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Into the Blue: A Case for Canada's Return to UN Peacekeeping

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Abstract

Is UN peacekeeping still relevant for Canada? Peacekeeping is an activity that is cherished by Canadians: it has helped to define who we are. Yet, many have argued that it is a concept that is unworkable in the context of modern conflict, that it is irrelevant. Some historians have argued that even during the heyday of Canadian peacekeeping, Canada entered into its UN commitments more out of a pursuit of the national interest than for the sake of its values, while others have said that peacekeeping has no place in the 'new wars' of today. This paper concludes that there is a connection between development and security and that United Nations multi-disciplinary peacekeeping and the integrated mission concept are superior constructs for the integration and delivery of both. UN peacekeeping has evolved and those who claim that it is irrelevant are often referring to outdated concepts. Force capability and the ability to use it has become part and parcel of modern peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is not a perfect solution and the United Nations itself is far from perfect. Peacekeeping is relevant for Canada, and properly supported, it can help us gain and hold a place of pride and influence in the world.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

"If I learned one thing from this enquiry, it is that there is no obvious answer to the question of Canada's future role in Afghanistan. But our presence in that distant land does matter."

John Manley (2008)

Our presence in Afghanistan certainly does matter. Canadian soldiers are engaged in a variety of activities, some controversial and some not, but what we do there is important and will have lasting effects on both our countries. Our role in Afghanistan, a combat one, has provoked significant debate across Canada. Certainly the role has reinvigorated the Canadian Army and is a source of pride for Canadian soldiers. The Canadian people do not always feel the same way and there have been calls to return to the days of UN peacekeeping, while others have said that those days are gone forever.

Is UN peacekeeping still relevant for Canada? Peacekeeping is an activity that is cherished by Canadians: it has helped to define who we are (Staples 2006: 1)[1]. Peacekeeping is so central to our sense of self that it has been called a national value. Yet, many have argued that it is a concept that is unworkable in the context of modern conflict, that it is irrelevant (Bercusson in Staples 2006: 13). Some historians such as Sean Maloney and Jack Granatstein have argued that even during the heyday of Canadian peacekeeping, Canada entered into its UN commitments more out of a pursuit of the national interest than for the sake of its values, while others have said that peacekeeping has no place in what Mary Kaldor (1997) has called the 'new wars' of today.

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[1] Staples quotes the Centre for Research and Information on Canada who reported that 69% of Canadians considered peacekeeping "a defining characteristic of Canada" as of October 25, 2005.

There can be no doubt that the face of conflict has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War, yet, evidence will show that peacekeeping, essentially a Cold War construct, has changed as well, at times reluctantly and always in reaction to changes in the nature of global conflict. The UN's failures of the 1990's caused many of the world's most capable nations, including Canada, to abandon United Nations peacekeeping in favour of *ad hoc* coalitions of the willing or regional bodies such as NATO in order to influence world events. Meanwhile, although reform at the United Nations may move at a glacial pace, the organisation has changed the way it looks at and practices peacekeeping. The Brahimi report and 2004's High Level Panel report have both made key recommendations concerning the way forward for peacekeeping. Further, the UN, long criticised for concentrating on the consequences of conflict and for not dealing with its causes, has altered its approach from freezing conflict with interpositional peacekeepers to solving the roots of conflict and building a lasting peace.

This new approach, typified by multi-dimensional peacekeeping and the integrated mission concept, combines security, development and humanitarianism under one umbrella. It is complex peacekeeping that seeks to create a safe and secure environment, and while that window of safety is open, to allow humanitarians to attend to people's basic needs while developers assist with building the institutions that will enable the area to govern itself and at the same time to give the tools that will aid in solving future conflict before it becomes violent. This approach may require a robust military component but more important will be the requirement for strategic coordination. Unfortunately, while the concept shows much promise, most of the nations with the

capabilities to make it work – Western nations – have walked away from peacekeeping and the UN in general, refusing to allow their troops to be placed under UN control.

Integrated Missions are a relatively recent concept in UN peacekeeping, or rather, peacebuilding. These missions draw on the total strength of the UN system and integrate peacekeeping, development and humanitarian action into one coordinated response designed to stabilize states in conflict, solve the roots of conflict and set the conditions for lasting peace. In a perceived break from UN tradition, most of these actions are overtly political and involve lending support to a local government authority. That is where the concept has run into controversy and major objections from the humanitarian community, who charge that it is eating away at their freedom of action or humanitarian space and putting humanitarians in danger.

Are integrated missions a significant step forward that should signal Canada's return to the UN fold? Before that can be answered we must come to an understanding of Canada's motivation concerning armed and humanitarian interventions. If, as some commentators have said, it is more about Canadian interests than Canadian values we must ask what is truly in Canada's interest and what is the best way to get there. There are no easy answers but if populations and citizens are targets in today's conflicts then it stands to reason that they must be part of, or be incorporated into the solution. As Canada becomes engaged in these complex and occasionally protracted conflicts we need to ask ourselves some difficult questions. What is Canadian policy? Why are we engaging? How long are we committing for and is that measured in time, money or in terms of meeting national objectives? As time passes, is international legitimacy a factor in the maintenance of national will? And lastly, can Canada state clear national

objectives and do we need to operate nationally to achieve them? Regardless of

Canada's motivations, it should be clear that our leaders would wish to choose the course

of action that has the highest probability of success and would lead to a viable exit

strategy whatever the outcome. Debates over whether Canada engages due to its interests

or values are largely academic as nations undoubtedly have both and their motivations

are likely linked to a mixture of both. Still, can it be argued that Canada could return to

UN peacekeeping purely out of national interest? This paper will show that

peacekeeping has evolved, that the UN's approach presents a viable option and that UN

peacekeeping, far from being an anachronism, is still relevant for Canada.

Setting the Stage - The Changing Nature of Conflict

One of the main arguments against participating in UN peacekeeping missions is

that the ways and means of waging war and the face of conflict have changed, and indeed

they have: war has become more chaotic and brutal. To understand why this chaos and

brutality is so jarring, it is essential to understand the body of rules and customs that have

developed around the waging of interstate or Westphalian conflicts. European

governments, their militaries and those that follow in their tradition have sought to limit

the brutality of war and attempt to bring order to conflict. This can be seen in such

diverse concepts as the code of chivalry that has evolved into our modern Law of Armed

Conflict and humanitarian law, the nation state system and the concept of state

sovereignty that grew from the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the development of

uniformed, disciplined armies that engaged in conflict at the behest of the state.

As our capability to cause harm has grown, so too has our desire to place

limitations on the suffering produced by conflict. An early example is the chivalric code.

In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius completed his works on *jus ad bellum,* justice relating to the initiation of war, and *jus in bello,* justice in the conduct of war. Grotius aimed "to prevent war [and] failing to prevent it, he [sought] to minimize its brutality" (Christopher, 1999: 81). The works of Grotius laid the groundwork for Just War Theory and the laws of armed conflict. These laws of armed conflict and humanitarian law have continued to develop, proscribing unnecessary suffering in the conduct of war as well as detailing proper treatment of captives and the civil populace. Examples include The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977. Due to the growing capacity of states to wage war, the twentieth century saw efforts to prevent war rather than simply to limit it. One such method was the balance of power, a system of alliances that would prevent any one state from seizing control of the European continent. It was the failure of the balance of power that led to the First World War (Bellamy *et al* 2004: 23). Another method, collective security, was a driving concept behind the League of Nations and the United Nations, organizations that were born from the ashes of the First and Second World Wars respectively. Collective security views an attack on a member state as an attack on all and activates an agreement to "join in the collective response to aggression" (Diehl 1994: 23). The U.N. Charter also imposed restrictions on the initiation of force. The United Nations concept of collective security involved both military and nonmilitary responses, the latter largely in the form of sanctions. The structure of the Cold War, which divided the world into two camps, effectively negated the concept of collective security and "had the effect of marginalizing the interventionist role of other international actors, such as the United Nations and humanitarian relief agencies" (Dannreuther 2007:144). This deadlock between the two

superpowers shaped global politics during the Cold War, and due to the Westphalian state-based structure of the UN Charter and the veto granted to the five permanent members of the Security Council, prevented "the Security Council from playing a dominant role in maintaining international peace and security (United Nations 2004: 12). It was in this context that Canada's Lester Pearson and UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld developed the concept of UN peacekeeping in response to the Suez Crisis of 1956. The traditional peacekeeping operations of the Cold War period were usually based on the assumption that states wished to find a peaceful resolution to hostilities and these operations were based on the three principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force. Although these principles were firmly grounded in the Westphalian concept of sovereignty, an examination to determine their utility in today's context would be worthwhile.

The Westphalian structure that predominated to the end of the Cold War provided some tangible advantages for those seeking to resolve conflict, or at least keep the peace. First, because governments held a perceived monopoly on the use of coercive force, international agencies could identify and knew with whom to speak. As states have legitimacy, the heads of state acted in the open and could be brought to the negotiating table. Conflict between states is usually motivated by territorial and or economic gain and so there are tangible areas for compromise. As well, states have distinct boundaries facilitating the separation of combatants and graphically limiting the size of the conflict. The militaries of states are organized, identifiable by their uniforms and generally adhere to laws that prohibit targeting of civilians and civilian objects. In short, the dominant

form of conflict had been formalized, organized and, as much as possible, the conditions set for an orderly return to peaceful relations between conflicting states.

