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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 35 / PCEMI 35

EXERCISE/EXERCICE MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES

**Coming Alongside:**

**An Analysis of Canada's Maritime Involvement in the Asia-Pacific Region**

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**Coming Alongside:  
An Analysis of Canada's Maritime Involvement in the Asia-Pacific Region**

**ABSTRACT**

The Asia-Pacific region is experiencing exponential economic growth and an increase in military expenditures far exceeding that of any other region in the world. Approximately 90% of the world's shipping trade is fostered in Asia-Pacific waters. Therefore, ensuring the free flow of goods through the Asia-Pacific is crucial to global economic interests. However, the Asia-Pacific is a tumultuous region, with many potential threats to its security.

Canada, as a middle power and a nation heavily reliant on trade, is particularly sensitive to the Asia-Pacific region's continued security and stability. The overall protection of the global economy is extremely important to Canada's strategic interests. At the forefront of Canada's involvement in the Asia-Pacific region is the Canadian Navy. With its technological capabilities, peacekeeping skills and coalition work, the Canadian Navy has much to offer in ensuring peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

This paper focuses on Canada's maritime role in the Asia-Pacific region and how the Canadian Navy can contribute meaningfully to global and Asia-Pacific security.



Whoever commands the sea,  
commands the trade;  
whosever commands the trade of the world  
commands the riches of the world,  
and consequently the world itself.<sup>1</sup>

Sir Walter Raleigh

## INTRODUCTION

In the new world order established since the Cold War, a major shift from a Euro-Atlantic dominated international system to an Asia-Pacific centric world has taken place. The Asia-Pacific region has become the centre for economic power and world trade as Asian economies have grown at an astounding rate compared to that of the West. This level of economic growth has led to an expansion of military procurement, increased competition for resources and elevated levels of regional tension, all which pose potential threats to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

In this age of globalization, any change to the economy or security of the Asia-Pacific region has a profound impact on the global economy. Approximately ninety percent of the world's shipping trade is fostered in Asia-Pacific waters.<sup>2</sup> The Directorate of Future Security Analysis (DFSA) outlined that “. . . ensuring the security of the world's oceans will be paramount in the future security environment since 90% of the world's trade is conducted by water and 80% of the world's urban centres are located in

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<sup>1</sup>GIGA Quotes, “Sir Walter Raleigh,” [http://www.giga-usa.com/quotes/authors/walter\\_raleigh\\_1\\_a003.htm](http://www.giga-usa.com/quotes/authors/walter_raleigh_1_a003.htm); Internet; accessed 19 April 2009.

<sup>2</sup>Karsten von Hoesslin, “The Implications of Illegal Maritime Activities for Canadian Security and Methods of Enhancing Surveillance and Monitoring in East Asian and North Pacific Waters,” *Centre for Military & Strategic Studies/University of Calgary*; available from <http://www.cdai-cdai.ca/symposia/2003/hoesslin.htm>; Internet; accessed 03 March 2009.



the littoral.”<sup>3</sup> Therefore, maritime security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region are crucial factors to global economic stability and security. However, Asia-Pacific is a region of strategic turbulence, with illegal maritime activities such as piracy, drug and human smuggling, small arms trafficking, and terrorism all presenting security challenges. Issues such as exclusive economic zones, maritime boundary disputes and the naval arms race also threaten the overall security of the region. The regional security paradigm is no longer solely determined by military strength, but by “. . . politics, economics, environment, culture and social factors.”<sup>4</sup>

Though several thousand kilometres away, Canada’s economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region have been well documented. Canada is a middle power bordered by three oceans with the longest coastline of any nation in the world and limited resources to manage it. Historically, Canada has predominantly focused its strategic intentions over the Atlantic to the east, and the Arctic to the north. During the period from 1910 to 1947, the Canadian Navy focused its attention on national security and Imperial defence requirements. In the Cold War Period (1947 to 1989) Canada’s role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) framework was the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) mission.<sup>5</sup> To the north, the Arctic Ocean has always been an area of strategic concern for Canadians and with the advancing of global warming, the shrinking

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<sup>3</sup>Directorate of Future Security Analysis (DFSA) research proposal presented to CFC JCSP 35, 08 September 2008.

<sup>4</sup>Joe Varner, “Canada and the Emerging Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma,” *Conference of Defence Associations Institute: First Annual Graduate Student Symposium* (13-14 November 1998); available from <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/1998/98varner.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 February 2009.

<sup>5</sup>Peter T. Haydon, “Why Does Canada Still Need a Navy,” Maritime Security Working Paper No. 1 – 2007 (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2007), 8-9.

of the Arctic ice-cap and the opening of Arctic sea routes to year round traffic, the question of Arctic sovereignty has become a priority of the current Canadian government.<sup>6</sup> However, Canada has been slow to foster relationships across the Pacific and Canada's involvement in the Asia-Pacific region has been sporadic. Globally, the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly important for trade, immigration influx, growing political power and related security concerns, all of which have an impact on Canadian strategic interests.

This paper focuses on Canada's maritime role in the Asia-Pacific region and how the Canadian Navy can contribute meaningfully to global and Asia-Pacific security. The study begins with an exploration of the key strategic issues in the Asia-Pacific region with specific attention on recent developments in the current security and defence atmosphere. Next, Canada's national and strategic interests in the area and this country's ties to the region are outlined as well as the defence relationship and security implications between Canada and Asia-Pacific countries. Canada's foreign policy and Asia-Pacific policy is discussed. This is followed by an overview of the navy's role as an instrument of foreign policy. The Canadian Navy's past and current role in the Asia-Pacific region is explored. Next, the Canadian Navy's defence and security involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, including Canada's participation in maritime deployments and multilateral and bilateral exercises as well as high level conferences is reviewed. Lastly, the challenges and opportunities for the Canadian Navy to build bilateral and multilateral ties and support peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region are explored.

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<sup>6</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence. *2008 Canada First Defence Strategy*. available from [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/first/June18\\_0910\\_CFDS\\_english\\_low-res.pdf](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/first/June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf); Internet; accessed 21 October 2008.



## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

It has been well established that the Asia-Pacific region has become the centre for economic power and world trade as Asian economies have grown at an astounding rate compared to that of the West. Approximately 90% of the world's trade is conducted by water and 80% of the world's urban centres are located in the littoral. Roughly 90% of the world's shipping trade is fostered in Asia-Pacific waters.<sup>7</sup> The amount of the world's economy linked to the maritime traffic transiting through the Asia-Pacific is staggering. In this region, the world trade volume has tripled and global container traffic increased by 366% since 1990.<sup>8</sup> Many countries are linked by the world's global supply chain from the origin of raw resources, the manufacturing centres, the importing and exporting of goods, warehousing, transportation and finally distribution centres for consumers. This long supply chain makes for a lucrative target for terrorist or organized criminal activity. For example, in 2007, only 5-6% of all containers were screened. An economic impact study commissioned by Singapore in 2006 described a hypothetical situation whereby US ports were shut down for 30 days. The study found that such a shutdown of the US ports would cost the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) approximately \$137 billion

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<sup>7</sup>von Hoesslin, "The Implications of Illegal Maritime Activities for Canadian Security...".

<sup>8</sup>National Security Coordination Secretariat, "Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO) 14-20 January 2007," [http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publications/conference\\_reports/APPSNO\\_Conf\\_Report.pdf](http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publications/conference_reports/APPSNO_Conf_Report.pdf); Internet; accessed 27 January 2009.

(USD) in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The author of the report highlighted the requirement for international co-operation to ensure a holistic approach to the security of this transportation line. Due to the globalization of the world's economy, each nation has a stake in protecting this supply chain and should share in the cost of the necessary security measures.<sup>9</sup>

In the New Maritime Strategy, jointly signed by the United States Coast Guard, United States Navy and the United States Marines, Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant US Coast Guard stated, "Keeping the seas safe and secure from a broad range of threats and hazards is in everyone's best interest. The key to global prosperity and security is through cooperation and coordination."<sup>10</sup> The challenges facing the Asia-Pacific maritime environment are not new, but have been amplified by explosive economic growth, the tremendous diversity of the region, strategic rivalries, competing national interests, rising nationalism, and trans-national security challenges.

## **THREATS TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

In order to better understand the rationale behind Canada's interests in the security and defence relationships in the Asia-Pacific, it is important to gain an appreciation of the complexities of the threats to the overall stability of the region and the maritime environment. Numerous organizations focus on identifying, studying and working to resolve the various security issues facing the collective states within the Asia-

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<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>United States Navy, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower," <http://www.navy.mil/maritime>; Internet; accessed 07 March 2009.

Pacific region.<sup>11</sup> The majority of the centres have identified similar broad threats to the overall stability and security of the region. These threats include terrorism, piracy, and international crime such as transporting illegal drugs, humans, and weapons, internal instability, national conflict, global warming/environmental factors, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>12</sup>

## **Terrorism**

Currently, the United States is conducting the Global War on Terror (GWOT), or what is now referred to as the Long War.<sup>13</sup> Terrorism is viewed amongst security analysts as the number one security concern in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>14</sup> A rise in

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<sup>11</sup>Major Organizations: East-West Center, The Maritime Security Programme (MSP), The Asia-Pacific Security Seminar, the Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO), the S. Rajaratnam Schools of International Studies, the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific, the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Jakarta, the Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, the Center for naval Analyses, United States, the Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, United States, COMLONGWESTPAC, the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Republic of Korea (IFANS), the Japan International Transport Institute (JITI), the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), the Maritime Intelligence Group, Washington D.C. (MIG) the National Defense University, People's Republic of China, the National Institute of Defence Studies, Japan (NIDS), the national Maritime Foundation, New Delhi (NMF), the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the Norwegian School of Management, the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi (ORF), the Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Japan (OPRF), the Okazaki Institute, Japan, the RAN Sea Power Centre (SPC-A), the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), and the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Maritime Security, accessed from [http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/Asia\\_Pacific.html](http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/Asia_Pacific.html); accessed 02 March 2009.

<sup>12</sup>VAdm Mihir Roy, "Maritime Security in South West Asia," Institute for International Policy Studies; available from <http://www.iips.org/Roy-paper.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2009.

<sup>13</sup>Naval War College, "Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/academics/courses/nsdm/documents/RugerPaper2Web.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2009.

<sup>14</sup>Richard W. Baker and Galen W. Fox, *Asia Pacific Security Survey 2008, East-West Center 2008*, available from <http://EastWestCenter.org>; Internet, accessed 16 February 2009.

terrorist attacks in the region has increased tensions and further amplified the risk to regional security. Examples of such terrorist activities include:<sup>15</sup>

. . . terrorist attacks against the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the killing of French technicians in May 2002, targeting the American Consulate in June 2002, and coordinated attacks against 21 petrol pumps in June 2003 in Karachi, Pakistan, suicide attacks in Bali in Indonesia in October 2002 and 2005, the bombing of the Marriot Hotel in August 2003 and of the Australian embassy in September 2004 in Jakarta, Indonesia, and the explosion in Super Ferry 14 in the Philippines in February 2004.

In January 2007, Professor Rohan Gunaratna lectured on the evolving threats of terrorism in the region and how terrorism is no longer limited to a local area.<sup>16</sup> The promotion of a global Jihad by Al Qaeda has resulted in various terrorist organizations supporting the widening of Al Qaeda's influence and increased support. He identified that ideological extremism was the actual threat and the sources of terrorism within the region were Al Qaeda operatives, fundamentalist groups in Southeast Asia associated with Al Qaeda, and home-grown Al Qaeda inspired cells. He also discussed the crucial role played by the US and Australian forces in the disruption of terrorist activities through “. . . enhanced communications, analysis, and training and equipping special operations forces (SOF).”<sup>17</sup> Gunaratna concluded by observing that poor legal enforcement in combating terrorism has allowed it to grow in Eastern Indonesia and the

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<sup>15</sup>Arabinda Acharya, “India and Southeast Asia in the Age of Terror: Building Partnerships for Peace,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 28, no. 2 (August 2006): 297-322; <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1154204231&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1240397028&clientId=1711>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2009.

<sup>16</sup>National Security Coordination Secretariat, “Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers . . .”.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*

Philippines, creating a place for groups like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to operate.

## **Piracy**

Piracy has historically been a concern for mariners. In Southeast Asia, spikes in piracy activity have occurred over the past 10 years. In 1999, approximately two-thirds of all piracy attacks occurred in Asia, and almost half in Indonesian waters.<sup>18</sup> In January, 2009, the ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) released its' annual report. Although the numbers for piracy in the Asia-Pacific region were lower than in previous years, the overall number of incidents of pirate activity was the highest at 293 since the Centre began collecting data in 1992. Indonesia, Strait of Malacca and Bangladesh all showed decreases due to increased vigilance by shipmasters and maritime security forces.<sup>19</sup> However, with 90 percent of the global trade transported by sea, piracy remains a global concern.

Modern piracy activities range from hijackings and boardings to stealing a ship at anchor or alongside. In some circumstances, these acts are supported by local maritime security forces. Acts of piracy increase when economies lag, poverty is present and when security forces are not properly funded. For example, a rash of pirate activities took

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<sup>18</sup>Dana Robert Dillon, "Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade," *The Heritage Foundation*; available from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/BG1379.cfm>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2009.

<sup>19</sup>International Chamber of Commerce, "IMB reports unprecedented rise in maritime hijackings," [http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=332:imb-reports-unprecedented-rise-in-maritime-hijackings&catid=60:news&Itemid=51](http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=332:imb-reports-unprecedented-rise-in-maritime-hijackings&catid=60:news&Itemid=51); Internet; accessed 09 March 2009.



place in Southeast Asia in 1997 at the time of the Asian financial crisis.<sup>20</sup> Though writing on Somali piracy, Clive Schofield's comments are also applicable to piracy in the Asia-Pacific<sup>21</sup>:

The fundamental causes of the Somali piracy phenomenon are well known – profound poverty and socio-economic dislocation as a consequence of state failure. The absence of governmental control on land to restrain criminal activities, is exacerbated by ready access to maritime skills and military hardware plus proximity to busy shipping lanes replete with tempting targets. Given these factors, it is little wonder that piracy has flourished off Somalia.

It is therefore concerning to note that the majority of maritime security forces in Southeast Asia are severely underpaid and look for other means to augment their income.<sup>22</sup> Without proper support and funds for these maritime security forces, it remains extremely difficult to prevent or decrease piracy activity in this region.

### **International Crime**

The use of the seas for the transporting of illegal drugs, trafficking of humans, smuggling of weapons and other contraband has a detrimental effect on legitimate international economies and regional traffic. "Piracy, armed sea robbery, environmental degradation, illegal fishing, drug, human and small arms trafficking are all forms of transnational criminal activity."<sup>23</sup> The increased cost of security forces in an attempt to stop these illegal activities has a negative effect on the global economy. Again, as with

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<sup>20</sup>Dillon, "Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade,".

<sup>21</sup>Clive Schofield, "The Other 'Pirates' of the Horn of Africa," RSIS Commentaries; available from <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/commentaries.html>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2009.

<sup>22</sup>Dillon, "Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade,".

<sup>23</sup>von Hoesslin, "The Implications of Illegal Maritime Activities for Canadian Security...".

piracy, incidents of international crime are far less frequent in countries with well trained and reasonably paid maritime security forces. The cost of piracy and armed sea robbery is estimated at \$16 billion USD annually though this estimation may be low as many ship owners choose not to report incidents because it increases insurance premiums and the ship owners incur delays and costs due to investigations.<sup>24</sup>

It is challenging to fight all three aspects of illegal activity: maritime terrorism, piracy and international crime. The oceans are vast, unpoliced and outside of territorial boundaries. The sea offers those with the intent, a place to move freely about the globe and conduct illicit activities for political, religious, personal or monetary gain. As Candyce Kelshall points out in her article, “Can We Mitigate Against the Merging of International Maritime Crime, Piracy and Terrorism”, the lack of international navies allows for the merging of these three criminal activities. Terrorist organizations are turning to illicit ventures such as piracy and drug trafficking to fund their activities and use subject matter experts to conduct smuggling and delivery operations.<sup>25</sup> The threat to international trade via piracy, terrorism, and maritime crime reduce investments and hinders economic growth. While these effects are costly to all economies they are most harmful to trade and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region which rely heavily on

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<sup>24</sup>“Piracy and Armed Robber Against Ships,” International Maritime Bureau Report: 1 January – 31 December 2000, quoted in Karsten von Hoesslin, “The Implications of Illegal Maritime Activities for Canadian Security and Methods of Enhancing Surveillance and Monitoring in East Asian and North Pacific Waters,” <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2003/hoesslin.htm>; Internet; accessed 03 March 2009.

<sup>25</sup>Candyce M. Kelshall, “Can we Mitigate Against the merging of International Crime, Piracy and Terrorism,” *Cranfield University: Centre for Security Sector Management* (16 August 2004); available from [http://www.ssronline.org/edocs/kelshall\\_cargo\\_securit.pdf](http://www.ssronline.org/edocs/kelshall_cargo_securit.pdf); Internet; accessed 07 March 2009.

trade flow, the majority to the United States.<sup>26</sup> The links between terrorism, piracy and international crime are becoming increasingly intertwined. These organizations have no respect for sovereignty and use the lack of an international navy to their benefit.

