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**MAKING WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT WORK: IDENTIFYING EFFECTIVE  
GOVERNANCE IN CANADA'S APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY  
IMPLEMENTATION**

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## **ABSTRACT**

In 2005, the Government of Canada released an International Policy Statement (IPS) that announced an “integrated 3D approach” that would combine defence, diplomacy, development and commerce in order for Canada to have an enhanced impact in post-conflict situations. This paper examines the implementation of that policy at the operational level to determine how the principles of effective governance are being applied in the quest for synergy amongst the government departments that are implicated in foreign policy execution. Using a case study methodology, it examines the views of actors involved in the 3D process at the level of interdepartmental working groups dealing with Canada’s efforts in Afghanistan and Sudan. It finds that the term “3D” is no longer used by the practitioners and has been supplanted by the term “whole-of-government.” It also finds that the desired policy integration envisaged by the 3D process is, in its current form, only coordination. This paper adds value to the foreign and security policy implementation field by providing a notional policy-based definition of 3D and a framework for an effective whole-of-government governance process. Finally, it addresses and clarifies issues surrounding the use of terminology in relation to 3D and whole-of-government concepts.

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## CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

*“We have seen the emergence of a class of problems whose causes are so complex, and whose solutions are so multi-factorial, that they require a multi-agency response.”<sup>1</sup>*

Since the end of the Cold War and even more so since the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001, there have been significant changes in the world order and the international security environment facing Canada. The security challenges posed by failed and failing states, international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction have led to a new breed of threats facing nations and governments. This new asymmetrical security environment has created complex problems that require sophisticated solutions which synchronize inputs from all elements of a nation’s foreign policy tools: diplomatic, informational, military and economic.

The quest for these multi-faceted solutions has spawned new terms and concepts in the foreign and security policy lexicon. Alternatively referred to in various countries and international organizations as a “comprehensive approach,” a “whole-of-government approach,” a “3D approach,” “policy coherence,” “horizontality” and “joined-up-government,” these approaches represent the attempt at achieving greater synergy amongst the elements of national power to achieve a nation’s security policy goals. The emergence of these terms fuels the perception that they are new or ground-breaking concepts. In the Canadian context, however, some argue that these approaches are not

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<sup>1</sup> Tom Ling, "Delivering joined-up Government in the UK: Dimensions, Issues and Problems," *Public Administration* 80, no. 4 (2002), 1, <http://search.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2007.



new, but are in fact a re-branding of old policy products.<sup>2</sup> This paper does not address itself directly to this perception of change or of recycling of old concepts. Instead, realizing that effective governance is critical to achieving national objectives in a complex world, this paper seeks to understand to what extent this quest for synergy in the execution of Canadian foreign and security policy is being accomplished. Its aim is to examine the implementation of that policy at the operational level to determine how the principles of effective governance are being applied.

### **The Phenomenon - Canada's 3D policy**

Canada has a long history of international involvement and the examples of Canada's participation on the world stage over the years are numerous. Notwithstanding a rich history of international engagement, the government of the day released an International Policy Statement (IPS) in 2005 that presented a way-ahead for Canada to respond to the new global security challenges. It announced an "integrated 3D approach" that would combine defence, diplomacy, development and commerce in order for Canada to have an enhanced impact in post-conflict situations.<sup>3</sup> This paper analyses the operationalizing of that policy and the depth to which the government departments that are primarily implicated in foreign policy execution (National Defence, Foreign Affairs, and the Canadian International Development Agency) are working together in that process.

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<sup>2</sup> During Chatham House Rules lectures at Canadian Forces College, two lecturers made this assertion on separate occasions.

<sup>3</sup> Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Overview* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005), 20.

A key factor in studying the implementation of this policy is the confusion over terminology. The plethora of terms used to represent interdepartmental or synergistic activity by various nations and organizations tend to be deceptively different based on their context, yet are often used synonymously. The 2005 IPS is no different, as it uses both “3D” and “whole-of-government” to represent the same concept.<sup>4</sup>

This confusion over terminology is further complicated by the virtual disappearance of the term “3D” from the current Government’s vocabulary. A review of recent speeches and reports indicates that while the term “3D” is used in only one instance, these same documents often refer to the extended version of the term by mentioning “defence, diplomacy and development.”<sup>5</sup> This is especially so with respect to Canada’s efforts in Afghanistan, despite the involvement of other government departments (OGD) in that intervention. That the abbreviated term “3D” is not in common use by the Government will therefore not deter its examination in this thesis, as the mechanisms for operationalizing its constituent elements indicate that the concept endures.

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<sup>4</sup> As an example, “3D” is used in *IPS: Overview*, 20; yet the Development chapter uses the term “whole-of-government.” Canada. Canadian International Development Agency, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Development* (Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency, 2005), 1, [http://web.archive.org/web/20060503214600/www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/IPS\\_PDF\\_EN/\\$file/IPS-EN.pdf](http://web.archive.org/web/20060503214600/www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/IPS_PDF_EN/$file/IPS-EN.pdf); Internet; accessed 17 January 2008.

<sup>5</sup> As an example, see: Canada. Government of Canada, "Canada's Approach in Afghanistan," <http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/mission-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 February, 2008; Canada. Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, "Final Report," Public Works and Government Services, [http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/pdf/Afghan\\_Report\\_web\\_e.pdf](http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/pdf/Afghan_Report_web_e.pdf); Internet; accessed 22 January 2008. Only the Government of Canada website: Canada. Government of Canada, *Canada's Approach in Afghanistan* refers specifically to Canada’s “3D approach.”

## Rationale for the Study

The underlying rationale for conducting this study lies in the quest for a deeper understanding of how Canadian foreign and security policy is being implemented. The motivations behind this logic are three-fold.

First, the implied complexity of seeking synergistic effects across government departments to achieve policy outcomes demands efficiency and effectiveness. Policy requires coherent implementation in order to achieve desired outcomes. According to Yarger, in a perfect world, policy would clearly articulate how the instruments of power are to attain the objectives, outcomes or end states desired. He cedes to reality, however, when he states: “In practice, it tends to be much vaguer.”<sup>6</sup> This lack of precision in articulating “how” policy objectives are to be attained creates opportunities for different interpretations by those charged with implementing the policy. One model of policy implementation shows a linear relationship of policy moving through an implementation structure that transforms policy into programs to be delivered.<sup>7</sup> In relation to Canada’s foreign and security policy, this paper will concern itself with the implementation level – the actors, organization and process that policy moves through to its eventual operationalization. Such a system of implementation would require a comprehensive governance structure to ensure orderly and efficient collective action. It is at this level

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<sup>6</sup> Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2006), 7, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA444141>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2008.

<sup>7</sup> Kenneth Kernaghan and David Siegel, *Public Administration in Canada*, 4th ed. (Toronto: ITP Nelson, 1999), 125. Kernaghan et Siegel also provide a more complicated model that shows feedback loops that effect both implementation and policy directly, but for the sake of this discussion, acknowledgement of the existence of the implementation level is sufficient.

that much can be learned about how effective governance is being demonstrated as policy is being operationalized to achieve outcomes.

Second, the confusion over terminology usage creates opportunities for misunderstanding, inefficiency and ineffectiveness. The issue of Government efficiency and effectiveness in horizontal or whole-of-government initiatives is an area of recurring study, where significant deficiencies have been observed. In 2005, the Auditor General reported that:

Much of the federal government's approach to cross-departmental initiatives has been case by case without having a coherent and integrated body of policies and guidance.<sup>8</sup>

The Auditor General's comments were directed specifically at domestic policy initiatives, however other observers have commented on the government's attempts at interdepartmental working in the foreign and security policy arena. For example, shortly after the publication of NSP and IPS, one academic remarked that the efforts to implement interagency activity at the operational level had been limited.<sup>9</sup>

Third, other studies of the 3D approach to date have focussed primarily on outcomes, vice the implementation process and the examination of the concept at the operational level has been particularly underrepresented.<sup>10</sup> An exploration of the whole-

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<sup>8</sup> Canada. Office of the Auditor General, "Chapter 4: Managing Horizontal Initiatives," *2005 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons*, Office of the Auditor General, 2005, <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20051104ce.html>; Internet; accessed 15 September 2007.

<sup>9</sup> Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for Joined-Up Government," *Policy Matters* 5, no. 5 (July 2004), 17, <http://www.irpp.org/indexe.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2007.

<sup>10</sup> Some examples of examinations into the approach are: Eric Lehre, *Is the 3-D Construct at Work in Kandahar Or are we Kidding Ourselves?*, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2006, [http://www.cdfai.org/newsletters/newsletterfall2006.htm#Article:%20Is%20the%203-D%20Construct%20at%20work%20in%20Kandahar%20or%20are%20we%20kidding%20ourselves](http://www.cdfai.org/newsletters/newsletterfall2006.htm#Article:%20Is%20the%203-D%20Construct%20at%20work%20in%20Kandahar%20or%20are%20we%20kidding%20ourselves;);

of-government concept in general, and how 3D in particular is working, will allow for more precision in understanding and a more effective approach to implementing foreign and security policy. In consideration of these factors, an exploration into the 3D approach and its underlying concepts is timely.

### **Scope of the Study**

This is an exploratory study that restricts itself to focussing on 3D at the operational level, that is, the level between strategic direction and tactical implementation. The definition of the “operational level” is often debated but for the sake of this analysis, it will be the level that requires interdepartmental working involving Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), the operational headquarters responsible for international operations.<sup>11</sup> The focus will be on the effectiveness of the implementation process vice the outcomes. In order to conduct this analysis, a case study approach will be used to concentrate on the viewpoints of practitioners or actors within the process. The cases to be studied are Canada’s interventions in Afghanistan and Sudan where the efforts of the 3D departments, as well as select OGD, are being brought to bear as part of wider international efforts to solve the respective crises. Although two cases are not exhaustive, they are sufficient to demonstrate the validity of the theory and

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Internet; accessed 5 December 2007; Patrick Travers and Taylor Owen, "Peacebuilding while Peacemaking: The Merits of a 3D Approach in Afghanistan" (University of Oxford, 2007), [http://www.iir.ubc.ca/site\\_template/workingpapers/Owen%20paper.pdf](http://www.iir.ubc.ca/site_template/workingpapers/Owen%20paper.pdf); Internet; accessed 11 December 2007; and Julian Wright, "Canada in Afghanistan: Assessing the 3-D Approach" (Waterloo, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 12-14 May 2005), [http://www.igloo.org/igloo/community.igloo?r0=community&r0\\_script=/scripts/folder/view.script&r0\\_pathinfo=%2F%7B7caf3d23-023d-494b-865b-84d143de9968%7D%2FPublications%2Fconferen%2Fcanada~1&r0\\_output=xml&s=cc](http://www.igloo.org/igloo/community.igloo?r0=community&r0_script=/scripts/folder/view.script&r0_pathinfo=%2F%7B7caf3d23-023d-494b-865b-84d143de9968%7D%2FPublications%2Fconferen%2Fcanada~1&r0_output=xml&s=cc); Internet; accessed 15 November 2007.

<sup>11</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder 05.024: Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM)," [http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/nr-sp/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=1751](http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/nr-sp/view_news_e.asp?id=1751); Internet; accessed 30 January 2008.

show how governance is being realized in international interventions. The research questions to be answered by the theory and the case studies are:

1. What are the basic working principles of the “whole-of-government” concept?
2. What constitutes a reasonable framework for analyzing the governance modalities of a whole-of-government initiative?
3. When assessed against this framework, how, and to what extent, is effective governance being realized in Canadian 3D policy implementation?

To answer these questions, this paper proceeds from the hypothesis that the implementation of Canada’s 3D policy does not achieve integration across government departments as suggested by IPS, but is at best only a complex form of coordination. Furthermore, this thesis will seek to establish that 3D is not synonymous with whole-of-government, but is merely a subset of a whole-of-government approach; albeit one that implicates certain government departments, in specific interventions.

### **Organization of the Thesis**

In organizational terms, Chapter 2 of this thesis provides a review of the contextual and policy foundations of 3D policy, followed by a review of select whole-of-government approaches in order to develop a governance framework for subsequent assessment of the case studies. It does not attempt to provide a precise definition of 3D, but rather postulates a theory that can be used to aid in thinking about 3D in the context of operationalizing Canada’s foreign and security policy. Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology, how the data was collected from actors and organizations in the 3D arena, and describes interview conduct. Chapter 4 describes the case studies and presents the

relevant findings. Chapter 5 provides an analytical strategy as a basis for comparing and contrasting the findings in relation to the governance framework. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the implications of the findings and also provides suggestions for future research.

## **CHAPTER 2 – BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY**

### **Introduction**

One of the principal challenges of examining the 3D phenomenon in the context of foreign and security policy implementation is to design research questions for use in case studies based on a workable definition of 3D. These questions could then serve to test that definition against the current practice of foreign and security policy implementation at the operational level. With this in mind, the aim of this chapter is to develop a deeper understanding of 3D from a theoretical standpoint in order to be able to apply it to case studies of current policy implementations. This chapter will commence with a brief discussion of terminology, followed by an overview of the genesis of 3D in Government policy as well as an examination of the relevant policy documents themselves. A brief survey of other whole-of-government approaches will be conducted to determine their relevance in defining the Canadian 3D Approach. It will include the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) “whole-of-government” approach; followed by the UK “joined-up government” approach; and conclude with the Canadian “horizontality” approach. Lessons and concepts from this examination, as well as from a short consideration of governance theory, will be drawn out in order to build a more comprehensive understanding of 3D for subsequent evaluation through concrete case studies.

### **Navigating the Terminology**

To set the stage for what follows, the issue of terminology must first be addressed. From an analytical perspective, there is much confusion surrounding the term “3D” and



its use to represent more than one governmental actor working together to achieve a particular policy effect. In the Canadian setting, the terms “3D” and “whole-of-government” are used almost synonymously which helps to create this confusion.<sup>12</sup> To avoid further misunderstanding, it is important to address this issue at this point, as it will aid in the comprehension of various approaches to inter-departmental working as this paper builds towards a deeper understanding of 3D.

According to Elson et al., there is a multiplicity of terms that have emerged in the public service lexicon to represent the concepts of exploring, leading, planning, implementing and measuring the impact of initiatives and programs that span inter-department, inter-government and inter-sector boundaries.<sup>13</sup> A summary of the more common terms is provided at Figure 2.1.

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<sup>12</sup> As an example, the term “3D” is used in *IPS: Overview*, yet *IPS: Development* uses the term “whole-of-government.” Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Overview*, 20; and Canada. Canadian International Development Agency, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Development*, 1.

