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MASTERS DEFENCE STUDIES

NOTHING NEW: THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND TRANSITION OPERATIONS

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Abstract

The Contemporary Operating Environment has transformed expeditionary military operations into complex interagency undertakings. The complexities now found in the operating environment have unhinged the traditional linear approach that nation-building once enjoyed. As a result, there is a requirement for militaries to effectively integrate all stakeholders in order to achieve initial and interim transitional momentum for eventual handover to civilian agencies and organizations. This paper contends that although the Contemporary Operating Environment may be something new to modern day militaries that have changed their approach to the conduct of operations, militaryled transitional operations are nothing new. It will also argue that in the absence of interagency transitional doctrine, the challenges that have materialized have created parallel efforts amongst government departments and agencies that serve to create diverging vice converging efforts. In order to create convergence, initial and interim transitional activities should managed by a military-led interagency transition structure thereby creating increased effectiveness and efficiencies. A military-led transitional structure that is properly resourced, therefore, would be able to integrate the necessary stakeholders in order to achieve and perpetuate unity of purpose towards the achievement of interim transitional momentum.

Abstract	ii
Table of Contents	iii
List of Figures	
Figure 1: The Cycle of Conflict	6
Figure 2: Stages of Conflict Resolution	8
Figure 3: Capability-Capacity Gap	9
Figure 4: Non-linear nature and the aspect of Spectrum of Conflict Quadrants that	
exist within each.	18
Figure 5: The Joint Campaign Construct	21
Figure 6: Canadian Army 2011 Brigade Headquarters Structure	78
Figure 7: Proposed Transitions Branch	80
Figure 8: Capability Development at the Operational Level	82
Figure 9: Nesting Capability Development within the Strategic Framework	83

Chapter

1.	Introduction	1
2.	The Contemporary Operating Environment	4
3.	Historical Examples and Their Relevance	21
4.	Transitions and the Dilemma of Interagency	43
5.	Transitional Structures	58
6.	A Proposed Operating Framework	67
7.	Bibliography	81

The essential questions for Canada are: how do we move from a military role to a civilian one, and how do we oversee a shift in responsibility for Afghanistan's security from the international community to Afghans themselves?¹

The Contemporary Operating Environment has transformed how militaries must approach and function within the 21st Century's spectrum of conflict and beyond. Although not relegated to the pages of military history books, the predominant bipolar nature of military operations in the 20^{th} Century – defensive at one end and offensive at the other – and the enabling operations that are undertaken to link the two can no longer be considered as a straightforward undertaking in a rapidly evolving globalized environment. The conduct of Transition Operations within the Contemporary Operating Environment, therefore, has become a concurrent, interagency endeavour initially led by military expeditionary forces. Success requires all of the functional components of a nation's power to operate in a concurrent, coordinated and complementary manner. For the purpose of this paper, Transition Operations will be defined as those initial militaryled interagency activities that seek to establish an environment where international or regional recognized non-military organizations and agencies can continue to successfully empower local, regional, and national institutions towards realistic and acceptable selfsustaining governance activities.² This definition can be considered as a compromise

¹ Canada. *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan [The Manley Report]*. (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 4.

² United States doctrine articulates that the Civil Affairs mission ".is to engage and influence the civil populace by planning, executing, and transitioning Civil affairs operation in Army, joint, interagency and multinational operations to support commanders in engaging he civil component of their operational environment, in order to enhance civil-military operations and other stated U.S. objectives before, during, or after other military operations." Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 3-05.40 (FM 41-10) *Civil Affairs Operations: September 2006, 1-1*. Canadian Army doctrine defines Stability Operations as "tactical

between the military-civilian dynamic of what Transition Operations "do" within the Contemporary Operating Environment.³ Whereas Stability Operations deal with the tactical and as such force freedom of manoeuvre and force protection, Transition Operations can be viewed as operational-level activities that assist in the establishing key democratic attributes that are absent in conflict zones.⁴

The simultaneity of activity that military forces must undertake and the omnidirectional dynamics that requires the engagement and incorporation of all government and non-governmental players, which has been considerably exacerbated within the contemporary battlespace as a result of globalization, is not new. The Canadian Defence, Diplomacy, Development and Commerce (3D+C) operating concept, what is now referred to as the Whole of Government or Comprehensive Approach, Krulak's Three Block War, Fourth Generation Warfare, Hybrid War, etc., in themselves can be considered as suitable metaphors to describe the Contemporary Operating Environment.

⁴ Tolerance, compromise, and willingness to peacefully settle disputes are considered key democratic attributes. *Ibid.*, 230.

operations conducted by military forces in conjunction with other agencies to maintain, restore and establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved." Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Land Operations (DRAFT)*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007), 7-90/169.

³ A number of documents and sources were researched but no definitive lexicon was found defining Transition Operations. The closest was Transition Support Operations, which ". . . often involve the process of moving from a coalition military authority or UN peace support operation to an indigenous political authority." United States. Headquarters, Department of the Army. *FM 3-05.40 (FM 41-10) Civil Affairs Operations*. . ., A-2. Within United Nations doctrine, Transitional Administrations are international management organs that initially implement and then oversee state-building, law and order, democratization, and economic reconstruction peacebuilding initiatives, traditionally within a post-conflict environment, for subsequent handover to an interim, indigenous political institution and eventually a democratically elected one. Allex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin. *Understanding Peacekeeping*. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006), 234-237.

The notion that military engagements will only have one centre of gravity can no longer be considered realistic. Today's military operations have become extremely complex and dynamic. The bipolar spectrum that militaries operated within, a spectrum that was doctrinally linked by what are now referred to as enabling operations, can no longer be considered an appropriate and lasting remedy for conflict resolution in today's security environment.⁵ The widened scope and complexity of campaign activities and the importance that transition operations have within today's Contemporary Operating Environment, as well as the future's, speaks to the holistic approach that must be embraced in order to achieve mission success. The context in which expeditionary operations have transformed and the adaptability that modern military planning and operations must embrace has signalled both a conceptual and doctrinal shift on how military operations must now be conducted. More importantly, however, is how the capacities and capabilities of non-military agencies and organizations must be integrated as essential components of a military campaign design and vice versa. Transition Operations and the effective integration of all stakeholders will create the necessary unity of purpose for achieving mission success given the geopolitical fragility that has resulted from globalization.

Chapter One of this paper will commence with a brief description of the Contemporary Operating Environment. It will then provide an analysis of current transitional doctrine and how the creation of capability-capacity gap has influenced how military forces operate within the Cycle of Conflict. As a basis for comparison, Chapter

⁵ Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (U.S.). *Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment*. (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2006), 61.

Two will provide two historical perspectives and how lessons learned from them continue to be relevant and applicable to 21st Century Transition Operations. Chapter Three will review why we have yet to fully embrace the challenges that the Contemporary Operating Environment presents given parallel efforts that interagency stove piping creates. With regards to transitional structures, Chapter Four will review, based upon current American initiatives, how a better-structured military-led interagency headquarters could create increased effectiveness and efficiencies in transition functionality through the mitigation of competing interdepartmental prerogatives and organizational cultures; mitigation would facilitate the convergence of interagency efforts vice limited ad hoc concentrations. Finally, Chapter Five will provide a proposed operating framework and recommendations for a transitional capability within the Canadian expeditionary headquarters structure in order to better integrate the omni-directional tendencies found within contemporary transitional operations that serve to overwhelm unity of purpose.

<u>CHAPTER ONE – THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT</u>

The Contemporary Operating Environment emerged as a result of continued globalization and the ever-increasing sophistication of military technologies and to some degree the continued ignorance of the human dimension of conflict. Sophistication of military technology has also allowed some militaries to conduct Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO).⁶ As a result, asymmetric operating environments have now replaced the conventional military engagements that Western technologically advanced militaries enjoyed within a symmetrical battlespace framework, such as that witnessed during the Cold War. The asymmetric battlespace is often characterized by what has been referred to by some as complex terrain. Complex terrain often enables a technologically inferior adversary the ability to more fully converge their strengths and weaknesses in a way that "levels the playing field" with a technologically superior adversary. As a result, physical security alone can no longer provide a stable and secure environment for friendly forces and has become but only one dimension of what is now often coined as a complex human security environment.

Canadian military activities within the 20th Century's Future Security Environment were based upon a Continuum of Operations and within a United Nations construct, the Spectrum of Peace Operations.⁷ The Continuum of Operations foresaw military forces conducting specific operations somewhere along a linear line with peace representing one end of the spectrum and total war the other. Within this spectrum, military forces would conduct operations against an adversary that was of Clausewitzian structure. The Continuum of Operations served to establish which military activities were to occur within the Intervention,

⁶ Brian G. Watson "Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force Structure," <u>www.StrtegicStudiesInstitute.army.mil</u>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2008.

⁷ Whereas the Spectrum of Operations views peace at one end and total war at the other, the Spectrum of Peace Support operations views the reverse albeit not as intense (Peacemaking-Peacekeeping-Peace Enforcement-Peace Building).

Stabilization, and Normalization Phases of the Cycle of Conflict between two or more 'border contained' belligerents (Figure 1). The type of military activity that is to be conducted is dependent upon what phase the conflict is in. Prevention of armed conflict erupting is initially pursued through diplomatic efforts, which can take the form of sanctions, the threat of military deployment (preventive deployment) or the actual employment of military force. In the event that diplomatic efforts fail and armed conflict between the two parties erupts, the emphasis of international activity transitions to the Intervention Phase where conflict de-escalation occurs; emphasis is initially placed upon military intervention although other methods of intervention may or are pursued.




Figure 1: The Cycle of Conflict

Source: Adaptation from *POE 210 – Introduction to Peacekeeping Course Notes*, *57-58*.

There are four tracks of intervention employed in conflict resolution. Track 1 – involvement of international and regional organizations such as the United Nations or Organization of American States (OAS) - become engaged with the key regional and/or institutional actors, such as political or military leaders, warlords or faction leaders in order to negotiate some form of mutually satisfying agreement. These organizations may use the threat of force to achieve desirable outcomes. Track 2 – involvement of international non-governmental and other unofficial organizations – are engaged with the mid-level actors involved in the conflict. They rely on their ability to mediate and facilitate the incorporation of mutually agreed upon solutions given that they usually lack any form of coercive power. Track 3 – engagement of local community leaders, governments and organizations – focus on the development of social cohesion within their areas of influence so that conflict resolution also becomes a bottomup process. Finally, Multi-track intervention is the complementary and simultaneous employment of Tracks 1 through 3. No one popular track is more effective than the rest given that effectiveness of which track of intervention to employ is dependent upon the root cause of the conflict, the balance of power that exists, whether the conflict is symmetrical or asymmetrical, and the escalating nature of the conflict itself. This multi-dimensional environment in effect requires the engagement of all levels - to varying degrees - of each track of intervention. During the Intervention Phase, therefore, peacemaking and humanitarian operations are conducted, which will consist of both combat and non-combat operations, both of which may be occurring simultaneously.

Successful conflict de-escalation, the separation of combative forces, and the cessation of hostilities enable transition to the Stabilization Phase where military operations and forces are reduced and replaced by increased civilian international and non-governmental nation building capacities and organizations. These three phases of conflict can be further sub-divided into stages of conflict resolution, namely: Prevention, Mitigation, Termination, and Recovery (refer Figure 2). However, the high tempo in which military operations are now conducted have created a capability-capacity gap (refer Figure 3) where timely and effective build-up of non-military international organizations and agencies does not occur. As a result, the nexus of effective and efficient integration and transition during the stabilization phase from military to non-military activity has become short-circuited.




Figure 2. Stages of Conflict Resolution

Source: Adaptation from *POE 210 – Introduction to Peacekeeping Course Notes, 57-58.*




Figure 3: Capability-Capacity Gap.

Source: Watson, Reshaping the Expeditionary Army, 5

During the Stabilization Phase military activities will take the form of both Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement operations in order to assist in maintaining the Rule of Law. Military activities will also seek to facilitate, monitor, and if necessary, re-enforce implementation of the negotiated peace agreement or settlement. Upon successful implementation of the peace agreement and the emergence of a sustainable peace where local bodies governing bodies and authorities begin to become predominant with international civil assistance, the presence and need for military forces become reduced. Referred to as the Normalization Phase, remaining military capabilities continue to focus upon limited and "as required" Peace Enforcement Operations. As well, military forces may lend support to Peace Building initiatives and activities. The context in which conflict is now managed within the Contemporary Operating Environment alienates this linear approach that late-20th Century conflict resolution enjoyed given that the forces opposed to nation building are not amenable to negotiation and "....[lack a] fundamental legal respect towards civilians and noncombatants. ..[and] by extension . ..[have] no appreciation of the humanitarian ethic."⁸ The east-west Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in a linear progression to conflict resolution where traditional diplomacy, or what is referred to as "power politics", was employed to create tangible non-military and military coercive conditions. Conflict resolution in this context, therefore, sought to leverage upon common interests in order to

⁸ Christopher Spearin. "Private Security Companies and Humanitarians: A Corporate Solution to Securing Humanitarian Spaces." *International Peacekeeper*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 2001), 25.

avoid military super-power confrontation.⁹ There is some current thought that acknowledges that international conflict resolution mechanisms, designed to remedy state versus state conflict, are applicable to the resolution of intrastate conflict. Compounding conflict resolution within the Contemporary Operating Environment is the clash of opposing goals vice the determination of common interests. As such, the ability to contain a conflict within a set of prescribed and agreed upon norms, the fostering of peaceful dialogue, by proscribing violence as a dispute settling activity, and establishing rules for limited types of violence that may be condoned, have unhinged the linear nature of traditional conflict resolution.¹⁰ As put forward in *Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges:*

... governments involved in [Low Intensity Conflict] have filtered low-intensity conflict through their own politico-military biases without subjecting those biases to an examination of the cultural and historical factors that lead to the evolution of effective doctrine, strategy, and force employment.¹¹

Focus on the Cold War conventional war, therefore, can be seen as

overshadowing the "lesser wars" that were peripheral to superpower interests.