### **Internal Instability**

Although terrorism remains the leading general security concern for the region, the instability of Pakistan and Burma/Myanmar was the highest specific security concern.<sup>27</sup> The social, ethnic, religious and political ties that intertwine the various nations in the Asia-Pacific have the potential to destabilize the entire region. For example, in the case of India “. . . there are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan or Bangladesh. There are more Nepalese and Tamils in India than in Nepal or Sri Lanka. Hence any disturbance in adjoining countries will impinge on India’s security calculus.”<sup>28</sup> Other nations with a high potential for instability include Burma/Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, North Korea, and Thailand. The concern is that instability in one country would cause a domino effect in other economically challenged countries.<sup>29</sup>

### **National Conflict**

The second most serious threat to stability in the region is unresolved historical rivalries and territorial disputes. As the Asia-Pacific region became the centre for world

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<sup>26</sup>Miemie Winn Byrd, “Combating Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Strategy,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 15.

<sup>27</sup>Baker and Fox, “Asia Pacific Security Survey 2008,”.

<sup>28</sup>Roy, “Maritime Security in South West Asia,”.

<sup>29</sup>Baker and Fox, “Asia Pacific Security Survey 2008,”.

trade due to explosive economic growth compared to that of the West, this increased level of economic competition has heightened the level of tension in the region. Besides the obvious sources of conflict such as the North Korean nuclear weapons issue and the independence of Taiwan, there are clashes over natural resources and control in the region such as India-Pakistan, the rise of China and the US reaction to a more powerful China, Japan and Russia. National security is no longer solely determined by military power, but also by “. . . politics, economics, environmental, culture and social factors.”<sup>30</sup>

The medium and smaller states in the Western Pacific are also part of the security dilemma in the region. States such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Australia and New Zealand all have a role to play in ensuring security in the region. Since the fall of the Soviet Union there is concern over old border disputes and the resources of the oceans surrounding their countries. Since 1985, member nations of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have taken steps to increase their military capabilities with defence expenditures rising over 50% and in 1995 they replaced the Middle East in arms purchased.<sup>31</sup>

Economic growth, the rise of individual nations and competition between states, are fuelling the procurement of weapons and ships. Richard A. Bitzinger discusses in his Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) commentary the significant, if not unprecedented, expansion of naval forces in the Asia-Pacific region. This expansion is not only quantitative, but also qualitative. Navies are expanding their capabilities to include the ability to conduct force projection and expeditionary operations. It is

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<sup>30</sup>Varner, “Canada and the Emerging Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma.”

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*

estimated that 200-250 major warships and 30 modern submarines have been ordered or planned for procurement in the next decade by countries in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>32</sup> Bitzinger's article deals exclusively with the procurement of aircraft carriers. Both the Indian Navy and the Thailand Navy currently operate carriers, but China, Australia, Japan and South Korea are considering expanding or developing their carrier capacities. This expansion will result in increased combat capacity including strike capability and command and control. In the Asia-Pacific region, if a conflict were to occur, it would be "... faster, more long-distance and yet more precise and more lethal, and perhaps more devastating in its effect."<sup>33</sup> The acquisition of submarines by many states is also a cause for concern in the region. Submarines pose a serious threat to naval operations due to their stealth and ability to operate almost undetected. They are relatively inexpensive to maintain and, when fitted with mines, torpedoes or anti-ship missiles, are a potentially dangerous political weapon.<sup>34</sup>

## Japan

Japan is the third largest economy in the world after the US and China measured on purchasing power parity basis.<sup>35</sup> Japan has the second strongest navy in the world,

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<sup>32</sup>Roy, "Maritime Security in South West Asia,".

<sup>33</sup>Richard A. Bitzinger, "Making a Comeback? Aircraft Carriers in the Asia-Pacific," RSIS Commentaries; available from <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/commentaries.html>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2009.

<sup>34</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada*, (Halifax, NS: Maritime Command: 1997), 19.

<sup>35</sup>Central Intelligence Agency, "World Fact Book," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html#Econ>; Internet; accessed 19 April 2009.

outside of the US.<sup>36</sup> Japan has the industrial capacity to build aircraft carrier battlegroups and have them fully operational in five years and develop nuclear weapons within months.<sup>37</sup>

Japan is technically still at war with Russia over the island chain consisting of Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan, and the Habomi group, known as the Northern Territories by Japan and the Southern Kuril Islands by Russia.<sup>38</sup> Japan is alarmed at the North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons, and they are deeply concerned over the long term plan of China's expansion. Japan and China also have disputes over Japan's off shore claims to oil and gas to the south, and China's continual penetration of Japanese waters.<sup>39</sup>

Based on a rising China, the North Korean nuclear program and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Japan has re-evaluated its “. . . self-imposed constraint of collective security.”<sup>40</sup> After the attacks of 9/11, Japanese warships were dispatched to the Indian Ocean under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (2001),<sup>41</sup> the first time since 1945 that Japanese ships had been active in the Pacific. The Japanese commenced

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<sup>36</sup>Richard Tanter, “Japan’s Indian Ocean Naval Deployment: Blue water militarization in a ‘normal country’,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*; available from <http://japanfocus.org/products/details/1700>; Internet; accessed 16 February 2009.

<sup>37</sup>Varner, “Canada and the Emerging Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma.”

<sup>38</sup>Central Intelligence Agency, “World Fact Book”.

<sup>39</sup>Boutilier, “Canada and the New Pacific Paradigm.”

<sup>40</sup>Dr. James Boutilier, “Canada and the New Pacific Paradigm.” Presented at the 23rd Annual CDAI Seminar, 15 February 2007. <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/seminars/2007/boutilier.pdf>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2009, 11.

<sup>41</sup>Tanter, “Japan’s Indian Ocean Naval Deployment: Blue water militarization in a ‘normal country’,”

working with the US on a joint sea-going, anti-ballistic missile system to be deployed in the Sea of Japan to protect against North Korea missiles. The Japanese also amended their defence relationship with the US to make it clear that Japan would support the US in any conflict between China and the US over Taiwan.<sup>42</sup>

As part of its rethinking of collective security arrangements, Japan signed a robust security agreement with the Australians in March 2007 and conducted trilateral naval exercises in the Pacific with the Indian and US navies.<sup>43</sup> Recently Japan participated in a trilateral US, Canadian and Japanese naval exercise prior to Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 2008.<sup>44</sup>

An American withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific region would result in increasing tensions between China and Japan and an arms race based on years of suppressed historic tension and aggression. As Varner points out, the international community has to recognize the emerging superpower status of China's regional dominance and Japan's close relationship with the US without offending either side.<sup>45</sup>

## Koreas

The Korean Peninsula has been, and continues to be, a concern for regional security. North Korea repeatedly threatens South Korea and Japan with its nuclear

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<sup>42</sup>Boutilier, "Canada and the New Pacific Paradigm."

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, "Westploy 2008 Okinawa Port Visit a Success," [http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/marpac/4/4-w\\_eng.asp?section=9&category=36&id=955](http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/marpac/4/4-w_eng.asp?section=9&category=36&id=955); Internet; accessed 19 April 2009.

<sup>45</sup>Varner, "Canada and the Emerging Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma."

program and missile tests over the Sea of Japan and Japan itself.<sup>46</sup> The South Koreans are economically stronger but lack the sheer number of soldiers that exists in the north. The capability of the North Koreans to conduct a nuclear weapons strike against North America is a clear threat to Canadian security.<sup>47</sup> However, security analysts see the situation in the Koreas as promising in terms of a peaceful resolution, with the key to success being continued negotiations through the Six-Party Talks. The ultimate goal is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.<sup>48</sup>

## India

Although they are both official cordial with each other, the Indians see the Chinese as their number one threat. India and China still have unresolved issues over their shared Northeast border after the 1962 war and they are both nuclear armed states.<sup>49</sup> India could eventually rival China's power both economically and politically and both look to become regional powers. India is concerned with China's expansion into the Indian Ocean, and the establishment of a deep-water port in Pakistan.<sup>50</sup> China, however, needs to feed its ballooning economy and diversify its energy sources. With the majority of China's energy coming via the Indian Ocean as opposed to the Pacific, China feels the

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<sup>46</sup>John A. Panneton, "Long-Term Threats in the Asia-Pacific." *Seapower* 50, no. 8 (August 2007): 3.

<sup>47</sup>Varner, "Canada and the Emerging Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma."

<sup>48</sup>Baker, and Fox, "Asia Pacific Security Survey 2008,".

<sup>49</sup>Varner, "Canada and the Emerging Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma."

<sup>50</sup>Boutillier, "Canada and the New Pacific Paradigm."



need to conceivably station ships in the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca to protect its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). In response, India has increased its relations with Indonesia, Japan and Vietnam to push its maritime frontier into China's ocean, the Pacific.<sup>51</sup> "The Indians, heartened by steady economic growth (although still far behind China's) and ties with Washington have become more openly ambitious of late, declaring themselves the natural masters of the Indian Ocean."<sup>52</sup>

## China

As the power of Russia waned at the end of the Cold War, the regional strength of China grew in proportion. China has had double digit figures of military spending for years, a 3 million person standing army, a growing blue water capable navy, and nuclear weapons, all which make it a formidable world power.<sup>53</sup> China could be adopting a more aggressive international stance as it emerges as a superpower. This theory is supported by the following factors: "China has expanded its national security objectives; China has changed its patterns in the use of military force; China is developing a modern sea control capability and China has concluded a series of diplomatic agreements that allows it to concentrate its efforts on Eastern Asia-Pacific."<sup>54</sup>

The relationship between China and Taiwan remains an unresolved issue. China's increase in naval power could be the prelude to China's attempt to re-establish

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<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup>Varner, "Canada and the Emerging Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma,".

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*

control over Taiwan. Currently, it is protected by the US, who routinely patrols the waters surrounding Taiwan. However, this protection comes at a cost as the US-Taiwan relationship also constrains Taiwan's political ambitions concerning nationhood status.<sup>55</sup> It is uncertain how the US would respond, and to what degree, if China attempted to reunify China and Taiwan.<sup>56</sup>

The Spratly Islands remain a potential flashpoint in Southeast Asia with six nations, including China, making overlapping territorial claims to the islands. The importance of these islands is the natural resources, including oil, which lie below them. Currently, China and the other nations with claims to the islands are attempting to resolve this issue, both politically and diplomatically. It is unlikely that, in the near future, the situation will escalate to the high level of tension of the mid-1990s. However, increased Chinese presence, nationalist fervour or demand for oil could elevate the security risk to the region.<sup>57</sup>

China's intentions as it rises in power and the world's reaction, particularly the US, to a rising China are causes of international concern. Dr. Boutilier indicates that most China analysts do not see China as a threat, at least not in the short to mid-term.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>Boutilier, "Canada and the New Pacific Paradigm."

<sup>56</sup>Varner, "Canada and the Emerging Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma,".

<sup>57</sup>Ralf Emmers, "The De-escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian Relations," RSIS Working Paper No. 189; available from <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP129.pdf>; Internet; accessed 03 March 2009.

<sup>58</sup>Boutilier, "Canada and the New Pacific Paradigm,".

However, as the economic and military power in Asia shifts, the effect on regional stability and how the US reacts will become a more pressing foreign policy issue.<sup>59</sup>

#### United States

It is well established that a US presence in the region has a stabilizing effect on Asia-Pacific. Analysts express concern that the US focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan after 9/11 is resulting in a reduction in US military and political strategic influence in Asia-Pacific. However, the US has responded to this apparent reduction in supremacy by shifting additional Aircraft Carrier Strike Groups to be permanently based in the Pacific and the redeployment of troops to East Asia.<sup>60</sup> This shift includes six of the USN's carriers, and sixty percent of their submarine fleet. The US is attempting to strengthen its ties in the Asia-Pacific region through a series of bi-lateral agreements and humanitarian visits.

In order for the US to maintain its hold as a superpower, the US Navy must continue to enjoy sea command and control its SLOC. The US also needs its allies in Japan, Western Europe and Canada, to take on more of the defence burden. The concern is if the US were to resume its isolationist approach it would cause an increase in

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<sup>59</sup>Derek Burney, "Canada must outgrow its juvenile relationship with China," *Globe and Mail*, 10 April 2009. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090409.wcoessay0411/CommentStory/specialComment/>; Internet; accessed 22 April 2009.

<sup>60</sup>Dr. Subhash Kapila, "United States Reasserts Supremacy In Tussle With China In East Asia And The Pacific," *South Asia Analysis Group* (30 August 2004); available from <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers12/paper1104.html>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2009.

Japanese defence requirements and an increase in tensions between China and Japan and the Koreans and Japan.<sup>61</sup>

#### United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

At the end of the Cold War, it was assumed that collective security bodies like the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would reduce or prevent future wars. The intention behind the signing of the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was to reduce all maritime disputes and resolve them peacefully.<sup>62</sup> Unfortunately, instead of resolving territorial issues, the adoption of UNCLOS and the establishment of the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has led to 13 different disputed EEZs within the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>63</sup> UNCLOS has allowed many nations to have overlapping claims. With an increased demand for fisheries, oil, and natural gas, the risk of state on state conflict has risen dramatically. “International law may have sown the seeds for war in the ASEAN region.”<sup>64</sup>

#### **Environmental Risks (Global Warming)**

The Asia-Pacific region is prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, tsunamis and cyclones. Due to the relatively poor economic state and close proximity to

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<sup>61</sup>Varner, “Canada and the Emerging Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma.”

<sup>62</sup>Peter Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: A “Medium” Power Perspective*, Maritime Security Paper No. 10. (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2000), 43-44.

<sup>63</sup>Varner, “Canada and the Emerging Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma.”

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*

the coastline of the majority of the population, any catastrophic event could lead to massive loss of life, forced migration, social unrest and a regional crisis. In fact, concern over global warming and its effects was the highest ranking non-traditional threat to regional security.<sup>65</sup> Obviously maritime forces can not defeat or stop global warming or natural disasters from occurring, but they can mitigate the severity of its effects and conduct disaster relief. For example, a USN carrier can provide hot meals, fresh water, supplies, medical facilities, and sea and air lift capabilities for thousands of people.

Another risk is the destruction of the environment in the process of harvesting finite natural resources. There is a marked increase in the struggle between regions over fresh water, fisheries, forestry, arable land, and other life sustaining systems as the Asia-Pacific economies bloom.

### **Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by President G.W. Bush on 31 May 2003, is the US effort to prevent the shipment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems and related materials between states and non-state actors. The intention of PSI is that ships and aircraft transporting suspected WMD or their components can be stopped and searched by signatory members of PSI. Though PSI has been viewed by many as a positive step in ensuring international peace and security, it has also had negative effects. When one nation, under PSI, boards and searches a vessel of another nation, tensions between the countries may increase. Such was the case of the

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<sup>65</sup>Baker and Fox, "Asia Pacific Security Survey 2008,".

Chinese flagged vessel *Yinhe*, which was boarded and searched in 1993 by a combined US, Saudi Arabian and Chinese team while alongside Damman, Saudi Arabia. No WMD or related material was found, causing increased tensions between the US and China.<sup>66</sup>

## **STABILIZING INFLUENCES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

Although the Asia-Pacific region does not have the European model of NATO, it does have organizations in place to assist in the peaceful resolution of issues and conflict. The 2008 Asia-Pacific Security Report polled security analysts to determine which organizations met the intent as “. . . instruments for building a sense of regional community . . . [and which were] mechanisms for practical cooperation and problem solving.”<sup>67</sup> The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), long seen as merely an organization without any real power and benefit, ranked quite high in both categories. ASEAN has “now gained recognition among regional security analysts as an organization that can have a practical effect.”<sup>68</sup> ASEAN’s high rankings are due to its work in the realm of security and economic cooperation, with such initiatives as counterterrorism cooperation and free trade negotiations. The signing of the November 2007 summit of an ASEAN Charter provided the group with a legal entity and the declaration of intent to

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<sup>66</sup>Yann-Huei Song, “The U.S.-Led Proliferation Security Initiative and UNCLOS: Legality, Implementation, and an Assessment,” [http://ao.sinica.edu.tw/download/publication\\_e/Year2007/human02.pdf](http://ao.sinica.edu.tw/download/publication_e/Year2007/human02.pdf); Internet; accessed 27 January 2009.

<sup>67</sup>Baker and Fox, “Asia Pacific Security Survey 2008,”.

<sup>68</sup>*Ibid.*

establish an ASEAN community with political, economic and socio-cultural elements within a regional security framework.<sup>69</sup>

In July 2008, ASEAN coordinated a meeting between itself, the European Union (EU), the US, Canada and other nations with Pacific interests to discuss military and civil cooperation in the event of a natural disaster similar to the Indian Ocean tsunami or the earthquake in Sichuan, China. The participating countries “. . . recognized that military assets and personnel, in full support and not in place of civilian responses, have played an increasingly important role in regional disaster responses.”<sup>70</sup> This sign of cooperation and coordination between the various countries and their civilian and military agencies enhances the credibility and the capability of ASEAN in the Asia-Pacific region.

