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Ships and Sailors of the Canadian Navy: Flexible Instruments of Foreign Policy

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On 15 September 2008 Canada turned over command of the Combined Task Force 150 to Denmark.[1] Combined Task Force 150 is the United States' Naval Central Command fleet force operating in the Gulfs of Aden and Oman, the Arabian and Red Seas, and the Indian Ocean. Its purpose is to conduct maritime security operations in the area establishing stability as well as thwart the use the maritime environment by terrorists. In addition to the command of the Task Force, three Canadian ships made up a Canadian Task Group in support of the Canadian commander. They were HMCS Iroquois, Calgary and Protecteur.[2] The command and the Canadian Task Group of ships was not an insignificant undertaking. As Mark McKinnon wrote, the contingent was "… Canada's second largest military deployment abroad after Afghanistan: 1,000 sailors aboard three warships looking for trouble in some of the wildest waters anywhere."[3] The significance of this particular contribution notwithstanding, it represents a continuation of Canadian naval presence in the area that dates back to the First Gulf War. Moreover, the command responsibilities were just another in a history of command positions in this decade since 11 September 2001. The continued involvement by the Canadian Navy is substantial from an international perspective. The Canadian Navy and its deployment of ships were and still are positive instruments of foreign policy in a changing world.

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[1] LCdr Marie-Claude Gagné, "Canada hands over command of CTF 150." *The Maple Leaf* vol 11, no 32 (1 October 2008)[journal on-line]; available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=4725; Internet: accessed 16 February 2009.

[2] Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, "The Canadian command of Combined Task Force 150." http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2665; Internet; accessed 16 February 2009.

[3] Mark Mackinnon, "Canadian warships ply African coast in hunt for pirates." *The Globe and Mail*, 16 September 2008; http://www.proquest.com/; Internet; accessed 16 February 2009.

Deploying ships to the Persian Gulf region is a demonstration of a Canadian foreign policy. The world has changed significantly since 11 September 2001. Not to belittle the events of that day, the world was changing prior to this momentous date. It is understandable that Canadian policy should change to match an evolving world. It should be no surprise to anyone that government policy must change, be it for political ideals, change in leadership, or purely fiscal constraints of the times. The Canadian Navy is subject to these changes if it is to be an effective instrument of foreign policy. As Prime Minister Paul Martin expressed in the forward to his government's *International Policy Statement* of 2005, "Foreign policy is how a nation best expresses itself to the world. Our policies as a government, reflecting our beliefs as Canadians, are articulated through the words we speak, the decisions we make and the actions we implement in the name of Canada."[4] The act of deploying ships to the world's hot spots is a manifestation of Canadian action.

The intent of this paper is to discuss the Canadian national policies that shaped these actions. This paper will concentrate of national foreign, defence, and security policies. Policies have changed over time. As suggested, significant changes were occurring as the Cold War ended. Canadian ships were deploying to the Persian Gulf since the first Gulf War. This paper will contain the discussion to those policies which were published in the 1990s up to 2005. These policies represented those which were enacted and approved during the majority of the deployments. The paper will progress through these national policies in somewhat chronologically order. Upon completion of

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[4] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview*. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005), Forward.

the analysis of national policies, a case will be made that deployment of ships to the Persian Gulf fulfilled national objectives and goals. For the purposes of this paper, the Persian Gulf will represent the general region. It is more than just the Persian Gulf specifically, as was seen with the operating area of the Combined Task Force 150. It is a broad interpretation of the geographical area. Referring to the area as the Persian Gulf is done for simplicity as well as gain a sense of gravity of the area.

As the world emerged from the 1980s and progressed into the early 1990s, the Cold War ended. The global security landscape had changed. It was clear that there was uncertainty in the world with the end of the Cold War. Historically, the end of a war meant that militaries could be drawn down and governments could gain some savings from the operation of their militaries, that is, a peace dividend. There was also debate that a new way in global politics was possible based on human security vice state security. If interstate conflict was on the ebb then an expensive armed forces may not be completely necessary.[5] In Canada, strengthening this argument was a powerful need for government to cut cost and return fiscal order. Government budgets would be reduced across all departments including the Department of National Defence, whose budget would decrease over the decade of the 1990s.[6] In this time of uncertainty in global politics and security, Canada moved toward fundamental change. Its foreign and defence policies would reflected this change.

