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TURKEY: STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL ASSET TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

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**TURKEY: STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL ASSET
TO THE EUROPEAN UNION**

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ABSTRACT

Turkey's journey to European Union (EU) accession commenced over forty years ago with the signature of the Ankara Agreement in 1963. While Turkey's candidacy to the EU was finally accepted in 1999 and its accession negotiations commenced in 2005, its accession process continues to be plagued by apprehension and debate on both sides. Although the issues associated with Turkey's EU membership are vast and complicated, this paper will demonstrate that Turkey's accession would provide a beneficial contribution to the EU in responding to 21st century challenges. Therefore, its accession is seen not only as desirable from a strategic and geopolitical perspective, but inevitable in the long run. The arguments will demonstrate that based on the very nature of EU enlargement and integration, the EU will continue to increase its zone of stability, security and prosperity in response to the challenges of the 21st century and absorb Turkey. It will argue that Turkey is complementary in terms of economy, demography, energy security, culture as well as regional and global security considerations to the EU, and that these factors will trump current concerns. Finally, it will illustrate that recent EU initiatives have demonstrated a renewed commitment to enlargement and easing of cultural apprehensions that will facilitate Turkish accession to the EU. In the end, although the counter arguments are strong, it will be convincingly illustrated that, from a strategic and geopolitical perspective, Turkey's accession to the EU is beneficial for Europe in the long run.

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TURKEY: STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL ASSET TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Introduction:

Since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, Turkey has aspired to become a Westernized European country. Turkey's journey to European Union (EU) accession commenced over forty years ago with the signature of the Ankara Agreement in 1963. It aimed at bringing Turkey into a Customs Union with the European Economic Community (later the (EU)), with full accession to the community as a long-term goal. While Turkey's candidacy to the EU was finally accepted in 1999 and its accession negotiations commenced in 2005, its accession process continues to be plagued by apprehension and debate on both sides. However, Europe and the world have changed. The 21st century brings new challenges that will arguably trump any prior concerns of Turkey being "too poor, too big and too different," making its EU accession a strategic net gain. The EU is grappling with the emerging issues of the 21st century such as globalization, demographic shifts, climate change, the need for sustainable energy sources and new security threats. The most significant issues identified by the EU include concerns over its energy security as well as the impending demographic crisis with the potential for a corresponding negative economic impact.¹ Recognizing these primary challenges and those inherent with globalization, the EU has reiterated that after fifty years of integration and enlargement, the vision set out by Europe's founding fathers remains as powerful as ever.² In reforming for the 21st century, the EU has acknowledged:

¹ Friends of Europe, "The State of Europe at 50: Looking to the next 50 years," http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Portals/6/Documents/Reports/2007_Oct_4_EPS_StateofEurope_Report.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 Feb 2008, 11.

...that the only viable approach to attain the right responses for Europe in a globalized world is through common solutions in order to: modernize the European economy to face new competition, to keep Europe as the forefront of efforts to address climate change worldwide, to secure sustainable energy supplies, to manage migration effectively, to combat terrorism, to help developing countries to fight poverty and to see European values promoted effectively in the global community.³

This paper will demonstrate that Turkey would be a complementary asset to the EU in meeting the challenges of the 21st century. Turkey is the largest, most strategic, geopolitically important country to ever apply for EU membership. It is situated at the regional crossroads of the Balkans, Middle East, South Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern Mediterranean, which are of strategic importance to Europe. Turkey not only has a growing and dynamic economy, but also is in a unique position to become an energy corridor between the East and West and the potential to exert significant influence in the peace and security along Europe's southeastern borders and in the Middle East more broadly. Although the issues associated with Turkey's EU membership are vast and complicated, this paper will argue that, contrary to Euroskeptic criticism, Turkey's accession would provide a contribution to the EU in responding to 21st century challenges

² "In a world dominated by political and economic units of continental dimensions, the European nations cannot hope to survive on a basis of political or economic independence. Europe must unite, not merely to preserve the peace and freedom of her peoples and to recover and augment her material prosperity, but to assert once more those principles which are now menaced and which must be preserved and given new life by being enshrined in a new structure." Vision for European Union as documented in the Declaration of Political Principles of European Union approved by the International Council of the European Movement at Brussels, 28 February 1949, contained in: Richard Vaughan, *Post-War Integration in Europe: Documents of Modern History*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 37.

³ European Commission, "Reforming Europe for the 21st Century," http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/com_2007_412_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 January 2008, 2.

and therefore its accession is seen not only as desirable from a strategic and geopolitical perspective, but inevitable in the long run.

This paper will argue: 1) based on the very nature of EU enlargement and integration, it will continue to increase its zone of stability, security and prosperity in response to the challenges of the 21st century and absorb Turkey; 2) Turkey is complementary in terms of economy, demography, energy security, culture as well as regional and global security considerations to the EU in the 21st century and these factors will trump current concerns; and 3) recent EU initiatives have demonstrated a renewed commitment to enlargement and easing of cultural apprehensions that will facilitate Turkish accession to the EU.

In particular, this paper will argue that Turkey's accession is both desirable and inevitable, from a strategic perspective by highlighting the most critical concerns as well as the complementary counter arguments in the following areas: 1) regional and global security, 2) cultural issues, 3) economics, 4) demographics and 5) energy security.

Chapter 1 will explore the EU Integration and Enlargement Policy, demonstrating that the EU will continue, by its very nature, to absorb new members with a view to increasing its zone of stability, security and prosperity to include Turkey, extending the same logic as in earlier accession processes. It will highlight Turkey's history and European integration to illustrate it has always leaned westward to the ideals of a civilized society based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It will demonstrate Turkey's progress and commitment to continue down this path to achieve the epitome of Kemal Atatürk's goal of becoming a member of the EU. Chapter 2 will highlight the geopolitical and strategic importance of Turkey to the EU as it aspires to become a global

actor in the 21st century. It will discuss the major apprehensions as well as opportunities and benefits in the key areas identified above. Finally Chapter 3 will outline the EU's renewed commitment to enlargement and cultural initiatives that are paving the way for a more diversified Europe. In the end, although the counter arguments are strong, it will be convincingly illustrated that, from a strategic and geopolitical perspective, Turkey's accession to the EU is beneficial for Europe in the long run.

Chapter 1

Historical Context: Europe's Policy of Enlargement

Enlargement is one of the EU's most powerful policy tools and serves the EU's strategic interests in enhancing peace, security, liberty, democracy and conflict prevention. Over five decades, the EU has successfully evolved in its response to external events, through deeper integration and widening through enlargement.⁴ Concomitant with every previous EU enlargement have been debates over the qualifications of prospective applicants. Yet no candidacy has ever ended without accession to the EU, even while the EU has to continue to reform and adapt to the impact of an ever larger Union. Given the challenges of the 21st century articulated by the EU itself, namely “to modernize the European economy to face new competition, to secure sustainable energy supplies, to manage migration effectively, to combat terrorism, to help developing countries to fight poverty and to see European values promoted effectively in a global community,”⁵ it is destined to evolve further.

⁴ During the last half century, the EU has pursued deepening and widening in parallel. As new members joined, the EU continued to pursue deeper integration, often stimulated by new challenges raised by the new members, which required attention to new policy areas at the EU level. Additional details are available in: Neill Nugent, “The Deepening and Widening of the European Community: Recent Evolution, Maastricht, and Beyond,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume XXX, no 3. (September 1992): 311-328.

⁵ European Commission, “Reforming Europe for the 21st Century,” 2.

1.1 - European Union Integration and Enlargement

Over the course of its history since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the EU has developed from being primarily an internally focused economic community to an important political actor on the global stage. The dynamics of European integration have been embedded in the larger international environment, and each occasion of integration and enlargement has been in response to internal and/or external factors. By the very nature and logic of its policies, the EU continues to absorb new member states to increase the zone of “democratic peace,”⁶ bringing increasing stability, prosperity and security.

The EU has evolved over a period of fifty years since its initial conception following World War II. The original intent was to promote security and prosperity among countries that had been ravaged by war in the first part of the 20th Century. The founding fathers⁷ utilized economic integration as the primary mechanism to achieve lasting reconciliation between Germany and France, and avoid further conflict between these two crucial states on the continent.⁸ Their vision was the catalyst of the European integration project, creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) under the Treaty of Paris in 1951. Further integration occurred in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome, where the six founding members; Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France,

⁶ The zone of democratic peace is a theory which holds that democracies, never or almost never go to war. This theory is related to empirical research in political science, international relations, and philosophy.

⁷ The founding fathers of the European Union are considered to be Robert Schuman (French Foreign Minister 1948-1952), Jean Monnet (French economic advisor/politician), Sir Winston Churchill (British Prime Minister), Konrad Adenauer (First chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany), Alcide de Gasperi (Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Italy), Walter Hallstien (German Foreign Ministry), Paul Henri Spaak (Belgian politician), and Alterio Spinelli (Italian politician) who are regarded as the principal architects of European integration following the end of the Second World War.

⁸ Seiju Desai, “Turkey in the European Union: A Security Perspective – Risk or Opportunity?” *Defence Studies* 5:3 (2005): 365.

Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands decided to establish the European Economic Community (EEC) with the creation of a common market covering a whole range of goods and services. Over the period of the next fifty years, this evolved into the EU, which pursued ever-deeper integration while concurrently taking in new members under its enlargement policy. Thus, the twin logic of “deepening” and “widening” have always gone together; one has never been pursued with the intent of ‘sacrificing’ the other.

The EU has gone through a series of six enlargements since its inception. Initial enlargements included Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973, followed by Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. Deeper integration took place concurrently with new environmental and social policies as well as the expansion of regional aid programs in response to the southern European expansion of these underdeveloped countries. This included the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975.⁹ In 1979 the European Community saw a decisive advance with the first elections to the European Parliament, and achieved a greater level of integration through the adoption of a European single market under the Single European Act in 1987. More specifically, the EU was motivated to establish a single market based on international economic pressures, as European firms had the sense they were increasingly falling behind their Japanese and American counterparts.¹⁰

In 1989, the political context of Europe was dramatically altered with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of authoritarian communism. This led not only to the

⁹ European Union, “Regional Policy,” http://europa.eu/pol/reg/overview_en.htm; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008. The objective of the ERDF is to strengthen economic and social cohesion in the EU by adjusting imbalances between its regions, with monetary support as a primary mechanism.

¹⁰ Alberta Sbragia, “Introduction – The EU and Its ‘Constitution’: Public Opinion, Political Elites, and Their International Context,” American Political Science Association; PSONline www.apsanet.org; Internet; accessed 7 January 2008, 239.

unification of Germany in October 1990, but also the democratic transformation of Central and Eastern European States formally members of the Soviet bloc. In the mid-1990s, twelve Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) expressed a desire to join the EU, each aspiring to share the EU goals of freedom, democracy and prosperity. Negotiations on future membership opened in 1997, leading to the further ‘widening’ or enlargement of the EU in response to these external events.

Concurrent to these international events was the development of the Maastricht Treaty or Treaty on European Union (TEU) that was adopted in 1993, as a result of both external and internal events. Externally, the collapse of communism and German reunification led to a commitment to reinforce the Community’s international position.¹¹ Internally, the Member States also wanted to supplement the progress achieved by the Single European Act with additional reforms. This represented a new stage in European Integration as it opened the way to political integration. The Maastricht Treaty created the EU based upon three pillars: the European Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and police and judicial cooperation in judicial matters (JHA).¹² The Treaty also introduced the notion of European citizenship, launched an economic and monetary union (EMU) and reinforced the powers of the European Parliament, leading to further ‘deepening’ or integration of the EU as a whole.

With the experience of past enlargements and potential membership of the CEECs, the prerequisites to join the EU were articulated with increasing precision over the course of its evolution. The Enlargement policy is defined by Article 6 and Article 49

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 239.

¹² European Commission, “Treaty of Maastricht on European Union,” http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/maastricht_en.htm; Internet; accessed 10 March 2008.

in the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), stating that any European country may apply for membership if it respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.¹³

Based on the concerns regarding the unstable democracies and incomplete economies of the CEECs candidates, the European Council further defined EU membership criteria in Copenhagen in 1993, which was further reinforced in 1995. The Copenhagen criteria set out the conditions that potential members must meet to be accepted into the EU. These criteria are:

1. Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for protection of minorities;
2. A functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; and
3. The capacity to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the objectives of the political, economic and monetary union.¹⁴

Furthermore, prospective member states must demonstrate their capacity to meet the obligations of EU membership by adopting the European *acquis communautaire*, a 100,000 page body of the European Legislature, through appropriate administration and judicial structures. There are thirty-five chapters in the *acquis*. Candidates must demonstrate for each chapter that it is ready to undertake the provisions. Once a respective chapter is opened, candidate countries are expected to enact national legislation and pass necessary laws for compliance with these provisions. Once the European Commission is satisfied that the candidate country has met the pre-conditions for accession, the member states

¹³ European Commission, "Consolidated Version of the Treaty of European Union Contents," http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002M/htm/C_2002325EN.000501.html#anArt6; Internet; accessed 12 December 2007.

¹⁴ European Commission, "Conditions for Enlargement," http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index_en.htm; Internet; accessed 12 December 2007.

must agree by unanimous vote in the Council to accept the candidature, followed by an absolute majority vote in European Parliament. Lastly, the accession treaty must be ratified by each EU member state in accordance with their constitutional procedures.¹⁵ Simply put, the prospect and conditionality of EU membership through this process have been transformational in candidate states on a path to accession, complimented by financial and technical assistance provided by the EU. Moreover, as a result of the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria and *acquis communautaire*, Turkey and any other candidate state that applied for membership post Copenhagen are subject to these criteria, making subsequent accession negotiations even more onerous on recent candidates.

The EU's vitality and geopolitical situation led to the fourth enlargement in 1995 that saw Austria, Finland and Sweden become member states. The creation of a single European currency significantly deepened integration, and in 2000, the EU adopted the "Lisbon strategy" to modernize the European economy in order to compete in the world market.¹⁶

The fifth enlargement to twenty five countries occurred in 2004 with the accession of ten of the twelve CEEC¹⁷ candidate countries. The enlargement from 15 to 25 countries was the culmination of a long process that led to the historical reunification of Western and Eastern Europe, which had been divided for half a century by the Iron Curtain and the Cold War.

¹⁵ European Commission, "Europe in 12 Lessons: Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy," http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_2/index_en.htm; Internet; accessed 12 December 2007, 1.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁷ The 2004 enlargement included the following ten CEEC states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, one of the republics of former Yugoslavia (Slovenia), the three Baltic states that had been part of the Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), and two Mediterranean countries (Cyprus and Malta). Bulgaria and Romania, among the original twelve CEEC candidates acceded later in 2007.

Several unique mechanisms or phase-in periods were applied to the CEEC's 2004 accession to facilitate their membership transition to the EU. Inclusive was a seven-year transition period that restricted the free movement of labour within the EU from these new members;¹⁸ application of "the Schengen zone"¹⁹ was restricted until the necessary conditions of the Schengen *acquis* were met;²⁰ and a ten year phase-in period was implemented for some of the monetary transfers to the CEECs such as the Common Agricultural Policy funds.²¹ Furthermore, while CEEC were considered members of the economic and monetary union (EMU) through their EU membership, with respect to the enlargement of the euro zone, the CEEC countries were considered "...members states with a derogation."²² The adoption of the euro and enlarged euro zone would be

¹⁸ European Commission, "Enlargement, two years after: an economic evaluation," http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication7548_en.pdf ; Internet; accessed 21 January 2008, 80. A labour transitional period was applied to the CEECs. It was divided in three phases over seven years, according to a formula of "2-plus 3-plus 2 years" with different conditions applying during each of these phases. Notwithstanding, Sweden, UK and Ireland decided not to apply this restriction on accession of the CEECs and the influx of migrants had a positive effect on their respective economies. As a result four member states (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Finland) decided to lift restrictions for the second, three-year phase of the transitional arrangements, while six others (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) have decided to alleviate them.

¹⁹ The "Schengen zone" refers to countries covered under the Schengen Agreement (two agreements concluded between European states in 1985 and 1990) dealing with the abolishment of border controls between participating states. It includes policies on the temporary entry of persons (including the Schengen Visa) harmonization of external border controls, cross-border police and judicial co-operation. There are 31 participating states (including 27 EU states and four non-EU members) that are subject to all or part of Schengen rules. Note: the UK and Ireland did not sign up to the Schengen zone.

²⁰ EuroLex, "Council Decision of 6 December 2007," http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_323/l_32320071208en00340039.pdf; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008. The European Council verified the necessary conditions for the application the Schengen *acquis* were met and nine new countries entered the Schengen zone on 20 December 2007. States admitted were the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.

²¹ Nugent, Neill, "Turkey's Membership Application: Implications for the EU," <http://www6.miami.edu/EUCenter/nugentfinal.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2008, 7-8.

²² EuroLex, "Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Central Bank - Fifth Report on the practical preparations for the future enlargement of the euro area," <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0434:EN:NOT>; Internet; accessed 25

authorized only when the necessary conditions were filled to meet an advanced stage of economic integration.²³ It is anticipated that the type of transition mechanisms or phase-in periods utilized for the CEECs may also be applied to Turkey's accession.

Notwithstanding, the attainment of full EU membership for Turkey without derogations is paramount at the end of any phase-in or transition period.

The EU finally opened accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005. Of note, the entire population of the ten states in the 2004 enlargement is equal to the population of Turkey (73 million or approximately 12% of the EU population).²⁴

Bulgaria and Romania became EU members in 2007 and the EU has since opened accession negotiations with Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). It has also reaffirmed its commitment for eventual EU membership of other Western Balkan countries including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia and Kosovo, provided they fulfill the accession criteria.²⁵

March 2008. Note: Slovenia qualified for the Euro zone in 2006 and was admitted 1 January 2007, followed by Cyprus and Malta on 1 January 2008.