## CONCLUSION

It is clear that Asia-Pacific has great potential in terms of economic growth and prosperity. However, many complexities exist in the region which threatens its overall stability and the maritime environment. These threats, if realized, would have a major detrimental effect on global economics and stability. It is important to understand the impact that issues such as terrorism, piracy, international crime, internal conflicts, national conflicts, environmental issues, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have on the maritime environment and global security. In order to support regional stability, sea control must be maintained by legitimate nations. Having

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<sup>69</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup>CBC News, “Asia-Pacific countries to co-operate on disaster relief,” <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/07/24/asia-pacific-relief.html>; Internet; accessed 16 February 2009.

identified the maritime threats in the region, attention can now be turned to examining the requirements of maritime forces to combat or mitigate this threat.





Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas in the twenty-first century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters.<sup>71</sup>

Alfred Thayer Mahan

## CHAPTER TWO CANADA'S TIES TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

### INTRODUCTION

Canada is a middle power nation that is heavily reliant on trade for its ongoing prosperity. Canada is currently a member of the Group of Eight (G8) and, according to the 2007 UN Human Development Index, is ranked as the 4<sup>th</sup> “Most Livable Country” in the world.<sup>72</sup> Canada is one of the ten top trading nations<sup>73</sup> and ranks ninth for highest GDP in the world.<sup>74</sup> The G8 countries are the world’s top major industrialized democracies, representing “about 65% of the Gross World Product, the majority of global military power (seven are in the top eight nations for military expenditure) and almost all of the world’s active nuclear weapons.”<sup>75</sup> A country’s standard of living is closely tied

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<sup>71</sup>Commander PK Ghosh, “Maritime Security Challenges in South Asia and the Indian Ocean: Response Strategies,” Center for Strategic and International Studies – American-Pacific Sealanes Security Institute Conference on Maritime Security in Asia; available from <http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/ghosh,%20maritime%20security%20challenges%20in%20SAsia%20&%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf>; Internet; accessed 03 March 2009.

<sup>72</sup>Infoplease, “World Statistics: Economic Statistics,” <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004372.html>; Internet; accessed 28 October 2008.

<sup>73</sup>World Trade Organization. “International Trade Statistics 2008: Table 1.8, 1.9,” [http://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/statis\\_e/its2008\\_e/its2008\\_e.pdf](http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its2008_e.pdf); Internet; accessed 28 October 2008.

<sup>74</sup>Wikipedia, “List of Countries by GDP,” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_GDP\\_\(nominal\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)); Internet; accessed 13 November 2008.

<sup>75</sup>Wikipedia, “G8,” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G8>; Internet; accessed 19 April 2009.

its economic prosperity which is required to sustain social programs, health care, etc. For Canada, this economic prosperity is based on trade:<sup>76</sup>

Canada's standard of living is amongst the highest in the world, and our social programs necessitate a rich and dynamic economy to sustain them. We are a trading nation, with roughly 80 per cent of our international trade and 40 per cent of our Gross Domestic Product tied to the relatively free flow of goods to and from the United States...In much smaller measures, the same is true for the European Union and some of the voraciously expanding economies in the Far East. To put this in terms that can be readily understood, one in four Canadian jobs is based upon international trade.

As Jack Granatstein asserts, "[Canada] must promote the economic growth of the nation to support the prosperity and welfare of its people."<sup>77</sup> To do so, Canada must ensure that its economy and the economies of its allies are protected. "A five percent reduction in international trade could cost Canada billions of tax dollars that the various levels of governments use to fund our social development and quality of life programs."<sup>78</sup>

Therefore, as one of the most heavily reliant nations on international trade, it is in Canada's best interests to ensure the ". . . rapid, seamless and secure movements of goods and people around the world in global transport and supply chains"<sup>79</sup> and to assist friends and allies in ensuring a stable world.

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<sup>76</sup>Andrew Leslie, "Boots on the Ground: Thoughts on the Future of the Canadian Forces," *Canadian Military Journal* 6, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 20.

<sup>77</sup>J.L. Granatstein, "The Importance of Being Less Earnest," *National Post*, 22 October 2003. [article on-line]; available from <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=4&did=432278951&SrchMode=1&sid=11&Fmt+3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1226885032&client>; Internet; accessed 21 October 2008.

<sup>78</sup>Leslie, "Boots on the Ground...", 20.

<sup>79</sup>Government of Canada, "Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative," <http://www.tc.gc.ca/CanadasGateways/APGCI/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 March 2009.

As a middle power, with a heavy reliance on trade, Canada needs to be focused on the emerging economic potential of the Asia-Pacific region. In order to understand Canada's national and strategic interests in the region, four areas will be examined: ties to the region, defence and security relationships, overarching foreign policy and Asia-Pacific policy.

## **CANADA'S TIES TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

### **Immigration**

A large proportion of Canada's immigrants currently come from the Asia-Pacific region. It is estimated that between 2005 and 2050, Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States will be the destinations of the majority of international immigrants coming mainly from China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan and the Philippines.<sup>80</sup> In the years 2000-2004, immigrants from the Asia-Pacific region comprised 50% of the total number of new immigrants to Canada.<sup>81</sup> Chinese is the highest non-official language in Canada, spoken by 16% of the total population.<sup>82</sup> In 2004, approximately 3 million Canadians were of Asian ethnicity, making up 28% and 35% of the populations of Toronto and Vancouver respectively.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>80</sup>Global Strategy Institute, "Seven Revolutions - Did You Know," [http://gsi.csis.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=blogcategory&id=73&Itemid=108](http://gsi.csis.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=73&Itemid=108); Internet; accessed 20 March 2009.

<sup>81</sup>Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, "Population & Immigration: Immigrants by Regional Source as Percentage of Total Immigration," <http://www.asiapacific.ca/en/publications/statistical-reports/immigrants-regional-source-percentage-total-immigration>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2009.

<sup>82</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup>Statistics Canada, 2001 Census of Canada (Cat. No. 97F0010XCB01001), January 21, 2003. 23 September 2004. <http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/standard/themes/index.cfm>, quoted in

Clearly the growing number of Asian immigrants in Canada has a major impact on Canada's politics, economics and culture. One only has to look at the effect of the political involvement of the Diaspora Tamil community in Toronto on Canadian policies concerning the ethnical conflict in Sri Lanka to see this impact.<sup>84</sup> Asian immigrants from some of the largest economies in the world like China, India, Japan and Korea also have a role to play in increasing Canada's trade and investments between Canada and the Asia-Pacific region. Remittances from Canada to India make up almost 20% of India's GDP and overseas the Chinese were responsible for almost 60% of China's total foreign direct investment, over \$130 billion.<sup>85</sup> Canada's newest immigrants could hold the key to increased wealth and prosperity and provide Canada with an edge in the Asia-Pacific market place.

### **Economic Ties**

Canada also has strong economic ties to the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in the area of trade. Canada's largest trading partner is the US, followed by Asia/Oceania and Europe.<sup>86</sup> Jack Granatstein, speaking at a 2008 maritime security conference in

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Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, "Canada Asia Review 2004," <http://www.asiapacific.ca/en/publications/statistical-reports/mother-tongue-canada>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2009.

<sup>84</sup>City News, "Thousands Form Human Chain To Protest Sri Lankan Violence," [http://www.citynews.ca/news/news\\_31515.aspx](http://www.citynews.ca/news/news_31515.aspx); Internet; accessed 19 April 2009.

<sup>85</sup>Michael Szonyi, "Asian-Canadians and Canada's International Relations," *Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada*; <http://www.asiapacific.ca/en/cia/asian-canadians-and-canadas-international-relations>; Internet; accessed 03 March 2009.

<sup>86</sup>Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, "Population & Immigration: Immigrants by Regional Source as Percentage of Total Immigration,".

Halifax, indicated that Pacific trade was now 3 ½ times that crossing the Atlantic.<sup>87</sup>

Although the US remains Canada's top trading partner, six of Canada's top 15 trading partners are in the Asia-Pacific region, with Japan as the second largest export destination after the US, followed closely by China and South Korea. The Asia-Pacific region is also an important partner with respect to Canadian imports, with China and Japan being the second and third largest importers into Canada.<sup>88</sup> From 1995 to 2005, Canada's exports to China more than doubled from \$3.5 billion to \$7.1 billion and Canada's imports grew 550 percent, from \$4.6 billion to \$29.5 billion. China, currently the world's fourth largest economy, is expected to be number one by 2041.<sup>89</sup> Therefore it is in Canada's best interests to have a portion of that market.

However, Canada's overall portion of Asian imports is steadily declining. In 1988, Canada's contribution to the Asian markets was 2.71% while in 2001, it fell to 1.27%.<sup>90</sup> To turn this trend around, John D. Wiebe, President and CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation, pushes for increased trade relations with Asia-Pacific nations in the form of bilateral or region-wide trade agreements and stresses that a change in attitude from Ottawa is crucial in making these agreements happen. Singapore and Canada have

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<sup>87</sup>Telegraph Journal, "Why we need a larger navy," 10 July 2008, 7; <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=6&sid=4&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=3&st...>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2009.

<sup>88</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, "Backgrounders: Canadian Naval Presence in the Asia-Pacific Region."

<sup>89</sup>Government of Canada, "The Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative (APGCI)," <http://investincanada.gc.ca/eng/advantage-canada-canada/asia-pacific-gateway.aspx>; Internet; accessed 21 March 2009.

<sup>90</sup>John D. Wiebe, "Seek Far East trade links, not South America," Asia-Pacific Foundation," available from [http://www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/foreast\\_trade\\_oped.pdf](http://www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/foreast_trade_oped.pdf); Internet; accessed 18 March 2009.

been working towards a trade agreement for some time. Wiebe emphasizes that a trade agreement with Japan, Canada's second largest trading partner, would send a clear message to the region of the importance that Canada places on its trading relationship with the Asia-Pacific. A trade agreement with Japan is of particular importance given that its "... annual trade with Canada is more than twice of all the countries of Central and South America combined."<sup>91</sup>

Canada is uniquely situated to capitalize on trade potential, given its geographic position between the Asia-Pacific region and North America. Currently, Canada's trade pipeline carries nearly 450 million tonnes of cargo through Canadian ports annually: "...one-third in domestic trade; one-third in trade with the United States, much of which eventually enters the global market; and one-third in trade with the rest of the world."<sup>92</sup> With Canada's heavy reliance on trade and dependence on international shipping, this pipeline is "...the life-blood of the economy."<sup>93</sup>

The Canadian Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative is a \$591 million investment by industry and all three levels of government to increase the capacity of Canada's trade pipeline and facilitate global supply chains between the Asia-Pacific and North America.<sup>94</sup> The advantage of the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative is that the Port of Vancouver is 36 hours closer by sea than California ports from Shanghai, and the Port of Prince Rupert (the closest North American port) is 59 hours closer than

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<sup>91</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup>Haydon, "Why Does Canada Still Need a Navy,".

<sup>93</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup>Government of Canada, "Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative,".

California from Shanghai.<sup>95</sup> The Asia-Pacific Gateway provides a land bridge between Canada's west and east coast and the markets in the US. Once this initiative is completed, Canada will be better positioned to expand commerce with the Asia-Pacific region, increase its share of container imports and improve the efficiency of Canadian and North American exports.

Public opinion in Canada recognizes the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region. The majority of Canadians view an increase in trade and the growing number of Asian immigrants to Canada as beneficial to the overall prosperity of the country. A national opinion poll commissioned by the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada found that "...57% of respondents agreed that Asian economies are vital to the economic well-being of Canada; and more than 70% felt that the federal government should promote increased trade with Asia."<sup>96</sup>

## **CANADA'S SECURITY AND DEFENCE INTERESTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

In addition to Canada's economic and immigration links to the region, Canada also has diplomatic and security relationships to Asia-Pacific. Given the potential for economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region, Canada has a vested interest in ensuring the security and defence of this region. Along with the benefits of globalization and an increase in trade, come heightened security concerns stemming from transnational crime, terrorism, and threat of WMD. As well, any regional conflict in the Asia-Pacific will

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<sup>95</sup>Government of Canada, "The Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative (APGCI)."

<sup>96</sup>Ron Richardson, "Canada Asia Review 2004," *Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada*; available from [http://www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/car2004/car2004\\_full.pdf](http://www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/car2004/car2004_full.pdf); Internet; accessed 10 March 2009.



have a negative impact on the global economy, in particular for countries highly reliant on trade, such as Canada. “In essence, it holds that Canada is not an inward-looking nation, and with our territorial boundaries safe from direct conventional military assault, Canada is made more secure by seeing to the resolution of global problems at their source.”<sup>97</sup>

In the *1994 White Paper on Defence*, this interrelationship between trade, economy and defence policy was clearly described. The *1994 White Paper* stated that “Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security especially since Canada’s economic future depends on its ability to trade freely with other nations.”<sup>98</sup> A more contemporary look at Canada’s role and responsibility in the world is taken from the Canadian Security Policy 2004 and highlights the theme of supporting global stability to ensure Canadian security and prosperity:

Canada has a long tradition of contributing to international security, even where our direct security interests are not affected. But the changing nature of the world has increased the number of international threats that can impact on Canada’s national security...Canadian security will be increasingly dependent on our ability to contribute to international security.<sup>99</sup>

Lastly, this theme is further reinforced in the *Canada First Defence Strategy* which states that “as a trading nation in a highly globalized world, Canada’s prosperity and security

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<sup>97</sup>Richard H. Gimblett, “A Strategic Overview of the Canadian Security Environment,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 9, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 10.

<sup>98</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence. *1994 Defence White Paper (Highlights)*; available from <http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id={D5385C59-1660-4E38-8C3B-684158B534CB}>; Internet; accessed 21 October 2008.

<sup>99</sup>Canada. Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society; Canada’s National Security Policy* (Ottawa: April 2004): 5-6.

rely on stability abroad.”<sup>100</sup> Based on Canada’s reliance on trade and its middle power status, it is expected that Canada will do its share to support regional stability and overall international security.<sup>101</sup>

Security instability in the Asia-Pacific region has direct impacts in Canada. For example, the exotic fish trade in South East Asia has led to an increase in over fishing and environmental exploitation of the fish stocks. As Asian fish stocks are depleted, there will be increased competition for those in and near the Canadian EEZ. The government of Canada has already taken steps to curb illegal driftnet fishing on the west coast.<sup>102</sup> Similarly, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis caused a domino effect of economic instability in South East Asia which impacted on the global economy. The rise of economic insecurity during this time caused a spike in maritime transnational criminal activity. Thousands of unemployed people turned to piracy, armed robbery at sea and illegal fishing to support their families.<sup>103</sup> Although the threat of piracy and armed robbery at sea is a remote possibility in Canadian Territorial Waters, other illicit activities such as illegal fishing, environmental degradation, human and drug smuggling, are proliferating into our waters.<sup>104</sup> For example, in 1999, four dilapidated boats carrying

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<sup>100</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, *2008 Canada First Defence Strategy*.

<sup>101</sup>Haydon, “Why Does Canada Still Need a Navy,”.

<sup>102</sup>von Hoesslin, “The Implications of Illegal Maritime Activities for Canadian Security...”.

<sup>103</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup>von Hoesslin, “The Implications of Illegal Maritime Activities for Canadian Security...”.

approximately 590 Chinese migrants, including 134 children without parents or legal guardians, arrived off BC's coastal waters.<sup>105</sup>

Regional maritime terrorism could have a major detrimental impact on world trade. In Joshua Ho's article "Recovering Trade After a Terrorist Attack: The APEC Way," he summarizes that a terrorist attack on a US port resulting in a shutdown would have a significant impact on the 12 APEC economies.<sup>106</sup>

For example, if trade at the US port was impaired for 15 days, the cumulative loss of GDP for the 12 APEC economies for three years was estimated at US\$82 billion dollars in 2006 dollars. The loss increases to US\$175 billion for a 30-day impaired trade and to US\$499 billion for a 60-day impaired trade.

The threat of maritime terrorism in the region and the possible ramifications on global trade is of great concern to Canada and other trading nations, and is therefore not just a regional issue.<sup>107</sup>

## CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Canada's most recent international policy statement, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, was tabled in Parliament in April 2005. This document provides an overview of Canada's role in global affairs and detailed chapters on diplomatic, defence, development and commercial policies that reflect Canada's national and

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<sup>105</sup>Government of British Columbia, "Human Trafficking in B.C." <http://www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/octip/identifying.htm>; Internet; accessed 18 April 2009.

<sup>106</sup>Joshua Ho, "Recovering Trade After A Terrorist Attack: The APEC Way," *RSIS Commentaries*; available from <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0972008.pdf>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2009.

<sup>107</sup>von Hoesslin, "The Implications of Illegal Maritime Activities for Canadian Security...".

strategic interests.<sup>108</sup> A multi-year program with five interconnected priorities is provided:<sup>109</sup>

1. revitalizing Canada's North American partnership with the United States and Mexico by enhancing security and promoting prosperity;
2. building a more secure world by countering terrorism, stabilizing failed and fragile states, and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
3. increasing domestic and global prosperity by strengthening Canada's competitiveness, enhancing international commercial engagement with key partners, and providing targeted services and support for Canadian businesses;
4. promoting good governance by sharing Canadian expertise to reform global governance and enhance local capacity; and
5. crafting a new flexible diplomacy to deal with global developments.