The breakup of the Soviet Union was supposed to bring forth an era of peace and stability. Instead, it created a power vacuum that initially led to internal conflicts and civil wars. These conflicts were characterized by multiple non-state actors, ethnic and religious violence and a lack of distinct borders or boundaries. The combatants were often irregular forces owing allegiance to regional warlords rather than to states. As they were not party to international agreements that placed limits on armed violence, they were either unaware of the international laws and norms, or felt no obligation to adhere to them. Civilians were often targeted, or worse, were the objects of ethnic cleansing campaigns, and human suffering rose. Resolving what William Durch (1996) has called the "uncivil wars of the 1990s" was exceedingly difficult as there was rarely any peace to keep. State structures had broken down and warring forces were no longer the relatively disciplined Clauswitzian armies that the international community was accustomed to dealing with. Many warring factions recognized no international law and often did not heed their own political masters, causing the collapse of negotiated ceasefires. Rather than economics or the gain of territory, the motivations for conflict were often identity based and there was little room for compromise as these hatreds, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, had been smoldering for years, suppressed only by the dynamics of the Cold War.

Another consequence of the Soviet Union's demise was that the United States was left as the sole remaining superpower. "Since the end of the Cold War, the power and international influence of the United States have been unparalleled – to the point that, at

the international level, most change begins and ends with the remaining superpower."

(Coicaud 2007). American preeminence and culture was spread and was solidified by the

phenomenon of globalization, and facilitated by technology such as the intranet. Other

cultures, particularly in the Islamic world, felt threatened by the dominance of a way of

life so different from their own value system and were virtually powerless to stem the

tide. As the United States has no peer or near-peer competitor in the military realm,

dissidents such as Osama bin Laden turned

ideological or cultural element can be more prominent. William Lind believes that the main reason why the British were successful in Northern Ireland following the events of Bloody Sunday was that they did not resort to the use of heavy weapons and worked at becoming acquainted with the area that they were in and minimised collateral damage and civilian casualties. Intuitively, this makes sense: if fourth generation warfare was developed to take on nations with superior military power, this power likely does not hold the answer for prevailing in this type of conflict.

This phenomenon is not new, however. The mix of brutality as well as the confusion of the military and political spheres would be recognisable to both Caesar and Napoleon. Australian doctrine on counter-revolutionary warfare from 1965 describes that style of war as follows;

> *(It uses) local and infiltrated supporters, destroys the whole fabric of the existing society so as to overthrow the established social order and constitutional government. It achieves this by propaganda, threat, blackmail, extortion, terrorism, murder and armed attack, aimed principally at the indigenous local authorities and designed to paralyse the armed forces by progressively committing them to defensive tasks* (Australia 1965: 25).

While it is important to know that the methods and face of war have changed from the Cold War, what is even more crucial is that states and their militaries have been slow to respond. Although counterinsurgency or COIN doctrine is now being written in many nations, the structures and thinking of militaries often remains focused on conventional combat operations that are easily exploited by insurgents. Tactical victories can easily be won by modern armies using technology and overwhelming force but operational and strategic victories of the kind that Al Qaeda orchestrated in the withdrawal of Spain from Iraq are more difficult to come by. The 1965 doctrine holds a clue when it says that "counter insurgency operations are simultaneously political and

military in their nature. There is no purely military solution" (Australia 1965: 25). It is here that NATO has difficulties for even though it is widely acknowledged that the ISAF mission is mainly a political and development one, the Alliance was never built to coordinate the efforts of modern, complex peacebuilding. It remains a military construct despite the formation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and a real attempt to marry security with development. It is this link with security and development that is worth exploring. If the causes of modern conflict share similarities with the causes of insurgencies and/or terrorism, modern peacekeeping may present itself as a possible policy option for nations looking to either engage in prevention or to ensure that recently recovered states do not relapse into chaos or become safe havens for terrorists. In the end, if NATO is experiencing difficulty with combining security with development, we should either expend significant energy into overcoming that shortcoming or examine constructs that have had more success in that realm.

CHAPTER 2

NATO

NATO was formed in 1949 as a military alliance to counter the communist threat represented by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. NATO has a political and a Military Council, a strategic headquarters located in Brussels, Belgium and three operational level headquarters. NATO, under a UN mandate, has deployed the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and operates ISAF headquarters in Kabul as well as subordinate formations in Afghanistan. As a Military alliance, NATO does not have civilian agencies dedicated to issues such as development, human rights, the rule of law and the like. As we have seen, Canada, beginning with the IFOR/SFOR for deployments to Bosnia has developed a preference to work through NATO when conducting military interventions. This is alluded to in the Independent Panel Report on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan (the Manley Report), when that report states that Canada is engaged in a "peace enforcement mission" that is different from "UN peacekeeping that Canadians have known and supported in the past" (Canada 2008: 21). While it is a stretch to claim that one is engaged in a peace support operation when one is a belligerent in the conflict, Canada's preference for NATO led missions stems from the military capability that they bring and the proven success that NATO enjoyed in the Balkans. In that conflict, NATO's command and control arrangements, broad range of military capabilities and freedom from the principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force combined to set the conditions for success in a peace enforcement or peace support operation far better than UNPROFOR which it replaced. UNPROFOR was hampered by a broad mandate but had little more capability and supporting doctrine

than a traditional peacekeeping mission such as the one in Cyprus. Yet, it is important to remember that in the case of Bosnia, NATO was the face of a larger team that included the UN, EU, OSCE and others.

Given NATO's effectiveness in the former Yugoslavia, there was an expectation that the alliance would enjoy similar success in Afghanistan. On the surface the expectations of success looked to be reasonably well founded. NATO's military capabilities, rules of engagement and willingness to engage in direct action are far more robust than they ever were in the former Yugoslavia. Further, several contingents are using a whole of government, joined up or comprehensive approach which is similar to a United Nations integrated mission. The results, however, have not been stellar. One of the key reasons for this lack of success is a "lack of consistent strategic vision" (Capstick 2007: 1) and coordination.

> *From the military perspective much of this lack of coherence can be attributed to one basic but critical mistake – the collective failure of American and NATO leaders to understand the true nature of conflict in failed and failing states. This failure led to the application of military force using concepts, doctrine, tactics and equipment optimized for state-on-state conflicts, but not well adapted to the realities of warfare 'among the people'.... Despite the overwhelming historical evidence that military force alone cannot defeat an insurgency or stabilize a failed state, the international community's efforts in Kabul have been characterized by an apparent lack of strategic vision and strategic level coordination of the civil-military effort* (Capstick 2007:1-2).

Part of this lack of strategic level coordination stems from NATO's organization weaknesses in that as a military alliance, it lacks the civilian and development focused organs that would facilitate such coordination, "… NATO deals only with military matters, so … another organization has to be found alongside but separate from it to handle, for example, law and order, governance and the economy" (Rupert Smith 2005, 389). As a result, NATO must rely on the nations that are providing the PRTs to provide

that coherence. As there are twenty-six PRTs being operated by fourteen different nations (Manley 2008: 85), there are very different approaches and so operational and strategic coherence are difficult if not impossible to attain as national interests are at play. Before examining Canada's approach, the whole of government concept, it is worth stepping back and looking at the situation that Canada finds itself in southern Afghanistan.

We know that the Canadians are in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a NATO-led and UN-sanctioned operation, but some of the important conditions that they work under were set by the previous operation, Enduring Freedom, part of the of the American war on terror.

At the outset, the plan to exact retribution from Al Qaeda for the 9/11 terrorist attacks did not involve a regime change in Afghanistan. This option became more likely after the Bush administration demanded that the Taliban turn over Al Qaeda and open up the country to US inspection, an ultimatum that the Taliban could not realistically accept as it would have meant the loss of the civil war in which they were engaged[2] (Conetta 2002, 12). As the demands were made and refused, the focus of American ire shifted more to the Taliban and less on Al Qaeda, the orchestrator of the terrorist attacks. It was here, in the refusal to separate Al Qaeda from the Taliban that the US lost the opportunity to punish the perpetrators of 9/11 in the form of a police action and moved towards a war in Afghanistan with the aim of toppling the Taliban regime (Conetta 2002: 12, 16). The removal of the Taliban created a power vacuum that placed the Northern Alliance, a group of ethnic minorities who received direct assistance from the United States, in

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[2] According to Conetta, Al Qaeda was intertwined into the Taliban's security apparatus and was being used to fight the civil war with the Northern Alliance. Loss of that force, if it were even possible to cut it out, would have cost them the balance in the civil war.

control in Kabul alienating the majority Pashtuns who dominate in southern and eastern Afghanistan. While the Taliban was Pashtun, there were deep divisions within the organization and many Pashtuns would have switched their loyalty to another Pashtun organization had one been available – US zeal for retribution made that impossible:

> *It proved impossible to quickly assemble a Pashtun alternative to Taliban power while conducting military operations that were killing hundreds of Pashtuns, aiding their northern adversaries and exacerbating a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan* (Conetta 2002: 13).