⁹ Committee of International Conflict Resolution. "Conflict resolution in a Changing World," in *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War*, edited by Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, 1-37. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000. *http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309070279&page=1; Internet; accessed 4 April 2008.*

¹⁰ Conflict resolution is defined as ". . .efforts to prevent or mitigate violence resulting from intergroup or interstate conflict as well as efforts to reduce the underlying disagreements." Conflict resolution consists of four strategies, those being power politics, conflict transformation, structural prevention, and normative change. *Ibid.*, 2 and 5.

¹¹ Stephen Blank, Lawrence E. Grinter, Karl P. Magyar, Lewis B. Ware, and Bynum E. Weathers. *Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges*. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1990), 318.

PHYSICAL SECURITY VERSUS HUMAN SECURITY

In densely populated and complex terrain, "Retirement" to a safe area no longer guarantees physical security simply as a result of having technologically advanced capabilities such as Command and Control, Computer, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) capabilities. Physical security in an asymmetric environment often becomes reliant upon being absorbed within conclusive indigenous population densities. This operational dynamic highlights the need for interagency integration and the initial subjugation of old organizational cultures. This aspect of integration and subjugation is necessary given the limitations that the littoral urban operating environment places upon more traditional physical security capabilities and capacities. Simply stated, the physical, human, and informational dynamics that are inherent to complex terrain can effectively marginalize what would be an overwhelming technical and tactical superiority in a symmetrical environment. Given this reality, fighting the last war or fulfilling humanitarian aid tasks based upon ritualized organizational cultures and beliefs prevents forward thinking while serving to marginalize those disenfranchised by the conflict environment. "Routinization", therefore, may create "gaps" within a campaign structure that can be exploited by adversarial elements.¹² Adversaries often impair military potency by avoiding confrontation with its strengths and attacking its weaknesses.

¹²Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (U.S.). *Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment*. (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2006), 62.

An increasing emphasis on human security has occurred as a result of two dynamics. First, global trade and the resultant restructuring that have ensued in order to allow governments to take advantage of growing international capital. This access has increased the disparity between the "haves and have-nots" of international society. Second, the end of the Cold War has rendered obsolete what was once a definable threat in terms of Western collective security. Human security involves military, political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions. These dimensions and the inter-play that each have towards the two major components underlying human security, "freedom from fear and freedom from want"¹³, play an equally important role in the Cycle of Conflict and how militaries must operate within the Contemporary Operating Environment.¹⁴ The implications upon military operations that the human security agenda has wrought are such that government agencies and non-government and international organizations must now consider the context of how security and nation building should be defined, viewed, achieved, and maintained given that the "security of [a] state can no longer be the only object that is the 'referent object' of security."¹⁵

Within the 20th Century's symmetrical operating environment security and nation building were somewhat easy to define and address given the geopolitical polarization

¹³ Simon Dalby. *Human security: environmental dimensions of a contested concept.* (Paper for the Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Workshop on "Taking Human Security Seriously," Meech Lake Conference Centre, Quebec, 24 July, 1998), 7.

¹⁴ Cycle of Conflict is the Intervention, Stabilization and Normalization within a conflict area where international civil and military agencies/organizations and local bodies interact in establishing an enduring peace. The Spectrum of Peace Operations is Conflict Prevention, conflict mitigation through Humanitarian and Peace Making efforts, termination of conflict and Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations, and recovery through Peace Building Operations. *POE 210 – Introduction to Peacekeeping Course Notes*. (Kingston: The Royal Military College Distance Learning, 2007), 57-58.

¹⁵ Dalby, *Human security...*, 6.

that was associated with the Cold War. As such, materiel, financial, and human resources could be more easily rationalized, mobilized, and apportioned within the conflict environment. The ability to do so within today's Contemporary Operating Environment where a unified, collaborative and comprehensive approach must exist becomes increasingly complex given the omni-directional dynamics and the overlap of competing development priorities. Defined as the Comprehensive Approach to operations, Full Spectrum Operations seek to be integrated with and supportive of the campaign themes that they are occurring within.¹⁶ The interplay, interdependence, and dynamics associated with each human security dimension influences the permissiveness and effectiveness of local, regional and international activities given that the establishment of security within any contemporary conflict must now go far beyond just simply addressing the physical threat. As such, resource allocation towards intervention initiatives in the new human security dynamic competes with traditionally held views that the state was the referent object of security. As a result, the economic, political, societal and environmental dimensions and their integration into a campaign framework are now just as essential in the establishment of a stable and enduring security environment as the military dimension is.

Compounding the ability of effective intervention is the inability to accurately define and as a result, effectively understand or contextualize the complexities of the

¹⁶ Comprehensive approach is defined as "the application of commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular environment. . . . The comprehensive approach brings together all the elements of power and other agencies needed to create enduring solutions to a campaign." Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Land Operations, DRAFT 2007*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007), 5-15/85. Full-Spectrum Operations are defined as "[t]he simultaneous conduct of operations by a force across the spectrum of conflict." B-GL-300-001/FP-001, 7-7/169.

threat and their knock-on effects. Religious and tribal differences, such as the divisions that are currently fuelling conflict in Iraq, and the drug, sex, human smuggling and illegal weapons trades, proliferation of transnational crime, epidemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS and the "transportability" that each possess render purely military initiatives in *"tackling [these] economic and social phenomenon"*¹⁷ ineffective and inadequate. Given these dynamics military operations within the Contemporary Operating Environment has become a dynamic, multifaceted, military-civilian endeavour that continues to evolve. However, in the absence of a peaceful resolution, activities to bring about near and mid-term stability must remain military-led.

The unique interplay that exists between principles for success within the Contemporary Operating Environment can be predicated upon which stage within the Cycle of Conflict forces are operating within or a mission's transition therein. Although Canadian doctrine refers to peacekeeping operations under the banner of Operations Other Than War where concomitant humanitarian and combat and non-combat operations occur, the realities that the Contemporary Operating Environment brings to play necessitates that the components of a nation's or nations' powers must be brought together. Interagency cooperation, therefore, must be generated, deployed and employed in such a manner that concurrent issues management and their remediation across the human security spectrum can be effectively dealt with in a coordinated and integrated approach. This integrative approach speaks to that aspect where main efforts and centres

¹⁷ Dalby, *Human security...*, 10.

of gravity are not only both complimentary but also interchangeable. The emergence of contemporary concepts such as the Three Block, Hybrid, and Fourth Generation Wars and the necessary interagency activities needed in order to bring about longer-term stability within the Contemporary Operating Environment will continue to have a "push and pull" effect on all agencies engaged in the contemporary conflict environment. This push and pull effect will challenge the traditional notions surrounding a military's ability to function within a physical security framework vice a human security framework. Whereas operations conducted within the mindset of a physical security framework may be considered ineffective as a means to creating a lasting peace within a conflict area, its applicability and supporting characteristics certainly remains of great importance in any nation building effort.

Since the Korean War Canadian military operations have tended to be relatively "static" endeavours that operated within relatively permissive, low-threat Spectrum of Conflict environment. These low-threat environments allowed for economies to be achieved with regards to materiél and human resources. Needless to say, transition operations in the late 20th Century have predominantly witnessed Canadian forces become expert in the Relief In-place given continued Government of Canada commitment to both established and enduring United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization missions and the rotational structure that the Canadian Forces has adopted for force generation and employment processes. It should be noted that on average two months of a six- to seven-month tour within the Canadian force employment stage, nearly one-third of the force's employment, has been concerned with an enabling operation, the Relief In-place, when viewed at the tactical and operational levels. Recent experiences, most notably the Canadian Forces transition from Kabul to Kandahar in 2005-06, and the subsequent operations that have been conducted since consolidation in Kandahar, has highlighted that the Contemporary Operating Environment has created the need for military forces to constantly operate within a transition operations spectrum with defensive and offensive operations as supporting vice the opposite which traditional doctrine espoused.¹⁸ This latter point speaks to the ease in which force posture could be assumed and the clear delineation of responsibilities within a traditional United Nations or North Atlantic Treaty Organization mission between agencies. When compared to missions now, the lack of a clear delineation of force postures that restrict the activities of non-military forces. Expanding upon Figure 3, Figure 4 is illustrative of the complexity that has now evolved and the need for integration of military and non-military organizations.

¹⁸ New draft Canadian Army doctrine has articulated what was once Transition Operations (Advance to Contact, Withdrawal, Relief In-place, Link-up, etc.) as Enabling Operations. Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Land Operations, DRAFT 2007*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007), 3-25/30.




Figure 4: Non-linear nature and the aspect of Spectrum of Conflict Quadrants that exist within each.

THE AMERICAN APPROACH

American doctrine views transition operations as Phase IV operations within a campaign plan or what has been more pragmatically referred to as Reconstruction and Stability Operations. The purpose of Reconstruction and Stability Operations is to re-establish critical infrastructure in order to address the post-conflict humanitarian environment. As well, Reconstruction and Stability Operations establish the conditions necessary for nation-building activities, initially conducted under a military authority, to transfer to civilian control. American doctrine identifies four possible scenarios in which transition will occur:¹⁹

- A coalition military force conducting a Relief In-place with another coalition military force.
- A coalition military force conducting a handover to either civilian (regional?) or United Nations authority.
- In accordance with the appropriate United Nations Charter or authorized rules of engagement, escalation or de-escalation of military operations (Enabling Operations conducted?).
- A coalition military force handing over to a national government.

¹⁹ ABCA Armies. *Coalition Operations Handbook*. (Arlington, Virginia: Primary Standardization Office, ABCA, 2005), 6-1 and 6-2.

American doctrine prescribes that Reconstruction and Stability Operations fall under the responsibility of a geographic combatant commander. Although it is the intheatre ambassador who acts on behalf of the Department of State and is the individual that is overall responsible for the supervision and direction of the Department's foreign assistance program within the conflict area concerned, it is the combatant commander who is responsible for the planning and conduct of Reconstruction and Stability Operations within the context of the regional military strategy. As such, the combatant commander is responsible for ensuring that interagency coordination occurs within the conflict area.²⁰ However, the dynamics that the Contemporary Operating Environment presents has resulted in an evolution on how the planning and conduct of combat and non-combat have become phased. Figure 5 depicts how the phasing for the planning and conduct of military operations has evolved from four to what is now the six phases of the American Joint Campaign Construct.

²⁰ United States. Headquarters, Department of the Army. *FM 3-07 (FM 100-20) Stability Operations and Support Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2003), A-20.




Figure 5: The Joint Campaign Construct.

Source: United States. Government Accountability Office. *GAO-07-549 Military Operations*, 15

The Joint Campaign Construct presented at Figure 5 still retains a linear approach that is typical of mechanistic organizations. Westernized, the mechanistic organizations are suited to stable operating environments and as such, processes and procedures tend to adhere to programmed established norms.²¹ This mechanistic and programmed approach can be viewed as why military planning processes follow a linear vice non-linear construct. In the end, the human dimension to conflict injects ambiguous context into an operational environment where the demarcation between military-civilian causes and effects become blurred. When applied to the model at Figure 4, it becomes obvious that

²¹ Gary Dessler and Frederick A. Starke. *Management: Principals and Practices for Tomorrow's* Leaders -2^{nd} Canadian Edition. (Toronto: Pearson Education Canada Inc., 2004), 134 and 266.

the Joint Campaign Construct must become adaptive to the non-linear operating environment that the Contemporary Operating Environment demands. More simply stated, conflict resolution within the Contemporary Operating Environment cannot be a linear problem solving construct where clear handover points from military to nonmilitary organizations can be rigidly established.

THE SEPARATION OF "CHURCH AND STATE"

Upon the transition from short-term military-centric operations to longerterm civilian-centric operations, the potential for the conflict to continue or the ability to successfully manage aspects of the transition can become undermined. If the very same military forces that were used to contain, control, and counter conflict activities transition or attempt to transition to undertake civilian-centric operations, an atmosphere can be created where organizations that rely upon neutrality and impartiality for "operational freedom" loose legitimacy in the eyes of the indigenous population that they are there to assist. Given that main efforts and centres of gravity become much more bureaucratically focused, the ability for military forces that were once engaged in combat operations to be seen as apolitical becomes untenable given the dissassociative nature that NGOs seek.²²

²² NGOs operating within NATO Areas of Operation, such as Angola and Somalia have been compromised as a result of the perceptions that since the NGO and the military were working in close proximity to each other, they lost local trust and were seen as taking sides to the conflict. Francis Kofi Abiew. "NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations," in *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, edited by Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond, 24-39. (London, England: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 31.

Greater focus must not only be placed upon the creation of transitional administrations not only at the strategic level, but of emerging greater importance, at the tactical-operational levels. As with the Canadian Forces current engagement in Afghanistan, it's main effort, the Afghan Compact and the integration, deconfliction, management, and development of the human security dimensions and their respective enablers speaks to the need for greater interagency integration and coordination, something that can only effectively occur at the tactical-operational levels.²³ Although unity of purpose may exist within the operating environment, unity of effort can suffer given that the military-humanitarian interface, whether it is in the form of the military force enabling NGOs or the military fulfilling humanitarian tasks, given that the creation and maintenance of a "humanitarian space" becomes blurred. Military and NGO humanitarian initiatives and activities may invite unintended secondand third-order consequences. These unintended consequences may develop a negative perception amongst the indigenous population towards non-military agencies.²⁴ This last point can lead to countervailing momentums within the humanitarian space between military and civilian agencies and as a result, an unintended mismanagement or misleading of indigenous population expectations.

²³ "The [Afghan] Compact sets out detailed outcomes, benchmarks, timelines for delivery and mutual obligations that aim to ensure greater coherence of efforts between the Afghan government and the international community." The compact deals with capacity building in: security; governance, human rights and the rule of law; and economic and social development. Government of Canada. "Canada and the Afghanistan Compact." <u>http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/contrib_ands-en.asp;</u> Internet; accessed 21 April 2008.