<sup>13</sup> Peter Elson, Marilyn Struthers and Joel Carlson, *Horizontal Tools and Relationships: An International Survey of Government Practices Related to Communities* (Ottawa: Human Resources and Social Development Canada, 2007), [http://www1.servicecanada.gc.ca/en/cs/sp/sdc/task\\_force/tfci02/FinalHorizontalityReportJanuary2007\\_engl-ish.pdf](http://www1.servicecanada.gc.ca/en/cs/sp/sdc/task_force/tfci02/FinalHorizontalityReportJanuary2007_engl-ish.pdf); Internet; accessed 5 December 2007.

Canada:	Horizontality <i>Whole-of-Government</i> <i>3D</i>
UK:	Joined-Up Government
Australia & New Zealand	Whole-of-Government
U.S.:	Collaboration
Ireland:	Joined-Up-Government/Horizontality
OECD:	Policy Coherence <i>Whole-of-Government Approach (WGA)</i>

**Figure 2.1 – Terms Used to Represent Horizontality in Various Countries**

Adapted from: Elson et al., *Horizontal Tools and Relationships: An International Survey of Government Practices Related to Communities*, 9.

Elson et al. developed this summary from a study of several western democratic approaches to horizontal initiatives, focussing on the domestic government to non-profit sector relationship. In order to expand this summary to include a foreign policy aspect, this thesis introduced the terms in italics as they appear in the literature and policy documents with respect to organizing governmental action in the international context.

For the purpose of this thesis, the term “whole-of-government” will be used generically to describe the act of working across departmental lines within a government on either domestic or foreign policy issues. It does not imply that certain departments are automatically included or excluded nor does it make specific inferences as to the context in which the concept will be applied, such as only in failed state scenarios. The term “3D” will be used in this paper to differentiate between the foreign and domestic whole-of-government policy domains. 3D will refer to foreign and security policy implementation where it involves principally the departments responsible for defence,

diplomacy and development, although on a case-by-case basis, it may involve other departments beyond the principal players. Both concepts refer to interdepartmental working but 3D is more exclusive and specific. Notionally then, 3D is a subset of whole-of-government, and is a specific interdepartmental working arrangement in the foreign policy arena. To further develop the understanding of 3D, it is necessary then to examine both of these concepts.

### **The Context of 3D Development - Requirement for a New Policy?**

A step to understanding the phenomenon that is 3D is to recognize the context that surrounds it. In the months and years following 11 September 2001, nations were required to adapt to the new security environment of transnational and asymmetric threats brought about by globalization and the rise of non-state actors. To further complicate the situation, Canada's instruments to act on the international stage, the departments of defence, diplomacy and development, were suffering from a deficit of investment that dated from the mid-1990s.<sup>14</sup> The reality at the time was the perception that a new solution and way of working would be required to counter the new threats.<sup>15</sup>

This concept of new solutions for new threats was acknowledged by academics and practitioners in the foreign policy realm. Focussing more on the decline of the foreign policy instruments than on the threats, Andrew Cohen called for a new

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<sup>14</sup> More than one commentator made this assertion with respect to declining investment in Canada's foreign policy instruments. See Hugh Segal, "A Grand Strategy for a Small Country," *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 3 (Autumn 2003), 4, [http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol4/no3/policy\\_e.asp](http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol4/no3/policy_e.asp); Internet; accessed 17 January 2008; or Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How we Lost our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2003), 2, 160.

<sup>15</sup> Segal, *A Grand Strategy for a Small Country*, 5.

internationalism that would give Canada the tools to return to the world as soldiers, donors and diplomats. This new internationalism would become an instrument of “pan-Canadian unity” that would serve to enhance Canadian self-respect and sovereignty.<sup>16</sup> He doesn’t go as far as suggesting integration amongst the three arms of internationalism (military, diplomacy and aid) but certainly champions their reinvigoration.

At about the same time that Cohen was writing, Senator Hugh Segal was assessing the strategic challenges to Canada’s diplomatic and military functions abroad in anticipation of Paul Martin taking over from retiring Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. In order to respond to the external threats facing Canada, preserve security and opportunity at home, and advance leverage with Canada’s allies, Segal proposed that a key requirement would be “a grand strategy for a small country that integrates military, diplomatic and foreign aid instruments.”<sup>17</sup> He also called for a new concept of interoperability and a doctrine to support it.<sup>18</sup>

Another vital point to understanding the context of 3D development was the recognition of increasing interdependence between development and security. Termed the “security-development nexus,” it realized that security was required for development, and development was required for security, which presented a circular argument that many countries had difficulty escaping from.<sup>19</sup> One commentator proposed that it was in fact former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s human security agenda, which

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<sup>16</sup> Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How we Lost our Place in the World*, 193, 203.

<sup>17</sup> Segal, *A Grand Strategy for a Small Country*, 5.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>19</sup> Fitz-Gerald, *Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for Joined-Up Government*, 8.

brought together diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and protection that was the precursor to 3D.<sup>20</sup> Thus the context prior to the development of 3D was one of new and emerging threats that demanded different or new approaches to countering them.

### **Policy Statements on 3D**

The policy portion of the 3D story starts with the release in 2004 of *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. Notable as the first-ever policy of its kind, it identified that the complex threats of the current security environment would require an integrated national security system to counter them.<sup>21</sup> In the context of international security, it focussed on failing and failed states and laid the foundation for an international policy review which would reflect an “increasingly integrated approach to defence, diplomacy and development (the “3Ds”).”<sup>22</sup> Not only was this the first policy mention of 3D, but it also signalled the Government’s intention to look outside classic departmental boundaries and seek more cross-governmental integration when engaging in the international arena.<sup>23</sup>

The International Policy Review culminated with the release in 2005 of *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* (IPS).

Published in five parts, it contained an entire document devoted to each component of the

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<sup>20</sup> David B. Dewitt and Jeffrey P. Plante, "National Defence Vs. Foreign Affairs: Culture Clash in Canada's International Security Policy?" *International Journal* 59, no. 3 (Summer, 2004), 5, <http://proquest.umi.com>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2008.

<sup>21</sup> Canada. Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004), vii, 6-8.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

international policy realm: *Defence*; *Diplomacy*; *Development*; and *Commerce* as well as a general summary titled *Overview*. Each document was authored by the department responsible for that policy realm: *Defence* by the Department of National Defence (DND); *Development* by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); and in addition to the *Overview*, the *Diplomacy* and *Commerce* policies were authored by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). It should also be noted that the *IPS: Overview* does make passing reference to the commerce element of the policy in conjunction with defence, diplomacy and development, but does not go as far as to include it in the lexicon (e.g. “3D+C”).<sup>24</sup> The *Commerce* policy of IPS is in fact “missing in action” on the DFAIT website and references outside of IPS of commerce being included with the 3Ds are scarce. For the purposes of this thesis, the commerce element will therefore not be considered further and the focus will remain on the 3Ds.

The IPS highlighted the decline in Canada’s diplomatic network, foreign policy capacity, defence capabilities, and commitment to development as a result of priority being given in the preceding years to domestic issues.<sup>25</sup> However, it announced a reinvestment in Canada’s international role as well as a new way of Government engagement in the international realm.<sup>26</sup> The *Overview* chapter of IPS declared a commitment to new forms of cooperation not only between Canada and other nations, but also within and across government departments, especially across issue areas.<sup>27</sup> The 3D

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<sup>24</sup> Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Overview*, 30.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, Foreword.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

approach was presented as the best strategy for supporting states that suffered from a broad range of interconnected problems.<sup>28</sup>

### **Reading Between the Lines - The Terminology Used in the Policy**

Of particular interest to the discussion of 3D, is how each of the Ds treats the subject in their respective chapters of the IPS. Two factors are of concern: the way each department defines the problem or states the focus of their policy; and concerning the governance question, the terminology used to describe the relationships with the other Ds. In the *Diplomacy* policy document, DFAIT sought to renew its role as the lead department for international policy, and to ensure a coherent Canadian approach to world affairs.<sup>29</sup> The term “3D” did not figure prominently in the document. However, the terminology used in relation to the approach and to the other departments emphasized the concepts of coordination, coherency and integration. The term “whole-of-government” is introduced in relation to bringing together Government-wide resources for a concerted Canadian strategy.<sup>30</sup>

The CIDA-authored *Development* portion of the IPS document called for a coherent approach to non-aid policies with a focus on global poverty reduction. Using the UN Millennium Development Goals as a framework, it called for a consideration of global poverty reduction to be factored into decision-making across government.<sup>31</sup> The

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<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>29</sup> Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Diplomacy* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005), 3.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

term “3D” does not appear in the document although there are several instances of the term “whole-of-government” in relation to development-cooperation. CIDA does indicate the intention to adopt an “integrated national approach to development” although the language with respect to interactions with OGD and other partners emphasizes cooperation, collaboration and coordination.<sup>32</sup>

The *Defence* policy document focussed on the Canadian Forces (CF) in relation to foreign policy as opposed to DND as a whole. There was no use of the term “3D,” although the relationship between the defence, diplomacy and development elements of an integrated strategy to counter international threats figured prominently.<sup>33</sup> The language used to describe these relationships was that of cooperation, collaboration, and inter-agency working.

This brief survey of the departmental policy documents revealed two issues. First, the departments did not describe the aims of their policies in similar terms. This demonstrates that perhaps there is not a shared understanding of the problems that the policies were designed to address. Second, the language used to describe the relationships with the other departments was not consistent across all three Ds, even though there were recurring themes of cooperation, collaboration, coordination and one mention of integration. This shows that the departments did not have a shared understanding of how they work together, if at all, to achieve the IPS aims. This is an issue for further examination in the case studies.

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<sup>31</sup> Canada. Canadian International Development Agency, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Development*, 1.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>33</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005), 6.



### **Notional Definition of 3D**

In the absence of a concrete definition of 3D, it will be helpful at this point to provide a notional definition of the 3D approach, as implied by the Government of Canada's IPS, to aid in the further analysis of its merits. This thesis proposes that:

The term "3D" describes a Government of Canada foreign policy initiative that integrates the efforts of the departments responsible for defence, diplomacy and development (Department of National Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and the Canadian International Development Agency) to achieve coherent international policy outcomes. The 3D Approach requires that government departments work in a coordinated, collaborative and cooperative fashion to allow the system to become more efficient at leveraging the assets of government. 3D is a subset or narrow application of a whole-of-government approach.

This definition is more descriptive than prescriptive in nature, and does not specifically address the methods in which integration of efforts will occur in order to achieve coherent policy outcomes. By using the language of the IPS, however, it does encapsulate the main themes intended by the policy as a basis for understanding 3D as a phenomenon and for comparison against other whole-of-government approaches.

### **OECD Study of Whole-of-Government Approaches**

The concept of a whole-of-government approach is not unique to Canada: the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), of which Canada is a member, has been considering and encouraging whole-of-government approaches for quite some time. The OECD views these whole-of-government approaches from the development perspective of engaging in fragile states, which the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines as:

Those countries where there is a lack of political commitment and/or weak capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies. In addition, these

countries tend to be characterised by poor governance and being prone to violent conflict.<sup>34</sup>

As early as 2001, OECD DAC members had identified the importance of integrated approaches on the part of donor governments for conflict-affected fragile states. They committed to increasing coherence in their respective policies that impact on conflict prevention: trade and investment; foreign affairs; defence; and development cooperation.<sup>35</sup> This quest for coherence was motivated by a perception that fragile states were confronted with a wide range of problems that would require a mix of actors, instruments and interventions to address.<sup>36</sup> The method for achieving this coherence was described as “joining-up” and was suggestive of an innovative mechanism to promote greater cooperation among the relevant departments of a particular donor government. In terms of defining a “whole-of-government approach (WGA),”<sup>37</sup> OECD offers the following description:

**Whole-of-Government Approaches (WGA)** see the departments responsible for security, political and economic affairs as well as those responsible for development and humanitarian assistance working effectively together across the political, security, economic and administrative domains of a donor government.<sup>38</sup>

This description retains its development-centric focus but appears to be exclusive rather than inclusive in that it does not suggest a broadening of participation past the principal

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<sup>34</sup> OECD Development Assistance Committee/Fragile States Group, "Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States," Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2006, 13, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf>; Internet; accessed 5 December 2007.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>37</sup> For the sake of clarity in reading, the OECD acronym “WGA” will be used only to refer to whole-of-government approaches in the OECD sense: that is ones that address only fragile state scenarios.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

partners of a 3D approach. On the surface, it looks quite similar to a 3D approach without any specific emphasis on coherency, collaboration, integration or coordination.

Despite the apparent similarities between 3D and WGA, and the lack of precision in the OECD description, the 2006 study conducted by the OECD DAC/Fragile States Group of existing WGA involvement in fragile states provides a significant contribution to the 3D/WGA discussion. The major recommendations for the operationalizing of WGA policy provided by the study are summarised in Table 2.1.

**Table 2.1 – OECD Recommendations for Improving Whole-of-Government Approaches**

<b>Area</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>
<b>Need for an Overall Framework</b>	<p>Establish a framework to improve effectiveness consisting of:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. a clear understanding of fragile states, shared by all government actors;</li> <li>2. a joint policy statement explaining the rationale for collaborative working and fragile states, along with aims and means to achieving them; and</li> <li>3. A commitment to establishing an effective dialogue between actors involved in a WGA as well as bridging differences in organisational culture.</li> </ol>
<b>Who to Involve?</b>	<p>When dealing with fragile states, it is important to engage with a wide range of actors. Those departments outside of the classic defence, development and diplomacy realms should be involved on a case-by-case basis when their assets would provide advantage to the entire effort.</p>
<b>Joint Analysis</b>	<p>Joint analysis or assessment of a particular situation by key ministries involved in a WGA will foster a joint understanding of the problem which will enable the establishment of broader, joint objectives.</p>
<b>Country-Specific Joint Operational Strategies</b>	<p>The case studies confirm that there is no “one-size-fits-all” strategy for addressing state fragility. Practical, country-specific approaches for engagement in fragile states that are developed as a result of early joint assessment and analysis are required to achieve WGA effectiveness.</p>
<b>Co-ordination: The Need for Political leadership and a Lead Co-ordinating Role</b>	<p>Clear political guidance and leadership is the starting point for an effective WGA.</p> <p>Engagement is not static: the roles and involvement of actors change over time and circumstances.</p> <p>Based on position, role and mandate, foreign affairs may be best positioned at headquarters level to take up this lead co-ordinating role.</p>
<b>Incentive structures</b>	<p>WGA working has several disincentives such as costs in financial and human terms. Incentive structures such as increased resources or institutional trade-offs should be considered to promote WGA working.</p>
<b>Mechanisms for Promoting Coherence</b>	<p>Joint budget lines or pooled funding are considered crucial to encouraging cooperation and coordination.</p>
<b>IM Systems</b>	<p>Information systems of actors, where possible, should be integrated.</p>

Adapted from: OECD, “Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States,” 8-11.