Decisions made early in the war set the conditions for the instability that Canadians are now facing in southern Afghanistan. Pashtun was pitted against non-Pashtun and "warlordism, banditry, and opium production (were given) a new lease on life" and the conflict was reduced to its local and tribal components (Conetta, 2002: 18, 20). The tribal component is not to be overlooked as the leadership of the Taliban was drawn from the Ghizai tribe, the main tribal competitor of the Durrani from which come both Hamid Karzai, the current President of Afghanistan, and the King (Conetta 2002: 25). All this is to say that the political and security situation in southern Afghanistan is very complex and any attempt to explain it solely in terms of Al Qaeda and the Taliban is overly simplistic and wrong. Further, it is a situation precipitated by the use of military power without regard for the strategic consequences. It is into this situation that the Canadians landed first in 2002 and later in 2005. It is worth noting that Canada began operating in Kandahar in 2005 before NATO assumed control and operated in the first few months under US command as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. It is hard to imagine that Canadian methods and viewpoint would not be affected by that association because as Conetta has said, "Principally, the United States is engaged in a punitive expedition and a manhunt, not a nation building exercise" (2002: 23). While some of the

consequences of Enduring Freedom are no doubt unintended, the overarching approach is

deliberate and consistent with the political realist school of thought:

> *Consistent with the administration's policy framework is a reduced emphasis*
> *on 'humanitarian interests', international legal mechanisms, stability issues*
> *and operations (including peacekeeping), and attempts at nation building.*
> (Conetta 2002: 31).

Into this convoluted situation Canada has deployed a battalion sized battle group

to help to create a safe and secure environment and a PRT that consists of military

personnel as well as representatives from the Canadian International Development

Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the

RCMP and Corrections Canada to aid in prison reform. This construct stems from

Canada's Whole of Government approach as officially articulated in the 2005

International Policy Statement as 3D, or Diplomacy, Development and Defence.

Whole of Government – Canada's Take on Integration

As NATO in general and ISAF in particular lack the coordinating bodies for

Afghan development, NATO depends on its troop contributing nations and their national

whole of government approaches filtered through the various PRTs. As a result, a look at

the whole of government approach is essential to this discussion as that, from a

development standpoint, is the current alternative to a UN approach. NATO's war in

Afghanistan is not going well. Drug production is rising, security is diminishing and

terrorism is prevalent (Davis 2008: 3). While it is certain that thing could be better, it is

difficult to articulate what success or a sustainable peace would look like. Certainly there

are those who would say that "…a limitless 'war on terror' is unsustainable and likely to

be self-defeating (Davis 2008: 3). Analysts have noted that "NATO needs a new unity of

purpose in Afghanistan" and that "(a) monumental effort is necessary on the part of NATO and the international community to better coordinate military and civilian instruments" (Davis 2008: 3). NATO's Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has said that "there is no military solution; the answer is development, nation-building, building of roads, schools" (Davis 2008:3). This is exactly where NATO encounters difficulty because it is difficult if not impossible to translate success in the former Yugoslavia, where there was a military solution, to an area where none exists. As a result, NATO is largely relying on the efforts of its national contingents in Afghanistan through their Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Many of these PRTs are truly national efforts as they attempt to bring together various national government departments. Canada's PRT is an excellent example of this method and uses Canada's whole of government approach, formerly known as 3D for defence, diplomacy and development. This approach brings together the three primary government departments that are engaged in promoting world order: Defence (DND), Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency, (CIDA) for the development side of the equation. In concept, the whole of government approach bears a close resemblance to integrated missions in that it sees security as "intrinsically linked to development issues" (Schmitz and Phillips 2008:2). It is different in that it does not draw on the many agencies of the UN such as those dedicated to development (UNDP), human rights (UNHCHR) and refugee issues (UNHCR). In addition to not leveraging the international community, the whole of government approach, being governmental, does not attempt to bring non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into the fold. Similar approaches are being developed in many nations as the

experience of the conflicts that immediately followed the Cold War has taught that

"military intervention could initially suppress conflicts, (but) it was not able to suppress

their underlying causes." It was also found that lack of security impeded development

efforts (Schmitz and Phillips 2008:2). Despite the best of intentions and the articulation

of a policy aimed at overcoming agency stovepipes, Canada's whole of government

approach is fraught with the interdepartmental barriers that it seeks to avoid. Canada is

not the only nation to have experienced difficulty with executing a whole of government

approach. The United States House Committee on Armed Services examined inter-

agency cooperation through the lens of PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan and

discovered several coordination and integration shortfalls. Because the make-up of PRTs

in Iraq and Afghanistan is different, only the observations and recommendations that

pertain to the Afghanistan PRTs will be dealt with in this paper.

Although the 3D approach was first formally mentioned in the 2004 National

Security Policy when it said that "(o)ur efforts to build peace, order and good government

will involve greater integration of our defence, development and diplomatic assets

(Canada 2004: 51), it was 2005's International Policy Statement (IPS) that brought the

approach to the fore. Yet, the articulation of the concept in the IPS leads to confusion as

Prime Minister Paul Martin's forward is at odds with the definition of the concept as

presented in the Overview. Prime Minister Martin's expression of the concept saw each

of the three 'D's as tools that could be applied to post-conflict situations while the

Overview promoted 3D as an approach to use in dealing with failed states. The

Overview's broader understanding of 3D or whole of government as a "method of

combining various assets" is more encompassing than Martin's statement (Hrychuk 2007:

29). Further, although the IPS aims at inter-departmental integration, or at least coordination, it sets the conditions for failure in the way that it presents the concept. "Engaging in exactly the stove-piping that 3D attempts to avoid, the three departments place differing amounts of emphasis on the concept within their individual chapters" (Hrychuk 2007: 28). The Overview states that the various departments and agencies must work together "through planning to execution" (DFAIT 2005a: 20), but is thin on detail as it fails to articulate how they will work together in terms of mechanism. "Rather it simply assumes that competing departments can work together under 3D, implying that policy cohesion can indeed occur (Hrychuk 2007: 29). While the Overview is clear that this cohesion is simply a means and not an end when it states that "we cannot mistake acting in concert for making a difference" (DFAIT 2005a: 3), it fails to articulate any expectations or measures of success (Hrychuk 2007: 30). The US study made the same finding, noting that there were no metrics for determining the success of PRTs and given that situation it is impossible to say if PRTs are what we should be doing if we wish to have successful stability and reconstruction operations (United States 2008: 26).

Perhaps the greatest impediment to a successful whole of government approach is that each department and agency has a different mindset (Schmitz and Phillips 2008:5). These mindsets are apparent both in theory as expressed in the IPS and in their practical application on the ground in Afghanistan. "(I)t becomes increasingly problematic when the very departments and agencies that 3D requires to act in concert hold competing viewpoints of the concept itself and its methods of implementation (Hrychuck 2007: 30). The defence document of the IPS acknowledges that the military will have to work with civilian departments in order to undertake increasingly complex security missions (DND

2005: 26), and includes consulting and information sharing as activities necessary for integration without saying when or how these activities will be carried out (Hrychuck 2007: 30). The Defence section also states that the "CF will seek to maintain the right mix of military capability to ensure that they can carry out all aspects of the three-block war" (DND 2005: 27). This reference to the three-block war stems from a concept articulated in 1997 by former US Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak when he said:

> *In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart, conducting peacekeeping operations and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle, all on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three-block war* (Krulak quoted in Dorn 2007).

It is important to capture General Krulak's words exactly because many have taken them out of context. He painted a fairly accurate picture of scenarios that soldiers involved in modern conflict may face, at least conceptually as real limitations from issues of consent and the results of loosing it would not allow you to switch back and forth so rapidly. It is not, however, military doctrine nor should it be taken to mean that the military should aim to supplant its other government department partners in preparing to do its job. Yet, this is often the impression that one gets. In her masters thesis for the War Studies program at the Royal Military College of Canada, Heather Hrychuk asks "(i)f the military can unilaterally undertake such tasks, why is there a need for cooperation and coordination with other departments? (2007: 32). Proponents of the three-block war would say that the military must have these capabilities because there are often circumstances where humanitarians and developers are unable to assist or are not present. They argue that in the absence of these other professionals, the military must step into the

void for a number of reasons. These reasons may include the necessity to undertake these sorts of tasks to ensure mission success to the requirement for the military to fill a humanitarian vacuum where one exists. In this they are right, but there is a very real difference between the type of development work done by the military compared with that of an organization such as CIDA or a number of the larger, well established NGOs. The perception that the military may be undermining the whole of government approach was bolstered when Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, who normally stresses that the Canadian Forces work in support of other government departments, said "(y)es, we have 3D and the military does all of the three Ds" (Schmitz and Phillips 2008: 5). Aside from raising questions about how a whole of government approach may work in practice or in theory and about interdepartmental support for the approach, the different

the tactical environment, may be detrimental to Canada's operational objectives if it is

perceived the wrong way by practitioners. Gerald Schmitz and Karin Phillips, in

preparing a paper for the Library of Parliament's InfoSeries, noted that "Canadian

diplomats must find a way to overcome the differing viewpoints of CIDA officials and

military officers working together in Kandahar and Kabul" (2008: 5). They also note

another challenge for diplomats. Since Glyn Berry, the Canadian PRT's first Political

Director, was killed by a car bomb in 2006, Political Directors have been confined to

secure military bases. The current Director does not see that situation changing for the

"foreseeable future" (Schmitz and Phillips 2008: 4-5). "As a result, diplomacy falls to

Canadian Forces units such as the CIMIC Team (Schmitz and Phillips 2008: 5). This

situation with two of the main players (DND and CIDA) in our whole of government

approach in a seeming state of disagreement and the other (DFAIT) rendered less than

effective on the ground does not bode well for the success of the approach as it is

currently envisioned.

