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MASTERS IN DEFENCE STUDIES

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Islamic Republic of Pakistan: The 21st Century Iran?

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ABSTRACT

Recent security, social, political and economic events over the last year give the impression that the integrity of Pakistan as a state may be at risk. This perceived vulnerability combined with rising levels of Islamic extremism suggests the country may additionally be at risk of becoming an Islamic Fundamentalist state. Pre-revolutionary Iran was also experiencing social, political and economic instability in the lead up to the revolution. Iran might therefore serve as a comparative model in assessing the likelihood of Pakistan succumbing to an Islamic fundamentalist takeover. After an analysis and comparison of the principal contributing issues, it is assessed that Pakistan does not currently possess the conditions and level of upheaval that precipitated the Iranian revolution. Furthermore there are additional mitigating factors suggesting Pakistan may not presently be at risk of becoming an Islamic Fundamentalist state. Should these conditions change however, the impact of an Islamic Fundamentalist Pakistan on regional and global security could be catastrophic. In order to decrease the risk of Islamic fundamentalism taking a future hold in the country, there are a series of political, social and economic mitigation strategies which should be implemented by both the Pakistani government and the international community.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The last few years have been tumultuous times for Pakistan. In late 2006, the country had earned a ninth place on a global list of countries most likely to become failed states. The drop from thirty-fourth the year before was symptomatic of the crisis that was occurring in the country.¹ In recent years, the economy, health and education have been sacrificed as a need for security consumed the political and economic capacity of the country. The decades old conflict with India over Kashmir combined with the steady rise of domestic extremism has begun to affect Pakistan's financial ability to maintain the world's eighth largest military.²

The political process in Pakistan has historically been paralyzed by fragmented partisan politics, charges of corruption and military interference resulting in perpetual periods of political crisis and a disenfranchised population. The country has had a military government from 1999 until late in 2007 when the military dictator removed his uniform and assumed the role of president. The increasingly unpopular alliance with the United States in the ongoing Global War on Terror (GWOT) being waged along the northwest border with Afghanistan has emboldened political Islamists elements within the country. This resurgence in Islamic fundamentalism activity has been perceived by many to be both a serious threat to Pakistan's national security as well as the international fight against terrorism. The significant number of violent actions attributed to these

¹"Pakistan is a top Failed State" *BBC News* 2 May 2006.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4964934.stm; Internet; accessed 16 Mar 2008.

²United States Department of State: Background Notes: Pakistan, 3 May 2007
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 Mar 2008.

radical Islamist elements has alarmed moderates within both Pakistan and the global community.

A highly publicized incident in July 2007 featured a public confrontation between government security forces and besieged religious extremists in the Red Mosque in the heart of Islamabad. The subsequent standoff was described ominously by some in the media as a struggle between religious extremists and liberal fascists that would eventually result in the deaths of nearly 300 people.³ Apart from this incident, there were scores of seemingly unrelated and indiscriminate terrorist attacks throughout the country which by the end of 2007 would claim the lives of over 1,300 people. This figure exceeded the number killed by similar attacks in the previous five years combined.⁴

From an international perspective, it appeared that Pakistan had become increasingly less effective in maintaining security and suppressing extremist influence. United States intelligence sources claimed that elements of al-Qaeda were freely operating in the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and were not being challenged seriously by Pakistan's security forces.⁵ Furthermore, many Pakistani Islamists in these regions have become radicalized as a result of the ongoing war northwest of the border, in Afghanistan, where US and NATO forces are perceived as waging a war on Islam. Extremist attacks against the Pakistani government were also common, particularly as President Musharraf had consistently pledged support to the US-led War on Terror. The

³Tony Kellett, "The Army and the "Talibanization" of Pakistan." Department of National Defence. Directorate of Strategic Analysis Issue brief (Ottawa: DND, 20 July 2007),1, 2.

⁴"Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence". Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee", (Washington: DNI United States, February 2008), p26

⁵ Kellett, "The Army and the "Talibanization" of Pakistan...", 10.

pool of extremist recruits appeared limitless as a lack of publicly funded schooling resulted in an explosion of Islamic schools. The popularity of these madrasas, many of which preach intolerance and hatred, had reached an all time high despite an advertised government crackdown. Many schools were independently funded by religious groups and there are fears that they have become breeding grounds for extremist ideology.⁶

In November 2007, President Musharraf declared a nationwide state of emergency citing the need to address the accelerating influence of Islamic extremism. He concurrently dismissed the chief court justice and declared it illegal for the media to directly criticize Pakistani leadership⁷. While extremist elements did constitute a threat to the country, the six weeks of marshal law probably had more to do with a need to circumvent the government opposition calls for his resignation. Masharraf's actions had a detrimental impact on the perceived legitimacy of the government from both international and domestic perspectives.

The year of extreme violence culminated in what was probably the most deleterious event threatening Pakistan's return to normalcy. The assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in late December, presumably by Taliban elements, was a serious blow for most Pakistanis.⁸ Her party's expected successful bid in the imminent elections had hope of restoring some level of stability and legitimacy to the political process.

⁶"Pakistan's Madrassas Thriving Amid Poverty." *The Toronto Star*. 22 January 2008. <http://www.thestar.com>; Internet; accessed 21 Feb 2008.

⁷"Pakistan Under Martial Law." *CNN*. Updated 4 November 2007, <http://www.cnn.com>; Internet; accessed 29 Jan 2008.

⁸"Pakistan Taliban warns new government to keep clear." *Reuters* 24 February 2008. <http://www.reuters.com>; Internet; accessed 28 Feb 2008.

As Bhutto was a moderate with national appeal, she was considered a threat to extremist influence and a significant obstacle to the realization of the fundamentalist agenda.

Islamic Fundamentalists generally have the stated goal of establishing a religious ideological state or influencing an existing state to govern through ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam and Sharia law. While the term Islamic fundamentalism denotes return to first principles of religion, it actually refers to a modern political ideologization of the religion. It is further defined by culling selected symbols to the exclusion of others from the historical repertoire of Islam. For these reasons, Islamism is the term preferred by many scholars rather than Islamic fundamentalism.⁹ As Islamic fundamentalism is still a widely accepted expression, however, both terms will be used interchangeably throughout the paper. Commensurate with the goal of establishing an ideological state is the suppression of western influence which is seen as liberal, decadent and permissive.¹⁰ Attempts by conservative religious groups to influence state policy or even gain control is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan as they have been involved in politics since the country was formed. Indeed, for much of the last five years, two provinces were under the influence of the legitimately elected Muttihada Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a political coalition composed of six religious parties including highly radicalized elements.¹¹ The situation in Pakistan is not unique. Islamic religious conservatism and fundamentalism has been on the rise worldwide over the last 30 years. The most notable event in these decades was the 1979 Iranian revolution, which gave birth to the first

⁹ Noorani, A.G. *Islam and Jihad: Prejudice Versus Reality* (London: Zed, 2002), 68.

¹⁰ "Pakistan Taliban warns new government to keep clear." *Reuters*. 24 February 2008. <http://www.reuters.com>; Internet; accessed 28 Feb 2008.

¹¹ United States Department of State: Background Notes: Pakistan..., 7.

Islamic theocracy. Periodically, in the history of Islamic society, there have been attempts to revert to the basic tenets of the religion during times of crisis. In times of cultural and political upheaval, Islam has seemingly represented the only viable and comforting guiding principle. Accordingly, the religious values have featured prominently in many rebellions and revolutions in Muslim countries, including Iran. From a western perspective, the revolution in Iran was a complete surprise, though in retrospect many of the classic preconditions for an uprising were evident. Pre-revolutionary Iran was a very important regional ally to the United States both economically and politically. Iranian oil was important to the US economy, while Iran was the major counter to Soviet aspirations in the Gulf region during the Cold War. Despite vast oil revenues and a formidable United States-furnished military, in the late 1970s, the Iranian people were suffering from high inflation, unemployment, political and religious suppression under an autocratic monarch, economic uncertainty, terrorism and a perceived national security crisis. These issues all contributed to the collapse of the monarchy and the resulting post-revolutionary Islamic Republic. This new type of theocratic government based on Islamic values has not been cooperative in the pursuit of regional and global stability.

Similarly, Pakistan is arguably the most important ally in South Asia to the United States in combating global terrorism. Following the events of September 11th, 2001, terrorism has represented the greatest security concern to the US since the end of the Cold War. The United States declared Pakistan a major non-NATO ally in 2004 and has subsequently invested significantly in terms of economic and military support to the

country.¹² Despite the economic infusion, there are dangers that inflation, traditionally high poverty rates and unemployment will precipitate unrest. The social problems associated with an uneven wealth distribution may also contribute to instability.¹³ Politically, Pakistan has recently emerged from an eight year autocratic military dictatorship. The civilian government landscape has historically been considered ineffective and corrupt with little sign of improvement. On the other hand, from a Muslim point of view, the western military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan are perceived as attacks on Islam and thus have damaged relations with the West. The specter of countrywide extremist terrorism and the continued uncertainty over Kashmir has yielded national security concerns.

There is a concern that the current political crisis and socio-economic conditions in Pakistan may continue to deteriorate and perhaps may lead to major political upheaval or collapse. It could be argued that many of the pre-conditions that were present in the years leading up to the Iranian revolution are now present in Pakistan. The prospect of an Islamic fundamentalist controlled Pakistan, similar to Iran, would be catastrophic to regional and global security, especially considering that unlike Iran, Pakistan controls a nuclear arsenal.

Scholars and analysts have produced considerable amount of literature on issues related to contemporary Pakistan and on the Iranian revolution and modern Islamism. In researching this paper, it was discovered that there was a wide spectrum of opinion regarding the complex nature of Islamic fundamentalism and causes of the Iranian

¹²*Ibid.*, 13.

¹³*Ibid.*, 8.

revolution. A series of papers by Nikki Keddi provided an excellent grounding in the nature and evolution of the Islamic revolutionary tradition, particularly in relation to Iran. The concept of Islamic fundamentalism's dual nature was very well presented by Johannes Jansen while AG. Noorani provided a complimentary analysis on the same subject from the perspective of moderate Islam. The most influential reference on the Iranian revolution, however, was "The Making of the Iranian Revolution by Mohsen Milani who was able to succinctly present the complexities of the Iranian revolutionary process.

The literature review revealed that there is wildly varying opinions as to what the future holds for Pakistan as well. Hassan Abbas' insightful study provided a comprehensive foundation pertaining to the nature of politics, national security and fundamentalism in Pakistan. The political landscape in Pakistan has altered significantly in the last few years, therefore recent government and private sector strategic analyses, supplemented by credible periodicals were necessary to understand the changing dynamics. Stratfor analyses, Jane's Sentinel Security assessments, US State department background notes and Canadian Defence R&D papers on Pakistan by Tony Kellett are considered indispensable in framing the situation in contemporary Pakistan.

That being said, none of the above specialists have explored the similarities between modern Pakistan and pre-revolutionary Iran in order to assess the prospects of fundamentalist Pakistan. This paper argues that, in this case, the method of historical analogy is an innovative way to determine the likelihood of Pakistan becoming an Islamist fundamentalist state. The scope of the study will be to examine the current religious, socio-economic and political situation in Pakistan and, in particular, the

ramifications of such an event for global and regional stability by comparing them with the corresponding situation in pre-and post-revolutionary Iran.

The analysis will consist of five parts. First, the nature and origins of the Islamic fundamentalist movement will be studied with an emphasis on motivations, history and the quest to acquire power and control at the state level. Next, the essay will consider the special case of Iran. As the first and only successful Islamic revolutionary state, the country represents a credible Islamic revolutionary model. This will be followed by a brief analysis of the current complex situation in Pakistan. The conditions in pre-revolutionary Iran will then be compared and contrasted to those in contemporary Pakistan to assess the relevance of the Iranian model and the likelihood of Pakistan becoming an Islamist-controlled state. The paper will then conclude by presenting possible policy ramifications of further fundamentalist influence on Pakistani regional and global security as well as possible strategies required to curb this influence.

It will be argued that despite the current social and political crisis in Pakistan exhibiting several of the preconditions necessary for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism at the state level, there exist sufficient differences to conclude that the country does not fit the Iranian Islamic revolutionary model and is unlikely to become an Islamic Fundamentalist state in the near future. It is likely, however, that given Pakistan's strong Islamic character and the existence of extremist political parties, radical Islamists will continue to have a measurable influence over Pakistani regional and international affairs.

2. THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MODERN ISLAMISM

Approximately one fifth of the world population is Muslim, yet the religion is not well understood by the West. The 1979 Iranian revolution and the recent 2001 attacks on the United States have, however, placed both Islam and Islamic fundamentalism into the spotlight. Nevertheless, most Muslims are not Islamists, even though many western observers may be inclined to think so.¹⁴ Islam is a religion whereas Islamism (or Islamic fundamentalism) treats Islam as a purely political ideology without the essence of faith.¹⁵ Alternatively, Islamism has been described as banishing reason from religion and compassion from faith.¹⁶ Islamist ideology is less about religious theology and more about using it as a vehicle in the furtherance of social, political and economic goals. The line between mainstream Islam and fundamentalism can sometimes be blurred as they are both derived from the same religious tradition, which also tends to suggest that the Islamist agenda for social change might appear to some to have a measure of Islamic legitimacy.

The use of Islam as a tool for social change is not new and indeed this concept has figured prominently since the religion was established fourteen centuries ago. Indeed, the creation of Islam occurred in the midst of social crisis where the poor were empowered in

¹⁴Encyclopedia Britannica Online. <http://www.britannica.com>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2008.

¹⁵Noorani, *Islam and Jihad...*, 68.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 65.

a revolt against the establishment.¹⁷ The importance of historical precedence within Islam, regardless of how ancient cannot be underestimated. Many of the complex issues that motivate contemporary Islamic politics and social values have origins deeply rooted in the past. History has great value in Islam, as many believe that the past can provide valid solutions for contemporary problems.

Contemporary Islamist movements have taken components from both the Qu'ran and the Sunna, and combined them through biased interpretation to produce a unique ideology geared towards the protection of Islam and its culture.¹⁸ These groups preach a message that offer universal appeal to many disaffected Muslims and in the last few years have appeared to enjoy unprecedented popularity. In some cases, they have successfully translated support into political influence. International concern regarding these events revolves around the fact that much of the extremist fundamentalist doctrine is militant and hostile to any opposition whether Muslim and non-Muslim. This hostility draws much of its strength from a long history of western interference and influence in the Muslim world. Should Islamic Fundamentalist groups attain power at the state level, it is not inconceivable that their policies would generate conflict in the international community and affect regional and global stability.

In order to understand the likelihood and potential impact that Islamism might have at the state level, one first needs to understand the nature of Islam, the key motivators of Islamism and the origins of the fundamentalist movement. In particular,

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 81.

