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MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES PAPER

**From the Physical to the Cognitive:
The Changing Nature of the Army in Post-Modern Operations**

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Abstract¹

It is arguable that, despite the fact the United States Army has been asked to perform with equal competence across the spectrum of conflict, it has historically invested more effort towards fostering a culture focused on the conduct of high intensity operations. However, there is no doubt that the Army is currently demonstrating innovation and adapting to both external and internal pressures. Over the last seven years, the United States Army has fundamentally shifted its culture from one focused on the physical domination of the battlefield to one focused more on the cognitive dimensions of the operating environment. This latter focus is both internal to the Army and its leaders, as well as external to the environment. The internal focus involves producing adaptive and flexible practitioners through the development of knowledge, intellect, and experience. The external focus involves a greater importance placed on influencing enemy, adversary, supporter, and neutral actions and perceptions through decisive and shaping actions that extend well beyond the previously accepted norms of the military. This broadening of the Army culture has been institutionalized through numerous changes within the institution's doctrine, training, and education. Furthermore, Army units, both deployed and within the United States, are demonstrating the change in culture through multiple alterations in how the institution and its members are approaching operations in the contemporary environment. The recent transformation of the Army culture and the resulting focus on the cognitive domain are significant because these changes will better enable the institution and its members to effectively accomplish missions throughout the spectrum of conflict and quickly adapt to change when warranted to do so.

¹ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

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Introduction

If expert knowledge is the heart of a profession, then effectiveness, the profession's ability to apply the knowledge, is its pulse.²

Don M. Snider & Gayle L. Watkins

The United States Army is a professional institution. Professions “serve society by effectively delivering a necessary and useful specialized service.”³ Don Snider, a career Army officer and professor at the United States Military Academy, has written extensively on the importance of Army professionalism. In a recent article, Snider outlined a broad framework that helps one conceptualize the Army as a profession. The main difference between professions and other employment is that professionals require a certain degree of expertise in a specialized field of abstract knowledge that, when practiced, is essential to the functioning of society.⁴ As servants to society, professions must create and maintain a level of trust between the practitioners of the profession and those they serve. This level of trust is fostered by the effectiveness of their service and the manner in which they execute their duties.⁵ The latter requirement is formalized by the moral obligations and ethical standards that govern the profession. The first requirement, effectiveness, relates to professional success in accomplishing the required

² Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, “The Future of Army Professionalism: A Need for Renewal and Redefinition,” *Parameters*, vol. 30, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 8; [journal on-line]; available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00autumn/snider.htm>; internet; accessed 24 March 2008.

³ United States, Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 1-0: The Army* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 14, 2005): 1-10.

⁴ Don M. Snider, “Officership: The Professional Practice,” *Military Review* (January-February 2003): 3; [journal on-line]; available from <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb03/JanFeb03/snider.pdf>; internet; accessed 14 March 2008.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

service. In order to build the “expert knowledge” that their practitioners need to be effective, these institutions often invest heavily in the development of individual expertise.⁶

The United States Army serves its client, American society, as a member of a profession of arms that includes the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. Each of these institutions provides a specialized function that, either collectively or individually, serves to protect the nation, defend its territory, and promote its interests. As a servant to the country, the Army must adapt to any mission that the people, as represented by their elected political leaders, assigns them. Performing all missions with equal competence requires the profession to sustain a broad knowledge base.⁷ This has been demonstrated historically because the Army has conducted operations that span the entire spectrum of conflict, from peace-keeping to traditional warfighting.

It is arguable that, despite the fact the Army has been asked to perform with equal competence across the spectrum of conflict, it has historically invested more effort towards fostering and developing the expert knowledge required to conduct high intensity operations.⁸ As a result of this narrow focus and the resulting knowledge base, the Army

⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷ Christopher R. Paparone, an associate professor in the United States Army Command and Staff College, and George E. Reed, an associate professor at the University of San Diego’s School of Leadership and Education Sciences, define professional knowledge as “information that members of the profession believe provides meaning and value in promoting understanding of how things work in their field.” See Christopher R. Paparone and Reed, George E. “The Reflective Military Practitioner: How the Military Professionals Think in Action,” *Military Review*, vol. 88, iss. 2 (March – April 2008): 66. [Journal on-line]; available from <http://proquest.umi.com>; internet; Accessed 20 April 2008.

⁸ Lawrence Yates, “The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005” *Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 15* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006): 1; available from <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/yates.pdf>; internet; accessed 10 February 2008.

often viewed tasks not directly related to destroying an opponent on battlefield as less relevant to their overall effectiveness.⁹ In today's strategic environment, this viewpoint is no longer tenable. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that the institution must re-examine its role in the management of conflict and expand its existing knowledge base to promote flexibility and adaptability amongst its members. Specifically, these operations demonstrated that tasks associated with building and maintaining order in foreign lands are often key enablers to the successful resolution of armed conflict and achieving final political objectives. Although, it is sometimes apparent that civilian experts are the most suitable individuals to conduct these operations, the Army continues to fill these roles due to a lack of civilian availability.

In 2005 the United States Department of Defense (DoD), issued *Directive Number 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*. This directive emphasized the importance of stability operations by stating that they were a core mission of the United States military. Additionally, the directive stated that stability operations should be the same priority as combat operations. The Department of Defense defines stability operations as, "military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish and maintain order in States and regions."¹⁰ To address this change in priorities and increase its effectiveness, the Army continues to adapt its knowledge base of core competencies. Effectiveness in these types of tasks required the skilled application of "'hard power' (the

⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹⁰ United States, Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 28 November 2005): 2.

means to provide security) and ‘soft power’ (the capacity to understand other nations, cultures and also the ability to work in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment).”¹¹ While the United States Army has always excelled on the application of ‘hard power,’ it has realized that it needed to change in order to develop the knowledge required to apply ‘soft power.’

Despite this understanding, the United States Army has historically been slow at adapting to change. This adaptation is even further complicated when change requires a broadening or evolution of the Army culture. Due to many factors outside of its control, the United States Army’s role in the resolution of conflict has dramatically changed. Military power must now be fused with all other aspects of national power to allow for successful transformation from instability to order. However, there is no doubt that the Army is currently demonstrating innovation and adapting to both external and internal pressures. Over the last seven years, the United States Army has fundamentally shifted its culture from one focused on the physical domination of the battlefield to one focused more on the cognitive dimensions of the operating environment. This latter focus is both internal to the Army and its leaders, as well as external to the environment. The internal focus involves producing adaptive and flexible practitioners through the development of knowledge, intellect, and experience. The external focus involves a greater importance placed on understanding and influencing enemy, adversary, supporter, and neutral actions and perceptions through decisive and shaping actions.

¹¹ James J. Carafono, “Post-Conflict Operations From Europe to Iraq,” *Heritage Lectures*, No. 844 (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 13 July 2004): 8; available from http://www.heritage.org/research/iraq/upload/66346_1.pdf; internet; accessed 8 April 2008.

An examination of the development of the Army culture, the changing methods in which the Army is building the knowledge base amongst its practitioners, and the current operations in the field demonstrates the Army's holistic approach towards changing its culture. Specifically, it demonstrates the focus that the Army has recently placed on the cognitive skills and knowledge within its own ranks concerning operations, elements of national power, and foreign societies. In addition, this examination reveals the importance the Army is placing on understanding the motivations and values of other societies and how the Army intends on influencing the behavior of individuals within the operating environment through targeting their perceptions and thought processes in the cognitive domain.

In order to clarify the term cognitive, in this context, the following definition will be used: "of, relating to, being, or involving conscious intellectual activity [such as] thinking, reasoning, or remembering."¹² Dr. Edward Smith, a military strategist on effects based operations from the United States, wrote extensively on the cognitive domain of warfare in his book titled, *Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War*.¹³ He explains that the cognitive domain is where decisions are formulated and made. It is where a person sees, experiences and makes meaning of the world in which he resides.¹⁴ In essence, the cognitive domain is the location where an individual's frame of reference exists, through which his

¹² Merriam-Webster Dictionary, "cognitive," [dictionary on-line]; available at <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cognitive>; internet; accessed 15 March 2008.

¹³ Edward A. Smith, *Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War* (Washington, D.C.: DoD Command and Control Research Program, 2002); available from http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Smith_EBO.pdf; internet; accessed 18 April 2008.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 173.

perceptions originate. Furthermore, this domain is where knowledge, judgement, and intuition combine as precursors for understanding and action. In this regard, the cognitive domain has much relevance in all human activity.

While most references written on the cognitive domain document the importance of this domain in warfighting, there seem to be no studies highlighting the recent shift to a cognition-based focus on conflict within the United States Army. On the other hand, there has been work concerning the implication cognitive processes as they relate to information age warfare in the contemporary environment. One such essay was written in 2006 by Peter Nicholson, a prominent Australian military expert, titled “Effects-based Strategy: Operations in the Cognitive Domain,” and published in the journal, *Security Challenges*.¹⁵ This essay examines the notion of knowledge or cognitive warfare as a concept for military operations. Another such reference that deals with shaping behaviors through effects-based operations is Edward Smith’s book cited earlier.¹⁶

In addition to the references concerning the cognitive domain of warfare, numerous publications are available that deal with changing military force structures and how militaries operate in order to meet the demands of the current environment. One such publication is British General Sir Rupert Smith’s book, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, which describes changes required of militaries due the fact that many of today’s wars are fought in an attempt to change the minds of adversaries and

¹⁵ Peter Nicholson, “Effects-Based Strategy: Operations in the Cognitive Domain,” *Security Challenges*, vol. 2, no. 1 (April 2006) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/SC%20Vol%202%20No%201/vol2no1nicholson.html>; internet; accessed 10 March 2008.

¹⁶ Edward A. Smith, *Effects Based Operations*.

populations.¹⁷ A publication that is more related to changes within the United States Army specifically is Douglas A. MacGregor's *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the Twenty-First Century*. In this book, MacGregor outlined a vision for transforming the United States Army's organizational structures, operational concepts, and leadership principles in response to the changing nature of the of the post-Cold War strategic environment.¹⁸ Another very popular publication about institutional innovation within armies that are facing changing threats is John A. Nagl's *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*.¹⁹ A final publication that is relevant to the current changes within the United States Army is James Kitfield's book *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War* in 1995.²⁰ This book details the importance that training, education, and practical experiences of leaders within the military play in how they prosecute warfare. While there is a vast collection of writings, workshops, and studies that focus on the past changes or recommended future changes to within military organizations in order to meet the challenges of the contemporary operating environment, there has been little written on the processes of cultural change currently taking hold across today's Army.