Several of the recommendations from the OECD study are significant as this paper proceeds in attempting to further define 3D and WGA. These will be considered in aggregate with the results of other studies later in this chapter. However, one recommendation deserves addressing at this time. In the area of “Who to Involve?” (Table 2.1) it was recommended that “departments outside of the classic defence diplomacy and development realms should be involved on a case-by-case basis.”<sup>39</sup> This is in apparent contrast to the originally-provided WGA definition and suggests that WGA can be more than just 3D and can involve a wide array of actors whose assets may be relevant and useful to the situation at hand.<sup>40</sup> Thus, the OECD study supports the hypothesis that 3D is a subset of WGA.

A main conclusion of the OECD study was that the challenge lies not only in applying these recommendations, but in developing a policy paper aimed at establishing a WGA for dealing with fragile states. Of the governments studied (of which Canada was one), none had developed such a policy paper.<sup>41</sup> There is one country, however, that has advanced the application of WGA in a significant way in its functioning of government: the United Kingdom.

### **Joined-Up Government in the UK**

In the United Kingdom, the concept of interdepartmental and intergovernmental working has been in existence for some time. According to Ling, “Joined-up

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

Government” (JUG) involves more than just the departments of central government.<sup>42</sup> Viewed as an “umbrella term,” JUG describes various ways of aligning formally distinct organizations, which may include public or private organizations, to pursue the objectives of the government of the day. It was in fact domestic policy that was the genesis of JUG. As a result of government reforms in the 1980s, there was a degree of fragmentation in UK devolved government that sought to decentralize agencies in the hopes of achieving efficiency and responsiveness. However, the incentives to achieve departmental aims outweighed the incentives to achieve government-wide aims and hence coordination was difficult. As a result, uncoordinated approaches to certain policy areas were severely criticised by auditors and in the late 1980s, urban policy began to emerge as an issue area that required JUG. The concept has been embraced and developed by central government along several fronts in both domestic and international policy fields.<sup>43</sup> On the international front, some successes have been achieved in UK government by the development of Global Conflict Prevention Pools, a structure that combines resources through formal cross-departmental agreements and processes for international engagement.<sup>44</sup>

There is a large literature on JUG in the UK from both practitioners and academics, which will aid in advancing our understanding of the concept in general and

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<sup>42</sup> Ling, *Delivering joined-up Government in the UK: Dimensions, Issues and Problems*, 616

<sup>43</sup> Policy Innovation Unit, "Wiring it Up: Whitehall's Management of Cross-Cutting Policies and Services," Policy Innovation Unit, <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/upload/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/coiwire.pdf>; Internet; accessed 26 January 2008.

<sup>44</sup> Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts?* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 19-20, <http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/191/987-enbk.pdf>; Internet; accessed 29 October 2007.

will lead to a more comprehensive definition of 3D. One author provides a provisional definition of JUG as a “phrase which denotes the aspiration to achieve horizontally and vertically co-ordinated thinking and action.”<sup>45</sup> Horizontally refers to interactions across government departments at the same level, while vertically refers to interactions upwards towards the policy-making level, or downwards towards the service delivery level. In the UK sense horizontality and verticality could involve working with different levels of government such as regional or municipal, as well as with non-public agencies such as volunteer organizations. This is very similar to the concept of horizontality in the Canadian context, which will be examined next.

### **Horizontality in the Canadian Government**

Horizontality and horizontal management have been topics in the Canadian public service management field for many years. Again, there is a body of academic and practitioner literature that has been produced, yet it is not clear that the concept has been embraced by central government to the same extent that it has in the UK. Notwithstanding, there have been some successes with horizontal initiatives in various areas of Canadian domestic policy.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> C. Pollitt, "Joined-up Government: A Survey," *Political Studies Review* 1, no. 1 (01, 2003), 35, <http://search.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2007.

<sup>46</sup> For case studies into these initiatives see: Herman Bakvis and Luc Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership* (Ottawa: Canada School of Public Service, 2004), 77, [http://www.ccmd-ccg.gc.ca/Research/publications/pdfs/hc\\_e.pdf](http://www.ccmd-ccg.gc.ca/Research/publications/pdfs/hc_e.pdf); Internet; accessed 29 November 2007; or Elson, Struthers and Carlson, *Horizontal Tools and Relationships: An International Survey of Government Practices Related to Communities*, 1-46. Many of the cases studied involve more than just federal departments but also span down to provincial and municipal government and non-government agencies.

For its part, however, Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) in its role as a central agency has attempted to both define the nature of horizontality and produce various tools for managing in the horizontal domain.<sup>47</sup> The TBS definition of a horizontal initiative follows.

A **horizontal initiative** is one in which partners from two or more organizations have established a formal funding agreement (e.g. Memorandum to Cabinet, Treasury Board submission, federal-provincial agreement) to work toward the achievement of shared outcomes.<sup>48</sup>

In a 2005 report from the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) this definition is criticized as it addresses the way funds are released to several federal organizations, and not the need for an appropriate governing framework. Additionally, OAG was concerned that although the policy and guidance documents that were examined contained references to horizontal initiatives, they were insufficient. The approach was still ad hoc and lacked a coherent, integrated body of policies, necessary to design governance and management arrangements for horizontal initiatives.<sup>49</sup> In response, the Government of Canada expressed a commitment to: improving the functioning of horizontal initiatives by strengthening the roles of central agencies (TBS and PCO); improving both the guidance and tools available for horizontal management of policies and programs; and continually monitoring and refining the process based on lessons learned.<sup>50</sup> Although the criticism and the response were based on observations in the domestic policy realm, it

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<sup>47</sup> For a representative sample of the various tools and resources available, see: Canada. Treasury Board Secretariat, "Links to Resources on Horizontality and the Regions," [http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/fcer-cfre/liens-liens/rhr\\_e.asp](http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/fcer-cfre/liens-liens/rhr_e.asp); Internet; accessed 30 January 2008.

<sup>48</sup> Treasury Board Secretariat cited in Canada. Office of the Auditor General, *Chapter 4: Managing Horizontal Initiatives*, 21.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.



will be instructive to learn if these lessons and principles have migrated over to the foreign and security policy realm.

Authors Bakvis and Juillet contribute a useful definition to the horizontality discussion:

**Horizontal Management** can be defined as the coordination and management of a set of activities between two or more organizational units, where the units in question do not have hierarchical control over each other and where the aim is to generate outcomes that cannot be achieved by units working in isolation.<sup>51</sup>

This definition is less rigid than the previous one in that it does not require a formal mechanism to bind together two or more organizational units, such as federal departments or agencies, in a particular initiative. It does, however imply that the interaction between two such units is limited to coordination. Additionally, it introduces the concept of “management of a set of activities” which implies that structures and processes are required in order to achieve this coordination, which will be addressed later in this chapter. At this point, however, an understanding of the various terms used to define the various approaches and concepts (3D, WGA, JUG, horizontal management) is necessary. Specifically, what exactly is meant by coordination, collaboration and integration?

### **Defining Coordination, Collaboration and Integration**

Of the literature reviewed, two sources provide useful insight into defining coordination, collaboration and integration. The first definitions are provided by Bakvis and Juillet from the Canadian horizontal management realm:

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<sup>51</sup> Bakvis and Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership*, 8.

**Coordination** is the practice of aligning structures and activities to improve or facilitate the likelihood of achieving horizontal objectives, to reduce overlap and duplication, and at a minimum, to ensure that horizontal objectives are not impeded by the actions of one or more units.<sup>52</sup>

**Collaboration** is the active process of not only coordinating activities, but also developing, agreeing to and implementing a strategy for achieving set objectives. Collaboration also involves the sharing of mandated authority, usually entails ministerial involvement and implies collective accountability.<sup>53</sup>

**Partnership** refers to the formalization of collaborative arrangements and agreements beyond simple memos or memoranda of understanding (MOU) to the level of legal contracts for deliverables and payment. Such formalized arrangements are more likely to be used in connection with external organizations (both commercial and non-profit).<sup>54</sup>

The cumulative nature of these definitions provides a descriptive scale from coordination to partnership that can be used to classify interaction between organizations.

Representative interactions on the scale can vary from informal networks to jointly-managed secretariats.<sup>55</sup> Although “partnership” has not appeared in the 3D policy documents, it is included here for illustrative purposes to delimit the ends of the scale.

The second contribution in the definitional debate is provide by 6 who in the course of studying JUG, viewed the scope of inter-organizational interaction as being either coordination or integration. He provides the following definitions:

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 8-9.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

**Coordination** refers to the development of ideas about joint and holistic working, joint information systems, dialogue between agencies, processes of planning, and making decisions.<sup>56</sup>

**Integration** is the actual execution or implementation of the products of coordination, through the development of common organizational structures and merged professional practices and interventions.<sup>57</sup>

These definitions are cumulative as well, with integration building upon coordination. To further develop the utility of the definitions, he has developed a Taxonomy of Types of Relationships (Table 2.2 – hereafter “Taxonomy”) which places all manner of interactions between organizations on a scale from “taking into account”(coordination) to “merger” (a degree of closeness and involvement past integration.)<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Perri 6, "Joined-Up Government in the Western World in Comparative Perspective: A Preliminary Literature Review and Exploration," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 14, no. 1 (Jan, 2004), 106.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 106.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 106.

**Table 2.2 - Taxonomy of Types of Relationship (with Horizontality Definitions Added)**

<b>Category of Relationship</b>	<b>Type of Relationship between Entities</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Horizontality Definitions (Bakvis et Juillet)</b>
Coordination	Taking into Account	Strategy development considers the impact of/on others	Coordination ↓
	Dialogue	Exchange of information	
	Joint Planning	Temporary joint planning or joint working	
Integration	Joint working	Temporary collaboration	↓ ----- ↑
	Joint venture	Long-term joint planning and joint working on major project core to the mission of at least one participating entity	
	Satellite	Separate entity, jointly owned, created to serve as integrative mechanism	
Increasing closeness and mutual involvement (but not necessarily greater efficacy or collective action)	Strategic alliance	Long-term joint planning and working on issues core to the mission of at least one participating entity	Collaboration ↓ -----
	Union	Formal administrative unification, maintaining some distinct identities	
	Merger	Fusion to create a new structure with a single new identity.	

Adapted from: 6, "Joined-Up Government in the Western World in Comparative Perspective: A Preliminary Literature Review and Exploration," 108; and Bakvis and Juillet, "The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership," 8-9.

For the purposes of comparing in this thesis the definitions provided from the two sources, the definitions provided by Bakvis and Juillet have been blended into 6's Taxonomy. The Bakvis and Juillet term of coordination resembles the ideas advanced by 6 about coordination. At the other end of the scale, partnership would appear to display convergence with a union relationship, while collaboration appears to have its parallel somewhere between the joint venture and strategic alliance relationships of integration. The utility of creating this hybrid Taxonomy is that it provides a range of relationships and definitions against which to compare the Canadian 3D approach. This is necessary in order to determine the nature of the 3D relationship and assess whether the terminology used to describe it is indeed accurate.

### **Governance Theory**

One of the conclusions from the literature was the necessity for governance mechanisms for the successful implementation and execution of inter-governmental working.<sup>59</sup> Much like the literature on whole-of-government working, the number of definitions of governance, and distinct analytical interpretations as to the impact in government, are as varied as the authors who draft them.<sup>60</sup> They range from general

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<sup>59</sup> Several authors raise this issue. For example, Wright, *Canada in Afghanistan: Assessing the 3-D Approach*, 9; B. Guy Peters, "Managing Horizontal Government: The Politics of Coordination," Canadian Centre for Management Development, <http://www.cspsefpc.gc.ca/Research/publications/pdfs/p78.pdf>, Internet; accessed 26 January 2008; Canada. Office of the Auditor General, *Chapter 4: Managing Horizontal Initiatives*, 2; and Patrick Charaix, Marcel Druart and Gianfranco Tantardini, *Which Development Directions for the Interdepartmental in the Crises Management?* [Quels axes de développement pour l'interministeriel dans la gestion des crises?] (Paris: Les Editions des Riaux - CEREMS, 2005), 79.

<sup>60</sup> Mike Marinetto, "Governing Beyond the Centre: A Critique of the Anglo-Governance School," *Political Studies* 51, no. 3 (Oct, 2003), 592, <http://search.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2007.

concepts to prescriptive formulas. Much of the recent concern with governance has arisen from the move away from big government of the 1980s and the concurrent management theory revolution. New methods of governing were being sought and as management guru Peter Drucker had argued at the time, the place where management theory was most needed was in the public sector.<sup>61</sup> Governance came to be known as an alternative to government, yet it is still often confused with government.

At its heart governance is about “creating conditions for ordered rule and collective action.”<sup>62</sup> Thus, a governance structure could be almost any structure, hierarchical or horizontal, as long as there is an ability to make decisions about the employment of resources.

Governance theory suggests a more horizontal structure, however. According to Rhodes, “governance refers to self-organizing, interorganizational networks.”<sup>63</sup> In a service-delivery paradigm, Rhodes uses the term “network” to describe several interdependent actors involved in delivering a service. The interdependency stems from a need to exchange resources (for example, money, information, expertise) to achieve their objectives, to maximize influence over outcomes and to avoid dependency upon other actors.<sup>64</sup> A crucial aspect of this concept is that the network be self-organizing: actors or organizations must seek each other out to form a network. The interdependency

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<sup>61</sup> Peter Drucker cited in: John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *The Witch Doctors: Making Sense of the Management Gurus* (New York: Random House, 1996), 279.

<sup>62</sup> Gerry Stoker, "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions," *International Social Science Journal* 50, no. 1 (Mar, 1998), 17, <http://proquest.umi.com>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2008.

<sup>63</sup> R. A. W. Rhodes, "The New Governance: Governing without Government," *Political Studies* 44, no. 3 (09, 1996), 660, <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 21 January 2008.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 658.

aspect of this definition could describe most interdepartmental relationships in a common policy area where the intent is to leverage the effects of various actors to meet shared goals. However departments directed by a central governmental policy are normally not self-organizing, but come together as a result of that direction. Thus, at the institutional level, the network is anything but self-organizing, however actors within various departments may seek out actors in other departments and form networks in that manner.

This highlights the role of the central agency, despite the tendency for governance theory to suggest a split between government and governance. Rosenau suggests that government refers to “activities that are backed by formal authority;” whereas governance refers to “activities backed by shared goals.”<sup>65</sup> In this light, the 3D approach calls for a combination of both government and governance. The central government remains the formal authority; however, the intent is to leverage the effects of the various actors in order to meet the shared goals. The notion of shared goals is problematic, however, due to the different ways that the problems are viewed from the perspective of each actor organization. In order to maintain a unity of purpose, the common objectives and goals would have to be set by that policy, which requires political guidance and a central agency to oversee the implementation.

### **Assessing the Governance Perspective**

So what has governance theory added to the discussion? According to Stoker, the utility of theory in examining organizational entities is at a general level by providing a

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<sup>65</sup> James N. Rosenau, "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics" In *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, eds. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 4.

set of assumptions and research questions.<sup>66</sup> Another author posited that “Governance theory allows us to reach the level of practice.”<sup>67</sup> With this in mind, it is necessary to extract those elements of governance theory that will facilitate a deeper understanding of 3D.