¹⁸The Qu'ran is the sacred scripture of Islam and word of God for all Muslims. The Sunna is a compilation of traditional social and legal practices of the Muslim community; Encyclopedia Britannica Online. <http://www.britannica.com>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2008.

the questions which need to be addressed are: Where does fundamentalism come from and what do they want? In answering these questions, this chapter will first briefly examine the influence of the West on Islam and the subsequent response. This will be followed by a synopsis of the origins and evolution of the modern Islamic fundamentalist movement and description of some of the key Islamic fundamentalist tenets. The chapter will conclude with an examination of potential issues that would exacerbate international relations should Islamists gain control at the state level.

Islam and the West

The Muslim religion was founded in Arabia in the year 622 by the prophet Muhammad. It is self-described as the final and purest incarnation of the Judeo-Christian monotheist tradition with Muhammad himself named as the final and most important prophet.¹⁹ Muslim society has many subgroups and cultural nuances that make the understanding of its religious-political landscape complex. However, most generally, Muslims are divided in two main sects that differ slightly in their interpretation of Islamic succession: the Sunnis and the Shia, who represent approximately 90% and 10% of the worldwide Muslim community respectively. Their differing views have often led to heated rivalry and violent confrontations. Since inception, Islam has grown exponentially and its powerful appeal and associated culture expanded to cover vast portions of Asia,

¹⁹Encyclopedia Britannica Online. <http://www.britannica.com>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2008.

Africa and the Middle East.²⁰ This culture would also be responsible for significant advances in the areas of science, medicine, mathematics and social liberties in a time when medieval Europe was still relatively ignorant of these disciplines.²¹

Since the establishment of Islam, the western world has represented the principal external threat for the religion.²² Both cultures have been locked in perpetual conflict fueled by religion, cultural differences and economics for more than a thousand years. Milestones of the conflict include the eleventh and twelfth century crusades, the expulsion of the Moors from Spain and the Ottoman conquest of south-east Europe. More recently, the European colonial era of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century neo-colonial period featured the systematic western subjugation and destruction of what remained of the Islamic empires. This long and continuous struggle has resulted in feelings of mutual suspicion and frequently unstable relations between Islam and the West.²³ These suspicions are still very strong which may have prompted a former NATO Secretary General to suggest that Islam represented the greatest threat to the western world since the fall of the Soviet Union.²⁴

For many traditionalists, the western influence has been viewed as having a negative impact on traditional Muslim values. Western liberalization and economics have

²⁰In 2006, Islam surpassed Roman Catholicism as the world's largest religion with 19.2 percent – "Vatican: Islam Surpasses Roman Catholicism as World's Largest Religion," The Associated Press (March 30, 2008).

²¹Johannes J.G. Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*. (New York: Macmillan, 1986), xi.
Noorani, *Islam and Jihad...*, 32.

²²Western world- Generalization over the centuries for Christendom, European colonial powers and eventually the United States.

²³Encyclopedia Britannica Online. <http://www.britannica.com>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2008.

²⁴ Johannes J.G. Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 22.

created upheaval in society, culture and politics. European society underwent significant and early gradual social change as a result of advances in trade, manufacturing, exploration, enlightenment and representative government. These events were also accompanied by a drift towards secularism. These same advances were introduced much later and more rapidly in the Muslim world. The traditional social and economic ties were suddenly and significantly altered, resulting in social mobility and subsequently societal tension and upheaval.²⁵ In contrast to the West, many Muslims have chosen to deal with these stresses by reverting to the refuge and comfort of Islam. Islam has retained enormous importance and is still regarded as both a unifier and a central aspect of social existence. Thus, the secular West has come to see the non-existent boundary between religion and politics in Islam as backwards in the modern age.²⁶ In contrast, some Muslims view the general decline of religious importance in the west as a symptom of decadence and moral bankruptcy.

Differences in culture have also been a source of conflict between Islam and the West. Many westernized elites were intent on instituting a comprehensive modernization of Muslim society. As a result many of the lower strata of society as well as some among the clergy saw modernization and westernization as synonymous. The perception was that traditional Islamic values were being discarded wholesale in favor of an alien culture. This “Westoxication” was resented by many traditionalists and further fueled anti-

²⁵Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to Islamic Republic. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 119.

²⁶ Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism...*, 1.

western sentiment.²⁷ Orthodox Muslims tended to view the liberal nature and permissiveness of the western culture and media as morally corrupt and fear their own culture and religion may be displaced. The censure of western music, media and cinema has usually been a feature of Muslim revivalist and revolutionary movements. Cinemas, for example, were early targets of rioters during the Iranian revolution.²⁸

In the realm of politics, many Muslims in the colonial and post-colonial period felt that they had inherited alien western government structures or corrupt, western supported, totalitarian regimes.²⁹ These regimes often ceded economic concessions to western interests at the expense of domestic producers. Some Muslims were able to adapt to this upheaval, profited from the new economic model and were able to escape traditional societal bounds. These new classes sought greater political influence in the affairs of the state.³⁰ When these demands were not met, Islamic solutions such as Sharia law were suggested, as it would be very difficult for the government to oppose the legitimacy of using the Qa'ran and the scholarly advice of Islamic clerics as a valid legal basis within a Muslim society.³¹ Probably the most significant political grievance against the West from a Muslim perspective, however, was the establishment and continued support for the existence of the state of Israel. It was perceived that the country

²⁷Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution...*, 141.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 118.

²⁹ Nikki R. Keddie, "The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993: Comparative Considerations and Relations to Imperialism." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (July 1994): 484.

³⁰Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution...*, 119.

³¹ Sharia Law is Islam's legal system. The body of law is drawn from both the Qa'ran and Fatwas which are theological rulings of Islamic scholars.: BBC. Q&A: Sharia Law Explained. 8 February 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7234870.stm; Internet; accessed 16 March 2008.

was carved out of what has traditionally been considered part of the Muslim world and built at the expense of the Palestinian people. These observations, coupled with a long standing historical cultural animosity against the West, provide some clues as to why many Muslims are not only predisposed to reject western influence and values but have chosen to revert to the most enduring and legitimate symbol of their culture, Islam.

Islam and the Tradition of Revolution

The last few hundred years have witnessed a concentration of Islamic uprisings in the Muslim world. Several movements occurred in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but were primarily reform movements against local rulers and those considered enemies of Islam.³² One of the primary influences of these uprisings was social upheaval. This era featured the rapid decline in the importance of great Islamic civilizations like the Ottoman and Moghul empires which compounded the political and social confusion for many.³³ These uprisings were mostly concentrated on the periphery of these contracting empires where political and social uncertainty was most intense.³⁴ Interestingly, many Muslims of this time period felt that participating in a revolt was considered worse than living beneath an unjust or evil ruler. There were two methods to circumvent this moral conflict. The first was to declare the leader of the rebel uprising as a renewer of Islam and the second was to declare holy war against an Islamic ruler who was censured as a “non-

³² Examples of these revolts include the Padri movement in Sumatra and the Wahabis in Arabia: Keddie, *The Revolt of Islam...*, 466, 467.

³³ *Ibid.*, 469, 470.

³⁴ Jansen, *The Neglected Duty...*, ix.

believer". The former type of revolt was classified as messianic and the second was called Jihad.³⁵

Western culture first began to influence Muslim society during the early part of the nineteenth century as expanding trade brought both groups into more frequent contact. Subsequently, colonialism and imperialism brought significant change as occupation, interference and European type governance displaced the traditional social and political structures in the Muslim world.³⁶ Coincidentally, a large number of prominent Islamic revivalist uprisings occurred soon after.³⁷ They were directed against local rulers and westerners but were less motivated by the necessity of the protection of Islam and more in response to economic, political and cultural alienation as a result of contact with western ideas and values. Indeed, it has been suggested that the anti-imperialism and anti-western culture led to Islamism rather than the reverse.³⁸ A common aspect of most of these uprisings, during both the pre-colonial and colonial period, was that they normally featured a charismatic religious-political leader.³⁹ The theory of "nativism" can provide some explanation of how these religious-political leaders were able to motivate followers in revolt. It is explained that when things are not going well, the community's misfortunes are caused by a neglect of traditional values or the old ways. The community is portrayed as having broken the covenant with tradition

³⁵Keddie, *The Revolt of Islam...*, 466.

³⁶Jansen, *The Neglected Duty...*, ix.

³⁷Examples include the Fara'izis uprisings in South Asia, Shamyl in the Caucasus, Abdel Qadir in Algeria, Senussis in Libya and the Mahdists in the Sudan, Keddie, *The Revolt of Islam...*, 467.

³⁸Keddie, *The Revolt of Islam...*, 486.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 470.

and defeat, occupation and humiliation are the subsequent punishments.⁴⁰ In a culture where religion is considered absolute, the people readily accepted Islam as the specific “old way” being lost to modern and western influence.

The Evolution of Modern Islamic Fundamentalism

Modern Islamic Fundamentalism was a response to the most intrusive period of colonialism spanning from the late 19th to mid 20th century. At the dawn of this era, European colonialism had reached its peak and much of the Muslim world had been occupied or subjugated.⁴¹ Among Muslims, these conditions gave birth to feelings of desperation and the need for a new resistance ideology. Over the next century, this ideology would diverge from mainstream Islam and evolve into what is now referred to as Islamic fundamentalism.

Egypt became the center for this ideological evolution. During the 1870s, Great Britain and France had taken control of the Egyptian economy and by extension Egyptian domestic politics in order to protect their investment in the Suez Canal and the sea route to India. During this time, a Cairo based scholar named Al-Afghani had had the opportunity to travel to Europe and was astounded by western economic development, comparative justice and the lack of arbitrary rule.⁴² He genuinely admired the west and sought to discover why the why the Muslim world had not kept pace. He came to the

⁴⁰Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism...*, 20.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 27.

⁴²Keddie, Nikki R. “Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective.” *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (June 1983): 584.

conclusion that there were two principal reasons for the decline. The first was the misinterpretation of Islam meaning the religion was deliberately being distorted by sycophantic clerics in order to legitimize the current social and political order. The second reason was that most of the contemporary Muslim ruling class was “tyrannical” with greater allegiance to western rather than domestic interests. All subsequent offshoots of Islamic fundamentalism are principally derived from these two observations.⁴³

He began to preach that the western powers were not as powerful as they appeared to be and suggested that a return to the glory of classical Islam could be accomplished through “re-interpretation,” which would deliver the society from its current ills.⁴⁴ While several other scholars advanced these ideas over the next fifty years, it was Hassan Al-Banna in Egypt during the late 1920s that would provide the next major re-adjustment of the ideology. He introduced the concept of organized violence against oppressors, including fellow Muslims deemed complicit in the subjugation of the Muslim people. These people included government officials and westernized elites.⁴⁵ Al-Banna had steered the movement away from a purely liberal reformist agenda.⁴⁶ One of his major achievements was the formalization of the movement by co-founding the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite government attempts at suppression, the Brotherhood ideology proved attractive to an urban population suffering under a humiliating and restrictive British occupation. The appeal was further enhanced as food and fuel shortages led to further instability and high

⁴³Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism...*, 27.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 29.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 22.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 40.

poverty rates during the 1930s. The Brotherhood was innovative and applied the tactics of newsletters, mass political uprisings, extra legal activities and assassination in furthering their agenda. Xenophobia, distrust for the West and secrecy also became hallmarks of the organization.⁴⁷ One of the most innovative Brotherhood approaches which increased membership was in the construction of a vast charitable social network. This practice provided a favorable image to the outside world and by aiding Muslims in poor areas with food, jobs and healthcare enhanced the appeal of the Islamist message.⁴⁸ Many of these concepts have endured and are common traits of modern Islamism. Al-Banna was followed by Sayyid Qutb who would eventually be regarded as the father of modern Sunni Islamic extremism. While he had no religious training, he was adept at re-interpreting Islamic law to justify the use of violence, and proving that all Muslims had a personal duty to conduct war against the enemies of Islam.⁴⁹ Qutb was also influenced by the writings of a South Asian reformer named Maulana Maududi. South Asians who did not read Arabic were forced to study Muslim texts that had been translated into local languages. This meant that they were deprived of the ability to study the Islamic texts in their original language and some of the historical context and nuance had been lost. South Asian Muslims like Maududi tended to take a more literal interpretation of the more militant passages of the Qa'ran. He was particularly inspired by Muhammad's seventh century call for fighters from the ranks of the weak and poor to

⁴⁷Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism...*, 47.

⁴⁸John Walsh, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Understanding Centrist Islam". Harvard International Review *Perspectives on the United States*, Vol. 24 (4) - Winter 2003:

⁴⁹Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism...*, 49.

overcome the hostility of the self-inflated rich and powerful.⁵⁰ In essence, the interpretation of Islamic message had migrated from the Middle East to Asia and then returned home with an Indian flavor and a strong militant message.⁵¹

These ideas would prove to be very attractive to the working poor in large cities where anti-western, anti-rich, and anti-elitist views became very popular. The loss of the 1967 war to Israel further reinforced the fundamentalist message as the defeat was portrayed as divine condemnation of the way Egypt had adopted western culture and civilization.⁵² Ironically, some saw their avowed enemy Israel as the quintessential model for an Islamic state as it demonstrated that a country based on religious ideology could prevail.⁵³ Due to its economic dominance and influence as well as its stance on Israel and other Middle Eastern affairs, the United States eventually evolved into the contemporary symbol of western imperialism and oppression.⁵⁴ This is despite not ever having been a colonial power in the region.

The final step in the Islamist evolutionary process would be the search for an alternative Islamic styled government that would guarantee absolute power and the protection of “traditional’ Islamic morality and values.⁵⁵

⁵⁰Noorani, *Islam and Jihad...*, 80.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 81.

⁵²Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism...*, 16.

⁵³Keddie, *The Revolt of Islam...*, 486.

⁵⁴Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism...*, 126, 127.

⁵⁵Keddie, *The Revolt of Islam...*, 486.

The Islamist Agenda

Islamists believe that Sharia law should be applied in the entire public sphere and private life, since Sharia is by definition the command of God.⁵⁶ They further believe that laws will only be obeyed if there was a government to establish and enforce them. Their rationale therefore concludes that in order for God's laws to be properly executed, an Islamic state ruled by an Islamic government is mandatory. In other words, only the power of a state can guarantee total application of Islamic law.⁵⁷ This argument is the classic justification and definition of the Islamic Fundamentalism's "dual nature" of religion and politics. In other words, the ultimate goal for Islamists is the creation of an Islamic state with the main purpose of enforcing religious purity and safeguarding political, cultural and religious values.⁵⁸ Presumably, the regulation of other state functions such as international affairs, security, schooling and banking would fall under the same religious-political guidance. This arrangement guarantees that Islamists would exercise absolute power over the state structure and further legitimize this scenario as representative of the classical Islamic caliphate governing structure. In reality, however, the caliphate and most other classical Islamic governments were secular in practice.⁵⁹ It should be noted that many mainstream Muslims also believe in the re-establishment of

⁵⁶Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism...*, 94.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 94.