²³ European Commission, "Economic and Financial Affairs," http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/the_euro/index_en.htm?cs_mid=2946; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

²⁴ Ingmar Karlsson, "Turkey's Cultural and Religious Heritage – An Asset to the European Union," in Turkey in Monitor, et al. Michael Emerson and Senem Aydin. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS): January 2004-February 2005 No. 1-14; shop.ceps.eu/downfree.php?item_id=1228; Internet; accessed 8 November 2007, 84.

²⁵ European Commission, "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006/2007," http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/com_649_strategy_paper_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 December 2007.

The EU seemed to be suffering from enlargement fatigue in 2005, compounded by the failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty.²⁶ However, it has once again demonstrated its resiliency with the signature of the Lisbon Treaty (Reform Treaty) on 13 December 2007, with ratification and implementation aimed for 1 January 2009.²⁷ The EU is continuing to pursue modernization and further integration in order to function with its enlarged and prospective membership, as well as respond more effectively to challenges of the 21st Century.²⁸

The increase in prosperity, stability and security through EU enlargement has been one of the most incredible successes of the European Integration project.²⁹ The EU process of integration and enlargement has facilitated a positive response to circumstances, such the fall of dictatorships, the collapse of communism and the rise of globalization. The attraction of the EU and conditionality imposed by both the Copenhagen Criteria and *acquis communautaire*, has combined to successfully transform

²⁶ The EU failed to achieve the unanimous ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty after the rejection by France and the Netherlands in late spring 2005.

²⁷ The development of the Lisbon Treaty allowed the EU to come out of the two year institutional stalemate since the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. The Lisbon Treaty holds several objectives: to achieve a more democratic and transparent Europe by strengthening the role of European Parliament and national parliaments; provide more opportunities for citizens to have their voices heard (through the new citizens initiative) and provide greater clarification of responsibilities at the European and national level. The Treaty also reflects the need for the enlarged Union to function more effectively by implementing modern institutions that improve its ability to act in areas of significant priority and to adapt its policies to a rapidly changing world. The Treaty will be implementing simplified working methods, streamlined procedures, new decision making and voting mechanisms. The Treaty of Lisbon will increase EU capacity as an actor on the global stage, through the implementation of a new High Representative for the EU in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as a new European External Action Service. Further details are available at the EU website or in the draft Lisbon Treaty available at: European Union, "Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community," <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf>; Internet, accessed 16 January 2008.

²⁸ European Commission, "Reforming Europe for the 21st Century," 2.

²⁹ European Commission, "Europe in 12 Lessons: Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy," 1.

Central and Eastern Europe from communist regimes to democracies. This success is reflective in the tremendous reform in candidate countries such as Turkey and Croatia, and potential candidates in the Western Balkans. Almost fifty years since the Treaty of Rome, through the process of integration and enlargement, the EU has expanded from six members to a union of twenty seven states, and has almost 500 million people producing a quarter of the world's wealth.³⁰

In examining the historical nature of the EU and its propensity to expand, the challenges articulated for the 21st century will remain a catalyst for further EU integration and enlargement. The EU will continue to absorb candidate countries that meet the membership criteria. Moreover, as will be examined later, the internal challenges faced by the EU will considerably strengthen the case for Turkish accession.

1.2 - Previous Enlargement Debates

While EU enlargement and integration has been largely successful, every single previous enlargement of the EU has prompted debates and generated outspoken naysayers. These issues have included "...applicant's qualifications, the need for EU self-reform, the impact of specific policies such as the common agricultural policy or regional policy, and the appropriate or prudent balance between widening and deepening."³¹ For example, in the 1973 enlargement, problems included British budgetary contributions and Commonwealth preferences. In the Mediterranean enlargement, Structural Fund financing and the Common Fisheries Policy were of

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.

³¹ Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jorgensen ed, *Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter* (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2007), 13.

concern. In the CEEC enlargement, problems included the unprecedented number of applicants as well as the fact that they had weak economies with relatively low gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in comparison with the EU average as well as underdeveloped political and administrative systems.³² Notwithstanding these numerous and varied difficulties, the EU rose to the challenge and found pragmatic solutions. Other candidacies have also been mired in debate. In 1976, the European Commission issued a negative opinion on Greek accession and did not think it was possible, yet its accession occurred only five years later.³³ Similarly, the EU did not want to include a reference to EU membership in the negotiated Europe Agreements with the newly democratic, former Eastern Bloc states in CEEC. Yet ten of the CEECs became full EU members within fifteen years. It was considered illogical to accede a divided Cyprus to the EU, yet Cyprus joined in 2004 and is still divided.³⁴ Furthermore, in 1986, Spain acceded to the EU, yet its post-Franco transition and democracy was not fully secured. Spain was allowed to join primarily to safeguard Spanish democracy and to allow it to develop and become fully consolidated.³⁵ Prior to May 2004, the largest enlargement in the EU's history was widely predicted to provoke major problems, such as institutional deadlock

³² Neill Nugen, "Turkey's Membership Application: Implications for the EU," <http://www6.miami.edu/EUCenter/nugentfinal.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2008, 17.

³³ John Redmond, "Turkey and the European Union: troubled European or European trouble?" *International Affairs* 83, no 2 (2007): 316.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 316.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 316.

and massive flows of migrant workers.³⁶ To the contrary, adjustments were limited and manageable and the latest enlargement was a remarkable success.³⁷ In every case, the result of the enlargement was increased economic dynamism, which assisted in maintaining and creating jobs across the entire EU and increased trade and investment that bolstered the Single Market.³⁸ This brief historical view demonstrates that such debate has hardly been unique to the question of Turkey's membership.

In the past, the EU has demonstrated preparedness to take risks with new members. Turkey has made significant progress in achieving the Copenhagen criteria and continues to make progress towards implementation of the *acquis communautaire* to fulfill the EU membership criteria. The challenges faced by the EU will considerably strengthen the case for Turkish accession complimented by the vision, political resolve and the propensity to assume risk that has been displayed at key moments in the EU's past.³⁹

1.3 - Turkey's Integration with Europe

Concurrent with the evolution of the EU has been the historical integration of Turkey with Europe. For centuries Turkey has had ties to Europe. As the centre of the

³⁶ Note: Institutional deadlock predicted with the CEEC accession has never occurred even prior to the Lisbon (Reform) Treaty signed 13 December 2007, pending ratification and implementation by 1 January 2009.

³⁷ European Commission, "2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper - The EU's Enlargement Policy," http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=505DC0561; Internet, accessed 8 January 2008, 3.

³⁸ Ibid., 3.

³⁹ John Redmond, "Turkey and the European Union: troubled European or European trouble?" 317.

Ottoman Empire, it served as a both a bridge to and barrier between Europe, Asia and the Middle East and was arguably the cradle of European civilization.⁴⁰ With its origin in ancient civilizations, the vast reach of earlier empires intertwined the histories of all people in the region and created a base of commonality that can serve as a foundation of influence, making Turkey a valuable asset to the EU in its endeavor to be a global actor. While the history of the Ottoman Empire has been deeply woven with that of Europe's for centuries, the focus of this section will be on Turkey's integration with Europe following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after WWI, when Turkey looked to Europe as a model for its future.

In the wake of the Ottoman Empire, the father of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, revived pan-Turkish nationalism and established the Republic of Turkey. Atatürk embarked upon a major campaign of political, cultural and economic reforms. He endeavoured to transform the ruins of the Ottoman Empire into a modern, democratic, secular nation-state, modeling itself on the democratic and liberal values that Europe represented. The principles of Atatürk's reforms are generally referred to as Kemalism⁴¹ and formed the political foundation of the modern Turkish state.⁴² Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, it has been pursuing closer links with Europe. In 1949, the Council of Europe admitted Turkey only a few months after the Treaty of

⁴⁰ Independent Commission on Turkey, "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?" <http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/english.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2008, 10.

⁴¹ "Kemalism (or also known as the "Six Arrows") is the principle that defines the basic characteristics of the Republic of Turkey that was developed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the Turkish national movement. Kemalist ideology, which found its expression in Atatürk's reforms sought to create a modern, democratic and secular nation state, guided by educational and scientific progress based on the principles of Rationalism, Positivism, and the Enlightenment." As per: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kemalist_ideology

⁴² Fatos Tarifa and Benjamin Adams, "Who's the Sick Man of Europe? A Wavering EU Should Let Turkey In," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 18:1 (2007): 53.

London, judging the Turkish Republic fulfilled its criteria for membership: "...to be a European country that respected human rights, pluralistic democracy and rule of law."⁴³

In 1952, Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), becoming a critical ally of the West during the Cold War given its geostrategic location borders to the southern flank of the Soviet bloc. As the Europe integration project gained momentum with the establishment of the EEC under the Treaty of Rome, Turkey indicated its desire to participate and applied for associate membership in 1959. The EEC accepted Turkey's application, signing an association agreement known as the Ankara Agreement in 1963. It was aimed at bringing Turkey into a Customs Union with the EEC and addressing Turkey's accession to the Community as a long-term goal. An Additional Protocol was signed in 1970 outlining the rules for a customs union between the two parties.⁴⁴ After almost twenty years of strained relations between Turkey and the European Community, Turkey applied for membership to the EC in 1987. The European Commission responded in 1989, confirming Turkey's eventual membership. However, it deferred the matter to more favorable times, citing Turkey's economic and political situation, as well as its poor relations with Greece and the conflict with Cyprus as creating an unfavorable environment in which to begin negotiations.⁴⁵

⁴³ European Commission, "Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective," http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/issues_paper_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 January 2008.

⁴⁴ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever," *SIAS Review* XXVI, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2006): 149.

⁴⁵ Tarifa and Adams, "Who's the Sick Man of Europe? A Wavering EU Should Let Turkey In," 53.

Despite the rejection of Turkey's application in 1989, the improvement of EC-Turkey relations continued and Turkey succeeded in achieving a Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU in 1996.⁴⁶ In 1997, Turkey was again refused candidate status at the EU Luxembourg Summit, despite the fact that numerous other states from the Mediterranean and Eastern and Central Europe were granted status. Nevertheless, the Luxemburg European Council, with the agreement of the German government, did confirm Turkey's eligibility for future accession to the EU.⁴⁷ Two years later, at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, the EU accepted Turkey as a candidate concluding, "Turkey is a Candidate State – destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria applied to the candidate States."⁴⁸

Important in understanding the contextual background of Turkey's accession is an appreciation of the Turkish domestic issues that contributed to challenges on its path to accession. Since the founding of the modern secular Republic of Turkey in 1923, the Turkish military has perceived itself as the guardian of Kemalism, the official state ideology, even though Atatürk himself insisted on separating the military from politics. The military has had a record of intervening in politics to protect the secular nature of Turkey. It assumed power for several periods in the latter half of the 20th century as a result of military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980 and most recently a 'soft coup' in 1997, with the removal Necmettin Erbakan, an Islamic-oriented prime minister. There remains a strong and central paradox. While the military saw its role as protecting the secular,

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 55.

democratic nature of Turkey, each of the four military interventions in Turkish politics pushed Turkey's civil-military relations away from the liberal ideal of democratic civilian control. Indeed, while Turkey was a democracy and a NATO member, the quality of its democracy was a concern for EU membership, in particular this lack of civilian control over the military. As part of its 2003 EU membership bid, the Turkish Parliament ratified a series of legislative packages designed to curb the influence of the military.⁴⁹

Turkey experienced many domestic complications that moved it toward liberalism and democracy. These included the war against Kurdish separatists and polarization between the secular establishment and political Islam. During the 1990s, commonly termed as the lost decade, compromise with Kurdish and Islamic enemies of the Turkish Republic was not an option and the concomitant result was "...military confrontation, political polarization, authoritarianism and economic crisis."⁵⁰ However in 1997, on the political front, the military had forced the Islamic Welfare Party out of power through a 'soft coup.' In 1998, with Abdulla Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) or (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or (PKK)) behind bars, the Kurdish separatist movement was largely defeated. Enticed by the prospect of EU membership, Ankara began implementing a series of political and economic reforms that ceased ineffective political parties that governed in the 1990s. This, coupled with the decisive action taken under the Finance Minister and backed by International Monetary Fund in 1999 restored economic stability. The general elections in 2002 were open for the emergence of a new

⁴⁹ European Commission, "Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress Toward Accession," <http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/Recom.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008, 11.

⁵⁰ Philip Gordon and Omer Taspinar, "Turkey on the Brink." *The Washington Quarterly* 29.3 (2006): 67.

political party. For the first time in Turkish history, the Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AK Parti, or (AKP)), “a political party with Islamic roots whose moderation was reflected in the lessons learned from the Welfare Party removal, won the national election in a landslide.”⁵¹ Notably, the AKP declared EU membership as its top priority and won by adopting an aggressively pro-EU political platform. According to Elif Ulcer, Turkey’s reformist Islamic movement achieved critical objectives of significant importance, “First, it gained political sense of legitimacy from the perspective of Turkey’s secular state tradition. Second it gained support of Turkey’s pragmatic middle class, business community and liberal intellectuals.”⁵² After the 2002 victory, the AKP committed itself to a substantial democratic reform process guided by the EU Copenhagen Criteria.

The AKP passed an extensive number of reforms aimed at harmonizing Turkey’s judicial system, civil-military relations and human rights practices with European norms, amending the Constitution eight times between 1995 and 2004. The Turkish government presented its National Programme for the Adoption of the *acquis* in March 2001, and subsequently adopted a major constitutional reform in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership in September 2001. Reforms strengthened guarantees in human rights and fundamental freedoms. A new civil code was also adopted in November 2001 and legal reform packages addressed areas including education in mother tongue, civilian control of the military, repeal of the death penalty,

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 60.

freedom of expression, freedom of demonstration and cultural rights.⁵³ Results of the reform process included stability; five years of economic growth of 7.5%, substantial foreign investment, a growing civil society as well as legal and educational improvements. Turkey also made key contributions to EU peacekeeping projects as well as lessening of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and creating a momentary opportunity to solve the frozen Cyprus conflict.⁵⁴ Over the period of 10 years, the prospect of Turkey's EU accession was the catalyst for the most substantial political transformation Turkey experienced since multiparty politics was introduced in 1945.⁵⁵ Finally, at the EU Summit on 17 December 2004, its persistence was finally rewarded. Recognizing the large scale political and economic reform that had taken place in Turkey, a start date of EU-Turkey accession negotiations was set for 3 October 2005. While all twenty five member states agreed to open negotiations with Turkey, it was emphasized that accession negotiations would be open ended with no guaranteed outcome and there was skeptical public opinion in much of Western Europe. Public opinion polls in France reflected a rejection rate of 70-80%, 76% in Austria and resistance in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Denmark and Sweden.⁵⁶ On the contrary, there was strong support from Britain,

⁵³ Elif Ucer, "Turkey's accession to the European Union," *Futures* 38 (2006): 201.

⁵⁴ International Crisis Group, "Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead Europe Report N°184 – 17 August 2007," http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/184_turkey_and_europe___the_way_ahead.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 February 2008, ii.

⁵⁵ Grigoriadis, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever," 148.

⁵⁶ Euractiv, "The EU-25's View of Turkey's Membership Bid," <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-25-view-turkey-membership-bid/article-133328>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008, 1.

support from Germany, Greece and the remaining Member States.⁵⁷ At the opening of accession negotiations, Parliament noted that Turkey could only become a member following the EU's long-term budget planning for the period from 2014 onwards, as it was the next logical opportunity based on the EU financial framework.⁵⁸

Through its interaction with Europe, Turkey has also acceded to the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later OECD) in 1961, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later OSCE) in 1973 and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Presently, Turkey is a member of all major Europe-wide institutions, the exception being the EU.⁵⁹ Thus, Turkey's membership in the EU is a logical culmination of Turkey's integration with Europe.

As demonstrated throughout its history, Turkey has had a vocation to become part of the European Community. The legitimacy of its membership has been confirmed many times by the EU throughout this history. It has been on a process of accession for over forty years and remains committed to the necessary reforms.

1.4 - Recent Developments

Since the transformational period of 2004, the Turkish accession negotiations have been slower than anticipated. In 2006, the EU-Turkey relationship was strained as Turkey did not comply with the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement of July 2005. Turkey had committed to removing obstacles to the free movement of goods, including transport restrictions to EU member states. However, by 2006, Turkey was still

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁵⁸ Ucer, "Turkey's accession to the European Union," 198.

⁵⁹ Independent Commission on Turkey, "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?" 12.

refusing to open its seaports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic.⁶⁰ Consequently, the EU froze eight of thirty five negotiation chapters, although negotiations are continuing in other areas. The pace of Political reform was also slow in the first half of 2007, as Turkey struggled with an internal political crisis over its presidential elections. However, the presidential elections were resolved through a democratic process, further consolidating the legitimacy of Turkey's democracy. EU-Turkish relations were also plagued by the sentiments of EU member countries such as France and Germany that advocated a "Privileged Partnership" with Turkey as opposed to full membership. As current European Commissioner responsible for enlargement, Olli Rehn, states, "Talk about privileged partnership only erodes the credibility and weakens the conditionality in Turkey. This reduces the political incentive for reforms and causes political backlash among ordinary Turks."⁶¹ He has further reiterated, "Let me be clear – the EU means business. We are talking about Turkey's accession and nothing less."⁶²

With the resounding victory of the pro-reform AK Party in the July 2007 parliamentary elections, both the AKP and the EU were given an opportunity to relaunch Turkey's accession process. The signature of the recent Lisbon Treaty (Reform Treaty) in December 2007,⁶³ modernizing EU Institutions, will provide the basis for the EU to

⁶⁰ Turkey's reluctance was due to the failure of the UN Annan Plan to reunite Cyprus. Turkey had convinced Turkish Cypriots to support the plan, yet it was vetoed by Greek Cypriots. Notwithstanding Cyprus was acceded as a divided island to the EU in 2004, causing some strain in the relationship.

⁶¹ Confederation of Danish Industries (DI), "EU Enlargement – Keep the Train on Track," http://www.di.dk/NR/rdonlyres/ED5FE03A-1594-48C1-A087-746F580B3CD9/0/Udvidelsespeje2007_Vestbalkan_Tyrkiet.pdf; Internet; accessed 3 February 2008, 43.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 43.