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[5] Andrew Ritcher, "Forty Years of Neglect, Indifference, and Apathy: The Relentless Decline of Canada's Armed Forces." in *Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy* ed by Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc J. O'Reilly, 51-82. (Lanham·Boulder·New York·Toronto·Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006), 64.

[6] *Ibid.*

During this time there are two documents that defined both foreign and defence policy that reflected how Canada would change fundamentally. The *1994 White Paper on Defence* and *Canada in the World-Canadian Foreign Policy Review* published in 1995. Although presented to the Canadian people in the year preceding *Canada in the World,* it is difficult to assess whether the *White Paper on Defence* reiterates or is independent of the foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is valid assumption that foreign policy was superior to defence policy. For this reason, *Canada in the World* will be discussed first.

Canada in the World presented interconnected themes that were prominent in the policy. These themes were economics, globalization, and security uncertainty. Economics was a driving factor. Governments wanted to control their financial outlay as well as increase there inputs. Globalization had connected Canada's economy to the greater world in ways yet seen. The Cold War had ended and the global order had changed giving rise to some security uncertainty. Underlining any Canadian foreign policy was the premise that Canada will participate in world affairs. This was and continues to be a fundamental principle that Louis St. Laurent suggested in his Gray lecture of 1947.[7] Notwithstanding the origins, this fundamental principle was entrenched in *Canada in the World* as evidenced by the statement, "Based on wide consultations, it is clear that Canadians want to remain actively involved in the world, although they

[7] Louis St. Laurent, *The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs.* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1947), 25.

recognize the financial constraints we face."[8] Thus, the government highlighted that Canada would be active in international affairs, as much as economics and fiscal responsibility would allow.

Globalization or the global framework was connecting the world as never before. Economics was seen to be connected to the stability and security of the world. This was highlighted in the policy by, "Stability and security are prerequisites for economic growth and development."[9] Furthermore, the policy presented an alternative philosophy that economic prosperity could be more effective as an instrument of foreign policy than an expensive military by, "While military capacities and might will remain important factors in the international system of the future, international affairs will be rooted increasingly in economic and trade relations between countries and regions."[10] It is in this atmosphere that the government based its foreign policy decisions to attain three key objectives: "the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture."[11] The projection of values and culture were "soft power" techniques, where the appeal of Canadian way of life and the robustness of Canadian institutions could sway international opinion and direction more effectively than a traditional "hard power" resource like a strong

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[8] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Canada in the World – Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995.* http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/summary-en.asp; Internet; accessed 12 February 2009.

[9] *Ibid*.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *Ibid*.

military."[12] Thus *Canada in the World* was reflective of the times. The central focus of the government was economics. Prosperity and employment of Canadians was its top foreign policy priority.[13] Nevertheless, Canada participated in world affairs. Security although uncertain was connected to economics through globalization. Canadian participation in world affairs was tested against economic prosperity for Canadians, protection of security, and the promotion of Canadian values and culture.

In this environment, the *White Paper on Defence* presented a pragmatic approach to defence considering the fiscal restraint and the changing philosophy in foreign policy that Canada was undertaking. That aside, similar themes contained in *Canada in the World* were also in the *White Paper on Defence*. The interdependence of economics and security was presented by, "…Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security, especially since Canada's economic future depends on its ability to trade freely with other nations."[14] The security uncertainty was echoed by, "In light of the much reduced threat of global war, the world may not be as immediately dangerous today, at least for Canada, yet it is neither more peaceful nor more stable."[15] Despite the uncertainty, the *White Paper on Defence* clearly defined the responsibility of the department by, "The primary obligation of the Department of National Defence and the

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[12] Andrew Ritcher, "Forty Years of Neglect, Indifference, and Apathy…, 64.

[13] Joel J. Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy." Policy Matters Vol 5, no. 2; (June 2004)[journal on-line], 17, available from http://www.irpp.org/fasttrak/index.htm; Internet; accessed 26 February 2009.

