

Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

CAADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 35 / PCEMI N° 35

EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS

**SEA BASING – ENHANCING THE RELEVENCE OF THE
NAVY IN AN INCREASINGLY JOINT ENVIRONMENT**

By / par LCdr Craig Bradley

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

ABSTRACT

The Navy finds itself in an increasingly joint environment where the focus has shifted from traditional Cold War capabilities to Operations other than War. The current construct of the Navy is ill prepared to participate in a meaningful way in joint operations with the Army and Air Force in future failed / failing states. A modest Sea Basing capability, developed in conjunction with the replacement of the AOR class ships, could provide a renewed relevance for the Navy in its ability to support the other environments while maintaining the largely blue-water focus that is so central to the current naval mindset. The proposed construct of the expeditionary Naval Task Group, with sea basing at its core, is not revolutionary but rather a modest evolution towards a more joint configuration in keeping with the Navy's most recent strategic vision. In an era when the considerable contributions of the Army, and to a lesser extent the Air Force, are front and center in the minds of Canadians, the Navy must alter its focus to delivery a more relevant capability to the Government of Canada.

Over the past several years the Canadian Navy has faced an identity crisis of sorts over its role in the international naval community and, more specifically, the recently transformed Canadian Forces. In an era when the considerable contributions of the Army, and to a lesser extent the Air Force, within the Afghanistan mission are front and center in the minds of Canadians, the Navy struggles to demonstrate its relevance in a post cold-war environment. Gone are the days of hunting Russian submarines in the Greenland – Iceland – UK gap and the focus on blue-water escort duties. In the future the Navy will find itself more focused in failing state type operations.

According to the Fund for Peace's annual ranking of failed and failing states, a full twenty five of the thirty five states classified as the most likely to fail are coastal states.¹ Add to this the fact that in excess of fifty percent of the world's population lives within fifty miles of a coast², and you have a situation in which the Canadian Forces will very likely be called upon to conduct Operations other than War (OOTW) in countries or regions with a littoral component. The addition of a modest, Canadian sized, Sea Basing capability could position the Navy to play a vital role in such operations. Sea Basing is simply the ability to deliver, command, and support forces ashore from a ship or group of ships. In its current configuration, the Canadian Navy is unprepared to provide the requisite joint support land and rotary wing air forces would need.

¹ The Fund For Peace, "Failed State Index 2008," http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140 ; Internet; accessed 12 February 2009.

² Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, "The Coastal Ocean Institute: At the Coast - where air, land, sea, and people meet," <http://www.whoi.edu/oceanus/viewArticle.do?id=4498> ; Internet; accessed 7 March 2009.

This paper will examine the increased relevance that the Navy could derive from positioning itself to play a more central role in future failed / failing state joint operations. It will argue that a modest Sea Basing capability could provide this relevance while maintaining the largely blue-water focus that is so central to the current naval mindset. The paper is comprised of five major areas; an introduction to sea basing, the relevance of the current Naval construct, an analysis of current and future threats, the identification of a potential sea basing construct and, finally, the examination of this construct within a joint operations framework.

Sea basing was initially described by Admiral Vern Clark in *Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities* as one of the three main tenants of an increasingly expeditionary role for the United States Navy. He describes sea basing as the “foundation from which offensive and defensive fires are projected – making sea strike and sea shield [the other two tenants] realities.”³ Milan Vego’s discussion of naval force support for Army troops ashore in *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas* provides a similar but more simplistic description. He describes the three main aspects as cover, support and supply which equate nicely with the tenants of sea shield and sea base.⁴ While acknowledging that maneuver is critical to military success, Admiral Clark explains that by exploiting the “largest maneuver area on the face of the earth: the sea” the United States Navy will be able to “tremendously increase the impact of naval forces in joint campaigns.”⁵ From the perspective of the United States military with its

³ Admiral Vern Clark, “sea power 21: Projecting Joint Capabilities,” *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute (October 2002), 32-41.

⁴ Milan N. Vego, *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas*. 2nd Ed. (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 269.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 32-41.

considerable amphibious capabilities, the principle difference that sea basing will bring to the fight is the ability to sustain operations ashore without the requirement for a land support base in a “friendly” nation or upon territory seized during the assault.