The intent of the policy statement was to re-position Canada internationally as a key player. Supporters heralded the policy as “. . . a focused, progressive approach rooted in realism.”<sup>110</sup> Critics stated the policy is “. . . vague, self-congratulatory and falls short of what Canada is capable of”<sup>111</sup> and that these contradictions and vague statements would make the implementation of the policy difficult and ineffective.<sup>112</sup> It is of relevance here to note that the policy statement supports multilateral cooperation “to

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<sup>108</sup>Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Canada's International Policy Statement,” [http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/current\\_discussions/ips-archive-en.aspx](http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/current_discussions/ips-archive-en.aspx); Internet; accessed 22 March 2009.

<sup>109</sup>Canada-Israel Industrial Research and Development Foundation, “Government of Canada Releases International Policy Statement,” <http://www.ciirdf.ca/press/news5.html>; Internet; accessed 23 March 2009.

<sup>110</sup>University of Victoria Office of International Affairs, “An Analysis of the International Policy Statement: voices of concern and praise for the new approach to Canadian Foreign Policy,” [http://oia.uvic.ca/feature/11\\_2005/](http://oia.uvic.ca/feature/11_2005/); Internet; accessed 22 March 2009.

<sup>111</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup>*Ibid.*

tackle emerging global issues, to protect people around the world against violence, and to give them the opportunity to build prosperous fulfilling lives.”<sup>113</sup> Unfortunately, as pointed out by the Conference of Defence Associations, “no suggestion is made, in the paper, as to which existing multilateral forums Canada would most usefully/profitably engage.”<sup>114</sup>

Canada’s foreign policy appears to be wholly dependent on the individual in the Prime Minister’s office as opposed to a dedicated long term strategy clearly defined by Canada’s national interests. Under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, the Conservative Government focussed on the Asia-Pacific region, making it one of his first official visits.<sup>115</sup> Under Prime Minister Chrétien, the Liberal Government declared 1997 as Canada’s Year of Asia Pacific<sup>116</sup> but in 2002, shifted Canada’s and the G8’s attention to the development of Africa, under the “Africa Action Plan.”<sup>117</sup> Currently, under the Harper government, focus has again shifted, this time to Latin and South America. “Canada can play a dynamic role working with our partners in the hemisphere to build a prosperous and safe neighbourhood of nations committed to democratic values and social

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<sup>113</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canada’s International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*, (Ottawa: Minister of National Defence Canada, 2005).

<sup>114</sup>Howie Marsh, *An Analysis of Canada’s International Policy Statement*, available from <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/presentations/marsh29apr05.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 March 2009.

<sup>115</sup>Richardson, “Canada Asia Review 2004.”.

<sup>116</sup>Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. “Government of Canada Announces Canada’s Year of Asia Pacific and Unveils Winning Logo.” [http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication\\_id=376835&Language=E&docnumber=207](http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=376835&Language=E&docnumber=207); Internet; accessed 24 March 2009.

<sup>117</sup>Constance Freeman, “Viewpoint: New Partnership for African Development,” *The International Development Research Centre*; available from [http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-26046-201-1-DO\\_TOPIC.html](http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-26046-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html); Internet; accessed 19 April 2009.

inclusion.”<sup>118</sup> No articulated rationale exists for these rapid changes in focus, leaving one to assume that they occurred at the whim of the prime minister in power.

The focus of Canada’s foreign policy impacts how effective Canada is on the world stage. In his article, “Whither Canadian Foreign Policy”, Earl Drake<sup>119</sup> argues that the new world order is not “...static, unipolar, or one-dimensional”<sup>120</sup> and that Canada could better position itself to achieve its national interests in light of the current global shift. Drake provides a list of six areas as suggested priorities for Canada. He omits “...Africa, Europe (except for G8 partners and the Scandinavians) and the Middle East, not because they are unimportant, but because they are of less direct concern to our vital interests and because we have less capacity to make a difference there than in the priority areas.”<sup>121</sup> Drake’s priority list for Canada is as follows: <sup>122</sup>

1. The United States of America
2. Other G8 countries
3. East and South Asia
4. Latin America
5. Norway and Sweden
6. Multilateral Systems

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<sup>118</sup>Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “The Americas: Our Neighbours, Our Priority,” <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/geo/Americas-ameriques-en.aspx>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2009.

<sup>119</sup>“Earl Drake is a former Canadian Ambassador to China and to Indonesia and assistant deputy minister for foreign affairs. He is currently an adjunct professor at Simon Fraser University and Project Director, China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development.”

<sup>120</sup>Earl Drake, “Whither Canadian Foreign Policy?” *Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada*; available from <http://www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/cac27.pdf>; Internet; accessed 03 March 2009.

<sup>121</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>122</sup>*Ibid.*

It is evident that Canada is medium power nation with strategic and global interests whom wants, and has the potential, to be an international player in the Asia-Pacific region. However, Ottawa must set a clear list of priorities in order to focus its interests and channel its scarce strategic resources. Drake argues that by providing clear guidance to Canada's financially strapped and understaffed departments responsible for carrying out foreign policy, Canada could be much more effective internationally.<sup>123</sup>

### **CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

If it is challenging to clearly define or articulate Canada's foreign policy globally, it is virtually impossible to discern Canada's Asia-Pacific regional policy. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) outlines Canada's priorities as rebuilding Afghanistan, the Americas and emerging markets. Although clearly defined strategies can be found on Afghanistan and the Americas, no clear and definitive policy for the Asia-Pacific region exists. Yet Canada recognizes the importance of this region as exemplified by the formation and support of such organizations as the Asia Pacific Foundation and the Asia Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative.

To be effective on the world stage, Canada needs to focus its economic, intellectual and human resources within the agencies of foreign policy like DFAIT and the Department of National Defence to meet her national strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific Region. The cost of not formulating a strategic plan with respect to the Asia-

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<sup>123</sup>*Ibid.*

Pacific region is considerable resulting in Canada's interests and commitment being questioned by Asian leaders as they try and determine if indeed Canada is a player in the region.<sup>124</sup>

Finally, it is important to note that the Obama Administration has signalled its intent that Asia will become a more significant player in US Foreign Policy under President Obama's leadership than under President Bush's. This message was signified by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's choosing Asia as her first overseas destination. The purpose of the Obama Asia policy is to re-establish the US commitment to Asia and the importance of Asian and US ties. The US is attempting to strength strategic ties in the region in the face of a rising China, potential regional stability and the rise of militant Islam.

## CONCLUSION

As the US focuses efforts to strength its ties with the Asia-Pacific region, can Canada, afford not to make a similar scalable effort? As the US recognizes the importance of Asia, and the multilateral formations of ASEAN and the East Asian Summit, can Canada allow its diminishing role to continue unabated?<sup>125</sup> Canada needs to determine what its Asia-Pacific policy is and establish its priorities for its federal departments dealing with international commerce, diplomacy, defence and development.

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<sup>124</sup>Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, "Formulating Canada's grand strategy in Asia," *International Journal* 56, no. 1 (Winter 2000/2001): <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=4&sid=2&srchmode=1&vinst=RPOD&fmt=3&st...>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2009.

<sup>125</sup>Amitav Acharya, "The Obama Administration, Asia Pacific Security and Canada." *Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada*; available from <http://www.asiapacific.ca/en/news/bulletins/the-obama-administration-asia-pacific-security-and-canada>; Internet; accessed 04 March 2009.





As some 2,500 years of recorded naval history attest, when governments have a problem away from their home shores they invariably send a warship as the first response.<sup>126</sup>

### **CHAPTER THREE CANADIAN NAVY SUPPORT TO FOREIGN POLICY**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

The first chapter of this paper examined the maritime threats in the Asia-Pacific region, including terrorism, piracy, and international crime such as transporting of illegal drugs, humans and weapons, internal instability, national conflict, global warming, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The second chapter looked at Canada's strategic interests in the region and Canada's national Asia-Pacific foreign policy. This section defines a navy's role as an instrument of foreign policy, the Canadian Navy's maritime role, and the Canadian Navy's past and current role in the Asia-Pacific region for the purposes of furthering Canada's national objectives.

#### **NAVY SUPPORT TO FOREIGN POLICY**

In his paper, "Strategic Concepts for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Back to the Future?", Peter Haydon discusses the nature of maritime strategy and how it supports a nation's grand strategy. Traditionally, navies bolster their government's economic and territorial interests. To support its nation's domestic and foreign policies, maritime forces must be able to have fleet capabilities which meet real and potential threats to a nation's security

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<sup>126</sup>Haydon, "Why Does Canada Still Need a Navy," 2.

and interests.<sup>127</sup> Haydon uses the following United States Navy definition to describe the mandate of navies:<sup>128</sup>

A navy is a state's main instrument of maritime force. What it should do, what doctrine it holds, what ships it deploys, and how it fights are determined by practical political and military choices in relation to national needs. Choices are made according to the state's goals, perceived threat, maritime opportunity, technological capabilities, practical experience, and, not least, the way the sea defines itself and its way of war.

### **Core Missions of the Navy**

Based on Ken Booth's triangular representation of naval missions, Haydon argues that to support its' country's strategic objectives and meet its naval and maritime policies, the navy's role is based on three key pillars: military, diplomatic and constabulary.<sup>129</sup> However, Haydon warns that the cornerstone of these core capabilities must be military power, for only through legitimate military force can a nation achieve the other two functions of diplomacy and constabulary.<sup>130</sup> In summary, a modern navy has two functions: "ensure national security and sovereignty at sea, and support foreign policy and overseas trade."<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>127</sup>Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: A "Medium" Power Perspective*, 32.

<sup>128</sup>George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The US navy, 1890-1990*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 1. as quoted in Peter T. Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: A "Medium" Power Perspective*, Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 10, The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies,(No date given), 36.

<sup>129</sup>*Ibid*, 43.

<sup>130</sup>*Ibid*, 45.

<sup>131</sup>*Ibid*, 38.

Haydon elaborates further on the three pillars and outlines the six mission categories of navies in the 21<sup>st</sup> century: strategic deterrence and compellence; power projection; sea control; naval diplomacy; security of the homeland and constabulary missions; and humanitarian assistance.<sup>132</sup> Historically, navies have overtly played a key role in achieving these missions. Strategic deterrence and compellence usually occur in the context of nuclear deterrence, with a navy's force used to deter a nation from a certain action or pushing an adversary to compliance. Power projection is the overt use of naval power to affect operations ashore. A navy is able to conduct power projection ashore either through amphibious operations, naval gunfire or air attacks. Sea control is the assurance of freedom of movement by one's own navy or the denial of an area from another nation's use. In both World Wars, the allied navies maintained the Sea Lines of Communication between North America and Europe, enabling the war to continue. Traditionally, nations have used their navies for diplomatic endeavours. A navy ship can initiate government to government contact, demonstrate a nation's interest in the area, support trade and conduct confidence building exercises. A navy can also support security of the homeland and constabulary missions through their presence in a region to prevent or deter aggression and criminal activity or to monitor a situation. Navies currently conduct anti-piracy or smuggling patrols off the Horn of Africa and in South East Asia. In addition, navies enforce economic sanctions, such as the Food for Oil program in the Persian Gulf in the 1990s. Finally, modern navies can be used for humanitarian assistance operations as exemplified in 2008, when the USNS MERCY

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<sup>132</sup>*Ibid*, 59.

conducted a humanitarian mission to the Asia-Pacific region as part of a Pacific Partnership good will mission.<sup>133</sup>

### **Intrinsic Value of the Navy**

There is intrinsic value in deploying the navy, as opposed to the army or the airforce. A warship has global reach and is a legal extension and symbol of the government it represents. A warship is a self-contained unit that can quickly deploy to anywhere in the world. The Canadian Navy High Readiness Task Group is on ten days notice to deploy and is not encumbered by a large logistics tail. Ships have the inherent flexibility of movement, sailing in and out of an area of concern relatively easily. Once the mission is over or the threat or crisis has passed, a navy can depart without the long process of a deployed army. The presence of a warship sends a signal to the nation, the region and the world of the concern or interest of the parent state. “Naval forces can be intrusive or out of sight, threatening or non-threatening, and easily dispatched but just as easily withdrawn.”<sup>134</sup> A clear example of the navy’s capabilities was demonstrated in October 2001, when, within a month of the attacks of 9/11, the Canadian government deployed Canada’s High Readiness Naval Task Group to take part in Operation Apollo, Canada’s initial contribution to the War on Terror:<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>133</sup>United States Navy, “Hospital Ship to Conduct Pacific Partnership 2008,” [http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story\\_id=34694](http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=34694); Internet; accessed 31 March 2009.

<sup>134</sup>Adm James D. Watkins, USN, “The Maritime Strategy,” *The US Naval Institute* 112, no. 2 (January 1986): 8.

<sup>135</sup>Canada. Department of National Defense, *Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark* (Ottawa, Ontario, May 2005), 3.

navies alone afford governments the means of exerting pressure more vigorously than diplomacy and less dangerous and unpredictable in its results than other forms of force, because the freedom of the sea makes them locally available while leaving them uncommitted. They have the right to sail the seas and the endurance to do so for the requisite periods, while land forces cannot present a credible level of coercion without overstepping the boundaries of national sovereignty.<sup>136</sup>

Clearly navies can achieve a great deal with respect to a nation's strategic objectives.

They can provide a military, constabulary and diplomatic response to virtually any region in the world. Navies can work in a coalition or individually and can be withdrawn at any time. The mere presence of a ship denotes the importance a nation places on any given situation. The ability to project maritime power is an important aspect of any great or aspiring great nation.

## **CANADA'S DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGY**

In broad terms, the *Canada First Defence Strategy* outlines what is currently expected from its military forces and what assets the government will provide to the CF to achieve these goals. In this document, Prime Minister Stephen Harper states his goal to build a first class modern military for “. . . keeping our citizens safe and secure, defending our sovereignty, and ensuring that Canada can return to the international stage as a credible and influential country, ready to do its part.”<sup>137</sup> Minister of National Defence Peter MacKay outlines the Canadian Forces' (CF) role in meeting the Government of Canada's national security and foreign policy objectives. To do so, the CF will be provided with the personnel, equipment, readiness and infrastructure to be

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<sup>136</sup>D.P. O'Connell, *The Influence of Law on Sea Power*, (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1975), 3-4, quoted in Peter Haydon, “Why Does Canada Still Need a Navy?” Maritime Security Working Paper No. 1. (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2007), 2.

<sup>137</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, *2008 Canada First Defence Strategy*.

able "...to deliver excellence at home, be a strong and reliable partner in the defence of North America, and project leadership abroad by making meaningful contributions to operations overseas."<sup>138</sup>

The *Canada First Defence Strategy* outlines the security concerns in a globalized world, including: "ethnic and border conflicts, fragile states, resurgent nationalism and global criminal networks [which] continue to threaten international stability."<sup>139</sup>

Canada's security is also threatened by regional tension resulting from the competition for resources and economic disparity in areas such as Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and the Balkans. Furthermore, the proliferation of WMD, the emergence of nuclear powers, the rise of Islamic militants in key regions, and the arms race in the Asia Pacific countries could all have significant impacts on international peace and security in the future.<sup>140</sup> These security issues are clearly articulated in Chapter One of this paper. In light of these security concerns and to achieve Canada's foreign policy objectives, the CF is given three distinct roles – "...defending Canada, defending North America and contributing to international peace and security."<sup>141</sup>

The *Canada First Defence Strategy* emphasizes the critical requirements for a strong global economy and regional stability to ensure Canada's continued prosperity. As a middle power nation with global interests, Canada works with other like-minded nations to ensure its security. Being able to tackle threats at their source is a crucial

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<sup>138</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>139</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>140</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>141</sup>*Ibid.*

element in the defence of Canada.<sup>142</sup> Canada supports and works well within defined international bodies such as the UN and NATO to ensure regional stability and economic development.

The Canadian Navy is well equipped to meet and support the objectives laid out in the *Canada First Defence Strategy*. The Canadian Navy has demonstrated leadership capabilities in multinational task groups and bilateral deployments with the USN. The Canadian Navy has the high-tech command and control capabilities and experience with like-minded nations in “coalitions of the willing” in the maritime environment to make a naval response the preferred choice in international issues.<sup>143</sup> The Canadian Navy, with its ability to project itself globally, has led and conducted Maritime Interdiction Operations far from Canadian and North American shores. Roles such as command of Combined Task Force 150 in 2008 allowed Canada and the Canadian Navy to achieve goals outlined in the *Canada First Defence Strategy*. These coalition operations included intercepting and inspecting shipping to prevent the transportation of WMD, terrorists, illegal immigrants, narcotics and piracy.<sup>144</sup> The Navy also provides support to non-government organisations to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations.<sup>145</sup> For example, in September 2008,

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<sup>142</sup>Ibid.

<sup>143</sup>VAdm Bruce MacLean, “Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers,” *NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace*; (2006), 33.