¹⁷ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London and New York: Allen Lane, 2005).

¹⁸ Douglas A. Macgregor, *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the Twenty-First Century* (Westport: Praeger, 1997).

¹⁹ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

²⁰ James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).

CHAPTER ONE- United States Army Culture

Culture is a prism through which individuals interpret their surroundings. While there are outward signs of culture, the essence of culture lies within the “subconscious assumptions” of the human mind.²¹ There has been much research defining and interpreting the general concept of culture, and military culture, in particular.²² This research spans numerous fields of study including all of the social sciences and humanities. While there is not one clear definition of culture, it is generally believed that culture is both based on society or groups and on the individuals within the group. In both the group and individual sense, culture is developed by experience and by the interpretation of experience in relation to values and beliefs.²³ Although the exact relationship between culture and cognition is debatable, it is clear that culture affects individuals, groups, or organizations in dynamic ways and has a large bearing on how they all apply logic to the world.

The Army defines culture as, “the set of long-held values, beliefs, expectations, and practices shared by a group that signifies what is important and influences how the

²¹ Brigadier General David A Fastabend and Robert H. Simpson, “‘Adapt or Die’ The Imperative for a Culture of Innovation in the United States Army,” *Army*, vol. 54, no. 2 (Arlington: February 2004): 16; [journal on-line]; available from <http://proquest.umi.com/>; internet; accessed 23 March 2008.

²² Some of the most preeminent studies on the American military culture and United States Army culture include: Center for Strategic and International Studies Report, *American Military Culture in the Twenty First Century: A Report of the CSIS International Security Program* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000); *Anthropology and the United States Military: Coming of Age in the Twenty-first Century*, ed. Pamela R. Frese and Margaret C Harrell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) and Edgar M. Johnson, *Workshop Introducing Innovation and Risk: Implications of Transforming the Culture of DOD*, Report Prepared for the Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation (Alexandria, VA: Institute of Defense Analyses, 2004); available from http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_384_D2967-FINAL.pdf; internet; accessed 10 March 2008.

²³ Edgar M. Johnson, *Workshop Introducing Innovation and Risk: ...*, II-6.

organization operates.”²⁴ As described in *Field Manual (FM) 1-0 The Army*, the Army culture is value-based and resides in both the institution and its people.²⁵ This culture is developed and nurtured from the moment a new recruit reports to his first duty station. The institution teaches new recruits and junior leaders a common set of values, ethics, performance expectations and standards. These standards are continually reinforced throughout all ranks and units within the institution, as a framework for everything the organization does. These fundamental values emphasize the qualities that the institution holds in the highest regard and provide soldiers guiding principles that serve as a framework for making decisions when situations are ambiguous or unfamiliar. The United States Army values include loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.²⁶ The United States Army’s Soldier’s Creed further clarifies the underlying standards within the institution. The Soldier’s Creed links concepts of culture, values, and ethos within the profession to a soldier’s core beliefs. These beliefs create the cognitive foundation for all members of the United States Army:

I am an American Soldier. I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army values. I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade. I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I will always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself. I am an expert and I am a professional. I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat. I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life. I am an American Soldier.²⁷

²⁴ United States. Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 6-22: Army Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2006): Glossary-2.

²⁵ United States. Department of the Army, *FM 1-0: The Army...*, 1-12.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1-16.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, iv.

In order to ensure that the Army culture adheres to the legal guidelines concerning the proper conduct of war, the United States Army includes a set of prescriptive rules that every soldier must abide by when taking part in military operations. The United States Soldier's Rules reflect generally accepted western laws of war:

- Soldiers fight only enemy combatants.
- Soldiers do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them over to their superior.
- Soldiers do not kill or torture enemy prisoners of war.
- Soldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
- Soldiers do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.
- Soldiers destroy no more than the mission requires.
- Soldiers treat civilians humanely.
- Soldiers do not steal. Soldiers respect private property and possessions.
- Soldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.
- Soldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superior.²⁸

The Army culture that stems from the nature of the profession of arms resonates throughout the entire organization. The culture is ingrained within the United States Army and its soldiers and is embodied in the words of the Warriors Ethos, the Army Values, and the Soldier's Creed. This cultural identity comprises the moral, ethical, and psychological attributes that are required to achieve victory in all aspects of peace and war.²⁹ American society has emplaced special trust in the men and women of the Armed Forces to exercise controlled violence when called upon to do so. If the Army is to be effective across the entirety of the spectrum of conflict, the leaders within the organization must ensure that the culture extends beyond the ability to close with and kill the enemies of the nation. This is when the true essence of the culture materializes.

²⁸ United States, Department of the Army, *Army Regulation (AR) 350-1: Army Training and Leader Development* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2007): 81.

²⁹ Benjamin C. Freakley, "Warrior Ethos - Heart of the Infantry" *Infantry Magazine*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Winter 2003) available from <http://proquest.umi.com>; internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

Critical to Army culture are the roles of leaders. It is important to understand how the United States Army defines leadership and the internal role officers and noncommissioned officers play in the application of combat power, or the “practice.” Because of this, officers and noncommissioned officers are critical in any change process within the institution. Army leaders are anyone who, “by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish the organizational goals.”³⁰ However, the United States Army formally defines leadership as, “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.”³¹ Although leadership and professionalism extend into all ranks of the Army, officers and noncommissioned officers serve a vital formal role within the organization. Officers exercise legal responsibilities over Army units at all echelons. They receive this authority by commission from the American people and the United States government.³² Non-commissioned officers serve as the backbone of the United States Army. They are the vital link between the commissioned officers and the soldiers. Both officers and non-commissioned officers are expected to be the ones that “turn values into action, bring coherence out of confusion, set the example, and articulate the viewpoint of the military institution.”³³

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1-1.

³¹ United States. Department of the Army, *FM 6-22: Army Leadership*..., 1-2.

³² Snider, *Officership: The Professional Practice*..., 8.

³³ Center for Strategic and International Studies Report, *American Military Culture in the Twenty First Century: A Report of the CSIS International Security Program*..., xvi.

Defining the Service Provided to Client

The Army's enduring role is to "protect the nation's interests, both at home and abroad, while also deterring future threats."³⁴ During the Cold War, the threat was the seemingly inevitable war against the Soviet Union. This conflict was envisioned to involve massed armies of multiple nations fighting tank and infantry battles across Europe. The style of fighting necessary for this type of conflict dominated Western military thinking for the greater part of the twentieth century.³⁵ In order to meet this need, the United States Army aligned the vast majority of its doctrine, training, education, and leadership development towards achieving success in the complexities of this form of warfare. Despite lessons learned in Vietnam concerning unconventional or irregular conflict, the Army institution viewed its primary role as fighting large scale, state-on-state warfare. This mission culture within the United States Army was focused predominantly on the high end of the spectrum of conflict, in which destroying an adversary's will to resist was achieved through the physical destruction of his military forces or capabilities.

Dr. Lawrence Yates, a member of the United States Combat Studies Institute, argues that the Army's institutional biases "has instilled the conviction in most officers that despite war's diversity, 'real' war is primarily a *conventional* [emphasis added] undertaking..."³⁶ Regarding this topic, Dr. James J. Carafano, a leading expert in

³⁴ General William S. Wallace, "FM 3-0: The Army's Blueprint," *Military Review*, vol. 88, no. 2 (March-April 2008): 2, [journal on-line]; available from <http://proquest.umi.com>; internet; accessed 12 April 2008.

³⁵ William J. Olson, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Institutional Challenge," in *Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict*, edited by Max G. Manwaring, 45-56 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991): 47.

defense affairs at The Heritage Foundation, a prominent conservative think tank located in Washington, D.C., attributes this focused attention on conventional warfare to “a rich tradition of Western military theory, typified by the nineteenth century Prussian thinker Carl von Clausewitz, who emphasized the primacy of winning battles and destroying the enemy’s conventional troops.”³⁷ This tradition greatly affected how the Army interpreted the military’s fundamental purpose of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. After the fall of the Soviet Union, prowess in this traditional form of war solidified the United States’ current position as the remaining global superpower. However, in the wake of a drastically changing strategic environment and ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States Army has realized that it needed to alter its approach to operations. This would require a broadening of the Army culture to ensure that the organization was capable of winning the nation’s wars while simultaneously setting the conditions for a sustainable peace.

This expansion is required because the Army’s culture serves as the frame of reference that all soldiers and leaders apply when taking action and making decisions. This culture is founded on core values and standards that guide members in their endeavors. The culture that resides within the Army is the source of the Army’s strength. Leaders at all levels of the Army continue to build upon its culture through the development of expertise through study, training, and experience in combat. While, prior to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army culture focused predominantly on high-

³⁶ Yates, *The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations...*, 1.

³⁷ James J. Carafono, “Post-Conflict and Culture: Changing America’s Military for 21st Century Missions,” *Heritage Lectures*, No. 810 (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation: November 2003): 3; available from <http://www.heritage.org/nationalsecurity/hl810.cfm>; internet; accessed 10 March 2008.

intensity combat, this is no longer the case. The continuously-changing nature of the strategic environment and the practical experiences of units in the field have necessitated a cultural transformation that fully embraces the institution's changing role in the transformation of conflict.

CHAPTER TWO – The Need for Change

Since the formation of the United States Army more than 232 years ago, the nation has called upon it to project military power across a wide spectrum of conflict in order to shape the environment in a manner consistent with national interests and values. A historical analysis of the employment of the nation's land forces reveals that the role of the United States Army extends well beyond its ability to wage war solely by engaging and winning traditional battles against foreign armies.³⁸ Despite this fact, some scholars argue that the institution has repeatedly demonstrated a cognitive bias that stability operations, or tasks related to building foreign nation's capacity to provide security and civil order within their own lands, were "someone else's job," and not an integral part of war.³⁹ Based on the complexity of today's operational environment, the United States Army has readdressed its internal ability to manage conflict. The government and the soldiers and leaders on the front lines realized that no longer can the Army be strictly focused on the application of lethal force against an identified adversary, but the Army also had to be focused on shaping the civil order within the society in which they operated. Increasing the capability of the Army to better influence the resolution of conflict required the institution to change its previously held bias. This change also required a careful balance of maintaining the ability to apply hard power in the form of controlled violence and increasing its ability to apply soft power in the form of non-violent military activities.