In his study for the Congressional Budget Office, Eric Labs identifies faster deployment / operations, more maneuver space, uncertainty on the part of the enemy and faster destruction of the enemy as operational and tactical advantages of a sea based concept. In addition, he explains that by eliminating the need to seek the permission of a host nation to establish a land base it will provide far greater freedom of action. It was also highlighted that a sea base would be less vulnerable to attack as they are constantly moving and they would be more easily defended.⁶ These advantages are largely shaped on the more transformational approach advocated by Admiral Clark involving a sea base made up of “...numerous platforms, including nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, multi-mission destroyers, submarines with Special Forces, and maritime pre-positioned ships.”⁷ Despite the United States Navy basis of the analysis, it can be applied to Canada – just smaller in scale.

Labs identifies in his report four often cited counterarguments to the above advantages of the concept. Two of the disadvantages; that a sea base could not support a division sized force and secondly the possible reluctance of the United States to embark on an opposed amphibious assault,⁸ are not relevant as the Canadian Forces could not

⁶ Eric Jackson Labs, *The Future of the Navy's Amphibious and Marine Prepositioning Forces* (Washington: Congressional Budget Office, 2004), 11.

⁷ Clark, *Sea Power 21*..., 37.

⁸ Labs, *The Future of the Navy's* ..., 12.

deploy a force of that size and would likely only deploy in a permissive environment. The final two counterarguments are valid and require more examination.

The most significant concern is that the force could be more vulnerable due to the concentration of resources in the sea base.⁹ The decision to utilize the sea base concept would require a full risk assessment of defensive capabilities and potential threats versus the potential losses. The greatest risk to the sea base would likely be posed by conventional submarines which could be effectively countered by the proficiency in Anti-Submarine Warfare resident currently in the Navy. The mix of defensive capabilities the Navy could draw from would provide very good force protection. The consequences of a single defensive failure could, however, jeopardize the entire mission and potentially the troops ashore.

The final counterargument is a simple cost versus capability enhancement argument. Within the US Navy model, the purpose built ships are indeed very expensive and are solely intended to be used in a sea base role. Within the Canadian context, the current requirement to replace obsolete replenishment ships provides an ideal opportunity to simply add capabilities to the new vessels. By some estimates, this role enhancement will add upwards of one billion dollars to the overall replacement program costs for three ships. The utility of the concept will be discussed later in the paper when a better appreciation of value can be made.¹⁰ Having explained the history of the sea basing concept along with its positive and negative elements, the strategic direction and current composition of the Canadian Navy will now be examined.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

In June of 2001 the Navy articulated its vision for the future in the much anticipated *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*. In the forward to this document Vice-Admiral Maddison highlighted that “We live in interesting times. Dramatic shifts within the international system promise uncertainty for decades to come”.¹¹ Three short months later with the terrorist attacks on the United States, these words would have a more profound meaning than was ever intended. On 12 September 2001, *Leadmark* found itself still a useful, albeit largely historical, document. In the coming months and years, the fundamentally changed international security environment in the post 9/11 world would demand fundamental changes. In May of 2005, *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the course from Leadmark* was published to address the now apparent deficiencies highlighted by the recent “transformation” of the Canadian Forces with its new focus on integrated joint operations.

To adequately consider the relevance of the Canadian Navy in its current construct, a set of criteria must be established. In *Charting the course from Leadmark* several additions were made to the vision statement articulated earlier that fundamentally shifted the focus for the Navy of 2025. The underlying themes of the additional vision elements applicable to this paper are that the force of 2025 must be able to operate jointly with the other elements, operate jointly in an offensive capacity anywhere in the world, assist the Army on the ground, operate with allies / coalition partners on the high seas and in the littoral waters of a hostile nation.¹² In addition to this vision statement discussed

¹¹ Department of National Defence, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* (Ottawa: Chief of the Maritime Staff, 2001), forward.