<sup>144</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, “Operation Altair,” <http://www.comfoc-ecfcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/altair/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 01 April 2009.

<sup>145</sup>MacLean, “Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers,” 33-36.



HMCS ST. JOHN'S was tasked to support the World Food Programme in Haiti to deliver much needed food supplies to her population.<sup>146</sup>

The Canadian Navy's international operations meet the six core missions outlined by Haydon: strategic deterrence and compellence; power projection; sea control; naval diplomacy; security of the homeland and constabulary missions; and humanitarian assistance. Canada's maritime functions create and sustain specific strategic and operational objectives through forward deployments with key bilateral and multilateral partners, as determined by the priorities outlined by the Government of Canada in the *Canada First Defence Strategy*.

## **THE CANADIAN NAVY'S ROLE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

### **World War I and World War II**

Historically Canada and its maritime forces were focussed on Europe and North America for the lead on national security and defence. In both World Wars, Canada's maritime efforts were devoted to ensuring that the vital SLOC to re-supply the United Kingdom were maintained. During the Battle of the Atlantic, the Canadian Navy was deployed in the Anti-Submarine Warfare role against German U-Boats in the North Atlantic. In the Second World War, Canada grew to be the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest navy in the world.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>146</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, "International Operations: HMCS St. John's completes mission in Haiti," [http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-a\\_eng.asp?category=15&id=682](http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-a_eng.asp?category=15&id=682); Internet; accessed 01 April 2009.

<sup>147</sup>Rob Heubert, "Continental Defence at Sea-the Canadian Challenge," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol 9, Issue 2 (Winter 2006/07): [journal on-line]; available from

By comparison, during the Second World War, Canada's contribution to the Pacific Theatre was fairly limited. Canada's involvement consisted mainly of Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), a few serving members in Royal Navy ships, members of the British Fourteenth Army, and the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers in the ill-fated defence of Hong Kong. In 1945, once Canada's commitments to Europe were completed, some 60,000 Canadians volunteered to join the Pacific forces and began amassing in nine centres across Canada. The Canadian naval contribution was to be in the neighbourhood of 60 ships and 13,500 men.<sup>148</sup> Fortunately for these men the surrender of Japan negated the requirement to invade the Japanese homeland.

### **The Cold War Period**

With the end of the Second World War and the emergence of the communist threat, the Canadian naval forces were used primarily to counter the surge of Soviet forces through the Greenland, Iceland, and United Kingdom gap. During the Cold War, the Canadian Navy was re-built to meet the growing submarine threat.<sup>149</sup> Again, Canada's Navy was primarily focused on the SLOC between North America and Europe. However, with the invasion of South Korea by North Korea 25 July 1950, attention again turned to the Asia-Pacific theatre. The Canadian Navy responded by sailing three Canadian destroyers, HMCS CAYUGA, HMCS ATHABASKAN, and HMCS SIOUX

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[http://www.jmss.org/2007/2007winter/articles/huebert\\_cont-defence.pdf](http://www.jmss.org/2007/2007winter/articles/huebert_cont-defence.pdf); Internet; accessed 03 March 2009.

<sup>148</sup>Canada at War, "Canadians in Asia & the Pacific." <http://wwii.ca/page32.html>; Internet; accessed 16 February 2009.

<sup>149</sup>Heubert, "Continental Defence at Sea-the Canadian Challenge,".

on 12 July for Korean waters. These assets were soon joined by the Royal Canadian Air Force and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.<sup>150</sup>

During the period between the end of the Korean War and the end of the Cold War, Canada's focus was again on the Atlantic. The Canadian Navy on the west coast was relegated to the role of training for those conducting the "real war" on the Atlantic.<sup>151</sup> That is not to say there were not advocates and opportunities for further engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. In his report to Parliament in 1963, Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Rayner, highlighted the requirements of the Canadian Navy to be able to operate with, and in conjunction with, allied navies.<sup>152</sup> He described the overarching purpose of the Navy as being able to carry out its wartime tasks and in peacetime, to prepare to carry out those missions in times of war or emergency. As part of the preparation to be capable of operating effectively with allies in various regions throughout the world, it is imperative that a navy is familiar with these different operational theatres and environments. In 1962, in support of this goal of maintaining the strength and flexibility of the Canadian Navy, West Coast ships visited Singapore, Rangoon, Colombo, Trincomalee (Ceyon), Port Swettenham (Malaya), Bangkok, Hong Kong and Yokosuka (Japan) in conjunction with a Commonwealth naval exercise in the

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<sup>150</sup>Veterans Affairs Canada, "Chronology of the Canadian Advance in Korea," <http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=history/KoreaWar/chronology>; Internet; accessed 01 April 2009.

<sup>151</sup>Dr. James Boutilier, "The Canadian Navy and the new naval environment in Asia," *International Journal* 3, no.1 (Winter 2002-2003): 194.

<sup>152</sup>Ready Aye Ready, "The State of the RCN in 1963," <http://www.readyayeready.com/timeline/1960s/rcn-in-1963/part03.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2009.

Indian Ocean.<sup>153</sup> Rayner emphasized that while ships were in foreign ports they would naturally support the (then) Departments of External Affairs, and the Department of Trade and Commerce in positively projecting Canada's image abroad.<sup>154</sup> Rayner also laid out what he thought were the five capabilities of the navy:<sup>155</sup>

- a) defend Canada's interests against attack from the sea;
- b) meet Canada's commitments to collective security arrangements...;
- c) contribute to other external undertakings, e.g. to UN operations (Korea and Suez);
- d) support the Canadian Army in actions arising out of (b) and (c); and
- e) contribute to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

## **Post Cold War**

At the end of the Cold War, a shift in Canadian strategic thinking towards regional stability occurred as the new world order moved from a bi-polar to a uni-polar world. The *1994 Defence White Paper* and the *1994 Government Statement on Foreign Affairs* reflected this shift by highlighting the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region as it applied to Canada's economic and security concerns. The CF was tasked to develop defence relationships with the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America.<sup>156</sup> The *1994 Defence White Paper* stated that up to this point, with the exception of Korea, Canada's role in the Asia-Pacific had been marginal. However, as Canada's interests in the region had increased, so had regional security ties. Canada became active in regional

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<sup>153</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>156</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence. *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1994), 27.

security discussions such as the Asia Regional Forum (ARF), the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific, and the Canadian Consortium on Asia-Pacific Security. It was assessed that as Canada's economic interests grew in the region so would Canada's regional security relations. The *1994 Defence White Paper* tasked the CF to increase its bilateral military contacts with key nations such as Japan and South Korea, and members of ASEAN. It also called for the broadening of its visit and exchange program.<sup>157</sup>

After the tabling of the *1994 Defence White Paper*, activity between the Canadian Navy and the Asia-Pacific region increased. In an article from the *Montreal Gazette* 04 July 1995, a senior Canadian naval officer was quoted as saying that "...Canada places a high importance on Asia-Pacific security to safeguard its economic interests and ethnic links with the region."<sup>158</sup> In the same article, Rear Admiral Bruce Johnston, Commander of Maritime Forces Pacific, stated "This is in line with Canada's new foreign policy to balance its traditional military leanings toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with a presence in the Pacific."<sup>159</sup>

This new direction from Ottawa, coupled with the acquisition of the new Canadian Patrol Frigates, placed the Canadian Navy in a better position to enact its engagement plan with the Asia-Pacific region. In 1995, MARPAC initiated a Western Pacific Deployment plan to the region which saw frigates from Esquimalt conduct multiple port visits in the Asia-Pacific region. The intention was to conduct a "... rolling

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<sup>157</sup>*Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>158</sup>The *Gazette*, "Canadian Navy to focus on Asia-Pacific admiral says," *The Gazette* (04 July 1995): A.7; <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=8&sid=2&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=3&st...>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2009.

<sup>159</sup>*Ibid.*

five-year visit programme. . . to demonstrate that we are ‘of the Pacific.’ The plan required that the Navy make annual trips to the region with repeat visits to individual countries every two years.”<sup>160</sup> This plan was developed and synthesized with DFAIT to enhance Canada’s military, diplomatic, cultural and economic relations. These deployments, initially called WESTPLOYS, were “. . . designed to ensure a consistent and predictable Canadian naval presence in Asian waters.”<sup>161</sup>

### **The Future**

The Canadian Navy’s document, *Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020*, was the Navy’s effort in defining Canada’s maritime strategy. *Leadmark 2020* summarized the core requirements of the Canadian Navy outlined by previous defence documents. Many of the threats discussed in *Leadmark 2020* originate from the Asia-Pacific region, such as the security concerns related to India-Pakistan, the Spratly Islands, and the Tamil Tigers.<sup>162</sup> *Leadmark 2020* also recognized the Middle East and Asia as being of strategic importance to Canada.

In 2006, Vice-Admiral Bruce MacLean, Chief of Maritime Staff, described the Canadian Navy’s role in forward security in his article, “Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers.” CF employment in the resolution of international crisis at its source has earned Canada international respect. This resolution at its source is in our own interests

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<sup>160</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, “Backgrounders: Canadian Naval Presence In The Asia-Pacific Region,”.

<sup>161</sup>Boutilier, “The Canadian Navy and the new naval environment in Asia,”195.

<sup>162</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, *Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020*, available from [http://www.navy.dnd.ca/leadmark/doc/part5\\_e.asp](http://www.navy.dnd.ca/leadmark/doc/part5_e.asp); Internet; accessed 16 February 2009.

as Canada's security is best protected by engaging failed or failing states far away from Canada. MacLean commented that there were several engagement opportunities for the Canadian Navy to defend our interests congruent with those missions outlined by Haydon. The Canadian Navy could be deployed to "...demonstrate concern over a developing situation, to participation in naval peacekeeping in disputed waters, to the suppression of piracy along international sea-lanes, and to the enforcement of sanctions against rogue states for failure to comply with United Nations resolution."<sup>163</sup>

In order for the Canadian Navy, with its finite resources, to meet all of the Government of Canada's requirements, as outlined in the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, clear direction and priorities must be provided and established by the senior navy leadership. On 12 March 2008, Vice Admiral D.W. Robertson, the Chief of the Maritime Staff, published his commander's intent. Three basic and continuing strategic goals were stated: renewal of the navy institution, success in operations today, and success in operations tomorrow.<sup>164</sup> Robertson commented that the Canadian Navy has deployed overseas to support Canadian strategic objectives and continued security in spite of a lack of a CF force employment strategy.<sup>165</sup> Robertson concludes that the navy will continue to operate and make its best assessment of Canada's long term strategic objectives in the absence of an officially stated maritime FE strategy while the Strategic Joint Staff and the Director General Maritime Personnel and Readiness determine what Canadian Maritime Strategy will be. In the meantime, Robertson encourages planners to focus on the US, the

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<sup>163</sup>MacLean, "Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers," 32-33.

<sup>164</sup>VAdm D.W. Robertson, *Maritime Commander's Intent for 2009 to 2012*, Chief of Maritime Staff: 3371-1948-1, 12 March 2008.

<sup>165</sup>*Ibid.*

Americas, NATO, focused relationships in the Asia-Pacific region and leadership opportunities for the Composite Task Group.<sup>166</sup>

The Commander's Intent was supported by the Director Asia-Pacific Policy office, which drafted an internal briefing note on "Canadian Defence Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region." Three broad objectives for the CF with respect to the Asia-Pacific region were outlined:<sup>167</sup>

1. Enhance CF interoperability in the region;
2. Demonstrate Canadian military commitment to the region; and
3. Support Canada's broader security and foreign policy agenda in the region.

The Canadian Navy continues to initiate and generate a great deal of activity to strengthen Canada's strategic, operational and tactical relationships in the Asia-Pacific region.

## **CONCLUSION**

Clearly navies can achieve a great deal with respect to a nation's strategic objectives. They can provide a military, constabulary and diplomatic response to virtually any region in the world. Navies can work in a coalition or individually and can be withdrawn at any time. The mere presence of a ship denotes the importance a nation places on any given situation. The ability to project maritime power is an important aspect of any great or aspiring great nation.

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<sup>166</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>167</sup>LCol S.H. Chessum, Canadian Defence Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region: Overview. Director Asia-Pacific Policy, 14 July 2008.



The Canadian Navy is well equipped to meet the objectives outlined in the *Canada First Defence Strategy* and *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark*. The Canadian Navy has continued to deploy overseas to support Canada's strategic objectives and security despite a lack of a CF Force Employment Strategy. The next chapter will look specifically at the Canadian Navy's defence and security involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, including Canada's participation in maritime deployments and multilateral and bilateral exercises as well as high level conferences with Asia-Pacific nations.

When the people of this region asks if Canada is finally serious about Asia, one of the indicators is the activity of the Canadian fleet.<sup>168</sup>

## **CHAPTER FOUR CANADA'S MARITIME INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

### **INTRODUCTION**

It is clear that Canada is geographically connected to and has expanding strategic and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. As the shift from a Eurocentric to an Asia-Pacific centric world continues, the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly important for Canada in terms of trade, immigration influx, growing political power and related security concerns. Unfortunately, although the interest of various levels of government and the Department of National Defence to engage in the Asia-Pacific region has been increasing, there is a lack of prioritization, firm direction and clearly defined objectives to oversee any type of Canada Asia-Pacific engagement plan. If Canada wants to remain a player in this vital region then it needs to remain engaged in a meaningful way.

In this chapter, the extent to which the Canadian Navy has been successful in contributing to regional security and furthering Canada's foreign policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific region is examined. This discussion will focus on the Canadian Navy's activities in the Asia-Pacific region during the period of the release of the *1994 Defence White Paper* to HMCS WINNIPEG's current Asia-Pacific mission with Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG 1). Canada's participating in maritime deployments and multilateral and bilateral exercises as well as attending high level conferences with nations in the Asia-Pacific region are examined.

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<sup>168</sup>The Gazette, "Canadian Navy to focus on Asia-Pacific admiral says," A.7.

## **CANADIAN NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

As previously discussed, the navy is traditionally a favoured choice to support its government's economic and territorial interests and diplomatic endeavours. A navy ship can initiate government to government contact, demonstrate a nation's interest in the area, support trade and conduct confidence building exercises. A navy can also be used to support security of the homeland and conduct constabulary missions through their presence in a region to prevent or deter aggression and criminal activity or to monitor a situation. The focus of Canadian naval deployments has always been in the order of continental defence, NATO and international security. Initiatives and deployments to the Asia-Pacific region are no exception, falling under the auspices of contributing to international peace and security.

At the end of the Cold War, the CF and the Canadian Navy struggled with its next priority for international peace and security. The *1994 Defence White Paper* provided direction for the CF in the post-Cold War era. For the first time, a White Paper tasked the CF to increase its bilateral military contacts with key nations such as Japan and South Korea, and members of ASEAN. It also called for the broadening of its visit and exchange program. Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAAC) was the best situated force with the best assets to initiate and strengthen Canadian military relations in the Asia-Pacific region. The introduction of the Halifax Class Frigate into the fleet gave the navy the ships with the endurance and the technological capability to engage in the Asia-Pacific. In addition, Rear-Admiral Bruce Johnston employed a mid-level Foreign Service officer

with a great deal of Asia experience as his special advisor to develop an Asia engagement plan.<sup>169</sup>

### **Western Deployment (WESTPLOY)**

To initiate the building of bilateral and multilateral ties between the Canadian Navy and the navies of the Asia-Pacific region and to demonstrate that Canada was a nation of the Pacific, MARPAC created a five year innovative deployment program, WESTPLOY. Key countries were identified, and an alternating northern and southern WESTPLOY program was actioned. To maximize Canadian economic, military and diplomatic relations within the Asia-Pacific region, these deployments were loosely coordinated with DFAIT.<sup>170</sup> However, the initial WESTPLOY program was very much under the discretion of MARPAC. With no overarching or focused direction from Ottawa, Johnston designed his own Canadian naval engagement in the Asia-Pacific.<sup>171</sup>

Since the development of the initial WESTPLOY program, the MARPAC Asia-Pacific engagement plan has become more transparent and wider consultation for planning occurs. MARPAC currently hosts an annual Asia-Pacific symposium and invites key members from the Chief of Maritime Staff and other DND policy advisors to discuss MARPAC's "Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Cooperation Strategy." This symposium provides an update on the geo-political and security situation in the region,

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<sup>169</sup>Dr. James Boutilier, email with author, 28 February 2009.

<sup>170</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, "Backgrounders: Canadian Naval Presence In The Asia-Pacific Region,".