In practice, one of the main problems with both of the Canadian and American

examples of the whole of government approach is that the principle of unity of command,

or more plainly the need to report to and take direction from a single source, is missing.

The IPS does not explain the coordination and control relationships and, to be fair, it may

not be the place of a policy document to explain that. Nevertheless, the evidence from

Afghanistan shows that this principle, so critical to integration, has been neglected. One

example concerns the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan or SAT-A. The SAT-A is

a group of military professionals that work at the diplomatic strategic level advising the

Afghan government. Although it works at the diplomatic level, it works 'in consultation'

with the Canadian ambassador and falls under the military chain of command. Further,

as it works in support of the Afghan government, "its activities are therefore determined

by the Afghan government rather than the Canadian Embassy in Kabul" (Schmitz and

Phillips 2008: 5). There is also potential for friction concerning the PRT which reports to

NATO and receives priorities through that chain. This weakens the whole of government

approach because the Political Director is "subject to the will of (Regional Command

South's Committee)…and therefore does not have a free hand in determining the

priorities and activities of the Kandahar PRT (Schmitz and Phillips 2008: 6). Unity of

command is an issue that also plagues the American PRTs in Afghanistan with the House

Armed Services Committee stating that the "lack of unity of command (was) resulting in

a lack of unity of effort" (2008: 20).

> *The bottom line, however, is that until PRTs receive consistent and clear direction from higher headquarters, they will not be able to maximize their efforts or judge their success. In this environment, resources cannot be programmed or applied effectively. The heroic tactical work being done by PRTs will go for naught without more coherent strategic and operational level guidance and oversight. In the absence of such guidance and oversight, resources, instead of supporting strategic agility, may be poorly prioritized and coordinated and, in some case, squandered* (United States 2008: 28).

While whole of government may, on the surface, look like integration in practice and

even in theory, it has a number of flaws. A reading of the IPS beyond the Defence

section continues to illuminate those.

DFAIT's section, 'Diplomacy', seeks to carve out a leadership role for DFAIT in

the development of whole of government strategies. (DFAIT 2005b: 30). Heather

Hrychuk notes that "(u)nfortunately, such leadership may be detrimental to the integrated

approach itself, through creating an imbalance of influence during policy development

(2007: 34). The prime example of this problem is the Stabilization and Reconstruction

Task Force (START) which, according to Hrychuk, "was to be the primary creator of whole of government strategy" (2007: 35). START includes an interdepartmental advisory board that facilitates integration. This board attempts to draw on members of DND, CIDA as well as officials from the RCMP, Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada and the Privy Council Office. "Unfortunately, the dominance of the foreign ministry has resulted in officials from other departments regarding START as more a creature of FAC (DFAIT) than a genuine, interagency, decision-making body (Hrychuk 2007: 37). While the diplomacy section of the IPS leaves unanswered questions with respect to the leadership and coordination of the integration effort, the development section issued by CIDA is even more confusing.

CIDA does not refer to the 3D approach in their section. "How can 3D partners work together cooperatively to achieve common goals when one actor neglects to even acknowledge that concept?" (Hrychuk 2007:37). A whole of government approach is used twice in the section but the other government departments referenced on these occasions are Justice, Health, Heritage, Immigration and Environment. Hrychuk rightly notes that Defence and Foreign Affairs are not mentioned and that is an indicator of CIDA's "level of discomfort with the 3D concept" (2007: 38). Underpinning the whole of government approach is the idea that security and development are linked. This is also why the military devotes significant effort to development issues, albeit short-term ones. For its part, CIDA in an attempt to preserve humanitarian space, a concept that will be explored later in this paper, has devoted no energy toward the security pillar and has a preference for remaining at arms length from the military (Hrychuk 2007: 60). Although CIDA is making strides towards closer cooperation with the Canadian Forces, it "has

made large monetary contributions to the Afghan government…" (Hrychuk 2007: 125).

While CIDA's preference for donating directly to the Afghan government may be correct

from a long-term development point of view, it "removes the need to coordinate,

collaborate or cooperate with the military or Foreign Affairs" (Hrychuk 2007: 125).

There are those who would agree with CIDA from a development perspective as a whole

of government approach can unintentionally increase the exclusion of the UN and local

people (Sarich and Kishbaugh 2006:: 4). Taken together, CIDA's reluctance to work

with its primary whole of government partners on the ground and its failure to mention

them in its section of the IPS indicates that CIDA is less than supportive of whole of

government (Hrychuk 2007: 125). Further, the fact that CIDA was the only one of the

three partners to print a disclaimer on the cover of their section stating that it was not an

official document gives one the impression that it was written under duress.

In her conclusion, Hrychuk makes excellent points with respect to Canada's

whole of government approach. As other commentators have noted, development should

not be driven by the national agendas of the troop contributing nations. With twenty-six

PRTs being operated in Afghanistan by fourteen different nations, a Canada centred

approach may be detrimental for Afghan development as a whole if it differs from the

approaches of the other thirteen nations. Hrychuk introduces the idea of a 'whole of

alliance' approach as our success in that distant land will likely depend on the approaches

of our allies (2007: 136). As we have seen, NATO does not have an overall development

strategy (Manley) and lacks the apparatus to deliver one. The UN's integrated missions

concept, as immature as it may be, begins to look very comforting by way of comparison.

CHAPTER 3

The United Nations

The organization and structure of the UN will be examined here as it is important to gain an understanding of the chief alternative to NATO in terms of strengths and limitations. The United Nations was established on the 24th of October 1945 with the intent of saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of war" (United Nations 1945: Preamble). The principle organs of the UN are the Security Council, the General Assembly, The Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat (United Nations 1945: Chap III).

All member states of the UN are represented in the General Assembly. They are represented on the principle of 'one state, one vote' (Gareis and Varwick 2005: 23). The General Assembly is not a world government, but rather a forum for international cooperation and, for the most part, its work takes place in its six main committees which are: disarmament and international security; economic and financial issues; social humanitarian and cultural affairs; special political questions and issues of decolonization; administrative and budgetary affairs internal to the organization; and legal issues (Gareis and Varwick 2005: 23, 26).

The Security Council is the primary body that deals with threats to international peace and security. "As such, the Security Council has reserved the authority to mandate and terminate UN peacekeeping operations (Meharg 2006: 35). The Security Council usually tasks the Secretary-General to prepare a plan to deal with the crisis and is the approving authority for that plan. The Security Council may either decide to take action

or refer the matter to the General Assembly for consideration. The Security Council does not have to demand the information in all cases. Matters may be brought before it by the Secretary-General, the General Assembly or by individual members of the Council itself (Bellamy *et al* 2004: 47). The Secretary-General is responsible to the Security Council for the organization, conduct, and direction of UN peacekeeping operations. The Security Council consists of five permanent members (P5)[3] as well as ten non-permanent members who are elected to their position by the General Assembly for two-year terms (Gareis and Varwick 2005: 27). The P5 hold veto power and a total of nine affirmative votes, barring any veto, are required for a motion to pass in the Security Council (Diehl 1994: 23).

Once a mission has been approved by the Security Council and given to the Secretary-General the planning of that mission falls to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). DPKO was established in 1992 to deal with the greater number and greater complexity of the missions since the early 1990s (Bellamy *et* al 2004: 49). In particular, DPKO is charged with "responsibility for the planning, preparation, conduct and direction of all United Nations field operations…" (Meharg 2006: 37). The following diagram depicts the UN and its major bodies and agencies.

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[3] The P5 are the United States of America, the United Kingdom, The People's Republic of China, Russia and France.

Figure 3.1 - The UN and its Agencies.
Source: Meharg (2006)

Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter as that document hinged on the idea of collective security. Collective security is a concept that sees all nations (or at least signatories of the Charter) unite against the any aggressor state, regardless of friendships or alliances. The idea was ahead of its time and the divisions of the Cold War quickly made it unworkable. Nevertheless, the UN, though the evolving concept of peacekeeping and its various civilian agencies has continued to find relevance despite the numerous challenges that it has faced over the years. With respect to breaches of the peace, chapters VI, VII and VIII are especially applicable.