¹² Department of National Defence, *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark* (Ottawa: Chief of the Maritime Staff, 2005), 49.

above, *Charting the course from Leadmark* identifies five key elements in its Naval Strategy for 2025. Two of these, “Modernize the present fleet capabilities for Operations Other than War” and “Expand the fleet capability required for joint expeditionary operations...capable of conducting Sea Control and projecting power ashore in support of the joint battle”¹³ are particularly important in determining the relevance of today’s Navy.

In a general sense, expeditionary operations require the operation of naval forces in a littoral environment where several factors need to be considered. They are topography ashore, typically shallow waters and mine and submarine threats. Topography ashore can provide cover for ground based air forces and missiles, greatly reducing the acquisition and reaction time for shipboard systems and personnel. The typically shallow waters in this zone can also significantly reduce the maximum speed of conventionally hulled major surface combatants.¹⁴ Mine and submarine threats in this environment are also more pronounced. In summary, the littoral environment is a challenging and dangerous one for large blue-water warships that have not been designed or optimized for these conditions.

Against this backdrop, today’s fleet is largely incapable of fulfilling these roles, particularly in this environment. The fleet is currently comprised of twelve frigates, three area air defence / command and control destroyers, two replenishment ships, four diesel submarines and twelve coastal defence vessels. The Halifax class frigates were designed

¹³ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁴ Milan N.Vego, *Operations of Blue-Water Navies in Narrow Seas*, Published text of presentation on Maritime Interests, Conflict and the Law of the Sea given Halifax June 1991, 10.

based upon the demands of the Cold War with a focus on Anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare primarily in a blue-water environment such as escort duties and the traditional Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap operations with the United States Navy and NATO. While the Halifax class modernization (HCM) / Frigate life extension (FELEX) projects announced in April 2008 will provide some critical enhancements in key areas such as Command and Control, Electronic Warfare, surface to surface missile system and radar upgrades, it is still limited in most of the joint capabilities identified. The enhancements were largely intended to enhance interoperability of the frigates when operating in combined operations with US Naval Battle Groups. The Iroquois class destroyers provide a capable command and control platform as well as an area air defense capability but are rapidly nearing the end of their operational lives. The area air defense capability is critical to any joint expeditionary operation but the command and control capability does not extend beyond the control of a Task Group at sea largely because of an inability to accommodate any additional staff beyond the current Naval Task Group staff construct. The Maritime Coastal Defense Vessels have such a limited blue-water capability that their employment outside of North American coastal waters in support of the expeditionary or littoral operations would be very problematic.

The best fit in a support role for expeditionary forces ashore would appear to be the AOR class vessels HMCS Preserver and HMCS Protecteur. There is even a limited pedigree with HMCS Preserver having been utilized off the coast of Somalia in 1995 as a “sea base” for the Army forces ashore. Despite a decided lack of official documentation for this operation, personal accounts obtained in 1996 indicated a largely effective contribution to the effort ashore. Responsibilities included reconnaissance, personnel

transport and re-supply with the embarked Sea King helicopters, personnel transport and re-supply with embarked ship's boats, provision of emergency medical treatment and as an R&R facility for the Army contingent. It must be remembered that this was in a largely permissive naval environment and the size of the force supported very small. Despite this success and similar efforts in disaster relief situations, the AORs have no expeditionary capability in anything other than a completely permissive environment. Approaching forty years of age, the AORs have also greatly exceeded their operational lives and will not be a factor in 2025.

Within the realm of combined operations with the US Navy and NATO, the Canadian Navy is a capable force that regularly provides valuable contributions to their Battle Groups, demonstrating a significant relevance within the sphere of combined operations. With regard to Operations Other than War and Joint Expeditionary Operations outlined in the Navy's strategy for 2025, a change of course in fleet composition is required if it is to achieve these aspirations and remain relevant in the new global security environment. A modest Sea Basing capability could provide this relevance while maintaining the largely blue-water focus that is so central to the current naval mindset.