²⁴ Espen Barth Eide, Anja Kaspersen, Randoplh Kent, and Karen von Hippel. "Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations". Independent Study For the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, May 2005.

http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&DocId=1003352; Internet; accessed November 2007, 30 and 31.

CHAPTER TWO – HISTORICAL EXAMPLES AND THEIR RELEVANCE

Originally published in 1940 and re-published in 2005 for informational purposes only, The United States Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual* can be considered a publication that remains relevant to the Contemporary Operating Environment. Defined as "[t]he ordinary expedition of the Marine Corps which does not involve a major effort in regular warfare against a first-rate power...²⁵ the "Small Wars" concept views the involvement of the United States State Department limited to the macro sphere of political issues thereby requiring the "...*earnest cooperation between State Department representatives and naval authorities.*²⁶ This contextual aspect speaks to a structural approach where junior State Department representatives are required to work alongside military authorities in order to solve problems "... that might involve the United States in serious difficulties."²⁷

The *Small Wars Manual* posits that, as a result of the threat environment, an occupying military force establishes a military government given that local governance and security structures are unable to provide for or maintain the public order necessary

²⁵ United States Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2005), 1-2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 34.

for the protection of life and property.²⁸ As such, the military government that is established by an occupying force serves to dominate, in extreme circumstances, all functions and branches of civil administration. Put more simply, the occupying military force is operating on behalf of a sovereign government that cannot in itself exercise effective control outside of its immediate power base. It is important to note that the military government constitutes a separate staff branch within the overall military headquarters structure but still remains responsible to the force commander.

The structure of the military government articulated in the *Small Wars Manual* clearly speaks to the interagency/intra-governmental efforts that are found in today's Contemporary Operating Environment. The military governor and civil affairs staff are organized along the following functional components: public works and utilities (to include mining, agriculture, forestry and fisheries); fiscal affairs (public finances, taxes, excises, banking, postal service, state insurance, foreign commerce, and customs service); sanitation and public health, schools and charitable institutions, legal department; the constabulary.²⁹ This structure is replicated at subordinate-level headquarters and is based upon extant territorial districts in order to ensure community integrity. Territorial districts are placed under control of a respective tactical-level commander and as security and stability gains traction and expands outwards, the sphere of civilian-led administration follows.³⁰ A take away point is what the *Manual* refers to as the "….

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 2, Chap 13-3.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6, Chap 13-8.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16, Chap 13-16.

coextension with political sub-divisions . . . *[which] subordinates tactical considerations to the necessities of civil administration*. ^{,,31} This simply means that as much as possible, maintenance of achieved civil administrative practices should be allowed to continue with a minimum of interference from renewed combat operations.

As evidenced by the Small Wars Manual, transition operations are nothing new. Operation Eclipse, the military occupation of Germany at the end of World War Two, was the transition operation that was to be successive to Operation Overlord during 1945-1946. Focusing upon post-conflict activities, Operation Eclipse coordinated and controlled the rebuilding of Germany's civil governance system and structures. The military-led, post-conflict transitional activities served as the "bridg[ing] link between *war and peace.*³² Given the complexity of the operating environment of the time, planners determined that the functional components of the operation would foresee a smooth implementation of post-conflict processes. Facilitated by trained military personnel who possessed relevant professional civilian administrative backgrounds, rebuilding activities would focus upon the continuation of policing and basic civil administrative functions, displaced persons and refugees, prisoner of war exchange, preventing the emergence of a health "catastrophe", military ordnance disposal and destruction, preventing the emergence of any German resistance activities (ie. resurgence of an underground Nazi movement), re-building of the economy and infrastructure, food

³¹ Ibid.

³² Kenneth O. McCreedy "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany." *The Journal of Military History, Vol. 65, No. 3 (July 2001), 713.*

distribution, and other basic day-to-day needs.³³ Based upon three possible courses of action, transitional activities would be eventually planned to occur as a sequel to Overlord and conducted in an operating environment of German unconditional surrender.³⁴

Military transitional activities employed during Eclipse would be informed by lessons learned from the Allied operations in Mediterranean Theatre of Operations during 1942 and 1943. Representing one end of a spectrum, transitional activities initially conducted in French North Africa would benefit from a collaborative environment given the existence of a cooperative central government. Transitional activities in Sicily and mainland Italy, however, would experience an operating environment that was representative of the opposite end of the spectrum. With no cooperative central government and transitional activities being conducted in enemy occupied territory, the Allies would be initially operating as belligerents. A non-permissive versus permissive environment would therefore require an evolved structural approach for the execution of transitional activities.³⁵

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA - OPERATION TORCH

³⁵ Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg. *Civil Affairs: soldiers become governors.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964), 653-654.

³³ *Ibid.*, 718.

³⁴ The other two planning courses of action were the rapid collapse of Germany and Germany contracting into pre-war borders. *Ibid.*, 720 and 723.

The Allied occupation of French North Africa in the Fall of 1942 would be informative of the complexities that a military would encounter while conducting transition operations within an enemy occupied territory. The Commander in Chief (CinC) North Africa Theatre of Operations, General Eisenhower, already augmented with a political advisor, identified the requirement for a civil affairs capacity to be resident within his staff. As a specialist staff, the civil affairs advisor that was furnished from the United States Department of State was responsible for the direction of political and economic affairs. As the Chair of the Joint Political and Economic Affairs Council, he was also responsible to ensure that in-theatre political and economic activities were coordinated with military operations. Given that initial transition operations would be conducted in non-enemy occupied territory, and that a full complement of personnel needed to establish a military government could not be resourced, existing French governance structures would be used but were subject to military necessity.³⁶ Subjugation of civilian agency activities to military exigencies necessitated an integrative interagency structure that would profit from the unity of purpose.

General Eisenhower strongly advocated the importance that the principle of undivided authority plays within a transitional theatre of operations. Not only did undivided authority promote efficient operational management but also more importantly, it avoided what could be perceived as divisions of authority - in the end there can only be

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 37.

one person that makes the decisions.³⁷ The interagency North African Economic Board (NAEB) speaks to the organizational structure that was intended to permit the unified and purposeful interagency planning and execution for transitional operations. The NAEB was a civil-military composite consisting of a civilian Joint Chairman (to be the Chief Civil Administrator), a military representative (the Chief Administration Officer), an executive Vice Chairman, Heads of section of the Board's executives, G1 and G4 Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) representatives and the Civil Affairs Section of the AFHQ. Responsible for the development and execution of an in-theatre economic plan, the organization also provided for the coordination of the following transitional activities:

- Coordination and supply of essential materials for the affected civilian population and those materials vital to utilities and industries.
- Purchasing of priority war effort materiél as well as the replacement of that materiél obtained from indigenous resources.
- Handling of currency and other financial problems.
- As determined by military requirement, the maintenance, repair and expansion of vital facilities.
- Maintenance of public health.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 31.

- Expansion of finished articles and foodstuff production.
- Coordination of transition to civilian control.³⁸

The Department of State was the lead agency for all civil activities in Allied occupied territory. Expression of military interests and requirements into the Department was communicated through an embedded executive-level military liaison officer. As the lead agency, the Department would create a number of committees that were established in Washington, for the purposes of managing theatre civilian economic and non-military issues. The overarching committee was the Committee of Combined Boards (COB). The COB would act as the focal point for all on-military related issues as well as the management of civil-economic matters. The operational arm of the COB was the Combined Committee for North and West Africa (CCNA). The CCNA was an interagency governmental organization that was responsible for "... assigning actions to the appropriate [government] agency and discussing the action taken or proposed. . . "³⁹ based upon requests from the NAEB. It should be noted that there was no military representation on the CCNA until three months after the commencement of military operations in French North Africa.⁴⁰ Lack of military representation and the procedural nature of the committees manifested itself in stovepiping and duplicative efforts given

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 44.

that three parallel information routes were extant; the CinC's staff would report to the War Department, the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the COB, and the Department of State to the COB.⁴¹ In addition, lack of advanced planning, firm policies, and the bureaucratic operating processes created inefficiencies.⁴² These inefficiencies and the competing and disparate nature of civilian interagency coordination would cause "... *disunity and competition among American agencies [which could] play into the hands of the enemy and [cause] confus[ion] "⁴³*

Where disunity and competition could be initially be "managed" transitional activities in Tunisia would require that they become military centric. Operating in enemy occupied territory required the fusing of NAEB transitional activities under a special detachment within the CinC's Civil Affairs Section. This fusion would allow for improved control and coordination of non-military activities.⁴⁴ Acknowledged that the planning and management of long-term political, social, and economic issues belonged in the domain of civilian government agencies, experience would underscore that they did not possess the operational structures to coordinate, control, and conduct transitional activities within a conflict and emerging post-conflict operating environment.⁴⁵

- ⁴¹ Ibid.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, 57.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 60.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 57.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 54 and 56.

SICILY AND MAINLAND ITALY – OPERATION HUSKY

The military transitional organization employed in Operation Husky was referred to as the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT). Under the direction of the Commanding General, who was acting in the capacity of a Military Governor, a Chief Civil Affairs Officer (CCAO) was responsible for the bureaucratic administration of military government policies, Implementation and administration of these policies would be facilitated through Legal, Financial, Civilian Supply, Public Health, Public Safety, and Enemy Property Divisions to deployed Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) that were integrated into subordinate manoeuvre headquarters and units. Working directly for the tactical-level commander and receiving no direction from superior Civil Affairs staff, the CAO would establish initial relations with the respective indigenous civil administrative authorities and create a municipal or provincial military government structure. Military government activities focused upon rebuilding law and order, maintain secure lines of communication, suppressing elements within the population that could effect present or future operations, and the restoration of essential utilities.⁴⁶ Upon determination by the tactical-level commander, responsibility for the established transitional activities would be devolved to the CAO and his staff.⁴⁷ Transition from military to allied civilian-led agencies and organizations would be

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 215.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 183-184.

considered when either military operation were no longer being conducted in the geographic area to be assumed or no requirement for military government existed.⁴⁸ These two conditions identify the concern that parallel combat operations and nation-building "stovepiping" activities cannot occur within the same operational area. All activities and their resulting effects must be complementary.

Having established a military government the CAO, with an administrative line of communication to senior Civil Affairs staff, would be responsible:

[T]o continue in operation provincial and municipal administration and essential local services, utilizing existing personnel wherever possible; to publish proclamations and ordinances, and in conjunction with Civil Police Officers to enforce proclamations, orders, etc., of military authority and to ensure that civil laws are respected; to issue local regulations to ensure security and local order; to organize and hold military courts; to co-ordinate with combat units in requisitioning, procurement, and billeting in local area; and to assist local unit commanders in any other matters involving the civil population.⁴⁹

Civil Affairs Officers would deal with an executive section, the Military Government Section (MGS), which resided within theatre headquarters. The MGS would serve as the conduit for communications between the theatre- and operational-level headquarters and any other subordinate headquarters with regards to transitional activities.⁵⁰ However, the "autonomous" nature that the CAO and tactical commander would be expected to operate within, given that only the provision of policy guidance would accompany them into the

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 214.

⁴⁹ Allied Force Headquarters Administrative Memorandum 35 dated 1 May 1943 in regards to Military Government organization for Operation Husky. *Ibid.*, 182.

⁵⁰ Authors note. Military government activities and transitional activities are one in the same. *Ibid.*, 184.

initial phase of combat operations and that further operational-level direction would only be received when the CAO was able to establish contact with superior Civil Affairs staff, would result in a lack of effective integration between the tactical and operational-levels and variances in the application of military occupational government policy.⁵¹.

The single AMGOT structure employed to manage initial transitional operations would suffer from the complexity that the Sicilian and mainland Italian operating environment provided. Insufficient indigenous government authority and the rate at which military operations were being executed would necessitate that the AMGOT structure be divided into static and mobile Allied Military Government (AMG) elements.⁵² Whereas static AMGs operated within secure rear areas mobile AMGs would be required to operate in combat areas. The span of control for the management of both static and mobile AMGs would exacerbate effective functionality of AMGs given the centralized control and coordination mechanisms that existed. Compounding what would as the perceived need for a decentralized approach to command and control of military government functions was a strategic-political need to dilute executive powers amongst some of the participating Allied nations.⁵³ As a consequence, additional levels of headquarters bureaucracy would be created.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 255-256.

⁵¹ In a 21 December 1943 report from a Chief AMGOT liaison officer, the officer cites an example of ineffective integration of policy where a Senior Civil Affairs Officer (SCAO) responsible for a province that is not a great wheat producer, is experiencing food shortages, and is surrounded by many other provinces that are, increases the purchase cost of wheat within the province in order solve his food shortage issue which in turn results in the drain of wheat in neighbouring agricultural provinces. *Ibid.*, 262.

⁵² Ibid., 252-253.

Whereas the initial AMGOT transitional organization employed a unified structural approach, the Sicilian and mainland Italian "split" of AMGOT into AMG "Rears" and AMG "Forwards" would suffer from the creation and imposition of an Allied Control Commission (ACC). The ACC would be an overlapping strategic-political organ that would establish and maintain ". . .*Regional, Provincial or other outlying offices as may be found convenient.*"⁵⁴ The ACC was organized into Military, Political, Economic and Administrative, and Communications Sections, which were further sub-divided into six, five, eight and six sub-commissions respectively.⁵⁵ Although activities between the ACC and AMGs were coordinated through theatre headquarters the respective divisions of authority between AMGs and the ACC, which were compounded by a lack of clarity with regards to jurisdictional boundaries and the various overlap of phases of the occupation, would cause confusion and reduce AMG efficiencies.⁵⁶

Realization of transitional inefficiencies and the "...unsatisfactory state of affairs ... caused by the division of authority among [the] three separate administrations

⁵⁴ ACC was "...[t]o be the organ through which the policy of the United Nations towards the Italian Government is conducted and the relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government are handled." *Ibid.*, 258.