[14] Department of National Defence. *1994 White Paper on Defence.* http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/newsite/downloads/1994%20White%20Paper%20on%20Defence.pdf; Internet; accessed 13 January 2009.

[15] *Ibid.*

Canadian Forces is to protect the country and its citizens from challenges to their security."[16]

Considering the security uncertainty, fiscal restraint and obligation to protect Canadians at home and abroad, special requirements of the Canadian Forces were intensified and were highlighted in the *White Paper on Defence* by,

> This combination of military requirements has led the Government to conclude that the retention of multi-purpose combat capable forces is in the national interest. These forces provide the Government with a broad range of military options at a cost consistent with our other policy and fiscal priorities.[17]

The approach was pragmatic; it gave the government options to use its military yet maintain fiscal priorities and options to reduce spending as much as possible.[18] In any case, the bold truth was stated by, "In setting this new course, the Government has had to make hard choices. Most areas of defence will be cut…"[19] Canada had a "multi-purpose combat capable force" but only to the extent that fiscal reality had permitted. Through the 1990s and into the first decade of the 21st century the multi-purpose force was tested.

In spite of the fiscal restraint, government decision makers used Canada's military more and more. As the decade closed, Canada was active, in fact overly active, when it came to the Canadian Forces' participation in world affairs. As Joel Sokolsky suggested, "In the first decade of the post–Cold War era, Ottawa dispatched forces to most of the hot spots in the newly turbulent world order, beginning with the First Gulf War and

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[16] *Ibid.*

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] *Ibid.*

continuing on to, among others, Bosnia, Haiti, East Timor and Kosovo."[20] These experiences, together with those following 11 September 2001, could only provide policy makers for both foreign and defence policies essential data to learn from. The reduction in defence spending had reduced the Canadian Forces to a point that the capabilities required of the *White Paper on Defence* could no longer be met nor sustained.[21] World events had certainly proved that the new global security environment was holding to its unpredictability. The evolution of Canadian national policy was captured in two important policy statements presented by the government in the first decade of the 21 century, the *National Security Policy* presented in 2004, and the *International Policy Statement* presented in 2005. Both represented significant lessons learned in the post Cold War era particularly, as they related to the Canadian Forces.

The significance of the security policy cannot be understated. It was a first for Canada. It emphasised a significant government imperative that was, "There can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens."[22] The policy also identified "three core national security interests"[23] that clearly stood as priorities for the government, they were: "[p]rotecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad; [e]nsuring that

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[20] Joel J. Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy." Policy Matters Vol 5, no. 2; (June 2004): 16; http://www.irpp.org/fasttrak/index.htm; Internet; accessed 26 February 2009.

[21] Andrew Ritcher, "Forty Years of Neglect, Indifference, and Apathy: The Relentless Decline of Canada's Armed Forces." in *Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy* ed by Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc J. O'Reilly, 51-82. (Lanham·Boulder·New York·Toronto·Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006), 67.

[22] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy.* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2004), vii.

[23] *Ibid.*

Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; [and] [c]ontributing to international security."[24] Although a policy fundamentally concerning the safety of Canadians at home, it recognized the global interconnection of security by, "Given the international nature of many of the threats affecting Canadians, national security also intersects with international security. At the same time, there are a growing number of international security threats that impact directly on Canadian security…"[25] Most important of these identified threats are failed and failing states.[26] In regard to this particular threat, the Canadian Forces were recognized as "an essential national security capability."[27] The security policy further defined the Canadian Forces capability to security by stating that, "In this increasingly unstable international threat environment, Canada must have armed forces that are flexible, responsive and combat-capable for a wide range of operations, and that are able to work with our allies."[28] Thus the multi-purpose combat capable force was reinforced by the *Security Policy*. It had also identified that failed and failing states were a recognized international threat to Canada. In dealing specifically with international threats, the policy defers to the *International Policy Statement.*

The *International Policy Statement* was a collection of several policy documents related to defence, development, trade and diplomacy. Particularly important were the foreign and defence statements. In the statement, Canada participating in world affairs was once again centrally important to the both the Canadian people and the

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[24] *Ibid.,* 4-6.