³⁸ Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations...*, 1.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

In order to ensure the security of vital interests and its people, the United States has chosen to take an active role in confronting evolving threats across the vast complexity of the global environment. Although the entire United States government is shifting to respond to these challenges, the Department of Defense continues to lead other government agencies in this process of transformation. The pace of change is largely due to external and internal factors. These factors originate from the challenges created by recent changes in the international order and the strategic setting.

The Operational Environment Demands Change

Several forces compelled the Army to change, most predominantly is the rapidly-transforming nature of the global environment. *Joint Publication (JP) 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines the operational environment as, “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.”⁴⁰ The recent update of *FM 3-0: Operations* outlines ongoing changes to local, regional, and global environments that must be considered in the employment of military power. These trends include the globalization of economies, the increased availability and advancement of technology, population growth, and urbanization.⁴¹ Higher demands for natural resources, climate change, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and

⁴⁰ United States, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication (JP) 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Amended through 04 March 2008* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2001): 394.

⁴¹ United States, Department of Army, *FM 3-0: Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2008): 1-1 thru 1-2.

the failure of many states to provide effective support for their populations add to the uncertainty underlying today's operational environment.⁴²

In essence, the world has become more interconnected. Communities and people that were once separated by a limited ability to communicate due to distance now have ready access to and influence upon one another. The recent revolution in information and communication technology (ICT) has sparked what some scholars called the transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age.⁴³ Where past conflict situations were once isolated, the perceptions and influences of competing forces are now thrust onto the world scene by the growing twenty-four hour media coverage and the internet.⁴⁴

While some conventional threats remain, state and non-state adversaries to American security and interests have looked towards alternative means to exploit vulnerabilities created by the current strategic environment. Terrorist and extremist organizations gradually materialized as a threat to the United States during the 1990s. The violent attacks of 2001 demonstrated the global reach of these extremists. The attacks also proved to the world that terrorists possess the expertise and will to kill thousands of people in a relatively short period of time. Due to the changing nature of the threat and the increasing complexities of the current strategic environment, the United

⁴² *Ibid.*, 1-2 thru 1-3.

⁴³ Nicholson, "Effects-Based Strategy...", 135.

⁴⁴ An example of the adversarial forces quickly learning to exploit the Internet and the global reach of the media was seen in Iraq where insurgents quickly established a sophisticated web presence and used Arab media to increase the psychological effects of their attacks. See Steven Metz, *Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2007): 20; available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB752.pdf>; internet; accessed 18 April 2008.

States and its military forces must continue to prepare for a future embroiled in ever-present conflict that can be defined as “protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors who use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.”⁴⁵

Understanding the characteristics of the international environment and the growing diversity of threats to American interests provides the context for the changing capabilities required throughout the entire government structure. The increase to capabilities should also reflect national policy, in essence, the direction of the political leadership.

Civilian Leadership Demands Change

The President of the United States outlines the broad strategic vision of how the military element of national power, in conjunction with other elements, are to be utilized to shape the global environment and provide enduring security for the American people through the national security strategy and supporting presidential directives. The *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS), released in March 2006, outlined this vision using two overriding pillars:

- 1) The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice and human dignity by working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies.
- 2) The second pillar is confronting challenges by leading a growing community of democracies.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ United States, Department of the Army, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2008*. Report Prepared for the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, 110th Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 26 February 2008): 2; available from <http://www.army.mil/aps/08/>; internet; accessed 12 April 2008.

⁴⁶ United States, Executive Office of the President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2006): Covering letter.

This strategy highlighted the widely-held sentiment that “safeguarding America against extremism and tyranny [requires] a national commitment to fostering democracy, stability, and prosperity in other societies.”⁴⁷

In 2004, with the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq at the forefront of the global stage, numerous studies supported this changing strategy by highlighting the need for a more effective governmental approach to assisting foreign states or regions regain civil order.⁴⁸ To improve the government’s ability to assist foreign states or regions that are at risk of, in, or in the transition from conflict or civil strife, President Bush issued *National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*.⁴⁹ This new approach not only outlined that the Department of State would have the lead in these types of operations, but also directed improved coordination, planning, and implementation of all the available resources of the United States government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international partners.⁵⁰ Although this impetus for change was created by

⁴⁷ Andrew R. Hoehn, et al, *A New Division of Labor: Meeting America’s Security Challenges Beyond Iraq*, Report prepared for the United States Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007): ix.

⁴⁸ Robert C. Orr, ed., *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2004) and Samuel R. Berger, et al, *In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities*, Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005).

⁴⁹ United States, Executive Office of the President of the United States, *National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) No. 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 7 December 2005), available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>; internet; accessed 15 March 2008.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

failure to effectively stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq, the more lasting importance was that the new approach addressed a broader issue. The United States would potentially intervene in conflict situations world-wide when these situations threatened the nation's security.⁵¹ Such situations could arise when failed or failing states are unable to exercise sovereignty over their own territories. These states could then be used as “a base of operations or a safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to [United States] foreign policy, security, or economic interests.”⁵² In order to implement national security strategy, the government recognized that it must have the capabilities to “increase the governance capacities of weak states, reduce the drivers of and catalysts of conflict, and assist in peace building at all stages of pre- or post-conflict transformation.”⁵³

In conjunction with this *NSDP 44*, the Department of Defense released its vision of how the department would support stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. In 2005, the Department outlined a policy that drastically altered the existing practices with the services and emphasized the importance that the department placed on its ability to contribute to stabilizing foreign countries or regions. *Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* states that:

⁵¹ United States, *National Security Strategy*..., 16.

⁵² United States, *NSPD No. 44*..., 2.

⁵³ Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson, *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues*, Report prepared for the United States Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007): xiii; available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG646.pdf; internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They *shall be given priority comparable to combat operations* [italics added for emphasis] and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.⁵⁴

Prior to this policy the United States Army had conducted and planned for stability operations, but did not prioritize competency in stability-related tasks as equal to those of their core combat tasks. Although, *DoDD 3000.05* and *NSPD-44* outline that these operations will be led by the Department of State, *DoDD 3000.05* increased the military role in these endeavors by stating:

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall *be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so* [italics added for emphasis]. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces. Stability operations tasks include helping:

- 1) Rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment;
- 2) Revive or build the private sector including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; and
- 3) Develop representative governmental institutions.⁵⁵

The vision of the Department of Defense concerning the military's responsibilities in stability operations, outlined within *DoDD 3000.05*, greatly increased need for change within each of the services. Not only must the military be able to destroy and defeat enemy forces, but they must expand their capability to aid in the establishment or re-

⁵⁴ United States, Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) No. 3000.05...*, 2.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

establishment of foreign civil and military institutions in order to shape the environment and set the conditions for a sustainable peace.

Preparing for new challenges and unexpected circumstances, while maintaining the capability to conduct major wars, has required the Army to transform the culture, doctrine, and structure of its organization. The additional requirement that the military must be prepared to establish and maintain order in foreign lands when civilians cannot do so greatly broadens the scope of transformation to encompass a variety of tasks that are widely outside the core competencies required to conduct combat operations and moves into areas of so-called “soft power.”

Increasing the knowledge and capabilities required to successfully accomplish these tasks creates a huge burden on all military forces. The United States Army and Marine Corps will carry the preponderance of the burden, since the majority these operations will occur on land. The conduct of stability operations requires the integrated efforts of all civilian and military elements of national power. While increasing the civilian operational and expeditionary capability is ultimately the best solution to achieving national objectives in troubled regions, currently, the ability of federal civilian federal agencies to operate in high-risk environments and their current expeditionary capabilities remain limited.⁵⁶ Therefore, it was imperative that the Army focus both on increasing internal capabilities and aiding other governmental departments in increasing

⁵⁶ United States. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report to Congress on the Implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (Washington, D.C.: 1 April 2007): i; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/downloads/Congressional_Report_on_DoDD_3000-05_Implementation_final_2.pdf; internet; accessed 15 April 2008.

their capabilities.⁵⁷ This is currently occurring and this forms a core part of the cultural change.

Internally Driven Change

While governmental direction has required the Army alter its approach to operations, numerous internally driven factors also contributed to the need to broaden the Army culture in order to meet the current conditions in the environment. The renewed emphasis on the varied competencies that the Army must develop as part of its profession is the manifestation of the old proverb that necessity is the mother of all invention (or, in this case, innovation). Experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan have led military leaders throughout the institution to seek a wider range of knowledge and skills in order to effectively execute the myriad of tasks that they will have to perform. In 2005, Secretary of the Army, Francis J. Harvey, and the 35th Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker, outlined the requirement for the Army to develop its cadre of leaders into what they called, “pentathletes.”⁵⁸ In a 2006 interview with *Spiegel Magazine*, General David H. Petraeus, the current Commander of Multi-national Forces Iraq, described a “pentathlete” as a leader who “is not only a sprinter, but also a long-distance-runner and high jumper.”⁵⁹ These leaders are required to possess attributes and

⁵⁷ United States. Department of the Army, *2008 Army Posture Statement, Information Paper on Stability Operations Capabilities*, available from http://www.army.mil/aps/08/information_papers/transform/Stability_Operations_Capabilities.htm; internet; accessed 18 March 2008.

⁵⁸ A slide presentation delivered by the Honorable Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the United States, to the Heritage Foundation captures the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army’s vision on the “pentathlete” leader. The Honorable Francis J. Harvey, *Army Transformation: Engaging the 21st Century* (20 October 2005): slide 9; available from <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Events/upload/102005Harvey.ppt>; internet; accessed 19 March 2008.

higher-level thinking skills that will allow them to adapt, learn, and act decisively in unfamiliar and often ambiguous situations. These attributes are founded in their ability to apply the “hard power” warfighting skills of their trade, but also include skills in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy.⁶⁰ In addition, these leaders are required to understand cultural context and work effectively across it.⁶¹ This analogy of a “pentathlete” creates a vision of the multitude of skills and attributes required from leaders at all levels of the organization. This vision also builds on and frames the Army’s “warrior ethos” in a broader context. The belief that leaders need only be proficient in their specific combat skills is no longer enough.

The need for versatile military leaders is not a novel concept. In an address to future military leaders in 1961, President John F. Kennedy highlighted the limitations of military power. He stated:

You must know something about strategy and tactics and logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone.⁶²

⁵⁹ Ullrich Fichtner, “We Have to Raise our Sights Beyond the Range of an M-16,” *Spiegel International*, 18 December, 2006 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,455199,00.html>; internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

⁶⁰ Harvey, *Army Transformation...*, slide 9.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² John F. Kennedy, “Remarks to Graduating Class at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 7 June 1961,” available from www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/publicpapers/1961/jfk232_61.html; internet; accessed 14 March 2008.