In considering how to organize, there is a paradox of seeking to achieve more governance-like characteristics in government functioning, yet retaining the control necessary for guidance and accountability. The reality for achieving an effective 3D approach is not that there must be a choice between government and governance, but that the approaches must be blended, to determine a hybrid solution. Alternative descriptions of governance refer to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred.<sup>68</sup> In considering 3D then, the governance perspective is one of interdependent activities conducted by an interorganizational network, backed by formal authority, guided by shared goals, in an environment in which the boundaries between the policy areas of respective departments have become blurred. What is necessary for the approach to be successful then is: network formation; articulation of formal authority and responsibility over the outputs of the network; and an equally clear articulation of the network’s shared goals.

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<sup>66</sup> Stoker, *Governance as Theory: Five Propositions*, 26

<sup>67</sup> Riitta Kosonen, "The use of Regulation and Governance Theories in Research on Post-Socialism: The Adaptation of Enterprises in Vyborg 1," *European Planning Studies* 13, no. 1 (Jan, 2005), 8, <http://search.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2007.

<sup>68</sup> Stoker, *Governance as Theory: Five Propositions*, 17.



## Combining the Concepts - A Notional Whole-of-Government Framework

At this point a framework for evaluating the 3D phenomenon is required. The literature revealed many recommendations and requirements, both specific and general, for the governance of whole-of-government approaches. Convergence of similar recommendations was identified and key thematic areas exposed from the sources were:

1. Structures;
2. Leadership;
3. Resources;
4. Relationships; and
5. Shared objectives;

A brief description of the major recommendations and requirements within each thematic area follows.

### Structures

A recurring concept in the literature above and beyond the requirement for a structure was that it needed to be supported by formal authority.<sup>69</sup> A central agency responsible for ensuring that the policy was implemented, with appropriate means for oversight and guidance, such as PCO, was viewed as the appropriate level of authority for inter-departmental initiatives.<sup>70</sup> Another feature of a structure is that it should provide incentives for organizations to work together, such as access to resources, access to expertise in another organization or the ability to influence that organization's policy

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<sup>69</sup> Elson, Struthers and Carlson, *Horizontal Tools and Relationships: An International Survey of Government Practices Related to Communities*, 25; and Fitz-Gerald, *Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for Joined-Up Government*, 3.

<sup>70</sup> Bakvis and Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership*, 59.

decisions.<sup>71</sup> A structure should have an accountability framework associated with it that should promote a more corporate, government-wide accountability.<sup>72</sup>

## Leadership

The importance of leadership in whole-of-government working cannot be understated.<sup>73</sup> Champions for interdepartmental working are seen as critical for to an effective whole-of-government approach.<sup>74</sup> These champions need to set the example both within their departments and inter-departmentally by supporting and facilitating approaches to working in this fashion.<sup>75</sup> Incentives for individual actors in organizations such as rewards or recognition are key motivators.<sup>76</sup> The literature revealed that skills in networking and collaborative goal-setting, accountability and management were necessary for the manager implicated in whole-of-government working.<sup>77</sup> Training in acquiring these skills should become part of standard development packages.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> OECD Development Assistance Committee/Fragile States Group, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*, 10.

<sup>72</sup> Bakvis and Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership*, 67.

<sup>73</sup> Elson, Struthers and Carlson, *Horizontal Tools and Relationships: An International Survey of Government Practices Related to Communities*, 25; and Pollitt, *Joined-up Government: A Survey*, 40.

<sup>74</sup> Elson, Struthers and Carlson, *Horizontal Tools and Relationships: An International Survey of Government Practices Related to Communities*, 30

<sup>75</sup> Heather Getha-Taylor, "Collaborative Governance: Lessons from Katrina," *Public Manager* 36, no. 3 (Fall, 2007), 8, <http://proquest.umi.com>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2007.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 9; and Ling, *Delivering joined-up Government in the UK: Dimensions, Issues and Problems*, 627.

<sup>78</sup> Getha-Taylor, *Collaborative Governance: Lessons from Katrina*, 9; and Policy Innovation Unit, *Wiring it Up: Whitehall's Management of Cross-Cutting Policies and Services*, 46.

## Resources

The availability and access to resources in terms of both financial and human was viewed as crucial to a whole-of-government process.<sup>79</sup> Pooled resources such as combined funding pools are viewed as a way to promote whole-of-government working.<sup>80</sup> Other tools such as guidance or best practice documents created by central agencies are perceived to aid in interdepartmental working, however the utility and availability of these tools was not widely known to actors in some cases.<sup>81</sup> Time is viewed as another important resource. In some cases, interdepartmental working cost more time than was perceived to be beneficial to the process.<sup>82</sup>

## Relationships

Relationships were viewed as key both between departments and between individuals in departments.<sup>83</sup> One aspect of relationships that was highlighted was the

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<sup>79</sup> Elson, Struthers and Carlson, *Horizontal Tools and Relationships: An International Survey of Government Practices Related to Communities*, 25; Bakvis and Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership*, 50.

<sup>80</sup> OECD Development Assistance Committee/Fragile States Group, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*, 25-6.

<sup>81</sup> Elson, Struthers and Carlson, *Horizontal Tools and Relationships: An International Survey of Government Practices Related to Communities*, 50.

<sup>82</sup> Pollitt, *Joined-up Government: A Survey*, 38.

<sup>83</sup> Elson, Struthers and Carlson, *Horizontal Tools and Relationships: An International Survey of Government Practices Related to Communities*, 36; and Getha-Taylor, *Collaborative Governance: Lessons from Katrina*, 9.

importance of trust between the actors as the necessary element that is required for horizontal arrangements to work.<sup>84</sup>

### Shared Objectives

Shared goals and objectives across departments were viewed as key to the success of whole-of-government ventures.<sup>85</sup> Joint analysis, which enables shared problem definition and understanding, is viewed as crucial in laying the foundation for defining shared objectives.<sup>86</sup>

These areas and requirements have been summarized in Table 2.3 – Requirements of an Effective Whole-of-Government Governance Process. The Central Questions refer to those activities or decisions necessary to satisfy the corresponding Requirement. Phrased as a question, the response will be indicative of whether or not a particular requirement is fulfilled. These questions will form the basis of the examination into the effective governance of the 3D approach in the case studies of the Afghanistan and Sudan initiatives.

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<sup>84</sup> Bakvis and Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership*, 9.

<sup>85</sup> Elson, Struthers and Carlson, *Horizontal Tools and Relationships: An International Survey of Government Practices Related to Communities*, 36; and Policy Innovation Unit, *Wiring it Up: Whitehall's Management of Cross-Cutting Policies and Services*, 16.

<sup>86</sup> OECD Development Assistance Committee/Fragile States Group, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*, 8-11.

**Table 2.3 – Requirements of an Effective Whole-of-Government Governance Process**

<b>Implementation Area</b>	<b>Requirements</b>	<b>Central Questions (representative)</b>
<b>Structures</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Incentives(department)</li> <li>▪ Formal authority</li> <li>▪ Accountability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Trade-offs, increased resource access</li> <li>▪ Hierarchy - lead/supporting department(s)</li> <li>▪ Organizational relationships</li> <li>▪ Role of central agencies - control and oversight</li> <li>▪ Culture – attitudes, loyalties</li> <li>▪ Formal agreements</li> </ul>
<b>Leadership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Incentives (individual)</li> <li>▪ Champions</li> <li>▪ Skills</li> <li>▪ Training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Career, success recognition</li> <li>▪ Political leadership and guidance</li> <li>▪ Lead by example - champions</li> <li>▪ Facilitative leadership</li> <li>▪ Skills training in areas of goal-setting, networking, and/or collaborative management</li> </ul>
<b>Resources</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Availability</li> <li>▪ Pooled resources</li> <li>▪ Tools</li> <li>▪ Time</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Shared budgets</li> <li>▪ Shared reporting</li> <li>▪ Cost-benefit</li> </ul>
<b>Relationships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Trust</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Personal relationships</li> <li>▪ Interdependency of network</li> </ul>
<b>Shared Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Joint analysis</li> <li>▪ Shared problem definition</li> <li>▪ Shared information</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Position dilution</li> <li>▪ Joint IM systems</li> <li>▪ Decision-making</li> <li>▪ Unity of effort</li> </ul>

### **Conclusion**

This process has provided two tools for the examination of the 3D approach: a conceptual consideration of the range of activities from coordination to partnership as displayed in the Taxonomy (Table 2.2); and an identification of the essential elements

required for the effective governance of a particular 3D approach (Requirements - Table 2.3). This will enable a fuller appreciation of the case studies in terms of the degree of actual interdepartmental interaction as well as an identification of which requirements of an effective whole-of-government governance process are being met.

## CHAPTER 3 –RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

### The Case Study as Research Technique

The case study methodology was chosen as the research technique to develop a deeper understanding of the operationalizing of foreign and security policy in the 3D setting. A qualitative research technique (in contrast to a quantitative technique), the case study is used extensively in social science research which includes practice-oriented fields such as public administration and public policy.<sup>87</sup> As an example, Bakvis and Juillet conducted a case study into horizontal management in domestic policy issues in Canada, which generated recommendations and conclusions considered earlier in this thesis.<sup>88</sup> Benbasat et al. support the use of case studies as being “well-suited to capturing the knowledge of practitioners and developing theories from it.”<sup>89</sup> One of the foremost developers of case study theory and techniques, Yin states that case studies are the preferred technique when “how” or “why” questions are being asked and when the investigator has little control over events.<sup>90</sup> His definition of a case study is:

An empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.<sup>91</sup>

With regard to the thesis at hand, the phenomenon is the 3D approach to Canadian foreign and security policy implementation and the context is the current global security

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<sup>87</sup> Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research Design and Methods* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1992), xiii.

<sup>88</sup> Bakvis and Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership*, 1.

<sup>89</sup> Izak Benbasat, David K. Goldstein and Melissa Mead, "The Case Research Strategy in Studies of Information Systems," *MIS Quarterly* 11, no. 3 (Sep., 1987, 1987), 370, [www.proquest.umi.com](http://www.proquest.umi.com); Internet; accessed 3 December 2007.

<sup>90</sup> Yin, *Case Study Research Design and Methods*, 1.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

environment. The boundary between these two is not crystal clear as policy adaptation is a reaction to changes in that environment, thereby creating a circular feedback loop with a variable boundary. In consideration of all of these factors, the case study methodology is considered appropriate for examining the 3D approach in an operational context, using a qualitative research technique.

### **Building Theory or Simply Exploring?**

The development of theory is both an input and an output of case study research. Case studies benefit from prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.<sup>92</sup> The analysis of the data allows the researcher to generalize from the empirical evidence in order to support, refine or challenge the theory.<sup>93</sup> Two theoretical constructs have been developed in Chapter 2 to aid in analyzing the 3D concept. First, the Taxonomy (Table 2.2) provides a framework against which to analyze 3D in order to examine the degree of coordination, collaboration or integration that it exhibits. The second, The Requirements of an Effective Whole-of-Government Governance Process (Table 2.3 – hereafter The Requirements), provides requirements to be satisfied by a whole-of-government approach, which will be indicative of how effective governance is being realized. These two constructs will form the theoretical basis for the data collection and analysis, the ultimate aim of which is a better understanding of the 3D concept and greater effectiveness and efficiency in policy implementation. This better understanding may be realized by a refinement in the

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<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 32-33.



theoretical constructs as a result of the case studies, or may simply provide exploratory inferences and conclusions for further study.

### **Selection of Cases and Unit of Analysis**

Key decisions must be made in the design of case studies. Specifically, the researcher must determine: if it will be a single- or multiple-case study; which cases to study; and the unit or level of analysis.<sup>94</sup> With regard to the current study, a multiple-case design was selected in order to allow for more cross-case analysis, the extension of theory and the opportunity to yield more general research results, as suggested by Benbasat et al.<sup>95</sup>

When selecting cases, researchers are cautioned that this should be carefully thought out rather than “opportunistic.”<sup>96</sup> According to Yin, the aim is for replication between the cases. Literal replication would predict similar results, while theoretical replication predicts contrasting results but for predictable reasons.<sup>97</sup> Due to time constraints, a decision to study only two cases was made: Afghanistan and Sudan. Although more than two cases might have been preferable to increase the possibility of increased cross-case convergence, Yin supports the use of only two cases, especially if the contexts differ as they may have common conclusions that will expand the

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<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>95</sup> Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead, *The Case Research Strategy in Studies of Information Systems*, 373.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 373.

<sup>97</sup> Yin, *Case Study Research Design and Methods*, 47.

generalizability of the theory.<sup>98</sup> Although the context in which 3D exists is the current global security environment, which encompasses both the Afghanistan and Sudan initiatives, their respective regional security environments are markedly different. More important, however, is the variance in the nature of Canada's mission in each country and the amount of departmental involvement in the particular initiatives. Using DND/CF involvement as the discriminator, in the case of peace enforcement operations in Afghanistan, this involvement is significant as it represents the main effort of current DND/CF operations and the largest deployed contingent (2500 personnel) on international operations.<sup>99</sup> Conversely, the Sudan initiative is at the other end of the scale: a peace support operation with less than 50 CF personnel deployed in total.<sup>100</sup> The large contrast in magnitude between these two cases suggests that they are "polar types" which may allow researchers to easily observe contrasting patterns in the data.<sup>101</sup>

The unit of analysis is that area in a particular case where the study is focused. Selection of a unit of analysis is informed by both the research questions and the generalizations that are hoped for at the end of the study.<sup>102</sup> Common units of analysis

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<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>99</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, "CEFCOM Backgrounder 07.009: Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan," [http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/nr-sp/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=1703](http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/nr-sp/view_news_e.asp?id=1703); Internet; accessed 20 February, 2008.

<sup>100</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, "CEFCOM Backgrounder 08.001: Canadian Forces Operations in Sudan," [http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/nr-sp/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=2568](http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/nr-sp/view_news_e.asp?id=2568); Internet; accessed 20 February, 2008.

<sup>101</sup> Kathleen M. Eisenhardt and Melissa E. Graebner, "Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and Challenges," *Academy of Management Journal* 50, no. 1 (2007), 27, [www.proquest.umi.com](http://www.proquest.umi.com); Internet; accessed 3 December 2007.

<sup>102</sup> Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead, *The Case Research Strategy in Studies of Information Systems*, 372.

are groups, individuals, entire organizations, specific problems or even decisions.<sup>103</sup>

Given that the focus of the Joint Command and Staff Programme is for the conduct of military operations at the operational level, it was deemed appropriate to select a unit of analysis that would have the greatest utility in understanding interdepartmental working at that level. The operational level is that level which bridges strategy and policy (usually at the national headquarters level) and tactics (the field level). For DND/CF, the entity that is concerned with the operational level of international operations is CEFCOM.<sup>104</sup> For the purposes of studying 3D, the interdepartmental mechanisms in which CEFCOM is involved are the interdepartmental working groups for the Afghanistan and Sudan initiatives.