⁶³ The Lisbon Treaty was signed 13 December 2007 and is still being ratified with completion and implementation targeted for 1 January 2009.

move forward in meeting the challenges of the 21st century and provides the framework for further EU enlargement.

Additionally, in 2008, Turkey's Foreign Minister and Chief Negotiator on EU accession, Ali Babacan, reaffirmed commitment to Turkish reforms to meet the *acquis communautaire* in order to achieve full membership.⁶⁴ Babacan stated that Turkey is aiming to open nine *acquis* chapters in 2008 and renewing its entire constitution. He emphasized that since September 2007, the government had convened 229 times to discuss EU procedures and sent 17 delegations to Brussels to continue to move forward on Turkish accession negotiations.⁶⁵ In the area of human rights, Turkey succeeded in abolishing the death penalty in 2002, and other areas of international controversy are being addressed. While the abolishment or amendment of Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code is pending resolution with an amendment awaiting submission to parliament,⁶⁶ Turkey has met another significant precondition for EU membership.⁶⁷ A new Foundation Law was signed by parliament on 20 February 2008,⁶⁸ to return property confiscated by the state to Christian and Jewish minority foundations, addressing a key

⁶⁴ EurActiv, "2008 to be 'EU year' in Turkey, says Foreign Minister," <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/2008-eu-year-turkey-foreign-minister/article-170121>; Internet; accessed 10 February 2008, 1.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁶⁶ Article 301 is a controversial article of the Turkish penal code. It took effect 1 June 2005, and was introduced as part of a package of penal-law reform in the process preceding the opening of negotiations for Turkish membership, in order to bring Turkey up to EU standards. It makes it a crime to insult "Turkishness."

⁶⁷ Turkish Daily News, "Government to submit article 301," <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=93099>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2007.

⁶⁸ EurActiv, "Turkey removes key obstacle to EU membership," <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-removes-key-obstacle-eu-membership/article-170471>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

human rights criticism of Turkey.⁶⁹ Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, speaking to the Turkish Grand Assembly, stated that the new foundation law "shows our determination on the road to EU full membership."⁷⁰

Conclusion

This section has demonstrated that the dynamics of European integration and enlargement have been embedded in the larger international environment. By the very nature of its policies, the EU continues to absorb new member states to increase its zone of stability, prosperity and security, in response to both internal and external events. It is argued that the EU will continue with the past precedent of employing this methodology in response to the challenges of the 21st century. While each enlargement has faced concerted opposition, enlargement has succeeded in increasing EU prosperity and security. The history of previous enlargement demonstrates that opposition and necessary debate have been a natural part of the process and all previous candidate accessions have ended with successful membership to the European Union. Therefore, the debate surrounding Turkish accession is not a new phenomenon and quite a natural part of the process. While significant challenges are anticipated throughout accession negotiations, Turkey has historically demonstrated the fortitude and commitment to continue on this journey to "Europeanization" as envisaged by its founding father, Kemal Atatürk. Turkey has remained focused on this objective for over forty years and has

⁶⁹ The EU has long been pressing Turkey to introduce the measures, which allow the foundations to reclaim assets seized more than 30 years ago, including churches, school buildings and orphanages.

⁷⁰ EurActiv, "Turkey removes key obstacle to EU membership," 1.

recently reconfirmed its commitment to EU accession despite some of the difficulties in recent years. The EU has successfully acceded members that were previously members of the Warsaw Pact and part of the former Soviet Union. There is valid reason to suggest that Turkey, who has been a member of the European Council since 1949, a member of NATO since 1952, as well as a member of every major European-wide institution with the exception of the EU, is destined for accession.

Chapter 2

Geopolitical and Strategic Implications of Turkish Accession

2.1 - Challenges of the 21st Century

The EU is grappling with globalization, demographic shifts, climate change, the need for sustainable energy sources and ways to respond to new security threats. The continent has identified that it has a demographic crisis on its hands, projecting by 2030 that Europe's labour force or working age population will have fallen by 20 million. To bridge this gap, Europe requires an aggressive influx of immigrants.⁷¹ While policy makers accept this reality, EU citizens are apprehensive to welcome immigrants and consequently, one of the most significant challenges facing the EU is achieving a truly multicultural Europe. It is believed to be the greatest challenge Europe will likely face, but also represents the greatest opportunity.⁷² Global demographic and economic changes are also an EU concern, with its relative standing in the world declining as emerging countries such as China, Brazil, Russia and India channel their populations and resources to achieve enormous economic growth.⁷³ The EU's relative share of the world population and global economy is shrinking constantly as other countries continue to advance. Energy security has been identified as a major emerging issue, with the dwindling of Europe's limited energy resources and recognition of increasing reliance on Russia for gas. The end of the Cold War has also brought globalization and new security

⁷¹ Friends of Europe, "The State of Europe at 50: Looking to the next 50 years," 11.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 40.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 15.

threats that continue to emerge from the south-eastern periphery of Europe.⁷⁴

Consequently, the EU has recognized the criticality of functioning more effectively in a competitive and globalized world, articulating reform objectives to better face the challenges of the 21st century:

...to modernize the European economy to face new competition, to secure sustainable energy supplies, to manage migration effectively, to combat terrorism, to help developing countries to fight poverty and to see European values promoted effectively in a global community.”⁷⁵

Turkey’s inclusion in the EU would be complimentary from a strategic and geopolitical perspective in meeting these concerns and further extending the EU’s zone of stability, security and prosperity. This chapter will highlight the major European apprehensions with Turkish accession as well as key areas of convergence in a symbiotic EU-Turkish relationship. The major factors for analysis include regional and global security, cultural issues, economics, demographics as well as energy security.

Regional and Global Security & Cultural Issues Analysis

The post Cold War European security environment has changed significantly with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and globalization. It has given prominence to emerging risk in the southern and eastern periphery of Europe and EU

⁷⁴ Sevgi Drorian, “Rethinking European Security: The Inter-Regional Dimension and the Turkish Nexus,” *European Security* 14, no.4 (December 2005): 425.

⁷⁵ European Commission, “Reforming Europe for the 21st Century,” 2.

strategic interests are now focused on this area.⁷⁶ There has also been a change in the concept of security, which was historically characterized by military containment and deterrence during the Cold War era. In this century of globalization, the security environment has necessitated a broader concept of stability and security, embracing interrelated political, economic, social and environmental factors. This inherently makes the opportunities and benefits of Turkish accession much more acute in an EU-Turkish symbiotic relationship.⁷⁷ In the present EU environment, security problems are “...increasingly trans-regional, multi-dimensional and are accompanied by a disappearance of traditional distinctions between Europe, Mediterranean, Middle East and the Black Sea and beyond on security matters.”⁷⁸ As a result, Sevgi Drorian argues that “...any instability and security in the area adjacent to Europe has repercussions on the social, economic, political and cultural well being of Europe.”⁷⁹ Based on the pessimistic scenarios for future EU security crisis to originate from the southern ‘arc of crises’ now characterizing the European politico-strategic environment,⁸⁰ Turkey’s accession to the EU would be invaluable to respond to new and more complex security threats and further extend the EU’s zone of “democratic peace” in this region. As Burak Akcapar argues:

⁷⁶ Drorian, “Rethinking European Security: The Inter-Regional Dimension and the Turkish Nexus,” 424.

⁷⁷ This broad statement on the changes to the security context is based on various sources including: Drorian (2005), Akcapar (2007), Desai (2005).

⁷⁸ Drorian, “Rethinking European Security: The Inter-Regional Dimension and the Turkish Nexus,” 424.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 425.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 425.

Turkey is strategic because of its human resources, system of government, tradition of statecraft including diplomatic and military skills, bustling free market economy, which is also an outlet for Caspian and Central Asian energy. Turkey has a significant potential to contribute to resolving regional and global challenges.⁸¹

In this complex security environment, Turkey arguably has political, economic, socio-cultural and security assets that, if a member state, would complement the EU's objective of increased stability, security and prosperity in the region.

This section will explore the more qualitative elements of Turkish accession, highlighting some of the apprehensions regarding security and foreign policy, as well as cultural/religious issues associated with Turkish accession. Based on the broadened dynamics of the security environment, the EU has much to gain in its role as an international actor by asserting influence on a regional and global scale through the accession of Turkey.

2.2 - Regional and Global Security Apprehensions

One of the major arguments against Turkey's accession from a security perspective is the extension of EU borders into the proximity of some of the world's most turbulent regions. Opponents prefer Turkey remain as a "buffer" between the EU and this region rather than extending the EU's borders to the volatile Middle East, where they fear instability in Middle East and Caucasus could have spillover effects in the EU.⁸²

⁸¹ Burak Akcapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 48.

⁸² Drorian, "Rethinking European Security: The Inter-Regional Dimension and the Turkish Nexus," 433.

Furthermore, it is argued that Turkey is already involved in conflicts with Cyprus and Armenia and its border with Iraq remains vulnerable, particularly if Iraq were to dissolve into its constituent ethnic components. Indeed the Cyprus-Turkey conflict would require complete resolution before EU accession could take place. Regardless of EU borders, Europe is already directly affected and will continue to be affected by events in states neighbouring Turkey.⁸³ The same “zone of instability” arguments were also put forth prior to the in 2004 enlargement, when several former Soviet Republics (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) were included as EU members and the border of Europe extended to Romania, Belarus, Moldova and the Ukraine. Yet, the enlargement was successful in bringing further peace and security to the region. Furthermore, as a member of NATO, support of many EU member countries (also NATO members) to the defence of Turkey is already committed through NATO policies. Recognizing the EU is inherently engaged in this region; Turkish accession would strengthen the EU Foreign policy ability, capacity and credibility and bring further stability and security. Prior to analyzing the benefits of accession, the Cyprus and Armenian concerns must be examined.

2.2 - Cyprus Issue

In 2004, Turkey made significant concessions in attempting to find a resolution to the division of Cyprus, supporting the UN based Annan Plan. Turkey convinced the Turkish Cypriots to support the plan and a 67% majority voted in favor. However, it was vetoed by the Greek Cypriots. Despite the failure of the UN Annan Plan, Cyprus was

⁸³ The same “zone of instability” argument was also put forward prior to the 2004 enlargement, when several former Soviet Republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) were induced as EU members and the border of Europe extended to Romania, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.

still acceded to the EU in 2004, with no resolution in sight. On the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005, it was to extend Protocol of its Customs Union to current EU members. However, Turkey refused to recognize Cyprus' legitimacy and has not opened its seaports or airports to Greek Cypriot traffic. As a result, the EU froze 8 chapters of the *acquis communautaire* in 2006. The resolution of this issue is one of the largest outstanding barriers to EU accession and its settlement would overcome a major obstacle to Turkey's convergence with the EU. It was hoped that following the Greek Cypriot's presidential election in February 2008, an opportunity might present itself to reengage in negotiations. A report by the International Crisis group asserts that another effort to achieve a comprehensive settlement to reunify Cyprus should be encouraged by the UN and EU in 2008 to resolve the long-standing dispute between ethnic Greeks and Turks on Cyprus.⁸⁴

Promisingly, in most recent developments, Cypriot leaders relaunched peace talks in March 2008 between the new President of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart, Mehmet Ali Talat, pledging to launch reunification negotiations by this summer.⁸⁵ In a gesture to improve the atmosphere of upcoming talks, Christofias and Talat agreed to reopen Ledra Street, one of five crossing points in the heart of the Cypriot capital. The removal of this historic symbol of partition took place on 3 April 2008. It ignited reunification hopes and was welcomed by the

⁸⁴ International Crisis Group, "Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition," <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5255&l=1>; Internet; accessed 10 February 2008.

⁸⁵ EurActiv, "Cypriot leaders relaunch peace talks," <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/cypriot-leaders-relaunch-peace-talks/article-171113>; Internet; accessed 7 April 2008.

International community.⁸⁶ The European Parliament President, Hans-Gert Pöttering, expressed his hope that this symbolic act would finally lead to Cyprus being an undivided member state and called it the “...first step of a real and visible approach between the two communities on Cyprus.”⁸⁷ In a statement by the Council of Europe Secretary General Terry Davis, he compared the fall of the Berlin wall with the events in Cyprus: “...the re-opening of this street, once so vibrant, brings new hope to all Cypriots that their country will soon be reunited and that Nicosia, like Berlin, will again become one city and one capital.”⁸⁸ While Turkey continues to make progress on the other chapters of the *acquis*, resolution or concession on the Cyprus issue will be required to re-open the eight frozen chapters. The recent events have brought a sentiment of renewed optimism. Solving the Cyprus issue would not only make Turkey-EU accession easier, but also EU-NATO cooperation in deployed operations abroad.

2.2 - Armenian Issue

EU accession talks with Turkey have highlighted the need for improved relations between Turkey and Armenia. Turkey’s border to Armenia remains closed and relations are politically strained due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenian claims of “genocide” occurring in 1915.

Turkey was one of the first states to recognize the newly independent Republic of Armenia in 1992, but closed its border in 1993, when Armenian separatist forces overran

⁸⁶ EurActiv, “Opening of Cyprus checkpoint breeds reunification hopes,” <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/opening-cyprus-checkpoint-breeds-reunification-hopes/article-171359>; Internet; accessed 7 April 2008, 1.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

Azerbaijan in the disputed territory around the Nagorno-Karabakh area. Turkey hoped this would put pressure on Armenia to make peace with Azerbaijan, whose population is primarily Turkic-speaking. Since the ceasefire in 1994, however, no resolution has been attained to solve the frozen conflict.

Relations are also strained as Armenia alleges that in 1915, the dominant “Young Turks” party in the Ottoman Empire, systematically organized the deportation and killing of 1.5 million Armenians. Turkey strongly denies Armenian genocide claims and has suggested an independent commission of historians be established to study the allegations. While there is no official EU requirement making Turkey’s accession dependant on its characterization of the Armenian massacres, it may be a factor in wider European judgment and seems to be moving up the agenda, placing increasing pressure on the states to resolve the issue.⁸⁹

While Turkey indicated that it was ready to build “political” relations in 2005 with then Armenian President Robert Kocharyan, no joint investigation of the allegations or successful diplomatic relations to resolve the border issues were achieved.⁹⁰ However, the recent Armenian presidential election in February 2008 brought in new President Serzh Sarkysyan and may provide a fresh opportunity for the normalization of relations. Turkish President Abdullah Gül congratulated Sarkysyan stating “I hope your new position will offer an opportunity for the normalization of relations between the Turkish and Armenian peoples who have proved over the centuries that they can live together in

⁸⁹ International Crisis Group, “Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead Europe Report N°184 – 17 August 2007,” 26.

⁹⁰ BBC News, “Turkey edges toward Armenian ties,” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4497519.stm>; Internet; accessed 31 March 2008.

peace and harmony” and further expressed the hope “...their joint efforts will eventually contribute to regional peace and prosperity.”⁹¹ While resolution of the Armenian “genocide” issue is not a “formal” criteria for accession, the resolution of the Armenian issues will remain pivotal in Turkey’s accession process. Hopefully, the change in Armenian leadership will provide a catalyst to normalize Armenian-Turkish relations, as it did in Cyprus, and place Turkey on a firmer path to accession.

2.2 - Regional and Global Security Opportunities

The accession of Turkey would be a significant strategic and geopolitical asset to the EU from a foreign policy perspective. Turkey has played a key role in the Cold War and is in a position to continue to play a crucial role in the security challenges of the EU in the future. Turkey would provide increased strategic depth to EU foreign policy through greater political, economic, diplomatic and military clout and would also extend the reach of the European Neighbourhood policy to increase security and stability in the area. By virtue of its history and geography at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, Caucasus, Middle East and the Balkans, not only does Turkey have an important geopolitical role, but a new geocultural dimension for future security in the region.⁹² Its extensive military resources and Western alignment also make it an invaluable ally for the EU’s Common Foreign and Defence Policy and a crucial link in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and drug trafficking. Turkey is also a member of major

⁹¹ Turkish Daily News, “Turkey wishes normal ties with Armenia,” <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?newsid=97106>; Internet; accessed 3 April 2008.

⁹² Drorian, “Rethinking European Security: The Inter-Regional Dimension and the Turkish Nexus,” 422.

Western Institutions, such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as Eastern institutions such as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Indeed, Sevgi Drorian asserts that Turkey's position may assist in bridging the West and Islam and create an alliance of civilizations.⁹³ The significance and symbolic nature of Turkey's only moderate Islamic Party (AKP) currently negotiating EU accession cannot be underestimated. It provides a model that democracy and Islam can exist in modernity, bridging the East-West chasm. The more Turkey is absorbed into the "democratic zone of peace" the more likely it will constitute a source of stability, security and prosperity for the regions in turmoil.⁹⁴

From a foreign and security policy perspective, there are also vast areas of EU-Turkey policy convergence where their symbiotic relationship has significant potential to contribute to resolving regional and global challenges.⁹⁵ In particular, various analyses of the regions surrounding Europe demonstrate that in the areas of the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, Central Asia, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, EU and Turkish foreign policies are complimentary and convergent.⁹⁶ Furthermore, the geographical priorities identified in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are all in Turkey's

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 422.

⁹⁴ Kemal Kirisci, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Time*, Chaillot Paper no.92 prepared for European Union Institute for Security Studies. (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006). Note: The zone of democratic peace is a theory which holds that democracies, never or almost never go to war and that they are less likely to become involved in militarized disputes among themselves. In practical terms, the theory suggests that a world of liberal/democratic states would be peaceful. Additional information is available in: Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999) and in Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008).

⁹⁵ Akcapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 48.