Similar to the experiences faced by earlier leaders in places like Vietnam, today's Army officers are getting first-hand experience in Iraq and Afghanistan that lends credence to these remarks from over forty years ago.

In an article written by Leonard Wong, a research professor of military strategy at the United States War College's Strategic Studies Institute in Carlisle, PA, he states contemporary Army leaders "have conducted missions for which they were never trained, executed operations that have outpaced Army Doctrine, shifting constantly from adrenaline-pumping counterinsurgency to patience-demanding nation-building, and received very little detailed guidance or supervision in the process."⁶³ Such tasks have included helping to restart struggling economies, running town hall meetings with local leaders, negotiating with various groups, rebuilding schools and medical facilities, training local police and security forces, and rebuilding basic infrastructure. While this list is not all-inclusive, it highlights the increasing need for Army leaders of all ranks and specialties to expand their knowledge base and professional skills in order to play active, beneficial roles in the management and transformation of conflict situations.

America's Army has been and will continue to be employed in the conduct of stability operations. Due to the drastically changing strategic environment, these operations have gained relevance as they relate to all Army operations. Government and institutional direction have promoted changes within the Army to address stability operations with the same emphasis as combat operations. This emphasis does not decrease the requirement for the Army to be capable of conducting major combat

⁶³ Leonard Wong, *Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1 July 2004): 15; available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB411.pdf>; internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

operations. It merely codifies the fact that in the absence of other organizations that can contribute to building a sustainable peace, the Army must be able to fill the gap. The newfound emphasis on the skills and capabilities required to conduct stability operations serves as an acknowledgment that the Army will continue to hold a vital role in resolution of conflict. Due to this, over the last several years, the Army has taken huge strides towards increasing the knowledge and cognitive abilities of its members so that they are better equipped to meet the needs of the nation.

CHAPTER THREE - A Change to Thinking about Military Operations

In order to meet the broad strategy outlined by the President and the accompanying policy of the Secretary of Defense, the American Army continues to develop innovative measures and increase its effectiveness. These changes signify the Army's re-assessment of its role as it relates to the contemporary environment. Furthermore, the change is evidence of attempts at becoming more effective in operating across the myriad of tasks that the institution and its members might have to perform. The Army is currently moving at a rapid pace to increase its capability and capacity for stability operations.⁶⁴ Three current major initiatives taking place across the Army include revising doctrine, adjusting pre-mission training, and transforming the professional education system. Understanding these changes allows one to better conceptualize how the institution is not only learning from the environment, but it is altering professional competencies through an increased focus on the cognitive domain. Thus, the organization now defines successful military operations as requiring the transformation of conflict through both defeating the threat directly and reducing or influencing the threat's sources of power. Both methods require a better understanding of the complexities of the operating environment and the audiences which need to be influenced.

While the immediate changes within the organization stem from a direct reflection of lessons learned during the last years of combat, as well as the domestic

⁶⁴ A recent Association of the United States Army (AUSA) review outlines some of the initiatives already in progress across the organization. They include transitioning to a modular force, rebalancing the active and reserve components, growing and developing leaders, establishing or expanding Army support organizations, enhancing training, and expanding language and cultural capabilities for Soldiers and leaders. Association of the United States Army, "The U.S. Army's Role in Stability Operations," *Torchbearer National Security Report* (October 2006); available at <http://www.ausa.org/PDFdocs/TBSecRpt/TB-StabOps.pdf>; internet; accessed 18 March 2008.

response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Army, as a whole, is transforming with the notion that successful stability operations are an integral part in the creation of an environment where all the elements of national power must converge to stabilize a region.⁶⁵ As a result of this need to synchronize efforts, numerous changes throughout the Army are enhancing the institutions ability to coordinate and conduct operations with joint, interagency, inter-government, multi-national partners. It is clear that military capabilities alone cannot provide the order and stability necessary for states and regions to recover and reestablish themselves, but the Army continues to have a vital role in the process.

In order to institutionalize this new knowledge, Army culture continues to broaden and accept these changes as a necessity for future success. In an organization that is as big as the Army is, cultural changes will inevitably take time. As this shift continues, the organization will add value to the culture, incorporating the full strengths of the individual as a warfighter and the individual as promoter of lasting stability. This cultural change must continue to be carefully balanced in order to ensure that, regardless of the mission, the Army will be prepared to effectively employ their unique skills to answer the nation's call.

How the Army Learns

Due to the complexity of the current operating environment, problems and conflicts quickly alter their form. To effectively operate in such an environment, the

⁶⁵ Melissa Bower, "FM 3-0: Doctrine Authors Cite Years of Review, Revision," *The Leavenworth Lamp Online* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: March 6, 2008), [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/articles/2008/03/06/news/news1.txt>; internet; accessed 16 March 2008.

United States Army has become skilled at identifying strengths and weakness in its operations and increasing its ability to disseminate creative solutions across the entire force at a rapid pace. Over the last several years, the United States Army has become an organization that learns rapidly. Institutional learning can be defined as:


A process by which an organization (such as the U.S. Army) uses new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional norms, doctrine, and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous gaps in performance and maximize future successes.⁶⁶

The institution prides itself on the ability to quickly gather and disseminate information and knowledge from sources within the environment and fielded members. The Army has refined a process for sharing knowledge across the entire institution. Information is disseminated throughout the organization within doctrine, leader development, and collective training centers. As the repository for much of this knowledge, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, ensures ready access to all elements of the institutional and operational Army.⁶⁷ CALL acts as a major proponent within the process of managing knowledge in the organization. Knowledge management is “the art of creating, organizing, applying, and transferring knowledge to facilitate situational understanding and decision making.”⁶⁸ Figure 1 demonstrates the Army’s process of developing knowledge from lessons learned by the operational army and how this knowledge is disseminated throughout the organization.

⁶⁶ Richard D. Downie, *Learning from Conflict* (Westport: Praeger, 1998): 23.

⁶⁷ United States, Department of the Army, *AR 11-33: Army Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2006): 11.

⁶⁸ United States, Department of the Army, *FM 3-0: Operations...*, 7-10.



<u>Army Doctrine:</u>	<u>Leader Development:</u>	<u>Collective Training:</u>	<u>Lessons Learned:</u>
<p>Doctrine is applied theory-theory derived from systematically analyzing patterns of recurring results of similar circumstances and events on various battlefields. Doctrine is based on careful observation and analysis of lessons learned through battlefield experience and simulated battlefield exercises. It does not attempt to outline an index of canned solutions. It aims to teach Soldiers how to think rather than what to think.</p>	<p>With the principal mission of leader development, the center for Army Leadership (CAL) develops leaders prepared to execute full-spectrum, joint, interagency, and multinational operations; advances military art and science; and supports many other operational requirements.</p>	<p>The mission of the CAC-T is to manage the development, resourcing, and integration of the Army's combined arms training efforts and programs to train units and leaders in conduct of the full range of military operations in the contemporary operational environment. CAC-T identifies, gathers, and supports the field's training requirements. It supports Army Transformation, but its primary focus is on supporting the field's readiness and leader development requirements.</p>	<p>As an agent for change the Army, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) disseminates and integrates new concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and other critical solutions throughout the Army. To reach out to other agencies, Soldiers, as well as to inform the general public, CALL provides extensive publications both in print and online.</p>

Figure 1 - How the Army Learns.⁶⁹

Doctrine

One of the most profound evolutions within the Army is the developing body of thought on how the Army operates in the current environment. This body of thought is captured in emerging doctrine. Since the Army is a doctrine-based organization, doctrine

⁶⁹ Figure 1 was recreated from an online source. See: United States Army Combined Arms Center, "Combined Arms Center (CAC) - An Engine of Change" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 2006); available from <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/dynamics.asp#>; internet; accessed 2 April 2008.

provides its members with the institution's view on the nature of operations, the fundamentals by which the organization conducts operations, and the methods in which commanders exercise command and control.⁷⁰ Thus, doctrine establishes a common frame of reference that leaders use to solve problems, but does not outline the specific solutions. Army doctrine greatly affects the culture of the organization and serves as the formal foundation for the institution's roles, norms, and beliefs. Therefore, changes to Army doctrine are used to promote changes to the institution as a whole.⁷¹ The most recent doctrine changes clearly reflect that the organization is continuously learning from experience in the current environment.

Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated to Army leadership that there was a gap in the existing body of knowledge concerning counterinsurgency operations. In an attempt to provide its warfighters with principles and guidelines that would fill this gap, the Army and the Marine Corps assembled a team of some of the nation's top experts to develop the new counterinsurgency manual, *FM 3-24* (Army naming convention) & *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5* (Marine Corps naming convention), *Counterinsurgency*, published in December 2006.⁷² Civilians, academics, and military professionals worked in a collaborated effort to compile the new manual. This counterinsurgency manual outlines the requirement for soldiers and

⁷⁰ United States, Department of the Army, *FM 3-0: Operations...*, D-1.

⁷¹ Melissa Bower, "FM 3-0: Doctrine Authors..."

⁷² Jim Garamore, "News Article: Army, Marine Release New Counterinsurgency Manual," *American Forces Press Service* (18 December 2006); available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=2453>; internet; accessed 15 April 2008.

marines to employ a mix of familiar combat skills with other skills that are more often associated with nonmilitary agencies.⁷³ Similar to *DoDD 3000.05*, the document

highlights:

Military forces can perform civilian tasks but often not as well as the civilian agencies with people trained in those skills. Further, military forces performing civilian tasks are not performing military tasks. Diverting from those tasks should be a temporary measure, on taken to address urgent circumstances...⁷⁴

The concepts covered in the manual solidified the requirement that soldiers and marines were “expected to be nation builders as well as warriors.”⁷⁵ In addition, the manual reinforces the fact that true conflict management requires the acceptance of individuals and societies. In an attempt to put the need for understanding cultures in context, the manual details that:

American ideas of what is “normal” and “rational” are not universal. To the contrary, members of other societies often have different notions of rationality, appropriate behavior, levels of religious devotion, and norms concerning gender. Thus, what might appear abnormal or strange to an external observer may appear as self-evidently normal to a group member. For this reason, counterinsurgents- especially commanders, planners, and small-unit leaders- should avoid imposing their ideals of normalcy on a foreign culture problem.⁷⁶

This profound statement within the counterinsurgency doctrine details the notion that practitioners of the profession must not only be culturally sensitive, but more importantly they must also understand that their own perceptions can dramatically effect how they frame the problem and develop solutions. The manual also highlights the notion that perceptions both at home and abroad will affect the outcome of the operation.