### **Data Collection**

The main focus of the thesis research was to gain the views of actors in the 3D policy implementation process. To this end, semi-structured interviews using an interview guide were conducted. In conducting research that relies on interviews, Patton advocates the use of an interview guide to ensure that the same basic lines of inquiry are pursued with each person interviewed. The interview guide provides topics and areas for inquiry which can be probed and explored as the interviewer sees fit in order to draw out comments to illuminate the subject at hand.<sup>105</sup> In the case of a complex topic such as 3D and whole-of-government, the different nuances of the comments can be important and

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<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 372.

<sup>104</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *Backgrounder 05.024: Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM)*.

<sup>105</sup> Michael Quinn Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2002), 343.

the interview guide helps to frame them in the context of a particular topic or subject area. The interview guide for this study is attached at Appendix 1.

Participants were advised that data gathered during interviews would not be attributed in the report either by name, rank, position, gender or department. This advice was provided twice: in an introductory letter in advance of scheduling the interview (Appendix 2); and again prior to conducting the interview. Concurrence to use contents of the interview in the report was gained prior to interviewing and all interviewees consented to having the interview recorded. Transcripts of entire interviews were not created; only those comments that have relevance to the study were transcribed.

Where appropriate, documentary evidence was requested of participants to support their narratives. Examples of relevant documents are: agendas for meetings; minutes of meetings; reports; presentations; and background material pertinent to the initiative. In certain cases, e-mail was used to pose follow-up questions to or request clarification from certain participants. The responses were typically made via e-mail.

The intent was to interview as many practitioners as possible from each of the departments involved in a particular initiative in order to gain a balanced assessment from an organizational and hierarchical perspective. The search was for areas of convergence as opposed to describing specific occurrences. Time restrictions prohibited an exhaustive data collection plan of multiple interviewees, and instead, a representative sample of the actors involved in the interdepartmental working groups was interviewed. Access to certain departments proved problematic and in the end, only actors from two departments were available to participate. On average, the actors interviewed were in middle-manager to director-level positions and had been involved in the various files for

a little more than two years. The experience-level in their respective departments and professional areas ranged from 4 to 25 years, with the mean being around 17 years. In the Afghanistan investigation, two interviews were conducted (one with three participants) across two departments, and two interviews were conducted (one with two participants) across two departments in the Sudan investigation. All interviews were conducted in person, although one was concluded via telephone. The interviews ranged in duration from 30 to 50 minutes.

Prior to continuing with the description and findings of the case studies, a word about the inclusion of interview excerpts in the thesis is necessary. The interview excerpts presented in this thesis have been edited slightly to enhance readability where the deletion of a word (such as “um” or “ah”) would not change the meaning of the interviewee’s comment. Addition of text to give a statement meaning out of the context of the interview was indicated in square brackets [ ]. Also, if text was removed, primarily to enhance the anonymity of the respondent, it was replaced with [...]. In order to protect the anonymity of all interview participants, references to gender have been reported as masculine. As a result, it should be borne in mind that the group of interviewees consisted of more than just males referring to their male counterparts! Finally, every attempt was made to give prominence to the actual words of the interviewees in order to better display their conception of the situation, as opposed to allowing it to be filtered by the interviewer.

## CHAPTER 4 - CASE STUDIES

### Case Study #1 - Afghanistan

#### Background

Afghanistan, a landlocked country in southwest Asia about the size of Manitoba, was thrust into the international spotlight in the days following the attacks of 11 September 2001. The brutal ruling Taliban regime, accused of harbouring al Qaeda terrorist operatives as they prepared for the attacks in America, refused to hand them over to the United States. In response, the Taliban were attacked and ousted from power by a “Coalition of the Willing” led by the United States. The subsequent vacuum that was created by the collapse of that government necessitated action by the international community to intervene on several fronts to provide security, stability and reconstruction assistance. Despite the installation of a democratically-elected government in 2004, Afghanistan is far from capable of self-governing without assistance, especially in the face of a violent Taliban insurgency in the south of the country.<sup>106</sup> Thus, the international community continues to be heavily involved in Afghanistan through the presence of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); investment and development work by the UN, the EU and the IMF; international and non-governmental organizations (IO and NGO); and extensive multi-lateral diplomacy.

The focus of international involvement since 2006 is the Afghanistan Compact, a multi-lateral agreement between the international community, and the Government of Afghanistan. Designed to develop Afghanistan into a stable, democratic and self-

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<sup>106</sup> Nasreen Ghufuran, "Afghanistan in 2007: A Bleeding Wound," *Asian Survey* 48, no. 1 (Feb, 2008), 163, <http://proquest.umi.com> ; Internet; accessed 27 March 2008.

sufficient society, this “five-year blueprint” is underpinned by three pillars of critical and interdependent activity: security; governance, the rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development.<sup>107</sup>

### Canada’s Involvement in Afghanistan

Although Canadian involvement in Afghanistan pre-dates the Compact, current Canadian efforts have been aligned with its principles. Of interest to this thesis is a statement on a Government of Canada webpage titled “Canada’s Approach in Afghanistan.” On this page, a direct correlation is made between 3D and the Afghanistan Compact: “Canada’s “3D” approach – defence, development and diplomacy – reflects the three pillars of the Compact: security, governance and development.”<sup>108</sup> Earlier in this thesis, it was argued that the term 3D had fallen out of the official lexicon, yet the term still appears on a current webpage. Although this may be a coincidence or even an oversight of negligible importance, the appearance of 3D in a current public document could lend credence to the argument that foreign and security policy implementation is the purview of a select few departments, as opposed to a wide-reaching whole-of-government approach. This case study will demonstrate that there is more than just the 3Ds contributing to Canadian efforts in Afghanistan, and will thereby call into question the relevance of the term.

A quick scan of any form of Canadian media on any given day, be it print or electronic, might lead one to believe that Canada’s only commitment to Afghanistan is in

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<sup>107</sup>Canada. Government of Canada, *Canada's Approach in Afghanistan* and Canada. Government of Canada, "Canada and the Afghanistan Compact," [http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/contrib\\_and-en.asp](http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/contrib_and-en.asp); Internet; accessed 11 February 2008.

<sup>108</sup> Canada. Government of Canada, *Canada's Approach in Afghanistan*.

the form of 2500 Canadian Forces soldiers conducting operations in Kandahar province. Although Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan represent the bulk of Canada's commitment in terms of human and physical resources, at least four other governmental departments are also significantly involved there. Elements from the CF, DFAIT, CIDA, the RCMP and Corrections Services Canada (CSC) are brought together in the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar. Often used as an exemplar of whole-of-government working, the PRT helps to reinforce the authority of the Afghan government in Kandahar Province by assisting in stabilizing and developing the region.<sup>109</sup> Canada has pledged approximately \$1.3 billion for development and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan through to the year 2011 and the PRT represents just one such vehicle for delivering those effects.<sup>110</sup> Given the scope of such operations, and the wide variety of participating government departments, the interdepartmental synchronization of those efforts in Ottawa is a complex task.

### Findings of the Study

At the time of research for this paper, the lead department for Canada's involvement in Afghanistan was Foreign Affairs. Within DFAIT, it was the Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs that headed the Afghanistan Task Force (FTAG) and had the lead interdepartmental coordinating role. On the day that the first interview was conducted for this case study, the Prime Minister announced the creation of a new

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<sup>109</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *CEFCOM Backgrounder 07.009: Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan*.

<sup>110</sup> Canada. Government of Canada, "Rebuilding Afghanistan Statistics Sheet," [http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/pdf/Tableau\\_WoG\\_MAR08\\_eng.pdf](http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/pdf/Tableau_WoG_MAR08_eng.pdf); Internet; accessed 31 March 2008.



Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan and an Afghanistan Task Force within the Privy Council Office (PCO) to “better coordinate and ensure the effectiveness of Canada’s activities in Afghanistan.”<sup>111</sup> The Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan was to be chaired by the Minister of International Trade, and the new PCO Afghanistan Task Force was to be headed by a Deputy Minister, the same individual who at the time was holding the position of Associate Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Despite this significant change in the policy formulation structure, it was assessed that, for the purposes of this thesis, continuing to focus on the structure in being prior to the Prime Minister’s announcement would still be relevant as it would take time for the changes to be implemented and filter down to the working group level. The major findings of this study, including those elements provided by interview participants, will be described below following the notional whole-of-government framework described in Table 2.3: structures, leadership, resources, relationships and shared objectives.

### *Structures*

3D interdepartmental consultations on Afghanistan occur at multiple formalized layers, indicating a significant amount of both horizontal and vertical coordination. Structurally, four interdepartmental meetings were held at various levels and intervals. At the highest level, a meeting chaired by the National Security Advisor (NSA) and attended by deputy ministers and equivalents was held on a bi-weekly basis to discuss strategic issues facing Canada in Afghanistan. Below that meeting, the Associate Deputy

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<sup>111</sup> Canada. Office of the Prime Minister, "Prime Minister Announces Decisive Action on Afghanistan Panel Recommendations," <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1985>; Internet; accessed 9 February 2008.

Minister for Foreign Affairs chaired a weekly meeting of Level One executives which also included senior military and civilian personnel deployed in Afghanistan. Directors General from the implicated departments met on a bi-weekly basis and finally, policy and operations directors met weekly with their respective counterparts. The focus of the director-level meetings was the operations of the PRT, as the nexus for Other Government Departments (OGD) working in Afghanistan. Departmental representation at all of these meetings reflected the five principal government departments working in Afghanistan: DFAIT, CIDA, DND, RCMP and CSC. With the exception of the NSA-chaired meeting, the chairmanship of the meetings rests with Foreign Affairs.<sup>112</sup>

Each of these levels in this interdepartmental structure is linked to the adjacent one above and below. One respondent referred to it as “feeding” upwards and that the “doers” at the director-level group: “Feed into the director general-level group and the director general-level group feeds into the Level One group.”<sup>113</sup> That same respondent also referred to this process being absolutely critical to “making sure that coordination, horizontally and vertically, happens.”<sup>114</sup>

The interview discussions revealed the important role played by the Privy Council Office (PCO) in the Afghanistan file, acting in its capacity as a central agency. The prevailing view was that, PCO was very much involved in the process and that their participation was necessary. This participation was described as being responsible for

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<sup>112</sup> Interview C and supporting document: Presentation excerpt – *Whole of Government Interaction (Afghanistan)*.

<sup>113</sup> Interview C

<sup>114</sup> Interview C

the “challenge function”<sup>115</sup> and acting as an “interlocutor, as opposed to a leader.”<sup>116</sup> The role of PCO was acknowledged to be that of supporting the Prime Minister<sup>117</sup> and representing the Prime Minister’s interests<sup>118</sup> as well as ensuring that departments were “in line with the wishes of the Prime Minister, the Ministers and the Cabinet.”<sup>119</sup>

### *Leadership*

Leadership in collaborative working and network development as well as the recognition of the requirement for special skill sets in these areas was evident in the Afghanistan case study. The view from one respondent was that his department was proactive in this matter:

All of our officers are encouraged to do a couple of things: not only network and know who their counterparts are in different departments across the Canadian Government; but network and know who their counterparts are in different foreign ministries abroad and in Afghanistan.<sup>120</sup>

As for skill sets in collaborative working, several respondents acknowledged a requirement for them, but felt that the emphasis on fostering and encouraging them was variable across departments. One department’s competency profiles placed importance on “networking and alliance building at all levels: it’s right up there.”<sup>121</sup> In another

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<sup>115</sup> Interview D

<sup>116</sup> Interview C

<sup>117</sup> Interview D

<sup>118</sup> Interview C

<sup>119</sup> Interview D

<sup>120</sup> Interview C

department, however, it was felt that specific training focussing on working with OGD needed to be delivered earlier in one's careers, to avoid having to learn by "osmosis" later in one's career.<sup>122</sup>

One respondent was more pessimistic on the institutional leadership that has been demonstrated in developing interdepartmental working knowledge:

I don't know of anything that I can say in the last three years that we've learned from this, other than we're trying to get better at bringing other folks in and having them spend some time with us.<sup>123</sup>

### *Resources*

The study revealed that employment of resources and the associated accountabilities were not a pre-occupation for the respondents working mainly at the Director level. This is not to say that they were unaware of how resources were to be employed, but recognized that these decisions were made at higher levels that benefited from the interdepartmental activity that occurred at the lower levels. One respondent stated succinctly his understanding of where his and his colleague's contributions fit into the interdepartmental effort: "It's a coordination function, so there would be no resources attached."<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Interview D

<sup>122</sup> Interview C

<sup>123</sup> Interview C

<sup>124</sup> Interview C

### *Relationships*

Interpersonal relationships were viewed as key to successful interdepartmental enterprises and time was cited as a crucial element in developing these relationships.

One respondent identified the repetitive nature of the relationship-building process over time, as a result of the turnover of personnel through various appointments:

You build relationships over time, just like anybody else. And the difficulty that we all experience is rotations: How do you have continuity? There are very few people, maybe one or two or three, that like I, have been working on this file for four years. Most people . . . one year, two years and then they move on to something else. And so then you have to build the relationship all over again, so that people can understand where you're coming from, how you treat [the file], that kind-of-a-thing.<sup>125</sup>

For another respondent, the impact of turnovers was offset by time spent building relationships earlier in his career:

They're all people that I've known for ten, twelve years now, which is fascinating. So the international community is quite small. Public servants who work in the international world tend to stay in the international world and we all cross paths eventually. And it's that development of networking that becomes extremely important.<sup>126</sup>

Of particular interest, however, were the viewpoints on how departmental culture affects the relationships at an organizational and individual level. Practitioners displayed an insightful understanding into the implications of cultural differences between departments:

There's also a challenge where we don't understand each other's culture. We come up in a stovepipe culture, where you're always in [your department's] envelope. Predominantly, people stay in their own departments until you get that opportunity later in your career to make that cross-over, but at that juncture, it's a little late to start to understand some

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<sup>125</sup> Interview D

<sup>126</sup> Interview C

of this stuff. You have to grasp it pretty quick. That's all part of the cultural understanding which has been absent.<sup>127</sup>

Their entire culture is based on going through a multilateral forum to negotiate resolutions and to move the agendas forward multilaterally. We have thrust them into a period where we've made them accountable for the transfer of detainees. We've made them accountable for things that they've never actually needed to do before. This is revolutionary, in the sense that we're asking them to do things that they simply have not been trained to do.<sup>128</sup>

I think all the departments are learning about each other and about themselves, frankly. No department has a monopoly on difficulties. And we all sort of understand that.<sup>129</sup>

Thus, the understanding of the culture of other departments was viewed by the respondents as a fundamental factor in enhancing interdepartmental working.