⁵⁸Graham E. Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier Countries: An Integrative View*. (Santa Monica: Rand, 1991), 2.

⁵⁹Keddie, *The Revolt of Islam...*, 463.

some form of Sharia law in the public sphere. The major difference, however, lies in the militant methodology of establishment and the process by which it would be administered. There is also much disagreement amongst Islamist groups regarding the interpretation of Sharia law. A major source of this confusion comes from the fact that the Qa'ran does not spell out any specific system of government.⁶⁰

Paradoxically, Islamic fundamentalist leaders tend to not have any formal religious training; however, they are usually highly educated in fields other than theology. Many are graduates of western technical institutions and are often engineers or doctors. Due to this type of background, they do not eschew modern technology. Those most susceptible to the Islamist message, however, tend to be from the lower middle class of society as they are the most affected by social upheaval.⁶¹

Traditional Islamic scholars normally do not endorse the idea of Islamic fundamentalism as they see the Islamist agenda as one that is a direct threat to their continued influence and interests in the state.⁶² In a typical Muslim state, the Ulama are expected to censure the government and provide advice when decisions are made which are contrary to Islamic tradition.⁶³ Conversely, in the Islamist model, there is no need for this role as any decision made by the Islamist state is guided by God and considered beyond criticism. In other words, Islamists believe in a state which is responsible for enforcing political, economic and social goals of Islam, but which does not have any

⁶⁰Kate Fillion, "World without Islam?" *Maclean's Magazine*, February 25, 2008, 17.

⁶¹Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier Countries...*, vi.

⁶²*Ibid.*, 2.

⁶³Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism...*, 8.

place for the clergy in the pursuit of these goals.⁶⁴ This difference of opinion on the importance and role of the role of the Ulama is a key factor separating Islamism from mainstream Islam.⁶⁵ It should be pointed out that this relationship is different under Shia fundamentalism. Shias view the Ulama as supreme authorities in religion, politics and the state.⁶⁶

aspects of life, the fact that religion and politics cannot be separated and that they are perpetually engaged in a holy war against enemies of Islam.⁶⁸ The more extreme or radicalized Islamists, however, represents the greatest concern for the international community, as they are likely to engage in strategies that would be destabilizing and repugnant to the greater Muslim and international community in the pursuit of these ideals.

The Islamist State

Islamic fundamentalism at the state level is likely to cause conflict from an international perspective and thus contribute to international instability. Much of the Islamist ideology pertaining to human rights and respect for international conventions is in conflict with established international and western values. An excellent insight pertaining to Islamist views can be garnered from Islamist fatwas⁶⁹ as well as ideological writings.

One such document titled the “Neglected Duty” (referring to the duty of jihad) was published by the group responsible for the assassination of the Egyptian President Sadat. This manifesto presents justification for the indiscriminate killing of Muslims and

⁶⁸*Ibid*,

⁶⁹ Fatwa is defined as a formal legal opinion (but not obligatory) given by a cleric or cannon lawyer of standing, in answer to a question from a judge of private individual: Noorani, *Islam and Jihad...*, 60-61.

non-Muslims as well as children and women. As witnessed by the assassination of Sadat, these actions would presumably be carried out in the form of terrorism.⁷⁰

Other Islamic ideological arguments suggest that it is an Islamic right to suppress minorities and pluralism, while rejecting free speech and democratic governance.⁷¹ Islamism also seeks to limit the rights and freedoms of women and justifies their physical abuse. Islamists believe women should be treated in accordance with precepts dating from the time of Mohammad.⁷² Any criticism of the Islamic state from both internal and external agents would also likely be dealt with severely. These intolerant and inflexible ideas would likely bring an Islamist state into conflict with the more liberal values of the international community.

Islamist ideology also demands that the state export these ideas to other Muslim nations. From international law point of view, any actions undertaken in this respect would be perceived as unsolicited interference in the affairs of another sovereign state, which would be detrimental in terms of political tensions. The new interpretation of Jihad would suggest that spreading the ideology would not be limited to peaceful means. Indeed, global Jihad, combined with indiscriminate violence, provides a platform for state sponsored international terrorism. These actions may not be limited to other Muslim nations as western governments who are seen as supporting unlawful Muslim governments are just as complicit. Indeed, Islamists have a decidedly North- South alignment, meaning they prefer not to align with the great powers and would therefore be

⁷⁰Jansen, *The Neglected Duty...*, 25-29.

⁷¹Noorani, *Islam and Jihad...*, 65.

⁷²Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism...*, 139.

vigilant in blocking any eastern or western attempts to influence the greater Muslim world.⁷³

Diplomatic relations would also prove difficult with an Islamist country as just about any of its actions would be aimed at furthering the establishment of Islamist states. Judging from the example of Iran, these may include deliberate deceit, the disregard of treaties, indiscriminate destruction of property and directly sabotaging international attempts at stability in the furtherance of revolutionary goals.⁷⁴ Islamist ideology also suggests that a Muslim should never work for nor cooperate with a non-Muslim government.⁷⁵ These sentiments suggest that a purely Islamist state would not be a stabilizing influence nor a constructive member of the international community. It is likely, therefore, that Islamism at the state level could represent a major obstacle in the pursuit of international security.

It has been established that religion has historically been a major unifying and cultural anchor for the Muslim world. Historically, many revivalist movements have been in response to periods of upheaval and instability and have had less to do with Islam than with finding a solution to perceived social, economic and political injustices. Many of these injustices were seen to be at the hands of colonial western powers which directly accounts for the preponderance of anti-western rhetoric in modern Islamic

⁷³Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier Countries...*, ix.

⁷⁴Michael A. Ledeen, *The Iranian Time Bomb* (New York: St Martins, 2007), 9.
Jansen, *The Neglected Duty...*, 25-29.

⁷⁵Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism...*, 52.

fundamentalism. Traditionally, fundamentalist support has been strongest in the lower middle class of society who usually have little political power and are more apt to suffer under economic and cultural reforms. Often, the mosque provided the only outlet for dissent for this segment of society, particularly under totalitarian regimes.

The modern Islamist movement has been evolving for more than one hundred years, yet it has only reached a point in the late twentieth century where it has the potential to exert significant political influence within the international arena. This political power is focused on the establishment of an Islamic state defined by strict adherence to Sharia law. The methodology to be employed in the establishment of the state and ideological expansion presents policies contrary to international laws and customs. It is likely, therefore, that the employment of this ideology at the state level has the potential of significant conflict with the international community and the West.

3. THE IRANIAN CASE

The 1979 Iranian revolution was considered a surprise to the international community. Nevertheless, a review of Iran's history should have revealed at the time that it was not unexpected. First, Iran had a long revolutionary tradition as well as a unique relationship between religious and social activism. This relationship proved an important factor in the making of the revolution. Second, both internal and external observers had miscalculated the level of domestic anger and confusion brought about by years of rapid social change, unregulated economic growth, leadership and security uncertainty, cultural and religious alienation and the denial of political participation. Many of these issues were attributed to alien western influences, specifically in describing the Shah's drive for modernization, centralization and secularization. At the same time, these factors were also representative of the classical preconditions for an Islamic uprising.⁷⁶ Lastly, Ayatollah Khomeini's emergence as a charismatic religious-political leader was instrumental in the Iranian Islamic fundamentalists' opportunity to experiment with statehood. Furthermore, the establishment of the Islamic Republic had a significant effect on regional and global events. The revolution was the catalyst for a devastating eight year war with Iraq, as well as a new domestic and foreign policy that resulted in Iran's current conflict with the international community.

In other words, as the first country to establish an Islamic fundamentalist state in modern history, Iran presents a quintessential example of how social upheaval and anti-

⁷⁶ R. Keddie, "The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993: Comparative Considerations and Relations to Imperialism." Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 36, No. 3 (July 1994); 465, 470, 484, 486.

imperialist attitudes could culminate in a revolution, which, on its turn, could lead to such a state. Therefore, in order to assess the likelihood of Pakistan becoming an Islamist state, it is important to examine in detail the causes and outcomes of the Iranian revolution, while an examination of the post-revolutionary Iran's impact on global and regional affairs will provide insight into the possible international impact of an Islamist Pakistan.

Historical Overview

Between 1870 and 1979, Iran experienced the fall of two dynasties, the forced abdication of four rulers, many political assassinations and a significant number of social movements and uprisings. This level of upheaval is unique in the third world and is symptomatic of a nation well acquainted with social dissent and uncomfortable in the new world order.⁷⁷ This one hundred year era can be broken into three periods: the end of the Qajar dynasty and the reigns of the first and the second Pahlavi Shahs. During the latter part of the Qajar dynasty (1895-1925), Iran became increasingly subjected to the pressures of colonial influence and dominance.⁷⁸ Great Britain and Russia both competed for economic access and were overwhelmingly successful as a result of the weak and ineffectual Qajar Shahs. Most of the Shahs' concessions benefited the colonial powers and were to the detriment of the Iranian merchants and business class. These factors sparked several uprisings and led to a deep rooted cultural aversion to

⁷⁷Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to Islamic Republic. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 28.

⁷⁸Nikki R Keddie, "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (June 1983), 580.

the West. The Ulama provided financial and communications support during these revolts and were not averse to allying themselves with the merchant and intelligentsia against the Shah and the West. These alliances established the Ulama as indispensable component for all subsequent movements for progressive change.⁷⁹ The end of the Qajar dynasty would be precipitated by two significant events; the discovery of oil and the rise of Reza Shah, who was intent on both seizing power and modernizing Iran.

The rule of the first Pahlavi Shah, Reza Shah (1925-1941), was characterized by rapid centralization, modernization and secularization. These changes were accompanied by a marginalization of Ulama influence. Centralization led to a shift towards autocracy, which limited the powers of the Majles (Parliament), a hard fought concession to liberal forces during the 1906 Constitutional Movement uprising.⁸⁰ Nationalization and investment in technology was frequently funded indirectly at the expense of the poorest classes through taxes. These peasants were kept in check by a loyal and new modernized military.⁸¹

During the rule of the second Pahlavi Shah, Mohammad Reza (1941-1978), oil revenues brought immense resources to fund even more intense modernization. This period also saw the forging of a close strategic alliance between the United States and the Shah. United States interests in Iran were primarily concerned with access to oil and the containment of Soviet influence in the region. The Shah eventually became dependant on this relationship for matters of national security and prolonging his reign. American and

⁷⁹Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution...*, 49-51.

⁸⁰*Ibid*, 63.

⁸¹*Ibid*, 63.

British intelligence agencies were forced to engineer the 1953 demise of the popular progressive nationalist Prime Minister, Mossadeq, in order to reverse the nationalization of the oil industry as well as to preserve Shah's autocracy. This event had a negative impact on Shah's legitimacy. Reza Pahlavi responded by increasing the level of autocratic control and by founding the oppressive secret service (SAVAK) in order to suppress any future political or internal challenges.⁸² His policies also became increasingly confrontational with the Iranian people. He openly attacked Islamic leaders, instituted laws that ran against traditional values, and did not explicitly oppose the recognition of Israel. His vast defence and modernization expenditures were seen as jeopardizing Iran's economic future.

Inconsistent American foreign policy played significant role in the demise of the Shah. The first blow came from the Kennedy administration that openly criticized the Shah and demanded that he ease oppression, allow public representation and institute land reforms. The Shah acquiesced by initiating the "White Revolution," which among other objectives sought to redistribute land from the Ulama and the upper classes to the poor. The White Revolution policies alienated many of the Ulama and contributed indirectly to the rise of the Shah's most outspoken critic - Ayatollah Khomeini. The second American lapse in foreign policy, the application of the Foreign Assistance Act actually provided the spark that triggered the revolution. American criticism of the Shah and pressure for greater freedoms sent mixed signals to the Iranian people.⁸³ The perceived criticism of the Shah and the demand for greater freedoms coincided with a

⁸²*Ibid.*, 73.

⁸³*Ibid.*, 181.

had become the world's largest purchaser of export military hardware.⁸⁵ On the other hand, there were no economic regulatory mechanisms to provide control over the growth of these expenditures. As a result, inflation skyrocketed, while labor shortages crippled the economy. The 1975 surpluses transformed into a \$7.3USD billion deficit by 1978 and the Shah was forced to increase taxes drastically in an attempt to save the economy. When these measures did not work, he blamed the merchants, industrialists and shopkeepers for engaging in profiteering. Some of them were prosecuted for non-compliance with Shah's request to voluntarily cut prices. Many industrialists were forced to provide minimum wages as well as stock options to the working class. This, in turn, contributed to even higher inflation, power outages, high rents, large unemployment rates and widespread hardship for the masses.⁸⁶ Pre-revolutionary economic conditions in Iran were, therefore, characterized by hyper inflation, soaring unemployment and shortages of basic goods, housing, and power. All social classes, especially the poor, had been negatively impacted by the 1978 economic downturn.

Social Conditions

The social upheaval caused by rapid urbanization, modernization, education and the change in traditional class structures was another major contributor to the 1979 uprising. In its drive for modernization, the Shah had instituted agrarian reforms that emphasized centralized control and the introduction of large scale mechanization. As a

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 166.

⁸⁶Keddie, "*Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective*"..., 588.

result, the peasant class was displaced and consequently drifted to the urban centers where they joined an expanding disenfranchised lumpenproletariate.⁸⁷ This urbanization progressed very rapidly. In the 1950s, Iran was described as a predominantly rural country with a relatively small population. Within twenty years the population was considered both large and urbanized. The urbanized peasant class would be one of the most negatively impacted social groups when Iran was struck with soaring unemployment and hyper-inflation in wake of the 1978 economic crisis.⁸⁸ These urban peasants were characterized as young, confused and disenchanted with the decline of Islamic values, rising western influence and lack of wealth and they would become the foot soldiers of the revolution.⁸⁹ The middle class, comprised of salesmen, shopkeepers, merchants and money lenders, was also disenfranchised with the regime. For centuries it had represented the backbone of the Iranian economy but had lost much influence as a result of the rapid and forced introduction of modern banking institutions, modern shopping malls and a flooding of western goods into the marketplace.⁹⁰ The middle class and the landed elite resented losing wealth and influence further under the Shah's anti-profiteering campaigns and rising of taxes. Oil wealth and a drive for increased education enabled Iran to send many rural students to university. Many of them felt alienated and disenchanted with the decadent city life and were easily radicalized by leftist

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 588.

⁸⁸ "Looking Back at Iran's Revolution." *BBC*. 11 February 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1814141.stm; Internet; accessed 21 March 2008.