[25] *Ibid.,* 3.

[26] *Ibid.,* 7.

[27] *Ibid.,* 49.

[28] *Ibid.,* 50.

government.[29] Globalization, economics and security remained as consistent themes in foreign policy. This was exemplified by, "Globalization has connected people and place in ways that were previously unimaginable, and has blurred the lines around national economies."[30] Moreover, globalization increased the speed of threats to security and the possibility of direct and dire consequence on Canada and Canadians.[31]

Economics, obviously, was still important to the government, yet the fiscal restraints that Canada conducted across the board within its government, particularly, in its Foreign and Defence departments, were having adverse effects on its international reputation. As Joel Sokolsky stated, "Despite the fast tempo of its global activities in the 1990s, the course of events after September 11 showed that there had been a change in Canada's position in the world and a diminution in its relative standing worldwide."[32] This was also reflected in the *International Policy Statement* by, "Recent years witnessed a relative decline in attention Canada paid to its international instruments, as priority was given to getting our domestic house in order."[33] As the Canadian Forces were important foreign policy instruments, improving on their capabilities would go far to improve Canada's international reputation. The government of the day was keen to reverse the declining trend.

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[29] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement…Overview*, 2.

[30] *Ibid.*, 1.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] Joel J. Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style…", 18.

[33] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: Overview*, 2.

As was the case with foreign policy, the *International Policy Statement* was the first review of defence policy since 1994. As discussed thus far, global security and politics had changed significantly in the eleven year period between reviews. The Canadian Forces were used more and more throughout the spanning years becoming more and more important with respect to foreign policy objectives. The government recognized the importance of the Canadian Forces as it pertained to foreign policy by, "…the Canadian Forces are a vital instrument of Canada's foreign policy, especially in today's unstable world."[34] In this statement, the government moved away from its pretence that it held in the post Cold War era, that a strong military may not be required or important. If anything, the tempo of the Canadian Forces was clearly an indication that an evolving global security environment required instruments that were capable of providing a response. The military was recognized as just such a responder by the statement, "The heavy demands on our military, both domestically and internationally, will not diminish—they may well increase. Canada must possess a military that is well adapted to the evolving security environment and ready to respond to the country's future needs."[35]

Although the government emphasized that the defence of Canada and North America were its first priority, a strong international response was also important. Global stability and security had positive and negative ramifications within Canada. Once again this interconnection of globalization, stability and security was highlighted by, "The Government also recognized the importance of meeting threats to our security as far

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[34] Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence. (*Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005), forward.

[35] *Ibid.,* 1-2.

away from our borders as possible, wherever they arose. Security in Canada ultimately begins with stability abroad."[36] The importance of reacting to problems when and where they occur in the world vice allowing them to fester and directly affect Canada is important. Globalization has shrunk the world. Therefore, the importance of the Canadian Forces to reach places anywhere in the world to deal with possibly threats to Canadians was emphasized by,

> An increasingly interdependent world has tightened the links between international and domestic security, and developments abroad can affect the safety of Canadians in unprecedented ways. Today's front lines stretch from the streets of Kabul to the rail lines of Madrid to our own Canadian cities. The Government has made a commitment to respond to potential threats to Canadian security before they reach our shores.[37]

Consequently, if the Canadian Forces are to continue to be an important foreign policy instrument then they must be robust multi-purpose combat capable in order to respond. As a contingent of the Canadian Forces, the Canadian Navy must be an equally robust multi-purpose combat capable force to provide government decision makers with options as vital foreign policy instruments.

Naval strategy as Peter Haydon states, "…is primarily about the use of naval forces to implement state domestic and foreign policy."[38] The type of navy Canada operates must be capable of executing both policies. As noted, the tempo of the Canadian Forces indicates there is no lack of opportunity to exercise the use of naval assets as positive instruments of foreign policy. As was discussed, Canada will

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[36] *Ibid.*, 2.

[37] *Ibid.*, 5.