### *Shared objectives*

The respondents were unequivocal in their belief that interdepartmental working on the Afghanistan file was striving to fulfill governmental objectives vice solely departmental ones. One respondent indicated that his department's objectives were those of the Government of Canada on Afghanistan, which were the objectives of the Afghanistan Compact.<sup>130</sup> Another respondent acknowledged that the utopian environment where actors put aside their departmental prejudices in favour of interdepartmental goals and objectives had not yet been achieved, but that progress was

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<sup>127</sup> Interview C

<sup>128</sup> Interview C

<sup>129</sup> Interview D

<sup>130</sup> Interview C

being achieved: “I think we are a lot closer to governmental objectives.”<sup>131</sup> As far as the work of interdepartmental groups meeting the objectives of the government, that same respondent highlighted that the lower-level outputs serve higher-level needs. It is at the higher level where the validation occurs to ensure that governmental objectives are being met:

Ministers and deputy ministers and others will not accept something that has not been consulted with another department. People know that, and they start with that impression.<sup>132</sup>

### *Summary*

Overall, the Afghanistan case study displays elements of effective governance. Key to the effort is a sophisticated interdepartmental structure at many levels served by layers of working groups which “feed” into these higher levels. These levels appear to focus efforts to achieve shared objectives in the form of Canada’s support to the Afghanistan Compact. Despite the existence of these governance mechanisms, pooling of resources and the attendant control of those resources as an encouragement to enhanced interdepartmental efforts was not observed.

## **Case Study #2 – Sudan**

### **Background**

Sudan has been in a practically continuous state of conflict for most of the last 52 years. Shortly after declaring independence in 1956, a civil war broke out, which began initially as a north/south conflict and evolved into a national crisis in the 1990s. This

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<sup>131</sup> Interview D

<sup>132</sup> Interview D

culminated in January 2005 with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM).<sup>133</sup> In March of that year, the 10,000-person United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was deployed to support that peace process under a Chapter VII mandate.<sup>134</sup>

Concurrent with the settlement of the CPA in the North-South Civil War, conflict was raging in the Darfur region of western Sudan. A thoroughly complex situation, the conflict involved: rebel forces made up of predominantly African sedentary tribes; the Government of Sudan; and Arab "Janjaweed" militia, armed and supported by the Government of Sudan. The rebel forces were in open conflict with Government of Sudan armed forces and the Janjaweed were used as a proxy force by the Government, conducting clearing operations against villages thought to be supporting the rebellion. Following the signing of a humanitarian ceasefire agreement in the summer of 2004, the African Union (AU) deployed a small observation and monitoring force to the region, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was expanded in late-2004 and again in 2005 to a total force of over 6,000 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police.<sup>135</sup>

In May 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed between a splinter faction of one of the original rebel movements and the Government of Sudan, but the violence continued as the original rebel groups fractured and Sudanese and Janjaweed

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<sup>133</sup> International Crisis Group, "The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan's Uncertain Peace, Africa Report N°96," International Crisis Group, [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn\\_of\\_africa/096\\_the\\_khartoum\\_splm\\_agreement\\_sudan\\_uncertain\\_peace.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/096_the_khartoum_splm_agreement_sudan_uncertain_peace.pdf); Internet; accessed 25 February 2008; and International Crisis Group, "Sudan," <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1230&l=1>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2008.

<sup>134</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Background: United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)," United Nations, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmis/background.html>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2008.

<sup>135</sup> African Union, "African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS): Background and Chronology," <http://www.amis-sudan.org/history.html>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2008.



forces continued their offensives.<sup>136</sup> In late-2007, Sudan acquiesced to international community and United Nations pressure to allow a hybrid AU/UN force to be deployed to Darfur in order to assist in bringing peace and stability to the region.<sup>137</sup> The hybrid force, United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) which subsumed the existing AU mission (AMIS), is acting under a Chapter VII mandate and has as its core mandate, the protection of civilians.

#### Canada's Involvement in Sudan

Canada's involvement in Sudan predates the current United Nations missions, with relations dating back to the 1960s, especially in the area of bilateral development.<sup>138</sup> Beginning in the late-1980s, however, and in response to human rights violations arising from the Government of Sudan's actions in the north-south conflict, Canadian assistance was restricted to humanitarian relief and support to the burgeoning peace process.<sup>139</sup> Support to the peace process was bolstered in October 1999 when Canada announced the appointment of a special envoy to the Sudan Peace Process as well as a direct financial contribution to the regional secretariat responsible for the talks.<sup>140</sup> Canadian involvement

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<sup>136</sup> International Crisis Group, "Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement: Africa Briefing no. 39," International Crisis Group, [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn\\_of\\_africa/b039\\_darfur\\_s\\_fragile\\_peace\\_agreement.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/b039_darfur_s_fragile_peace_agreement.pdf); Internet; accessed 20 February 2008.

<sup>137</sup> United Nations, "Background: African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)," United Nations, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/background.html>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2008.

<sup>138</sup> Canada. Canadian International Development Agency, "Sudan: Overview," <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/sudan>; Internet; accessed 20 February, 2008.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid*

was limited primarily to DFAIT and CIDA, with a commitment on the part of CIDA to work closely together,<sup>141</sup> which may have been the genesis of a 3D approach to Sudan.

Canada's current approach to Sudan is described as:

Three-pronged: Using diplomatic channels to pursue sustainable political solutions and to address the root causes of the conflicts; providing humanitarian, reconstruction and peacebuilding assistance to affected populations; [and] supporting both the United Nations and African Union peacekeeping missions in Sudan.<sup>142</sup>

This policy clearly implicates the departments responsible for 3D, but does not go so far as to state or imply a synchronization of efforts.

In addition to the ongoing CIDA-administered development and humanitarian assistance, DFAIT, DND/CF and RCMP all had direct involvement in Sudan. The Department of National Defence and the CF became involved in Sudan in 2004 in support of both the UN and the AU. Initial support to the UN was in the form of two staff officers to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) in 2004,<sup>143</sup> and has evolved into approximately 34 CF members serving as staff officers, military observers and support personnel serving with the current UNMIS.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> Canada. Government of Canada, "News Release no. 232: Canada Announces Support to Sudan Peace Process," [http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication\\_id=377283&Language=E&docnumber=232](http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=377283&Language=E&docnumber=232); Internet; accessed 20 February 2008.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>142</sup> Canada. Government of Canada, "Canada: Active in Sudan - Diplomacy," <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/sudan/cip-pic/library/diplomatic-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2008.

<sup>143</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *CEFCOM Backgrounder 08.001: Canadian Forces Operations in Sudan*.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

Canadian support to the African Union began as the provision of two CF staff officers to assist with planning and capacity building at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa in the fall of 2004. Since that time, additional staff officers were deployed to assist in capacity building in areas such as strategic planning, air operations, contracting, and logistics and operations planning. In addition, Canada donated basic military equipment as well as approximately 105 general purpose armoured vehicles are currently on loan to the countries providing the bulk of the protection forces to AMIS. The CF personnel commitment to the African Union has been transferred to the new hybrid UNAMID and now comprises three officers serving at UNAMID headquarters as well as four soldiers training UNAMID personnel to operate the armoured vehicles.<sup>145</sup>

In the diplomatic arena, Canada is a regular co-sponsor of resolutions in the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council. Canada also works with partner countries to provide full support for the implementation of peace agreements and to urge parties to all conflicts in Sudan to reach peaceful settlements.<sup>146</sup>

Outside of the 3Ds, the RCMP has also been involved in Sudan. For a short period of time in early 2005, one RCMP staff officer was provided to the AU to assist in planning related to employment of the civilian police component of AMIS. Additionally, RCMP officers have been deployed as part of the civilian police component of UNMIS in South Sudan since mid-2005.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>146</sup> Canada. Government of Canada, *Canada: Active in Sudan – Diplomacy*.

<sup>147</sup> Canada. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "International Peace Operations Branch," [http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/peace\\_operations/missions\\_current\\_e.htm](http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/peace_operations/missions_current_e.htm); Internet; accessed 20 February 2008.

Canada will invest over \$275 million in Sudan in 2008-09 in the areas of security, diplomacy and aid, which builds upon the over \$388 million that Canada has contributed since 2006.<sup>148</sup> In addition to humanitarian aid and the specific activities listed above in support of the UN and the AU, this total also includes direct monetary contributions to the African Union. Although the 3Ds (plus RCMP) are active in Sudan, each department is very much executing its own tasks in their specific areas of expertise.

Interdepartmental coordination on Sudan occurs at the next level up, the departmental headquarters in Ottawa, which will be addressed in the next section.

### Findings of the Study

Currently, the responsibility for leading interdepartmental coordination in Ottawa rests with Task Force on Sudan (FSDN), a Directorate within DFAIT. The main forum for bringing together the various departments involved in Sudan is a weekly interdepartmental meeting chaired by the Director of FSDN. Representation at the weekly meeting could consist of personnel from: DFAIT, DND, CIDA, PCO, Department of Finance, and the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS)<sup>149</sup>. Not all departments are represented at all meetings and the level of representation from each department varies from desk officers to executives, according to the issues to be discussed on a given day.<sup>150</sup> Moreover, there can be multiple representatives from

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<sup>148</sup> Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Backgrounder: Canada's Contribution to Peace and Human Needs in Sudan," [http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication\\_id=385984&Language=E&docnumber=64](http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=385984&Language=E&docnumber=64); Internet; accessed 31 March 2008.

<sup>149</sup> Representative Agenda: *Weekly Interdepartmental Meeting on Sudan* and distribution list.

<sup>150</sup> Interview A.

various directorates or levels in each department. For example, within National Defence, Associate Deputy Minister (Policy), the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) and Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) typically send representatives to the meeting. In the case of Foreign Affairs, several directorates are represented in addition to FSDN, such as: Media Relations; African Regional Issues; United Nations, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law; Peace Operations Group; Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Group.<sup>151</sup> The multiple representations from each department confirm that there is not a single point of concentration within each department that other departments engage for coordination. This suggests that interdepartmental coordination does not occur in a linear fashion, but is indeed a complex web or network that may engage both horizontally and vertically.

As with the Afghanistan Case Study, the major findings will be described below using the notional whole-of-government framework: structures, leadership, resources, relationships and shared objectives.

### *Structures*

The interviews brought to light two key concepts with respect to structures: the role of central agencies in the interdepartmental process; and the development of informal networks to supplement the official structure. In looking at the role of central agencies, the case study revealed that PCO executes a key function in the Sudan file, but that the function has changed over time. Although the role of PCO and the extent of its

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<sup>151</sup> Representative Agenda: *Weekly Interdepartmental Meeting on Sudan* and distribution list.

involvement was not apparent to all actors,<sup>152</sup> one respondent emphasized the importance of PCO guidance at the outset of an initiative.<sup>153</sup> For that practitioner, close contact with colleagues in PCO was necessary in order to understand what the Government and the Prime Minister “actually wants to see.”<sup>154</sup> Additionally, the depth and degree of PCO involvement in the Sudan file was observed to change over time and was felt to be the result of a change of government. It was felt by one practitioner that when the Prime Minister had a greater interest in Sudan, the daily contact with PCO increased, indicating that PCO involvement varied according to Government priorities.<sup>155</sup>

A second key finding with relation to structures is the development of informal networks amongst actors within the working group structure. This phenomenon was described by one respondent as being an “unofficial little think tank between [three colleagues within and without the respondent’s department] and myself.” He described the utility of this think tank:

What’s important is that we get together and brainstorm a few things, and then we go back to our respective organizations, knowing what the others are thinking or what they’re trying to pursue ... there’s that kind of unofficial synchronization of efforts [...] because I know where they’re going with things and I’ve been included; and I keep them informed of things, and vice versa for me. That’s a very symbiotic relationship, from my perspective.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> This is likely due to the varying lengths of time that various actors have been involved with the Sudan file.

<sup>153</sup> Interview B

<sup>154</sup> Interview B

<sup>155</sup> Interview B

<sup>156</sup> Interview A

### *Leadership*

The case study revealed the existence of institutional leadership in this interdepartmental initiative. Whether as a result of the responsibility for leading foreign policy development in general, or as a result of the leadership role played by DFAIT/FSDN at the working group level, DFAIT is seen as the institutional leader in this case. According to one respondent:

Where DFAIT certainly does have leadership is in the creation of those memorandums to cabinet that guide the process [...] So DFAIT has the lead in that coordinating role in creating that document and shaping that document. The overarching strategy, largely the way DFAIT wants it to be shaped, obviously in consultation with input from other departments, is where the leadership role comes from in shaping the overall strategic goals.<sup>157</sup>

### *Resources*

As was expected, the study revealed that funding resources were managed at a level higher than the interdepartmental working group. Consistent with Government of Canada practices, funding allocation and authorities remain within departmental lines of accountability.

### *Relationships*

Generally, the quality of relationships was viewed as key to achieving successful outcomes from interdepartmental working groups. The actors themselves were seen to be essential to the establishment of these relationships as well as the trust between the various actors. For one respondent, it was not only the actors and the positions they held, but also their understanding of the context in which they were working:

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<sup>157</sup> Interview B

Relationships are established by putting the people in the right places ... It's having the right person in the right place within the organization and having an understanding of each other's "chains of command."<sup>158</sup>

Another respondent felt that it was important to establish trust and build these relationships over time. More importantly, these relationships needed to be created before the onset of a crisis, in order to be able to leverage the benefits of it in a timely fashion: "Because when the crisis starts, you're running, and you need to have that relationship interdepartmentally."<sup>159</sup> For another, the requirement for trust in these relationships is unequivocal: "Trust is huge! Absolutely."<sup>160</sup>

### *Shared objectives*

Generally, it was felt by respondents that shared goals and objectives at the working group level were pre-dominant over individual ones. However, the fact remains that participants are representatives from their respective departments, which have certain expectations about the outputs of any interdepartmental working groups. One respondent acknowledged that there can be a tension between departmental objectives and governmental objectives:

When you are sitting at that interdepartmental table, there are times, to be very honest, where you have to remind everybody that we're not different departments here, we're the Government of Canada and we need to move things accordingly. So that challenge does arise.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> Interview B

<sup>159</sup> Interview B

<sup>160</sup> Interview B

<sup>161</sup> Interview B



He summarized by saying that even though these tensions can often be overcome, departmental differences cannot be entirely forgotten: “Each organization does have its specific goals and its specific vantage points, and that’s never lost in a conversation.”<sup>162</sup> This tension between objectives and viewpoints does not seem to hamper the process of collaborating on issues and providing the appropriate advice to ministers and government. After describing at length a personal experience whereby desk officers from various departments had formulated an agreed-upon recommendation to government, he summarized by saying:

So they’re [cabinet ministers] all going into this together. It is presented as a Government of Canada strategy and is never really presented as “Department of Foreign Affairs strategy” or “the Department of Defence wants to do this.”<sup>163</sup>

### *Summary*

Overall, the findings of the study suggest that elements of effective governance are present in the interdepartmental process surrounding Canada’s involvement in Sudan. The enthusiasm of the interviewees toward the requirement to work across departmental boundaries in this endeavour was evident. It was also apparent that respondents sought to achieve greater effectiveness where necessary by working outside of formal mechanisms and structures to form self-organizing networks for collaboration, which also reinforces the importance of relationships.