⁸⁹Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution...*, 26.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 116.

influences.⁹¹ In other words, while the Shah had introduced many modernization policies and had destroyed traditional structures, he failed to establish suitable substitute social institutions for these groups. This situation left the majority of Iranians confused and in search of social alternatives, which included Islamic Fundamentalism.

Islamic Religion and Culture in Iran

Iran is unique in that it is the only Muslim country which is dominated by the Shia interpretation of Islam.⁹² The Shia world view is somewhat different from the Sunni in that many Shia have a heightened sense of victimization, and a more pronounced tendency towards xenophobia and martyrdom.⁹³ These traits can certainly contribute to a more emotional and participatory reaction to social events. The Shia clergy in particular have traditionally acted as the socialist voice of the people in Iran, especially for those unable to represent themselves under autocratic rule. This view has led to the clergy aligning themselves with other groups such as liberals, intelligentsia and the merchant class in progressive social agendas. They were able and often willing to use the mosque network in order to communicate to and energize the masses during most Iranian uprisings over the last century.⁹⁴

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 194.

⁹²United States Department of State: Background Notes: Iran, 3 March 2008. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 March 2008, 2.

⁹³Graham E. Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier Countries: An Integrative View*. (Santa Monica: Rand, 1991), 8.

⁹⁴Keddie, "*Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective*" ..., 580.

The Shia clerics were also unique in that over the centuries they had acquired land and businesses and had traditionally enjoyed considerable influence. Years of increased secularization, however, led to a gradual decline in their power and influence. The Shah deliberately excluded the clerics from traditional representation in education and jurisprudence. He also tried to bring religious schools under the control of the state and instituted laws that contravened traditional religious and cultural values including the gender equality Family Protection Laws of 1967 and 1975.⁹⁵ He also reduced the traditional government financial transfers to the Ulama in the wake of the 1978 financial crisis.⁹⁶ He was not shy from incarcerating the clerics, who were seen as disruptive, and the SAVAK, the state secret police, even had jails reserved solely for the Ulama.⁹⁷ Although the Iranian Ulama were initially composed of both moderates and radicals with differing views regarding the monarchy, the consistent attacks against them prompted the religious scholars to form a united front against the Shah.

The Shah also pursued a cultural agenda which diverged from traditional Shia Islam. The two major issues considered most offensive to pious Shias were the Shah's glorification of pre-Islamic Persia and the promotion of western culture. A primary example of the first was the staging of a state celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Empire, followed by the announcement that the traditional Iranian calendar would be replaced by the one used in the Ancient Persian Achaemenid Empire.⁹⁸

⁹⁵Keddie, *"The New Religious Politics" ...*, 714.

⁹⁶Keddie, *"Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective" ...*, 588.

⁹⁷Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution ...*, 117.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, 124.

Western culture was considered by many of the religious conservatives, including the Ulama, to be decadent, insidious and permissive. There was concern it would eventually supplant traditional Islamic culture. This “Westoxification” was represented by cinemas, bars, discos and playhouses, all of which would become favorite targets of the religious conservatives and anti-western rioters in the years prior to the revolution.⁹⁹

Some in the clergy developed a personal dislike for the Shah on account of his anti-Islamic policies, promotion of western values and the perceived attacks on the Ulama. Indeed, in the aftermath of the White Revolution, Khomeini developed a hatred for the Shah and would become his most outspoken critic. Khomeini’s anti-west, anti-Zion, anti-monarchy platform was combined with an emphasis on Islam and attracted significant support across social classes.¹⁰⁰ Khomeini was eventually arrested and subsequently deported to France where he would continue to be the most vocal critic of the Shah over the next decade. His principle tactic was to declare many of the Shah’s policies un-Islamic, which for the devout would mean they were prevented from following or accepting them. In 1978, in a poorly thought out attempt to counter Khomeini’s criticism, a government-controlled newspaper published an article attacking the cleric. Consequently, widespread rioting broke out as the article had been interpreted to be an attack upon both Khomeini and Islam. The regime’s brutal response resulted in a dozen deaths and hundreds of injuries. The chain of events led to nationwide strikes

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 118.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, 99.

which paralyzed the country. In a classic Iranian Ulama-merchant alliance, the strikers were provided financial aid by both groups in order to prolong the strikes.¹⁰¹

Relations with the United States

The cornerstone of Iranian national security policy for decades prior to the revolution had been the close relationship with the United States. Because of the strong autocratic nature of the regime, the people perceived the Shah and the state institutions as synonymous. Any weakness displayed by the Shah was, therefore, perceived as weakness of the state. Iran was generally considered a stable and secure state mainly because of its close alliances with European countries and the United States. Additionally, the vast majority of the population was indifferent towards external politics as long as they perceived that the Pahlavis were in control.¹⁰² On the other hand, in the 1970s, the United States had just emerged from an era inspired by the anti-Vietnam movement, which meant human rights were high on the political agenda. This atmosphere led to the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act that denied assistance to any foreign regimes that imprisoned persons for political purposes. Exiled Iranian opposition dissidents had meanwhile created among foreign public the perception that a political holocaust had been ongoing in Iran. This prompted Amnesty International and the United Nations to censure the Shah.¹⁰³ The United States was, therefore, forced to balance the requirements of

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, 191.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, 185.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, 181.

supporting a close strategic ally and fulfilling a domestic political agenda. The result was a vacillation in policy towards support for the Shah. This was particularly evident in the sudden denial of certain technologically advanced weapon systems in the late 1970s after many years of *carte blanche* procurement policies.¹⁰⁴ In order to meet American foreign policy expediencies, the Shah liberalized the media, eased restrictions on massed rallies and granted clemency to political prisoners. The newly freed media promptly broadcasted the large human rights protests against the Shah during his subsequent visit to Washington. The reaction of the American public precipitated a feeling among the masses that the United States had abandoned both the Shah and Iran.¹⁰⁵ The sudden procurement denials and the overt hostility of the US public towards the Shah instilled in the Iranian population a sense of uncertainty and confusion about national security and a led to a further loss of confidence in the Shah.

Security Establishment

The security of the state was handled by the military and the intelligence agency (SAVAK). The latter had a reputation for being omnipresent and was frequently accused of using torture against the people in the execution of its duties.¹⁰⁶ Both the SAVAK and the military were fiercely loyal to the monarchy and traditionally had no compunctions with using force against civilians when required. The human rights initiatives insisted

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, 184.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, 187.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 127.

upon by the Carter administration and subsequently adopted by the Shah, however, restricted their actions in the last days before the revolution. The military was quite capable of defeating the revolution; however, its leadership lacked decisiveness and the political savvy to implement a solution. An American military envoy, Gen Huyser, noted that the five Iranian military Service Chiefs had decided to stage a coup in January 1979, just prior to the Shah leaving the country in order to save the monarchy. He was amused by the fact that the five chiefs had yet to figure out the basic logistics on how to implement the plan. In fact, the Shah had specifically prevented the Service Chiefs from meeting collectively in the past in order to prevent a coup against him.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, the Iranian security institutions, in the time preceding the revolution, could be characterized as an effective security apparatus deprived of the necessary decisive leadership and political finesse to put down the revolution.

Political Conditions/Situation

The Shah's failure to modernize the political institutions in concert with his modernization of the socio-economic sphere was probably the most important contributing factor in the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty. The increased social mobility stemming from the rapid socio-economic development created a new, better educated and powerful middle class that desired to have some control over their political future. It is suggested that the Shah recognized this fact yet was unwilling to relinquish meaningful

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, 220.

control over the country.¹⁰⁸ His “political reforms” were normally a façade with no real meaning. They were meant to give the people the perception that they had the ability to affect state policy through participation in a quasi-democratic political process. These institutions were the Meliyun/Mardom two party system in 1958 and the single party Rastakhiz in 1975 which were supposed to suggest that the masses had an ability to voice their grievances against unpopular public policies in a structured political forum. The former was a two party oppositional system and the latter was a single party split into two opposing factions. In reality, the “opposing” parties had no measurable differences in agenda or political ideology and the leaders were obsequious to the Shah.¹⁰⁹ The Rastakhiz concept would be recognized by the people as a travesty of democracy and would inadvertently politicize much of the population against the monarchy and further increase the demand for true democratic representation.¹¹⁰

Since virtually all socio-economic groups had various grievances against the Shah, they eventually formed a loose political alliance with the goal of political change but not necessarily aiming to end the monarchy. Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as the leader of this alliance of convenience simply because he was the one who had been the most vocal critic of the Shah and had demonstrated the necessary charisma to mobilize the masses. Early in the uprising, no one realized that his true agenda would be to assume control of the group to form a fundamentalist state.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 181.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 123, 125.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 124.

Post-Revolutionary Iran - Regional and Global Policies

While the 1979 revolution resulted in the overthrow of the Shah, it would take another four year for the Islamic fundamentalists to finally purge and eliminate all other political groups within Iran. The effects of the Islamist flavored revolution were, however, felt almost immediately in the international arena. During this four year period, Iranian regional and global interests were dominated by a foreign policy geared towards the export of the Islamist agenda and the security of the revolutionary state. These views were clearly articulated in 1980 by Ayatollah Khomeini himself:

“We must strive to export our revolution throughout the world, and must abandon all ideas of not doing so, for not only does Islam refuse to recognize any difference between Muslim countries, it is the champion of all oppressed people. Moreover, all the powers are intent on destroying us, and if we remain surrounded in a closed circle, we shall certainly be defeated. We must make plain our stance toward the powers and the superpowers and demonstrate to them that despite the arduous problems that burden us, our attitude to the world is dictated by our beliefs.....What is certain is that the Islamic movement in Iran has released the power of the people of Iran as no other “ideology” or nationalist emotion could have done. The Islamic revolution is far from over; in some ways it is just beginning. The work of leveling the social order has barely begun.”¹¹¹

The export of revolution policy has resulted in conflict and strained relations with many of its Arab neighbors. Following the revolution, Iran sent envoys to many of the Gulf States in an attempt to incite an Islamic uprising and even publicly supported a plot to overthrow the government of Bahrain in 1981.¹¹² Iran has particularly been adept at supporting minority Shia movements in neighboring countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan

¹¹¹Karen A. Feste, *The Iranian Revolution and Political Change in the Middle East* (AbuDhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies, 1996), 9.

¹¹²United States Department of State: Background Notes: Iran, 7.

and Turkey. These countries all perceive this interference as meddling in their internal politics.¹¹³ While Iran is predominately Shia, it has shown willingness to work with both Shia and Sunni fundamentalist causes around the world in support of strategic goals.¹¹⁴ Iranian attempts to expand its influence were not only limited to the Middle East and South Asia. Iranian attempts to destabilize Algeria and Zambia through the support of Muslim extremists in the 1990s eventually resulted in these countries severing of diplomatic relations with Iran.¹¹⁵

Probably the greatest international concern is the fact that Iran is an acknowledged ideological and financial supporter for many terrorist groups with global impact, such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which are all violently opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process.¹¹⁶ Senior Iranian state officials have routinely been implicated in terrorist attacks, including one in 1994 that killed eighty-five at an Israeli community center in Argentina.¹¹⁷ There is also substantial evidence to suggest that the Al-Qaeda organization had received Iranian training and support in the execution of the 1998 twin bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.¹¹⁸ Not only is Iran keen on Islamization of its neighboring “oppressed” Muslim countries, it is equally motivated in preventing American influence in the region. Iran was recently indicted as the responsible

¹¹³Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier...*, 7.

¹¹⁴Michael A. Ledeen, *The Iranian Time Bomb* (New York: St Martins, 2007), 11, 12.

¹¹⁵Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Iran, 38.
<http://sentinel.janes.com/public/sentinel/index.shtml>; Internet; accessed 5 Mar 2008.

¹¹⁶United States Department of State: Background Notes: Iran, 7.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, 7.

¹¹⁸Ledeen, *The Iranian Time Bomb...*, 12.

actor in the 1996 Khobar towers bombing in Saudi Arabian that killed 19 and wounded another 372 American servicemen.¹¹⁹ It is believed that Iran is also responsible for sabotaging the current attempts at establishing a lasting peace in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹²⁰ Iran has also routinely worked to undermine any attempts by its Muslim neighbors to conclude peace accords with Israel. The Islamic Republic is fiercely defensive of its revolution and its refusal to cooperate with international bodies in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has further increased tensions in the region.¹²¹ A nuclear armed Iran would be a major destabilizing force in the region.

While Iran has preferred to orchestrate conflicts through the support of insurgent and terrorist groups, the revolution did indirectly spark a state to state conflict. The devastating eight year war with Iraq evolved from a long time dispute over navigation rights on the Shatt-al-Arab, which is an economically important shared waterway. After having become emboldened by the events in Iran some Shia minorities in Iraq rebelled. Saddam Hussein accused Iran of inciting the revolts and retaliated by forcibly exiling thousands of Iraqi-Shias. As tensions mounted, Iraq eventually attacked in the mistaken belief that Iran had become weakened both militarily and politically following the revolution.¹²² The subsequent eight year war would devastate both economies and negatively affect trade and security for the remainder of the Gulf States.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, 13.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, 14.

¹²¹United States Department of State: Background Notes: Iran, 7.

¹²²Shaul Bakhash, *The Politics of Oil and Revolution in Iran* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1982.), 22.

Secondary consequences of the revolution would include an oppressive domestic human rights record which included violent purges, the repeal of women's rights, state sponsored assassination as well the suppression of media and civil liberties.¹²³ These policies would further alienate Iran and draw increased criticism from the International community.

The Iranian revolution was a complex reaction to socio-economic changes caused by a rapid modernization policy and made possible by massive oil revenues. There were several other important contributors which included: A severe economic downturn affecting all classes following several years of growth; Rapid urbanization; the perceived loss of national security; a perceived attack on traditional Islamic culture and religion by the monarch; the mobilization of the Shia clergy in support of many diverse social groups including leftists and liberal moderates; the emergence of a charismatic leader; a backlash against a feared and eventually impotent security establishment; and a ruler who had become divorced from the traditional values that guided his people and who would resent his western styled policies.

While all of these aspects would be major contributors to the revolution and the eventual take over by Islamists, the lack of political reform needed to compliment the new socio-economic structure might be characterized as the key cause of the revolt. In other words, the political situation in pre-revolutionary Iran was influenced by the grievances of a population that for several generations had been denied political freedom by successive autocratic rulers.

¹²³United States Department of State: Background Notes: Iran, 5.

Even though the revolution has been classified as an Islamic revolution, the major causal factors were more akin to a Marxist uprising with a goal of increased political voice, the promise of wealth distribution and the protection of traditional cultural values. Islam played only a supporting role in the initial stages of the revolution and provided the communications network, a traditional legitimacy framework as well as charismatic leadership to effect change.