[38] Peter T Haydon. "The Context of Sea Power and Maritime Strategy." in *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century: A "Medium" Power Perspective.* (Halifax NS: Centre fro Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University 2000), 32.

participate in world affairs; it has throughout the decades past. If ships are to be a viable instrument in Canada's participation in an unpredictable security environment and world, then they must afford the government flexibility and options. As dictated by defence policy, the Canadian Forces and the Navy must provide government a multi-purpose combat capable force. Additionally, the key objectives must be fulfilled namely, "the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture."[39] Ultimately, Canadian security is paramount. The primary international threat to Canada from abroad was failed and failing states. Deploying ships must have an effect on failed or failing states. The deployment of ships to the Persian Gulf will now be discussed with respect to each of these points.

Emulating the national policy of multi-purpose combat capable forces, the naval strategy was and is to provide government with "…the possession of balance, combat capable, general purpose maritime forces…"[40] As the navy grew out of the Cold War, it adapted quickly to this governmental policy with the advent of the Naval Task Group. In this new era, ships no longer deployed as squadrons of similar ship capabilities. Ships deployed as a group of combatants, together with their air detachments, and a replenishment ship. The combination of naval capabilities, aircraft and replenishment multiplied the overall effectiveness and sustainability of the force.[41] Although the composition of a Naval Task Group was designed based on mission needs, a typical

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[39] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Canada in the World.…*.

[40] Department of National Defence, *The Naval Vision*. (Halifax: Maritime Command, 1994), 5.

[41] Department of National Defence, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy 2020*. (Ottawa: Chief of Maritime Staff/Director of Maritime Strategy, 2001), 31-32.

group is made up of: an Iroquois class destroyer for command and control; one or more Halifax class frigates for its operational flexibility and depth; and a Protecteur class auxiliary oil replenishment ship for sustainment.[42] This offered a significant contribution to any operation be it Canadian or multinational.[43] It was and is the answer to multi-purpose combat capable force. The Naval Task Group afforded the government flexibility as a foreign policy instrument.

There is inherent flexibility in deploying ships to any area of strife or crisis. This provides government decision makers with a positive instrument to allow participation in an unpredictable world. Ships can deploy relatively quickly. Additionally, if needed, they can change roles on route. Furthermore, they are not tied to the area and can remove themselves as necessary or as ordered.[44] This is best exemplified by HMCS Ville de Quebec's redeployment to support the World Food Program. HMCS Ville de Québec was originally deployed with the NATO's Standing Naval Reaction Force Maritime Group One in the summer of 2008. It was diverted to escort ships contracted by the World Food Program to deliver food to Mogadishu, Somalia.[45] The government exercised its prerogative and participated in an important international predicament. By changing HMCS Ville de Québec's role midstream, redirecting it to a place of strive and

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[42] Richard Gimblett, *Operation Apollo.* (Ottawa: Magic Light Publishing, 2004), 28.

[43] Lt(N) Bruce Fenton. "Foreign Policy and Naval Forces: A Canadian Perspective." in Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy the Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy: Papers presented to the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Dalhousie University June 1998 edited by Ann L. Griffiths, Peter T. Haydon and Richard Gimblett, 131-146 (Halifax NS: the Centre, 2000), 133.

[44] Department of National Defence, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy 2020*, 31-32.

[45] Lt(N) Chris Gabriel, "HMCS Ville De Québec Retasked." http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/villedequebec/2/2-s_eng.asp?category=273&title=1946; Internet; accessed 1 April 2009.

remove it when the job was complete, the government exercised a full range of inherent naval flexibility that ships provide as instruments of foreign policy.

However, if deploying ships are to be fully effective instruments of foreign policy then they should also fulfill the government's key foreign policy objectives. As discussed, the first of these objectives was "the promotion of prosperity and employment"[46] for Canadians. It is difficult to make a direct connection of ship deployment to the Persian Gulf to the prosperity and employment possibilities of an average Canadian. Generally, the ship is there to conduct security and stability operations not promote nor sell Canadian business. Nevertheless, the Persian Gulf has a significant economic connection to the international community. In 2006, the nations of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (Canada is a member) imported approximately 31% of the oil which included 17% of total oil imported by the United States.[47] The amount of oil that is transported from the area is of great importance to countries in Europe as well as Japan and the United States. The region is a major source of energy for many of the member countries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. This energy, in turn, feeds economic engines that demand resources and produce goods, consequently, feeding trade amongst these nations. Japan and United States are important trading partners with Canada. The United States is, by far, Canada's most important trading partner. It is not a tremendous extrapolation to say that this trade feeds directly employment and prosperity in Canada. Thus, by sending ships to the Persian Gulf, Canada is satisfying the objective of

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[46] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. *Canada in the World.…*.