⁵⁵ Section compositions were a follows: Military Section sub-commissions: Naval Forces, Land Forces, Air Forces, Prisoners of War, War Material Factories, and Material Disposal; Political Section subcommissions: Foreign and Internal Political Affairs, Civilian Internees and Displaced Persons, Information and Press Censorship; Economic and Administrative Section sub-commissions: Economic (further subdivided into an additional eight sub-commissions), and Administrative (further sub-divided into an additional six sub-commissions); and Communications Section sub-commissions: Shipping and Ports, Inland and Civil Air Transportation, and Postal and Tele-communications. *Ibid.*, 257.

⁵⁶ The three phases of the occupation were beachhead operations, combat operations, and posthostilities operations. *Ibid.*, 250 and 261-262.

[AMGs Forward and Rear and ACC]"57 would result in an attempt to streamline the command and control of military transitional authorities. Streamlining would see the integration of AMG Rear with the ACC, and the "grouping" of AMG Forward elements under the command of a tactical-level commander while the technical control of AMG Forward elements would be exercised by the ACC headquarters. The Economic and Administrative Section of the ACC was further split into two separate Sections, an Economic Section and an Administrative Section, and an additional section was established, the Regional Control and Military Government Section (RCMGS). The RCMGS was responsible for the central coordination of AMG Forward activities so that "co-ordination of policy, continuity in administration and close liaison with military formations and units[could] be ensured,....⁷⁵⁸ The resulting re-structure of the original ACC organization from four to six functionally organized sections, and the headquarters staff that each and their sub-commissions possessed, speaks to the complexity of the transitional operating environment.⁵⁹ In addition, some of the sub-commissions found within the initial ACC section construct were re-allocated to another section in order to maximize efficiencies. In order to summarize, the re-organization of military transitional structures would have AMG Forward elements, now referred to as Army AMGs, under the command of a tactical-level commander. These Army AMGs were allocated to and operating amongst Corps and Divisional combat formations and units. The Army AMGs first priority was to establish the initial military government structure in a newly liberated

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 263.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 268-269.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 266-267.

territory with emphasis on law and order, sustenance of the local population, and reestablishing essential utilities. Secondary to this effort would be those activities necessary for the normalization of the occupied territory whereupon ACC controlled elements would assume responsibility from Army AMGs and assist and guide local government authorities in accordance with ACC directives.⁶⁰

The United States' experience during Operation Husky would underscore the difficulties surrounding concurrent and parallel civilian-led nation-building activities given that "...*civilian agencies quickly learned that in a theatre of war they lacked the resources and organizations to function effectively*."⁶¹ As already mentioned, the importance that the principle of undivided authority within a transitional theatre ensures efficient operational management and the prevention of false perceptions.

Lessons learned during operations in the Mediterranean would inform the military transitional structures that would be employed in Operation Eclipse. Two organizational approaches were available for implementation. The first organizational approach was the a transitional authority led by a prominent civilian administrator supported by an Army executive in an "overwatch" capacity. The second organizational approach was a transitional organization led by a capable military officer supported by subject matter experts.⁶² Learning that a close integration between military transitional authorities and

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 267 and 270-271.

⁶¹ McCreedy, *Planning the Peace...*, 717.

⁶² Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs..., 673.

normal military headquarters staff must exist, and that the military transitional structure should be principally based upon a military structure, the latter of the two structures approaches would be adopted.⁶³ Major lessons learned were:

- Planning of transitional activities must be involved at the onset of operational planning.
- Civil Affairs elements must be integrated with their parent combat formation early.
- Resourcing for the execution of transitional activities must be sufficient enough to enable the establishment of continuity.
- That AMGOT structures must possess a administrative as well as security capacity.⁶⁴

ALLIED OCCUPATION OF GERMANY - OPERATION ECLIPSE

Operation Eclipse was planned in a foreign policy vacuum given that clear strategic political guidance was lacking. This vacuum was due to the differences that existed between the United States and other Allied governments.⁶⁵ As well, issues of having military forces involved in a post-conflict nation-building endeavours would cause

⁶³ Transition Operations would be the responsibility of the combatant commander, follow a normal military chain of command, be subject to military necessity, and the Civil Affairs elements commanding and controlling transitional activities would be mobile and temporary. *Ibid.*, 672 and 677.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 198.

⁶⁵ McCreedy, *Planning the Peace...*, 716.

frictions between both American civilian and military government departments.⁶⁶ The United States military's view was that in order to prevent parallel efforts that served only served to duplicate efforts, its structures would better enable a unity of command and therefore prevent redundancies to occur.⁶⁷

High executive-level government opinion still held that civilian administrative organizations vice the military should be the lead agency for the planning and conduct of transitional activities within an occupied territory. This civilian organization, would serve as the single point of contact between all military forces and civilian agencies operating within the theatre of operations. As the lead agency, it would facilitate the transition between military forces and civilian agencies when the latter was able to "... *[assume] post-conflict administrative duties.*"⁶⁸ However, given the success that Operation Overlord would achieve, the generation of this civilian-led transitional administrative structure would be hampered by time, the organizational capacity of the United States Department of State, and the Department's capabilities to effectively reorganize itself to fulfill the task at hand; "*[n]o other civilian agency stepped forward to assigned areas.*"⁶⁹ This last point speaks to and reinforces what civilian agencies had already learned in Tunisia.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 718.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 717.

⁶⁷ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*..., 673.

⁶⁸ McCreedy, *Planning the Peace...*, 717.

The Eclipse transitional structure for transitional operations in Germany would undergo a series of organizational changes. Although not within the scope of this paper, research has indicated that the functional requirements for managing transitional activities would be resident in some form and capacity within each newly conceived organization responsible for the conduct of military government. For the purpose of this paper, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) will be referred to .⁷⁰

The Eclipse transitional organization within SHAEF would operate under the newly formed G-5 Civil Affairs Division. The G-5 Civil Affairs Division consisted of eight functional sections, those being: Operations, Supply, Displaced Persons, Legal, Economic, Financial, Public Health, and Administration.⁷¹ The Operations Branch was sub-divided into an Operations Group, which was responsible for the day-to-day coordination and control of transitional activities, and an Organization, Personnel, Equipment and Training (OPET) Group, which was responsible for the development and

⁷⁰ German Country units would be stood down in late-Summer 1944 and American personnel would be absorbed into the newly formed United states Group Control Council for Germany (US Group CC), which operated under ECAD and was structured to parallel the higher-level Germany government organizations. Initially small, it would grow exponentially after VE Day. Although it would incorporate a number of civilian specialists from American industry, it would become a bureaucratic organization that did not enjoy the degree of professional interaction that it once did, or the needed appreciation of German cultural and societal dynamics. The Us Group CC would change in name only to become the Office for Military Government for Germany of the United States (OMGGUS) in the Fall of 1945 and would be the representative organization of the ACC. Likewise, G5 SHAEF would become G5 US Forces European Theatre (USFET). USFET would eventually be renamed the Office of Military Government US Zone upon the realignment of military Government Organization in Germany." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 3. (August 1946), 329-349. http://www.jstor.org; Internet; accessed 25 January 2008, 332-347.

⁷¹ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*..., 677.

administration of plans and policies in regards to Civil Affairs personnel.⁷² Under the control and coordination of the G5 SHAEF directorates would be led by an Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) and composed of officers who held functional responsibility for a particular aspect of transition planning and execution.⁷³ This hierarchal structure would be more or less replicated at each subsequent level of command down to Divisional level and organized to reflect the dynamics of the geographic area to be administered. Thus, deployed military government detachments would consist of between 24 to 100-plus personnel all ranks and responsible for a *Lander* (states), *Provinzen* (provinces), *Regierungsbezirke* (district), *Stadtkriese* (city), and *Landkriese* (rural county).The number of personnel corresponded to the size of the district, city, or rural county being administered.⁷⁴ Military government elements operating below the Divisional level were concerned with civil-military relations in regards to tactical force protection.⁷⁵

Created for the detailed planning of transitional activities associated with Allied occupation of countries in the European Theatre of Operations, Country Units, later referred to as Country Sections, were responsible for the planning and eventual conduct of military government.⁷⁶ Established to address the micro-level aspects of military government policies these units would be initially dissolved. American Country Team

⁷² *Ibid.*, 680.

⁷³ Functional components were legal, financial, economic, food and agriculture, public safety, public health and welfare, manpower and "other matters". Zink, *American Military Government...*, 336.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 338-341.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 337.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 329.

personnel would be reconstituted as the United States Group Control Council (US Group CC) to and become the principle Civil Affairs Detachments that were used to form the nucleus of the military government detachments responsible for the control and coordination of transitional activities.⁷⁷ Like the military government detachment structures already discussed,, these Civil Affairs Detachments were structured upon the governance level that they would find themselves operating within and categorized as either Group A, B, C or D. As such, Group A Detachments units found operated at the *Lander*, *Provinzen*, and some large *Stadtkriese levels*, Group B Detachments at the *Regierungsbezirke* and *Stadtkriese* levels, Group C Detachments at medium-sized *Stadtkriese*, smaller *Regierungsbezirke*, and some larger *Landkriese* levels, and Group D Detachments at the and *Landkriese* and some small *Stadtkriese levels*.⁷⁸ Group size initially ranged from 39 personnel all-ranks for a Group A Detachment.

Initially consisted of 400 personnel all ranks, military-strategic direction would eventually hinder the Group's activities given that the military government structure would not reflect German governance structures. The Group's organizational structure would also suffer due to personality-driven factors. Instead of creating functional directorates the Group would suffer from the consolidation of functions. Stated more simply, a directorate, for example, would consist of public welfare, education, religious affairs, local government and civil services, etc. under the authority of one individual

⁷⁷ Country Sections would form the nucleus of those military governments that would be established in occupied territories. Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs...*, 677.

⁷⁸ Zink, American Military Government..., 338.

with some of the "portfolios" undermanned in comparison to their complexity.⁷⁹ The Group would eventually expand to include civilian trade and industry representation as well as representation in food and agriculture.⁸⁰ The Group's growth would ultimately lead to a structural environment where relationships could not be effectively developed. More importantly, however, would be the lack of understanding of German cultural dynamics that would "...*make it difficult to plan with adequate effectiveness.*"⁸¹ The Group would also suffer from a lack of specialist personnel and balanced functional structures.⁸²

The military government detachments were operationalized under the European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD) and consisted of over 8,200 personnel all-ranks organized into Civil Affairs (CA) Regiments, Companies, and Detachments. .⁸³ The Division's mission was:

[t]o perform the administrative and operational functions for all [Civil Affairs] personnel [operating] in the ETO [European Theatre of Operations], U.S. Army, but inclusive of CA personnel assigned to Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command, and First U.S. Army Group.⁸⁴

- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 333.
- ⁸² Ibid., 335.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*, 341.

⁸⁴ Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs..., 675.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 332.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 333.

The resulting deployment of military government elements to combat formations would reduce ECAD's role to an administrative one given that the former would receive their direction from the parent formation that they were attached to. As a result, ECAD's primary functions would become provision of administrative facilities for military government detachments, training in military government duties, and compiling military government reports.⁸⁵

Military government would be the structure upon which Germany's post-conflict transition would rely. Consisting of military government detachments augmented by combat troops, these detachments would be responsible for creating working local governance structures, police forces, administration of military courts, and the restoration of basic services.⁸⁶ Initial planning difficulties would be encountered. The inability to identify second-and third-order effects, no structured conflict to post-conflict transition doctrine, and military planners averse to "…*offending political leaders by exceeding the bounds of strict military necessity*"⁸⁷ would underscore the complexity of the transitional activities needed to be undertaken and the complicated organizational architecture in which Eclipse needed to be planned and executed.⁸⁸ Operation Eclipse, upon conflict termination, was to "…*establish the conditions under which 'United Nations' agencies can assist in the relief and rehabilitation of liberated countries.*"⁸⁹ However, rather than

⁸⁸ Ibid., 720-721.

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⁸⁹ Ibid., 722.

⁸⁵ Zink, American Military Government..., 341.

⁸⁶ McCreedy, *Planning the Peace* ..., 737.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 720.

enjoying a linear transition from conflict to post-conflict operations, Eclipse would become a concurrent operation to Overlord where no clear boundary existed and combat and stability operations overlapped.⁹⁰ In the end, the military occupation of Germany would last for four years, transitioning to civilian control in 1949.

Operational lessons learned from Eclipse were as follows:⁹¹

- Post-conflict activities will be concurrent to combat operations and as a result, staff structures, capabilities and capacities must be reflective.
- Political direction is slow to materialize and as a result, military planning will occur in a vacuum.
- Ad-hoc structures result in "...duplicative efforts and bureaucratic battles [resulting] in wasted resources and time."⁹²
- Although a joint and combined military operation, non-military participation in planning was lacking and as a result, was not an interagency endeavour.
- Transition from a military- to civilian-led authority may be long in the coming.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 724 and 728.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 730-737.

⁹² Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs..., 735.

A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE: 1st CANADIAN CORPS AND OPERATION FAUST

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) had been planning relief operations in the Netherlands predicated upon the assumption that German forces would surrender all at the same time and that civil administration would be available what SHAEF planners referred to as the "collapse theory".⁹³ The north-western region of the Netherlands would be organized into three operational areas: Area 'A', the area south of the Waal River; Area 'B', the area west of the Issjel River; and Area 'C', the remaining area east of the Issjel River.⁹⁴ Area 'B' was subdivided into 'B-1' and 'B-2' where the latter was the responsibility of 1st Canadian Army. The context of the operating environment differed from that of Torch, Husky and Eclipse in three ways; first, German forces operating in the area, estimated at a strength of 200,000 troops, were not considered as part of the main Allied effort as part of their liberation planning; second, it was unknown if the Germans were going to defend in Area B, completely evacuate Area B, or maintain static garrisons in Area B – all three options possessed the option of increased environmental degradation through the flooding of lowlands. Not only would this increase hardship and hugely effect economic recovery, but it would also create huge mobility issues in regards to relief efforts; and lastly, the population of 4.5 million Dutch, of which 3.6 million were located in area B-2, were in danger of starving

⁹³ Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs..., 821.