⁹⁶ The convergence of the EU and Turkey's foreign policies is reflected in Akcapar (2007), Aras (2006), Buharali (2004), Emerson and Tocci (2004), Drorian (2005) and Kirisci (2006).

proximity.⁹⁷ Indeed, Emerson and Tocci concluded that “Turkey stands to be an unequivocal asset for the EU’s external policies” based on a combination of “objective factors” and “normative arguments.”⁹⁸ Some of the factors emphasized within the report include “Turkey’s role [as] a geographical hub for regional cooperation,” and the fact that Turkey’s location “is well situated to become a forward base for the EU’s security and defense policy, for military logistics and the credibility of the EU’s presence in the region.”⁹⁹ From a foreign policy and security perspective, many sources conclude that Turkey and the EU can mutually reinforce each other’s assets and capabilities. Turkey, with the cultural links and understanding of Eurasia and the Middle East, has human resource assets that are complementary to those of the EU, which in principle, could be utilized in conjunction with the technical and financial resources of the EU to further policy objectives of enhanced security and stability in the region.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, Turkey has both military and police forces that could be effectively deployed to support the EU’s foreign policy objectives in south-east Europe and the wider Middle East.¹⁰¹ The potential for further synergy outlined in several assessments of Turkish-EU convergence concurs with the point made by the then president of the European Commission, Romano

⁹⁷ Can Buharali, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards EU Membership: A Security Perspective,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* vol 3, no. 3 (Fall 2004) Journal on-line; available from http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_6.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 January 2008, 13.

⁹⁸ Michael Emerson, and Nathalie Tocci, “Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy,” http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1143; Internet; accessed 8 November 2007, abstract.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

¹⁰⁰ The complimentary nature of EU-Turkish assets and capabilities is reflected in Akcapar (2007), Emerson and Tocci (2004) and Kirisci (2006).

¹⁰¹ Emerson and Tocci, “Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy,” 29.

Prodi who stated that: “We in the EU are aware of the important benefits that Turkey’s membership could bring to the European Union.”¹⁰² Clearly, the EU has much to gain with Turkish accession based on the complementary and converging EU-Turkish Foreign Policy interests in the region.

Furthermore, Turkey’s strategic value to the security of the EU is demonstrated through its full participation in NATO since 1952, the OSCE since 1973, and its associate membership in the Western European Union (WEU) since 1992. It has also contributed to the ESDP by participating in all EU-led military operations.¹⁰³ Turkey is currently contributing to the EU-led military operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU-led police mission EUPOL KINSHASA in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and EU Police Mission (EUPM-II) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, Turkey has made significant contributions to international peacekeeping operations in areas of primary concern to the EU including those in Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo and participated in the EU-led military and police missions in Macedonia (FYROM). Turkey also led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan until December 2002.¹⁰⁵ In April 2007, Turkey also ratified an Agreement with the EU

¹⁰² Europa Press Release, “Romano Prodi President of the European Commission Visit to Bogaziçi University Bogaziçi University Istanbul, 16 January 2004,” <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/20&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2008.

¹⁰³ Seiju Desai, “Turkey in the European Union: A Security Perspective – Risk or Opportunity?” *Defence Studies* 5:3 (2005): 385.

¹⁰⁴ European Commission, “Turkey 2007 Progress Report,” http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 9 January 2008, 75.

¹⁰⁵ Independent Commission on Turkey, “Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?” 18.

establishing a framework for its participation in EU crisis management operations.¹⁰⁶

Turkey's membership in these security organizations and participation in EU-led operations demonstrate that it is a valuable and complementary asset to the EU regional and global security objectives. Therefore, Turkey's accession is a logical culmination of its ever-increasing efforts to achieve EU security objectives.

Additionally, Turkey has participated in the Convention to the Future of Europe with the aim of contributing to the enhancement of ESDP efficiency and capabilities to meet current international security challenges.¹⁰⁷ With its orientation toward ESDP and as one of the strongest NATO partners, Turkey would be an asset to the European defence system. Turkey has the 6th largest standing army in the world, spends 4.4% of its GDP on defence and offered a brigade sized unit supported by air and naval components to the EU's rapid deployment force.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, with Turkey's accession, there would be mutually beneficial cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs pillar in dealing with emerging transnational threats to security and stability such as international terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking and illegal migration.¹⁰⁹

While concern has been expressed about extending EU borders to include Turkey, globalization and transnational security threats already affect the EU as a result of events that occur in countries neighbouring Turkey. Furthermore, similar to the 2004

¹⁰⁶ European Commission, "Turkey 2007 Progress Report," 75.

¹⁰⁷ Independent Commission on Turkey, "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?" 18.

¹⁰⁸ Meltem, Muftuler-Bac, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies," *SAGE Publications*, vol 31(4):489-502. <http://people.sabanciuniv.edu/~muftuler/documents/muftulerbacsecurity2000.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2008, 496.

¹⁰⁹ Independent Commission on Turkey, "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?" 18.

enlargement, Turkey would not accede to the Schengen zone upon its immediate EU accession. Admittance would be at a later timeframe based on an evaluation of Turkey's border control and surveillance capabilities and following a decision by the European Council.¹¹⁰ Alignment of Turkey's border management legislation and practices with the *acquis* has already commenced with its National Action Plan.¹¹¹ Therefore, border concerns are being addressed and Turkey would play a key role in ensuring the security of the EU in this respect. It is clear that there is significant convergence in EU-Turkey foreign and security policies and Turkey's membership would further strengthen the EU's position as a foreign policy actor in the region. Turkey, with the largest NATO force in Europe, would also be complementary to the EU's "soft" power that could be used to project "hard" power in the region with the aim of promoting EU objectives.¹¹² Therefore, from a security perspective, the benefits of Turkish accession could outweigh the apprehensions of opponents to extending EU borders. Numerous sources concur that Turkey's membership would give the EU more weight in world affairs by enhancing

¹¹⁰ European Commission, "Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective," http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/issues_paper_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 January 2008, 42. This is similar to the restrictions placed on accession of the CEEC states in 2004 until they met the Schengen *acquis*. Nine of the CEEC states became part of the Schengen zone on 20 December 2007.

¹¹¹ European Commission, "Turkey 2007 Progress Report," 65.

¹¹² Joseph J. Nye coined the term 'soft power' in the 1980s. Soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade, and arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies. Whereas hard power, the ability to coerce, grows out of a country's military or economic might. Nye emphasizes that soft power is required to deal with critical global issues that require multilateral cooperation among states. Additional details are contained in: Joseph J. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success In World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

political, cultural and military capabilities, thereby promoting the EU goal of stronger involvement in regional and global foreign and security affairs.¹¹³

2.3 - Cultural/Religious Apprehensions

Another argument against Turkish accession is made on cultural-religious grounds and it is the most dominant argument against Turkey's EU membership. This argument concerns the "fundamental nature of the European experience and the future evolution of European values."¹¹⁴ While the EU has focused on membership broadly defined by a country's commitment to democratic institutions, human rights, rule of law as well as other elements defined in the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey's potential membership ignited a deep conflict between institutional principles and identity. The discussion evoked old prejudices of Turkey as 'the other' that played on contemporary fears. Notions that the "Turks are again at the gates of Europe, ready to over run its cities with hordes of unemployed men who are not capable of integration; having stopped then in 1389 in Kosovo and then again in 1529 and 1683 before gates of Vienna, Europeans are now committing collective suicide by inviting them into the union..."¹¹⁵ was a view held by the far right political perspective of Jörg Haider's Austrian Freedom Party.¹¹⁵ Thus, some of the roots of anti Turkish motivation seem to be based in history, domestic

¹¹³ Akcapar (2007), Emerson and Tocci (2004) and Kirisci (2006).

¹¹⁴ Akcapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 27.

¹¹⁵ Seyla Benhabib and Isiksel Turkuler, "Ancient Battles, New Prejudices, and Future Perspectives: Turkey and the EU," *Constellations* 13, no.2 (2006): 221. Note:

politics and current European migration and integration problems.¹¹⁶ Potential Turkish membership has effectively caused Europe to re-evaluate its identity, values, integration problems and the future of Europe and the EU. Its membership prospects precipitated tumultuous ‘enlargement fatigue’ that contributed to the dominant discourse following the 2004 enlargement and the failure to ratify the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005. Turkey’s large Muslim population also negatively influences European views of Turkey. The recent rise in Islamist populism and unrest has increased fears that Turkey would act as a conduit for Islamic extremists to enter Europe. However, this view tends to overlook the fact that internal social problems of EU member states are contributing to the discontent of Europe’s Muslim population more than external factors.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is seen by many as replacing the communist threat, which is fueled by the increasing tendency of media to portray “all fundamentalist movements principally opposed to the Western model of pluralism and democracy.”¹¹⁸

Drorian argues:

...[there] is a need to distinguish between political Islam, which can be a leading force for change and reform within the Mediterranean states and that of extremism which manifests itself as marginalized militant variety with devastating consequences. Such differentiation between various nuances of Islam will have an important implication for Europe’s security strategies, politically and economically. To be sure, violent fundamentalist movements in the name of religion, specifically of the Islamic variety, pose a very serious threat to the economic, social and political stability and security for a number of key states

¹¹⁶ Anti Turkish motivations based on such factors is supported in various sources including Barash (2005) and Benhabib (2006).

¹¹⁷ K. Barysch, S. Everts and H. Grabbe, “Why Europe Should Embrace Turkey,” Centre for European Reform, 2005; http://www.cer.org.uk/turkey_new/publications_turkey_new.html; Internet; accessed 6 December 2007, 14.

¹¹⁸ Drorian, “Rethinking European Security: The Inter-Regional Dimension and the Turkish Nexus,” 428.

along the Mediterranean littoral, and increasingly in mainland Europe...On the other hand, the much feared rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, a moderate and parliamentary movement which has its roots in political Islam, have so far proved to be a real motor for change for the country.”¹¹⁹

The AKP has been successful in implementing a substantial series of political, economic and social reforms. These have brought it closer to the European model of democracy and social pluralism through its desire to join the EU and the process of accession negotiations. The significance and symbolic nature of a moderate Islamic Party pursuing EU membership cannot be underestimated. It provides a model to others of how democracy and Islam can coexist in modernity, thereby enhancing intercultural dialogue and further peace and security in the region. Thus, as Drorian asserts, the need remains for Europe to differentiate between nuances of Islam and the resurgence of various strands of Islamic extremism that is fueling fears and apprehensions in Europe.¹²⁰

The cultural-religious argument also takes on escalating seriousness as it is manifestly offensive not only to Turks but to millions of Muslims around the world and in Europe. Inferred in various sources of literature, opposition to Turkish membership seems to be based primarily on racism, the notion of a pre-existing and unchanging Muslim-Christian divide, which “clash with the achievements of a pluralistic nature of the European integration project.”¹²¹ As David Philips argues, the apprehension about whether Turkey could ever become truly “European” ignores the fact:

...today’s Europe is a rich mosaic of cultures, ethnicities, and religions. It is a community of values, in which democracy is strengthened by diversity. More

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 429.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 429.

¹²¹ Akcapar, *Turkey’s New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 27.

than a political and economic bloc, the union is a dynamic democracy-building project.¹²²

Turkey's accession would confirm the European integration project as an inclusive community of values based in democracy. On the contrary, the rejection of Turkey's membership, after it has made progress on economic and political reforms, will send the wrong message to Muslims around the world, the significant population of Muslims currently residing in the EU, and in the Balkan states aspiring for EU membership. Thus Gulnur Aybet argues:

...[to] exclude Turkey from a South East Europe fully integrated into the EU would be disastrous not only for Turkey-EU relations, but also for EU efforts to integrate Muslims of South Europe, for Turkey's bilateral relations with the countries in the region, and for Turkey's ongoing contribution to international efforts to project stability from the Balkans to Afghanistan.¹²³

A rejection of Turkey would also significantly undermine the credibility of the EU and correspondingly, its foreign policy influence.¹²⁴ The EU has systematically confirmed Turkey's membership eligibility throughout history, and to date, no candidate accession negotiation process has ever ended in anything less than membership. If Turkey, the one democratic country in the Islamic world is perceived to be rejected on a cultural-religious basis, this would not only undermine EU credibility in Turkey, but may extend to other

¹²² Wolfgang Schauble and David L. Philips, "Talking Turkey; Is Europe Ready for a Muslim Member?" *Foreign Affairs* vol 83, no. 6 (November/December 2004): 134.

¹²³ Gulnur Aybet, "Turkey's long and winding road to the EU: implications for the Balkans," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 8:1 (2006): 83.

¹²⁴ Ucer, "Turkey's accession to the European Union," 209.

Muslim states, adversely affecting future EU foreign policy influence and potential stability in the region.

2.3 - Cultural/Religious Opportunities

In this context, Turkey's accession has taken on greater significance and could be seen as a strategic asset to the EU from a political and geocultural perspective. From its inception, "the EU has been a visionary project of achieving 'unity in diversity' by bringing various cultures and nationalities to work together towards common objectives of peace and prosperity."¹²⁵ Increasing tensions between religious and cultural world views continue to prevail in the 21st century and, in this environment, the political impact of Turkey's EU accession has taken on even greater significance with the global polarization between the Islamic world and the West.¹²⁶ The events of September 11, terrorist attacks in Spain and England, the murder of Theo van Gogh by an Islamic extremist in the Netherlands, and the French/Algerian riots of 2006, have also contributed to the rise of "Islamophobia" in Europe.¹²⁷ The admission of Turkey to the EU would "confirm the Union's nature as an inclusive and tolerant society, drawing strength from its diversity and bound together by common values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law

¹²⁵ Seda Domanic, "The Turkish Accession to the European Union: Mutually Beneficial? Mutually Possible?" http://www.europeum.org/disp_project.php?pid=23; Internet; accessed 2 February 2008, 4.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹²⁷ Taspinar, "Turkey's Fading Dream of Europe," *Current History* 106, no. 698 (Mar, 2007): 125. Additional information on the murder of Theo van Gogh and the rise of "Islamophobia" is available in: Ian Buruma, *Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam, and the Limits of Tolerance* (New York: Penguin Group, 2006).

and respect for human values.”¹²⁸ Thus, the EU would gain broader respect and credibility, enhancing its “soft power” in many parts of the world. Turkey’s accession would also set an example of successful coexistence and reinforce and extend the intercultural dialogue between the Christian, Muslim and other minority religion populations. Concurrently, Turkey’s EU membership would permanently consolidate Turkish democracy and refute the notion that Islam and democracy cannot coexist. The successful inclusion of Turkey in the European integration process would also demonstrate to the Islamic world that it is possible to find solutions to the “...dilemma of combining religious beliefs and traditions with the universally accepted principles of modern societies.”¹²⁹ By providing an alternative model to the “...exclusive, sectarian and closed society propagated by radical Islamists,” Europe could play an invaluable role between the West and the Islamic World in future relations.¹³⁰ Indeed, Seiju Desai argues, the EU needs a secular, democratic and stable Turkey to dispel Samuel Huntington’s prophecy of the inevitable “Clash of Civilizations” and to “demonstrate to the wider world, EU can act as inspiration for greater democratic reform leading to security and stability.”¹³¹ It is important to recognize that Europe has never been entirely Christian. There has been a strong Turkish/Muslim influence in Europe historically from the Ottoman presence in Central and South-Eastern Europe until the 19th and 20th centuries and in the Iberian Peninsula before the Reconquista in 1492.

¹²⁸ Independent Commission on Turkey, “Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?” 16.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹³¹ Desai, “Turkey in the European Union: A Security Perspective – Risk or Opportunity?” 388.

The European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, also asserts that "...the need to enhance cooperation and deepen understanding between people, cultures and faiths has never been more important" and argues "it is not a clash of civilizations but a clash of ignorance."¹³² Ferrero-Waldner asserts that we all have our roots in the same civilization when the:

Greek and Roman Empires dominated the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East were as integral a part of their culture as Gaul, Iberia or the Balkans. Our major religions stem from the same root. And the principles of behavior which guide a good Jew, Muslim or Christian have more in common than we might think. The issues with which our societies are grappling are also remarkably similar. In all our societies we must reconcile old and new values, demographic and economic changes, and find jobs and opportunities for the young.¹³³

Again, in the above context identified by the Commissioner, Turkey is a valuable asset in this effort to bridge civilizational or religious divides. In any event, these "divides" are less divisive than on first examination. All three religions are monotheistic and Abrahamic in root and have religious and ethical roles that have influenced European culture, history and statehood. With its origin in ancient civilizations, the vast reach of earlier empires intertwined the histories of all people in the region and created a base of commonality that can serve as a foundation of influence, making Turkey invaluable to the EU in bridging civilizations and enhancing the EU's endeavor to be a global actor.

There is already a substantive European Muslim population of more than 15 million living in the EU. Therefore, Islam is already an integral part of the European culture and is a European religion. Given this context, Turkey joining the EU would be

¹³² Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "Dialogue of Cultures - clash of civilizations or clash of ignorance?" <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/198&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2008, 2.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 2.

powerfully symbolic for European Muslims in signifying that their cultural values are compatible with the EU. Where there has been opposition within specific EU member countries, these countries have demonstrated positive changes in recognition of the demographic reality of Muslims within the EU. In Germany, where three quarters of the Muslim population is of Turkish origin, Germany reached out to a wider representation of Turks and other Muslim immigrants with the convening of its German Islam Conference in 2006.¹³⁴ The objective of the conference was to improve religious and social integration of the Muslim population in Germany and Federal Minister Wolfgang Schäuble stated “The Conference on Islam has already shown that all sides are prepared to take part in a dialogue to find shared solutions for living together in harmony.”¹³⁵ In France, when he was Interior Minister, Nicholas Sarkozy prevailed over the dissension in 2003, to initiate the French Council of the Muslim Religion.¹³⁶ Turkey’s current government has also been active in fostering respect and dialogue between Islamic and Western societies. For example, in 2005, the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Spain launched a UN-backed Alliance of Civilizations Project. Its objective is to improve understanding and cooperative relations among Islamic and Christian cultures and to help counter the forces that fuel polarization, extremism, intolerance and terrorism.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ International Crisis Group, “Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead Europe Report N°184 – 17 August 2007,” 29.

¹³⁵ Federal Ministry of the Interior, “German Islam Conference 2006,” http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_028/nn_1026710/Internet/Content/Themen/Deutsche__Islam__Konferenz/DatenUndFakten/Islamkonferenz__Kurzinfo__en.html; Internet; accessed 29 February 2008, 1.