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<sup>162</sup> Interview B

<sup>163</sup> Interview B

## First-Hand Experience

In addition to the rich data provided by the practitioners, the experiences of another practitioner in the Sudan file could be considered for relevance: those of this author. In early-2005, the author participated in the African Union Mission in Sudan (Darfur) and worked closely with members from DFAIT, CIDA, and the RCMP as well as representatives from the UN, AU, IOs, NGOs, and military officers and bureaucrats from government departments of other nations. As a result, the author understands first-hand the complexities of interdepartmental, interagency and international coordination at the tactical level. At the time, he experienced and contributed to what was an effective interdepartmental coordination effort in the Canadian context. Representatives from Canada's 3Ds, as well as RCMP, worked closely to implement the Government's policy collectively, as well as at times, assisting each other in their respective policy realms. Unfortunately, he did observe in other contexts, the deleterious effects of a lack of co-operation between agencies, where it appeared that differences, both cultural and operational, could not be set aside for the good of the whole. Perhaps this attitude, although viewed in a different setting, was best encapsulated by FBI Agent Robert Hanssen, as he was portrayed in the 2007 movie *Breach*: "Co-operation is counter-operational. That's the mentality."<sup>164</sup> Arguably, attitude could be a key contributing component to an effective 3D governance process, although its ability to be observed and quantified could prove problematic, as it resides within the actors themselves. This

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<sup>164</sup> FBI Agent Robert Hanssen, referring to the lack of interdepartmental co-operation between US federal law-enforcement and intelligence agencies in the movie: Billy Ray, *Breach*, Universal Pictures, 2007.

notion will be considered as the paper continues with an analysis and discussion of the major findings of the case studies.

## CHAPTER 5 - ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

### General

Recalling the research questions to be addressed by this thesis, the objective was to identify elements of effective governance in Canada's 3D approach to foreign and security policy implementation and to test the hypothesis that any such elements would not be integrated, as suggested by the 3D approach, but would merely be a complex form of interdepartmental coordination. To that end, the analysis and discussion in this chapter will focus on three areas: (1) comparing and contrasting the findings from the studies according to the notional 3D governance framework (Table 2.3); (2) an analysis of the level of coordination or integration as compared to the Taxonomy (Table 2.2); and (3) a discussion of the use of terminology in interdepartmental interaction.

### Compare & Contrast Findings

At this point, the aim is to exercise what Yin calls "analytic generalization," wherein "developed theory is used as a template to compare the empirical results of study"<sup>165</sup> The theoretical template to be used follows the same format as the description of the findings for each case and will be presented according to the notional 3D governance framework: structures; leadership; resources; relationships; and shared objectives. Given that these two cases were selected for their polarity with respect to each other, the search will be for significant points of convergence or divergence between the cases in order to validate or disprove the theory.

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<sup>165</sup> Yin, *Case Study Research Design and Methods*, 32.

## Structures

At first glance, it would appear that the structures for the two cases were markedly different. The Afghanistan file has multiple levels of interdepartmental coordination with an Associate Deputy Minister at the head, while the Sudan file has one interdepartmental coordination mechanism, chaired by a Director, with variable participation at all levels on an issue-specific basis. Upon reflection, however, this is not viewed as a divergence from the theory, but rather as the case-specific shaping of the structure based on the scope and requirements of a given file.

The theoretical construct called for PCO as the central agency, to play a role of providing guidance and oversight and to ensure that policy was implemented consistent with political intentions. From the two cases it can be seen that PCO does play that role and it was assessed to be important by the actors involved. It was also acknowledged, however, that after the initial guidance is given, the PCO role diminishes into the background, which is consistent with the theoretical requirement. Even though the day-to-day engagement of PCO in an initiative is expected to diminish after passing on the initial guidance of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, it is not clear to what extent PCO contributed to effective governance of these particular interdepartmental activities through continuing oversight and the shaping of implementation outcomes.

## Leadership

Although the framework called for significant individual leadership skills or champions of whole-of-government working, this area was not explored to its greatest potential, due to external time constraints. The thesis concentration, in this area however,

was on institutional leadership and there was definite convergence of this point between the two case studies. Across both cases, there was explicit recognition of Foreign Affairs as having the lead role in the interdepartmental initiative. This is not surprising, as it has been proposed that in any sort of joint working, there will always be a “dominant command perspective,” whereby the goals, views or vision of one of the entities will drive the agenda and the other entities will act in support of the first.<sup>166</sup> Although this is essentially a military viewpoint, this concept could be expanded to the inter-departmental realm whereby one minister (or subordinate bureaucrat) could be the leader (commander or manager) who is supported by the efforts of the remaining leaders. Recognizing that the 3D approach sought to give all departments a voice on issues that affected them, the dominant command perspective concept may be a more realistic view of the process than that of a council of equals solving problems.

## Resources

The notional whole-of-governance framework provided several areas of investigation into the significance of resources in the governance of an interdepartmental file. A key theoretical concept that was offered was that the creation of funding pools which could only be accessed through inter-departmental coordination would enhance whole-of-government efforts. Given the polarity of the two cases in terms of financial expenditure by Canada (over \$388 million in Sudan since 2006 and approximately \$1.3 billion in Afghanistan through to 2011), it was expected that the findings would reveal that the control of resources was a pivotal topic at the interdepartmental working group

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<sup>166</sup> Link, Major General Charles D., "Unintended Consequences: The Roles and Missions Debate is Yielding Unexpected Insights," *Armed Forces Journal International* 132, no. 8 (March 1995), 55.

level. This was in fact, not so, as the cases revealed that coordination was the primary aim of the process and control of resources remained within departmental responsibilities and authorities. This is consistent with the theory provided earlier which suggests that pooling of resources is only accomplished in higher categories of joined-up working such as unions, mergers and partnerships, which imply formal arrangements including contracts between organizations or the formation of new entities. The degree of coordination evident in the case studies will be discussed in a subsequent section.

### Relationships

An important element of the framework was interpersonal relationships, both for the actors in the process and for the engaged departments and agencies on the larger scale. The importance of this element was confirmed by the cases studied in this thesis: of all of the areas of study, this was the one that the interviewees were most passionate about. Given that all interviewees were professionals, the importance of interpersonal relationships to effective coordination was implicit.

There was also recognition from both cases of the different cultures of the government departments and how that affects their interactions. Specifically, there was the expression of the requirement to understand the other department's culture, way of thinking and conditions to make the coordination process more effective. The importance of relationships to the effective operation of any organization is not unique to government or interdepartmental working. However, given that this 3D approach requires that departments that have not traditionally worked closely together in policy

implementation now become effective team mates, it is essential that the relationships be sound and not a weak point in the governance system.

### Shared Objectives

From the theoretical framework, shared objectives (vice strictly departmental ones) were presented as key to the success of 3D and whole-of-government ventures. The foundation of these shared objectives is joint analysis. Shared objectives were evident in both of the case studies either through explicit government policy statements such as Canada aligning its support with the Afghanistan Compact, or fully-coordinated recommendations being presented to Cabinet.

Due to time constraints, joint analysis was not exhaustively explored in the study, although one element of the preconditions of joint analysis, information sharing, was evident. The major information management systems in use by departments and actors were departmental-specific. However, many of the relevant offices within DND do have DFAIT computer workstations, allowing them to be placed on Foreign Affairs distribution lists. Where these facilities did not exist, there was cross-sharing of relevant information, as well as the standard practice administrative practices of agenda-setting and minute-keeping.

### Summary

Overall, the case studies supported the theoretical whole-of-governance framework, with only slight deviations. Where the cases differed from the theoretical framework was in the area of resources, where the theory suggested more pooling of



resources to achieve effective governance. However, in order to achieve this pooling of resources, and consequently more effective governance, formalized structures would be required between departments, which would require a wholesale change in Government accountability requirements.

Significant areas of convergence were identified at the interdepartmental working group level of analysis and given that these cases were selected for their polarity, the notional whole-of-government governance framework accurately describes the elements of effective governance that would be expected in such a 3D enterprise. This convergence supports the hypothesis that a 3D approach is indeed a whole-of-government approach, albeit one where the number of departmental participants is limited and are selected on a case-by-case basis.

What remains to be seen, then, is if this framework will allow an accurate assessment of the degree of coordination. That is, is it coordination, integration, collaboration or a partnership?

### **Coordination or Something More - What Exactly is this 3D Approach?**

According to the practitioners interviewed, there was no confusion as to the nature of the interdepartmental ventures examined. For the majority, it was coordination, plain and simple. One practitioner, however identified a difference between coordination and integration, and encapsulated it in an elegant analogy:

I think the infatuation with coordination is a little bit beside the point [...] But I also think that it has been absolutely fascinating to be part of the evolution of the bureaucracy towards integration. There is a difference between integration and coordination. Integration means that you have the same objectives; you are working together towards them. Coordination

means: I'm going to buy some milk, you get some juice, and we'll have breakfast.<sup>167</sup>

From this viewpoint, the aim of these ventures is to move to a place where interdepartmental integration is the norm. Returning to the theory, however, will permit a subjective assessment of the coordinating or integrating nature of the approach.

This brings the discussion back to the definitions of coordination, integration and collaboration and the Taxonomy of Types of Relationship (Table 2.2) presented in Chapter 2. The issue is how to compare the Canadian 3D approach against these models. The definitions used to build the Taxonomy denote a clear difference between coordination and integration. Coordination is the development of ideas about joint working while integration is the implementation and execution of the products of coordination and calls for merged professional practices and interventions. Using these definitions, 3D finds itself as a coordination activity with designs on becoming an integration activity, insofar as it has not succeeded in merging professional practices and interventions. Nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable future, primarily due to cultural differences between the departments involved in 3D.

When considering the definitions provided by Bakvis and Juillet (Chapter 2), coordination implies the reduction of overlap and duplication and to not impede the actions of others in achieving horizontal objectives. Collaboration is coordination plus strategy development and implementation, and involves authority sharing and collective accountability. Partnership requires a high level of formalized arrangements such as contracts and is more applicable to use in connection with external organizations and thus will not be considered in this discussion. Viewed through these lenses, 3D is

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<sup>167</sup> Interview D

coordination, and could be considered for entry-level collaboration, but lacks the authority sharing and collective accountability required for full membership.

Thus, to place 3D on the Taxonomy scale (Table 2.2), 3D exists somewhere between “Taking into Account” and “Joint Venture.” Exact placement on this scale would be case dependent and would also require a subjective interpretation of “long-term.” It is proposed that the Afghanistan and Sudan files could find themselves comfortably at either of “Joint Working” or “Joint Venture” as they have been ongoing for relatively long periods of time in governmental terms (seven and four years respectively). Thus, 3D is a highly-developed coordination activity that exhibits some characteristics of low-level integration or collaboration. This leads to another point of examination.

Given the classification of 3D as somewhere between coordination and integration (or collaboration, depending on preference) the notional definition of 3D requires another look to determine its relevance. The notional definition provided in Chapter 2 placed emphasis on integration, collaboration, coordination and cooperation. Having further examined the nature of those terms in the context of the case studies and arrived at a placement on the Taxonomy, the definition appears to be satisfactory for the current process and doesn't exhibit any substantive flaws. Thus, at this point it would be premature to restate the definition without further examination, and it can be confidently carried forward into the future for consideration by practitioners and policy makers, or for further testing. The next issue for discussion of the terminology surrounding 3D.

### **Use of the Terminology - Is 3D Still the Right Term?**

In order to further refine an accurate vocabulary for use by policy-makers, practitioners and academics, the use of the term 3D itself should be examined. Having taken to the time to examine and define 3D, some might argue that it has been all for nought as the term and concept of 3D are no longer in common usage and are thus no longer relevant. Furthermore, it might be argued that examining the terminology has not furthered the understanding of the concept in a meaningful way. The counter-argument to this view is that with an accurate vocabulary surrounding the term and concept, precious time will not be lost in these discussions, but rather can be devoted to improving the process itself and its attendant outcomes. Thus, the terminology relating to 3D or whole-of-government currently in use by practitioners should be addressed.

In order to explore practitioner thoughts about terminology and the underlying concepts that were represented, a specific question regarding the use of the term 3D was asked of all interviewees.<sup>168</sup>

whole-of-government [approach]. We've got 26 departments ... 26 departments can provide something to resolve a crisis. So it's more than 3D, which limits a thing like that too much. We've got what, eight different departments in Kandahar? So it's more than 3D.<sup>169</sup>

Practitioners involved in the Afghanistan file were equally in agreement. One respondent stated: "I try never to use it . . . ever. I think it's flawed."<sup>170</sup> Another indicated that it had completed its lifecycle and outlived its usefulness:

Then it went from 3D to 3D+T, and basically under the new government, the whole concept of 3D sort of started to evaporate, not suggesting that it was a political decision, but rather a recognition that it was beyond diplomacy, development, defence and trade.<sup>171</sup>

The point to be made then, is if the term is no longer politically correct or even socially acceptable, as has happened over time with many other terms and words that were once in common usage; or it no longer represents the concept for which it was originally intended, then perhaps from a simply practical point of view, it needs to be unequivocally rejected and replaced with a more modern and correct term. The practitioners interviewed for these studies feel that whole-of-government is that term, as evidenced in a previous interview excerpt. In a separate interview, one of his colleagues reinforced that point: "Yeah ... definitely whole-of-government."<sup>172</sup>

Two questions are raised by this acceptance of the term whole-of-government. First, will it represent all cross-departmental initiatives, for both the domestic and foreign policy realms, or will its use be restricted to foreign policy only? If it is the former, then the notional 3D developed in this thesis would need to be abandoned in favour of a

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<sup>169</sup> Interview B

<sup>170</sup> Interview D

<sup>171</sup> Interview C

<sup>172</sup> Interview A

definition that is more all-encompassing in both of these domains. To that end, as previously demonstrated, the Treasury Board Secretariat already has concepts and mechanisms in place to support horizontal initiatives. Rather than reinventing the wheel, these should be studied for their applicability to cross-departmental initiatives in the international domain.

Second, will adopting a term in use by other governments and organizations (Australia, New Zealand, OECD) hinder or aid in working cross-governmentally and internationally? At the outset, it can be taken for granted that all whole-of-government approaches are not created equally and the differences and similarities could be their own sources of confusion. These are most definitely questions for further study and contemplation.