Chapter VI refers to the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes". In that Chapter, Art 33 states that parties which endanger peace and security should seek a solution by

negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their choice. Art. 34 gives the Security Council powers to investigate. Chapter VII refers to "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and acts of Aggression". In accordance with Art. 39 the Security Council determines the threat to the peace and what shall be done. Under Art. 41, the Security Council can call upon members to apply non military efforts such as disrupting economic relations, rail, sea, air, communications and diplomatic relations. Should the provisions and actions of Art 41 not be enough, action by military force may be necessary including demonstrations, blockade, or operations under art. 42. Members agree to contribute to such a force or offer rights of passage or aid under Art 43 (United Nations 1945).

In general, the cooperative measures used for securing peace are contained in Chapter VI and the coercive measures are found in Chapter VII. The concept of the use of force is important to the UN and to the notion of collective peace and security that emerged out of the Second World War because of the League of Nations experience. Under the league, the mechanisms for employing force were weak. "There [was] enough ambiguity in the language of the articles and sufficient political reasons to believe that the military actions would be loosely coordinated national efforts undertaken by the major powers with the approval of the League" (Diehl 1994:16). The League limited itself largely to the types of actions found in Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. "…when it came to the use of force, the United Nations had both the rationale and the mechanisms to take collective action" (Diehl 1994: 22). A discussion on the use of force is essential to any consideration of modern peacekeeping. Many of peacekeeping's detractors claim that the

UN's reluctance to use force in the face of a determined opposition and memories of events such as the fall of Srebrenica drive that debate. The utility of force, one of the considerations that must be weighed if Canada is to view peacekeeping as a viable option will be examined in Chapter 4.

The end of the Cold War changed much of the context in which the UN operated. Gone was much of the rancour and deadlock that had plagued the Security Council, but also gone was much of the stability and predictability that the Cold War dynamic had created. UN peacekeeping was, at that time, very much a product of that Cold War dynamic and the UN, in the face of a 'new world order' looked to reform itself and its concept of peacekeeping.   In 1992, in response to the need to respond to the requirements of the complex type of peacekeeping that was evolving, the UN created the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). DPKO was charged with the responsibility to plan manage deploy and support all UN peacekeeping operations and provide executive direction on behalf of the Secretary-General (United Nations 2003: 3). As we have seen, classical, interpositional peacekeeping gave way to more complex forms.   UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote his *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* in 1995 and in examining the new security paradigm he said that the methods of dealing with the new security challenges were "preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, peacekeeping: peacebuilding: disarmament, sanctions; and peace enforcement"[4](Boutros-Ghali 1995).

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[4] Boutros-Ghali's use of the term peace making in this context refers to diplomatic efforts rather than the use of armed force.

In August of 2000 the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations led by former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi examined the changing nature of conflict and the UN's efforts to keep pace. Widely known as the *Brahimi Report*, it was unusually frank and direct (Gareis and Varwick 2005: 227). The Panel made a total of 57 recommendations from the strategic to the tactical level (United Nations 2000). Brahimi examined both the successes and the failures of the 1990's and his recommendations have changed the face of UN peacekeeping. Some of the main recommendations are as follows:

‹ The international community must ensure that peacekeeping is the most appropriate response.

‹ There must be a willingness on the part of the belligerents to stop fighting.

‹ Peacekeeping is only part of the solution and must be coupled with integrated solutions that include the UN and other organisations.

‹ There must be a stated objective and a clear mandate.

‹ The security Council must ensure that the mandate can be achieved by closing the mandate means gap.

‹ There must be a rapid deployment of capability.

‹ Impartiality and Neutrality are not the same thing and confusing the two "can amount to a policy of appeasement". Impartiality should be in respect to the mandate and not the warring parties because the UN needs to be able to distinguish victims from aggressors.

‹   Peacekeeping forces must be able to apply appropriate force in order to "defend themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate" (United Nations 2000).

Actioning the recommendations of the *Brahimi Report* has been a priority of the UN. The report laid the groundwork for modern peacekeeping in many ways. One of the key recommendations that spoke directly to the relationship of security and development was the call to establish an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF). The report noted the lack of an integrated planning capacity in DPKO to bring together functions such as political analysis, military and police operations, human rights, development, humanitarian action and all of the other elements that make up an integrated, coordinated response (United Nations 2000: 34). The IMTF would be what the military would call a reach-back capability – the one place that mission elements could call for expert assistance drawn from across the UN family and a mirror of the mission's own integrated make-up. (United Nations 2000: 35).

Later, Boutros-Ghali's successor, Kofi Anan, created the High-Level Panel on threats Challenges and Change to examine the world's new security situation and to make recommendations for the UN. With many of the restrictions of the Cold War removed, the UN was able to look at re-establishing one of its original purposes which was to "…take effective collective measures for the *prevention and removal*[5] of threats to the peace, …" (United Nations Charter 1945: Chap 1, Art 1). The Panel's report – *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* viewed threats from a perspective that understood the roots of human conflict and included among those threats poverty, large-scale human rights abuses, decease as well as terrorism and international crime (United

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[5] Emphasis added.

Nations 2004: 14-15). One of the chief recommendations of the Report was the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Support Office (United Nations 2004: 83-84). This recommendation was made specifically with respect to internal conflicts and the Panel noted that the capability gap created by the absence of a Peacebuilding Commission in the UN's Charter should come as no surprise as that document was drafted with interstate conflicts in mind. The Gap the Panel referred to was that "there is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid state collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace" (United Nations 2004: 83). The Peacebuilding Support Office was recommended as an instrument to enable this new capability. In recommending the Office, the Panel stated that its creation would "ensure that the Secretary-General is able to integrate system wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations" (United Nations 2004: 84). This is exactly the type of integration and coordination mechanism, or the how as opposed to the what, that is missing from Canada's current whole of government approach. *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all,* a report written by Kofi Anan, recommended the Peacebuilding Commission to the General Assembly and the commission was established by Security Council Resolution 1645 in 2005 (Enoh-Eben 2008: 1).

The purpose of the Commission is to gather the resources of the international community and to "advise and propose integrated strategies for post conflict recovery, focusing attention on reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development, in countries emerging from conflict" (Enoh-Eben 2008: 1-2).

Integration of Capabilities

Owing to political situations, resource limitations and varying degrees of national will, there is the possibility of integrating a UN peacekeeping force with the force of a regional organisation such as NATO or the African Union (AU). Partnering with the AU, the UN's response in the Darfur region of Sudan is an example. It has been argued that the UN is often the best option for missions that employ less than 20,000 troops and that regional organisations such as NATO or the EU are better at coordinating the actions of larger bodies of soldiers. While the pure numbers perspective is overly simplistic as it does not take into account such critical variables as mandate, intent, use of force and impartiality, the assessment does point to the fact that placing troops under either NATO or UN command presents different options in the policy tool box and that nations that would discard either option out of hand would be short-sighted and limiting themselves unnecessarily.

Integrated approaches are needed to help a mission transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Kofi Anan's report *In Larger Freedom* noted that "Deploying peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces may be essential in terminating conflicts but are not sufficient for long-tern recovery" (United Nations 2005). In fact, UN research has determined that roughly half of all countries that emerge from conflict lapse back into violence within five years. The road to lasting peace may be different in each circumstance but that is why integrated approaches are so important. They can determine what a sustainable peace would look like and then tailor the response so that people at the tactical and operational levels know what to do and have the tools available to do it. The Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office were created to help in that

determination and enable the integration of the many actors needed to transition to lasting peace. We have just looked at the evolution of thinking relating to peacekeeping within the UN, now let us turn to the evolution of peacekeeping itself.

The Evolution of Peacekeeping

We often cannot agree on whether peacekeeping is relevant because we cannot agree on what it is. Certainly commentary that peacekeeping is an outdated concept because Canadians cannot have their soldiers standing between warring factions, taking fire, and not being able to do anything about it is not helpful because peacekeeping has evolved significantly since the dark days of the early 1990's. It is only by determining what peacekeeping is - what modern peacekeeping has become that we can make rational decisions concerning whether it is still relevant for Canada. "…[A] universally accepted definition of the term "peacekeeping" does not exist" (Meharg 2006: 59). Diehl argues that "[i]t may be that the term *peacekeeping* is used in so many different ways because it is not mentioned in the U.N. Charter (as are collective security and other approaches to peace) and because the strategy has evolved out of ad hoc responses to various crises" (1994: 13). Diehl goes on to define the term more narrowly by limiting it to actions where "neutral and lightly armed interposition forces…are deployed…" (1994: 13). In fact this term, which has come to mean so much and so little to many, may be anachronistic. Today, peacekeeping is often used in contexts where there is no peace to keep. The term is used as a euphemism for various forms of conflict resolution and even war fighting; the U.S. troops who invaded Grenada were called peacekeepers (Diehl 1994: 4). Neither the Government of Canada nor NATO has defined peacekeeping (the NATO glossary omits both peacekeeping and peace support operations (PSO)). In

Canada's case it may be that when dealing with a term that is steeped in politics and emotion the national will may be best served by adopting the broadest definition possible, and choosing not to define peacekeeping would accomplish that end. Yet, anachronistic though it may be, there is value in retaining the term. The notion of peacekeeping evokes feelings of pride in Canadians so a use of the term may garner support for foreign policy initiatives – at least in the short-term. The key will be to define the term in such a way that it has practical value or leads to success in the field. The U.N. definition – "Peacekeeping is the deployment of international military and civilian personnel to an area of conflict, with the consent of the parties to the conflict, in order to: (a) stop or contain the hostilities, or (b) supervise the carrying out of a peace agreement" (Meharg 2006: 59), is too narrow in that it seeks in a way to preserve the status quo without attempting to solve the issues at the root of the conflict. While the definition refers to both military and civilian personnel, it does not sufficiently highlight the multi-disciplinary approach that is so often required for conflict resolution. A better working definition would be – peacekeeping is a form of conflict resolution with international legitimacy that seeks to achieve peace, security and good relations between peoples through the cooperative actions of national, international and non-aligned groups with an interest in security, stability and the betterment of the human condition. This definition is very similar to one used by Alex Morrison of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre when he said that peacekeeping is "actions designed to enhance international peace, security and stability, which are authorized by competent national and international organizations, and which are undertaken cooperatively and individually by military, humanitarian, good governance, civilian police and other interested agencies and groups." (Morrison 1999).