<sup>171</sup>Dr. James Boutilier, email with author, 28 February 2009.

and provides planning guidelines for the staff in pursuit of engagement opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>172</sup> As stated by Gimblett, “while the primary objective of WESTPLOY remains to foster better ‘navy-to-navy’ relationships, port destinations and activities are finalized in consultation with [DFAIT] to ensure maximum support for broader diplomatic efforts.”<sup>173</sup> DFAIT will regularly use visiting Canadian ships as platforms to foster trade and diplomatic relations in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>174</sup>

WESTPLOY deployments vary in scope and size and are critical in maintaining defence ties within the region and foster mutual understanding and respect as the building blocks for future military, diplomatic and constabulary work. For example, in 2008, the most recent WESTPLOY, HMCS REGINA and HMCS OTTAWA made a diplomatic visit to Okinawa Japan, conducted the first ever trilateral exercise with Canadian, US and Japanese forces, and continued on to visited eight other ports in order to advance stronger ties between the navies of Canada, the US and Asia-Pacific.<sup>175</sup> In that same year, HMCS PROTECTEUR and HMCS CALGARY conducted a port visit to the Republic of Korea

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<sup>172</sup>RAdm T.H.W. Pile, *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Cooperation Strategy*, MARP: 3000-1 Confidential, 06 February 2008.

<sup>173</sup>Richard Gimblett, “Asia-Pacific Diplomacy,” [http://www.Frontline-canada.com/FrontLineSecurity/pdfs/4\\_AsiaPacific.pdf](http://www.Frontline-canada.com/FrontLineSecurity/pdfs/4_AsiaPacific.pdf); Internet; accessed 21 April 2009.

<sup>174</sup>Government of Canada, “HMCS Regina deploys to Northeast Asia on,” [http://geo.international.gc.ca/asia/china/media/news\\_releases-en.aspx?id=8350](http://geo.international.gc.ca/asia/china/media/news_releases-en.aspx?id=8350); Internet; accessed 20 April 2009.

<sup>175</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, “News Releases: Westploy 2008 Okinawa Port Visit a Success,” [http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/marpac/4/4-w\\_eng.asp?section=9&category=36&id=955](http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/marpac/4/4-w_eng.asp?section=9&category=36&id=955); Internet; accessed 06 April 2009. (HMCS OTTAWA and REGINA visited China, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam during this deployment).

to mark her 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary as part of an international Fleet Review in the Busan Region.<sup>176</sup>

WESTPLOY continues to be part of the Canadian Navy's strategy to promote peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region through the building of bilateral and multilateral ties between Canada and various nations in the region. The diplomatic port visits and participation in naval exercises with the US and the Asia-Pacific navies continue to raise Canada's profile in the region and enhance Canada's credibility as a player in the Asia-Pacific.

### **CANADIAN NAVAL EXERCISES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

The organizing and participating in international naval military exercises meets the three pillars of maritime roles as described by Haydon. International naval exercises support the military objectives of allowing different navies to conduct combined maritime operations in all areas of warfare. Exercises meet the constabulary role by demonstrating how different navies can build and contribute to the Recognized Maritime Picture and communicate this information to the rest of an International Task Group. Finally, exercises are diplomatic in nature as they provide opportunities for confidence building, the demonstration of the strength of the multi-national organization and the development of solidarity and interoperability between exercise participants.

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<sup>176</sup>According to Dr. Boutilier's "Standing into heavy seas", Canadian naval vessels deployed into the Western Pacific 108 times between 1960 and 1994. Since the first WESTPLOY in 1995, on average two Canadian ships have deployed to or transited through the Asia-Pacific region.

## **Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)**

The premier maritime exercise in the Pacific, and arguable the world, is the USN lead Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. The intention of this multi-national exercise is to demonstrate a commitment to regional security and build interoperability between participating nations to enable them to carry out the entire spectrum of naval combined and joint operations in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>177</sup> The RIMPAC 2008 website states that this exercise “...demonstrates the Navy’s commitment, as expressed in the Maritime Strategy, to working with our global partners to protect the maritime freedom that is the basis for global prosperity and to ensuring stability throughout the Pacific Rim.”<sup>178</sup> RIMPAC 2008 consisted of 10 nations, 35 ships, six submarines, over 150 aircraft and 20,000 personnel<sup>179</sup>, presenting an excellent opportunity to practice skills in combating terrorism, piracy, preventing the proliferation of WMD, and conducting humanitarian assistance operations.<sup>180</sup> According to Vice Admiral Samuel J. Lacklear, Commander US 3<sup>rd</sup> Fleet and Combined Task Force RIMPAC, “The RIMPAC exercise is recognition of the global security environment we are in. It’s a recognition that no one country can maintain the global security environment, and it requires all of us to work together to acquire this goal.”<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>177</sup>Commander Third Fleet, “RIMPAC 2008 to Unite Ten Nations in Combined, Joint Exercise,” [www.c3f.navy.mil/rimpac\\_2008](http://www.c3f.navy.mil/rimpac_2008); Internet; accessed 25 March 2009. The ten nations are Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Netherlands, Peru, Republic of Korea, Singapore, United Kingdom, and the US.

<sup>178</sup>Commander Third Fleet, “RIMPAC 2008,” [http://www.c3f.navy.mil/RIMPAC\\_2008/about\\_rimpac\\_rimpac08.html](http://www.c3f.navy.mil/RIMPAC_2008/about_rimpac_rimpac08.html); Internet; accessed 25 March 2009.

<sup>179</sup>Commander Third Fleet, “RIMPAC 2008 to Unite Ten Nations in Combined, Joint Exercise,”

<sup>180</sup>Asia Pacific Defense Forum, “RIMPAC 2006: Fostering Regional Peace and Security,” [http://forum.apan-info.net/2007-2nd\\_quater/rimpac/1.html](http://forum.apan-info.net/2007-2nd_quater/rimpac/1.html); Internet; accessed 25 March 2009.

For the Canadian Navy, RIMPAC is the pre-eminent Pacific exercise and the cornerstone for its biennial WESTPLOYs. Since its inception in 1971, the Canadian Navy has participated in every RIMPAC exercise. During RIMPAC, Canada is afforded leadership opportunities at the operational command level and to enhance its interoperability with nations of the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>182</sup> The RIMPAC exercise and WESTPLOY allows the Canadian Navy to work with other nations in the Asia-Pacific to demonstrate its military capabilities, enhance diplomacy and play a role in the constabulary mission while on the high seas. As Brigadier-General Yvan Blondin, Deputy Combined Forces Air Component Commander, pointed out “When you’re called into an operation, that’s not the time to learn how things work. We use exercises like RIMPAC to get comfortable with other services and other militaries, so that our people can understand how operations are done in an international forum.”<sup>183</sup>

Although Canada and the rest of the RIMPAC participants view the intention and the results for RIMPAC as positive, not all Asia-Pacific nations share this sentiment. Russian military officers were invited to attend RIMPAC in 2004 and 2006 but declined.<sup>184</sup> In 2008, as part of the RIMPAC 2008 Foreign Observer Program, naval officers from Russia, Mexico, and Colombia visited the USN amphibious assault ship

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<sup>181</sup>United States Navy, “RIMPAC Touted as Largest Maritime Exercise in World,” [http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story\\_id=38312](http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=38312); Internet; accessed 25 March 2009.

<sup>182</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, “WESTPLOY/RIMPAC 08,” [http://www.navy/forces.gc.ca/marpac/5/5-w\\_eng.asp?category=29&title=950](http://www.navy/forces.gc.ca/marpac/5/5-w_eng.asp?category=29&title=950); Internet; accessed 25 March 2009.

<sup>183</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, “Air Force demonstrates leadership at RIMPAC 2008,” [http://www.airforce.forces.ca/site/newsroom/news\\_e.asp?cat=114&id=6820](http://www.airforce.forces.ca/site/newsroom/news_e.asp?cat=114&id=6820); Internet; accessed 25 March 2009.

<sup>184</sup>United States Navy, “Russia accepts RIMPAC Invitation,” [http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story\\_id=34230](http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=34230); Internet; accessed 07 April 2009.



USS Bonhomme Richard to enhance their understanding of coalition interaction and provide them with the confidence to participate in future RIMPAC exercises.<sup>185</sup> The Pyongyang Press article, “KCNA on Japan’s participation in ‘Rimpac’”, was skeptical of Japan’s intention and participation in RIMPAC 2002. The article denounced Japan’s image as a “peace-loving state” pursuing an “exclusively defensive policy.” It was evident to the author that Japanese participation in RIMPAC was a clear indication that Japan’s “...ambition to dominate Asia remains unchanged and its moves to invade the DPRK have become evermore undisguised.”<sup>186</sup> The article went on to further accuse Japan of escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region and of risking global peace and security.<sup>187</sup> Although this article is clearly biased it does have its North Korean readers, some of whom remember well Japanese expansionism in the 1930s and 40s.

Likely the most critical complaint about RIMPAC and its intent came from China. On 30 June 2008, the Beijing based International Herald Leader reported that their assumption was that China was the target of RIMPAC ‘08.<sup>188</sup> The report continued that China and Russia had been invited in the past as observers but that the overall intention of RIMPAC was never clear, that they were excluded from some of the events and that in 2008 they were not invited at all. The article concluded that RIMPAC was the remnant

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<sup>185</sup>United States Navy, “International RIMPAC Observers Embark Bonhomme Richard,” [http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story\\_id=38729](http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=38729); Internet; accessed 25 March 2009.

<sup>186</sup>Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), “KCNA on Japan’s participation in “Rimpac’”, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200207/news07/16.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2009.

<sup>187</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>188</sup>China.org., “Military exercise in the Pacific targets China,” [http://www.china.org.cn/international/opinion/2008-07/01/content\\_15916848.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/international/opinion/2008-07/01/content_15916848.htm); Internet; accessed 05 April 2009.

of a Cold War exercise; that China and Russia were still considered the enemy and that “The multinational marine military exercise is part of US efforts to contain China and to ensure the US’s continuing dominance of the Asia-Pacific region.”<sup>189</sup>

According to the USN, China was not invited to observe RIMPAC 08 due to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-65) which precludes military to military contact with China with the exception of search-and-rescue and humanitarian assistance operations. The article also notes that in 2006 a waiver was given for a Chinese team to observe a portion of an exercise off of GUAM, and that a few Chinese observers were allowed to monitor RIMPAC 98 before the law was passed.<sup>190</sup> This critique by China of RIMPAC has not evolved into an issue between the two countries as of yet. However, there is the possibility that China could make this an issue with Canada or other Asia-Pacific nations in the future based on a country’s participation in RIMPAC.

### **Other Asia-Pacific Exercises**

Though none can match its size and scope, there are several other Asia-Pacific exercises besides RIMPAC. The US military participates in just over 30 exercises in the region annually.<sup>191</sup> Other key exercises include Cobra Gold, Talisman Sabre, and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT).

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<sup>189</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>190</sup>United States Navy, “Russia accepts RIMPAC Invitation.”

<sup>191</sup>MSgt Chris Vadnais, “RIMPAC 2008 builds trust between nations,” <http://www.pacaf.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123107905>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2009.

Cobra Gold is an annual combined US and Thailand sponsored multinational exercise conducted in Thailand. Cobra Gold is designed to promote peace and security and enhance joint and multinational interoperability and capability focussed on regional security issues such as terrorism and counterinsurgency.<sup>192</sup> Cobra Gold involves other Asia-Pacific nations such as Singapore, Japan, and Indonesia.<sup>193</sup> Though not a participant in Cobra Gold, Canada has been invited to observe the exercise. Two other exercises which Canada does not participate in are Talisman Sabre and CARAT. Talisman Sabre is a biennial US-Australian bilateral exercise conducted in the Asia-Pacific.<sup>194</sup> The precursor to this exercise was Tandem Thrust which, up until the name change, Canada was allowed to participate in. The focus of Talisman Sabre is on “operational and tactical interoperability through a high end, medium intensity scenario involving live, virtual and constructive forces.”<sup>195</sup> Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) is an US sponsored annual exercise which consists of a series of bi-lateral events with the US and several Southeast Asian nations.<sup>196</sup> CARAT is “designed to build relationships and

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<sup>192</sup>APAN, “Exercise Cobra Gold 2009,” <https://www1.apan-info.net/Default.aspx?alias=www1.apan-info.net/cg08>; Internet; accessed 07 April 2009. Full participating nations include: Thailand, United States, Singapore, Indonesia, Japan and tentatively South Korea.

<sup>193</sup>United States Department of State, “Cobra Gold’09 Joint Exercise Announced February 4-17, 2009” <http://bangkok.usembassy.gov/news/press/2009/nrot002.html>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2009.

<sup>194</sup>Global Security.org, “Tandem Thrust,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tandem-thrust.htm>; Internet; accessed 07 April 2009.

<sup>195</sup>Australian Government, “Exercise Talisman Saber 2009,” <http://www.daff.gov.au/aqis/avm/military/talisman-saber-2009>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2009.

<sup>196</sup>GlobalSecurity.org, “Successful CARAT Singapore Ends; Plans Begin for 2009 Exercise,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/07/mil-080703-nns08.htm>; Internet; accessed 07 April 2009.

enhance the operational readiness of the participating forces.”<sup>197</sup> There was discussion of MARPAC integrating a ship for a portion of a CARAT deployment, but due to lack of resources it was placed on hold.

It is not clear that the Canadian Navy would deploy a ship to participate in all or any of these exercises even if invited to participate. By attending some exercises and not others it could send messages to regional navies or governments of the importance Canada places on that relationship. Most likely, Canadian participation in these exercises is limited more by time, distance and resources versus any overarching grand strategy. Based on the Canadian Navy’s positive experiences in regional exercises like RIMPAC and bilateral engagements, Canada would likely be invited to more events if present in the region. However, if you only visit a few weeks a year, and do not commit longer than a year in advance it is difficult to plan for one’s arrival. It is safe to assume that if the Canadian Navy had more of a presence in the region that it would be invited to participate more in multilateral exercises in the Asia-Pacific.

## **PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE**

The US led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was initiated by President George W. Bush on 31 May 2003. The intention was to have a “...global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>197</sup>United States Navy, “Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) 2007,” <http://www.clwp.navy.mil/CARAT%202007/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2009.

<sup>198</sup>United States Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm>; Internet; accessed 04 April 2009.

The PSI is also in line with the January 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement that the proliferation of WMD was a threat to international peace and security. Similarly the G-8 and the European Union have echoed this statement and are concerned about the danger of WMD, in particular if provided to terrorists.<sup>199</sup>

Canada joined PSI in December 2003. According to DFAIT, “Canadian participation in the PSI is consistent with, and supportive of, Canada’s emphasis on strengthening counter-proliferation mechanisms to promote regional stability and international security.”<sup>200</sup> DFAIT has the lead on the policy issues of PSI, and DND the lead on operational issues.<sup>201</sup> Although all of the CF has the capability to participate in PSI operations, it is the Canadian Navy which has been at the forefront of these operations. During Operations Augmentation, Apollo and Altair the Canadian Navy was tasked with Maritime Interdiction Operations, including detecting, tracking, hailing, intercepting, and if required boarding merchant vessels to verify cargoes and divert vessels in contravention of UN Security Council Resolutions.<sup>202</sup>

Additionally, it is Canada’s intention to prevent the spread of WMD to rogue states and non-state actors. This goal has the potential to put the CF in direct confrontation with Asia-Pacific nations such as North Korea, a nation with a history of

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<sup>199</sup>Global Security.org, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/psi.htm>; Internet; accessed 04 April 2009.

<sup>200</sup>Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “The Proliferation Security Initiative,” <http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/nuclear-nucleaire/psi-isp.aspx?lang=eng>; Internet; accessed 04 April 2009.

<sup>201</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>202</sup>*Ibid.*

proliferation activities,<sup>203</sup> and China and India who have not yet signed the initiative.

China's concerns regarding PSI stem from the legality of interdictions. In December 2004, at a press conference a Chinese foreign ministry official clarified China's position:<sup>204</sup>

China understands the concerns of the PSI participating countries over the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. However, there are also many concerns in the international community about the legitimacy and effectiveness of PSI interdictions and consequences that may arise there from. The PSI participants should take this into serious consideration. China consistently holds the view that proliferation issues should be resolved within the international legal frameworks by political and diplomatic means, and that any non proliferation measures to be taken should serve to promote international and regional peace, security and stability.

However, in July 2003 China conceded to the Container Security Initiative to allow for pre-screening of all containers bound for the US. India's concerns are based on what they perceive is a two tiered system of the core group and the US and others. Until India's concerns are met they will not likely join the PSI.<sup>205</sup>

## CONFERENCES AND SYMPOSIUMS

Besides naval deployments, international exercises, and PSI, Canadian military officers also participate in several of the Asia-Pacific regional security forums. These gatherings offer senior level military officers the opportunity to meet their counterparts in other countries, influence strategic direction to reflect Canadian interests and strengthen

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<sup>203</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, "Backgrounders: Canadian Naval Presence In The Asia-Pacific Region," .

<sup>204</sup>British American Security Information Council, "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): Combating Illicit WMD Traffic," <http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/counterproliferation/psi.htm>; Internet; accessed 04 April 2009.