⁹⁴ Colonel C.P. Stacey. Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III - The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-west Europe 1944-1945. (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 582.

given the repressive measures that the occupying German forces had implemented.⁹⁵ In addition, prominent political Diaspora was pressuring the Allies to act quickly in order to prevent a major catastrophe given that:

 \ldots [conditions are] so desperate, that it is abundantly clear that, if a major catastrophe, the like of which has not been seen in Western Europe since the Middle Ages, is to be avoided in Holland, something drastic has to be done now, that is to say before and not after the liberation of the rest of the country [original italics].⁹⁶

Montgomery's 21st Army Group, of which 1st Canadian Army was subordinate to, established a special planning staff in order to deal with the complexities of providing for Dutch relief. As such, the Headquarters Netherlands District was established and placed under the Operational Control of 1st Canadian Army for operations while maintaining direct technical liaison with 21st Army Group for the relief aspects.⁹⁷ Four contingencies were developed for supply and relief of Area B-2, those being: from the south by the crossing of the Waal River, from the north, through two ports, by air drop; and lastly, by roads from the east. Known respectively as Plackets 'A', 'B', 'C', and 'D', 1st Canadian Army would assign responsibility for Placket D operations to 1st Canadian Corps.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Enemy strength estimate from SHAEF G-5 Historical Report No. 60, dated 27 March 1945. Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs...*, 830. As a result of a civilian railway strike inspired by the Dutch Resistance, German forces would impose a food embargo on agriculturally reliant urban districts that were already suffering from a shortage of food. The railway strike would also create a negative third-order effect by creating a shortage of coal. Stacey, *Official History of...*, 582 and Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs...*, 829.

⁹⁶ Stacey, Official History of ..., 583.

⁹⁷ Stacey, Official History of ..., 585.

⁹⁸ Plackets 'A', 'C' and 'D' would remain under the control of Headquarters Netherlands District but separate from 1st Canadian Corps. This author's interpretation is that this "technical" arrangement facilitated a synchronization of land, sea and air efforts in order to effectively coordinate and conduct relief operations. Stacey, *Official History of...*, 586.

Although 1st Canadian Army established a Deputy Director Military Government, who was responsible for the Civil Affairs liaison within the headquarters and eventual coordination of handover to Headquarters Netherlands District and, it would be 1st Canadian Corps' responsibility to initially conduct relief operations in the area and when essential *"maintenance installations could be conveniently transferred"*⁹⁹ to follow-on Civil Affairs elements.¹⁰⁰ Initial relief activities would occur within a negotiated "safe corridor" where a temporary truce would be observed by both the Allies and the Germans.¹⁰¹ The main problem anticipated in Area B-2, from an infrastructure perspective, was to re-establish the water supply, which relied upon electrical supply, which in-turn required coal for power generation in order to not only thresh wheat which was being held in reserve in order to feed an undernourished civilian population but also to power "many public utilities...." Although a microcosm of Eclipse, it would require two months of relief efforts until it could be declared that the military phase could be concluded and transition to Netherlands Government civil administrative control with the understanding that continued support to Allied operations would retain primacy as the situations required.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Stacey, Official History of ..., 607.

⁹⁹ Stacey, Official History of ..., 586.

¹⁰⁰ 1st Canadian Corps would conduct handover of Area B-2 to 21Civil Affairs Detachments in three phases over a 78-hour period after official German surrender. Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs...*, 832.

¹⁰² Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs..., 829 and 830.

¹⁰³ Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs..., 821 and 834.

Operational lessons learned form Faust are as follows:

- Political pressures will necessitate that solutions be developed and executed in the now regardless of the threat situation.
- That pure military force will be required to facilitate initial relief efforts and subsequently handover to the requisite, qualified follow-on forces. Being able to think "outside the box" may bring about novel and mutually compatible solutions to resolve crisis problems.
- That infrastructure requirement can be nested and reliant upon single sourcing for power and production.

CHAPTER THREE – TRANSITIONS AND THE DILEMMAS OF INTERAGENCY

Transitional operations conducted within a United Nations context views that nation building activities occur within a relatively stable and secure operating environment. The instability that was created given the collapse of a failing or failed sovereign government and the associated insecurity where competing political ideals were vying for power at the expense of the indigenous population creates a chaotic and complex environment in which unarmed organizations and agencies cannot effectively or efficiently operate. At some point, however, it becomes acknowledged that conflict in itself does not become an effective nor efficient means to achieving respective ends.¹⁰⁴ More simply stated, conflict exhaustion and stalemate creates an atmosphere where political consensus amongst the conflict parties leads to the initiation of reconciliation under international supervision and assistance.

Transitional authorities seek to ameliorate the conditions that underpinned the conflict environment in the first place by operationalizing three over-arching instruments. Political agreement to the establishment of a transitional authority, as already mentioned, is the first such instrument. The second instrument focuses upon the attempt to maintain, preserve, and defend a nation's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality, and national unity. Rehabilitation and reconstruction is the third instrument employed. Rehabilitation and reconstruction foresees the phased deployment and integration of international assistance and aid towards the creation of realistic political and technical imperatives, civilian-led facilitation and implementation, and the creation of an international committee to harmonize international contributions.¹⁰⁵ To operationalize the "instruments" transitional authorities will implement an action plan that will be multi-disciplinary in approach and consist of the following functional component structures: human rights, elections, military, civil administration, civilian policing, repatriation, rehabilitation, and any other functions that are deemed essential such as information operations as but one.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁴ United Nations. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping Missions 3rd Edition.* (New York: United Nations department of Public Information, 1996), 453-455.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 455.

Of the above noted functions, it should be noted that the military component will be engaged with those activities associated with post-conflict stability and security issues. namely: the verification of withdrawal of both foreign and indigenous military forces, supervision of ceasefire agreements, weapons and munitions control, and mine clearance and development of indigenous mine-clearing capabilities and capacities whereas the civilian administrative component concerns itself with foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security, and information. Using the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) as an illustrative example, transitional authority activities were allowed to proceed within a climate of relative stability. This relative stability is indicative of the 15, 900 military peacekeepers deployed in supervising the conformity of 450,000 military and militia personnel and their estimated 350,000 weapons and over 80 million rounds of ammunition.¹⁰⁷ With regards to civilian administration responsibilities, the transitional structure at the 'operational' level was existent in the form of 21 regional administrations where a ratio of one international civilian police officer for every 15 indigenous police officers was present.¹⁰⁸ The point that is trying to be drawn out is the aspect of a ceasefire agreement between the belligerent parties to the conflict and the relative stability of the operating environment as demonstrated by the ratio of international versus indigenous military and policing capacities. This "linear" aspect of traditional transitional administration where the inclusiveness of differing political, ethnic, and cultural divides can be achieved in nation

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 456.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 457.

building activities does not play well in current threat dynamics given globalization, trans-nationalism and how religion is being manipulated in order to fuel the conflict environment. However, it must also be noted that the mission's deployment lag denied initial operational momentum resulting in diminished indigenous expectations and "... *a sense of [international] political drift and disarray [allowing belligerents]...to hedge positions on full compliance with the [peace] Accords.*"¹⁰⁹ This latter fact speaks to the capacity gap and the need for more reflective force structures in today's operating environment.

In his book *International Governance of War-Torn Territories*, Richard Caplan highlights the close relationship that exists between civil administration and local capacity building and political institution building. This relationship in itself underscores the need for a structured headquarters that is complementary to and reflective of the disciplines that reside within other government departments and more importantly, that transition operations within the Contemporary Operating Environment demand in situ capabilities and capacities vice reliance on strategic reachback and the "100-foot screwdriver" in order to coordinate and deliver needed, longer-term effects.

As already mentioned, transition from post-conflict to nation-building traditionally followed, for the most part, a linear approach. This approach to nationbuilding was operationalized through the authorization of transitional administrations

¹⁰⁹ James A Schear. "Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping: he Case of Cambodia." in *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, edited by Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, 248-266. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 252-253.

such as the United Nations (UN) Transitional Administration for Eastern Slovonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. These UN transitional administrations enjoyed a certain degree of security and stability and as such, their approach to nation-building was more reflective of a linear progression as illustrated in the Cycle of Conflict (Figure 1). Although these Transitional Authorities have (were able) to enjoy a relatively unchallenged security environment, they also enjoyed a relatively small geographic footprint in which to administer nation-building activities and programs. When viewed through this lens, the small territorial nature of the country being administered enables transitional authorities to better manage activities.¹¹⁰ This aspect of territorial expanse and the difficulties that protracted time and space have upon implementing the core function of civil administration – public order and internal security, repatriation and reintegration of displaced persons, conducting basic civil administrative functions, development of local political institutions to include elections and society building, and economic reconstruction and development – reinforce the need for an interagency structure that is capable of complementing higher military-political strategic objectives.

¹¹⁰ Caplan compares the United Nations wide involvement in transitional activities when operating in smaller territories to its involvement in Afghanistan given that "Afghanistan was thought to be too large, its terrain too forbidding, and its politics too unstable, to be able to replicate [previous TA experiences].", Richard Caplan. *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 26.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION – THE AMERICAN DOCTRINAL APPROACH

The American approach recognizes the fact that in order to be operationally successful, there must be the ability to effectively blend the capacities and capabilities that is inherent to each aspect that comprises a nation's power.¹¹¹ Given this exigency, the National Security Council is the executive-level authority that provides direction for all United States government departments. Whereas the military provides supporting enablers to a lead non-military agency in a domestic context, it is the geographic combatant commander that is responsible for the planning and implementation of a campaign plan that requires interagency coordination. It must be noted that although the Country Team, acting as a proxy for the Department of State, "is the senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body"¹¹² under the Head of Mission (a United States ambassador) and as such, responsible for the overall supervision and direction of a foreign assistance program. The Head of Mission does not have command over non-mission personnel, forces assigned to international organs, or the military forces of a regional combatant commander or those of the combatant commander's in-theatre subordinate units. Put more simply, the Chief of Mission has authority over all United States government programs and through the Country Team, is responsible for the efficient and economical conduct of necessary program activities and that they are interrelated.¹¹³

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, A-7.

¹¹¹ United States. Headquarters, Department of the Army. *FM 3-07 (FM 100-20) Stability Operations and Support Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2003), A-0.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, A-25.

The Country Team, like any other organization, consists of a hierarchal framework with associated responsibilities. Of particular importance is that it also incorporates, dependent upon mission context and the perceived need of the Head of Mission, a senior representative of those United States government departments involved in the mission. It should also be noted that the command and control arrangement between the Country Team and in-theatre military command is ad hoc.¹¹⁴ In order to ensure a degree of continuity and situational awareness with regards to relevant policy goals and objectives, the military commander is provided a political advisor. This political advisor is responsible for ensuring that the commander is aware of the diplomatic considerations that may have an affect on either his campaign design or vive versa, as well as establishing the informal liaison and links amongst other in-country embassies and other government departments, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)¹¹⁵.

For the greater part, foreign assistance programs are administered through nongovernmental organizations or what is more commonly referred to in bureaucratic speaking as "implementing partners". Non-governmental organizations can be viewed as both enablers and force multipliers for a military force involved in transition operations. Their enabling and force multiplying capability is derived from the fact that they usually

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, A-5.

¹¹⁵ USAID: manages developmental, humanitarian and civic assistance in conjunction with Department of Agriculture; provision of general direction on all non-military assistance programs – some programs can be security related. Ibid., A-49 and A-50.

possess a great deal of knowledge about the local culture and regional dynamics as well as reducing the civil-military resource requirements that would have had to be maintained by a military force to the detriment of other more needed military-centric resources. Although their organizational culture differs from that of the military's (nongovernmental organizations espouse neutrality, independence, and humanitarianism), their short-term goals are usually similar to that of a military commanders intended reconstruction and stability tasks.¹¹⁶ In order to integrate the effects that these nonmilitary entities are capable of producing, ad hoc Civil-Military Operations Centres are established within the military force structure in order to facilitate the coordination between military forces and all other non-military agencies.¹¹⁷

Representing the Government of Canada, Canadian interests and the ". . .advoc[ation] of Canadian policies and perspectives top foreign governments. . . "¹¹⁸ speaks to the consular role that Foreign Affairs' missions have. Unlike the American Head of Mission, who is responsible for the overall supervision and direction of a foreign assistance program within an affected country where American forces are operating, the Canadian approach foresees that programs are complementary.¹¹⁹ Given that the Head of Mission is managed by geographic directorates within the Department of Foreign Affairs,

¹¹⁶ United States. Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 3-07 (FM 100-20)..., A-10.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, A-16.

¹¹⁸ Canada. *Estimates 2005-2006. Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities. Foreign Affairs Canada*: (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, Public Works and Government Canada, 2005),10.

¹¹⁹ DFAIT Policy and Governance Structure diagram states that the Head of Mission "act[s] on behalf of Canada with final decision making authority" and "ensures that all federal programs are complementary." Canada. *Estimates 2006-2007. Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities. Foreign Affairs Canada.* (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, Public Works and Government Canada, 2006), 24.

it speaks to the strategic "reach forward" that exists. If there is no political mission presence or an absence of an indigenous governmental authority to interact with in the failed or failing state in question, it is incumbent upon the deployed military task force commander to plan and implement a campaign plan that requires interagency coordination.

CANADIAN FORCES DOCTRINE AND INTERAGENCY

With the exception of Chapter 10 in *Peace Support Operations*, there is no mention of transition operations or the need for interagency coordination. Although the *Peace Support Operations* manual alludes to peace support operations as the military component of peace building, it specifies that peace-building activities are "...*mainly undertaken by civil agencies in the mission area but some military involvement may be necessary*."¹²⁰ The manual further alludes to complex peacekeeping operations but focuses military involvement to the provision of emergency humanitarian assistance or the provision of a security shield for non-governmental and international organizations to operate behind.¹²¹ This "security shield" eventually leads to full state transitional authority towards successful nation building.