It is now necessary to examine what the current and future threats in this new global security environment are. As previously discussed, twenty five of the thirty five states classified as the most likely to fail are coastal states.¹⁵ When this list is examined

¹⁵ The Fund For Peace, "Failed State Index 2008," http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140 ; Internet; accessed 12 February 2009.

against the current state of world affairs, coastal countries such as Somalia (#1), Sudan (#2), North Korea (#15), Lebanon (#18), Sri Lanka (#20) and East Timor (#25) stand out. This grouping is not intended to diminish the importance or seriousness of the situation in any of the other countries on the list. It does, however, focus this discussion on countries where Canada or her allies have serious security concerns, where we have conducted operations in the past or where our national interests or values come into play. The situation in any of these countries could very quickly deteriorate to the point that the Government of Canada would look to the Canadian Forces to provide some facet of a solution.

Somalia is a failed state where United Nations forces, in the latest of many missions, have valiantly attempted to restore some semblance of government. Despite these efforts, UN peacekeepers were killed as recently as February 2009 and pirates continue to operate off the coast. The pirate situation has caused a number of countries with economic interests in the region to send naval forces to ensure the safe passage of commercial vessels. While most countries outside of the African Union have been content to leave the situation on the ground to the Africans, the piracy situation in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean could force nations with interests in the area to reconsider their involvement ashore. The volatile nature of the situation on the ground and the instability of most countries in the region would make establishing a forward operating base challenging and the minimization of the logistical footprint ashore a top priority. A sea base arrangement would be a very viable solution.

In Sudan the President has been indicted for war crimes and a humanitarian disaster is unfolding in Darfour. There have been calls around the world for countries to

come forward and work to resolve the situation. If a regime change were determined to be a viable solution, how would the ground troops be inserted and supported? As the situation in Lebanon deteriorated and Canadian citizens trapped by the conflict demanded rescue, the government chartered ferries and had two warships in Halifax on standby. The United States used a cruise ship but had a Marine amphibious vessel on scene as well. The intent here is not to delve deeply into all of the situations but to highlight how beneficial a sea base capability would be to the government in dealing with the situation in these, and future, failing and failed states.

Given where the Canadian Forces are likely to be deployed in the future, what would a sea base capability for Canada look like? It would need to be versatile and cost effective. It could not be an expensive single purpose “in case of emergency break glass” type of construct. Although it would be tightly constrained financially, it would almost certainly be supported by the Chief of Land Staff for the additional capability and flexibility it would bring to land combat operations.

The US Navy model was briefly discussed earlier in the paper. While this construct is arguably the epitome of what a sea base is or could be, it is completely beyond the reach of the Government of Canada. So what can Canada afford and how would it work? The intent here is to identify only a broad concept that would provide a modest capability to support joint operations ashore as described in *Leadmark 2025*. There are certain fundamental functions that must be addressed. The sea base force must be able to defend itself in a full spectrum maritime environment, it must be able to provide some defensive support to the troops on the ground, it must be able to logistically support the troops for a specified period of time, it must have a robust joint command and

control capability and finally, it must be able to extract the forces at the end of the mission.

As a starting point, the proposed Joint Support Ship (JSS) would provide the cornerstone from which the Canadian Forces could conduct sea based operations. The statement of operational requirements describes its concept of employment as providing “...strategic sealift transport” and “sustainable in-theatre, sea-based command and control and joint / combined force support.”¹⁶ The statement of requirements also describes several capability based scenarios that the ship would be required to undertake. Taken collectively, the wide ranging capabilities needed to satisfy these scenarios would yield a very versatile package.

Although the JSS will play a significant role in the proposed Navy construct, its specific capabilities as outlined in the statement of requirements will only be discussed briefly to give an appreciation of its utility in joint operations. Firstly, it will provide the same level of Naval Task Group support currently resident in the AOR. In addition, it would have the capability to disembark a small battle group from an anchored position off shore and to deliver a battle group into a functional harbour in a moderate threat environment using three Joint Support Ships. It would be structured to provide a limited sea based Joint Task Force Headquarters capability with the addition of mission specific C4I that would be easily integrated into existing systems. Rearward C4I would be fully resident in the fitted systems. It would be capable of providing thirty days of support to

¹⁶ Department of National Defence, “Annex A to 32673-304 JSS SOR Version 4.0 dated 16 May 2007.” http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat/jss-nsi/documents/JSS_SOR_V_4.0_Annex_A.pdf ; Internet; accessed 9 March 2009.