¹³⁶ International Crisis Group, “Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead Europe Report N°184 – 17 August 2007,” 29. The president of the French Council of the Muslim Religion is from the dominant Algerian minority and a Turk became secretary general, symbolizing a potentially moderating role for Turkish Islam. Note: the present French Government is the most multicultural in the history of France (i.e. Justice Minister, Rachida Dati and Urban Affairs Minister, Fadela Amara). Sarkozy is the individual who chose to put Muslims in government.

Furthermore, the importance of cultural issues has emerged as a significant EU agenda, acknowledging that "...culture is an indispensable feature to achieve the EU's strategic objectives of prosperity, solidarity and security, while ensuring a stronger presence on the international scene."¹³⁸ In a European Commission report, the EU emphasizes that "...world-wide, cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue have become major challenges for global order based on peace, mutual understanding and respect for shared values, such as protection and promotion of human rights and the protection of languages."¹³⁹ In this context, the EU has contributed to the UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expression. There is also growing awareness in the EU that it has a unique role to play in promoting cultural richness and diversity, both within Europe and world-wide. Thus, the EU cultural agenda has identified three interrelated sets of objectives:

...[the] promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue; promotion of culture as a catalyst of creativity in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs; promotion of culture as a vital element in the Union's international relations.¹⁴⁰

Within the context of the EU's cultural agenda, Turkey has a key role to play from a geopolitical and geocultural perspective. Turkey would be an asset in both achieving the

¹³⁷ United Nations, "Alliance of Civilizations," www.unaoc.org; Internet; accessed 16 January 2008.

¹³⁸ European Commission, "On a Europe agenda for culture in a globalizing World," <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0242:FIN:EN:PDF>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2008, 3.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

EU objectives and in refuting Samuel Huntington's notion of the "clash of civilizations."¹⁴¹

Based on Turkey's history and geographical location, it has the potential to bridge civilizations and demonstrate that Islam and democracy can exist in modernity, which is powerful not only for Turkey but for the world. From a strategic perspective Turkey's accession to the EU would be beneficial in fostering an alliance between civilizations that has the potential to enhance not only EU stability and security but future global security.¹⁴² Ali Tekin asserts that "the EU's positive stand on world peace through genuine dialogue with different civilizations and cultures will be a significant contribution to the development of a universal value system for effective world governance in the future."¹⁴³

Economic, Demographic and Energy Security Analysis

Turkey's population is young and dynamic, and its economy is the fastest growing on the continent. Its inclusion in the EU would add substantively to Europe's economic weight in the world. Europe faces severe economic issues in the coming decades unless it can produce more dynamic growth on the continent, and this is further exacerbated by its declining and aging population. As well, based on Turkey's

¹⁴¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 159. Huntington's "clash of civilizations" argument is based on a natural cultural border he articulates between "Western Christian peoples from Muslim and Orthodox peoples." (see map pg. 159) However, the EU and NATO currently have member states of an Orthodox background. Thus, Huntington's thesis is falsified by this current reality. Therefore, by extension, the cultural argument for Turkey's accession is not that relevant.

¹⁴² Turkey has formal diplomatic relations with Israel. In the event a "real" peace process is initiated between Israel and the Palestinians, Turkey, as a member of EU may play a major role.

¹⁴³ Ali Tekin, "Future of Turkey – EU relations: a civilizational discourse," *Futures* 37 (2005): 289.

geographical location at the crossroads of the major energy reserves in the world, its role as an energy corridor will contribute significantly to the future security of EU energy requirements.

2.4 - Economic Apprehensions

Nonetheless, another major concern expressed against Turkish accession is the potential economic impact on the EU. Opponents see Turkey as a large “poor country” with a low GDP per capita and a significant portion of its population working in the agricultural sector. Under the current EU financial framework, a substantial portion of the EU budget is allocated to aid for poor regions and to agricultural subsidies. As a result, opponents are concerned Turkish membership would literally bust the EU’s budget. However, financial constraints, international trade rules as well as the impact of the last enlargement are forcing the EU to reform its finances and agricultural policies, regardless of Turkey’s accession negotiations.¹⁴⁴ In a report by the Independent Commission on Turkey, comparing the economic starting conditions of Turkey against other EU members, it was demonstrated that its economic position is not fundamentally worse or dissimilar to other members such as Bulgaria, Romania and Poland at the start of their accession.¹⁴⁵ A notable comparison is GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, which is an important measure for a country’s degree of development and a significant financial consideration of the EU. The respective GDP per capita in Euro (at purchasing power parities) reflected in the report demonstrated that Turkey was between

¹⁴⁴ Barysch, Everts and Grabbe, “Why Europe Should Embrace Turkey,” 14.

¹⁴⁵ Independent Commission on Turkey, “Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?” 41.

Bulgaria and Poland at (6256), Bulgaria was at (5120), Romania (4980) and Poland (7410) at the start of their accession.¹⁴⁶ Turkey's status in many other economic factors was also within the relative scale of these CEECs that successfully acceded to the EU. In consideration of Turkey's GDP per capita in relative terms, economics should not be a factor to preclude Turkey's accession. Comparatively, the EU has acceded members with an equivalent or less GDP per capita, and Turkey's significant economic resurgence since its EU prospects and IMF program, have led to a more stable economy and currency that will continue to mitigate potential financial implications on the EU. In the meantime, Turkey's accession process will have deepened and widened its transformation. As Fatos Tarfi argues, "...there is no reason to believe Turkey's economic progress would be any less successful than the post communist member nations' has been."¹⁴⁷

Turkey is also "...registering the highest actual economic growth rates, not only among EU member and candidate countries but also among the entire membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)."¹⁴⁸ Moreover, Turkey's economic growth has been substantially higher than the EU average since the start of accession negotiations as outlined in the following table compiled by Eurostat in 2007.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ Independent Commission on Turkey, "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?" <http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/english.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2008, 41.

¹⁴⁷ Tarifa and Adams, "Who's the Sick Man of Europe? A Wavering EU Should Let Turkey In," 65.

¹⁴⁸ Akcapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 20.

¹⁴⁹ The Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) is the statistical component of the European Commission. It produces data for the EU and strives for consistent statistical methods across the EU member states.




Figure 1.1- Economic Growth in Turkey and EU-27 – GDP growth (real)
Source: Confederation of Danish Industries (DI), “EU Enlargement...,” 41.

If Turkey’s dynamism persists, it will contribute significantly to the EU’s economic vitality and increase the size and competitiveness of the European internal market.¹⁵⁰ Notwithstanding, it is recognized that Turkey still requires structural upgrades and reforms to its economy, such as better public and corporate governance as well as an active industrial policy, in order to enhance further development in order for Turkey to realize its full potential and make recent gains irreversible.¹⁵¹ However, it has made significant progress, and in all likelihood, by the time EU public is confronted with a final decision on Turkey’s membership, its economic status will have substantially progressed.

There were significant economic concerns leading up to the previous EU enlargement of the 10 CEEC states, similar to those expressed for Turkish membership,

¹⁵⁰ Akcapar, *Turkey’s New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 20.

¹⁵¹ Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jorgensen ed. *Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter*. (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2007), 107.

yet the enlargement from an economic perspective has been very successful. A European Commission report, “Enlargement Two Years After – An Economic Evaluation,” emphasizes the successful economic integration and benefits of the enlargement on both the new and old members of the Union, contrary to concerns preceding the enlargement. The report outlines that the “stability provided by accession helped to multiple trade and investment between EU-15 and EU-10 as well as within the EU-10 creating a win-win situation for all involved.”¹⁵² While there were political sensitivities regarding the free movement of labour, migratory flows from the EU-10 have in general been small even toward countries that allowed unrestricted movement of workers (UK, Sweden and Ireland). The report recommends remaining member states reconsider whether continuation of labour restrictions is required.¹⁵³

Agriculture was also a concern. Increased trade integration, the inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and EU support contributed to the modernization of agriculture and the growth of farmer’s income. Although the accession widened income disparity in the EU, overall there has been economic growth in all member states. The report emphasizes that economic growth on average has been faster in the new member states

¹⁵² European Commission, “Enlargement, two years after: an economic evaluation,” http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication7548_en.pdf ; Internet; accessed 21 January 2008, 1. Note: EU15 refers to EU member states prior to the 2004 enlargement which consists of: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, UK, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland and Sweden. The EU10 refers to the CEEC states that acceded to the EU in 2004. EU member states which include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta).

¹⁵³ European Commission, “Enlargement, two years after: an economic evaluation,” 6. A labour transitional period was applied to the CEECs which were divided in three phases over seven years, according to a formula of “2-plus 3-plus 2 years” with different conditions applying during each of these phases. Notwithstanding, Sweden, UK and Ireland decided not to apply this restriction on accession of the CEECs and the influx of migrants had a positive effect on their respective economies. As a result four member states (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Finland) decided to lift restrictions for the second, three-year phase of the transitional arrangements, while six others (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) have decided to alleviate them.

and in general the countries with the lowest income per-capita have tended to grow the fastest. With strong economic growth, the report asserts there has been increasing macroeconomic stability. The report concludes that:

...overall the fifth enlargement by leading to a larger more integrated market, has created the conditions for the whole European market economy to become stronger, more dynamic, hence better equipped to face increased global competition. More broadly and fundamentally, by enhancing peace, stability, security, prosperity, democracy and human rights and the rule of law across Europe, it is clear the fifth enlargement, as the previous ones, has been a success for all its Member States.¹⁵⁴

While the accession of the CEECs shared similar economic concerns to those currently expressed for Turkey; overall the fifth enlargement and economic integration of the EU-10 has been successful. Therefore, there is reason to conclude Turkey, which is comparable in size, with a GDP per capita not unlike other CEEC members, could be successfully integrated into the EU. Furthermore, according to Konrad Lammers, from a purely macroeconomic perspective, Turkey's accession would be an advantage and "...lead to an increase of 4.2 to 4.6% in the GDP of that country." He further argues based on his estimation that, "the incumbent states (EU15) could also expect a positive effect, although a very small one (0.5% to 0.7% of their GDP)."¹⁵⁵ This is similar to the GDP growth forecast of 0.5/0.7% associated with the 2004 enlargement.¹⁵⁶ Comparatively, Turkish accession should translate to a stronger, more dynamic European market economy, similar to the effects of the 2004 enlargement experience.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁵⁵ Konrad Lammers, "The EU and Turkey – Economic Effects of Turkey's Full Membership," *Intereconomics*, (September/October 2006): 287.

¹⁵⁶ European Commission, "Enlargement, two years after: an economic evaluation," 23.

2.4 - Economic Opportunities

Turkey is a complementary strategic EU asset from an economic perspective. It has undergone a significant economic transformation since the prospect of EU membership in combination with the financial assistance received through an International Monetary Fund (IMF) Program in 1999. Turkey has made incredible progress since 2001, both in terms of maintaining high levels of economic growth and achieving macroeconomic stability. Its economic growth was among Europe's highest average at 7.5% from 2002 to 2006, while the Gross National Product (GNP) nearly tripled to \$401.4 Billion.¹⁵⁷ The inflation rates were reduced to single digits over the same period falling from an annual 29.7% to 9.7%. Interest rates, in addition to public sector deficit and debt, have been lowered to sustainable levels. In terms of its long term performance, Turkey's economic growth performance is expected to surpass that of the EU 27, as a result of its favorable demographic profile and large productivity increases. GDP growth is expected to average approximately 4 to 4.5% a year in 2011 to 2020 and approximately 3.5% a year in 2021.¹⁵⁸ In addition to achieving stable and high GDP growth, Turkey also improved its level of productivity at a significant pace. In accordance with the Global Competitiveness Report 2007, Turkey's ranking in the Global Competitive Index has improved to 53rd.¹⁵⁹ Turkey's ranking rose from 59th in 2006 and

¹⁵⁷ International Crisis Group, "Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead Europe Report N°184 – 17 August 2007," 4.

¹⁵⁸ Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd, "Turkey economy: Ten-year growth outlook" *EIU ViewsWire*, New York (10 Sep 2007): 3.
<http://proquest.umi.com.proxy1.lib.umanitoba.ca/pqdweb?index=23&did=1367885501&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1201751684&clientId=12305>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2008.

¹⁵⁹ World Economic Forum, "Global Competitiveness Report 2007,"
<http://www.gcr.weforum.org/>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2008.

71st the previous year. As Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF has emphasized, “These are striking achievements and underline the enormous potential of the Turkish economy.”¹⁶⁰

This dynamic growth, in conjunction with macroeconomic stability, contributed to a growing investment environment in Turkey for foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2005, FDI flowing into Turkey reached a historical high of 9.7 billion United States dollars (USD). Even more substantial, FDI inflows doubled in 2006, making Turkey the largest recipient in the region with 20 billion USD of FDI inflows.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, Turkey is ranked the 22nd most attractive destination for FDI in the world, up from being the 35th in 2005 as indicated in the UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2006.¹⁶² Among the emerging markets, Turkey is now the 7th most attractive FDI destination.¹⁶³

The prospect of EU membership is fuelling Turkey’s economic growth. When the customs union was signed in 1995, the Turkish economy stood at 66.5 billion USD and escalated to 362 billion USD in 2005. In 2005 the Turkish economy surpassed Sweden and Switzerland, becoming the 19th largest economy in the world and the IMF forecasts Turkey to overtake the Belgian economy in 2007 by reaching 447 billion

¹⁶⁰ International Monetary Fund. “Anne O Krueger: Turkey's Economy: A Future Full of Promise,” <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2005/050505.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2008.

¹⁶¹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “World investment report 2007,” http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2007_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 February 2008.

¹⁶² Domanic, “The Turkish Accession to the European Union: Mutually Beneficial? Mutually Possible?” 2.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 2.

USD.¹⁶⁴ Turkish foreign trade from 1995 to 2005 also grew from 57 billion USD to approximately 190 billion USD. Kemal Kirisci asserts that maintaining this performance would translate to increased employment not only for Turkey, but for Europeans as well as other people in Turkey's neighbourhood.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, an increase in jobs within Turkey, would reduce pressure to emigrate to Western Europe, thereby alleviating some of the short term concerns of increased labour migration on accession. In the future, the performance of the Turkish economy may have significant implications in terms of its neighbourhood, as prosperity may further enhance stability and security in the region.¹⁶⁶

Furthermore, with a population of more than 73 million, and its purchasing power expected to steadily increase, Turkey's potential as a market for goods from EU member states continues to gain importance.¹⁶⁷ With the initiation of accession negotiations, Turkey's gradual adaptation to the rules and standards of the Internal Market has made it more attractive to companies and investors, as illustrated with the net doubling of FDI in 2006. Turkish imports of merchandise also rose almost 18% year-on-year, making Turkey the EU's fifth largest export market in the world in 2006.¹⁶⁸ The level of imports and exports continues to grow and, based on a European Commission study of market potentials in Turkey, exports to Turkey could increase by 242%, corresponding to 236

¹⁶⁴ Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey in the EU: A win-win scenario," *The Bridge: A quarterly review on European Integration*, 2008. http://www.bridge-mag.com/magazine/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=260&Itemid=31; Internet; accessed 30 January 2008, 1.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁶⁷ Independent Commission on Turkey, "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?" 18.

¹⁶⁸ Confederation of Danish Industries (DI), "EU Enlargement – Keep the Train on Track," 45.

billion euros at the current level.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, Turkey could further increase EU export capacity and economic viability by functioning as a commercial bridge to the Middle East.¹⁷⁰

In a recent interview, Ali Babacan, expressed confidence in Turkey's economic resurgence and stated that "Turkey expects to move into the world's top 10 economies in 15 years as it steps up major reforms and becomes a more European country."¹⁷¹ The Foreign Minister also stressed the country's transformation over the last five years and its determination to continue economic, political and social reforms, stating, "For us, most important is to continue the process. This is a win-win situation for Turkey because it can continue its reforms which will enable the country to meet EU standards."¹⁷²

Babacan also highlighted that in preparation to become a major economic power, Turkey is expanding international access by opening ten embassies in sub-Saharan Africa as well as diplomatic missions in India and other locations. Finally, in reiterating Turkey's dynamism and future ambitions, Babacan asserts that "Turkey currently ranks 17th on the list of global economic powers and is projected to be in the top 10 by the year 2023 according to Turkish and international organizations' projections."¹⁷³

It is recognized that further economic reforms are required by Turkey in order to meet the *acquis communautaire* and achieve its full economic potential. Notwithstanding

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹⁷¹ PR-Inside, "Foreign minister: Turkey to become one of world's top 10 economic power in 15 years," <http://www.pr-inside.com/foreign-minister-turkey-to-become-one-r406344.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2008, 1.

¹⁷² PR-Inside, "Foreign minister: Turkey to become one of world's top 10 economic power in 15 years," 1.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 1.

the challenges ahead, it is clear by the Foreign Ministers's remarks that Turkey is committed to the necessary reforms required to achieve full EU membership. All of the synergistic economic developments outlined above highlight the vitality of the Turkish economy. With a strong GDP growth, it has the potential to bring a required dynamism to the slow growing EU economy since Turkey presently possesses a large, growing, stable market. With the emergence of China, India and Brazil, significant as economic competitors to the EU, Turkish accession is essential to sustain overall EU economic growth and its global economic status.¹⁷⁴ Turkey's accession will enhance a EU primary economic objective, to modernize the European economy to face new competition in the 21st century.

2.5 - Demographic Apprehensions

Turkey has a population of 73 million and by the time of accession it would be larger than many EU member states, with the exception being Germany. The potential weight of Turkey's influence in EU Institutions is disconcerting to many current member states, in particular smaller states are concerned about being marginalized in EU institutions and decision making. Another popular argument relates to migration concerns, where "youthful strangers" would replace the aging EU workforce, adversely affecting the social cohesion of European societies. This argument rallies the spectre of increased criminality and the taking of jobs away from European youth.¹⁷⁵ Each of these

¹⁷⁴ Birol Yesilada, Brian Efir, and Peter Noordijk, "Competition among Giants: A Look at How Future Enlargement of the European Union Could Affect Global Power Transition." *International Studies Review* 8 (2006): 620.