[47] Alan Petzet, "The strategic Strait of Hormuz." *Oil & Gas Journal*, 23July 2007, http://www.proquest.com/ Internet; accessed 6 April 2009.

economic prosperity and employment for Canadians. It is in the Canadian interest to participate in the establishment and maintenance of security in the Persian Gulf region.

The second key objective is "the protection of our security, within a stable global framework."[48] Certainly world economics is inexorably linked to security and stability in Persian Gulf region as just discussed. Sending ships to participate in the security and stability operations is in direct support of this objective. Moreover, working as a member of a coalition is in essence working in the global framework. Coalitions, particularly military coalitions, grew out of the post Cold War era to manage international crisis.[49] Coalitions are the modern method to provide security in world affairs. When Canada participates in these combined or coalition forces, it is providing security in this new global framework. As Canada leads and commands coalition forces, it accentuates its commitment to protecting security in a stable global framework. Canadian ships deployed to participate in coalition task forces in the Persian Gulf are fulfilling this key objective.

The last key foreign policy objective is "the projection of Canadian values and culture."[50] Canadian values and culture are projected certainly anytime that a ship travels internationally and conducts its business. The ship and its crew are a projection of Canadian way of life. Working within coalitions, Canadian perspectives and ideals are being communicated and displayed continually. This is, in itself, the promotion of

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[48] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. *Canada in the World….*

[49] Douglas Bland. "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom." Policy Matters Vol 3, no. 3; (February 2002): 24, [journal on-line] available from http://www.irpp.org/fasttrak/index.htm; Internet; accessed 26 February 2009.

[50] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. *Canada in the World....*

Canadian values and culture. As ships conduct the daily business of Maritime Security Operations or Maritime Interdiction Operations, they typify the application of rule of law. Moreover, the mainstay of these operations is boarding ships. In boarding, Canadian sailors come into direct contact with crews from lowly dhows to large cargo ships. During a typical boarding, international crews interact with Canadian sailors. Canadian sailors conduct their business in a professional manner with tolerances and respect embodying strong values from home, once again projection of Canadian values. Similarly in the command role, the promotion of Canadian values is equally demonstrated. The command interaction with participating ship's captains and superior commanders is a reflection of Canadian values. In his command of Combined Task Force 150, projection of Canadian values was an important aspect in Commodore Davidson's maritime influence line of operations of his overall campaign in the region. As he stated concerning maritime influence "… it is also about building [Canadian] influence in the region."[51] He goes on to say that, "The objective can be pragmatic… or idealistic - with a view to bringing Canadian values to bear, such as encouraging human rights and the rule of law."[52] Thus in command or in support of larger operations, Canadian ships being deployed to the Persian Gulf reflect and project Canadian values.

The last foreign policy goal is to counter the threat of failed and failing states. Failed and failing states are considered by Canada as significant threat to global and

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[51] Rear-Admiral Bob Davidson, "Modern Naval Diplomacy – A Practitioner's View,." Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol 11, no 1 and 2 (Fall and Winter 2008/9): 35;[journal on-line] available from http://www.jmss.org/2009/winter/articles/davidson-commentary2009.pdf; Internet; accessed 25 Feb 2009.