<sup>205</sup>*Ibid.*

relationships with allied nations. Three key forums, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), and the Shangri-la Dialogue, are discussed.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1994, to enhance dialogue on political and security issues shared by its 27 member states and to contribute to confidence-building and diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>206</sup> In addition, ARF provides a setting for the development of cooperative solutions to regional issues. Canada, as an ASEAN dialogue partner, has attended the ARF since its inception. CF members have contributed positively to discussions at ARF confidence building events, military education and language training.<sup>207</sup> In April 2008, Canada and Brunei co-chaired an ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventative Diplomacy in Ottawa.<sup>208</sup>

The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) allows senior regional naval personnel to meet and discuss maritime issues. Its aim is

to increase naval cooperation in the Western Pacific among navies by providing a forum for discussion of maritime issues, both global and regional, and in the process, generate a flow of information and opinion between naval professionals leading to common understanding and possibly agreement.<sup>209</sup>

Canada currently has observer status as it is a nation that borders on the Western Pacific, but is not a Western Pacific nation. Canada has been an active participant in this event

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<sup>206</sup>ASEAN Regional Forum, “The ASEAN Regional Forum,” <http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/AboutUs/tabid/57/Default.aspx>; Internet; accessed 05 April 2009.

<sup>207</sup>Chessum, *Canadian Defence Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region: Overview*.

<sup>208</sup>ASEAN Regional Forum, “List of ARF Track 1 Activities (By Subject),” <http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFActivities/ListofARFTrackIActivitiesBySubject/tabid/94/Default.aspx>; Internet; accessed 06 April 2009.

<sup>209</sup>Western Pacific Naval Symposium, “Welcome,” <http://www1.apan-info.net/Default.aspx?alias=www1.apan-info.net/wpns>; Internet; accessed 05 April 2009.

since 1996.<sup>210</sup> The Canadian Navy sees WPNS as a way to further bilateral and multilateral confidence building exercises, foster relationships, contribute to international security and to emphasize their dedication to the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>211</sup> The Canadian Navy is also sponsoring a Maritime Security Challenges Seminar in 2010 to focus on the navies of WPNS and to exam the challenges faced in the region.<sup>212</sup>

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) is the premier venue for discussing and resolving defence and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. According to the IISS:

since its inaugural meeting in 2002, the Dialogue has become an integral part of the architecture of Asian defence diplomacy and is seen as the region's premier and most inclusive security institution. The Shangri-La Dialogue continues to serve as the best available vehicle in the Asia-Pacific region for developing and channelling astute and effective public policy on defence and security.<sup>213</sup>

The IISS invites defence ministers, chiefs of defence staff, foreign ministers and other senior officials from approximately 27 governments to attend this annual conference. Canada has been invited and attended since its inception. However, until recently, lower level DND members have represented Canada. In 2008, for the first time after years of MARPAC lobbying, the Canadian Defence Minister, Peter MacKay and the Associate Deputy Minister attended this conference. The Defence Minister was afforded the

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<sup>210</sup>Chessum, *Canadian Defence Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region: Overview*.

<sup>211</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, "Backgrounders: Canadian Naval Presence in the Asia-Pacific Region,".

<sup>212</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, "Western Pacific Naval Symposium – Maritime Security Challenges Seminar 2010," [http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/marpac/4/4-w\\_eng.asp?section=0&category=50&id=1008](http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/marpac/4/4-w_eng.asp?section=0&category=50&id=1008); Internet; accessed 05 April 2009.

<sup>213</sup>The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "IISS Asia Security Summit The Shangri-La Dialogue," <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2008/>; Internet; accessed 05 April 2009.



opportunity to meet his Asia-Pacific counterparts and discuss "...regional security, public policy on defence and security, and the security situation in Afghanistan."<sup>214</sup> Concerning his visit, Peter MacKay wrote "The Asia-Pacific region is of increasing importance to Canada. Many Canadians have family connections there, and the region's economic growth has important implications for our own prosperity. It is only natural that we are taking a keen interest in Asia-Pacific security issues."<sup>215</sup> One can only speculate on the reasons for why it took six years before the Minister of Defence finally attended the only international conference where a large number of defence ministers from the Asia-Pacific participate. Whatever the reason, it is hoped that Minister MacKay's attendance and "keen interest" is a reflection of the Canadian government's growing recognition of the emergent economic and security importance of the Asia-Pacific region to Canada and a blossoming commitment to strengthening relationships.

## CONCLUSION

Participating in deployments and multilateral and bilateral exercises as well as attending high level conferences with nations in the Asia-Pacific region presents Canada with opportunities to effectively contribute to regional peace and security in a potentially volatile region. Actively partaking in deployments and exercises increases the Canadian Navy's own skills and interoperability with other militaries, shows a visible Canadian presence in the Asia-Pacific region and establishes the foundations for building

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<sup>214</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, "Asia Security Summit," <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister-ministre/newsletter-bulletin/2008-06-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 16 February 2009.

<sup>215</sup>Ibid.

cooperative relationships with participating countries. Canada's attendance at international conferences with Asia-Pacific nations fosters shared understanding, cooperation and trust as countries exchange views on areas of mutual concern and security issues.

In order to maintain and foster its economic, political and military ties, Canada needs to maintain and cultivate its relationships within the Asia-Pacific region. Canadian naval and air personnel have worked in bi-lateral and multi-lateral naval exercises, symposiums, and exchanges over the past 50 years. The Canadian Navy has made great efforts to foster regional security and support through working with various organizations in such forums as WPNS, the Shangri-La Security Dialogue, and the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies.

But is this enough to establish Canada as a player in the Asia-Pacific region? Are there are opportunities for Canada to build bilateral and multilateral ties and promote peace and security in the region? What are the challenges to doing so? These questions are explored in detail in the final chapter.



## **CHAPTER FIVE EXPLORING CANADA'S MARITIME ROLE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Clearly the Canadian Navy is actively engaged in the Asia-Pacific region through deployments, military exercises and participation at international conferences with Asia-Pacific nations. This chapter will explore the potential for Canada to further build bilateral and multilateral ties and promote peace and security in the region. Two key challenges to operating in the Asia-Pacific region are considered, followed by a discussion on the strengths of the Canadian Navy and opportunities for further involvement in the Asia-Pacific region.

### **CHALLENGES TO OPERATING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

The Canadian Navy has been at the forefront of maintaining Canadian presence in the Asia-Pacific region. To determine whether opportunities exist to further Canada's strategic interests in the region and whether or not Canada wishes to take those opportunities, two key challenges to operating in the Asia-Pacific region require consideration.

#### **Lack of an Established Security Model**

A significant challenge to working or operating in the Asia-Pacific region for Canadians is the lack of a common security organization, such as NATO. Unlike in Europe where NATO grew out of the end of the Second World War, there has been no central focal point to unify the nations of the Asia-Pacific into a collective security

agreement.<sup>216</sup> The fundamental role of NATO is “to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means.”<sup>217</sup> NATO is useful in mediating and preventing potential confrontations, safeguards the common values of its member countries and promotes these values throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.

However, there is great debate as to the validity of a NATO like construct in the Asia-Pacific region. Tan and Acharya state that “the Asia-Pacific has never presented the strategic coherence that would have facilitated the creation of a truly multilateral collective defence framework e.g., NATO.”<sup>218</sup> Not only is the Asia-Pacific region viewed as lacking strategic coherence, there is also the distrust by Asia-Pacific nations of outsiders and their impact on the security dimensions of the region. For example, in 1955, the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, while speaking at the Political Committee of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, strongly denounced the collective security packs being formed by the US in Asia and the Middle East.<sup>219</sup> As Acharya argues, Nehru was opposed to collective security as it risked the involvement of Western powers in Asian affairs. For these reasons the nations of the Asia-Pacific were less supportive of organizations like South East Asia Treaty Organization and more responsive to the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> Boutilier, “Canada and the New Pacific Paradigm,”.

<sup>217</sup>NATO, “Welcome to NATO,” [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/what\\_is\\_nato.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/what_is_nato.htm); Internet; accessed 21 April 2009.

<sup>218</sup>See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds. *Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order*, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 172.

<sup>219</sup>Amitav Acharya, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism,” available from <http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/913>; Internet; accessed 04 April 2009.

<sup>220</sup>Ibid.

According to the Asia Pacific Security Survey 2008, ASEAN has the greatest level of support of any multilateral organization either in the region or globally.

### Alternatives

In 1996, at the Multinational Naval Cooperation and Foreign Policy into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Symposium in Halifax, the focus was on how to develop ways for navies to cooperate in a multinational setting. However, it was acknowledged that challenges exist in the Asia-Pacific region as there is no military treaty organization like NATO. Asian nations prefer bilateral engagements as oppose to multinational or regional forums.<sup>221</sup> When Dr. Boutilier presented his paper, “Multinational Naval Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region”, in which he outlined the principle of middle power navies like Canada and Australia using their expertise to foster cooperation with the smaller navies of the Asia-Pacific region, it generated a great deal of discussion. Some viewed the idea of a regional navy as a positive step towards building confidence, interoperability and communications between navies while others did not see the potential for multinational naval cooperation. Opportunities exist for outside involvement in the region but it was assessed that the West would have to get more comfortable with bilateral agreements based on the Asian experience.<sup>222</sup>

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<sup>221</sup>The Canadian Press, “Pacific replaces Atlantic as naval hot spot (Halifax Maritime Symposium,” *Canadian Press NewsWire* (22 May 1996): 1; <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=6&sid=2&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=3&st...>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2009.

<sup>222</sup>Fred W. Crickard, Fred Deveaux and Katherine D. Orr, eds, *Multinational Naval Cooperation and Foreign Policy into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Symposium Report*, (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1996), 20.

Another option to combat maritime security issues in the absence of a common security organization is through International Policing or a standing International Maritime Force. To be effective, such a force would have to be authorized jurisdiction and pursuit into signatory nations' territorial waters. This standing force would also have to be financially supported for training, equipment and maintenance. The key to protecting or securing SLOC is “. . . an effective, efficient, highly trained and equipped, and most importantly, uncorrupt maritime security service.”<sup>223</sup> Unfortunately, a force like this is the exception. Countries like Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have excellent security records whereas nations such as Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, and Myanmar with their less reasonably trained and paid forces have a far less successful security record.<sup>224</sup> Another major obstacle to the establishment of such a force is the concern of jeopardizing maritime territorial boundaries as outlined in UNCLOS. For example, there are seven nations currently disputing the claims to the Spratly Islands and each nation is concerned that any concession on an international police force would impact their claim.<sup>225</sup> Any maritime solution against maritime threats needs to be more comprehensive than purely a military or security response. Socio-economic measures need also to be considered so as to prevent further acts of international crime and piracy.<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>223</sup>von Hoesslin, “The Implications of Illegal Maritime Activities for Canadian Security...”.

<sup>224</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>225</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>226</sup>JN Mak, “Incidents at Sea: Shipjacking, Maritime Muggings, Thefts and Illegal Migration in Southeast Asia,” *Maritime Institute of Malaysia*; available from <http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/JMMak-piracy.pdf>; Internet; accessed 19 April 2009.

In addition, any standing international maritime force must have experience working in a coalition and conducting exercises and confidence building measures prior to operations. The requirements of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence are complex and must be sorted out prior to undertaking operations or responding to a crisis. Nations must remain engaged with allies to resolve issues such as logistics, tactics, training and doctrine development.<sup>227</sup>

Another way to increase the security level in the Asia-Pacific region is through increased regional cooperation. Vice Admiral Mihir Roy outlined an agenda for maritime cooperation in his “Maritime Security in South West Asia” paper. Initially, regional maritime cooperation would commence with low level operations such as search and rescue, anti piracy patrols, and discussions on the marine environment. The next stage would include advanced operations and exercises such as disaster relief, environmental protection, surveillance and constabulary work. The final broader stage “. . . could be the joint development of marine technology, maritime diplomacy, development of eco-tourism, marine parks and safety of offshore assets.”<sup>228</sup> Regional cooperation should be achieved in a step-by-step approach.

As discussed earlier, ASEAN is making improvements towards its effectiveness and ability to respond to security issues within the region. For example, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia now have a tri-lateral agreement to police the waters of the Strait of Malacca and the Singapore Strait.<sup>229</sup> These bi and tri lateral agreements also require

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<sup>227</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada*, 26.

<sup>228</sup>Roy, “Maritime Security in South West Asia,”.



foreign financial aid in order to support this endeavour.<sup>230</sup> ASEAN, through its work with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), is attempting to establish force postures in providing maritime security to the region.

### **Asia-Pacific's View on Outsider Involvement**

As previously mentioned, the Asia-Pacific is sensitive to outsider involvement in their region. One example of this was the implementation of joint patrols in the Malacca Straits by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to counter the threats of piracy and maritime terrorism.<sup>231</sup> Malaysia and Indonesia both clearly expressed their opposition to having outside powers patrolling the Malacca Straits. According to Ali and Chen, “apart from the issue of sovereignty, [Malaysia and Indonesia] assert that the foreign forces would not have the local knowledge or familiarity with local culture to deal with regional threats.”<sup>232</sup>

The cautious attitude of Asia-Pacific nations towards international intervention was reflected in the Asia Pacific Security Survey, 2008, in a question dealing with interventions by the international community in the case of a nation's humanitarian issue. The group was asked on which of the following six civil conflicts with possible wider

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<sup>229</sup>Joshua Ho, “Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Lessons from the Malacca Strait,” *RSIS Commentaries*; available from <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSI0092009.pdf>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2009.

<sup>230</sup>von Hoesslin, “The Implications of Illegal Maritime Activities for Canadian Security...”

<sup>231</sup>Mushahid Ali and Jeffrey Chen, “Maritime Security Cooperation in the Malacca Straits: Prospects and Limits,” *IDSS Commentaries*; available from <http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publications/Perspective/IDSS232004.pdf>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2009.

<sup>232</sup>*Ibid.*

impacts would meet the criteria for international intervention. The six were Sudan (Darfur), South Pacific Islands (failed state), Burma/Myanmar (human rights), Sri Lanka (escalating civil war), Middle East (Palestine/Lebanon/Jordan), and Iraq (civil war after US withdrawal). Survey results showed that participants felt that only the situation in Darfur warranted the use of UN peacekeepers.<sup>233</sup> There was a definite lack of support for international intervention.

Yet despite these expressed concerns, the Asia-Pacific region is not completely opposed to external help, with some caveats. For example, in the case of the Malacca Straits, though “the impetus for any regional initiative must come from within the region . . . [extra regional powers] can help to underwrite them with technical assistance, resources and training.”<sup>234</sup> External help has not been ruled out, but must occur in consultation with, and acceptance from, the Asia-Pacific nations.

### **STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE CANADIAN NAVY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

So how successful might the Canadian Navy be in stick-handling these challenges of operating in the Asia-Pacific region and is it in our own best interests to do so? Canada, and more specifically the Canadian Navy, has several noteworthy and unique strengths and abilities which are well suited to work effectively in this region, though not without risks and challenges.

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<sup>233</sup>Baker and Fox, *Asia Pacific Security Survey*, 2008.

<sup>234</sup>Ali and Chen, “Maritime Security Cooperation in the Malacca Straits...”.

## Relationships and Reputation

As previously discussed, Canada and Asia-Pacific have strong immigration ties, with a large proportion of Canada's current immigrants coming from the Asia-Pacific region. Canada also receives favourable reports from the greater Asia-Pacific community in its openness to visible minorities. According to Michael Szonyi, high profile appointments of prominent Asians in Canada, such as David Lam as Lieutenant-Governor of BC and Adrienne Clarkson as Governor-General, received extremely positive press in the Asian media.<sup>235</sup>

At the national level Canada is developing or preserving strong relationships with many of the key players in the Asia-Pacific region. These key relationships with Japan, China, and the USA, are briefly described below.

### Japan

In 2008, Canada and Japan celebrated 80 years of diplomatic relations.<sup>236</sup> Japan is a major focus of Canada's attention in the region and the prime ministers and foreign affairs ministers of the two countries meet frequently. The two governments co-operate on many areas including peace and security, fisheries, finance and telecommunications. Japan and Canada contribute considerable to international security and share similar foreign policy objectives. In 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi and Prime Minister Martin agreed to continue the efforts outlined in the 1999 *Action Agenda for Peace and Security*

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<sup>235</sup>Michael Szonyi, "Asian-Canadians And Canada's International Relations," *Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada*; available from [http://www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/relations7\\_17dec03.pdf](http://www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/relations7_17dec03.pdf); Internet; accessed 03 March 2009.

<sup>236</sup>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-Canada Relations," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/canada/index.html>; Internet; accessed 22 April 2009.

*Cooperation* and enhance their bilateral cooperation in the following areas: responding to terrorism; fighting transnational organized crime; enhancing regional stability and human security; advancing non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) objectives; increasing bilateral security and defence exchanges; enhancing the ability of the United Nations to deal with new threats; and cooperating to achieve a comprehensive resolution of North Korea issues.<sup>237</sup> Along with joint exercises with Japan, the Canadian Navy has ensured that WESTPLOY visits include at least one Japanese port visit to reinforce this commitment to Canada's partner in the region. Canada recognizes the importance of Japan in the Asia-Pacific region and that Canada needs to continue to develop and promote a strong bilateral relationship between the two nations.<sup>238</sup>

## China

With its growing economic, diplomatic, military and political influence on the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, China is an obvious choice for Canadian focus in Asia-Pacific.<sup>239</sup> China and Canada established diplomatic relations in 1970. The two governments collaborate on a wide range of issues, including trade and

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<sup>237</sup>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "2005 Canada-Japan Agenda For Peace and Security Cooperation," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/canada/visit0501/agenda.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2009.