The Iranian revolution has had a far reaching impact on global security, as the country would be intent on exporting the revolution using any means necessary. This includes the support of international terrorist organizations and active state participation in the destabilization of countries seen to be too complacent with the west or perceived as oppressive to Muslim populations.

4. THE PAKISTAN CASE

Some Western observers believe that the latest political crisis in Pakistan brought the country to the brink of collapse.¹²⁴ A legacy of military dictatorships and incompetent and corrupt civilian governments led to a cynical and disillusioned population. In addition to political uncertainty, intensified and widespread extremist attacks have presented a significant national security challenge. Decades of past neglect of social institutions such as education resulted in a legacy of poverty and unequal income distribution.¹²⁵ The current war in Afghanistan, waged by NATO and US, has been recast by some Islamist parties as a war against Islam. Western support for Musharraf, who has become unpopular in Pakistan, has fueled further resentment against the West.

This scenario appears to parallel several of the same socio-economic and political issues that precipitated the uprising which overtook Iran in 1979. The conditions in Pakistan will, therefore, be examined in order to subsequently compare and contrast them with the pre-conditions that contributed most to the Iranian revolution as presented in the previous chapter. This comparison will form the basis in assessing the likelihood of Pakistan becoming an Islamic fundamentalist state. The examination of Pakistan will look at current economic and social conditions; religious and cultural perceptions

¹²⁴“Annual Forecast 2008: Beyond the Jihadist War –South Asia.” *Stratfor*. 26 February 2008. <http://www.stratfor.com>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2008.

¹²⁵United States Department of State: Background Notes: Pakistan, 3 March 2008 <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 March 2008, 8.

dominant in the country; the relationship with the United States; security institutions as well as the contemporary political landscape.

Historical Overview

In the sixty years since independence, Pakistan has lost three wars to India, suffered from widespread sectarian and extremist violence, lost a sizeable portion of its territory and has endured thirty-two years under military rule. It is surprising that a country which has experienced so much upheaval in such a short period has not suffered a significant collapse.

Pakistan emerged as a state in response to perceived subjugation by both colonial Britain and Hindu nationalism. Minority Muslims living in India were unable to secure the guarantee of political, economic and religious rights under the Indian National Congress and, therefore, sought a separate state. During the granting of independence to India in 1947, Great Britain sought to solve this problem by establishing two separate states, India and Pakistan.¹²⁶ Five predominantly Muslim provinces and three territories joined Pakistan including Bengal, which was separated from the other contiguous states by 800 miles, on the eastern side of India.¹²⁷ Another state, Kashmir, which was considered a majority Muslim homeland but controlled by a Hindu Maharajah opted to

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, 3.

¹²⁷ West Pakistan was comprised of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and the Pakistani administered Kashmir areas (Federally Administered Northern Area. (FANA) and Azad Kashmir). East Pakistan is now Bangladesh following independence in 1973.

join India after his territory was threatened by Pakistani incursions.¹²⁸ This event has been at the root of most animosity between Pakistan and India since partition.

The Era of Secular Governance

The period between independence and 1958 saw significant political turmoil forcing the military to eventually assume control. The military was generally well received by the people and the leadership was considered competent and not oppressive.¹²⁹ During the ensuing dictatorships, Pakistan would lose both a war with India over Kashmir in 1965 and the state of East Pakistan in 1971. American inaction during both conflicts led to an erosion in confidence in the US and a subsequent search for alternative allies. Both events also sparked a public loss of confidence in the military and, following the loss of East Pakistan, the military handed control of the state to Ali Bhutto, who had won elections in West Pakistan.

Bhutto was popular with the majority as his Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had campaigned upon a socialist agenda. He was successful in adopting a new constitution as well as restoring the economy and public confidence following the war.¹³⁰ His appeal eventually waned as a result of frequent changes in fiscal policy and economic stagnation. In an attempt to restore his credibility, he began to merge Islam with his socialist agenda. Up until this time, Pakistan had been strictly secular despite repeated

¹²⁸Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift to Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 41.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, 35.

¹³⁰United States Department of State: Background Notes: Pakistan..., 4.

attempts by Islamists to introduce their ideology into state affairs. Following an election scandal in 1977, resulting in mass rioting, the military acted and General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq stepped in as martial administrator and was able to quickly restore order.

The Islamization of Pakistan

In an attempt to legitimize and cement his non-democratic leadership, Zia ul-Haq aligned himself with Islamic parties who would for the first time enjoy some influence over the state. He also introduced sharia law which would affect many aspects of national life; however, he did exempt key areas such as the constitution and the economy.¹³¹ During this time, a bill was introduced by one of the more radical parties, Jamat-i-Islami to implement total Sharia Law over all aspects of the state. It was defeated as most Pakistanis social groups including other Islamic parties were opposed.¹³² In 1979, the Soviets entered Afghanistan and Pakistan again became strategically important to the West. Saudi and US funding was made available to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to train Islamic jihadists to counter the Soviet occupation.¹³³ This strategy would lead to large groups of radicalized and unemployed fighters looking for a cause at ' end. The relationship during this time improved considerably with the US and the Reagan administration donated F-16s and \$3.2USD billion in financial aid to

¹³¹Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan...*, 9.

¹³²*Ibid.*, 13.

¹³³Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift to Extremism...*, 112.

Pakistan.¹³⁴ In 1988, Zia ul-Haq was killed in a plane crash and in the aftermath, Pakistan returned to democracy.

A Return to Democracy

The period between 1988 and 1999 featured four successive democratic governments. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif each held the position of prime minister twice during that time. All four governments however would be tainted by corruption and infighting. In 1990, it was revealed that Pakistan had been working towards the building of a nuclear weapon and under the Pressler amendment, the US cut off all aid to Pakistan.¹³⁵ This was seen as a betrayal by Pakistan after the hardship it had endured in supporting the war against the Soviets.¹³⁶ Despite government infighting, some successful economic reforms were introduced and during his first tenure Sharif passed another Sharia bill which further Islamicized the state.¹³⁷ During this period, Pakistan assisted the Taliban in gaining control of Afghanistan and began to employ veteran jihadists from the Afghanistan campaign in Kashmir to counter Indian interests.¹³⁸

In 1998 India tested a nuclear device and Pakistan felt it necessary to demonstrate in kind. The entire country was elated with the nuclear achievement, though it eventually

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, 111.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, 120.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, 145.

¹³⁷United States Department of State: Background Notes: Pakistan..., 5.

¹³⁸Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift to Extremism...*, 141.

led to crippling punitive economic sanctions.¹³⁹ The end of democracy came in 1999 when Sharif in an attempt to consolidate his power, employed biased corruption investigations, suppressed the media and judiciary and then attempted to replace the Chief of the Army with a loyalist while the Chief was out of the country.¹⁴⁰

The War on Terror

The attempt to replace the Chief of the Army was not well received by the military and they quickly moved to dismiss Sharif's government. General Pervez Musharraf, the Chief of the Army, then assumed control of the state. As with all military regimes, he enjoyed popular support for the initial part of his tenure.¹⁴¹ The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11th 2001 again brought Pakistan and the US together. In preparation for the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, the US demanded complete cooperation from Musharraf as Pakistan was strategically vital for both geographic access and regional intelligence.¹⁴² Pakistan was also forced to reverse its policy on the Taliban, which it had considered an ally. In return, Pakistan received financial support, military aid as well as relief from sanctions that had been in place since the 1998 nuclear tests.¹⁴³

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, 162, 163.

¹⁴⁰United States Department of State: Background Notes: Pakistan..., 5.

¹⁴¹Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift to Extremism...*, 177.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, 218.

¹⁴³Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Pakistan, 6.

The attack on Afghanistan and the US rhetoric preceding the invasion of Iraq sparked significant imperialist concerns in much of the Muslim world. These events led to widespread anti-western sentiment and emboldened religious extremists and religious groups. While American presence in Afghanistan become intolerable, support for Osama Bin Laden was on the rise.¹⁴⁴ The election in 2002 that brought Islamists to power in two provinces was a direct consequence of the situation. Extremist and regional attacks gradually began to increase and Musharraf was unable to curb the violence. In 2007, the situation deteriorated significantly when Musharraf mishandled the Red Mosque crisis, imposed martial law, placed the judiciary under house arrest and moved to suppress the media. Equally unpopular acts were the placement of military officers into civilian government billets, a perceived acquiescence to all US demands and the suspicion that he had rigged 2007 presidential election.¹⁴⁵ These actions resulted in public protest including a large gathering in response to the unwarranted sacking of the chief justice. Musharraf's popularity reached a low point following the death of Benezir Bhutto as many were convinced that he had been ambivalent regarding her safety.¹⁴⁶

Though some of Musharraf's policies were well intentioned, such as an anti-corruption task force and an initial crackdown on militants, his softened stance on many eventually weakened the entire country. In reaction to his unpopular policies, the

¹⁴⁴Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift to Extremism...*, 223, 224.

¹⁴⁵Department of National Defence, Directorate of Strategic Analysis Issue brief: "*Pakistan's Political Crisis*," (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007), 3.

¹⁴⁶International Republican Institute, Pakistan <http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2008.

February 2008 elections devastated Musharraf's party, the People's Muslim League-Q (PML-Q) and the religious parties he had aligned with.

Out of the 336 seats in the National Assembly, the PPP won 121 seats, the PML-N took 91 and Musharraf's PML-Q would only hold 54. The MMA, representing the Islamist coalition, which had previously been aligned with Musharraf until the coalition fractured in November, was only able to garner six seats country wide.¹⁴⁷ The elections brought to power the two largest moderate parties with widespread appeal in a coalition government.¹⁴⁸ In March, these two parties joined together to present a formidable opposition to Musharraf's power.

Conditions in Modern Pakistan

Economic conditions

Pakistan's economy has improved substantially in the last decade. In 2000, the country instituted several macroeconomic reforms including massive privatization, banking improvements, and world class anti-money laundering legislation.¹⁴⁹ The economy received a significant further boost following Pakistan's commitment to the war on terror in 2001. Many of the sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan since the 1998 nuclear testing were lifted and the country became the recipient of substantial

¹⁴⁷ Election Commission of Pakistan <http://www.ecp.gov.pk> ; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

¹⁴⁸“Pakistan towards a constitutional regime change?” *Stratfor* (22 February 2008). <http://www.stratfor.com>; accessed 28 February 2008. - The Pakistan People's Party (PPP), chaired by the spouse of Benazir Bhutto and Sharif of the Peoples Muslim League-N (PML-N).

¹⁴⁹United States Department of State: Background Notes: Pakistan..., 8.

foreign investment and debt relief.¹⁵⁰ In 2003, the US provided \$1.5USD billion in bilateral debt relief and helped negotiate the rescheduling of foreign debt from other lenders on generous terms.¹⁵¹

Several foreign banks have recently entered the Pakistan market and are introducing advanced banking technology and risk management practices which are expected to strengthen credit ratings of Pakistani banks.¹⁵² The government has also privatized many national holdings (\$3.3USD billion in 2006 alone), which resulted in increased state revenues and positive follow-on effect on the economy. The GDP has experienced steady growth at 6-8% for the last two years.¹⁵³ This growth rate is considered one of the best in Asia and is expected to continue for the medium term.¹⁵⁴ Some shortfalls in the economy do exist, such as a chronic inability to collect taxes and the high inflation which in March 2008 stood at 11%.¹⁵⁵ The recent worldwide increases in the price of gas and food have been the cause for this rise in inflation rather than poor fiscal policy. Additionally, while Pakistan has been successful in issuing state bonds, the current political and security situation has hampered increased investment.¹⁵⁶ Generally,

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁵²Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Pakistan..., 151.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*, 153.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 151.

¹⁵⁵CIA World Fact Book, Pakistan, <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/CIA/Factbook/geos/pk.html>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2008.

¹⁵⁶United States Department of State: Background Notes: Pakistan..., 8.

the Pakistan macro-economic situation can be considered healthy; however, its continued growth rate will likely depend on future political and security stability.

Social Conditions

Pakistan is a populous country of 160 million and it is considered a low-income country by the World Bank.¹⁵⁷ Unresolved issues with Kashmir and the related longtime animosity with India has meant that a large proportion of Pakistan's budget has traditionally been allocated to defence with investment in social institutions being relegated to second tier status. Lack of social spending combined with a relatively high population growth led to poverty and unequal income distribution.¹⁵⁸ This led to greater urbanization and migrant worker schemes for those in search of better opportunities.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, due to a lack of publicly funded schools in rural areas, children attend the only available alternatives which are frequently the Islamist fundamentalist madrassas.

The greatest obstacle to overall employment and social well-being for Pakistan is the low adult literacy rate of 41.5%.¹⁶⁰ This education deficit has been acknowledged and is being addressed by both the Pakistan government and the international community.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 8.

¹⁵⁹ "Migration and Pakistan", YesPakistan.com, (18 June 2002).
http://www.yespakistan.com/people/migration_pak.asp; accessed 12 March 2008.

¹⁶⁰ Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Pakistan, 152.
International Labor Organization, Global Employment Trends
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/download/get08.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 February 2008.

Education spending has been prioritized through a Social Action Program and the 2006/2007 budget included a 52.7% increase in education spending.¹⁶¹ Much of the \$3USD billion aid package allocated by the US is also being directed at social improvements including education.¹⁶² These actions have been complimented by a concerted Poverty Reduction Strategy funded by the World Bank.¹⁶³

From a macro level, many of these measures are beginning to have an effect as evident by the doubling of per capita income in the period between 2000 and 2007.¹⁶⁴ South Asia as a whole, including Pakistan, has seen a dramatic overall decrease in extreme poverty, with the World Bank predicting a possible end to poverty within a generation.¹⁶⁵

The last decade has also seen the emergence of a large middle class in Pakistan. This group has embraced consumerism, the media and information technology. It is suggested that the revolution in media availability and technology has made this group more aware of their rights as they were heavily involved in the protests in defiance of Musharraf's attacks on the judiciary in 2007.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶¹Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Pakistan..., 152.

¹⁶²United States Department of State: Background Notes: Pakistan..., 8.

¹⁶³Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Pakistan..., 152.

¹⁶⁴ "Pakistan, Another Kind of Change" *Pakteahouse*. 15 April 2008.
<http://pakteahouse.wordpress.com/2008/04/15/pakistan-another-kind-of-change>; Internet; accessed 15 April 2008.

¹⁶⁵International Labor Organization, Global Employment Trends
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/download/get08.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 February 2008.

¹⁶⁶ "Pakistan, Another Kind of Change" *Pakteahouse*. 15 April 2008.
<http://pakteahouse.wordpress.com/2008/04/15/pakistan-another-kind-of-change>; Internet; accessed 15 April 2008.

While the overall trend in the social situation appears to be improving from a macro level, the events of 2007 have actually resulted in widespread pessimism. In the lead up to the February election, many cited domestic security and political uncertainty as major concerns. The recent sharp rise in inflation regarding basics such as wheat, petrol and electricity was the major irritant for many Pakistanis. These concerns combined with the unpopularity and lack of confidence in Musharraf, led Pakistanis to vote for a new government.