¹⁷⁵ Akcapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 22.

apprehensions as well as the strategic implications of EU and Turkish demographics will be addressed below.

A major concern articulated with respect to the size of Turkey is its potential impact on EU Institutions. Turkey's membership to the EU, however, is not anticipated prior to 2014 and by that timeframe both Turkey and the EU will have evolved considerably. By 2015, the EU is anticipated to have 28 members including Croatia, with the status of the Balkan states at that juncture dependant on the economic and political developments in the region.¹⁷⁶ By that timeframe, the new Lisbon (Reform) Treaty will be in place, assuming the ratification process is successful by the 2009 target. This will allow EU Institutions to function more effectively in an enlarged membership. Furthermore, the opportunity to modify EU policies as a result of experiences with new members will be available with the end of the 2007-2013 budget period, in particular with respect to the more controversial regional and agricultural policies which seem to be of primary concern with Turkish accession.¹⁷⁷ Concurrently, Turkey will have deepened and widened its transformation, and the successful conclusion of accession negotiations will rely on Turkey fulfilling all membership criteria articulated in the 35 Chapters of the *acquis communautaire*. As the Independent Commission on Turkey emphasizes, it is difficult to surmise what impact Turkish membership will have on the functioning of the EU with any accuracy considering the numerous uncertainties for the EU and Turkey.¹⁷⁸ However, the potential inclusion of Turkey raises political apprehensions and debates

¹⁷⁶ Independent Commission on Turkey, "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?" 23.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 23.

over the relative power and institutional position that Turkey might have if it joins in 2015, when it would be approximately the same size as Germany. Therefore the potential impact on EU Institutions will be examined in this context.

In the case of the European Commission, under the Lisbon Treaty from 2014 onward, there will be a shift to have the Commission made up of two-thirds of the number of member states with strictly equal rotation across them.¹⁷⁹ Therefore, irrespective of its size, Turkish accession will have very little impact as all member states will have a commissioner from their respective state in two of every three rotations of the Commission.¹⁸⁰

In the European Council of Ministers, a new double majority voting method will also be introduced under the Reform Treaty in 2014. This will require at least 55% of the member states representing 65% of the EU population to secure a majority.¹⁸¹ Under this new double majority voting, Turkey would have the same influence as Denmark in the first instance and in the second instance its influence would be equal to Germany.¹⁸²

A Kristy Hughes, of the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, asserts that Turkey would not dramatically alter the existing power balances in EU. She states:

On an individual country basis, there is nothing in the inclusion of Turkey in the EU's voting system that drastically shifts the relative power of different countries

¹⁷⁹ European Union, "Treaty of Lisbon – Taking Europe into the 21st Century," http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm; Internet; accessed 10 January 2008, 1. Commissioners will be selected on a system of equal rotation among member states to serve in five year terms. Therefore, there will be a nation from each member state in two Commissions out of three.

¹⁸⁰ Kristy Hughes, "The Political Dynamics of Turkish Accession to the EU: A European Success Story or the EU's most Contested Enlargement?" Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Report No. 9, 2004: 124.

¹⁸¹ European Union, "Treaty of Lisbon – Taking Europe into the 21st Century," 1.

¹⁸² Confederation of Danish Industries (DI), "EU Enlargement – Keep the Train on Track," http://www.di.dk/NR/rdonlyres/ED5FE03A-1594-48C1-A087-746F580B3CD9/0/Udvidelsespeje2007_Vestbalkan_Tyrkiet.pdf; Internet; accessed 3 February 2008, 48.

– even with the new double majority voting system. While today Germany has 18.1% of the population share of votes in an EU of 25, France 13.2% and the UK 13.0%, looking to 2015, in an EU of 28 including Turkey, then Germany would have 14.5% of the population vote, Turkey 14.4%, France and the UK almost 11%. Indeed with the reduction in Germany’s voting weight, the system could be said to be more evenly balanced.¹⁸³

Furthermore, Hughes concludes that as a large member state, “Turkey will add to the relative weight in EU decision-making of the larger countries, however, the impact is not very large.”¹⁸⁴ Hughes illustrates this in an assessment and calculation of the relative share of the population of the largest 4 member states in an EU of 25, 27 and 28 and the share of the “big 4” + Turkey in an EU of 28. Finally Hughes concludes:

In the EU of 25, the big 4 account for almost 57% of the population share, and almost 54% in an EU of 27. Turkey’s accession would mean the largest 5 countries would account for 60% of the population share. This is only 3 percentage points different from the joint population vote of the big 4 in today’s EU25. Nor do the largest countries often or easily agree - and agreement of five on any particular one of the myriad of EU directives or policies will be even harder than at four.¹⁸⁵

It could be further argued that adding Turkey “pluralizes” the power among the more powerful member states, making for a more balanced EU as a whole.

The impact on the European Parliament is another area of concern. Recognizing that EU institutional arrangements are based on population, this would give Turkey substantial weight, similar to the four largest member states; Germany, France, Britain and Italy. The allocation of seats to Turkey in the European Parliament would be similar

¹⁸³ Hughes, “The Political Dynamics of Turkish Accession to the EU: A European Success Story or the EU’s most Contested Enlargement?” 13.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 120.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 120.

to Germany. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament will be comprised of 751 Members of Parliament (MEPs) with seats distributed among countries according to “digressive proportionality,” with no country possessing less than 6 or more than 96 MEPs.¹⁸⁶ As Hughes has assessed, the application of this proportional adjustment means Germany and Turkey are anticipated to be allocated 84 seats each, with Germany’s share falling from 13.5% to 11.2% and France, the UK and Italy falling from 10.6% to 8.8%.¹⁸⁷ Again, Hughes asserts that with the requisite adjustments in European Parliament, there would not be an unbalanced dominance by one country. However, in this context, France will reduce from the second power in the EU to the third, which may be a factor in the French elite’s opposition to Turkey’s membership.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, the impact of Turkey’s large representation would be “reduced by the fact that voting in the European Parliament normally follows party lines rather than the national positions of members.”¹⁸⁹ The Independent Commission on Turkey asserts that “the continuation of the consensus principle in important areas of EU action, in particular common foreign and security policy, defence policy and fiscal policy diminishes the relevance of the population size of member states for the Union’s decision-making process.”¹⁹⁰ Such an analysis alleviates some of the concerns regarding Turkey’s political influence based on its size.

Furthermore, the development of the Lisbon (Reform) Treaty on the heels of the rejected EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005, illustrates the political dynamism and ability

¹⁸⁶ European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon – Taking Europe into the 21st Century,” 1.

¹⁸⁷ Hughes, “The Political Dynamics of Turkish Accession to the EU: A European Success Story or the EU’s most Contested Enlargement?” 122.

¹⁸⁸ Akcapar, *Turkey’s New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 24.

¹⁸⁹ Independent Commission on Turkey, “Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?” 24.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

of the EU to resolve complex issues, to modernize and reform. The Lisbon Treaty will provide institutional mechanisms to ensure the EU operates effectively to meet the complex challenges of the 21st century. Precedence has demonstrated that the EU policies continue to evolve with integration and enlargement. Through its transformation processes, Turkey and the EU will look considerably different at the time of accession, mitigating some of the current concerns related to the impact on EU Institutions.

The impact of migration is another popularly expressed concern. While the effects of uncontrolled migration being experienced by various societies both within and external to Europe cannot be dismissed, Akcapar argues the potential effects of migration are least relevant in Turkey's case due to its current process of convergence with the EU.¹⁹¹ At present, approximately 30% of Turkey's population is below the age of 15. The youth are living through a period of close alignment with the European standards and norms, including in the education sector.¹⁹² They will essentially be raised as a Turkish-European generation due to the fact that EU-Turkey links are intensifying through the accession process. As a result, Ackapar argues "Tukish-Europeans" will naturally be more compatible than other migrants who did not benefit from opportunities of an accession candidate through such a period of convergence.¹⁹³ EU demographic trends also illustrate that the EU will need labour and the Turkish supply will likely be the least problematic to integrate as a result of the ongoing convergence process with the EU. For example, the literacy rate in Turkey is 88.1%, the gross primary and secondary education

¹⁹¹ Akcapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 22.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 22

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 22.

enrollment ratio is 96.3% and 86.6% respectively.¹⁹⁴ The most significant increase has been in secondary education up, from an enrollment ratio of 69.7% in 2000 to 86.6% in 2006, demonstrating increasing education levels in Turkey. Overall, Baris Tan reports that there are currently "...19.4 million students in Turkey: 0.4M in pre-school, 10.5M in primary school, 3.6M in secondary school, 3M in extension programs and 1.9M in university."¹⁹⁵ English and other European second language courses available in Secondary Education and University facilities, are fostering further EU convergence by enhancing linguistic abilities.¹⁹⁶ Approximately 16 million or 21.1% of the population also utilizes the Internet and Turkey is ranked 7th for the highest internet usage in Europe.¹⁹⁷ These literacy and education statistics illustrate the potential for enhanced integration with the EU as overall human capital in Turkey continues to develop. Furthermore, many migration analysts have estimated that Turkish migration is not anticipated to be more than approximately 3.5 million migrants or 0.35% of the EU population, and potentially much less as a result of the increasing economic vitality

¹⁹⁴ Turkstat, "Population and Development Indicators," <http://nkg.die.gov.tr/en/goster.asp?aile=3>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2008.

¹⁹⁵ Baris Tan, "A Global Guide to Management Education 2006 – Turkey," http://www.gfme.org/global_guide/pdf/251-256%20Turkey.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 March 2008, 254.

¹⁹⁶ Numerous websites indicate English and other European foreign languages are offered in Turkey's secondary school and universities, however, specific country statistics on English language linguistics were not readily available.

¹⁹⁷ Internet World Stats. "Turkey Internet Usage Stats and Market Report." <http://www.internetworldstats.com/eu/tr.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008. Note: Turkey is ranked the 7th European country for internet usage behind Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Russia and Spain. The overall internet usage in Europe is 43% with its growth at 231.2% between 2000 - 2006 as indicated at: Internet World Stats, "Internet Usage in Europe," <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm#europe>; Internet; accessed 14 April 2007.

within Turkey.¹⁹⁸ A study completed by the Boğaziçi University has concluded that the migration pressures on the EU from Turkey would not be as startling as some suggest.¹⁹⁹

As Ezan argues:

If Turkey loses the membership perspective, the EU may end up having more immigrants than a free movement of labour regime with Turkey. And the composition of this migration would be less conducive for the EU labour markets – and – for integration in the host societies. The experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain indicate that a successful accession period with high growth and effective implementation of reforms reduces and gradually eliminates the migration pressures. There is no priori reason why Turkey would not go through a similar experience.²⁰⁰

The Southern European experience has now been mirrored by the 2004 accession of the CEECs. Where there were initial concerns regarding migration, free labour movement restrictions were instituted on accession (with the exception of the UK, Ireland and Sweden). However, as many as thirteen EU member states have now alleviated this restriction due to the positive economic potential associated with the migration of labour resources.²⁰¹

It is anticipated that the Turkish negotiation process may include a labour transition period, similar to the application in the 2004 enlargement of the 10 CEEC states. In the case of Turkey, this would equate to seven years on top of the ten

¹⁹⁸ Kristy Hughes, “Turkey and the European Union: Just another Enlargement?” Friends of Europe, 17 Jun 2004 www.friendsofeurope.org/pdfs/TurkeyandtheEuropeanUnion-WorkingPaperFOE.pdf; 13.

¹⁹⁹ Refik Ezan, Umat Kuzubas and Nilufer Yildiz, “Growth and Immigration Scenarios: Turkey-EU,” CEPS: Turkey in Monitor, no 12 (December 2004), 124.

²⁰⁰ Hughes, “Turkey and the European Union: Just another Enlargement?” 13.

²⁰¹ European Commission, “Enlargement, two years after: an economic evaluation,” 6. Sweden, UK and Ireland decided not to apply this restriction on accession of the CEECs and the influx of migrants had a positive effect on their respective economies. As a result four member states (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Finland) decided to lift restrictions for the second, three-year phase of the transitional arrangements, while six others (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) have decided to alleviate them for a total of thirteen member states.

anticipated for the negotiation process. Recognizing current EU demographic trends, by that timeframe, opponents to Turkish membership or free labour movement in Europe could be vying for Turkish labour and its associated wage contribution into the EU social security network.²⁰² Given the EU demographic trends that will be covered in the upcoming section, the problem for the EU may be that there are too few as opposed to too many Turks to migrate to the EU markets.²⁰³

2.5 - Demographic Opportunities

Turkey is a complementary strategic EU asset from a demographic perspective given the changing European context in the 21st century. One of the most significant EU concerns is the impact of European demographics in upcoming decades, with a substantial increase in the elderly proportion of the EU population and a correspondingly decline in the numbers of working age and young people. This issue has been gaining recognition at the national and European level due to its profound economic, budgetary and social consequences and is deemed one of the most important challenges facing the EU.²⁰⁴ A European Commission report identifies that the average annual potential demographic growth rate for the EU is projected to fall substantially from 2.2% between 2004 and 2010 to 1.4% between 2030 and 2050 with several countries anticipated to

²⁰² Akcapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 22.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 22.

²⁰⁴ European Union Economic Policy Committee, "Impact of ageing populations on public spending on pensions, health and long-term care, education and unemployment benefits for the elderly," http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/epc/documents/2006/ageingsummary_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 January 2008, 2.

experience an even larger decline.²⁰⁵ The aging population will have a substantial fiscal impact on almost all EU countries, with the effects accelerating as of 2010.²⁰⁶ From an economic perspective, the most significant change concerns the EU working-age population (15 to 64), with this age group starting to decline from 2010 by 48 million or 16% by 2050.²⁰⁷ Such a net loss will act as a drag on potential economic and employment growth, with an aging population leading to public pressure for increased public spending on areas such as health, pensions and benefits, in the medium and long run.²⁰⁸ As a result of these unfavorable demographic developments, potential EU GDP growth is also projected to decline in the upcoming decades. It is anticipated that the average annual potential growth rate for the EU15, will fall from 2.2% between 2004 and 2010 to 1.8% between 2011 and 2030 and to 1.3% between 2031 and 2050.²⁰⁹ A more drastic decline is anticipated for the EU10, from 4.3% between 2004 and 2010 to 3% in the period 2011 to 2030 and to 0.9% between 2031 and 2050.²¹⁰ This higher trend is due

²⁰⁵ Council of European Union, "Economic and Financial Affairs, 14 February 2006," <http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom>; Internet; accessed 10 February 2008, 10.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁰⁷ European Commission, "The Economic impact of ageing populations in the EU25 Member States," http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication562_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 21 January 2008, 23.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 24.

²⁰⁹ European Union Economic Policy Committee, "Impact of ageing populations on public spending on pensions, health and long-term care, education and unemployment benefits for the elderly," 6. Note: EU15 refers to EU member states prior to the 2004 enlargement which consists of: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, UK, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland and Sweden.

²¹⁰ European Union Economic Policy Committee, "Impact of ageing populations on public spending on pensions, health and long-term care, education and unemployment benefits for the elderly," 6. The Note: EU10 refers to the CEEC states that acceded to the EU in 2004. EU member states which include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta).

to both unfavorable demographic developments as well as the assumption that the productivity growth rates for the EU10 are coming closer to the EU15 countries as they complete convergence.

As a result of these demographic developments, migration is high on the political agenda based on its potential to offset some of the economic effects of ageing. In accordance with a European Commission report, annual net migration inflows to the EU25 currently amount to 1.3 million people, which is 0.35% of the total population of the EU. The report identifies that the majority of these inflows go to the EU15 countries, while some EU10 countries are experiencing some outward migration. Eurostat is projecting a reduction of inflows to approximately 800,000 people by 2015 (0.2% of the population), with a stabilization around that level up to 2050, equating to a cumulative net inflow of 40 million by 2050.²¹¹ Notwithstanding these migratory projections, there will still be a gap of over 8 million people of working age based on the overall trend of the EU demographic decline. Furthermore, as a result of anticipated migration requirements, the impact of cultural issues within a globalizing world is increasing in importance within the EU. For the first time the EU has articulated a cultural agenda. It recognizes the criticality of successful integration, multiculturalism and intercultural dialogue and their linkage with the EU's future prosperity.²¹²

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

²¹² European Commission, "On a Europe agenda for culture in a globalizing World," <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0242:FIN:EN:PDF>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2008, 8.

EU demographics are on the decline. Turkey can be an important opportunity in this regard. Turkish demographics and human capital could be a key element of sustaining growth and production in future, for the EU economy. Presently, approximately 30% of the Turkish population is below the age of 15 and demographic trends identify that by 2020 the percentage of the working age population will reach optimal levels.²¹³ This could complement the corresponding decline in EU population to provide economic sustainability. While there is no EU *acquis* on education curricula, Turkey has been initiating reforms in this area since the early years of EU convergence. For example, between 2003 and 2006, it identified 273,444 girls deprived of primary school education, generally in traditional eastern areas and brought 81% of them into the education system.²¹⁴ Turkey has been a participant since 2001 in the Bologna Process to create a European Higher Education Area (EHEA),²¹⁵ as well as a participant in the Erasmus Program since 2004, which is a European Commission exchange program enabling students in thirty-one European countries to study for part of their degree in another country.²¹⁶ Turkey is also a member of the Fulbright initiative with the United

²¹³ World Resources Institute, "Turkey – Country Profile," www.earthtrends.org; Internet; accessed 12 January 2008.

²¹⁴ International Crisis Group, "Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead Europe Report N°184 – 17 August 2007," 11.

²¹⁵ Benelux Bologna Secretariat, "About the Bologna Process," <http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/about/>; Internet; accessed 31 March 2008. The objective of the Bologna Process (named after the Bologna Declaration signed 19 Jun 1999 in Bologna, Italy) is to create a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) based on international cooperation and academic exchange that is available to, European students and staff as well as students and staff from other parts of the world. The Process currently unites 46 states that are all party to the European Cultural Conventions, committed to the aim of the EHEA and involves the European Commission, Council of Europe and UNESCO-CEPES, and representatives of higher education institutions.