Regardless of how we define it, peacekeeping has come along way from the days of classical, lightly armed interpositional forces. Modern peacekeeping is complex, multi-disciplinary and often seeks to solve the roots of conflict. To borrow a turn of phrase from Oldsmobile – this is not your father's peacekeeping. With that in mind, it is worth looking at how the concept has evolved, and more importantly, what it has become, before making any recommendations on whether the concept holds relevance as a Canadian foreign policy tool.

The Cold War dynamic put into play a number of conditions that led to the birth of traditional peacekeeping forces in response to the Suez Crisis in 1956. This form of peacekeeping involved observation, monitoring and most importantly, the interposition of lightly armed forces between the warring parties. Traditional peacekeeping usually prevented the recommencement of the war because: a ceasefire or peace agreement had already been reached; the belligerents were usually member states of the United Nations who would not risk a blow to their international credibility stemming from aggressive action against a peacekeeping force; and they had the support of their superpower patron. The Cold War introduced an atmosphere of artificial stability that collapsed with the Berlin Wall.

As we have seen, in the aftermath of the Cold War, conflict was often intra-state and involved non-state and rogue actors with no regard for conventions or the symbolic presence of the United Nations. The limitations of traditional peacekeeping with its adherence to the principles of consent, impartiality and minimum force were sharply illuminated; other solutions were needed. Throughout the 1990's the United Nations

worked to evolve the concept of peacekeeping. 'Wider Peacekeeping'[6] of the type found

in Bosnia under UNPROFOR and in Rwanda emerged in the early 1990s. Wider

Peacekeeping, in addition to taking place under chaotic conditions where fighting was

ongoing, distinguished itself from Traditional Peacekeeping by the inclusion of additional

tasks such as delivering humanitarian aid, protecting freedom of movement and

protection of people. Wider Peacekeeping should be seen not as an innovation but as the

result of ever broadening mandates without the corresponding increase in means to action

them. The issue of consent was important in discussions of Wider Peacekeeping and if

excessive use of coercive force violated that consent one could be said to have crossed

the "Mogadishu Line" into Peace Enforcement and the mission would fail (Bellamy *et al,*

2006: 132). Bellamy *et al* view Wider Peacekeeping as "an *ad hoc* response to the 'new

wars'" (2006: 144). In many ways it is a Westphalian response with post-Westphalian

intent.

Peace Enforcement, as the name suggests, is the enforcement of the will of the

Security Council by military means (Bellamy *et al*, 2006: 146). These types of missions

require a robust combat capability as well as permissive rules of engagement and

effective command, control and communications throughout the force. For these reasons,

the United Nations has normally mandated the action and handed the operation to a lead

nation for execution. For reasons of capacity and political expediency this lead nation is

normally the United States. The relationship between the U.S. and the U.N. on the issue

of peace enforcement has generated both practical and theoretical problems. From a

practical point of view, the U.S. has, on a number of occasions, exceeded the mandate

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[6] A doctrinal concept of peacekeeping developed by the British Army and no longer in use. It referred to missions such as UNPROFOR in the early 1990's that were given wider mandates and more tasks to perform than had been the norm under traditional peacekeeping.

given by the Security Council for reasons of national interest (Bellamy *et al*, 2006: 150).

This creates obvious credibility problems for the U.N. Theoretically, there are significant

questions concerning the ethics of post-Westphalian interventions and of whether the

Security Council should be imposing its will on nations through the use of force (Bellamy

et al, 2006: 162). There have been charges that these types of 'peacekeepers', and these

charges extend to other missions with robust ROE and/or capacity building features, are

nothing more than "the colonial officers of the so-called 'new empire'" (Humanitarian

organization quoted in Meharg & Marks, 2007: 30). The imposition of western values on

other parts of the world is a source of conflict itself. The U.N. missions in Somalia are

examples of Peace Enforcement.

One of the later evolutions of peacekeeping is Peace Support Operations (PSO).

These normally involve a robust multi-national force, sometimes acting on behalf of the

U.N. and a significant civilian component (Bellamy *et al*, 2006: 165). PSO is a merger of

the concepts and tasks of Wider Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and the U.N.'s

experience in managing transitions. The approach attempts to overcome the difficulties

associated with each individual concept. They are not perfect. One significant problem

is that an established organization such as NATO or a nation such as the U.S. must often

take the lead and this leads again to the force pushing a western liberal approach at

people who are possibly unwilling or unready to receive it. This is the same criticism

leveled by humanitarians when they speak of colonialism and the new empire. Although

PSOs close the mandate-means gap, they often do not do it with Blue Helmets but rely on

regional organizations such as NATO or the African Union. The following diagram from

Bellamy *et al* (2004: 145) adds perspective to the discussion on consent as it related to

the need for combat capability, and from this point of view, highlighting the problems with Wider Peacekeeping.


Figure 3.2 – Consent vs. Capability
Source: Bellamy et al (2004)

Integrated Missions

While many of the Western nations have been involved with PSOs such as IFOR/SFOR and ISAF during the last decade, the U.N. has been re-inventing its approach to peacekeeping and conflict resolution; the result has been the emergence of Integrated Missions where the functions of security, development and humanitarianism are centrally integrated and coordinated (United Nations 2006: 3). Throughout the 1990s, the focus of the UN shifted from the maintenance of the s*tatus quo* to managing transitions and peace building (Eide, *et al*, 2005:10).   Once the artificial constraints and supports of the Cold War were removed, the strong linkages between peace, security and development became apparent. In the days of Traditional Peacekeeping, peacekeepers, developers and humanitarians seldom crossed paths, now they inhabit the same space and coordination is essential to ensure that their efforts are mutually supporting, or at least not

working at cross purposes.   Experience in Rwanda has shown that poorly coordinated aid can do more harm than good and can even fuel the conflict[7] (Weir, 2006: 14).

As we have seen, there are many nations and organizations that are working on whole of government or comprehensive approaches. A recent seminar in Brussels examined the work of three major organizations in this field, the UN, NATO and the European Union (EU). It was noted that the UN had been evolving its integrated missions concept in operations and that at the time, the UN was a major player in 20 of 28 conflicts in the world. It was noted that the UN "brings the full panoply of tools" to address conflict and that "the integrated missions concept (was) the most advanced and best tested approach to the management of multidimensional and integrated peace support operations" (Nagelhus Schia and Ulriksen 2007: 9).

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[7] This is a reference to aid manipulation in refugee camps as well as stolen aid that was used directly in support of the conflict. The lesson is that while aid may be given in a neutral and independent manner, it always operates in a politicized context (Weir 2006: 14)

CHAPTER 4

Peacekeeping as an Alternative – the Pros and Cons

What if Canada made a return to peacekeeping? Would that reduce our military to a constabulary force? What of our relationship with NATO? This chapter will examine some of the reasons why Canada should include UN multi-dimensional and integrated missions in what we do and some of the main arguments against. For the most part, the arguments will pertain to a generic situation; however, the situation in Afghanistan will also be covered.

Engaging in UN peacekeeping should not mean abandoning commitments to NATO or refusing to take part in NATO operations because they are too 'war-like'. Until recently, Canada maintained the capability to conduct two, albeit much smaller than our current one, out of country missions simultaneously. This is the commitment that Steven Staples is referring to when speaks of a deal between General Rick Hillier and then Prime Minister Paul Martin (2006: 21). Too often, when we argue for or against something it becomes a case of all or nothing. This is not referring to our commitment to Afghanistan and Staples' contention that the military broke a promise – in that case, unforeseen circumstances required the resources for both 'potential' missions to be committed to one area, leaving nothing in reserve. This argument is more conceptual. Canada does not have to make a choice between NATO and UN-led operations. Nor should we have soldiers or academics stating that "the days of (insert out of vogue concept here) are gone – if a type of commitment can achieve Canada's aims and objectives, it should remain in the tool box. This all or nothing argument concerning the UN and NATO runs parallel to the argument concerning Canada's interests and values.