Islamic Religion and Culture in Pakistan

Pakistan has the unique distinction of being the first country ever founded purely on religious grounds.¹⁶⁷ Since Pakistan was created out of primarily Muslim settled areas, Muslims account for 97% of the population.¹⁶⁸ Although, the dominant form of Islam in Pakistan is Sunni, there is a significant Shia minority group which accounts for 20% of the population.¹⁶⁹ Each of the Pakistan's states is fiercely and ethnically independent and Islam is the sole ideological element which binds them together. Ali Bhutto's attempts to tap religious support were the spark that led to increasing Islamization of the country. This trend would continue with many successive governments with ever increasing emphasis on Islamization. Both Zia ul-Haq and Musharraf noted that aligning themselves with religious parties was an effective strategy

¹⁶⁷Graham E. Fuller, "Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier Countries: An Integrative View." (Santa Monica: Rand, 1991), 4.

¹⁶⁸CIA World Fact Book, Pakistan, <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/CIA/Factbook/geos/pk.html>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2008.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid*,

to counter the strength of the moderate and secular parties. While religious parties are now able to influence some government policy, their decision to participate in the democratic process means their agenda will likely be diluted by the more popular moderate forces at the national level.¹⁷⁰

The NWFP and the tribal areas have traditionally been the bastions of Islamic conservatism and following the elections in 2002, the new Islamist government instituted a crackdown on permissive western influence. This included the blocking of cable channels, the destruction of billboards depicting women, as well as cinemas and music.¹⁷¹ However, the results of 2002 election in NWFP should be considered more a vote against the nascent US war being waged in Afghanistan, than an endorsement of fundamentalism. Indeed, the MMA, which had been the victor in NWFP in 2002, was soundly defeated in the 2008 elections by a secular party.¹⁷² Indeed, the MMA only retained three out of a possible thirty-three seats available in NWFP.¹⁷³ Most Pakistanis were shocked by the results of the 2002 election and today the vast majority is both wary and opposed to extremism.¹⁷⁴

Another important aspect regarding the nature of Sunni Islamists in Pakistan is that they are considered conservative socially and economically. While there are some

¹⁷⁰ Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier Countries...*, 21.

¹⁷¹ Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift to Extremism...*, 229.

¹⁷² Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Pakistan, 7.

¹⁷³ Election Commission of Pakistan, <http://www.ecp.gov.pk>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2008.

¹⁷⁴ Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift to Extremism...*, 229.

International Republican Institute, Pakistan, <http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2008.

exceptions, they do not tend to champion the rights of the lower classes. Instead the PPP harkening from the legacy of Ali Bhutto has assumed this important and influential role as the socialist spokesperson for the poor.¹⁷⁵

Relations with the United States

Most Pakistanis would describe US foreign policy relating to Pakistan as a cyclical pattern of engagement and withdrawal.¹⁷⁶ America first showed interest in Pakistan due to the latter's strategic location early in the Cold War. In exchange for the use of air reconnaissance bases, Pakistan received economic, military and political support.¹⁷⁷ US inaction during the 1965 war with India was seen as a betrayal, prompting a move away from the US and a closer alignment with China.¹⁷⁸ Relations thawed when Pakistan served as the conduit for Sino-US rapprochement only to freeze again in the wake of US embargoes of in the midst of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. Pakistanis soon came to see the US as an unreliable ally, but they became experts in deciphering America's short term fears in order to garner aid and support whenever possible.¹⁷⁹ This cycle of rapprochement and perceived betrayal would occur again during the Soviet-Afghan war. The events of 9/11 and the war against terror have again brought American

¹⁷⁵ Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan...*, 20.

¹⁷⁶Tony Kellett, "Pakistan's Political Crisis." Department of National Defence. Directorate of Strategic Analysis Issue Brief (Ottawa: DND, August 2007), 9.

¹⁷⁷Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift to Extremism...*,24

¹⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁷⁹United States Department of State: Background Notes: Pakistan..., 8.

economic aid, debt relief and support. However, many Pakistanis are now wary of US reliability and intentions in Pakistan.¹⁸⁰ The unreliability of the US as a counter to Indian power has led to diversification in defence through closer military ties with China and the clandestine development of a nuclear arsenal.

There is also a feeling amongst Pakistanis that many of the demands being placed on the country by the US to crack down on violence in the tribal areas are unreasonable.¹⁸¹ While most Pakistanis do not support terrorism, they are beginning to see the war against terror as an American war.¹⁸² American rhetoric suggesting unilateral action against insurgents in the tribal areas has angered the entire country. In November 2007, Musharraf resigned his position as chief of the army in order to legally run for president. Prior to that time however, he was considered a military dictator who had sacked the judiciary and suppressed the media. Many in Pakistan had begun to resent the fact that the US, a country who supposedly supported freedom and democracy still supported Musharraf following these actions.

The US considers Pakistan as an extremely important ally in the war against terror and it has therefore been declared a major non-NATO ally. This status has opened the door for significant military aid with the objective to target militants in the tribal areas. Relations between the US and the new Pakistani government are expected to be good as

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁸¹Kellett, "*Pakistan's Political Crisis*" ..., 10.

¹⁸²International Republican Institute, Pakistan <http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2008.

both main moderate parties campaigned on a counterterrorism platform.¹⁸³ This should ensure continued close ties with the US and placate fears of a democratic Pakistan adopting a strategy of extremist tolerance or appeasement.

Security Establishment

In 1947, Pakistan inherited the legacy of a competent and professional military trained by and modeled after the British Army. The military was compelled to intervene early in the country's history when the political system faltered, and since then it has never been willing to fully relinquish this role.¹⁸⁴ Both the Army and the intelligence apparatus, the ISI, have a history of undermining the civilian government or operating in defiance of elected government goals when it suited them. Senior officers in the military have also been accused of corruption and fraud; however they have been successful in avoiding being investigated.¹⁸⁵

During periods of military rule, the ISI was routinely employed in the suppression of political opposition or the engineering of election fraud during times of democratic rule. The ISI was also responsible for training and handling the jihadists in both Afghanistan and Kashmir operations, a legacy now that now contributes to the current internal security crisis. There are also suggestions that many senior officers in the army and the ISI who took their commissions during the Zia ul-Haq Islamization era or those

¹⁸³Chowk. "Pakistan's Elections- An Analysis"; <http://www.chowk.com/articles/print/13582>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2008.

¹⁸⁴Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift to Extremism...*, 10.

¹⁸⁵*Ibid.*, 185.

who worked with jihadists during the Afghan war may now harbor sympathies for fundamentalists.¹⁸⁶ This was highlighted by an aborted coup attempt in 1996, when four senior officers were convicted of planning a coup and installing an Islamist regime.¹⁸⁷

Despite its many faults the military has provided some measure of stability to the country and has traditionally enjoyed a relatively high popularity rating (80%) with the Pakistani people.¹⁸⁸ The army is the only institution which has the ability to maintain the security integrity of the state. Each time it has imposed martial law in the midst of political crisis, with the exception of the recent 2007 imposition by Musharraf, it has been welcomed by the public. Several senior military officers have also acted as mediators in solving political crises rather than imposing martial law. General Kayani helped broker the return of Sharif and Bhutto, in preparation for the 2008 elections and General Kraker was credited with solving a political crisis between the President and the Prime Minister in 1993.¹⁸⁹ Musharraf notwithstanding, the military leadership has routinely demonstrated an uncanny ability to sense the mood of the Pakistani people and to move decisively in order to preserve stability. The new commander of the Army, General Kayani, is no exception and he has chosen to be pragmatic in the wake of the 2007 crisis. In the lead up to the election, the military subtly withdrew support from the unpopular president and

¹⁸⁶ Kellett, "The Army and the "Talibanization" of Pakistan...", 8.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁸⁸ International Republican Institute, Pakistan <http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2008.

¹⁸⁹ Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift to Extremism...*, 151.
 "The Rise of Pakistan's 'Quiet Man'" BBC. 27 November 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7024719.stm; Internet; accessed 16 Mar 2008.

eventually reversed policies instituted under Musharraf which had become unpopular.¹⁹⁰ He is credited with ensuring that local authorities, intelligence or police were not able to tamper with the 2008 election process, which was subsequently accredited internationally as a fair election.¹⁹¹ He has recognized that the people desire a withdrawal of the military from politics and has addressed these issues by demonstrating commitment and support for the democratically elected government.¹⁹² Kayani has, therefore, stated an intention to distance the military from politics and concentrate on addressing the extremist insurgency threat.¹⁹³ These moves will likely enhance the stability of Pakistan.

Political Conditions

While Pakistan was originally founded as a democratic country, it has spent more time under dictatorship than civil government rule. The recent elections appear to indicate an emerging shift in the civil military balance with the military seemingly accepting a supporting role.¹⁹⁴ The historic alliance between the two largest moderate

¹⁹⁰“New Pakistan Army Chief Orders Military Out of Civilian Government Agencies, Reversing Musharraf Policy” *New York Times*. 13 February 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com>; Internet; accessed 29 Feb 2008.

¹⁹¹“Pakistan Towards a Constitutional Regime Change?” *Stratfor*. 22 February 2008. <http://www.stratfor.com>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2008.

¹⁹²“New Pakistan Army Chief Orders Military Out of Civilian Government Agencies, Reversing Musharraf Policy” *New York Times*. 13 February 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com>; Internet; accessed 29 Feb 2008.

¹⁹³“Pakistan: Military Intelligence, Politics and the Jihadist Struggle.” *Stratfor*, 8 January 2008. <http://www.stratfor.com>; Internet; accessed 15 Mar 2008.

¹⁹⁴“Pakistan and its Army.” *Stratfor*, 6 November 2007. <http://www.stratfor.com>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2008.

parties, the PPP and PML-Q, bitter rivals for many years, also provides some measure of optimism. There are still some serious political issues which need to be addressed, including institutional transparency, corruption, violent crime, poverty, regional violence and the issue of Kashmir. The new Prime Minister, Yousef Gilani has also made it a priority to restore government institutions such as the judiciary, which were altered by Musharraf.¹⁹⁵ It is likely that a new policy will be forthcoming that details cooperation with the US in counterterrorism, in a manner acceptable to the country. The parliament is already discussing a long-term solution strategy that will compliment Pakistan military action with negotiations, which should prove a better solution over the several uncoordinated strategies implemented by Musharraf.¹⁹⁶ Should the current government coalition be able to work together, and maintain an allied front, it is possible that some advances be made on some of the issues mentioned above. Regardless of the outcome, however, the existence of a democratically elected coalition should give many in Pakistan the feeling that they have some ownership of the agenda.

Since partition, Pakistan's national agenda has been dominated by security in the context of India. This legacy resulted in spending on defence at the expense of social institutions, resulting in chronic poverty and few prospects for advancement. These problems were compounded by a series of corrupt civilian governments and military dictatorships. Additionally, the legacy of training and encouraging jihadists in the support of conflicts in Afghanistan and Kashmir has now returned to haunt Pakistan.

¹⁹⁵Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Pakistan, 7.

¹⁹⁶ "Pakistan: Democratization and US Interests" *Stratfor*, <http://www.stratfor.com>; Internet; accessed 15 Mar 2008.

Joining the war on terror, however, signaled signs of better long-term prospects for Pakistan. While this alliance has likely been the catalyst for increased militant violence in the country, it has forced Pakistan to finally deal with the issue of extremism and the majority of the population is in favor solving this problem. The lifting of sanctions, fiscal reforms and increased investment from the global community as a result of the alliance has invigorated the economy and consequently allowed for investment in social institutions. The 2008 elections have also tentatively signaled the reemergence of a democracy and a shift away from direct military control. While the military will now likely direct its attention on the suppression of insurgent violence, it is possible that it will intervene politically should it be required to maintain the integrity of the state. There are still many challenges for Pakistan, but the people should feel some ownership in the future path of the country under a democratic agenda.

5. PAKISTAN AND IRAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter will compare the principal conditions that contributed to the Iranian revolution with that in contemporary Pakistan in order to assess the likelihood of the latter becoming an Islamists state. The areas to be compared include the economic conditions, social development and the religious factors, international relations, the security situation, and the strength of the political system. Furthermore, this chapter will present additional factors which would serve as obstacles for the establishment of an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Pakistan.

Economic conditions

It has been observed that the potential for revolution is much higher during periods of rapid economic retraction.¹⁹⁷ James Davies' "J" curve¹⁹⁸ further qualifies this statement by suggesting that prolonged economic development enhances the expectations of those who are most affected by the economy and a subsequent major economic reversal would generate relative loss and unfulfilled expectations.¹⁹⁹ Between 1969 and 1975, Iran experienced staggering economic growth due mainly to the increase in the price of oil. The Shah was optimistic and promised a further 25% increase in the per

¹⁹⁷Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution...*, 32.

¹⁹⁸ The "J" curve is a theory put forward by James Davies which suggests revolutions are more likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. People then subjectively fear the ground gained with effort will be lost and their mood turns revolutionary. The theory is so called as the graphical representation of the theory resembles an inverted "J": James C Davies. "Towards a Theory of Revolution" *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Feb., 1962), 5.

¹⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 31.

capita income, raising the expectations of the masses.²⁰⁰ Between 1975 and 1979, the lack of adequate Iranian fiscal controls, unstable policies, massive state expenditures and a significant drop in the price of oil had led to a sharp economic reversal. As the majority of the population was dependant upon the oil industry, individual expectations were dashed in most classes, fomenting general dissatisfaction with the Shah's stewardship.

Conversely, Pakistan, though it has endured several cycles of growth and contraction, has never endured the dynamics of a rentier oil economy.²⁰¹ Pakistan's current economic growth of 6-8% is currently one of the fastest growing economies in Asia.²⁰² Unlike Iran, which had relied on unsound and reactionary fiscal controls, the State Bank of Pakistan has been relatively successful at keeping the economy stable and healthy over last several years.²⁰³ The infusion of aid from several nations, the introduction of sweeping economic reforms and the economic support brokered by the US since Pakistan joined the war on terror has also contributed significantly to the economy's health. While the present inflation in Pakistan is considered high at 11%, it does not compare to the hyper-inflation²⁰⁴ that occurred in the lead up to the Iranian

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 163.

²⁰¹ A rentier state is one which derives much of its income from outside rent. In the case of Iran, much of the income was derived from oil revenues and not from taxes paid by citizens. The economy of a rentier state is vulnerable to the fluctuations in the value of its 'rented' resource. In the case of Iran with 84% of revenues derived from oil, significant fluctuations in oil prices would produce a significant impact on the Iranian economy: Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution...*, 32, 162.

²⁰² Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Pakistan..., 151.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 153. Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution...*, 166-172.