Within Canadian Forces operational doctrine, tactical self-supporting units (TSSUs) are envisioned to capably function not only as combat elements, but also as

¹²⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GG-005-004/AF-023 *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War.* (Ottawa; DND Canada, 1999), 10-2.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 10-3.

elements capable of functioning beyond the spectrum of combat operations.¹²² In this context, therefore, capably functioning beyond the spectrum of combat operations is limited to civil-military coordination, which in its holistic sense deals with the liaison and interaction with relevant civilian organizations within a respective area of operations.¹²³ This notion of civil-military coordination is structured into three domains, those being: Civil-Military Coordination, which deals with relationships at the strategic level and those aspects of interagency for national guidance development; Civil-Military Operations, which deals with military activities ensuring that the civilian environment in which a military force is operating does not impact upon a military forces freedom of manoeuvre; and Civil-Military Cooperation, which is considered a military function where military forces and in-extremis civilian agencies cooperate and coordinate in order to support the military force's mission. This latter point views activities as either activities to enhance force protection or activities to support an "...indigenous government, authorities and populace . . . [where t] he type of conflict, maturity of involvement, national guidance, and international presence will [determine] the level and duration of support."¹²⁴ Given these domains, it would appear that the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) fulfill the Civil-Military Cooperation aspect of civil-military relations, namely Military Civic Actions with a view to enhancing the force protection dimension of military forces. Although doctrine alludes to interagency orientation and the consequent output of strategic guidance in order to enable "...

¹²² Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 *Canadian Forces Operations*. (Ottawa; DND Canada, 2005), 10-5.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 19-1.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 19-2.

.operational planning and tactical implementation [to] occur. . . "¹²⁵ absent from this equation is the operational-level aspect of civil-military coordination and the operationalized force structure needed to effectively plan and execute longer-term transition operations. This last point is further emphasized by the fact that the *Peace Support Operations* manual mentions the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) as a lead department for peacekeeping but offers no mention of linkages to "leading" at the operational or strategic levels.¹²⁶

DEFENCE, DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND COMMERCE (3D+C) - STOVEPIPING AND BLINDERS

With regards to Failed and Failing states, Canada's peace support operations will play a key role in providing stability to troubled regions of the world.¹²⁷

Antonio Donini, a former director of the United Nations (UN) Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy UN Humanitarian Coordinator for

Afghanistan as well as the chief of the Lessons Learned Unit of UN Office for the

¹²⁷ Canada. Estimates 2006-2007. Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities. Foreign Affairs Canada..., 43.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 19-3.

¹²⁶ It would appear that there is an attempt to codify interagency processes with regards to transition operations. Current organizational constructs has the Afghan Task Force as a strategic-level executive advisory body to the Privy Council Office and the recent creation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START). The former is "... charged with co-ordinating all government departments and efforts in Afghanistan" whereas the latter is comprised of four groups (Conflict prevention and Peace Building, Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response, Peacekeeping and Peacekeeping Operations, and Mine Action and Small Arms) each responsible for the identification, approval, monitoring, management and evaluation of Global peace and Security Fund projects. Lee Berthiaume, "Manley Report Realizes Afghan Task Force Fears," *The Hill Times*, (30 January 2008); http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2008/january/30/afghan/; Internet; accessed 22 April 2008 and Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. "Organizational Structure," http://www.international.gc.ca/fac/START-GSTR/strat-structure-gstr.aspx; Internet; accessed 16 April 2008.

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, refers to the significant disconnect, a perceptions gap, that exists between western military forces and non-governmental organizational agencies and those indigenous populations that they are there to assist.¹²⁸ He views the context in which forces are operating within as "... an astonishing blend of conflict, postconflict. humanitarian and development characteristics."¹²⁹ This operating context in itself complicates the once stable structure that NGOs operated within, and the strains upon the social contract, which traditionally served as a guarantee for NGOs to function relatively unencumbered.¹³⁰ Unfortunately, the security challenges that current asymmetric conflict environments present has raised the need for traditionally antimilitary international agencies that operated within the same operational area to become reliant upon military forces to enable their programs to achieve some degree of traction and with that, the on-going debate as to who retains primacy within the "humanitarian space".¹³¹ Whereas international agencies have entered into their own version of asymmetric humanitarianism, a context where a humanitarian consensus cannot be negotiated given the dilemma that exists between recognizing international humanitarian law and working in coordination with insurgents that do not, the very nature of the Contemporary Operating Environment demands that all actors conduct their respective activities unified in purpose; this last point, unity in purpose, clearly highlights the need

¹²⁸ Antonio Donini. "Local Perceptions of Assistance to Afghanistan." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14, No.1 (January 2007), 1.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³⁰ NGOs are reluctant to be identified with military forces given that they want to maintain close contact with the local population they are assisting. Francis Kofi Abiew. "NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations," in *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, edited by Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond, 24-39. (London, England: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 28.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 25-27.

to establish both the vertical and horizontal coordination and control structures that not only enable synchronization of activities, but more importantly establish a functional and efficient interdependence between military forces, governmental departments, and the NGOs that governments recognize and fund.¹³² This lack of unity in purpose, contributes greatly to what Donini terms the "... three Ds: disillusionment, disempowerment, [and] disengagement "¹³³ amongst the indigenous population being assisted. Given the dynamics that are present within today's Contemporary Operating Environment, the way in which transition operations were approached during the Canadian Forces move from Kabul to Kandahar, using Operation ATHENA Rotation 4/Operation ARCHER Rotation 0 as an example, can be seen as contributing greatly to this perception thereby negatively influencing unity of purpose.¹³⁴ Although the move from Kabul to Kandahar was an operational success when viewed as an enabling operation, it suffered from an inadequate force structure and political commitment when viewed from a transitional approach. Despite the Task Force's move, a move that was done in order "... to complement Canada's growing civilian aid presence in the province [of Kandahar]"¹³⁵, initial political-strategic direction failed to appreciate the complexity of the operating environment despite a history that is replete with documented examples. A reduced force structure and the lack of effective departmental integration at the onset of operations in

¹³² Recent Manley Report identifies the "inadequate coordination between military and civilian programs for security, stabilization, reconstruction and development." Canada. Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 13.

¹³³ Antonio Donini. Local Perceptions..., 6.

 $^{^{134}}$ Author's personal observation during deployment on Operation ATHENA Roto 4/ARCHER Roto 0.

¹³⁵ Canada. Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 11.

Kandahar have necessitated an ad hoc and iterative approach in order to deal with the challenges of the operating environment.¹³⁶

In their 2004-2005 Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) in what was then the Department of Foreign Affairs Canada (DFAC's), no mention was made of failed or failing states. Although the Report speaks of a Whole of Government approach, the approach is limited in context to representation in United Nations' *bodies*, does not speak to coalition or multi-national force structures although ". . .*policy advocacy and new measures will also be undertaken to address issues such as* . . . *peace support operations*.

...¹³⁷ Alluded to measures within the Report were in the form of a developing a "Canada Corps", which would consist of a pool of governance and institution building professionals that would act as a force multiplier to existing governmental efforts in the and the development of policy that would guide a more dynamic approach to Whole of Government in international mission areas.¹³⁸ Further articulated in CIDA's 2005-2006 RPP, the "Canada Corps" initiative would "...*develop collaborative partnerships across government, NGOs, the private sector, and Canadian citizens to bring greater*

¹³⁶ "Fostering development, and improving governance, cannot proceed without security. Canada's civilian and military efforts in Kandahar, after just two years of close collaboration, are now starting to achieve some real operational synergy. . . . " Canada. *Independent Panel on* ..., 31.

¹³⁷ Canada. *Estimates 2004-2005. Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities. Foreign Affairs Canada*. (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, Public Works and Government Canada, 2004), 34.

engagement, expertise, [and] coherence...¹³⁹ to transitional operation structure functionality.

A re-integrated government department, the 2005-2006 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's (DFAIT's) Report on Plans and Priorities identified the development of the Whole of Government strategy as its first priority and identifying the need to transform the Department into a "... 21st century foreign ministry...."¹⁴⁰ In order to implement strategy, operational-level campaign designs that identify tactical tasks need to be crafted, something that is essential in the execution of transitional operations. Although the Department has commenced the development of an interdepartmental Stabilization and Reconstruction Force (START), the only mention within the 2005-2006 RPP of any activity that is reflective of transition-centric operations deals in leading interdepartmental coordination with CIDA and DND with regards to Canadian policies on mine action and conventional weapons.¹⁴¹ Allusion to the essential nature that security plays within transitional activities is highlighted by the documents curt reference to Canada's support in the reconstruction of Iraq where "...efforts to date have been hampered by security issues,"¹⁴²

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 23.

¹³⁹ Canada. *Estimates 2005-2006. Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities. Canadian International Development Agency.* (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, Public Works and Government Canada, 2005), 25.

¹⁴⁰ Canada. Estimates 2005-2006. Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities. Foreign Affairs Canada..., 19.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 20 and 23.

As articulated by the United Nations and contained in the 2004-2005 Forward of the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA's) Report on Plans and Priorities, the need to achieve the objectives contained in the Millennium Development Goals relies upon establishing supportive and enabling conditions through the generation, deployment and employment of resources, what has been termed by the Government of Canada as the Whole of Government Approach and by Canadian joint military doctrine as a comprehensive approach to operations, that mutually reinforce one another across the Contemporary Operating Environment threat-conflict spectrum.¹⁴³ This notion of Whole of Government/comprehensive approach in itself speaks to the need for a fully integrated, in situ force structure that is enabled by vice reliant upon strategic reachback that in itself suffers from departmental stovepiping. This latter fact cannot be solely attributed to the Canadian way of approaching transition operations within the Contemporary Operating Environment given that transition to Operation Enduring Freedom lacked an effective interagency developed approach.¹⁴⁴

In its 2004-2005 Report on Plans and Priorities, The Canadian International Development Agency reinforced the Whole of Government approach towards development. Although Canada's 3D approach in Bosnia may have on the surface reflected an integrated approach where the Department of National Defence coordinated

¹⁴³ The United Nations stated MDG are: Eradicate poverty and hunger, Achieve universal primary education, Promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, Improve maternal health, Combat HIV/Aids, malaria, and other diseases, Ensure environmental sustainability, and develop a global partnership for development. Canada. *Estimates 2005-2006. Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities. Canadian International Development Agency...*, 84.

¹⁴⁴ William Flavin. "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." *Parameters*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 95-112. p. 9 (of handout)

a number of CIDA funded small-scale reconstruction and de-mining initiatives, it did so within a relatively benign threat environment, and certainly in one that cannot be compared to the Contemporary Operating Environment in which military and nonmilitary forces operate within today.¹⁴⁵ The take away point from this is that CIDA funded initiatives were administered by the Canadian Forces and as such, CF units were able to operate in-theatre absent of direct CIDA coordination and planning capacities given that Canadian forces were able to manoeuvre within a relatively benign Area of Operations, and that initiatives were tactical and force protection orientated an not tied to longer-term transitional activities. It is interesting to note that the RPP eludes to the interdependence of the 3Ds in the form that Canada's contribution to security in and around Kabul as part of the International Security Force (ISAF) aids in the Afghanistan's long-term development and reconstruction.¹⁴⁶ It is apparent that this form of interdependence is being coordinated through a means of bureaucratic strategic reachback vice in-theatre structures. Although CIDA's rasion d'etre is the administration of Canada's Official Development Assistance funds, its supplementary mandate of "... support[ing] democratic development and economic liberalization as well as international efforts to reduce threats to international security"¹⁴⁷ is illustrative of the need to have robust CIDA in-theatre capabilities and capacities as a force multiplier during transition operations within the Contemporary Operating Environment. Given that CIDA funds a number of local, regional and international NGOs as part of their

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁴⁵ Canada. *Estimates 2004-2005. Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities. Canadian International Development Agency.* (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, Public Works and Government Canada, 2004), 27.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

geographic and multilateral programs and Canadian partnerships, their initial integration into a military-led interagency task force could more effectively leverage the NGOs that they are funding.¹⁴⁸

CHAPTER FOUR – TRANSITIONAL STRUCTURES

In his paper *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) David P. Cavaleri uses a historical analysis of the United States' occupation of Japan in order to illustrate what he identifies as nine enduring planning themes when military forces are engaged in stability operations. Although analyzed against the context of a state versus state conflict environment, he extends his historical analysis to both Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom in order to demonstrate the linkages between the traditional conflict environment and conflict within the Contemporary Operating Environment.

The enduring planning themes for the conduct of transition operations – legitimacy, security, commitment, situational understanding, unity of effort, infrastructure, economic status, planning effort, and media – all have a part to play to achieve identified political-military strategic end-states; however, the operating environment will dictate which of the nine will be of greater import given that ". . .*no two stability operations will ever be alike, even if they occur in the same city and especially if*

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 74 and Annex I.

they occur in a different region or country. ^{*n149} Given this dynamic Cavaleri identifies* that in order to achieve success in transition operations, despite the context in which it may occur, must be underpinned by the three themes of legitimacy, security, and situational awareness and that abrogation or indifference to all or any one of the three can serve to undermine other planning themes or potentially lead to mission failure.¹⁵⁰</sup>

During this author's research, a number of descriptors with regards to identifying fundamentals or principles to be acknowledged during transition operations surfaced that are not articulated but arguably intuitive given the exposure to complex operating environments; expectation management, empowerment, reinforcement, commitment, motivation, interdependence, cooperation, consideration, security, transparency, legitimacy, integrity, adaptability, remediation, negotiation, coherence, posture, sensitivity, traction, and momentum are but some that "materialized". Given that military doctrine has been, until the arrival of the 21st Century, consumed with fighting and moving between offensive and defensive operations in order to achieve a recognizable and tangible military end-state, it has been the evolving 21st Century conflict environment that has created an operating environment where a recognizable and tangible end-state has become blurred.