²¹⁶ European Commission, "Education and Training," http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/socrates/erasmus/what_en.html; Internet; accessed 31 March 2007. Erasmus statistics for Turkey indicate that in 2005 there were: 1,142 students and 339 teachers going

States (US) that provides grants for Turkish students to pursue undergraduate studies or Masters and Ph. D. degrees in the US.²¹⁷ Participation in these higher education programs further enhances Turkish human capital, integration and convergence with the EU. The EU recognizes Turkey's young population may offset aging EU societies, and have commenced several educational enhancement initiatives and programs that have had a positive impact on individuals and EU-oriented universities.²¹⁸ The EU is also investing financial support to human resource management, having committed 158.7M Euro over the next three years as identified in the Multi-Annual Indicative Financial Framework as part of the accession negotiations (50.2M in 2007, 52.9M in 2008, 55.6M in 2009.)²¹⁹ The combination of EU support and Turkish educational policies and investments will continue to enhance Turkey's population as a demographic asset in a future enlarged EU. The development of human capital will be an important driving force of sustained economic growth, both domestically in Turkey and regionally, that would also facilitate faster convergence with the EU.²²⁰

from Turkey to other states and 299 students and 218 teachers coming into Turkey under the Erasmus program IAW the information available at Erasmus Statistics. "Erasmus Statistics of Turkey." http://www.eurydice.org/ressources/eurydice/eurybase/pdf_images/TR_EN_063.pdf; Internet; accessed 31 March 2008.

²¹⁷ Fulbright. "The Fulbright Commission." <http://www.fulbright.org.tr/>; Internet; accessed 3 April 2008. The Turkish Fulbright Commission was established in 1949 through a binational agreement between US and Turkey. It supports Turkish students and secondary school teachers through grants for higher education which include travel and living expenses for those wishing to study in the U.S.

²¹⁸ International Crisis Group, "Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead Europe Report N°184 – 17 August 2007," 12. Examples of educational initiatives include the Leonardo, Erasmus, Youth and Jean Monnet programs.

²¹⁹ European Commission, "Commission Decision on Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2007-2009 for Turkey," http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/mipd_turkey_2007_2009_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 January 2008.

²²⁰ Domanic, "The Turkish Accession to the European Union: Mutually Beneficial? Mutually Possible?" 3.

A report by Birol Yesilada demonstrates that the decline in EU GDP in the future could be reversed by adding Turkey. It also emphasizes that contrary to current public opinion in the EU over Turkey's membership, it is "...only after this country's accession that we see leveling off of the EU's economic decline and observe an increase in its projected per capita productivity."²²¹

With a young and dynamic population as well as a growing economy, Turkey would be a significant asset to the EU. It could offset its demographic decline and its corresponding economic challenges to sustain economic vitality, positively influencing its capacity to act globally in the future. The EU has already recognized this symbiotic relationship and is currently involved in embracing and developing human capital in Turkey with a view to further modernizing the European economy.

2.6 - Energy Security

Increasingly, energy is being discussed in the Eurasian context as a security issue and the role of Turkey is continuing to rise as a corridor to energy resources in Central Asia. In 2006, the EU imported half of its energy requirements and forecasts indicate 70% of all European energy sources in the next twenty years will be met by imported products, including resources from regions threatened by insecurity.²²² Energy resources are required to maintain economic growth and dependence has been growing to

²²¹ Yesilada, Brian Efir, and Peter Noordijk, "Competition among Giants: A Look at How Future Enlargement of the European Union Could Affect Global Power Transition," 620.

²²² European Commission, "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Secure and Competitive Energy Security," http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com2006_105_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 March 2008, 3.

disconcerting levels with import dependency of the EU expected to reach 94% for oil and 84% for natural gas by 2030.²²³ This is even more of a concern recognizing that half of the imports come from Russia, Norway and Algeria. Not only is energy an EU concern; globally the energy demand is rising. Global oil consumption since 1994 rose by 20% and is anticipated to grow by 1.6% per year, while the overall world energy demand is anticipated to rise by 60% in the next 25 years.²²⁴ The EU consumption of natural gas is also a concern, with recent research estimating that Europe's natural gas requirements will increase by 160% until 2030.²²⁵ Russia is currently the EU's leading supplier, providing 67% of European natural gas imports. This overdependence is of concern both in terms of the rising demand as well as the inadequacy and the security of the Russian supplies to meet future demands. Dependence on Russian gas became more of a concern following January 2006, when the Russian monopoly gas supplier, Gazprom, temporarily cut off supplies going through the Ukraine.²²⁶ This dropped pressure in gas pipelines in Hungary, Austria and other EU countries, launching EU concerns about their future energy security, the potential use of gas as a political weapon against the EU, and underinvestment in energy infrastructure within Russia.²²⁷ In the context of this crisis, diversification of energy sources, potentially from the Middle East and Central Asia, are gaining importance. The ability to diversify transit routes to ensure safer access to

²²³ Akcapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 45.

²²⁴ European Commission, "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Secure and Competitive Energy Security," 3.

²²⁵ Domanic, "The Turkish Accession to the European Union: Mutually Beneficial? Mutually Possible?" 3.

²²⁶ Katinka Barysch, "Turkey's role in European Energy Security," http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_turkey_energy_12dec07.pdf; Internet, accessed 15 January 2008, 3.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

reliable energy must be taken seriously. In January 2007, the European Commission published its energy policy package. It put diversification of sources of supply at the top of its priority list with the Caspian and Central Asian regions central to the diversification plans of the Commission.²²⁸ From this perspective, Turkey and the EU have a converging interest both in diversification of sources, security and access.

Turkey is also strategically important to Europe based on its geography. It is in close proximity to a significant portion of the world's oil and gas reserves and is already a significant hub of energy distribution. Its relevance will continue to grow as new multinational projects come to fruition. As Akcarpa asserts:

The country is of strategic importance for the security of energy supplies to the EU, lying at the crossroads of various existing and future pipelines carrying both oil and gas from many core producer regions, namely Russia, the Caspian Sea, the Middle East and North Africa.²²⁹

Turkey has the potential to be Europe's fourth main artery of energy resources (behind Russia, Norway and Algeria). It connects global markets from east-west and north-south through oil and natural gas pipelines that exist, are currently under construction or planned. When combined, these pipelines will have the capacity to transport 7% of the global energy supply, or one of every sixteen barrels of oil through Turkey, upon

²²⁸ EuroLex, "Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament - an energy policy for Europe," <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0001:EN:NOT>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008. In addition to diversification of energy sources, other EU Energy Policy targets identified included; improving energy efficiency by 20% by 2020; raising the share of renewable energy to 20% by 2020; and increasing the level of biofuels in transport fuel to 10% by 2020. The EU has already committed to cutting its own green house gas emissions by at least 20% and would increase this reduction under a satisfactory global agreement.

²²⁹ Akcapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 46.

completion.²³⁰ The keystone of the east-west energy corridor is the 1,730 kilometer Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline which opened in May 2006, significantly increasing Turkey's profile as an energy hub. This pipeline has an annual capacity of 50 million metric tons, roughly amounting to 1 billion barrels per day and transports Azeri crude oil to Turkey's Ceyhan port via Georgia.²³¹ The East-West corridor also involves the Baku-Tblisi-Ezurum (BTE) and Trans-Caspian natural gas pipelines, which connects proven reserves of 460 billion cubic meters to the Turkish gas pipeline system and further to European gas networks.²³² The "interconnector" pipeline between Turkey and Greece has recently been completed, for the first time allowing the delivery of Caspian gas to Europe without crossing Russian Territory.²³³

While the Turkey-Greece interconnector is a key to enhanced energy security, the Nabucco Company Pipeline project will have an even greater impact for Europe's energy security and Turkey's role as an energy hub. The Nabucco Company pipeline project is planned to run from the Caspian Sea through Turkey and is necessary to reduce the EU's dependence on Russia. This pipeline will cut the EU's reliance on the Russian Gazprom monopoly by a quarter, where the cost of gas "...undergoes a doubling of price when it comes to Europe."²³⁴ Construction of the 3,300 kilometer Nabucco Company Pipeline is scheduled for 2009 with completion scheduled for 2013. It will have the capacity to

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 46.

²³¹ Domanic, "The Turkish Accession to the European Union: Mutually Beneficial? Mutually Possible?" 3.

²³² Akcapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 47.

²³³ Barysch, "Turkey's role in European Energy Security," 3.

²³⁴ EU Business, "US champions EU's Nabucco gas pipeline project," <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1203681725.2/>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2008.

carry 31 billion cubic meters of gas annually, distributing Caspian natural gas via Turkey to Europe and linking Central Asian natural gas reserves with Central European states. Some critics argue this would be insignificant compared to the EU's overall gas needs in and of the amounts that the EU is still likely to buy from Russia. However, John Roberts, an energy expert at Platts, argues that the "...mere existence of an alternate supply route would strengthen the EU's hand in negotiations with Russia and thus force Gazprom to sell gas on a more competitive basis."²³⁵ Furthermore, he argues, "...if Nabucco prompted Russia to drop its prices by as little as 1 euro per thousand cubic meters....then – even if not a single cubic meter of gas ever flowed through Nabucco – it would provide a good return on its 5 billion euro investment."²³⁶ An extension is also planned of the currently active Blue Stream natural gas pipeline, transporting Russian natural gas to Turkey, with extensions to Greece, Italy and France. It has the potential to quadruple its current capacity to pump 32 billion cubic meters of gas annually.²³⁷ The following diagram illustrates the major existing and potential pipelines through Turkey.

²³⁵ Barysch, "Turkey's role in European Energy Security," 4.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

²³⁷ Domanic, "The Turkish Accession to the European Union: Mutually Beneficial? Mutually Possible?" 4.




Figure 2.1 – Gas Pipelines Turkey
Source: Barysch, “Turkey’s role in European Energy Security,” 8.

Based on both existing and future pipelines, Turkey’s role as an energy hub and in the diversification of sources is critical, making it an essential strategic partner for the future energy security of the EU.²³⁸ It is clear that both the EU and Turkey would share a symbiotic interest in the area of energy security based on Turkey’s ability to act as an energy corridor, channeling Caspian and the Middle Eastern energy to Europe. Its

²³⁸ European Commission, “Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Secure and Competitive Energy Security,” 16.

strategic importance to the EU's future energy security is undeniable.²³⁹ When combined with Turkey's other assets, "...the energy corridors produce a major trump card for Turkey going beyond geopolitics."²⁴⁰ The structural processes of demographics, economics and energy security are very quantifiable, and particularly strengthen the case for Turkish accession.

²³⁹ European Commission, "Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply," http://ec.europa.eu/comm/energy_transport/livrevert/final/report_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 March 2008. The European Commission underscored that "particular attention should be given to transit states such as Turkey in the context of transport routes that will be necessary for the full exploitation of the resources of the Caspian Sea."

²⁴⁰ Akcapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 48.

Chapter 3

Renewed Consensus for Enlargement and EU Cultural Initiatives

The accession of Turkey to the EU is a controversial topic with varying degrees of support both within EU governments among its citizens. While there is a great deal of diversity among member states, with multidimensional elements that influence European public opinion on Turkish accession, a number of EU initiatives have not only reaffirmed EU commitment to enlargement but are focused on key areas that may positively influence public opinion toward its membership. Optimism for Turkish accession is grounded in the Lisbon Treaty outlining EU reforms for a "...Europe of 27 or more Member States" that will provide better EU mechanisms to meet the challenges of the 21st century.²⁴¹ A renewed consensus toward future EU enlargement has been articulated by the EU to include Turkey, as well as a more streamlined instrument for pre-accession funding to support candidate reform.

In the case of Turkey's accession, one of the most controversial debates of enlargement has been centered on so called "cultural differences," which are essentially a European euphemism for antipathy towards the membership of a majority Muslim state. In this respect, it is interesting to note several emerging and ongoing EU cultural agenda initiatives, including "The European Year of Intercultural Dialogue," and an increase in civil society dialogue between the EU and Turkey, among other projects.

²⁴¹ European Commission, "Reforming Europe for the 21st Century," 2.

3.1 - European Opinion on Turkish Accession

The accession of Turkey to the EU is a highly controversial topic and both EU governments and citizens are divided on whether Turkey should become a member. According to the 2006 Eurobarometer, citizens' support to Turkish accession was over 50% in Sweden, Poland, the Netherlands and Romania.²⁴² In the UK, Portugal, Bulgaria as well as Ireland there was a relative majority in favor.²⁴³ A summary by Alain Servantie, based on Eurobarometer and various other opinion polls, further highlights that political leaders in Italy, Spain, Greece and Belgium expressed support to Turkey's accession, while their respective public opinion was less supportive, and strong public opposition was present in Belgium.²⁴⁴ In France 76% of young people opposed Turkish accession according to the 2006 Eurobarometer, and German opposition in recent polls was between 54% and 73.4%. Austria has been one of the states with the strongest public resistance with opinion polls as high as 80% against Turkish accession in 2005.²⁴⁵ Servantie asserts that high opposition to Turkish accession seems most prominent in states with the largest percentage of Turkish immigrants "...which may reflect the lack of integration of migrants and the xenophobic attitudes and fears of the local population."²⁴⁶

²⁴² The Eurobarometer is a series of public opinion surveys on issues pertaining to the EU that are regularly performed on behalf of the European Commission across the EU member states.

²⁴³ Alain Servantie, "European Public Opinion on Turkey," http://www.bridge-mag.com/magazine/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=261&Itemid=31; Internet; accessed 31 March 2008, 1.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁴⁵ Antonia M Ruiz-Jiménez, and José I Torreblanca, "European Public Opinion and Turkey's Accession: Making Sense of Arguments For and Against," *CEPS – Centre for European Policy Studies*; http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1494; Internet; accessed 31 March 2008, 8.

²⁴⁶ Servantie, "European Public Opinion on Turkey," 2.

While there is different levels of support within EU member states and overall public opinion polls are low, this is not dissimilar to the trends in previous enlargements. For example in 2004, on accession of the CEEC states, only 42% of EU members were in favor of the enlargement.²⁴⁷ Historically, in a poll compiled in 1954 at the inception of the European integration project, only 29% thought a French-German alliance could work.²⁴⁸

A report by Antonia Ruiz-Jimenez and Jose Torreblanca, also examines European citizen's attitudes toward Turkish accession and key elements in determining support for or opposition to its accession. The report asserts that views for and against Turkey's accession are multidimensional and that citizens use different arguments for both positions. It identifies that the likelihood of support or opposition depends on whether citizens adopt a perspective that:

...is utilitarian (resting on costs and benefits), identity-based (founded on Turkey being part of Europe) or post-national (linked to the view of a rights-based EU emphasizing democracy and human rights). The main findings are as follows: first, support for Turkey's membership is mostly based on post-national arguments; second, opposition to Turkey's accession is mainly connected with identity-related arguments; and third, instrumental reasons (costs/benefits) play a less relevant role. [It concludes] Turkey's future membership in the EU will thus not be won or lost at the public opinion level on the material plane (cost/benefits) but on the relative weight of the post-national visions...²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ European Commission, "Enlargement, two years after: an economic evaluation," 18.

²⁴⁸ Servantie, "European Public Opinion on Turkey," 1.

²⁴⁹ Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca, "European Public Opinion and Turkey's Accession: Making Sense of Arguments For and Against," abstract.

The report suggests that the key to support of Turkish membership resonates in the way accession is argued and justified, not entirely on the way its accession is negotiated.²⁵⁰ These themes are key in examining the EU's strategy to deal with enlargement concerns. The EU has undertaken a number of initiatives that are focused on key areas that will positively influence public opinion on Turkish accession.

3.2 - The Lisbon Treaty

The EU has recently expanded from 15 to 27 members. Modernization and reform are essential to enhancing its capacity to operate in an enlarged EU as well as to respond more effectively to the challenges of the 21st century. After the disappointment of the non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, there was an air of pessimism on the future of EU integration and enlargement. While the Constitutional Treaty failed to secure unanimous support, it provided a springboard for further resolution. The steps towards an institutional settlement were achieved through a framework at the EU Council in June 2006, the Berlin Declaration in March 2007, and in a comprehensive agreement on the elements for reform in June 2007.²⁵¹ These resulted in the signature of the Lisbon Treaty on 13 December 2007, outlining EU reforms for "...A Europe of 27 or more Member States [that] gives the opportunity to act on a continental scale and face up to issues that transcend national boundaries....to achieve the right responses for Europe in a

²⁵⁰ Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca, "European Public Opinion and Turkey's Accession: Making Sense of Arguments For and Against," abstract.

²⁵¹ European Commission, "Reforming Europe for the 21st Century," 3.

globalized world.”²⁵² Ratification and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty is targeted for completion prior to the June 2009 European elections.

Optimism for Turkish accession is grounded in confirmation that the Lisbon Treaty framework has been developed to include “...27 or more member states,” indicating the EU’s intent to expand beyond its current 27 state membership. Once again, this process demonstrates EU resiliency to achieve resolution, and modernize and streamline its processes and institutions in the face of challenges. This is an important precedent as we look to the future of Turkish accession, recognizing some EU Institutional or budgetary elements may require further refinements. These potential adjustments will seem dwarfed compared to the strategic and geopolitical importance that Turkey represents for the EU’s future.

3.3 - Renewed Consensus to Enlargement

In addition to the development of the Lisbon Treaty, there has been a renewed consensus toward enlargement. In December 2006 the European Council concluded that:

Enlargement has been a success story for the European Union and Europe as a whole. It has helped to overcome the division of Europe and contributed to peace and security throughout the continent. It has inspired reforms and has consolidated common principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law as well as the market economy. The wider internal market and economic cooperation have increased prosperity and competitiveness, enabling the enlarged Union to respond better to the challenges of globalization. Enlargement has also enhanced the EU’s weight in the world and made it a stronger international player.²⁵³

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁵³ European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007/2008- Including annexed special report on the EU's capacity to integrate new members,” http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/strategy_paper_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 December 2007, 3.