⁷³ United States, Department of the Army, *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2006), Forward.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 2-9.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Forward.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 1-5.

Although the manual is written to cover one specific operation amongst the many types of missions that the Army must be prepared to execute, its ideas are testament that the Army is transforming its culture to increase effectiveness in reducing instability in conflict situations. More importantly, the concepts expressed in the new manual strengthen the argument that Army missions require the organization to broaden its normative assumption that combat skills alone define organizational effectiveness. In today's conflicts, leaders and soldiers need the cognitive skills to understand the situations they find themselves in and the intellect to find innovative methods to increase their effectiveness.

Army Operations Doctrine

Even more recent than *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, the Army published a revised *FM 3-0: Operations* in March 2008. The new operations manual is the Army's capstone doctrinal publication that provides the conceptual framework of how the Army will conduct all operations, not just counterinsurgency operations. In addition, as a capstone manual, the document sets the foundation for the development of all subordinate field manuals within the Army's inventory and provides the basis for all levels of the Army Education System curricula.⁷⁷ Some of the changes outlined within this manual include the requirement for Army units to train in the application of full-spectrum operations to ensure that it will have a balanced, versatile force able to provide expeditionary and campaign capabilities to joint and combine-force commanders.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ United States, Department of the Army, *FM 3-0: Operations...*, v.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 1-16.

Clearly influenced by the lessons learned from current operations, national security initiatives and the directives originating at the Department of Defense level, the new manual acknowledges the complexity of the contemporary environment with discussions that Army forces will likely not be able to separate civilians from the battlefield.⁷⁹ This is an overt acknowledgment that civilians will be predominant feature affecting the execution of all military operation. In addition, the manual details that these civilians and “their support are often the principal determinant for success in future conflicts,” creating a unique cognitive challenge for military practitioners.⁸⁰

As the first major revision to Army operational doctrine since the events of September 11, 2001, *FM 3-0: Operations* contains various examples of the cultural shift within the Army. The first example is the increased emphasis on a whole-of-government approach to operations and how the Army, serving as part of the joint force, fits into this process. The new manual fully acknowledges that “the Army’s primary purpose is deterrence, and should deterrence fail, decisively winning the Nation’s war by fighting within an interdependent joint team.”⁸¹ Furthermore, the new operations manual recognizes that military force alone will not likely resolve conflict. It states that in the current environment, the best method for resolving conflict involves a combined effort of all American and allied instruments of national power.⁸² These instruments of national power include the civilian and military elements that provide diplomatic or political,

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Forward.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, viii.

⁸² *Ibid.*

information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement functions.⁸³ Another indication of the change in Army culture described within the doctrine is the notion that “within the context of current operations worldwide, stability operations are often as important [as], or more important than, offensive and defensive operations.”⁸⁴ To accompany the standard offensive and defensive operations inherent to Army operations, the manual adds the requirement for proficiency in the tactical tasks that enhance civil security and civil control, restore essential services, support governance, and support economic and infrastructure development.⁸⁵ This broadening of the Army’s types of operations reinforces the Army’s obligations to, when called into action, ensure the safety, security and well-being of civil populations worldwide, and requires the organization to constantly seek a unified effort with other government and international agencies in bringing stability to unstable foreign environments and setting the conditions for a sustainable peace. These operation types are congruent with the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization’s (S/CRS) major technical sectors of security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure.⁸⁶ Although *FM 3-0* emphasizes the importance of stability operations, it also details that, in all operations, the degree of emphasis on offensive, defensive, and stability operations

⁸³ United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 February 2006): 13; available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/gwot.pdf>; internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

⁸⁴ United States, Department of the Army, *FM 3-0: Operations...*, vii.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 3-12.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 3-15.

fluctuates depending upon the situation.⁸⁷ The new concept of operations provides a flexible, adaptive response to the inherent complexities of the world and widens the often narrow focus of conventional Army operations.⁸⁸ In sum, the Army's new operational model demonstrates that "dominant landpower, while vital to operations, represents only one element of a broader campaign that requires the application of each element of national power."⁸⁹

Stability Operations

To complement the Army's newest capstone doctrine, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which includes the Army's doctrine writers, is concurrently revising subordinate doctrine. One of the major doctrinal efforts within the organization is the revision of the 2003 version of *FM 3-07: Stability Operations*.⁹⁰ This manual revision will clarify the specific operation types and supporting tasks that the Army must understand in order to successfully accomplish stability operations. Although the new *FM 3-07: Stability Operations* will be a step forward in terms of integrating a comprehensive, whole-of- government approach to stabilizing conflict regions, the Army continues to develop additional supporting doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to provide tactical units with the practical "how to" for higher-level doctrinal concepts.⁹¹

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 3-19.

⁸⁸ Melissa Bower, "FM 3-0: Doctrine Authors..."

⁸⁹ General William S. Wallace, "FM 3-0:..., 3.

⁹⁰ Szayna, Eaton, and Richardson, *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations...*, xix.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

The volumes of emerging doctrine serve as testament that the Army is heavily engaged in the process of translating concepts into practical application and better equipping its members with the intellectual tools necessary to operate across the spectrum of conflict. The Army has also recently funded a series of studies in an effort to understand and address the gaps between existing and emerging United States Army doctrine and the potential military requirements outlined by other government agencies. The RAND Arroyo Center, a nonprofit research and development center in the United States, headed one such study entitled *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues*.⁹² In August 2005, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, a subcomponent of the Department of State, compiled a list of individual tasks that, when taken as a whole, are intended to support a country's achieving a sustainable stability.⁹³ These tasks are captured within the Department of State's essential tasks matrix (ETM) for post-conflict reconstruction.⁹⁴ The RAND study compared the tasks outlined within the ETM with the August 2004 and July 2006 versions of *FM 7-15: The Army Universal Task List (AUTL)* and other Army doctrine to identify where the Army doctrine did not fully address potential requirements and to

⁹² *Ibid.*, 60.

⁹³ In July 2004, the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created to "lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy." See U.S. Department of State, "About S/CRS," available from <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm>; internet; accessed 15 April 2008.

⁹⁴ The United States, Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Matrix* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2005): iii; available from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/53464.pdf>; internet; accessed 15 April 2008.

recommend a range of doctrinal solutions to these issues.⁹⁵ This particular study primarily focused on the tasks associated with establishing security, because these are the tasks that the American land forces are particularly well suited for and are a prerequisite for effective execution of other stability and reconstruction tasks.⁹⁶ From all of this it is evident that the Army has expended considerable effort towards understanding and addressing current shortcomings within its professional literature.

Training

The United States Army Training and Leader Development model (Figure 2) demonstrates how the organization prepares its members and units for missions.⁹⁷ As indicated in the model, the entire organization is involved with the training and development process. This process occurs at institutional schools and training centers and is refined to specific unit needs and expectations within the operational units across the Army. All leaders within the organization are expected to continue self-development throughout their careers. The entire training and developmental process is greatly influenced by and influences the Army culture. This entire process is adapting to the changing environment with particular focus on developing the cognitive skills within its practitioners. It embodies a systems approach that ensures changes are enacted in all parts of the Army.

⁹⁵ Szayna, Eaton, and Richardson, *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations...*, 60.

⁹⁶ The study also recommended additional reports that would address potential Army requirements in the remaining technical sectors outline within S/CRS essential tasks matrix. *Ibid.*, 64.

⁹⁷ United States, Department of the Army, *FM 7-0: Training the Force* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2002): 1-6.



FIGURE 2- United States Army Unit and Leader Development Model.⁹⁸

Source: United States, Department of the Army, FM 7-0..., 1-6.

Culture & Language Training to Understand the “Human Terrain”

Some of the initial shortfalls that the Army experienced in both Afghanistan and Iraq have been attributed to the lack of understanding of or appreciation for societies and cultures.⁹⁹ The failure of soldiers and leaders to understand distinct belief-systems, values, customs, nuances and traditions often led to misunderstandings and tension when they were confronted with having to deal directly with the population.¹⁰⁰ As a result of

⁹⁸ United States, Department of the Army, *FM 7-0...*, 1-6.

⁹⁹ Sheila M. Jager, *On the Uses of Culture Knowledge* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 13 November 2004): 1; available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB817.pdf>; internet; accessed 15 April 2008.

¹⁰⁰ Montgomery McFate, “The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No 38 (3rd Quarter 2005): 44; [journal on-line]; available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/1038.pdf; internet; accessed 15 April 2008.

these lessons learned in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the entire Army has recognized the need to become more culturally attuned to local populations. This will increase their understanding of the current situations and further their ability to form potential solutions to any problems experienced.¹⁰¹ To highlight the need for a detailed understanding of culture, General David H. Petraeus stated:

Knowledge of the cultural terrain can be as important as, and sometimes even more important than, the knowledge of the geographical terrain. This observation acknowledges that the people are, in many respects, the decisive terrain, and that we must study the terrain in the same way that we have always studied the geographical terrain.¹⁰²

To counter the gap in cultural knowledge, cultural awareness and languages skills are being emphasized at every level of the Army. The institution has increased its focus on providing cultural awareness training for all soldiers and units deploying into an operational theater. This better enables the practitioner to understand the frame of mind of various actors within the environment. In addition, the Army has made computer-based, language-learning tools, including Rosetta Stone® software, as well as cultural-based computer gaming software, available, to all active Army, National Guard, Reservists and Department of the Army civilian personnel through its Distributed Learning System's Army e-Learning.¹⁰³ Cultural awareness training is also being introduced at all of the institutional schools across the ranks. This concerted effort to

¹⁰¹ General David H. Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering In Iraq," *Military Review* (January-February 2006): 8; [journal on-line]; available from <http://marshallfoundation.org/documents/Petraeus1.pdf>; internet; accessed 5 April 2008.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁰³ United States, Department of the Army Public Affairs, "News Release: U.S. Army to Provide Rosetta Stone® Foreign Language Training" (Washington, D.C.: 30 September 2005); available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/10/mil-051004-army02.htm>; internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

address an identified knowledge gap will aid the Army in understanding the “human terrain,” and is applicable to all types of operations. While these recent programs are predominantly focused on the cultural intricacies present in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is grasping the importance of culture in all operations. It is creating an internal culture of learning and knowledge that extends well beyond the application lethal force on the battlefield.

