the FLN exploited anti-war and anti-government organizations in metropolitan France in an effort to undermine French efforts in Algeria. Many of these organizations opposing the war were in fact completely disconnected from the FLN, but figured prominently in supporting the insurgent cause and influencing the decline of the support in metropolitan France.

Modern insurgencies frequently involve many supporting nations who are susceptible to the challenges of maintaining the approval of their domestic populations. As a result of the Vietnam War, former American Secretary of Defence Weinberger outlined broad public support as one of his preconditions before he would ever consider committing troops to a conflict.[224] Regarding the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan, Canada is not immune to the consequence that domestic support has on the mission and how difficult it is to maintain. To determine Canada's future in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Stephen Harper made it clear that he would seek strong domestic support before

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[222]*Ibid*., 207-208.

[223]George Kelly, *Lost Soldiers,* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), 168-169, cited in Eric Ouellet and Pierre Pahlavi, *Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare: A Case Study of the French Army in Algeria, 1954-1960* (Toronto, ON: Canadian Forces College, 2009), 4.

[224]Bruce Fleming, "Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?" *Parameters* 34, no.1 (Spring 2004): 62.

considering further commitment and that all parties agreed on Canada's national objectives.[225] This stance was echoed by the Manley Report that predicted Canada's resources and patience for the war were limited. The report recommended that the government strive to ensure that Canadians are provided with an update on Canada's performance and given an assessment on how national objectives are being met.[226]

Like France in 1960, Canada, in present day, is not immune to the effects the political left and anti-war organizations have on undermining domestic support for an overseas counter-insurgency. The New Democratic Party (NDP) has never been a strong supporter of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan and made it a key issue in their 2008 General Election campaign. They advocate a withdrawal from Afghanistan and negotiations with the Taliban, rather than combat operations, in an attempt to determine a peaceful solution to the conflict.[227] Like their counter-parts in France, the NDP do not have any actual ideological, emotional, or even physical link to the insurgents in Afghanistan yet have worked independently in achieving the aim of undermining the support of the Canadian population for continued participation in the conflict.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The case study of the Algerian insurgency provides many lessons on the complexities and challenges of this form of warfare. It is a type of warfare that does not

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[225]Gloria Galloway and Ingrid Peritz, "Troops Wont Stay Unless All Parties Agree," *The Globe and Mail*, 23 June 2007, A1.

[226]*Report of Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, 37-38.

[227]New Democratic Party of Canada, "Canada's Next Steps in Afghanistan," http://www.ndp.ca/press/canadas-next-steps-in-afghanistan; Internet; accessed 28 March 2009.

have a pure military solution. The violent nature of the insurgents requires a solution that is not purely socio-economic and uses military action where required. Governments must develop a comprehensive civil-military approach to undermine the insurgent rhetoric of improved security and social standing. Modern counter-insurgency forces are faced with two distinct centres of gravity: the indigenous population where the reforms are instituted as well as the domestic population of those nations combating the insurgents. Projecting these lessons forward to Canada's role in combating the insurgency in Afghanistan, it was revealed that the hard-learned lessons from Algeria are being implemented. As insurgencies become more coalition-based and supporting nations join other counter-insurgency forces, applying these lessons will take on increasing prominence.

CONCLUSION

Insurgencies are complex problems with economic, political, and social factors. The dynamics among these factors are deep and complicated. At one end of the spectrum are government forces trying to maintain law, order and good governance. Opposing them are the insurgents who object to the government's rule and are pushing for a change to the social order to correct the socio-economic imbalances which exist. Each side struggles for legitimacy by attempting to convince the population that they are best suited as representatives and basic need providers. Their legitimacy can only be maintained by ousting the other party. Understanding the need for a change in the social order is crucial for government forces if they are to understand the root cause of the conflict, institute reforms, and decrease the legitimacy of the insurgent.

This paper examined the deep dynamics of insurgencies in greater detail by first examining the works of prominent theorists to understand the basic characteristics and causes of an insurgency. After a resurgence of this form of warfare since the end of the Cold War, these theorists reveal that there are some enduring tenets that will remain unchanged. An insurgency is about achieving the control of the population and is tied to legitimacy and changing the social order. Both forces embark on a struggle in which the indigenous population becomes the battle ground. Actions taken are as much about defeating their opponent as they are about fostering support of the populace. The theoretical examination of insurgencies also revealed that they are networked in nature. Clan and tribal based organizations with decentralized control have existed for centuries. This tenet has been greatly enabled by globalization and the information age in which

information can be passed more rapidly across a loosely connected network with artificially created borders.

The enduring tenets were shown to be valid through the use of a case study of the Algerian insurgency and revealed the deep division between the Europeans and the FLN. Spurned on by growing pan-Arab nationalism, the FLN sought to change the social order by convincing the Muslim population that they were the only force capable of eliminating French repression and injustice. Both sides embarked on a campaign to influence the population through the use of violence, torture and coercion. The FLN also enjoyed a network of support from neighbouring countries, Muslims in Europe, and anti-war Europeans, which provided funding and safe havens of operation.

While the French were successful at suppressing the FLN, ultimately they failed to retain Algeria as a part of France. This was caused by a decline in support for the French government by the citizens of metropolitan France. The French populace was deeply divided over the brutal and oppressive methods used by the army and the increasing cost of the war. The loss of support brought about the end of the Fourth Republic which eventually led to Algeria being granted independence in 1962.

The case study revealed two separate effects that must be considered in an insurgency. The first is that the domestic population, as much as the indigenous one, must be considered as a centre of gravity. As France discovered, as soon as they lost the support of their own citizens, the loss of the war was inevitable. As modern insurgencies become coalitions of nations, the support of these domestic populations will become an ever increasing issue, as seen by Spain's withdrawal from Iraq. The second effect revealed was the influence of disconnected third parties. The FLN were supported by

academics, socialists, anti-war Catholics, and the left-leaning media, many of whom were not in direct contact with the FLN nor directly controlled by a central FLN military-political structure guiding their actions.

The case study of Algeria validates the enduring tenets of an insurgency but is primarily an example the maintenance of an empire by a European power.   Most examples of insurgencies occurring since the end of the Second World War have been part of a process of decolonization involving a dominant European power. Further study into an insurgency not involving the demise of an empire of a European power will enhance the validity of the enduring tenets identified. The examination of an insurgency prior to the Second World War, before globalization and the information age, will further enhance the notion that insurgencies have always been inherently networked.

An insurgency is a complex problem with no purely military or purely political-economic solution. With the growing divide between have and have-not nations, it is a form of warfare that will become increasingly common. By understanding the enduring tenets of an insurgency and through an examination of the past, a government can be prepared for the future.

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