We have both. If a construct such as UN peacekeeping stands a good chance of operational success and can serve both our interests and our values why would we not do it? Can peacekeeping serve the national interest? Sean Maloney argues that we acted purely in our interest when we engaged in peacekeeping to preserve superpower peace during the Cold War (2001: 31). Is it possible that peacekeeping could serve our interests again?

The Peacekeeping Terrorism Link

If it seemed as though the Western nations had abandoned UN peacekeeping in the late 1990's, there could be no doubt as they joined coalitions of the willing led by the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks: the moral outrage was palpable and something had to be done. Canada was no exception. Initially, the Chrétien Government offered its high readiness battalion, the Third Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) to ISAF which at that time was a British-led peace support operation in Kabul. The British, cognisant of the difficulties with creating a mandate-means gap decided to avoid that problem by geographically restricting the mandate to Kabul, rather than increasing the means. They turned down Canada's offer of troops as 3 PPCLI was seen as bringing the same capability as British forces and there would have been a risk of "geographically widening the mission" (Bellamy *et al* 2004: 182). 3 PPCLI then was offered to and subsequently joined operation Enduring Freedom in Kandahar in 2002 (Bellamy *et al* 2004: 182). There have been criticisms of this early version of ISAF in that it allowed a separation between itself and Enduring Freedom and therefore, at least at the outset, allowed the United States to distance itself from the task of reconstructing Afghanistan (Bellamy *et al* 2004: 182). Regardless, in its need to show

solidarity with the United States and to assist in ridding the world of terrorists that had killed over 3000 people, some of them Canadians, Canada crossed a conceptual line in the sand and moved from peacekeeping to offensive operations – to some extent, we remain there today. This either/or approach has led many to believe that peacekeeping is longer relevant in the modern world. The doctrine that one cannot negotiate with terrorists has grown from incidents of airline highjackings to now encompass entire insurgencies. Is there a link or a place for modern peacekeeping in today's unstable world? The UN certainly has no direct experience in combating terrorism. "Theoretically and practically, those two types of activities appear to be fundamentally different" (Tardy: 2004: 25). Thierry Tardy, a faculty member at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, argues that peace operations in places such as Sierra Leone and the Congo share "few common features with the questions raised by terrorism" (Tardy: 2004: 26). He continues to argue, though, that there is an indirect link in that peace operations are often deployed to so-called failed and failing states and that these are "fertile grounds as well as possible havens for terrorist groups" (Tardy: 2004: 26). Ramesh Thakur, the Senior Vice Rector of the United Nations University and an Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations states that "defeating international terrorism requires both military and police action, and nation-building…" (Thakur 2006:199). Terrorism and conflict often share a common root so, intuitively, the prevention of one may *de facto* prevent the other. Tardy notes that the two themes of conflict prevention and peacebuilding make up two of Brahimi's three elements of peace operations (Tardy: 2004: 26). The Report of the Policy Working Group on the UN and Terrorism stated that "Operational prevention is relevant because any measures that

alleviate crisis and prevent armed conflicts from developing or expanding could lower the likelihood that terrorist acts…would occur" (Tardy: 2004: 27). Peacebuilding has a place here as the aim is "a sustainable peace in which terrorism will have less cause to breed and grow" (Tardy: 2004: 27). Tardy argues that this approach should cause nations to re-evaluate peacebuilding operations from a cost /benefit perspective because if peacebuilding operations were seen as contributing to the fight against terrorism, nations may see some strategic importance in the role (Tardy: 2004: 28). Seen in this light, this relationship between peacekeeping and terrorism may answer two questions of strategic importance to Canada: what does Canada get from participating in peacekeeping, and is peacekeeping still relevant for Canada? Beyond the optics of being a responsible global citizen, it is argued that peace building operations with this intent are directly related to Canada's national interest. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno has stated that:

> *Until 11 September 2001, the interest for areas of crisis, where states are failing from the inside, was primary [sic] a humanitarian concern: we were thinking about the populations of those countries, that are always the first victims: we did not realise that this humanitarian concern is also a security imperative, and that stabilisation of these areas by peacekeeping operations is a strategic necessity* (Tardy: 2004: 28).

What this means for Canada is that peacekeeping, in the right context, remains a viable policy option as it provides a method to deal with the root causes of conflict and by extension, many of the root causes of terrorism. In addition to being in our interest for reasons of security, Bellamy *et al* note that Canada has established a reputation as a willing and able peacekeeper and that "international prestige and moral weight at the UN and beyond" has been the result of efforts in the field of peacekeeping (2004: 52).

Use of Force in Modern Peacekeeping

The enduring image that many Canadian Forces officers have of peacekeeping is one of UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia. It was an operation that was mandated to protect people but not permitted to use measures of coercive force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Soldiers can remember not being able to legally protect people because their overly restrictive rules of engagement would not let them or they were too lightly armed. The fall of Srebrenica, thankfully not a Canadian experience, stands out as the best example of such a scenario. Rupert Smith describes the placement of so many lightly armed peacekeepers amidst the warring parties as "strategically unsustainable and tactically inept" (2005: 4). Who would want to return to that?

As a result of some high-profile situations involving the use of force, or more appropriately the lack of it, the Brahimi report examined the issue. The result of that examination is a new understanding concerning the use of force. The panel concluded that more robust rules of engagement were needed to defend the mission, the mandate and those who peacekeepers were sent to protect (United Nations 2000: 9). Specifically regarding the use of restrictive rules of engagement, the Panel said that those rules "should not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers" in particularly dangerous situations (United Nations 2000: 9). This last comment refers to rules of engagement that required UN soldiers to be actually shot at before they could resort to deadly force; by that time of course, it could be too late. In the end, Brahimi recommended robust rules of engagement, realistic and achievable mandates and peacekeeping forces with the actual capability and international will to carry them out.

The 2004 High-Level Panel on Treats Challenges and Change advanced the notion of the use of force by UN peacekeepers further.

The Panel asked the question "What happens if peaceful prevention fails?" (United Nations 2004: 61) and determined that in cases where states needed to act in self defence, where states carried out acts of aggression and where states were unable or unwilling to protect their own people, the UN Charter – "properly understood and applied, is equal to the task." In considering whether the UN should authorize the use of force, the Panel developed five criteria of legitimacy that included the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose for the use of force, last resort, proportional means and the balance of consequences (United Nations 2004: 67). The Panel also endorsed the principle of the right to protect, R2P (United Nations 2004: 66), a cause that was championed by Canada.

"The experience of a number of UN- or NATO-led peacekeeping missions has shown that a force with deterrent effect against potential disturbers of the peace becomes involved in far fewer combat situations and is more successful in fulfilling its mandate than does a poorly armed force with convoluted rules of engagement" (Gareis and Varwick 2005: 228). The UN has evolved its thinking concerning the use of force since the days that Canada was deployed to Cyprus and with UNPROFOR. The judicious use of force is now a part of UN peacekeeping doctrine and arguments that state that UN peacekeeping is irrelevant or ineffective because it does not allow deterrent force are out of date.

Integrated Missions and the Diminishment of Humanitarian Space

Overall, there is a general acceptance that Integrated Missions are the way of the future for the UN (Eide, *et al*, 2005:16), but they are surrounded by great controversy because they aim to "pursue the *partial* engagement of peacebuilding while at the same time to provide humanitarian assistance in ways that [are] *impartial*" (Eide, *et al*, 2005:11). The UN approaches integrated missions from three broad perspectives: the restoration of stability; the protection of civilians; and the provision of the "foundations for long-term recovery, development and democratic government" (Eide, *et al*, 2005:12). The merging of these perspectives results in different points of view, priorities and tensions. Conceptually, peacekeepers and developers share much common ground. Stabilization will dissolve into conflict if transitional and development efforts are not planned and put into place (Eide, *et al*, 2005:13). In practice, the UN is building a real track record of success in this area with Namibia, Nicaragua, East Timor and Kosovo being some of the obvious examples. The real tensions occur between the humanitarians and the others attached to the mission. Humanitarian actors (within and outside of the UN system) base their actions on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (Weir, 2006: 21-22). It is very difficult to reconcile these principles with political and often partial activities necessary for peacebuilding, yet "those humanitarian actors within the UN are part of a system which, in its peacebuilding pursuits, is deeply political" (Eide, *et al*, 2005:13). Some humanitarians believe that association, let alone integration, with the military and development actors will identify them with the political mission and put them and their recipient populations at risk. They speak of humanitarian space, a conceptual bubble of safety created by their guiding principles and now invaded

by integrated missions and militaries fighting 'three block wars'. Fine tuning is required. While there must be efforts to address the very real concerns of the humanitarian community, it will be argued that Integrated Missions are not the root cause of the diminishment of humanitarian space and that, in fact, they represent an opportunity to solve present concerns.