[52] *Ibid.*

Canadian security.[53] It is not surprising that Afghanistan springs to mind as an example of a failed state within the Canadian perspective. What connection to Afghanistan does the navy have? As Geoffrey Till suggested "… there is more to seapower than grey-painted ships with numbers on the side. Seapower also embraces the contributions that the other services can make to events at sea and the contributions that navies can make to events on land or in the air.[54] Therefore, ships being deployed to the Persian Gulf should have influence or contribute positively to the effects concentrated on Afghanistan. Certainly, the first ships deployed to the Persian Gulf after 11 September 2001 directly supported effects in Afghanistan. These ships conducted Leadership Interdiction Operations in search of Al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders escaping Afghanistan.[55] In addition, the Commander of Canadian Task Force was assigned the responsibility of defence of the United States Marine Expeditionary Unit. The forces in this group were one of the first major forces to move ashore in Afghanistan.[56] As Canada reverted to single ship deployments to the Persian Gulf, the support to efforts in Afghanistan continued indirectly. These ships were integrated into United States Carrier Battle Groups. On station, aircraft from the carriers were flying regular sorties in support of ground troops in Afghanistan.[57] Furthermore, as Combined Task Force 150 conducted its Maritime Security Operations, it restricted the flow of illegal drugs in the area. The disruption of

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[53] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement*:…*Overview*., 13.

[54] Geofferey Till. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century.* (London and Portland OR. Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 4.

[55] Richard Gimblett, *Operation Apollo.* (Ottawa: Magic Light Publishing, 2004), 70.

[56] *Ibid.*, 47-48.

[57] Rear-Admiral Bob Davidson, "Modern Naval Diplomacy …, 41.

narcotics adversely affects terrorism and extremist in the Afghan campaign. The interruption of narcotic trade diminished the money for weapons and explosives for extremist in Afghanistan.[58] Thus, ships deployed to the Persian Gulf are indirectly and directly affecting the situation in a failing state clearly satisfying this security imperative.

This paper investigated and discussed Canadian national policies that shaped the employment of ships to the Persian Gulf region. From national foreign policies it was gathered certain consistent goals and objectives. First and foremost, Canada would participate in the world affairs. Additionally, Canada holds, as important objectives, the prosperity and employment of Canadians; international security, and the promotion of Canadian values. Furthermore, in terms of security, Canada asserts that the protection of its citizens at home and abroad is and will continue to be its fundamental obligation. Consequently, international security is a major priority for the Canadian government. With globalization, the possibility of international threats of the world adversely affecting Canadians at home is real. The primary international threat to Canada is from failed and failing states. Therefore, to thwart this threat it is important that the Canadian Forces are multi-purpose combat ready capable of responding to crises at great distance from Canada.

Canada's deployments of ships to the Persian Gulf satisfy fully national policy goals and objectives as well as its security priority. By deploying ships, Canada is certainly sending a message to the international community that Canada will participate as necessary be it crisis or otherwise. The Persian Gulf region is certainly an area that is susceptible to crisis. The area is a significant energy resource that is vitally important to

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[58] *Ibid.,* 42.

many countries. Canadian ships provide security and stability to the area together with other coalition navies. It is in the Canadian interest to participate. The Canada Navy contribution is a positive projection of Canadian values as well as protection of the prosperity at home. Lastly, ships fulfill roles that are affecting the campaign in Afghanistan, Canada's priority failed state. Be it protection of United States Carriers operating aircraft conducting sorties in support of troops on the ground or interdicting drug trade that supports extremist in Afghanistan, Canadian ships are contributing to the campaign and government goals in Afghanistan.

The Canadian Navy and its employment of ships were and still are positive instruments of foreign policy in a changing world. Above all, Canadian warships sent around the world are representatives of the Canadian government and Canadians themselves. Canadian ships in the Persian Gulf are fulfilling foreign policy goals and objectives. They are contributing to international stability and security which subsequently supports security at home. As the Minister of National Defence, Peter MacKay stated in the announcement on command of Combined Task Force 150 that it, "…shows Canada's dedication towards making the world a safer place. Denying terrorists the use of the maritime environment as a venue for illicit operations translates into added security for Canadians at home and abroad."[59] The Canadian Navy, its ships and sailors are providing the government of Canada vital and important options to satisfy its endeavors in international affairs.

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[59] National Defence and the Canadian Forces. "Canada to lead Combined Task Force 150." http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2585; Internet; accessed 16 February 2009.

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