forces deployed ashore. Within the air environment, it would be able to transport and operate a Land Tactical Aviation Group of up to eight Griffon helicopters in addition to its organic three to four maritime helicopters. It would also be capable of conducting the full range of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operations. Finally, it would be fitted to accept a scalable / modular hospital with up to seventy five medical staff embarked.¹⁷

Firstly it must be emphasized that the JSS is not, and was never intended to be, an Amphibious Assault ship. It would also not be capable of exercising its full range of capabilities simultaneously. It could not, for instance, replenish the Naval Task Group while landing material ashore. These limitations also extend to material carried and personnel embarked; the inclusion of the scalable hospital would reduce the lane meters available for land force equipment or humanitarian relief supplies. It should also be noted that the intention is to move the vast majority of troops into theatre using strategic airlift resources. The battle groups referred to are only the vehicles, material, supplies, and the personnel required to support them that would be embarked in the Joint Support Ship. It should also be noted that its off-loading mechanisms are relatively slow when suitable harbour facilities are not available and it is intended for employment in a permissive harbour environment with a low to moderate threat level.

The major weaknesses in the Navy structure with the addition of the Joint Support Ship would be its limited ability to operate in a littoral environment and inadequate force protection capabilities. In the current structure, the deployment of one or more Joint Support Ships in a task group with an Iroquois class destroyer and one or more frigates would provide sufficient force protection but it is unlikely that the Iroquois class will

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, no page.

with us in 2025. The essential command and control, long range air search radars and area air defence Standard Missiles that the Iroquois class brings to the force will need to be resident elsewhere in the task group. It is possible that a new surface combatant could fill the deficiency but a more novel solution could be to integrate the long range air search and Standard Missiles into the Joint Support Ship as it will have the C4I to provide task group command. This would allow the new surface combatant to be shaped as required without the area air defence encumbrance, allowing it to be focused on a more littoral role while maintaining blue water capabilities as well.

As the center of task group structure, the capabilities of the Joint Support Ship are the key to its operational effectiveness. The addition of yet another capability in the form of area air defence would be controversial as the most significant criticism of the Joint Support Ship concept to date has been its attempt to integrate so many capabilities into one hull. These criticisms focus on the extensive compromises that would likely result from this complex, never before attempted, level of integration. The old adage “Jack of all trades; master of none” could easily be applied to the Joint Support Ship concept in this regard. Unfortunately the procurement of additional classes of vessels to cater specifically to individual capabilities is likely to be beyond the financial and manpower means of the Canadian Forces therefore making this the only viable option.

The resulting task group would have at its center the Joint Support Ship with both task group and joint force command elements, task group escort / force protection and over the shore strike capabilities being provided by a number of updated Frigates and littoral support / protection provided by the new surface combatants that will have replaced the Iroquois class. This is the construct that will be used in the remainder of the

paper's discussion of the Navy's relevance within a joint and combined operations framework.

This Canadian-sized sea basing construct must now be examined to determine the positive affect its adoption could have on the perceived relevance of the Navy in joint and combined operations. To accomplish this, a basic framework must be established against which the impact of the changed structure can be gauged. Relevance is defined as the "state of being connected to the current subject"¹⁸ which could be looked at in two ways. The idealist would look at the meaningful participation of Naval forces in Canadian Forces joint operations as the only test of relevance while the realist would only consider the Canadian public's connection with the activities of the Navy echoing the familiar naval adage "if it doesn't make the news, it didn't happen". The combination of these two criteria, meaningful contribution of naval assets and a favorable public perception of the Navy, will provide the basis of examination.

The earlier discussion of political instability in countries such as Somalia, Sudan, East Timor and Sri Lanka have highlighted potential areas where the Government of Canada could consider deploying ground troops should the situation dictate. To provide an evaluation of the proposed construct it is necessary to look into past operations, including those in Somalia and East Timor, to ascertain what the joint / combined operational benefit would have been. By looking to past operations it will be possible to determine future benefits and relevance.