Humanitarian space is more than just area. Many would argue that it is not about area at all, but that it is a concept that allows humanitarians the freedom of action to carry on with their work in a safe, impartial and independent manner (Forster:2005). Safety, impartiality and independence are three of the more important areas where integration runs afoul with the humanitarian community. The ICRC occupies a special place in that community. They are the organization that holds most purely to the four humanitarian principles and their ethic and resources ensure that they will remain this way. The ICRC is also the International Organization (IO) that is a key holder of humanitarian law. Although the humanitarian community cannot in any way be considered homogeneous, the ICRC's position allows it to speak with authority on issues related to humanitarian space. In May of 2005 the ICRC's Vice-President, Jacques Forster, delivered an official statement that gave the ICRC perspective on Integrated Missions. Summing up the chief concern of the ICRC and others he says, "the main risk I see for humanitarian action in general is its integration – willing or otherwise – into a political and military strategy to defeat the enemy. In other words, the subordination of humanitarian activities to political goals, using aid as a tool for local or foreign policy" (Forster, 2005). Forster goes on to say that there are real security risks when insurgents believe that humanitarians are part of a foreign agenda, or in the worst and very contemporary case, as "part of a Western

conspiracy against Islam" (Forster, 2005). These are serious and legitimate concerns but before the international community begins to question the rationale behind integration it is essential that we determine if anything can be done, short of failing to integrate humanitarianism, to resolve the paradox. Additionally, it is worth asking if Integrated Missions are the root cause of the potential evaporation of humanitarian space. Forster does concede that there are advantages to the integrated approach in that humanitarian action is not a substitute for sustainable political action and that integration is useful for avoiding conflicts of interest and promoting dialogue. Lastly he concedes that, due to scale and poor security conditions, the military is sometimes welcome in relief operations. Forster makes no specific recommendations but leaves the door open to constructive dialogue. That dialogue will be important and the Integrated Mission concept may provide both the impetus and the vehicle for achieving it.

Many observers have noted the erosion of humanitarian space but not all agree that integration is the cause. The changing dynamic at the end of the Cold War brought more than a change in peacekeeping responses. Intra-state conflicts had more of a direct impact on civilian populations. The rules of conflict were changing or at least were being ignored – aid workers and UN peacekeepers were becoming targets (Weir, 2006: 8). Much of what is driving conflict today is international terrorism. Terrorists make a point of deliberately targeting civilians of which humanitarian workers are an obvious sub-group. Another point that has been raised is that humanitarian groups are facing more directed violence, not because they are humanitarians, but because they are Western and that it is not so much the notion of humanitarian space that is threatened but the Western model of humanitarian action (Safe Democracy Foundation, 2005). Although not

mentioned explicitly, the concept of humanitarian space rests on the framework that is the body of international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions, once used to identify combatant from non-combatant and to protect civilians from the more direct effects of warfare are being ignored by many of today's belligerents. Because they are not state entities, they are not signatories to those conventions and in many ways, see them as rules of the Western world (Rupen Das in Meharg & Marks, 2007: 33).

What we can take from all of this is that it is not simply humanitarian space that is disappearing. The Western way of war that gave birth to humanitarian space is disappearing as well. The law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law are under the same assault as the one directed at humanitarian space. This is not to suggest that the West or anyone else abandon those laws for to do that would be to turn our back on everything that we stand for, but it is necessary to understand that this is the environment facing peacebuilding and humanitarian operations in many places on the globe.

While it is too simplistic to say that Integrated Missions are responsible for the diminishment of humanitarian space, it is also not fair to say that they do not have any impact on the issue. There is no one templated structure for an Integrated Mission and in fact the team that submitted the "Report on Integrated Missions" for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group argued against one, believing that form should follow function (Eide *et al*, 2005: 17). That said, a common practice is the 'double-hatting' of one official as both the Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) (Weir, 2006: 13). The RC is explicitly political (Weir, 2006: 13). Certainly, with something as conceptual as humanitarian space, perceptions are important, and the perception of a

Western agenda, whether due to an integrated concept or to the fact that the organization itself is Western could lead to damaging results. There is some recent evidence that independence, as a concept for gaining space, is working. In January of 2006, many UN and *associated* NGO compounds were attacked and looted in the Cote d'Ivoire. The Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) compound was untouched and it has been suggested that this is because MSF scrupulously kept its independence from the political components of the mission (Weir, 2006: 24). In contrast, the bombing of the ICRC Headquarters in Baghdad is a reminder that not even the most independent are safe.

According to Erin Weir, a Research Associate at the Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Training Centre, the realities are that: most 'independent' groups are dependent on UN missions for some sort of support; many humanitarian agencies are engaging in development and so are overlapping with UN mandates; and coordination is not desirable but necessary. She argues that in failing states, the UN may be the only organisation to affect coordination and given its status as the representative of the international community, it is obligated to do so. Further, she states that many humanitarians would agree that the UN is responsible to coordinate and so the real tension is not that the UN is doing it but how (Weir, 2006: 34-35). There is a requirement for the UN to adjust the concept of integration. NGOs do essential work and while military and development work are incompatible with humanitarian action it must be realized that these activities, when coordinated, can offer highly complimentary long and short-term outcomes (Weir, 2006: 26). The practice of double-hatting the RC/HC must be reviewed. Incidents of the politicization of aid must be investigated and they must stop in the future, but integration and coordination that at least attempts to respect

of peacebuilding from the Western world, Integrated Missions represent the best hope for success. While the debate between humanitarians and others involved with peace building has raged for some time, Joel Charny argues that integration has been reaffirmed. Noting that "neutral and independent humanitarian action is often impossible to effect without corresponding diplomatic, political, and, if necessary, military action" (2004: 14). He goes on to say that "the ICRC has in effect endorsed the philosophical underpinnings of an integrated approach" (2004: 15). Integrated missions also represent a new and immature doctrine and thus an opportunity for experienced countries such as Canada to shape those ideas ensuring that the United Nations thought process benefits from our experience and that thoughts on integration proceed in ways that will produce even better solutions. It is an opportunity that Canada should not pass up.

Afghanistan – What does Success Look like and Can Peacekeeping Play a Part

Is there a place for a UN peacekeeping force in Afghanistan? To many, that is a slippery slope because as Brahimi noted, there must be a peace to keep. No one should advocate dropping a UN peacekeeping force into the middle of an insurgency where even the United States and NATO feel their capabilities stretched. A peacekeeping force in Afghanistan would mean a peace process and that means talking to the Taliban. How likely is that?

President Karzai has already offered to negotiate and has gone so far as to offer a power sharing deal (Yung 2007: 3). The Afghan Senate has passed a bill calling on the government to open direct negotiations. The Afghan people are also very supportive of

negotiations[8] (Yung 2007: 3). Although the majority of Afghans view the Taliban in a negative light, "they recognize that their political inclusion may be necessary for peace" (Yung 2007: 4). Some of the advice given by the Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy in Kabul is to "know what winning looks like." The Student handbook from the Counterinsurgency Leaders Course states that "some of the enemy will be part of the Afghan government in the future. Political accommodation that addresses legitimate insurgent grievances is part and parcel of victory" (Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy 2007: 13).

Could peacekeeping figure into Afghanistan's future? Yes, but only after the initiation of a peace process and, due to reasons of impartiality, Canada and other NATO nations may be precluded from playing an active part.

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[8] "A recent poll conducted in Afghanistan by the Environics Group revealed that while a large majority of Afghans held "very to somewhat negative" views of the Taliban (73% nationally, 67% in Kandahar), "a strong majority (74%) of Afghans nationwide (and 85% in Kandahar) strongly or somewhat support negotiations between the Karzai government and the Taliban." A majority of Afghans (54% nationally) would even support a "coalition government" with the Taliban." (Yung 2007: 3-4)

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

This paper has argued that UN peacekeeping is still relevant for Canada. In doing so it has not taken an either/or approach and looked to recommend that Canada drop its NATO commitments or build a military that would shy away from or not be able to carry out warfighting tasks. Rather, it has focused on the utility of modern peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool.

The argument has been made that in the post Cold War world; there is a powerful connection between development and security. This connection has been stated explicitly by NATO's Secretary-General when he gave top priority to development and said that there was no purely military solution. Counterinsurgency doctrine says the same thing about military solutions. Yet NATO lacks that capability and capacity to coordinate development in Afghanistan. As a result, its troop contributing nations, recognising the security/development nexus, are engaging through various whole of government approaches and their PRTs. We have seen that there are some serious shortfalls with those approaches. We have also seen that the United Nations integrated mission concept, a recent development in multi-dimensional peacekeeping, represents perhaps our best hope for overcoming those shortfalls.

This paper has shown that peacekeeping has evolved from the days of cease fire observation and interpositional forces. Modern peacekeeping, when supported by the international community, can be what it needs to be to get the job done. That includes

the integration of security, development and humanitarian pillars as well rules and capabilities to tell victim from aggressor and put the later in their place.

A major argument that is used against integrated missions, that of humanitarian space, has been dealt with in this paper and though there is still work to do in this area, the bottom line is that development and humanitarian work take place in highly politically charged environments and the solution will need a multi-disciplined approach. Soldiers, developers and humanitarians must find ways to work together or at least not work at cross-purposes.

Peacekeeping is not a perfect solution and the United Nations itself is far from perfect. Yet, UN peacekeeping has evolved substantially and offers good opportunities for success in solving the world's conflicts. It is in our interest to get involved: it is a noble endeavour. Peacekeeping is relevant for Canada, and properly supported, it can help us gain and hold a place of pride and influence in the world.

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