Furthermore, the Commission reaffirmed its commitment to enlargement stating that the EU "...honors existing commitments to countries already in progress," which includes Turkey.²⁵⁴ The Commission acknowledged that while the enlargement agenda still faces a number of major challenges, the draw of the EU is encouraging important political and economic reforms in Turkey and contributing to stability. A number of lessons learned from the previous enlargements and the implementation of necessary strategies to progress the EU enlargement agenda are also paving the path for Turkish accession.

A European Commission special report on the EU's capacity to integrate new members, identified key areas for improvement to sustain the support and momentum for enlargement. Communication was the cornerstone. Enhanced public communication is required to articulate the benefits and challenges of enlargement, in particular to alleviate some of the current apprehensions by explaining how enlargement works as a gradual and carefully managed process.²⁵⁵ The EU also identified the need to better demonstrate commitment to candidate states as well as more effectively explain that their progress is judged on their own merits, with progress dependant on the pace of reforms in each respective candidate state.²⁵⁶ Support to candidate governments was emphasized as an important role for the EU, in order to explain the nature of the EU and how citizens of candidate states benefit from closer EU relations while preparing for membership. To this end, the EU has initiated a major information campaign for its citizens to gain a better appreciation and increase transparency of the enlargement process. Extensive

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*,15.

material is available in EU official languages on the internet, in various publications and through increased civil society dialogue initiatives. This demonstrates EU commitment to more positive, dynamic and progressive accession negotiations. In particular, significant efforts have been focused on Turkey with the civil society initiative described later in this section.

The Commission also adjusted pre-accession policy tools to better address the challenges of enlargement. In January 2007, the EU implemented a new financial mechanism, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), to provide a tighter focus on reform and funding priorities to support candidate members.²⁵⁷ The decision of the EU Commission reflected in the Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) for Turkey demonstrates the EU's resolve for moving accession negotiations forward with a funding commitment of 1,602.3 Billion Euro over the next three years. The MIPD funding is detailed in the table below.

Component	2007	2008	2009	Total
I – Institution Building	252.2	250.2	233.2	735.6**
II – Cross-border cooperation	6.6	8.8	9.4	24.8
III – Regional Development	167.5	173.8	182.7	524
IV – Human Resources Development	50.2	52.9	55.6	158.7
V – Rural Development	20.7	53.0	85.5	159.2
Total	497.2	538.7	566.4	1602.3

* Figures are in current prices, million €

Figure 3.1 – The Turkey Multi-Annual Indicative Financial Framework
Source: European Commission, “Commission Decision on Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2007-2009 for Turkey,” 16.

²⁵⁷ European Commission, “Commission Decision on Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2007-2009 for Turkey,” http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/mipd_turkey_2007_2009_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 January 2008, 4.

Cumulatively, the EU's renewed consensus to enlargement, and its modifications to both its enlargement strategy and financial funding framework for accession negotiations, demonstrate its commitment to the progression of Turkey's accession to the EU.

3.4 - The European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008 (EYID 2008)

The reality of a multicultural Europe and the criticality of intercultural dialogue to the EU's future prosperity and stability have been internalized by the EU, for a number of reasons. First, 9/11 and the perceived security threats, secondly, the Algerian riots in Paris in 2006 as well as the death of Theo van Gogh, and thirdly, anxieties regarding Turkish accession. These have all brought the integration of contemporary Muslim culture to the forefront. For the first time ever, the EU has established a European strategy for culture, focused on contributing to economic growth and intercultural understanding.²⁵⁸ In this context, a decision by the EU Parliament and Council designated 2008 "The European Year of Intercultural Dialogue" in order to achieve a number of EU's strategic priorities. These strategic priorities include:

...respecting and promoting cultural diversity in Europe, improving co-existence and encouraging active European citizenship open to the world and based on the common values of the EU; and enabling EU to make its voice better heard in the world and to forge effective partnerships with countries in its neighbourhood, thus extending the zone of stability, democracy and common prosperity beyond the EU, and thereby increasing the well-being and security of European citizens and those living in the EU.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁸ Europa Press Release, "First-ever European strategy for culture: contributing to economic growth and intercultural understanding," <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/646&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2008.

²⁵⁹ European Parliament, "Decision No 1983/2006/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (2008)," http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_412/l_41220061230en00440050.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 January 2008, 6.

Achieving further diversity in Europe is based on long term demographic trends; therefore the emphasis on intercultural dialogue is a primary strategic goal for the EU. The EYID 2008 initiative is simply an initial step in a critical process that must address the current challenges of integration and future migration. The emphasis of the EU on intercultural dialogue is yet another qualitative element paving the way for the future accession of Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey's historical and geographical position would serve as a strategic and geocultural asset in further extending the security of the EU by enhancing intercultural understanding and dialogue in the region and globally.

3.5 - Civil Society Dialogue: EU-Turkey Initiative

Another key initiative in bridging intercultural issues is the Civil Society Dialogue initiative between Turkey and the EU.²⁶⁰ The objective is to generate enhanced mutual understanding between citizens of Turkey and the EU of the opportunities and challenges of Turkey's accession.²⁶¹ This is of particular significance as the mutual level of understanding is weaker in comparison with other candidate states, where concerns and misperceptions are more prevalent. Based on experience of previous enlargements, the integration of citizens in the EU accession process and the strengthening of solidarity between the societies of the EU and candidate countries is imperative to success.

²⁶⁰ The fundamental nature of civil society dialogue is systematic contact and exchange between all sectors of civil society in the EU Member States and Turkey. The intent is to assist in bridging the information gap, achieve better mutual knowledge and bring citizens and different cultures, political and economic systems closer together, thus ensuring a stronger awareness of the opportunities as well as the challenges of future accessions.

²⁶¹ Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, "EU Turkey Review - Civil Dialogue," <http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/File/AB-Gorunum/Sayi-09/01%20REVIEW.pdf>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2008, 8.

Therefore, the Civil Society Dialogue represents a key element of the EU's accession strategy for Turkey. It has committed 21.5M Euro to promote Civil Society in Turkey, which will complement the technical EU-Turkish accession negotiations.²⁶² A measure of success to date has been the expansion of Turkey's civil society with more than 84,000 non-governmental organizations currently in Turkey.²⁶³ Despite the tenuous EU-Turkish accession negotiations of last year, the Eurobarometer has also indicated that support for EU membership in Turkey is quite stable at over 50%.²⁶⁴ Ambassador Marc Pierni, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, also asserts:

“...The tide of opinion seems to be changing regarding enlargement as Europeans are becoming increasingly aware of the benefits, and not the mythical disadvantages, offered by its new citizens.”²⁶⁵

3.6 - Turkey in European Popular Culture

Turkey is an integral part of the popular cultural framework of Europe. In sports, a Turkish team competes in European cup competitions. The European soccer titles were won by a Turkish team, Galatasaray, in 2000. It claimed the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Cup and the Super Cup, defeating the UK and Spain.²⁶⁶ The

²⁶² European Commission, “Civil Dialogue EU and Turkey,” http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Sivil_Toplum_Diyalogu/EUTURCSD.html; Internet; accessed 2 February 2008.

²⁶³ Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, “EU Turkey Review - Civil Dialogue,” 2.

²⁶⁴ Delegation to European Commission of Turkey, “Eurobarometer Turkish National Report – Autumn 2007,” http://www.avrupa.info.tr/News_Archive/Feb2008,01feb08.html; Internet, accessed 10 January 2008.

²⁶⁵ Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, “EU Turkey Review - Civil Dialogue,” 8.

²⁶⁶ UEFA, “Galatasaray pride of Turkey,” <http://www.uefa.com/competitions/uefacup/history/season=1999/intro.html>; Internet; accessed 31 March 2008.

European Champions League final match in 2005 was played in an Istanbul stadium.²⁶⁷ Turkish athletes are also recognized in the European halls of fame in almost every other sport. In music, a Turkish singer, Sertab Erener won the European song contest (Eurovision) in 2003, which was hosted by Turkey and broadcasted live all over Europe.²⁶⁸ While there are so-called “cultural differences” raised as Turkish EU membership is debated, ironically Turkey is strongly integrated in many elements of popular culture throughout Europe. Thus, the “cultural differences” may not be as great as perceived.

3.7 - “Europe Capital of Culture” Istanbul 2010

Another interesting development in the context of Turkey’s accession is the selection of Istanbul as the “Europe Capital of Culture (ECOC)” in 2010. This event gives the city the opportunity to present a cultural and arts program lasting for about a year, emphasizing the richness, diversity and shared characteristics of Europe’s culture.²⁶⁹ Throughout history, Istanbul has not only been a capital of three of the longest-lived empires in history, but also a centre for monotheistic beliefs, with its history intrinsically intertwining Europe and the broader region. Istanbul as ECOC will provide yet another opportunity to improve and deepen intercultural dialogue between Turkey

²⁶⁷ Roder Events 2005, “UEFA Champions League Final 2005,” http://www.rzs.de/en/events/events_2005/uefa_2005.htm; Internet; accessed 31 March 2008.

²⁶⁸ BBC News, “Turks Cheer Eurovision Winner,” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/2939776.stm>; Internet; accessed 31 March 2008.

²⁶⁹ Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, “EU Turkey Review - Civil Dialogue,” 13.

and the EU, with the event providing an occasion to "...to unite people from diverse, contrasting backgrounds and perspectives in harmony and mutual understanding."²⁷⁰

It is also interesting to analyze this event in a larger strategic context. The European Year of Intercultural Dialogue is 2008, the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty will be completed no later than January 2009, followed by European elections in June 2009. Istanbul has been selected as a "Europe Capital of Culture" in 2010, which is "synchronized" with the transition of new European Parliamentarians. Perhaps it is visionary foresight, given Turkey's accession negotiations will have advanced significantly by this timeframe and the first window of opportunity for EU membership accession nearing in 2014.

Qualitatively these EU initiatives are paving the way to overcome the final political hurdle for Turkish membership. A few EU member states have indicated that referendums will be held as the final determinate of Turkey's membership to the EU. As such, it has necessitated a comprehensive approach to increasing civil society dialogue to enhance cultural understanding, and overcome stereotypes, as well as address current EU integration issues. The cumulative effects of these initiatives will hopefully facilitate a broader understanding of Turkey, assist in overcoming some of the apprehensions of its accession, and help to develop a consensus for its indisputable place in the EU.

²⁷⁰ Istanbul 2010, "The European Capital of Culture," <http://www.istanbul2010.org/?p=10&lang=eng>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2008.

Conclusion

The dynamics of European integration and enlargement have been embedded in the larger international environment. By the very nature of its policies, the EU continues to absorb new member states to increase its zone of stability, prosperity and security in response to both internal and external events. It enlarged to include weak post dictatorial regimes in the Mediterranean that transformed into democracies. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break up of the Soviet Union, the EU again increased its zone of “democratic peace” through further enlargement and integration to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, there is reason to conclude the EU will continue with this past precedent to absorb Turkey as a complimentary member state in response to the emerging challenges of the 21st century. Previous enlargements have also demonstrated, similar to current discourse on Turkey, that opposition and debate are a natural part of the process. While significant challenges are anticipated throughout accession negotiations, Turkey has both historically and recently demonstrated the fortitude and commitment to continue on its journey to EU membership.

Recognizing that there are valid concerns regarding Turkey’s accession to the EU, these concerns are not insurmountable when assessed against the strategic and geopolitical value of Turkish accession. Turkey is an important geopolitical and geocultural asset to the EU that would play a prominent role in the efforts of the EU to become a global actor. There is significant convergence in EU-Turkey foreign and security policies and Turkey’s close historical and cultural ties with countries in its larger neighbourhood would serve to facilitate its constructive role towards contributing to peace and conciliation in these regions. Turkey is also in a unique geopolitical position

and with strong interests in regions like Central Asia, South Caucasus and the Middle East, it would enhance the EU's profile and influence of its foreign policy as a member. Furthermore, Turkey as a democratic, secular and social state based on Western rule of law, yet with strong ties to the Islamic world, may serve as a model and a source of inspiration for other countries aspiring to modernization.²⁷¹ The accession of Turkey would also serve as the antithesis of the "clash of civilizations," fostering much needed respect and dialogue between Islamic and Western societies in an era of rising polarization between the West and Islam.²⁷² The inclusion of Turkey in the EU would be a net gain in meeting the challenges of the 21st century from a cultural as well as regional and global security perspective.

Economics, demographics and the need for energy security will also continue to increase the momentum and impetus for Turkish accession over time. The declining demographic trend in the EU will require it to embrace immigrants to maintain its economic sustainability to compete with emerging economic giants such as China and India. As a member state, Turkey's growing economy, dynamic population and ongoing development in human capital would complement the EU in modernizing its economy to face new competition and maintain its capacity as a global actor. Furthermore, energy resources are required to maintain economic growth. Turkey, as an energy hub and as a source to achieve diversification, makes it an essential strategic partner for the future

²⁷¹ Independent Commission on Turkey, "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?" 16.

²⁷² Zeki Kutuk, "Turkey and the European Union: The Simple Complexity," *Turkish Studies* 7:2 (2006): 279.

energy security of the EU.²⁷³ The cultural argument which seems to be the strongest argument articulated by opponents is being mitigated by the EU's cultural agenda. The EU has recognized that Europe will continue to be multiracial and multicultural. It is therefore taking extensive measures to increase civilizational dialogue in order to ensure further stability, security and prosperity of the EU. While the quantitative areas such as economics, demographics and energy security will inherently move the EU toward Turkish accession, the qualitative element of bridging the cultural apprehensions is also progressing within Europe. These converging and synergistic quantitative and qualitative elements demonstrate that Turkey can assist the EU in facing the challenges of the 21st century and arguably will pave the way for Turkish accession. Therefore, its accession is seen not only as desirable from a strategic and geopolitical perspective, but inevitable in the long run.

At the end of the successful Turkish accession negotiations, following the signing of an Accession Treaty, all member states must ratify the agreement. It is hoped that the EU member states will demonstrate vision and recognize the strategic and geopolitical importance of Turkey, and ultimately support its EU membership. As demonstrated, all past EU enlargements have been mired in debate and the EU has taken "risks" with the accession of previous members. The rejection of Turkey's accession would jeopardize the international credibility of the EU with unquantifiable repercussions. Moreover, no previous candidate accession negotiations have ever ended in anything less than full membership. The symbolic nature of a defeat or rejection of

²⁷³ European Commission, "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Secure and Competitive Energy Security," 16.

Turkey, after it has filled all of the rigorous EU membership criteria, could have an adverse impact not only on EU-Turkish relations but greater East-West, Christian-Islamic relations and even potentially regional and global stability.

In summary, the EU's integration and enlargement have always been embedded in the larger international environment. Therefore, based on the challenges of the 21st century, there is reason to conclude that the EU will continue to increase its zone of security, stability and prosperity through the successful accession of Turkey. Unlike the Cold War era, Turkey's strategic importance has increased beyond simple geography to include a geopolitical and geocultural value for the EU. It will facilitate economic growth, energy security, complement demographic trends, and enhance the ability of the EU as a foreign policy actor to increase stability both in the region and globally. The EU had also initiated its own modernization, making many policy changes as a part of the new Lisbon (Reform) Treaty. It has renewed its identity and charted its course for future EU enlargement as the most effective way to deal with emerging challenges. Based on the objectives of the EU's cultural strategy, the cultural apprehensions associated with Turkey's accession will continue to be diluted with increased mutual understanding of the challenges and benefits of Turkish accession and through enhanced intercultural dialogue. Overall, from a quantitative and qualitative perspective, Turkey's accession is seen as a strategic and geopolitical net gain for the EU.

Some of the recent opposition is based on the current status of both Turkey and the EU. The accession negotiations will continue to radically reform Turkey and it will be significantly different than it is currently. The EU will also look different at the time of accession with impending institutional and policy changes as a result of Lisbon. The

EU will likely evolve further, as necessary, to address any current concerns with the accession of Turkey, as was the case with the recent fifth enlargement. The benefits of Turkey's accession from a strategic and geopolitical are too great for its path on accession negotiations to end in anything less than full EU membership. Turkey's accession process, from the Ankara Agreement in 1963 to the present complex and much divided accession negotiations, will continue to be a long and winding road to full membership. While the issue of Cyprus remains a stumbling block requiring resolution prior to Turkish accession, encouragingly, peace talks have been relaunched by Cypriot leaders. The removal of a historic symbol of partition, with the opening of a Cyprus checkpoint in the heart of the capital on 3 April 2008, has ignited reunification hopes, holding promise for resolution and correspondingly future Turkish accession.²⁷⁴ As Akcapar argues, the strategic value of Turkey and global dynamics are leading to an ever more integrated relationship between the EU and Turkey that would logically end in EU membership:

The complexity of Turkey's accession process to the European Union is matched only by the density of its strategic value in terms of geographic location as well as national political, military, social and cultural assets. The importance of Turkey is so vast, and its extant fusion with the rest of Europe is so impossible to disentangle, the opponents of full EU membership cannot muster a definite no. Even if EU leaders blunder into saying no, it will not hold – as was the case in 1997 when the Luxemburg Summit thought it had produced a rejection of Turkey's membership; it lasted only two years. Roughly a decade earlier, in 1988, a similarly note was played with the European Commission thought it had buried Turkey's European bid by issuing a negative opinion on Turkey's membership. It did not fly. Each generation of leaders may try their hand in resisting historical, political, regional and global dynamics that long preceded them and shall in all likelihood also supersede them. But Turkey always ends up being a part and parcel of the European equation, and eventually will also be inseparable from its institutions.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴ EurActive, "Opening of Cyprus checkpoint breeds reunification hopes," 1.

²⁷⁵ Akcapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, 31.

While it is recognized that there will be many challenges on the Turkish path to full EU membership, Turkey's strategic value is undeniable. As Turkey's Foreign Minister has emphasized, "...The accession of Turkey to the EU could be the greatest peace project of the 21st Century," particularly given the powerful stabilizing effect it could have on the Middle East.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁶ PR-Inside, "Foreign minister: Turkey to become one of world's top 10 economic power in 15 years," 1.

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