²⁰⁴ Hyperinflation is characterized as a period of rapid inflation that leaves a country's currency virtually worthless. It is normally an extreme rate of inflation in which the general price of goods and services rises very rapidly. Prices rise so fast that consumers become convinced that it will keep rising and try to buy as much as possible today to beat tomorrow's expected higher prices. Hyperinflation tends to feed on itself, becoming more and more severe. Hyperinflation can destroy an economy because money ceases to

revolution. While 11% inflation is worrying to many, it not considered catastrophic. Over the last 15 years, Pakistan has experienced inflation ranging between 3.5% and 11.6% with several peaks as high as 15%.²⁰⁵ It can be concluded that from a macroeconomic perspective, Pakistan does not resemble pre-revolutionary Iran and should not suffer the instability that helped precipitate the revolution.

Social issues

Social upheaval in pre-revolutionary Iran can be regarded as one of the major contributing factors to the revolution. The Shah's rapid modernization and industrialization policy marginalized or alienated many of the country's social classes. Additionally, his strategies created a large group of urbanized poor who were acutely sensitive to the pressures of inflation and unemployment. The Shah's failure to build social institutions for this group made them susceptible to the idea of Islamic fundamentalism and revolt. The disenfranchised and emergent Iranian middle class also became frustrated with their impotence in influencing state affairs. The Ulama and the merchant classes were also marginalized. Therefore, in the case of Iran, there was a situation where all disenchanted disparate groups, representing most of the society, banded together against the Shah.

perform its traditional functions as medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value.
:http://www.investorwords.com ; http://www.canadianeconomy.gc.ca

²⁰⁵ Muhammad Salam, Abdus Shazia Salam and Mete Feridun. "Inflation in Developing Nations: The Case of Pakistan." *International Research Journal of Finance and Economics*. Issue 3 (2006), 138-159.

Similarly, Pakistan has a very large and urbanized poor population which has traditionally been sensitive to inflationary pressures. In fact, the recent rise of inflation due to increased fuel costs was regarded as the most important issue in the lead up to the February 2008 elections.²⁰⁶ Pakistan has been also slow to build social institutions in past. Nevertheless, there has been significant investment in this area in the last several years. The government has recently allocated significant amounts of international assistance including a large portion of the \$3USD billion assistance package to address long term health and education needs.²⁰⁷ Much of the substantial foreign aid that has been directed to Pakistan since it joined the war on terror is also being targeted at poverty reduction as well as improving the overall economy.²⁰⁸ Successive Pakistan governments have also attempted to address unemployment and urbanization through formal migrant work schemes.²⁰⁹ As in Iran, Pakistan has developed a rapidly expanding middle class. However, in contrast to pre-revolutionary Iran, this emerging group has the opportunity to participate in the Pakistani political process through the democratic mechanisms. In other words, despite that the economic concerns of the poor classes in Pakistan are congruent to those that existed in pre-revolutionary Iran, the February 2008 election demonstrated that Pakistanis as a whole prefer a moderate, socialist and secular solution to Pakistani problems.

²⁰⁶International Republican Institute, Pakistan <http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan.asp>; accessed 15 February 2008.

²⁰⁷United States Department of State: Background Notes: Pakistan..., 8.

²⁰⁸Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Pakistan., 151.

²⁰⁹“Migration and Pakistan,” *YesPakistan.com*, 18 June 2002 http://www.yespakistan.com/people/migration_pak.asp; Internet; accessed 12 March 2008.

Religious and Cultural Concerns

In Iran, the Shah's suppression of Islam and Islamic tradition was considered injurious to the religion. His push for secularization and the aggrandizement of the nation as the ancient Persian Empire also added to the perception that Muslim culture was on the verge of being subsumed by western culture. While these insensitivities distanced the Shah from the people, Khomeini skillfully used Islam and anti-western rhetoric to attack the monarchy by declaring many of the Shah's measures as un-Islamic. This was an effective method of inciting and mobilizing the lumpenproletariate. It was also useful in portraying the Shah as an elite outsider who espoused alien western values, which contradict traditional Islamic values. While the Shah believed these policies were for the greater good of the country, he did not foresee the ramifications that his anti-Islamic policies would have on the common people. The issue angered many, and it allowed Islam to become the vehicle for mobilization of the masses in revolt and further isolate the Shah.

In contrast, Pakistani civilian and military regimes have understood the value of Islamic culture and have used it as a tool to legitimize their power. Pakistan was founded on Islamic principles and thus, their importance as the sole unifying state ideology has been exploited extensively.²¹⁰ Zia ul-Haq's Islamization strategy was crucial to prolonging and legitimizing his ten year dictatorship. Virtually all successive governments have employed these same tactics or have aligned themselves with religious

²¹⁰Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier Countries...*, 6.

parties, and therefore, it has been very difficult for a religious political leader to condemn the government as an enemy of Islam.

In chapter three, it was suggested that the ideological, social and political aspects of Shi'ism, the dominate sect of Islam in Iran, might have provided the revolutionary temperament necessary to confront the Shah's troops. In the words of Keddi, "The independent power, wealth and ideology claims of the Shi'i ulama probably allowed its members to become the first leaders of a twentieth-century Islamic revolution."²¹¹ This is not the case with the Sunni dominated Pakistan. While such a statement does not suggest that Sunni Muslims would not resort to a revolution if required, they have traditionally been more conservative.²¹²

In Iran, the Shia socialist agenda allowed the Ulama to become the spokespersons for the peasant class. This gave them widespread acceptance and support from the people. In Pakistan, the Islamists have tended to be more proponents of conservative social and economic views. The PPP with their socialist agenda have, in essence, preempted the Islamists from using the socialist philosophy to gain widespread support.²¹³

Security Establishment

The security institutions in Iran by virtue of their willingness to use violence and torture in the suppression of the people fueled animosity towards the monarchy. They

²¹¹Keddie, *Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective...*, 597.

²¹²*Ibid.*, 8.

²¹³Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan*, 20.

came to symbolize the oppressive nature of the Shah's regime and contributed to the anger and frustration felt by many citizens in the period preceding the revolution. It should be pointed out that, in the early days of the revolution, the Iranian military had the opportunity to stop the mass upheaval. It remains unknown whether they chose not to act as a result of Shah's directives or whether they lacked the necessary leadership and initiative to conduct the operation. An announcement was however made by the Iranian Military Council over the state radio, stating the military would abstain from political interference at the height of the revolution.

Conversely, the Pakistani military is considered a symbol of stability and a guardian of the state in times of crisis. It has acted as a mediator between contentious domestic political parties during civilian crises and is an important institution to counter the external threats such as India. While on numerous occasions it has seized control of the state, tampered with elections and meddled in government affairs, the military as a whole has traditionally enjoyed a relatively high approval rating amongst the people.²¹⁴ Should the military be faced with a situation where the integrity of Pakistan is at stake, it has both the inclination and ability to intervene as it has done throughout the history of the country.

²¹⁴Tony Kellet, Department of National Defence, Directorate of Strategic Analysis Issue brief: "*Pakistan's Political Crisis*," (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007), 7.

Relationship with the United States

It has been observed that states which experience a sharp reversal in their economic fortunes are more susceptible to revolution when this is accompanied by withdrawal of its main foreign ally.²¹⁵ In pre-revolutionary Iran, the people had acknowledged that the Shah relied completely on the US for the security of both the state and the monarchy. American vacillation on foreign policy towards Iran conveyed the perception that the US had abandoned Iran and the Shah. These events coincided with the economic collapse of the late 1970s and enhanced the instability of the regime and the potential for revolution.

As with pre-revolutionary Iran, the US is currently regarded by Pakistan as a major strategic ally for both economic and military support. Based on historical precedence, however, many Pakistanis feel that the US will abandon the country both financially and strategically at the denouement of the conflict in Afghanistan.²¹⁶ Pakistan has however, diversified its security options by developing a nuclear capability and aligning itself with other powers such as China. Consequently, a potential American withdrawal of both financial aid and security would likely not affect Pakistani perception regarding internal security or confidence as strongly as it did in Iran.

²¹⁵Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution...*, 31.

²¹⁶ "Pakistan vs. al-Qaida", RAND, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/031306UPI.html>; Internet; accessed 16 February 2008.

Political Conditions/Situation

One of the primary contributors to the Iranian revolution was the inability of the people to challenge the Shah's autocratic policies through participation in the political process. His suppression of democracy and unwillingness to share power propelled the middle class to rally against him. Pakistan, on the other hand, was founded as a parliamentary democracy with the expectation that the people would have the ability to contribute to the shaping of state policy. Even though democracy has been impeded frequently by military dictatorships, representing a scenario closer to that of pre-revolutionary Iran, the marginalization of Musharraf, following the latest legitimate elections, has signaled a swing back towards true democracy and a move away from autocracy. It might be said that the 2008 election was the outlet by which the people were able to express their frustrations with an unjust ruler. Democracy provided the outlet for grievances that the citizens of an autocratic state would have had access to.

It has been noted that the Iranian revolution was a complex interrelation of economic, political, social and traditional aspects that all culminated at the correct time and place. Such a complexity is very difficult to replicate. Following the analysis on the preceding pages, it can be concluded that even though on the surface many of the current conditions in Pakistan might appear to have parallels to those of pre-revolutionary Iran, the Iranian revolutionary model is not a relevant proxy for a Pakistani Islamist revolution.

Likelihood of an Islamic Fundamentalist Pakistan

While social, economic and political conditions make repeating the Iranian revolutionary model in Pakistan improbable, there are additional factors that prevent Pakistani fundamentalists from assuming control via armed intervention or even via legitimate political means. There are three main obstacles preventing Islamists from coming to power in Pakistan: the decline in the broad appeal of fundamentalism; the lack of competent charismatic leadership; and the strong military opposition to fundamentalists.²¹⁷

Islamic fundamentalism is now viewed by many in the Muslim world as a tarnished ideology devoid of appeal.²¹⁸ Former hardline Islamist groups in countries like Algeria and Egypt have now softened their agendas as the feasibility of a fundamentalist state has become unrealistic. No fundamentalist regime, regardless of religious faith has succeeded in the promise of social uplift, equality or economic progress.²¹⁹ The idea that a fundamentalist nation state will provide a better life for its citizens is a hollow promise. Iran is an excellent example of a fundamentalist state that has not been able to deliver the promises of wealth balance and a better existence, despite having access to considerable oil revenues.

The majority of the Iranian population now views their current theocratic government as illegitimate and it appears they have no more political freedoms than they

²¹⁷Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan...*, 17-21.

²¹⁸*Ibid.*, 8.

²¹⁹Noorani, *Islam and Jihad: Prejudice Versus Reality...*, 82, 65.

enjoyed under the Shah.²²⁰ The current Iranian economy suffers from chronic mismanagement and corruption, which has caused oil production to decline steadily since the revolution. In 2007, the country witnessed petrol rationing and estimates even suggest Iran will become a net importer of petrol by 2015.²²¹ Both unemployment and inflation rates are currently estimated to be in excess of 20% and the income gap between the wealthy and the poor is increasing. It is also estimated that in excess of 150,000 skilled Iranians are leaving the country each year, one of the most significant “brain drains” in the world.²²² There have also been reports of frequent intimidation and suppression of religious minorities in the country. In other words, Iran no longer represents the fresh alternative to western style governments.

While there has been some level of sympathy in Pakistan for fundamentalist militant tactics in the past, the last year has seen a dramatic decrease in public tolerance as a result of the intensity of the violence. At the beginning of 2007, 70% of the people in the NWFP had a favorable opinion of Osama Bin Laden. This support had plummeted to 4% by early 2008.²²³ Just prior to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, a nationwide poll suggested support for suicide bombing had dropped precipitously since 2004.²²⁴ Ironically, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto may have eroded much of the fundamentalists remaining support base in the days leading up to the election. Indeed, the

²²⁰Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Iran . . . , 4.

²²¹*Ibid.*, 4.

²²²*Ibid.*, 6.

²²³“Pakistani Support for Taliban Dropping, Poll Shows,” *The Globe and Mail* (11 February 2008), <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>; Internet; accessed 20 Feb 2008.

²²⁴“View from Pakistan: Before Bhuttos Assassination, Public Opinion was Increasingly Opposed to Terrorism,” Pew Research. (28 December 2007). <http://pewresearch.org>; Internet; accessed 8 Feb 2008.

NWFP, which has been a bastion for extremist support for several years, lost most of their political seats in the recent February elections.²²⁵

There are also many minority groups within Pakistan who would oppose a fundamentalist regime. Indeed, religious coalitions have never been successful in garnering much more than 10% of the vote during elections.²²⁶ Minority Shia groups who comprise 20% of the population would certainly oppose a fundamentalist regime as it means the imposition of Sharia law upon them. Shia groups would rather have a secular government rather than abide by the Sunni interpretation of Sharia.²²⁷

A second barrier to fundamentalist control is the lack of unity and charismatic leadership from among the religious parties. Many Pakistani religious groups have difficulty agreeing on a shared political agenda.²²⁸ Specifically, they cannot agree on the interpretation of Sharia, the foundation of their platform.²²⁹ The epicenter of the hardcore radical movement in the Pakistani tribal areas is Waziristan. There, Baitullah Mehsud founded a coalition of extremist groups known as the Tehrik-i-Taliban. Mehsud is known to have close ties with the Afghan Taliban and is generally believed to have been responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.²³⁰ He founded the Tehrik-i-Taliban

²²⁵ “PPP, PML-N in Sight of Magical Number., *Dawn* (20 February 2008), <http://www.dawn.com>; Internet; accessed 21 Feb 2008.

²²⁶ Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan...*, 36.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 19.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 21.

²²⁹ Khan, *Danger Zone...*, 30

²³⁰ “In Pakistan, Doubts Over the Fight in Tribal Areas,” *New York Times* (12 February 2008). <http://www.nytimes.com>; Internet; accessed 29 Feb 2008.

in order to coordinate actions amongst several militant groups. However, he has had little success in keeping the group united as tribal and regional differences have become contentious. Several groups have now split from the alliance and some have even adopted pro-government agendas. Other extremist groups now oppose Mehsud's armed groups from entering their territory.²³¹

Probably the most significant barrier to Islamic fundamentalists assuming state control is the Pakistani military. The Pakistani armed forces have little interest in allowing a fundamentalist takeover and would likely step in to prevent this from happening. The military is the most powerful institution in Pakistan and one of its primary mandates is to play the role of guarantor of the state in response to anti-constitutional traditionalists.²³² Indeed, the military has never allowed security policy to be compromised by domestic ideology considerations.²³³

The military has consistently demonstrated that it is capable of dealing with radical fundamentalists. In early 2008, the military conducted an effective three week campaign against the Tehrik-i-Taliban, which led to a ceasefire request from the militants.²³⁴ The Pakistan's military capacity is constantly improving with the delivery of US spares and support that was lacking under years of embargos and would likely be capable of deterring most armed attempts to seize control of the country. There are,

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² "Pakistan and its Army." *Stratfor* (6 November 2007). <http://www.stratfor.com>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2008.