<sup>238</sup>J.D. Kenneth Boutin, "Great Expectations: Canada and the Asia-Pacific Region Under the Chretien Government," CANCAPS Papier 17 (Toronto: Canadian Consortium on Asia-Pacific Security, York University, 1997), 6.

<sup>239</sup>Bruce Muirhead, "China and Canadian Official Development Assistance: Reassessing the Relationship," *Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada*; available from <http://www.asiapacific.ca/files/Analysis/2009/RRChinaandODA.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2009.

investment, multilateral cooperation, the environment, health, and culture though hold different views on human rights and systems of government.<sup>240</sup>

David Winkler, a China expert, although talking about CIDA and Canadian aid to China, stresses the importance of remaining engaged in China in Bruce Muirhead's article "China and Canada Official Development":<sup>241</sup>

Other countries of consequence, Australia, the UK, the Americans, the Europeans, are moving into an engagement with the Chinese but we're fortunate because we were there early and have created relationships which are very useful. However, a failure to continue to be engaged doesn't just end our participation; it means we lose significant ground compared with other countries which are more than prepared to move in and to be engaged to our obvious disadvantage...

The Canadian Navy has recognized the importance of engagement with China and, during the course of WESTPLOYS, has visited Chinese ports several times in the last 15 years. Recently, the Chinese Navy conducted a good will visit to Victoria, the home of Canada's West Coast Navy. The two navies have commenced low level exercises consisting of ship manoeuvres, communication serials, and seamanship of one day in duration. The visit of a warship can open doors both economically and diplomatically.

## United States

The United States is Canada's most important defence partner and ally, with close economic interdependence and common values.<sup>242</sup> Canada and the US have similar

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<sup>240</sup>Government of Canada, "Canada-China," [http://geo.international.gc.ca/asia/china/political\\_economic/default-en.aspx](http://geo.international.gc.ca/asia/china/political_economic/default-en.aspx); Internet; accessed 22 April 2009.

<sup>241</sup>Muirhead, "China and Canadian Official Development Assistance: Reassessing the Relationship,".

foreign policy objectives and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Both nations desire a secure and stable region to ensure the free flow of economic goods.<sup>243</sup> With its bilateral alliances and security guarantees, the USN acts as a constabulary force for the world's oceans and as a stabilising force in the region.<sup>244</sup> Under the Bush administration, it appeared to many Asia-Pacific nations that US interest in the region was waning, as demonstrated by the reduction in US forces and the focus of their assets primarily in the Persian Gulf.<sup>245</sup> However, as noted previously, the current Obama administration has signalled its intent that Asia will become a more significant player in US Foreign Policy under President Obama's leadership.

According to the new US Maritime Strategy, the US, the predominate maritime power in the world, is looking for assistance in securing the world's oceans as no one nation has the capacity to do it all. The transnational threats to security in the Asia-Pacific region highlight the requirement for a multilateral approach to security.<sup>246</sup> Canada, as the only nation to integrate into USN Carrier Battle Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups,

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<sup>242</sup>Government of Canada, "Defence and Security," [http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/detroit/bilat\\_can/sec\\_pol.aspx?lang=eng](http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/detroit/bilat_can/sec_pol.aspx?lang=eng); Internet; accessed 22 April 2009.

<sup>243</sup>Boutin, "Great Expectations: Canada and the Asia-Pacific Region Under the Chretien Government," 18.

<sup>244</sup>Canada. The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Crisis in Asia: Implications for The Region, Canada, and the World*. The Honourable John B. Stewart, Chair and The Honourable Raynell Andreychuk, Deputy Chair. (December 1998); available from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/fore-e/rep-e/rep08dec98-e.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2009.

<sup>245</sup>Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Repositioning US Engagement in Southeast Asia: A Case for Non-traditional Security," *RSIS Commentaries*; available from <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0382008.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

<sup>246</sup>*Ibid.*

can be a great benefit to the USN in the patrolling of the world's oceans.<sup>247</sup> One example of increased interoperability was the participation of a Canadian warship as part of the USS Boxer Expeditionary Strike Group (BOXESG) during the bi-lateral Indian and US Navy exercise MALABAR 2006.<sup>248</sup> The US also wants to build relationships and trust with other nations in the region and strengthen its ties through bilateral agreements and humanitarian visits to combat maritime terrorism, crime, and regional conflicts.<sup>249</sup> However, as previously noted, an outside driven security initiative will not be welcomed in the Asia-Pacific region. The USN should proceed with caution to avoid appearing imperialistic and arrogant and should focus efforts on how to most effectively support regional cooperative efforts.

## Risks

Though Canada enjoys a positive relationship with the majority of the countries in the Asia-Pacific, activities such as PSI could potentially put the Canadian Navy in the forefront of conflict with nations like China and North Korea. Should Canada choose to increase its presence in the region, there is a higher likelihood of this type of negative interaction. Such conflict would heighten tensions and could potentially negatively affect Canada and Asia-Pacific relations.

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<sup>247</sup>Boutilier, "Canada and the New Pacific Paradigm,".

<sup>248</sup>Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, "Indian, Canadian and U.S. Forces Partner For A Safer Asia-Pacific Region," [http://forum.apan-info.net/2007-2nd\\_quarter/malabar/1.html](http://forum.apan-info.net/2007-2nd_quarter/malabar/1.html); Internet; accessed 16 February 2009.

<sup>249</sup>Joshua Ho, "The U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower," *RSIS Commentaries*; available from <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0812008.pdf>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2009.

Canada's professional modern navy and its use of soft maritime power and diplomacy make it a well respected addition to the regional maritime picture in the Asia-Pacific region. The Canadian Navy has a strong reputation as professional sailors when operating in the region. The Canadian Navy has built upon its successful deployments, exercises and conferences in the region. Though minimal research exists on the perception of the Asia-Pacific countries on Canada, indications such as Canada's observer status at WPNS signify the Asia-Pacific region's acceptance of Canada as a country with Pacific interests. The key to ongoing success in the region is Canada's professionalism and diplomacy and its apparent support from the greater Asian community.

### **Coalition Involvement**

No one nation has the ability or the capability to provide security for the entire maritime domain. However, maritime units together can provide a heightened level of security throughout the world. As previously discussed, the Canadian Navy is involved in several key exercises in the Asia-Pacific to increase Canada's interoperability with other militaries and build cooperative relationships with participating countries. Canada has a proven record of operating effectively with regional allies in times of crisis e.g., East Timor. Canadians also bring skills of peacekeeping, vessel boarding, counter-insurgency, and humanitarian relief that other Asian navies are keen to learn.<sup>250</sup> These

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<sup>250</sup>Boutilier, "Canada and the New Pacific Paradigm,".



skills and the willingness of the Canadian Navy to train would assumingly be welcomed by the Asia-Pacific nations to support regional security initiatives and would also support establishing close ties and trust with these allies.

An example of our involvement in a coalition is Canada's current role in the historic Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG 1) deployment to the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>251</sup> A force like SNMG 1 is a maritime force “. . . made up of vessels from various allied nations, training and operating together as single team. . .”<sup>252</sup> This task force exercises together in a variety of operational tasks and can respond to crisis anywhere in the world. SNMG 1 is also used to establish presence, demonstrate solidarity, conduct diplomatic visits, and support maritime capabilities to other missions.<sup>253</sup> NATO's intention with this deployment is to increase awareness of SNMG 1, and “. . . NATO hopes to enhance the dialogue with the nations visited and to demonstrate its ability to deploy maritime forces beyond NATO's traditional area of operations.”<sup>254</sup>

Canada, a NATO country and contributor to NATO's maritime forces, has joined SNMG 1 with a West Coast frigate. On 05 February 2009, HMCS WINNIPEG departed to the Asia-Pacific to rendezvous with SNMG 1.<sup>255</sup> Rear Admiral Tyrone Pile commented that “Winnipeg's deployment will strengthen Canada's long-standing

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<sup>251</sup>NATO. The Standing NATO Maritime Group 1. “SNMG – Operation Pearl,” [http://www.snmgl.nato.int/SNMG1\\_ficheiros/Page2450.htm](http://www.snmgl.nato.int/SNMG1_ficheiros/Page2450.htm); Internet; accessed 19 April 2009.

<sup>252</sup>NATO. The Standing NATO Maritime Group 1, “The Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG 1),” [http://www.snmgl.nato.int/SNMG1\\_ficheiros/Page342.htm](http://www.snmgl.nato.int/SNMG1_ficheiros/Page342.htm); Internet; accessed 08 April 2009.

<sup>253</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>254</sup>NATO. The Standing NATO Maritime Group 1. “SNMG – Operation Pearl,”

<sup>255</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, “Domestic Stories: HMCS Winnipeg departs on overseas mission,” available from [http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/3/3-a\\_eng.asp?category=7&id=710](http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/3/3-a_eng.asp?category=7&id=710); Internet; accessed 08 April 2009.

relationships with countries such as Australia and Japan, as well as allow us to reach out to other countries in the Indo-Pacific region.<sup>256</sup> Cdr Craig Baines, Commanding Officer of HMCS WINNIPEG, likely summed it up best when he stated: “They [the crew] can conduct high-end operations, an immediate response to developing crises, humanitarian aid, and many other maritime functions, all the while being sailor-diplomats in support of Canada’s interests in strategically important parts of the world.”<sup>257</sup> The Canadian Navy can provide a link between NATO and the Asia-Pacific region.

### **Deterrent and Stabilizing Effect**

A Canadian presence in the Asia-Pacific also provides a deterrent effect in the region. It is in Canada’s best interests to effectively combat threats to international and regional security in the Asia-Pacific region as they have the propensity to infringe on Canadian interests and Canada’s territorial waters.

Canada can also play a role in supporting regional stability through the prevention of the loss of fragile states and the proliferation of WMD. Nations such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, Laos, and Cambodia and possibly Indonesia and the Philippines are at risk of collapse. Canada needs to work with these states and others to maintain stability and resolve issues peacefully. Canada also has a role to play with the peaceful development of nuclear energy and the prevention of nuclear and biological weapons proliferation.<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>256</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>257</sup>*Ibid.*

### **Active Participation in Security Organizations**

Another challenge for Canada with respect to regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific is the view that Canada is a less than active participant in such institutions as ASEAN, ARF and APEC. Although there is discussion of making the US a partner in the region, there is little discussion of offering Canada a partnership. Canada also has to decide on Canadian accession to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity. Signing this agreement would allow Canada to stay engaged in Southeast Asia.<sup>259</sup> As the Asia-Pacific region continues to foster its own regional institutions and gain confidence in their capabilities, Canada needs to reinvigorate itself into these broader regional institutions like APEC and ARF to demonstrate Canada's relevance and importance to the region.<sup>260</sup> If Canada does not maintain a consistent presence in the region, it runs the risk of being marginalized and eventually shut out.

### **CONCLUSION**

Two key challenges require consideration in determining the extent to which Canada, or any other country, can operate effectively in the Asia-Pacific region. The lack of an established security model means that there is no governing collective body to mediate and prevent potential conflict or safeguard the freedom and security of the Asia-

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<sup>258</sup>Ron, Richardson, "Canada Asia Agenda 2006," *Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada*; available from [http://www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/caa2006/CAA2006\\_full.pdf](http://www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/caa2006/CAA2006_full.pdf); Internet; accessed 18 March 2009.

<sup>259</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>260</sup>*Ibid.*

Pacific nations. Debate has raised questions of whether a NATO-like model would even work in Asia-Pacific, and alternatives such as an international maritime force, regional cooperation have been suggested. With Asia-Pacific's preference for bilateral agreements, memorandums of understandings and partnerships, it appears a variety of approaches to security should be integrated together to sustain regional security.

Canada's strong or developing relationships with many of the Asia-Pacific countries, well respected Navy, involvement in coalitions and deterrent and stabilizing presence affords Canada the possibility of effectively contributing to the stability and security of the Asia-Pacific region and advancing Canada's national and economic interests.



## CONCLUSION

As the economic centre of gravity shifts to the Asia-Pacific region, it becomes increasingly important to ensure the stability and security of the maritime environment in this region. This is no simple task as the maritime security environment in the Asia-Pacific region is very dynamic and turbulent. This is a region with great potential for major conflict between nations, plagued by unresolved historical rivalries and territorial disputes. The destructive impact of a regional conflict and the potential to destabilize the region is exacerbated by the enormous increases in defence spending and arms procurement currently occurring in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to internal conflict, the stability and security of Asia-Pacific is threatened by other factors which would have detrimental effects on the global economy, including organized crime, terrorism, environmental exploitation and degradation and trans-national conflicts. Any one of these threats could disrupt the flow of economic goods and the energy resources used to feed the economic powerhouses of the region.

Canada, as a nation bordering on the Pacific and with the majority of its GDP linked to trade, has an expanding vital interest in the security of the Asia-Pacific region. Canada's social, economic and security ties to the Asia-Pacific region are ever increasing. Based on Canada's dependency on international trade, it is in Canada's best interests to ensure stability and the unimpeded flow of maritime commercial traffic in the Asia-Pacific region. "To do otherwise would result in the false perception that Canada is a

mere opportunist, especially if it tries to trumpet Asia Pacific credentials on the trade front while ignoring security issues.”<sup>261</sup>

Navies are traditionally used to support the government’s economic and territorial interests. The navy’s core missions are military, diplomatic and constabulary. More so than the other services, the Canadian Navy has played the role of Canadian military ambassadors in Asia-Pacific, advancing the nation’s diplomatic, defence and development objectives through deployments, military exercises and participation in Asia-Pacific conferences and symposiums. Through such contact, bilateral and multilateral ties between the Canadian Navy and the navies of Asia-Pacific nations are built, interoperability is developed, mutual understanding and trust are increased, and peace and security is promoted. In addition, the frequent presence of a Canadian warship is a deterrent to negative action in the region. The Canadian Navy provides the Government of Canada with many options in the international domain to project our foreign policy, to promote our national interests, and to gain diplomatic and security advantages.<sup>262</sup>

However, the Canadian Navy’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific region has taken place in the absence of a clear Asia-Pacific policy or a commitment from Ottawa to remain consistently engaged in the region. Without a clearly defined Asia-Pacific policy to focus Canada’s efforts in the region, limited military resources and conflicting priorities will stand in the way of Canada making an effective contribution in Asia-

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<sup>261</sup>Canada. The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Crisis in Asia: Implications for the Region, Canada, and the World*.

<sup>262</sup>MacLean, “Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers,”.

Pacific. Though the Canadian Navy has made progress in advancing the interests of Canada and contributing to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, the sporadic and ad hoc approach to military deployments and inconsistent presence in the region has damaged Canada's credibility in the Asia-Pacific. Without a long term commitment and presence, Canada will not be viewed as anything more than an infrequent transient to the region. By clearly formulating our national and global interests and focusing our defence activities to these interests through a clearly defined Asia-Pacific policy, Canada can have a credible military presence in Asia-Pacific

However, remaining engaged in the region comes at a cost. Finite resources would have to be shifted from other international commitments and Canada risks becoming more heavily involved and committed in a potentially volatile area. Yet given our heavy reliance on international trade to support our high standard of living, can we afford not to make a strong investment in protecting these interests?

Given the tumultuous environment of the Asia-Pacific region, the potential for some type of crisis, whether humanitarian, regional conflict or the proliferation of WMD, is high. As a member of the G8 and a middle power, Canada would be expected to respond if such a crisis occurs. By remaining engaged in the region and continuing to train with coalition forces, the Canadian Navy will be better positioned to influence the response and partner with coalition forces. With its technological capabilities, peacekeeping skills and previous coalition work, the Canadian Navy has much to offer in ensuring peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.





## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAW	Anti-Air Warfare
AOR	Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment Vessel
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APSS	Asia-Pacific Security Seminar
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
ASuW	Anti-Surface Warfare
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam)
ASEAN-Plus-Three	ASEAN plus China, Japan and Republic of Korea.
ASEAN-ISIS	ASEAN – Institute of Strategic and International Studies
CBM	Confidence Building Measures
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief Pacific
CF	Canadian Forces
CFB	Canadian Forces Base
CPF	Canadian Patrol Frigate
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DFSA	Director of Future Security Analysis
DND	Department of National Defence
DoD	Department of Defense (USA)
DPRK	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EFZ	Exclusive Fishing Zone
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
G8	Group of Eight
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HMCS	Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
JMSDF	Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force
MARPAC	Maritime Pacific Command
MCDV	Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MPA	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters

NIDS	National Institute for Defense Studies
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NIDS	National Institute for Defence Studies
PACEX	Pacific Exercise
PACOM	US Pacific Command
PLA(N)	People's Liberation Army (Navy)
PRC	Piracy Reporting Centre
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific (Exercise)
RSIS	Rajaratnam School of International Studies
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SNMG 1	Standing NATO Maritime Group 1
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SPODs	Sea Ports of Disembarkation
UN	United Nations
USD	United States Dollars
USN	United States Navy
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
WESTPLOY	Western Pacific Deployments
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPNS	Western Pacific Navies Symposium
WTO	World Trade Organization

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