Starting in 2000, Canada provided four hundred and fifty troops to Task Force East Africa in support of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The force

¹⁸ Oxford dictionary

included mechanized infantry, engineers and a headquarters element. This is the type of mission that would have benefited from the availability of an expeditionary task group construct. The provision of sealift, headquarters facilities, tactical air and sea support could have greatly aided the effectiveness of the mission. In situations such as these the provision of tactical helicopter support has not routinely been included in the force composition. If an effective sea base was provided, it could be easily included in the package providing significant operational benefit. The complete joint package would have enhanced mission effectiveness and would have painted a favorable picture, for the Canadian public, of a truly joint force working together to accomplish important United Nations work.

In Somalia the limited sea base support provided by HMCS Preserver was critical to the overall mission and was widely reported in Canada. Had the additional capabilities inherent in a JSS along with a Tactical Helicopter element been available, the effectiveness of the land contingent would certainly have been enhanced. With the Task Group construct Maritime Interdiction Operations off the coast could have been executed as the situation dictated. While effectiveness would have been enhanced, it is unlikely that the public's perception would have been bolstered given the unfortunate events which occurred ashore.

During Operation Toucan in East Timor, HMCS Protecteur provided the base of operations for six hundred Canadian service personnel for the seven month operation. In a similar situation to Somalia, Protecteur was utilized to the maximum extent possible but she was never intended to provide this type of sea lift and headquarters support. Although

the Sea Kings helicopters flew one hundred and fifty seven sorties¹⁹ to move goods ashore, the addition of effective off-loading capabilities from anchor would have been beneficial. These same shortcomings have been seen in other security and humanitarian missions providing assistance in Haiti and Louisiana. Without the dedicated sealift capabilities, sea based command and sustainment capabilities of the Joint Support Ship, Canada is only able to provide the most basic level of support to the population and the land forces ashore.

It is important here to clarify that in terms of disaster / humanitarian relief, this joint expeditionary capability is not intended to replace the rapid reaction DART construct. While this naval construct brings tremendous capabilities and resources to a littoral area, it does so far too slowly to provide the immediate support that DART provides. This capability should be considered as the follow on from DART; taking as long as four to six weeks to arrive depending on distance to be traveled.

With the above discussion focused on joint operations, it is important that combined operations also be examined. In many circles within the Navy, combined operations with the US Navy, NATO or other allies is seen as the future. Rather than develop capabilities such as JSS that may not be optimized for specific situations, it could be more advantageous to maintain our current blue water naval capabilities and work more closely with our allies. The Navy would back away from the JSS concept, acquire replacement AORs for Naval replenishment purposes only and build new area air defence

¹⁹ National Defence and the Canadian Forces. "Canadian Expeditionary Force Command; Operations" <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/index-eng.asp> ; Internet; accessed 9 March 2009.

destroyers to replace the Iroquois class. In essence, maintain the status quo. This would lock the Canadian Navy into pursuing combined operations with our allies. The fundamental problem with this approach is that the Canadian Navy would lose the ability to effectively support the Army and Air Force in operations directed by the government. The Army will deploy, the Air Force will get them there and provide support, while the Navy is working with a US Carrier Battle Group somewhere else in the world. Although all three elements may be working toward the same government directed strategic end state, the absence of the Navy from what the Canadian public would see as the main Canadian effort, would have a negative impact on public's perceived relevance of the Navy.

In conclusion, it has been argued that Sea Basing is what the Navy needs to maintain, or even resurrect, its relevance in an increasingly joint environment in accordance with its stated strategic direction. As operations shift from traditional Cold War roles to Operations other than War, the Navy must adjust its course acquiring and developing the capabilities needed to allow the Government of Canada to advance its objectives throughout the world. It has been shown that a modest, Canadian sized sea basing capability could provide this relevance while still maintaining the largely blue-water focus that is so central to the current naval mindset.