¹⁴⁹ Lieutenant Colonel US Army (Retired) David P. Cavaleri. *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*. (Fort Leavenworth Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 87.

Of the three "core" planning themes that Cavaleri identifies, legitimacy, security and situational awareness can be viewed as mutually reinforcing and enduring. Legitimacy speaks not only to the aspect of international sanction in regards to intervention, but also that of facilitating the legitimacy of indigenous civil administrations in what can be considered a spectrum of legitimacy.¹⁵¹ In order to prevent destabilization of a fragile security environment, whether the destabilization occurs as a result of a resurgent indigenous military or paramilitary force or an inability to counter insurgent forces, there exists the necessity to deploy sufficient security forces given the formers' ability to effect domestic and economic security. This security threat could serve to potentially reduce the confidence in an interim or long-term transitional government and serve to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the indigenous population. Situational understanding, last of the three key transition planning themes, speaks to not only the tactical myopia that military forces are faced with, but also with the macro complexities that if ignored lead to the creation of a security vacuum. Without an appreciation of second- and third-order effects an already fragile security climate can become exacerbated and as such, increase threat dynamics.¹⁵²

In their paper discussing intervention and transitional administration, Graham Day and Christopher Freeman state that:

¹⁵¹ The perception of legitimacy and the ability of claiming, maintaining and transferring it is essential to an occupation force's success. Operation BLACKLIST (US occupation of Japan in World War Two) established several mechanisms to ensure that legitimacy was established and maintained. In contemporary parlance, transferring legitimacy to an indigenous administration transitions through three levels: temporary interim administrations, longer duration transitional administrations, and finally a permanent administrative design. *Ibid.*, 63 and 64.

¹⁵² Imposing non-normative cultural norms or failing to mitigate the removal of an entity within a country's/society's once normative structure can lead to increased instability. *Ibid.*, 69.

...[there] are different strengths within the international community, which should be used selectively to produce the best end result. Ensuring coalitions remain broad rather than narrow, whether under the auspices of the UN or regional organizations, widens the availability of resources and expertise.¹⁵³

This aspect of broadening organizational structures ensuring that the resident and unified expertise is contained within speaks to the generation, deployment and employment of multi-disciplinary task force organizations within today's Contemporary Operating Environment. All this is to say that the organizational form must follow function. It also goes without saying that in order for the organization to be effective and efficient in the execution of its tasks, it must be sufficiently resourced.

Canadian involvement in future conflicts will be constrained to either being an active up-front participant within a "Coalition of the willing" or as a follow-on force involved predominantly in what the US doctrinal lexicon refers to as Stability and Reconstruction Operations (RSO). Given this reality, and the reality that conflict can no longer be considered a linear activity, the need to achieve a blend and deploy an "off the shelf" force structure, or as a very minimum an interagency C4ISR structure, will be needed in order to effectively and efficiently function within the Contemporary Operating Environment. The need for military-civilian enabled task forces will be required to assist in the fulfillment, as a participant, of those "… *international obligations imposed on an*

¹⁵³ Graham Day and Freeman, Christopher. "From Policing to Peace: Intervention, Transitional Administration and the Responsibility to Do It Right." http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org/R2P/Day Freeman.pdf; Internet; aaccessed 19 January 2008.

occupying power by the Fourth Geneva Convention. . . . ^{*n154*} Although Canada and Canadians may never view themselves as an occupying power but rather as what our popular culture believes the Canadian Forces to be – peacekeepers – the fact is that we are not functioning as an intervening authority/power between two or more belligerents and as such cannot realistically view participation as impartial, consensual, and operating under the banner of minimum use of force.¹⁵⁵ Given this dichotomous relationship, peacekeeping has become a subset within what is termed Peace Support Operations.

Peace Support Operations (PSOs) are undertaken to transform societies ravaged by conflict into liberal democratic ones.¹⁵⁶ However, the context in which PSOs occur has greatly altered the way in which a military force is required to operate not only with regards to neutrality, impartiality, and consent but more importantly, how it must be incorporated with humanitarian and civilian nation-building capacities and capabilities. In the context of PSOs, traditional peacekeeping has morphed into military forces providing for a secure environment where the civilian capacities address policing and implementation of the Rule of Law, the building of enduring democratic institutions, reconstruction of state capacities, and national reconciliation.¹⁵⁷ Satisfying these operational and strategic-level objectives cannot be done as parallel activities that may

¹⁵⁴ Sarah Graham-Brown. "Multiplier Effect: War, Occupation and Humanitarian Needs in Iraq." *Middle East Report,* No. 228 (Autumn, 2003), 13. <u>http://www.jstor.org</u>; Internet; accessed 13 December 2007.

¹⁵⁵ Impartiality, consent, and minimum use of force are considered to be the Holy Trinity of United Nations Peacekeeping. Bellamy et al, *Understanding Peacekeeping...*, 96.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 165.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 171.

occasionally crossover. Paring this down to a joint operational area context, PSOs can be viewed as a mechanism to facilitate transition operations thereby establishing that zone of stable peace where peace building activities of state-building, law and order, democratization, and economic reconstruction can occur.¹⁵⁸ In the absence of a professional and integrated in-theatre military-civilian force structure, military personnel, whom are required to act outside of their scope of responsibility and capability and therefore fulfilling tasks that they are not effectively trained for, create partial vacuums with regards to development and governance issues. Given the current rotational nature of Canadian forces as a result of operational tempo, and the recognition that *"war fighting and humanitarian relief could take place simultaneously"*¹⁵⁹ in the Contemporary Operating Environment, the need to force generate, employ, and deploy, as a minimum, an interagency C4ISR is imperative to contribute to achieving mission success.

MILITARY-LED NATION BUILDING AND STRUCTURES

Conduct of transition operations must be based upon a military framework with resident nation-building capabilities and capacities in order to establish the initial momentum necessary for development towards a sustainable peace. Within the United States Army, Civil Affairs organizations provide a deployed commander a capability to

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid., 230 and* 235-248.

¹⁵⁹ Roger Mac Ginty. "The pre-war reconstruction of post-war Iraq." *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 24, No. 4 (2003), 607.

"...*engage the civil component of the operational environment.*"¹⁶⁰ Regionally focused, Civil Affairs provides the supported commander with expertise in the cultural and political dimensions of their operating environment. Development and integration of the civilian agencies and organizations into the supported commander's concept of operations serves to create the conditions for the transition of reconstruction, stability, and development operations and initiatives from military forces to non-military organizations and agencies.¹⁶¹

Civil Affairs within the United States Army is structured in such a way to provide the requisite functional expertise and the command, control, coordination, and synchronization of initial nation-building initiatives through the deployment of either Active or Army Reserve units. Civil Affairs provides the supported commander the following subject matter expertise that are resident within a CA Functional Specialty Cell for the rehabilitation, establishment or maintenance of: Rule of Law; public health and welfare; infrastructure; governance; economic stability; and public education and information. Of the six functional expertises, only the first four are present at the Army Reserve Brigade to Battalion levels. The CA Company provides the capability and capacity to assess, plan, coordinate, and synchronize Civil-Military operations. It should be noted that Active Army CA units are not structured with any of the functional

¹⁶⁰ United States. Headquarters, Department of the Army. *FM 3-05.40 (FM 41-10) Civil Affairs Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2006), 2-1.

¹⁶¹ The US Army Civil Affairs Manual does not definitively articulate a definition for transition operations in the glossary. However, in Chapter 2, it articulates a transition operation '... in which the military force is redeploying home while the foreign nation (FN)/HN re-establishes civilian services...." *Ibid.*, 2-7.

expertise that are resident within the Reserve structure and as such, act as the Vanguard for the establishment of in-theatre command, control and coordination of CA activities.¹⁶²

The United States Army has developed its modernization programs based upon on the doctrine of Rapid Decisive Operations where the focus of the operational framework is founded upon what has become termed as Effects Based Operations, or in Canadian doctrinal lexicon Effects Based Approach to Operations.¹⁶³ As put forward by Watson in his paper "Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force Structure", Rapid Decisive Operations specifically envision bringing a regional conflict to a quick and decisive end through the deployment and employment of smaller, lethal forces. However, the rapidity in which these operations are executed create second- and third-order effects that are considered "detrimental to creating the conditions for a free and fair society to emerge. . .the chief objective of military intervention in the modern environment."¹⁶⁴ Although his article proposes that the American Brigade Combat Team (BCT) construct must be re-tooled to reflect the operational reality that the Contemporary Operating Environment requires military forces to operate within, namely the introduction of stabilization brigades to ensure that what he refers to as a strategic pause. Watson views strategic pause as that period during the build-up of post-conflict nation building capabilities and capacities where initially achieved successes in momentum can begin to disintegrate. Whereas

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 2-7 to 2-21.

¹⁶³ Brian G. Watson. "Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force Structure." (August 2005) Strategic Studies Institute Website. <u>www.StrtegicStudiesInstitute.army.mil</u> accessed 25 January 2008, 4

BCTs would continue to conduct combat operations, sustainment brigades would, as identified by the United States' Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept, be able to conduct limited combat operations in order to ensure that initial security gains can be maintained so that momentum of high tempo combat operations can continue relatively uninterrupted. At the same time sustainment brigades could ensure that post-conflict long-term reconstruction activities can proceed under favourable conditions.¹⁶⁵ This conceptual framework does not lend itself well to Canadian participation in the resolution of regional conflict given that we do possess neither the size nor inherent skill sets to become effectively employed within a stabilization operations environment. Although the currently structured Provincial Reconstruction Team lends itself, in concept, to the capabilities envisioned in sustainment brigades, it lacks the physical and cognitive horsepower needed to achieve the regionally focused nation-building activities required in the contemporary post-conflict environment. Capacity and capability must therefore be leveraged through the incorporation of structures that facilitate both stabilization and reconstruction objectives.

The Canadian Forces does not have the capacity or capability to conduct standalone stability and reconstruction operations and arguably, would be hard pressed to be a significant contributor when viewed through a capacity lens. When compared to the sustainment brigade force construct that the United States Army is investigating, it is apparent that we lack the requisite expertise and capabilities to effectively resource a similar structure. So how then can the Canadian Forces, deployed as a small force

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

package, significantly contribute during transition operations in order to maximize, to the greatest extent possible, limited resources with a view to synchronizing governance, economic, basic infrastructure and military operations, both within national and coalition/international parameters?

CHAPTER FIVE – A PROPOSED OPERATING FRAMEWORK

An Integrated Mission is one in which structure is derived from an in-depth understanding of the specific country setting; of the evolving security, political, humanitarian, human rights and development imperatives in that particular country; and of the particular mix of assets and capacities available and/or required to achieve the desired impact through mutually supportive action. In other words, form (mission structure) should follow function and be tailored to the specific characteristics of each country setting.¹⁶⁶

The primacy of military operations is essential to providing the initial and intermediate stability necessary for both non-combat and non-military activities a space to coordinate, operate, and eventually flourish. Their combination in an intermediate security environment will lead to a long-term stable and secure environment. Enduring security traction, therefore, and the ability to quickly regain it in the event of relapse, remains an essential component of any integrated, interagency task force in today's Contemporary Operating Environment. Stated another way, the current joint, interagency, multinational, and public operating environment that current literature is focused upon requires a functional Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) where

¹⁶⁶ United Nations. Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2007. <u>http://action.web.ca/home/cpcc/attach/06_DPKO_IMPP_final_.pdf;</u> Internet; accessed 12 March 2008.

acceptable end-states vice *decisive* ones establish the baseline for longer-term development to occur.¹⁶⁷

United Nations doctrine rarely supports an exit strategy that is only premised on the conduct of elections. As a result, nation-building forces of troop contributing nations must be capable to facilitate the implementation of longer-term strategies.¹⁶⁸ Escalation of United Nations peace missions and their associated success rates speak to the cost effectiveness of military-led intervention and underscores that capacities and capabilities for interim nation building are embedded within task force structures.¹⁶⁹ The preeminence of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to non-United nations commanded missions, and the difficulty of the United Nations to optimally integrate interagency efforts, speaks to the need for the deployment of a tactically self-sufficient units (TSSUs) to mirror those United Nations nation-building structures or, at the very least, be reflective of the capabilities whilst providing for marginal capacities in order to set the stage for longer-term nation- building tasks to be

¹⁶⁷ Within the last few years, there has been a considerable amount of literature within Canadian Army doctrine circles with regards to operating in the Joint, International, Multi-agency, and Public (JIMP) environment. As stated in the Canadian Land Operations (Draft 2007) doctrine publication: "Land forces will operate in an increasingly complex, interdependent environment in which they must plan to conduct operations that will influence the physical and cognitive aspects of the terrain, threats and hazards, the local populace and other systems, actors, and entities within the environment. They must do so in a comprehensive approach, working within a joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) framework to achieve enduring success." Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Land Operations, DRAFT 2007..., 2-1/23.*

¹⁶⁸ Harland, David. "United Nations Peacekeeping Today: Current Challenges and required Responses" in *United Nations as Peacekeeper and Nation-Builder Continuity and Change – What Lies Ahead?* edited by Nassrine Azimi and Chang Li Lin, 169-183. (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 170.

assumed by follow-on forces.¹⁷⁰ Integrated marginal capacities within a TSSU's core structure speaks to an ability to move from coalition-led Phase IV activities to United Nations-led or sanctioned transitional activities where valued enablers and force multipliers would augment baseline military capability. Upon transition residual military enablers and force multipliers could serve as deterrents to would-be spoilers and address that aspect where it is neither prudent nor feasible to deploy follow-on peacekeeping forces into an adjacent area where there is no peace to keep. Therefore, a TSSU operating within a multinational force would be a tool to manage a "spoiler" dynamic but more importantly, establish an initial baseline through the effective and efficient integration of all organizations and agencies within the respective Area of Operations. Given the omni-directional aspects that the Contemporary Operating Environment presents, expeditionary force structures, therefore, must be reflective of the operating environment dimensions.¹⁷¹

There are four overarching themes that have surfaced in this paper, which must be catered for in transitional operation interagency force structures. First, is the creation of a capacity gap as a result of Rapid Decisive Operations. Second, is that of military primacy in the initial and intermediate stages of operations in the Contemporary Operating Environment and the need to fully integrate non-military organizations and agencies at the outset of transition planning. Third, is that transition operations will not

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 174 and 176.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 179.

be linear in their execution. Finally, is that form must follow function and be adequately resourced.