²³³ Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan...*, 39.

²³⁴ "In Pakistan, Doubts Over the Fight in Tribal Areas," *New York Times* (12 February 2008). <http://www.nytimes.com>; Internet; accessed 29 February 2008.

however, suggestions that many senior officers who took their commissions during the Zia ul-Haq Islamization era harbor sympathies for the fundamentalists. Additionally, there were members in the ISI who were sympathetic to these groups by virtue of their relationships during the Afghan war.²³⁵ This has led to speculation that they might undermine the military and become willing participants in a fundamentalist regime. The military has, however, responded to these challenges by conducting periodic purges of the ISI ranks which has likely thinned their ranks and their influence.²³⁶

From a pragmatic point of view, the military would have much to lose if the country was to become dominated by a totalitarian Islamist government. Following the Iranian revolution, the control over the armed forces became a priority for Khomeini and he took steps to ensure they could no longer act independently, including purges of the officer class and the creation of the Pasdaran militia. In the first six months of the revolution, 248 officers were executed and hundreds more either imprisoned or exile. The Pasdaran were an independent militia which maintained internal order and were a foil to the power of the regular military.²³⁷ A situation not likely to be tolerated by the Pakistan military command.

In Pakistan, the military also wields considerable economic power as it has consciously diversified its power base by investing in several national industries and businesses. It is estimated that the Pakistani military is now one of the country's largest

²³⁵Tony Kellett, "The Army and the "Talibanization" of Pakistan." Department of National Defence. Directorate of Strategic Analysis Issue brief: (Ottawa: DND, 20 July 2007), 8.

²³⁶Hassan. *Pakistan's Drift to Extremism...*, 153
Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Pakistan, 135.

²³⁷Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution...*, 258.

corporate conglomerates and holds assets in excess of \$20 billion.²³⁸ These assets include five “welfare foundations”, which encompass banking construction material companies and heavy manufacturing. Profits from these activities allow the military to distribute wealth amongst its members; however the senior officers receive a disproportionately larger income compared to the rest of the ranks.²³⁹ Looking at the example of the Iranian revolution, where fundamentalists seized control of the large state run conglomerates, it is unlikely that the Pakistani military would be willing to accept the loss of these assets from which many of its senior members derive their wealth.²⁴⁰

Islamic fundamentalism would have great difficulty overcoming these obstacles in an attempt to seize the state. While the importance of Islamism in Pakistani society is undeniable, they do not represent the views of the majority of the population, nor the socialist appeal to the peasant class. Furthermore, Islamists would require the complete cooperation of the Pakistani armed forces in realizing their goal, which, at the present moment, seems unrealistic.

²³⁸Kellett, “Pakistan’s Political Crisis”..., 7.

²³⁹*Ibid.*, 7.

²⁴⁰Milani, *The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution...*, 258.
Kellett, “Pakistan’s Political Crisis”, 7.

6. CONCLUSION: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A PAKISTAN AS A FUNDAMENTALIST STATE

Implications of an Islamist Pakistan

While Pakistan does not necessarily fit the Iranian revolutionary model, it does not mean there is a guarantee that fundamentalist ideology will not continue to place increasing pressure on the governance of the state. Indeed, since partition, conservative religious groups have played an important role in politics and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Pakistani politics have proven to be unpredictable and the changes which have occurred in Pakistan during the first quarter of 2008 could be reversed by a catastrophic change to the security or socio-economic landscape. There are reports that in the near future, worldwide price increases in food and fuel supplies may dramatically rise, impacting vulnerable classes in countries like Pakistan.²⁴¹ This could lead to further socio-economic regression and perhaps destabilization to a level outside the ability of the state to control. Additionally, any perceived threats to Pakistan national security such as US unilateral anti-terrorist incursions or serious threat by India could seriously enhance domestic anti-western and pro-Islamist sentiments. Both of these scenarios may invoke increased Islamist sympathy from the population on a larger scale than occurred in the wake of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. These scenarios might empower both radical Islamists in the tribal areas and conservative religious parties within the

²⁴¹Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, 44.

government. Islamists therefore may still have future opportunities to exert considerably more influence.

This increased influence scenario or even one describing complete Islamic fundamentalist control of the state would be disconcerting to the international community. For this to occur, however, complete cooperation of the military would be required. Arguably, the first bill passed by the government would be to implement Sharia law in the legal areas not already governed by these rules, including the constitution, martial law ordinances, family law and fiscal policy.²⁴² This move would cement the fundamentalist power over the state and reduce the influence of other secular institutions like the judiciary. If the Islamists were to come to power through the democratic process or through an alliance with the military, it is likely that the regime would not be overtly radical. The main reason for this is that religious parties in Pakistan have traditionally been more conservative than radical. Conversely, however, extremist groups operating in the tribal areas and Kashmir would likely take advantage of an Islamist regime and attempt to advance their radical ideologies through militancy, perhaps by building a mini Islamist state within the tribal areas.²⁴³

While implementation of a conservative variant of Sharia law could lead to domestic unrest particularly amongst minorities, the resulting impact of a fundamentalist government on regional and global security would be a primary concern to the international community. The degree to which the government would be radicalized would influence the shape of foreign policy; however, some generalizations might be

²⁴²Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan...*, 38.

²⁴³*Ibid.*, 39.

extrapolated on the basis of historical precedence. In a similar fashion to post-revolutionary Iran, an Islamist Pakistan would likely feature a greater hawkishness towards the subject of national security. There would also likely be a desire to export Sunni fundamentalism to other “oppressed” Muslims states as well as moving to sever or distance relations with the United States and the West.

A Shift in National Security Policy

The key area of concern in terms of national security for a fundamentalist Pakistan would be the relationship with the United States and the West. This relationship would certainly deteriorate, if Pakistan were to demonstrate a tendency to work against the efforts of the West, particularly in the support of terrorism or undermining NATO efforts in Afghanistan. The US would react harshly to these actions and Pakistan fundamentalist leaders would need to balance ideology against not only the loss of continued access to American military equipment and financial support, but the possibility of military reprisals. Pakistan would feel much more comfortable facing India in a conflict with at least some support from the US. It would therefore be a difficult decision for a fundamentalist Pakistan, considering the fact that the country has never allowed security policy to be compromised by domestic ideological considerations.²⁴⁴ Conversely, China would likely continue to remain a cautious ally, as long as Pakistani external efforts did not impact Chinese domestic security.

²⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 39

From a regional aspect, an Islamist Pakistan may lead to deteriorating relations with Afghanistan, Iran and India. Depending on its relationship with the US, an Islamist Pakistan might be expected to alter its policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan and begin to support anti-western or Taliban forces.²⁴⁵ This would need to be done carefully and covertly in order to avoid repercussions from the United States and NATO. These actions might be seen as similar to those employed by Iran in the supporting of Muslim groups in African countries.

Even though relations with Iran have always been good, even in the wake of the revolution, this relationship could be negatively affected with the Pakistan government being dominated by radicalized Sunni Islamists. Two adjacent Muslim fundamentalist states with differing ideological views on Islam could lead to regional difficulties.²⁴⁶ Iran has routinely demonstrated over the last thirty years a need to protect and sponsor minority Shia Muslims in Pakistan to counter Sunni persecution which has included targeted killings in the past on both sides.²⁴⁷ The full implementation of a rigid fundamentalist variant of Sharia law would likely further isolate the Shia minority or embolden intolerant Sunni militants, perhaps compelling Iran to act. Furthermore, any Pakistani attempt to intervene in Afghanistan, even covertly to aid in the re-establishment of the Taliban would not be received well by Iran. Iran saw the Sunni fundamentalist Taliban regime as a serious threat and actively participated by supporting the Northern

²⁴⁵Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier Countries...*, ix

²⁴⁶Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan...*, 25.

²⁴⁷Abbas, *Pakistans Drift into Extremism...*, 204.

Alliance against the Taliban prior to 9/11.²⁴⁸ While the situation would likely not result in overt conflict, the relationship could become strained. The current relationship with India over Kashmir may also lead to increased tensions should a fundamentalist government assume control in Pakistan.

Islamists have traditionally been the most hawkish in the influencing of foreign policy and were the most vocal in demanding that Prime Minister Sharaf conduct nuclear tests in response to India's tests in 1998.²⁴⁹ They were also the most derisive regarding discussions over the Kashmir summit in 2001. Indeed, when a genuinely disappointed Musharraf was unable to agree even to basic measures with India, he was subsequently applauded by the religious groups.²⁵⁰ It is unlikely that this stance would soften under a fundamentalist government. The general thaw in relations over the last few years with India could rapidly come to a close. Additionally, Islamists may chose to resume clandestine support to extremist groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) who routinely conduct attacks against Indian interests in Kashmir.²⁵¹ The risk of widening the conflict over Kashmir would be a dangerous development, particularly, if one side should begin to lose. Depending on the level of extremism in the government, the thought of nuclear exchange might be considered more acceptable under certain ideological circumstances.

²⁴⁸Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Iran..., 40.

²⁴⁹Abbas, *Pakistans Drift into Extremism...*, 162.

²⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 198.

²⁵¹Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence..., 10.

The Export of Fundamentalism

Pakistan might also be expected to export its Sunni fundamentalist ideology in support of Muslims in other countries. As noted previously, Kashmiri and, potentially, Afghan militants would be the primary recipients of this support, but most likely this support would also be offered globally. In 1992, the newly appointed ISI chief, LGen Nasir, a self described born-again Muslim, took it upon himself to provide aid to Muslims in Bosnia in defiance of a UN arms embargo. He supplied them with sophisticated anti-tank missiles which would prove pivotal in the defeat of the Serbs. He also supported religious groups in China, the Philippines, and central Asia, resulting in a US demand he either be sacked or Pakistan would be placed on the State Department's terrorist watch list.²⁵² The ISI was also widely believed to have been engaged in drug trafficking during the early 1990s in order to fund covert operations. It is possible these measures might become the preferred method of funding operations, particularly, if military funding was ceased by the United States.²⁵³

A Distancing from the West

Probably, the most deleterious situation that might result from an Islamist controlled Pakistan would be the decision to no longer participate in the war against terrorism. In February 2008, the US National Intelligence Director suggested that the

²⁵²Abbas, *Pakistans Drift into Extremism...*, 148

²⁵³*Ibid.*, 148-149.

Pakistan-Afghanistan region is important for many American top security interests. Terrorist groups operating along the border between the two countries not only threaten regional stability, but they offer a safe-haven for the Al-Qaeda leadership and the training of new operatives with global capabilities.²⁵⁴

A fundamentalist Pakistan would likely limit cooperation with the West in the prosecution of these organizations. The degree to which these limitations would be implemented would depend upon the Pakistani need for American financial support and military aid. US military access to Pakistani bases and overflight could also be strictly limited or even revoked, which in result be detrimental to ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan.²⁵⁵ The loss of vital Pakistani intelligence pertaining to the border regions and the ability of militant groups to rest and recover from Afghan operations in Pakistan would render the NATO mission relatively untenable.

The most damaging aspect of an Islamist controlled Pakistan, however, would be the potential for proliferation of nuclear technology or materials to other states or non-state actors. In 2003, Pakistan was suspected of sharing sensitive warhead and test data with the North Koreans as well as other sensitive nuclear information with Iranian and Libyan scientists.²⁵⁶ The impact on global security would be immense, if a fundamentalist Pakistan were to support the aspirations of other regimes or terrorist groups seeking a nuclear capability.

²⁵⁴Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence..., 4, 5.

²⁵⁵Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan...*, 42.

²⁵⁶Abbas, *Pakistans Drift into Extremism...*, 30, 231.

Mitigating the Rise of Islamism in Pakistan

An Islamic fundamentalist Pakistan would certainly have the potential to impact both regional and global stability. The global community and specifically the United States cannot afford to let Pakistan regress to a point where fundamentalism might gain increased influence. While the latest post-election political and military leadership situation appears guardedly promising, these advances will need to be reinforced by meaningful international action to demonstrate that the government is credible. An emphasis on long term economic support to Pakistan would need to be the cornerstone of this policy. Aid would need to be increased and directed principally towards building social institutions and bolstering the economy rather than defence. Investment in education and infrastructure, particularly, in the most underdeveloped areas like the FATA and NWFP would be a priority. Innovative initiatives such as the funding and encouragement of madrasas which focus on broad and moderate Islam would erode Islamist power in tribal areas, where the “free” extremist madrasas are able to recruit many of their followers.²⁵⁷ Encouraging the government to modernize and reform the legal and political structures in these regions would also reduce the local perception of arbitrary governance. All of these initiatives would also require a commitment to build culturally sensitive and effective security forces in the tribal regions.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 240.

²⁵⁸ Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, 27.

In terms of diplomacy, the West and the US in particular need to follow a more nuanced approach to Pakistan. The primary goal should be the continued support of legitimate government and democracy which has shown to reduce the likelihood of fundamentalism gaining ascendancy.²⁵⁹ The West should also be prepared to support the judiciary and the freedom of the press in Pakistan, which are crucial in order to help preserve these ideals. Supporting individuals or dictatorships rather than state institutions has fostered widespread Pakistani resentment and anti-western attitudes. This occurred following the US support for Musharraf in midst of his campaign to suppress both the media and the judiciary.²⁶⁰ This anti-western sentiment has resulted in a widespread reduction in support for anti-extremist and counterterrorism cooperation with the West in Pakistan.

While it would be unrealistic to believe that corruption could be eradicated in Pakistan, Western encouragement for meaningful reforms to reduce opportunities for exploitation would also contribute to government credibility. A less corrupt state would also encourage further international investment, leading to a more prosperous and stable society.

National security has represented the cornerstone of Pakistani foreign policy since the country was founded. Much of the budget has traditionally been consumed in the maintenance of a formidable military; however, this has been at the expense of critical

²⁵⁹C. Christine Fair, "US-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability, and the Future of US Policy." CT-297, Rand Corporation (January 2008).

²⁶⁰*Ibid.*

social infrastructure.²⁶¹ While the current state of the relationship with India appears promising, a permanent or lasting solution is required over Kashmir. The United States and the international community should encourage developments towards an equitable solution. All of these measures and in particular any direct encouragement should be carried out with due regard to national sensitivities and should not appear to be pressuring the state or military in a manner that would suggest unsolicited western intervention or subjugation. A more secure Pakistan would have the ability to redirect essential resources to social reforms and the combating of internal extremism. These measures would help stabilize the country and result in a nation that may be more attractive to international investment and one less susceptible to radical Islam.

²⁶¹ Abbas, *Pakistans Drift into Extremism...*, 239.

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