Notwithstanding the realization that the term 3D has been overcome by recent events in Canadian governmental operations and replaced with the term whole-of-government, the investigation into the associated governance issues is still relevant. The implications and conclusions drawn from this thesis will be presented in the final chapter.

## **CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION**

This thesis was conducted to further our knowledge of Canada's 3D approach to foreign and security policy implementation and in particular the extent to which it is a coordination or integration activity. Concurrently, it sought to identify the elements of effective governance that might be evident in the approach. Although the study was able to advance the understanding of these areas, it also ascertained that the term 3D has almost all but disappeared from the vocabulary of foreign and security policy practitioners and that the concept has expanded to include other governmental departments and agencies relevant to the policy development and implementation process. This chapter will address each of these issues by providing a summary of the implications of the case study findings and suggestions for future research. It will conclude with a final comment.

### **Implications of the Case Study Findings**

Coordination or Integration?

Originally presented as an approach that integrates the efforts of the departments

especially evident in longer-term initiatives as actors and departments become more accustomed to their roles within the 3D process.

Shortcomings in the 3D approach which keep it from attaining full integration or collaboration are: the inability to merge professional practices and interventions; and the lack of sharing of mandated authorities and collective accountabilities. Thus, although some aspects of integration or collaboration are displayed, the 3D approach is in effect, a sophisticated coordination mechanism. The implication of this conclusion will become more significant when considered in aggregate as part of the governance considerations.

#### Effective Governance

The study set out to determine if effective governance was being realized by the 3D approach. Based on the theoretical and literature review, a notional whole-of-government governance framework was developed that described the elements necessary for effective governance: structures, leadership, resources, and relationships and shared objectives. Within the sophisticated coordination mechanism that is 3D, elements of effective governance are displayed in all areas, with the exception of one: resources. The theory suggested that pooled resources would enhance the effectiveness the governance of an interdepartmental approach, yet pooled resources were absent in the 3D approach as observed in the Afghanistan and Sudan initiatives. If 3D is to move beyond coordination and become a truly integrative approach, then more effort must be placed on devising mechanisms to pool and employ resources. This will require further engagement of central authorities such as PCO, TBS and Finance and changes to Governmental accountability frameworks. Additionally, an essential requirement to



support the decision-making necessary to employ resources will be the enhanced definition of shared objectives through improved joint analysis and problem definition. Notwithstanding, the approach displayed effective governance across the remaining areas. Structures and relationships were the two areas that displayed the most positive impact on the effectiveness of the approach. Efforts must be made through the application of effective leadership, to continue to maintain and improve the effectiveness of all areas of the governance structure in 3D as a whole, and in each initiative in particular.

#### Whole-of-Government - The New 3D

This thesis found that the term 3D is no longer used by the practitioners and has been supplanted by the term whole-of-government. In practical terms, 3D has been expanded past diplomacy, defence and development to include other departments on a case-by-case basis, as displayed in both the Sudan and Afghanistan initiatives. As an approach or paradigm which describes interaction among departments responsible for the implementation of Canadian foreign and security policy, its utility has expired: whole-of-government is indeed a more accurate term. Nonetheless, the change in terminology does not seem to hamper operation at the working-group level. Actors have conceptually, or in response to new messaging lines, accepted the new terminology and have integrated it into their vocabulary. They have moved past the semantics of the discussion and are focussing on the implementation.

Even though the new terminology has been accepted, it will take time for 3D to disappear from the lexicon. The term still appears verbatim on Government web pages

and in spirit in documents such as the Manley report, albeit sporadically. In order to hasten the extinction of the term, all official messaging needs to be consistent in its use of language.

Although it is probably too late to turn back the clock, as it is usually very difficult to resurrect ancient language, 3D could have been used in a different way that may have been more enduring. Had it been intended to represent 3-dimensional as opposed to the departmental 3D functions, it may have demonstrated more utility and longevity. In that way, it would have implied a more holistic approach to governmental operations. However, whole-of-government is now *de rigueur* as the replacement for 3D, but that new term comes with its own baggage. Does whole-of-government describe any interdepartmental activity both domestic and international, or does it relate solely to the pursuit of international objectives? If it is the latter, then perhaps a new term needs to be introduced to clearly differentiate a boundary between domestic and foreign policy issues. A possible contender could be the “all-encompassing approach (AE approach), although this author reserves that judgement to those more skilled in the linguistic arts.

### **Future Research**

In the process of conducting the research for this thesis, several avenues of further research were discovered. Before discussing the most significant of these, however, the author would also like to share an insight that was gained into the challenges of studying governmental operations.

The reality of studying a contemporary phenomenon such as current interdepartmental interaction is having to react to the dynamic nature in which changes

occur. Noted governance researcher Gerry Stoker cites difficulties in studying a moving phenomenon in that “no sooner is the perspective outlined than the object of study changes.”<sup>173</sup> As a counter-point to this reality, he claims that an evolutionary development of governance is required. This thought was echoed by one interviewee when he suggested that one must realize:

That there is not a beginning, a middle and an end, to how these things are playing out within the bureaucracy. But as we saw [...] from the decision taken two weeks ago [formation of Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan], it is evolutionary.”<sup>174</sup>

Despite this challenge, this thesis has some valuable conclusions about 3D and whole-of-government working and has set the stage as suggested by social researcher Michael Patton for, “hypotheses for future applicability and testing.”<sup>175</sup>

In turning to the possibilities for future research, the first is to consider revisiting the Afghanistan and Sudan cases, but expanding the levels of analysis higher and lower. This would give the advantage of examining whole-of-government working from the strategic level, right down to the tactical level. A wider range of actor viewpoints and documentary evidence could be considered to provide a more rigorous top to bottom analytical study to measure the effectiveness of inter-agency and inter-departmental coordination.

Additionally, the new structure for the Afghanistan file announced on 8 February 2008, which changes the lead department from DFAIT to PCO, appears to be a move to provide the whole-of-government approach with stronger guidance, oversight

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<sup>173</sup> Stoker, *Governance as Theory: Five Propositions*, 26.

<sup>174</sup> Interview D

<sup>175</sup> Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*, 583.

and leadership from the central agency that is demanded by the theory. Once the new structure has had time to establish itself, a study of its implications would be timely. This would serve not only to further examine the Afghanistan initiative, but could expand the understanding of the role that the central agency plays in interdepartmental coordination from policy making through to implementation. Such an examination would be beneficial as the role of PCO, acting as central agency, was viewed as crucial to the process but the extent to which PCO contributed to effective governance of the interdepartmental coordination was not well described.

Third, there are other Canadian examples of whole-of-government and interdepartmental initiatives that could be examined for relevance. A prominent example is Canada's current involvement in Haiti which is seeking to expand departmental involvement by potentially involving the Canadian Coast Guard.

Finally, given the propensity of Canada to act internationally within a coalition or multilateral context, the complexities of a whole-of-government approach will be compounded by the requirement to coordinate with other partners. The term used by both NATO and the UN to represent their "whole-of-organization" approach is "comprehensive approach."<sup>176</sup> The requirement to synchronize policy and action on a broader scale will give rise to expanded governance challenges to ensure effectiveness.

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<sup>176</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary General, "Speech at the Microsoft-BBC-NATO - Defence Leaders Forum Noordwijk Aan Zee 23 April 2007," NATO, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070423a.html>; Internet; accessed 31 March 2008; and United Nations Security Council, "Press Release SC/7014: Security Council Addresses Comprehensive Approach to Peace-Building," <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7014.doc.htm>; Internet; accessed 31 March, 2008.

### **A Final Comment**

This thesis has demonstrated that a “counter-operational” mentality does not exist amongst the practitioners interviewed, which is most likely essential to the success of the Canada’s Afghanistan and Sudan initiatives. As is often the case in many other settings, negative attitudes, ineffective governance structures and even a lack of resources can often be overcome by shared visioning, enthusiasm for collective action and the drive for mission accomplishment to find a common solution to a common problem. It is precisely this latter attitude in its practitioners, aided by the appropriate resources, structures and tools, that Canada requires in order to further refine its whole-of-government approach, or whatever the next term will be, in order to ensure that Canada’s foreign and security policy is implemented effectively and efficiently for the benefit of Canadians in the years ahead.

## Appendix 1

### **Information Letter: Individual Research Project – Making ‘Whole-of-Government’ Work: Identifying an Effective Governance Model for Canadian 3D Missions**

February 2008

Dear Colleague,

My name is Richard Pamplin and I am currently a student at Canadian Forces College pursuing a master’s degree in defence studies. In partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree, I am completing an individual research project entitled “Making ‘Whole-of-Government’ Work: Identifying an Effective Governance Model for Canadian 3D Missions.” To assist me with this project, I am requesting approximately one hour of your time to participate in a one-on-one interview. I would like to provide you with more information about this project and what your involvement would entail, should you choose to participate.

Canada has added a new dimension to international interventions by combining the efforts and effects of several federal departments into the whole-of-government approach. This concept was prominent in the 2005 International Policy Statement and is alternatively referred to as the 3D approach, representing the key players of defence, diplomacy, and development. Despite the apparent successes of current missions such as in Afghanistan and Sudan, there is no formalized method of organizing the 3D approach at various levels. In fact, the co-ordination and application is different depending on the size and requirements of the intervention. What is unclear is how decisions are made, resources allocated and more importantly, who is accountable. The goal of this project is to contribute to a better and more up-to-date understanding of the 3D approach and inter-departmental working. It will address questions such as: how are the various government departments involved in the 3D approach interacting with each other? The focus of this study is at the interdepartmental working group level and the members from the various departments will be interviewed to determine their perspectives on the 3D approach. It is anticipated that information gathered from this project will aid in deeper understanding of inter-departmental working and will improve the effectiveness of whole-of-government approaches.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. It will involve participating in a single one-on-one personal interview to discuss issues of interdepartmental working in the context of a Canadian foreign policy intervention abroad. The interview will be approximately one hour in duration, conducted at a mutually convenient location by myself.

The information that you provide in the interview is considered completely confidential and I ask that you do not identify or name specific individuals during your interview. The interview will be recorded with your consent, and will be kept in a secure location to

which only I will have access. If you wish, you can choose not to be tape-recorded but still participate in an interview. The content of your interview will not be made available or accessible to anyone other than me. Results communicated or reported will contain no identifying information. If excerpts from interviews are to be used in reports or publications, under no circumstances will identifying characteristics be reported. All notes, recordings and transcripts will be destroyed upon receipt of the grade for the project.

On completion of the project, a paper will be submitted to Canadian Forces College for marking and may be considered for submission to a variety of journals. If you wish a copy, one will be provided to you.

If after reading this letter you have any questions regarding this project or would like additional information, please feel free to contact me at 416-482-6800 Ext. 8225.

Thank you in advance for your interest in this project - it is greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

Richard A. Pamplin  
Major  
Student – Joint Command and Staff Program 34  
[pamplin@cfc.dnd.ca](mailto:pamplin@cfc.dnd.ca)

## **Appendix 2    Interview Guide**

### **(Topic Categories and Sample Questions/Probes)**

#### **Introductory Remarks**

- Introduce myself; explain: who I am; general purpose of the research; its relevance and potential benefit to the departments; why I am conducting the interview; general format of the interview; and time commitment.
- Review of confidentiality/anonymity (i.e. something you say or part of your experience may be documented in the report, but no identifying information will be included). Your experience will be compared to that of other members involved in the process and reported in aggregate, with no identifying information.
- Ask if any questions or if any clarification is needed.

#### **The current initiative**

- Could you describe the current interdepartmental initiative that you are involved in? Title? Composition? Mandated mission (goals)?
- Can you describe a typical work cycle? (How often does the group meet? Consultations between meetings? What are the outputs of the group? Are there deliverables? Reports?

#### **Structures**

- How does the working group function? Is there a format? Agenda? Chairman? Is there agreement on these issues?
- Are there any formal agreements between departments? (example)
- Is the structure of the group purpose-built for this initiative, or is it based on another initiative or model?
- Are there any incentives to working inter-departmentally? For the department?
- To whom (entity, not name) is the group accountable? Does this accountability ever conflict with your own departmental accountability?
- Can you describe the commitment to the initiative? By departments? By individuals?

#### **Resources**

- Does the group control any resources (money, personnel) to apply to the initiative? If so, how are decisions made to their employment?



- Where can you, or the group, go for help in improving the process of working together across departments? Are there guidance or best practices documents?
- How do you perceive the process? Useful? Time-consuming?

### **Leadership**

- Does the group have a leader, appointed or otherwise? If yes, does the leadership style facilitate inter-departmental working and group cohesion?
- How do the members of the group view working inter-departmentally? Is there anyone that stands out as a vocal advocate for the group and its goals? How is the group viewed from within your department amongst leaders?
- Is there an overriding loyalty, such as to the department vice the initiative?
- Has there ever been formal recognition for successes of the group? For individuals in the group?
- Is any emphasis placed on the skills required to work in a group setting such as facilitative networking, collaborative goal-setting, and group accountability? Have you ever received any training in any of these areas?

### **Relationships**

- On this initiative, do you only work with specified members from other governmental departments OGD? Do the members of the group change? By person? By position? Do you seek out others from OGD? Do they seek you out to work with?
- In doing your work, do you need inputs (or outputs) from other OGD members of the group? If so, how do you interact with them? Share information? Is there sharing in other areas, such as expertise?
- Do you feel that trust is important in the functioning of the group? (example)
- Is there a cultural difference between the departments? Does this aid or hinder the initiative?

### **Shared Objectives**

- Is there an over-arching strategy for the group? Was it developed by the group? Provided from a higher level? It from your own department?
- How is information gathered? From one or more department(s)? By the group as a whole? How is information exchanged? (example)
- How are problems defined?

- How are the group's objectives and goals formed?
- Do you think that one departments' objectives and goals override other departments' objectives and goals? Are the other departments' supportive of those objectives? How are conflicts resolved? Do departmental positions become diluted in the process?
- How are results measured? By the group? By the individual departments?

### **Terminology**

- Are the following terms ever used? (In what context? (example); what does it mean?)
  - Whole-of-government
  - 3D
  - Horizontal Management?
  - Horizontal initiative?
  - Joined-up government?
  - Coordination?
  - Collaboration?
  - Partnership?

### **Personal Perceptions**

- Is it beneficial to the outcomes of the group? To your department? To you?
- Are there any incentives for you to work inter-departmentally?

### **General Discussion**

- Is there anything else about the process that you think is important?
- Are there any documents (presentations, minutes of meetings, reports) that you feel could be useful in my research? (If yes, confirm delivery method)

### **Closing the Interview**

- If I have further questions or would like to clarify any points later, do you have any objection to me calling you?
- Are you interested in receiving the completed research paper? (If yes, verify mailing, e-mail address) - Thank You – leave contacts for potential follow-up

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