Institutional and Operational Training

The Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTC) have also undergone significant changes in the last couple of years. The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, as well as the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) at Hohenfels, Germany, have transitioned their focus from the previous simulated high-intensity battlefields to a more realistic picture of the contemporary environment that reflects current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁰⁴ These changes include constructing Arab villages, bringing in Iraqi-Americans to serve in a variety of roles, like as sheiks, imams, mayors, and host-nation security forces.¹⁰⁵ In addition, the scenarios now include a wide range of warfighting, security, governance, civil affairs, and stability operations with a constant simulated media presence when before a majority of these components were largely ignored.¹⁰⁶ All

¹⁰⁴ Harvey, *Army Transformation...*, slide 23.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* slide 23.

¹⁰⁶ For detailed examples on the multitude of changes occurring within the Combined Training Centers, See Robert W. Cone, “NTC: The Changing National Training Center,” *Military Review*, vol. 86, iss. 3 (May – June 2006). [journal on-line]; available from <http://proquest.umi.com/>; internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

of the training centers, both active and reserve, are constantly improving their facilities and scenarios to better replicate the complex counterinsurgency and civil affairs operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹⁰⁷ Additionally, these changes are facilitated by the training centers continuous feedback from deployed Army units which allow for unfound realism in the training environment.¹⁰⁸

Not only is the institutional Army, consisting of the infrastructure and Army organizations that recruit, train, equip, and prepare soldiers for operational missions, changing how and where it is conducting training, but operational units are altering their methods to meet the variety of challenges they must face in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some units are partnering with community organizations to enhance their readiness for future missions. One example of this occurred prior to the 1st Cavalry Division's deployment to Iraq in 2003. The unit, understanding that success on the battlefield would rest heavily its ability to aid civil services, did extensive pre-deployment training with two local cities near Fort Hood, Texas.¹⁰⁹ This innovative method of training Army units and leaders on the intricacies of running urban areas is only one of many examples of how Army leaders are identifying needed capabilities and demonstrating their resourcefulness to prepare

¹⁰⁷ Andrew Feickert, *Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress*, Report Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 18 January 2008): 7; available from <http://fas.org/spg/crs/natsec/RL34333.pdf>; internet; accessed 10 April 2008.

¹⁰⁸ Gary Sheftick, "CTC Innovations Prep Units for Iraq, Afghanistan," *Army News Service*, 17 June 2005; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/06/mil-050617-arnews02.htm>; internet; accessed 3 April 2008.

¹⁰⁹ MG Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review* (July-August 2005): 10; [journal on-line]; available from <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/chiarelli.pdf>; internet; accessed 10 March 2008.

their units for a complex environment. These innovative methods are often unorthodox and contrast with the previous rigid training structures that the Army used in the past.

Educating To Build Knowledge

In order to understand of the magnitude of the changes within the Army and to identify how the profession of arms is adapting to the new operating environment one can examine recent changes within the professional military education (PME). In December 2005, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued his instructions to the services concerning Officer Professional Military Education (OPME):

In its broadest conception, education conveys general bodies of knowledge and develops habits of mind applicable to a broad spectrum of endeavors. At its highest levels and in its purest forms, education fosters breadth of view, diverse perspectives and critical analysis, abstract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, and innovative thinking, particularly with respect to complex, non-linear problems. This contrasts with training, which focuses on the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific functions and tasks.¹¹⁰

In effect, this policy explains how education and training relates to competency within the military profession.

Over the last several years, the United States Army's PME system has dramatically changed to the match the changing requirements of the profession. As a subset of this system, the Army officer education system (OES) consists of common-core training and task-specific training that develops expert knowledge within the officer corps corresponding with the expected roles that each individual will have within the

¹¹⁰ United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01C: Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)* (Washington, D.C.: 07 August 2007): Enclosure A, 1-2; available from http://www.js.pentagon.mil/doctrine/education/cjcsi1800_01c.pdf; internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

organization. As part of the policy on education it must be noted that “all of the military schools and development programs include elements of both education and training.”¹¹¹

The challenge for the institution is to find the right balance between officers who are generalists and those who are specialists, as well as the right balance of knowledge that an individual member is able to apply to his specific role in the profession.

OES begins with initial military training at each officer’s pre-commissioning source. Since 2006, the initial military training for all Army officers was modified to include three phases of Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). The overall purpose of the course is to

develop competent and confident leaders imbued with Warrior Ethos who, regardless of branch [specialty], are grounded in field craft and are skilled in leading Soldiers, training subordinates and employing and maintaining equipment.¹¹²

BOLC Phase I occurs prior to commissioning and aims to educate cadets and officer candidates on the Army values and traditions, to assess their readiness and potential for future commissioning, and to develop the broad basis for continued development.¹¹³

Upon commissioning, officers enter BOLC Phase II, a six-week, branch-immaterial course in small-unit leadership and tactics that educate and train students in the warfighting tactics and techniques required of all officers.¹¹⁴ Phase III is a branch or classification-specific course that provides the specific combat skills and knowledge

¹¹¹ United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01C...*, 2.

¹¹² Lisa Alley, “Basic Officer Leadership Course Gets Green Light For Officer Education,” *Army News Service* (25 February 2005); available at <http://www.mccoy.army.mil/readingroom/triad/03112005/BOLCgreen%20lightforeducation.htm>; internet; accessed 24 March 2008.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

required to meet the needs of the specific specialty.¹¹⁵ Although the BOLC program focuses predominantly on the fundamental knowledge and skills that are required in warfare, it also includes general cultural awareness and negotiation skills necessary to interact with other societies.

After four to seven years at their first assignment, officers return to a branch-specific Captain's Career Course (CCC). This course educates and trains officers on common-core skills required regardless of their branch and the specialized skills necessary to command a company-size unit within their branch.¹¹⁶ In addition, this course educates officers on the skills required to serve as a staff officer within a battalion or brigade staff. Each of the branch-specific career courses has added stability operations and cultural awareness to their previous curricula. Although this effort is predominantly focused on tactical-level warfighting actions, it provides a foundation for working amongst the population and understanding the holistic nature of the operating environment.

Acknowledging the need to increase its expert knowledge within more senior members of the profession of arms, the Army has institutionalized three recent developments in the OES for mid-career officers, in the ranks of senior captains and majors. The first change is that mid-career officers are chosen to become specialists in a specific functional area that the Army needs.¹¹⁷ This is the point in an officer's career in which he decides if he will continue in the operational career field or will gain a specialty

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ United States, Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3: Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 11 December 2007): 24.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

that complements and supports the warfighting functions. These specialists are sent to civilian or military schools to gain the expert knowledge that they will need to practice their specific service. Examples of these functional area designations include acquisitions, information operations, and other specialties. The second change within the officer education system is the expansion of approved advanced civil schooling (ACS) opportunities focused on disciplines supporting increased cultural awareness, diplomacy, governance, security, and operational skills. The expanded graduate school program was initiated in November 2005.¹¹⁸ This program enhances the development of broad intellectual capabilities that will enable Army leaders to exercise better judgment in their decision making, particularly when dealing with ill-defined problems. Moreover, the program allows Army officers to gain different perspectives and world views as they interact with civilian students and academics.

While the junior level courses in OES are quickly changing to meet the growing complexities of the environment and incorporate lessons learned from both Iraq and Afghanistan, the most drastic changes within the OES are occurring in the mid-level course taught at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the senior-level course (designed for senior lieutenant colonel and colonels) at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Recently, the mid-level Army Intermediate Level Education (ILE) curricula transformed its focus from large-scale conventional operations to “full-spectrum joint, interagency, multi-national operations that stress cultural and religious aspects of

¹¹⁸ United States, Department of the Army, *Military Personnel (MILPER) message no. 05-293 AHRC-OPL-L: Expanded Graduate School Opportunities for Junior Officers*, 23 November 2005; available from http://www.military.com/MilitaryCareers/Content/0,14556,MPDC_Army_Officer_News_120105-2,00.htm; internet; accessed 24 March 2008.

the operating environment.”¹¹⁹ This course now incorporates 200 hours of counterinsurgency and stability operations in its core program.¹²⁰ Additionally, the course now offers more than 40 hours of stability-related electives and mandatory regional studies.¹²¹

The significance of the change in the curricula is profound. Not only has the course shifted focus away from high-intensity warfare, but it has institutionalized the notion that wars cannot be conducted by only military forces. This latter focus emphasizes that war is, and should be, an endeavor involving the whole-of-government. These changes highlight that militaries must integrate with all of the elements of national power in a unified effort to influence the operating environment. This philosophy has been reinforced through an active enrollment of civilians from other government agencies as students within the course. In addition, the change to curricula demonstrates that the United States Army has changed the way it looks at problems by using a wider range of cognitive processes. This includes understanding the sources of instability and conflict so that Army practitioners can contribute effectively to the resolution, not just treat the symptoms. The change in focus also shows that the Army is attempting to impart the professional knowledge required to allow officers to better make sense of the world in which they operate.

These changes to curricula are also affecting the higher-level courses within the professional military education. The Army War College is broadening leader expertise

¹¹⁹ United States. Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Report to Congress on the Implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05...*, 15.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 15.

by the implementation of “a mandatory 30-hour regional studies course, a 12-hour Middle East Symposium, and a series of 30-hour electives covering cultural and regional issues.”¹²² The War College and other senior service schools have drastically increased their efforts in analyzing and studying stability operations at the operational and strategic levels.

In short, the United States Army is using a multitude of initiatives to build the knowledge of its practitioners so that they can better understand their operating environment and the mechanisms that influence it. This effort is apparent throughout the organization and demonstrates how the culture is adapting to reflect their role in conflict management. These changes indicate an attempt to become more effective in operating across the multitude of tasks that the institution and its members might have to perform. The Army is leveraging these initiatives to increase its capability and capacity for the stability operations. More importantly, the Army is equipping its members with the cognitive skills to better understand and adapt to the complexity an ever-changing environment. No longer is the institution teaching its leaders and soldiers what to think, but it has transitioned to educating its practitioners on how to think.¹²³ This will, in turn, allow the institution to the challenges of today and those of tomorrow.

¹²² *Ibid.* 15.

¹²³ United States, Department of the Army, *FM 3-0...*, D-1.