Overcoming institutional inertia and harmonization of conditions of service for all deployed within a JIATF is necessary to overcome the fragmentation associated with departmental stovepiping.¹⁷² As articulated in CIDA's 2005-2006 RPP, advancement of the Whole of Government approach to transitional operations would require the following four pillars to be operationalized: increased Canadian expertise in the development of governance programming; effective strategic communication in order to bring about greater visibility of governance efforts; establishing greater convergence and coherence between government departments and other agency governance activities; and effective development and application of knowledge management.¹⁷³ In order to effectively operationalize these four pillars a level of congruency must be established between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in order to effectively conduct transition operations. Establishment of standing interagency planning teams at each level would not only ensure that unity of effort is instilled and maintained, but also that the idiosyncrasies that exist between agency cultures are better understood, leveraged, and compensated for. Therefore, unity of effort at the strategic level, where political guidance informs and guides the development of a supported plan, enables the

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 182.

¹⁷³ Canada. Estimates 2005-2006. Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities. Canadian International Development Agency ..., 23.

development of an integrated operational-level design that will link tactical-level actions and activities to national and military strategic objectives.¹⁷⁴

Although not the focus of this paper, there is a requirement to very briefly discuss the strategic aspect of structures for transitional operations. At present, Canadian capacity to undertake the complexities of planning and executing transitional operations can be considered limited given Canada's population base and capacities to effectively project and sustain national power. Unlike initiatives being taken by the United States Department of Defence for interagency coordination with combatant commands, such as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) that proposes membership from the Department of Defence, Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Treasury, USAID, and the Department of Transportation, Canadian efforts to deal with the interdepartmental coordination of national power for transition operations in the Contemporary Operating Environment continue to be predominantly ad hoc in approach and stovepiped.¹⁷⁵ As identified in a recent United States Government Accountability Office report improvement in the planning and execution of integrated, interagency

¹⁷⁴ Based upon open-source documentation, it would appear that the Department of National Defence is the only government department that has a strategic plan beyond what is articulated in Part III Estimates of its Report on Plans and Priorities (Strategy 2020). Also, whereas the Department is organized with dedicated strategic planners, it would appear that strategic planning within DFAIT/CIDA is not institutionalized and conducted bi-weekly through the Policy Committee, which is chaired by ADM Strategic Policy and Planning. Where the ". . agenda is shaped by those current issues currently before relevant Cabinet committees as well as by the department's business plans and strategic priorities." Canada. *Estimates 2006-2007. Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities. Foreign Affairs Canada...*, 18 and 24.

¹⁷⁵ Lack of integration guidance, inhibiting information sharing, and lack of understanding with regards to agency/organization organizational culture and behaviour is resulting in unity of effort "not being established." United States. Government Accountability Office. GAO-07-549 Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. http://www.gao.gov; Internet; accessed 19 January 2008, 5.

stability operations will occur when: specific strategic guidance is provided on how to integrate non-military organizations and agencies; overcoming practices that prevent information sharing; understanding respective planning processes and capabilities; and increasing non-military participation in stability operations planning; and that departmental representatives develop greater planning experience and training in order to become more inclusive to the military planning process vice fulfilling advisory and liaison roles.¹⁷⁶ The current Canadian answer to addressing interdepartmental coordination and inclusiveness is the DFAIT-led Afghanistan Task Force.¹⁷⁷

The Canadian Army is gravitating towards establishing Affiliated Battle Group and symmetrical brigade headquarters structures. The intent behind these structural "iterations" is to enable the Army and other service environments to better force generate expeditionary units and command and control organizations. Although the evolving construct of both the Affiliated Battle Group and brigade headquarters has increased the capacities and capabilities required for the planning, coordination, command and control of combat operations, there has been relatively little emphasis placed on transitional tasks. Put more simply, the 2011 brigade headquarters structure is not adequately optimized for full spectrum operations in the Contemporary Operating Environment. As

http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0738-e.htm accessed 13 March 2008.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 5 and 28.

¹⁷⁷ Afghanistan Task Force facilitates "a greater degree of integration between Canada's development and diplomatic and military efforts in Afghanistan, as well as to develop overarching common policies and objectives for the Canadian mission. In addition to working with CIDA and DND to coordinate Canada's Afghanistan policies, the role of the task force was to support the work of Canadian diplomats on the ground. This involved managing and streamlining the workload of diplomats, as well as ensuring that their work was in line with Canada's overall strategic objectives." Canada. Library of Parliament. Afghanistan: Canadian Diplomatic Engagement.

Operation Eclipse exemplified and throughout history, the bottom-up approach to transition operations "... has been the best approach to rebuilding states."¹⁷⁸ Force structures, therefore, must be able to maintain transitional tempo while waiting for nonmilitary nation-building organizations and agencies to establish their own in-theatre capability-capacity thresholds. The ability of non-military organizations and agencies to achieve an in-theatre capability-capacity threshold, therefore, allows them to assume and evolve the transitional accomplishments and tempo established by military forces. Incorporation of civilian agency and other government department capacities and capabilities into the military planning process must occur well before the initiation of transitional operations on the ground. "Effectiveness [becomes] enhanced [through the] align[ment of] national and departmental priorities and operations more closely—and *more collaboratively*.¹⁷⁹ Although operational security concerns will prevent inclusion in some of the more sensitive aspects of mission planning, integration at the onset of force generating an expeditionary task force would ensure that those tactical force protection orientated humanitarian activities that are conducted by military forces are supportive of longer-term transitional activities. This last point speaks to establishing the groundwork for enduring transitional tasks where the effective management of indigenous expectations and creation of complementary vice parallel activities mitigate unintended second-and third-order consequences that NGOs and other international organizations must contend with.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Conrad C. Crane. "Phase IV operations: where wars are really won." <u>http://www.encyclopedia.com/printable.aspx?id:133371068;</u> Internet; accessed 13 February 2008, 6.

¹⁷⁹ Canada. Independent Panel on ..., 26.

¹⁸⁰ NGO participation with military forces in the short-term may consequently lead to long-term alienation latter military forces have departed. In addition, variances in NGO charters and principles create




Figure 6: Canadian Army 2011 Brigade Headquarters Structure.

Source: Directorate Land Force Development

Figure 6 represents the current spiral of the Canadian Army's brigade headquarters structure for 2011 implementation. The commander is supported by the traditional branch and specialist advisor staffs that are standing positions in a domestic posture and restricted positions are force generated on the road to high readiness for subsequent expeditionary operations. The specialist advisor staffs in this structure provide the commander with the requisite subject matter expertise as it pertains to the

variations in consensus within a given mission area "... and may make NGOs unpredictable and even tempestuous partners." Francis. *NGO-Military Relations in Peace operations*..., 27-32.

planning and execution of combat and security related operations and tasks. What is not resident is the subject matter expertise required for the planning and execution of transitional tasks or support to the planning, coordination and control of transitional tasks. The structure has limited transitional-centric planning functions to capacity building in the area of Security Sector Reform within the Plans Branch, a small Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Cell resident within Operations Branch, and Other Government Department (OGD), NGO, and Local Authorities liaison detachments, political, and development advisors within the Command Information Branch.

FORM FOLLOWS FUNCTION

In order to provide this capability and avoid the ad hoc nature that currently typifies the Canadian dynamic of planning and coordination of transitional activities, a transitional staff branch should be created. Under the guidance of a Deputy Chief of Staff Transition, the branch would consist of the requisite skill sets necessary to plan, coordinate, and control larger tactical and operational-level transition tasks within the operating area regardless if the task force is the supported or the supporting organization. Led by a suitably qualified military officer assisted by an experienced mid-level civilian administrator or vice-versa, the branch would not only provide the requisite expertise needed to effectively and efficiently plan, coordinate and control transitional activities but more importantly, provide the necessary intellectual and practical depth in order to allow both combat and stability operations to become mutually reinforcing.. Leveraging an already nascent capability and capacity within the 2011 brigade headquarters structure,

Figure 7 represents a proposed Transition Branch for incorporation into the brigade headquarters structure.




Figure 7: Proposed Transition Branch

The Deputy Chief of Staff Transition could be responsible for the following planning and coordination aspects as well and serve as the bridging mechanism in a mid-to high threat-operating environment between military and non-military agencies. As Chapter Two of this paper has already identified, the Branch could focus upon: coordinating in-flow and distribution of those materials that are essential to vital utilities and industry infrastructures; handling of currency and other financial issues such as payment to locally employed persons; implementation and initial project management for the repair,

maintenance and expansion of essential utilities and industrial infrastructures such as power generation and distribution, waste management, and irrigation; development of essential managerial and technical competencies amongst the indigenous population in order to effectively and efficiently manage basic governance processes such as civil administration, Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRE), ordinance disposal and destruction, and essential Public Safety measures outside the realm of policing and hostnation military; coordination and control for the provision of essential public health and veterinarian services; initiation and implementation of legal and judiciary reform mechanisms focusing on essential skills sets and institutions; coordination of transition to local/regional civilian governmental control for subsequent operational-level integration into provincial and national control; coordination of complementary non-government and international organization activities within respective area of operations; coordination of complementary inter/intra-government department development programs; and essential vocational training that are complementary to activities aforementioned.

The interagency composition of DCOS Transition would provide the necessary baseline for the planning and initial coordination and control of essential transitional activities implementation prior to a JIATF deployment into the Theatre of Operations. As well, the staff capacity would also allow for the re-establishment of transition tempo in the event that the security situation experiences some degree of re-lapse.¹⁸¹ It must be

¹⁸¹ The recent Manley Report identified that "fragmentation and uncoordinated effort that prevail throughout the programming of international development aid in Afghanistan. Effectiveness would be enhanced by aligning national and departmental priorities and operations more closely—and more collaboratively. We also believe that the Provincial Reconstruction Team, sooner rather than later, should be placed under civilian leadership." Canada. *Independent Panel on...*, 26.

stressed that this branch would not replace the close-tactical activities of the CIMIC Cell resident within the G3 Info Ops Cell or assume the day-to-day functions of a J9. The J9 and CIMIC detachments would continue to fulfill the tactical-level civil-military functions that serve to enable the force protection and freedom of movement considerations of a task force. DCOS Transition's purpose would be to establish the conditions for the commencement of a higher level tactical/operational project that would incorporate the various dimensions of nation-building activities.

The establishment of the conditions necessary would commence in the early aspects of operational planning. Termed pre-war reconstruction, operational planning would involve the co-option of non-military organizations and agencies into a military-led planning group in order to minimize countervailing activities.¹⁸² This higher level project would establish an operational-level transition tempo for subsequent handover to civilian-led authorities. A simple example of a higher order project could be the construction or rehabilitation of a power generating station. Whereas the tactical-level CIMIC detachments would still maintain the coordination of hiring and paying of indigenous general labour for rudimentary site preparation and construction, the higher-level tactical/operational project would require the development of the practical skills needed to repair and maintain equipment, managerial skills for human resources and project management, and governance skills in order to operate the infrastructure as a public utility (Figure 8). As this "hub" is completed, additional "nodes" are then

¹⁸² Roger Mac Ginty. "The pre-war reconstruction of post-war Iraq." *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 24, No. 4 (2003), 601 and 606.

constructed, either sequentially or concurrently, which develop the same skills sets albeit at a lower level of governance (ie. outstations within a grid). This example speaks to the economic stability, supply management, infrastructure, governance and education components of the transition branch. Nesting this project within a prescribed higherorder nation-building structure not only builds interim transitional momentum, but significantly contributes to longer-term strategic nation-building initiatives. Figure 9 illustrates how the power generating project can become nested within higher-order initiatives based upon indigenous opium cultivation.¹⁸³




Figure 9: Nesting Capability Development within the Strategic Framework

¹⁸³ Using opium production in Afghanistan as an example, allow opium cultivation to continue within a regulated environment for use in the pharmaceutical industry. Instead of destroying crops, allow the crops to be cultivated and produced within a controlled and legislated environment thereby maintaining an already established and relied upon economy. International R&D would develop alternative crops that would in time replace or greatly diminish reliance upon opium production. Whereas the creation of infrastructure for opiate production may not be a desired outcome, it could be considered an acceptable outcome during the interim as nation-building initiatives continue to gain traction. Author.

CONCLUSION

The Contemporary Operating Environment has brought with it a number of significant challenges and dimensions that require military forces to operate outside of their traditionally intended purposes and comfort zones. Although the complexity of the operating environment may have evolved with the progress of time, the historical examples included herein have demonstrated that it is not a new concept. Strategic guidance, operational integration of all military and non-military stakeholders, primacy of military operations, legitimacy, security, situational awareness, and the need to integrate international and other government organizations and agencies within a military expeditionary headquarters structure, serve to not only address the capacity-capability gap caused by Rapid Decisive Operations, but also establishes the transitional momentum necessary for non-military organizations and agencies to carry-on. The need to have near and mid-term transitional activities incorporated early into a campaign plan, and that plan to be initially military-led until the operating environment lends itself to civilian managed, highlights the need to overcome the cultural and "routinized" cultures and habits that each organization and agency brings to the table. Establishment of acceptable goals, goals that are implemented from the "ground up", require that agency stovepiping become a process of the past and the acknowledgment that adequately resourced form must follow function.

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