Central to this shift is the acquisition of the proposed Joint Support Ships and the establishment of a task group concept with them as the core element. While the incremental cost, at over one billion dollars for three ships, is high given the overall defence budget, when amortized over the thirty plus year life of the JSS, it appears much more modest at only thirty three million dollars per year. This simple change in focus will

allow the Navy to continue to make a valuable contribution in combined operations but, when the Government of Canada demands a joint effect somewhere in the world, the Navy will have the strategic capability to realize their aspirations with a 100% Canadian Joint Task Force. This construct will be a force multiplier that will bring added effectiveness and capabilities to the land and air elements; demonstrating to the Canadian public that their tax dollars have been wisely invested in a truly joint armed forces that is well equipped and prepared to do their work at home and around the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*. Ottawa: Chief of the Maritime Staff, 2001.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark*. Ottawa: Chief of the Maritime Staff, 2005.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. "Annex A to 32673-304 JSS SOR Version 4.0 dated 16 May 2007." http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat/jss-nsi/documents/JSS_SOR_V_4.0_Annex_A.pdf ; Internet; accessed 9 March 2009.
- Clark, Admiral Vern, US Navy. "Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities" *Proceedings*, October 2002; United States Navy; <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/proceedings.html> ; Internet; Accessed 8 March 2009.
- Douglass, C.H. *Future Seabasing Technology Analysis: Logistics Command and Control*. Alexandria: Centre for Naval Analyses. 2006.
- Gregson, Wallace C. and R.V. Dutil "Sea-Basing: Projecting Power and Influence from the Sea." In *The Role of Naval Forces in 21st – Century Operations*, edited by Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., 169-181. Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's, 2000.
- Hansen, Commander Kenneth. "Starting Over: The Canadian Navy and Expeditionary Warfare" A paper prepared for the conference "What Canadian Military and Security Forces in the Future World? A Maritime Perspective" hosted by the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University 10-12 June 2005; <http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/msc2005/msc2005hansen.pdf> ; Internet; accessed 12 February 2009.
- Kaplan, Robert D. "Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean" *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2009; Council on Foreign Relations; <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/64832/robert-d-kaplan/center-stage-for-the-21st-century> ; Internet; accessed 12 February 2009.
- Labs, Eric Jackson. *The Future of the Navy's Amphibious and Marine Prepositioning Forces*. Washington: Congressional Budget Office, 2004.

- Mitchell, Paul. "A Transformation Agenda for the Canadian Forces: Full Spectrum Influence" *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2003/2004; Chief of Military Personnel; <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo4/no4/transfor-eng.asp#n31> ; Internet; accessed 7 March 2009.
- National Defence and the Canadian Forces. "Canadian Expeditionary Force Command; Operations" <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/index-eng.asp> ; Internet; accessed 9 March 2009.
- Schrady, David. *Sea-Based Logistics and Lessons from the Falklands*. Unidentified: Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis, undated.
- Stoker, Cdr Nick "Medium Sized Navies and Sea Basing: Brave as Lions and Cunning as Foxes" In *Australian Maritime Issues 2006 SPC-A Annual*, edited by Andrew Forbes and Michelle Lovi, 251-260. Canberra: Sea Power Centre - Australia, 2007.
- The Fund For Peace. "Failed State Index 2008." http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140 ; Internet; accessed 12 February 2009.
- Ullman, Harlan K. "Influencing Events Ashore" Chapter 22 from *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, Eds. Richard L. Kuglar and Ellen L. Frost, Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 2001, pp 493-520. Accessed 14 May 2008; http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2001/Global%20Century%20-%20June%202001/C22Ullma.pdf . From C/DS-523/WTH/LD-1.
- United States. National Research Council. *Naval Expeditionary Logistics: Enabling Operational Maneuver From the Sea*. Washington: National Academy Press, 1999.
- United States. The Congress of the United States. *Sea Basing and Alternatives for Deploying and Sustaining Ground Combat Forces*. Washington: Congressional Budget Office, 2007.

Vego, Milan N. Operations of Blue-Water Navies in Narrow Seas. Published text of presentation on Maritime Interests, Conflict and the Law of the Sea given Halifax June 1991.

Vego, Milan N. *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas*. 2nd Ed. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. "The Coastal Ocean Institute: At the Coast - where air, land, sea, and people meet."

<http://www.whoi.edu/oceanus/viewArticle.do?id=4498> ; Internet; accessed 7 March 2009.