CHAPTER FOUR- Manifestations of the Changed Culture

Conflict is an inherent feature of human affairs. Although violent confrontations can manifest themselves in various forms, the underlying cause generally involves a disagreement through in which various parties perceive threats to their wants or needs.¹²⁴ Many states and regions across the world are currently plagued with internal conflict. Due to the dynamic nature of social interaction and the continually-evolving global environment, these situations vary greatly in their scale, intensity, and unpredictability. Conflicts in today's environment are often extremely complex and they evolve and transform over time, based on a multitude of factors. In order to be successful in transforming these types of complex conflicts, the United States Army has had to continually adapt its practices. The Army is preparing its practitioners for a future that will be characterized by persistent conflict of all types, from those that might require nonviolent interventions to those that warrant conventional warfare. In order to do this, the Army continues to broaden the cognitive abilities of its members so that they can judiciously apply direct action and indirect action to shape the environment in terms favorable to their assigned mission.

Cultural transformation within the United States Army has encouraged its members to strive for the knowledge required to better understand the nature of the conflict, to conceptualize the multitude of relationships among the variables affecting the conflict, and to strive for innovative solutions to managing conflict. In sum, this emerging institutional culture fully recognizes that the most effective method of affecting a wide variety of conflict situations is making sure its members understand how

¹²⁴ Michael Nicholson, *Conflict Analysis* (London: The English Universities Press, 1970), 2.

to deal with these problems cognitively as opposed to merely physically. This includes developing practitioners with adaptive qualities that allow them to influence the minds of various actors within the environment. Reinforcing this notion, Robert H. Scales Jr., a retired United States Army Major General, noted:

[officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan] are telling us that wars are won as much by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions – all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation.¹²⁵

Therefore, the culture within the United States Army today has changed to meet the demands of understanding societies amongst which it operates and how best to influence the outcomes that will ultimately lead to stability in any region.

This change in the Army culture has materialized in how the institution and its practitioners approach current operations. Unlike other cultural transformations that evolve over extended periods of time like the changes after Vietnam, this transformation has occurred at an accelerated rate, due to the immediacy of the need for change.¹²⁶ Over the last several years, almost sixty percent of the Army has deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan, some individuals and units serving several tours.¹²⁷ During this time, the large majority of practitioners have come to realize that the previous approach of combat operations leading directly to victory is not effective in the contemporary operating

¹²⁵ Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Culture-Centric Warfare,” *United States Naval Institute. Proceedings*, vol. 130, iss. 10 (October 2004); [Journal on-line]; available from <http://proquest.umi.com>; internet; accessed 20 April 2008.

¹²⁶ This article highlights the immediate need for the Army to cultivate a culture of innovation and adaptation. See Brigadier General David A Fastabend and Robert H. Simpson, “‘Adapt or Die’ ...

¹²⁷ Gina Cavallaro, “If You Haven’t Deployed Yet, Stand By for Orders,” *Army Times Online*, 24 February 2008; available from http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/02/army_deploy_080224w/; internet; accessed 8 April 2008.

environment. Furthermore, the Army has recognized that success will only be realized when the host nation has the ability to establish and maintain civil order amongst the population and act responsibly towards its neighbors.

The Army has institutionalized, through its ethos, doctrine, education, and training, the notion that its involvement in conflict is complemented by, but also, extends beyond its ability to use coercive force. This idea does not diminish the vital need for knowledge and skills required to wage a decisive conventional engagement. Rather it promotes the understanding that force alone will likely not lead to an enduring resolution of conflict in terms favorable to the nation and that a comprehensive approach is required to win the peace. This commitment to and integration of the all elements of national power throughout the planning and execution of its missions is a profound change to the Army's previous operational concepts. Other examples of this cultural transformation reside in the Army's increased efforts to build host nation capacities. Understanding the vital importance of a legitimate host-nation government that can sustain a lasting peace within its own borders, the Army has devoted significant time and effort towards helping nations build the capacity to govern and secure their own population from internal and external threats. This commitment to building the host nation's institutions demonstrates the Army's internalization that it now has a larger role in setting the conditions for a sustained peace in conflict torn regions. Finally, the Army has fundamentally changed its approach in influencing both adversarial and friendly populations in order to shape the operating environment. This shift is outlined and emphasized within the new *FM 3-0 Operations*. The manual highlights information and knowledge as vital elements in all

aspects of Army operations.¹²⁸ All of these developments are being actualized through the Army's activities in today's conflict regions.

The Human Terrain

Understanding the effect of operations as seen through the lens of the Iraqi culture and psyche is a foremost planning consideration of every operation.

Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli¹²⁹
Commanding General Task Force Baghdad 2004-2005

The last seven years have proven that it is vital to understand “the people among whom [the United States Military forces] operate as well as the cultural characteristics and propensities of the enemies....”¹³⁰ The characteristics of the local society include the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements that are often included in the term “human terrain.”¹³¹ These factors generally outline the frame of reference in which each individual views the world. Having an appreciation for these factors enables one to better understand motivations and perceptions that form the basis for decisions. In turn, this appreciation will also allow the practitioners to operate more effectively with a foreign environment. Many of the successes in current operations stem from units and individuals who took the initiative to better understand and respect the local culture.¹³²

While the Army recognized that it needed to improve each practitioner's knowledge of

¹²⁸ United States, Department of the Army, *FM 3-0: Operations...*, 7-1.

¹²⁹ Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace...”, 14-15.

¹³⁰ Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, and Don Smith, “The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century,” *Military Review*, vol. 86, iss. 5 (September-October 2006): 8; <http://proquest.umi.com/>; internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 11.

culture and language, the institution also realized that it could leverage civilian expertise in social sciences. This would to help Army units gain a deeper understanding of their environment.

The United States Army has recently implemented a revolutionary initiative aimed at addressing the lack of knowledge of foreign societies and cultures. The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), a United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) organization out of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the lead agency in the formation and implementation of the Human Terrain System (HTS).¹³³ Enlisting the expertise of civilian anthropologists, sociologists, and regional experts, the United States Army has created an integrated system for collecting, analyzing, storing, and sharing detailed knowledge about the societies in which soldiers and units are operating.

Understanding the complexity of a society is a daunting task. In an attempt to meet this challenge, the Army captures vast amounts of information from their surroundings to better understand the systems and subsystems that are present in their area of operations. Although, there are several hundred different categories of information used, the following list provides a brief example of some key categories:

- Key regional personalities
- Social structures
- Links between clans and families
- Economic issues
- Public communications
- Agricultural production¹³⁴

The entire Human Terrain System (HTS) incorporates databases, subject matter experts, and research cells within the United States.¹³⁵ It also deploys Human Terrain

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

Teams (HTT) with many of the brigade-size units in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These teams consist of both military personnel and civilian experts with the task of providing the commander and the staff with the perspective of the local population. Figure 3 outlines the structure of the human terrain teams and specific duties of each member within the team.




Figure 3 - Human Terrain Team (HTT)¹³⁶
Source: Kipp, “The Human Terrain Team...”, 12.

These teams are now an integral part of the military decision making process (MDMP) at the brigade level and allow the organization to better understand what motivates individuals and groups within the operating environment.¹³⁷ This knowledge has allowed the Army to view, “[operations] from a human perspective, from a social scientist’s perspective.”¹³⁸ This further allows the commanders and staff to make informed decisions on how and when to prosecute direct and indirect actions in an

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹³⁸ David Rohde, “Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones,” *The New York Times*, 5 October 2007; available from <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9d04e3d81130f936a35753c1a9619c8b63;internet>; accessed 4 April 2008.

attempt to shape the environment. In one case, a brigade commander operating in Afghanistan commented that after he integrated a Human Terrain Team (HTT) into his staff, traditional combat operations dropped by sixty percent.¹³⁹ A better appreciation of the cultural setting within their area allowed the unit to understand how they could elicit support from the population and prioritize their efforts towards bringing governance down to the people.¹⁴⁰

The Human Terrain System (HTS) is an innovative method of gaining an appreciation for and understanding of the cultural aspects that shape different perspectives within a given society. When properly implemented, the Human Terrain System (HTS) helps clarify previous assumptions or gaps in understanding that had plagued the Army in previous years. This tool allows the commander and his or her staff the ability to visualize the complexity of the social systems within their area of operations so that they are more capable of understanding root causes of conflict and conceptualizing possible second and third-order consequences of their actions. It further allows the commander and his staff the ability to better understand the situation from the perspective of the population and potential adversaries.

Whole of Government - Capacity Building

Many conflicts originate from or are fueled by the host nation's lack of capacity to effectively and fairly govern its own territory. Since stability is largely dependent on a local population's perception that its government is able to meet individual needs and

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

interests, ultimate success in providing long-lasting civil order must come from the host nation. To aid in restoring order in conflict regions, the United States has adopted a comprehensive approach that involves all elements of national power working together to strengthen the host nation's capacity to stabilize a region. Since the majority of the expert knowledge required to aid in the restoration of a functioning society resides within civilian governmental and non-governmental agencies, the military has recently focused much effort towards increasing civil-military cooperation.

Over the last several years, the United States Army has taken innovative measures to strengthen its ability to work in coordination with a variety of civilian agencies and host nation partners. These measures extend beyond solely setting the security conditions for the legitimate government to establish civil order. In 2003, after an interagency concept development between the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), whose area of responsibility includes Afghanistan and Iraq, created and deployed numerous Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to Afghanistan.¹⁴¹ These provincial reconstruction teams combine military personnel and civilian staff from the diplomatic corps and developmental agencies with host nation government officials in an effort to increase the host nation's ability to govern its own territories.¹⁴² These teams are led by civilian agencies, but the majority of the manpower

¹⁴¹ Michael J. Dziedzic and Colonel Michael K. Seidl, *Special Report No 147: Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, September 2005): 3; available from <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr147.pdf>; internet; accessed 19 March 2008.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 2.

is often supplied by the military.¹⁴³ The original teams were first fielded in Afghanistan and then quickly replicated in Iraq. As of September 2007, there are over twenty coalition PRTs operating in Afghanistan and a projected twenty-five PRTs scheduled to operate in Iraq.¹⁴⁴ While the original PRTs provided widespread support for provincial areas, smaller PRTs are being designed and integrated directly into brigade size tactical units in Iraq.¹⁴⁵ These efforts consolidate expertise in numerous fields and areas such as electricity, healthcare, water and sewage treatment, animal husbandry, and more.¹⁴⁶ Although not strictly an Army-led initiative, PRTs are being increasingly integrated into Army planning and execution. They provide a vital link to the political elements of the host nation so that Army practitioners can better work in support of their national and regional processes. The integration of PRTs into Army planning and actions illustrate the whole-of-government approach and the Army's efforts towards stabilizing conflict through indirectly influencing the local populations.

Building Security Forces

Dr. Colin Gray, a professor of international politics and strategic studies at the University of Reading, United Kingdom, notes that in battles fought amongst the people,

¹⁴³ United States Congressman Vic Snyder, *Hearing on the Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq*, Statement of Subcommittee Chairman, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 110th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C.: 5 September 2007; available from http://armedservices.house.gov/apps/list/speech/armedsvc_dem/snyderos090507.shtml; internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ Gerry J. Gilmore, "Reconstruction Teams Helps Iraqis Connect with Central Government," *American Forces Press Service*, 25 July, 2007, [journal on-line]; available from <http://defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46835>; internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

“decisive combat occurs in and about the minds of civilians, not on the battlefield. Protection of the people must be job one.”¹⁴⁷ The role of protecting the local population ultimately must be assumed by a legitimate host-nation security force. This will ensure that the lasting conditions for stability will be established and the conditions will remain beyond the United States’ involvement in both regions. *FM 3-0: Operations* outlines the Army’s concept of civil security and defines the institution’s perceived role in the process of securing a population:

Civil security involves protecting the populace from external and internal threats. Ideally, Army forces defeat external threats posed by enemy forces that can attack population centers. Simultaneously, they assist host-nation police and security elements as the host nation maintains internal security against terrorists, criminals, and small, hostile groups. In some situations, no adequate host-nation capability for civil security exists. Then, Army forces provide most civil security while developing host-nation capabilities. For the other stability tasks, civil security is required. As soon as the host-nation security forces can safely perform this task, Army forces transition civil security responsibilities to them.¹⁴⁸

To address this issue, the United States Army has made dramatic efforts towards building host-nation armies, police forces, and border security forces within Iraq and Afghanistan. Although, prior to 2001, the task of building and training indigenous forces was once the domain of special operations units, today conventional army units are providing much of the manpower towards this effort. The Army now trains and deploys military training teams in both countries. These teams are helping to build the institutional structures and systems that will eventually enable the host nations to recruit, train, sustain, and employ their own forces to provide for security from internal and external threats. In recent

¹⁴⁷ Colin S. Gray, “Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 2, No. 2 (Winter 2007): 43; [journal on-line]; available from <http://maxwell.af.mil/au/ssq/2007/Winter/gray.pdf>; internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

¹⁴⁸ United States, Department of the Army, *FM 3-0: Operations...*, 3-13.

testimony before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Major General (Retired) Robert H. Scales commented that building an effective Iraqi National Security apparatus is vital to the creation of a stable environment in the country.¹⁴⁹ Currently, the United States Army, along with joint and coalition forces, employs over 5,000 military members as embedded trainers within Iraqi units and training centers.¹⁵⁰ This effort has even included instructors of the United States Command and General Staff in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, deploying to Iraq in order to help develop and revise curricula for newly formed Iraqi military schools.¹⁵¹ In addition, there are 1,300 servicemen and women serving as trainers for Iraqi headquarters, joint, army, and ministerial staffs.¹⁵²

The United States Army has structured specific teams to continue to train these host-nation forces on counterinsurgency and conventional tactics, while tactical Army units are pairing up with host-nation units in the field. Rather than focusing efforts on their own ability to secure the populace, these tactical Army units are focusing efforts on enabling the host-nation forces to take the lead on operations. This strengthens the population's perception that their government institutions are legitimate and capable of providing a stable and secure environment. This also conveys the message that the

¹⁴⁹ Major General (Ret) Robert H. Scales, Jr. testified before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on 2 April 2008. See United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Iraq After the Surge: Military Prospects*. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2 April 2008. available from <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2008/ScalesTestimony080402a.pdf>; internet; accessed 5 April 2008.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ Jeff Crawley, "CGSC Team Helps Iraqi Staff College," *The Fort Leavenworth Lamp Online* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 28 September 2006), [journal on-line]; accessed from <http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/articles/2006/09/28/news/news1.txt>; internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

¹⁵² United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Iraq After the Surge*.

United States Army does not intend occupy the country indefinitely and that it is investing in the future civil order within the country. By building host-nation capacity and letting the indigenous forces take the lead in military operations, the United States Army is creating the conditions for the host nation to take responsibility for its own security and ensuring that both the American military and the host-nation government are committed to setting conditions for enduring success.

Due to the level of violence within certain conflict regions and the lack of civilian experts readily available to aid in restoring civil order within these areas, in recent times, the United States Army has assumed many roles which were once considered well outside its area of expertise. Although the Army has personnel who specialize in working with civil authorities and local populations, the overall number of these specialized soldiers within each tactical unit's area of responsibility is normally limited.¹⁵³ Therefore, in the absence of alternatives, tactical unit commanders often deal with the civil government directly.¹⁵⁴ The change that has taken place within the Army's education and training systems aims at preparing these leaders for the growing set of responsibilities they must assume. While destroying identified enemy forces remains a priority, the majority of Army leaders at all levels have come to recognize that establishing a safe and secure environment, building legitimate governance, reconstructing infrastructure, and providing humanitarian relief are equally, if not more, important in some circumstances. The latter tasks aim at establishing a new civil order founded on the trust and confidence that the civilian population has towards both the

¹⁵³ Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency...", 7.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 7.

military forces and their respective host-nation government. This marks a radical departure from the understanding of their military role that was held prior to current deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now the Army focuses not solely on the physical destruction of enemy forces on the battlefield, but also on shaping popular support and opinion through helping to build a stable civil society. Through their actions and messages, the Army is targeting the cognitive dimensions of conflict.

Information

The use of information on the battlefield is another drastic change in how the Army conducts operations aimed at influencing the cognitive processes of actors within the operating environment. *FM 3-0: Operations* details the importance of information in all aspects of Army operations.¹⁵⁵ The Army's use of information targets the decision-making processes internal to the organization and external to all individuals in the operating environment. The manual explains the uses of information as:

Commanders use ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], coupled with knowledge management and information management, to make better decisions more rapidly than their enemies and adversaries. Simultaneously, they direct information tasks to hamper their opponents' decision making ability, protect their own, gain the trust and confidence of the people, and win the support of the diverse audiences throughout their operational environment.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵ The new version of FM 3-0 outlines a long list of capabilities that contribute to information tasks. These capabilities include: Leader and soldier engagement, public affairs, psychological operations, combat camera, strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy, physical attack, electronic attack, electronic warfare support, computer network attack, computer network exploitation, information assurance, computer network defense, electronic protection, operations security, physical security, counterintelligence, and military deception. See United States, Department of the Army, *FM 3-0: Operations...*, 7-3.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

While using information to improve situational awareness amongst members of the Army and attack the will of enemy forces is not a new concept, the increasingly widespread use of and emphasis placed on using information to shape the perceptions of the population is. This integration of information operations into Army missions is enabled by the cultural awareness that it is building within the organization. This understanding allows the Army a better comprehension of how ideas are sent, received, and understood by the society in which they are operating.

The practice of using information to isolate enemy forces and shape popular opinion is now common through every echelon of the Army. Through experiences in the both Iraq and Afghanistan, Army practitioners realized that every action sent a message. Information has become a weapon that can easily change the outcome of a conflict situation. The enemy forces often exploited opportunities to shape perceptions of friendly actions in a manner that would promote their cause.¹⁵⁷ In order to use information to their own benefit, the Army now employs an array of non-violent capabilities and practices to shape the perception and decision-making of adversarial target audiences. These capabilities and practices include deception operations, computer network operations, operations security, electronic warfare, psychological operations, civil affairs operations, the use of combat camera and public affairs.¹⁵⁸ Understanding the growing importance of informing and influencing the populace, the Army is incorporating all these available means to accomplishing these vital tasks. Consequently,

¹⁵⁷ Steven Metz, *Learning from Iraq: ...*, 20.

¹⁵⁸ Curtis D. Boyd, "Army IO is Psyop: Influencing More With Less," *Military Review* (May-June 2007): 67-68; [journal on-line]; available from <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun07/Boyd.pdf>; internet; accessed 8 April 2008.

information operations are no longer deemed a separate function, but rather, a vital part of every action that the Army executes.¹⁵⁹ These operations are synchronized with combat operations in order to ensure a synergistic effect that goes far beyond conventional combat.

Similar to the many of the ideas captured by Peter Nicholson in his article, “Effects-Based Strategy: Operations in the Cognitive Domain,” the Army has recently focused much effort towards informing and influencing the adversarial population, third-party opinion, and world opinion.¹⁶⁰ These efforts aim at supplying these target audiences with truthful and accurate information concerning Army operations, in order to diminish support for the adversary, while increasing support towards their own cause.¹⁶¹ Rather than a sole reliance on technology to dominate the information domain, the Army is now emphasizing human aspects of information operations. This includes the individual soldier’s ability to influence societal systems. The Army uses its soldiers and leaders as mediums for getting their message out through the use of information engagements. Information engagements are considered to be:

The integrated employment of public affairs to inform [United States] and friendly audience; psychological operations, combat camera, [United States] Government strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign audiences; and, leader and Soldier engagements to support both efforts.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ The new version of FM 3-0 details that “Every engagement, battle, and major operation requires complementary information operations to both inform the global audience and to influence audiences within the operational area...” See Department of the Army, *FM 3-0: Operations...*, 4-3.

¹⁶⁰ Nicholson, “Effects-Based Strategy...”, 140.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² United States, Department of the Army, *FM 3-0: Operations...*, Glossary-7.

Commanders and leaders at all levels are capitalizing on the various mechanisms available to engage human perceptions throughout the operational environment. There are countless examples of the military and the Army actively seeking new methods to get their message out into the public domain. Numerous recent examples demonstrate the cultural shift that fully embraces the ability to influence the cognitive domain.

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, recently stated on an on-line blog site that Multi-national Forces Iraq (MNF-I) currently posts unclassified videos of Army operations on the popular website *YouTube*.¹⁶³ Lieutenant General Caldwell explained that the purpose of these videos was to provide vivid examples of the power of the American military and to strengthen public resolve at home. These videos also aimed at thwarting enemy actions on the front line. Furthermore, Lieutenant General Caldwell stated that the Army encourages soldiers to interact with the media, to post personal accounts contain non-operational information on blogs, and to post videos on *YouTube* with the intent of getting their stories out. Along with empowering soldiers as a medium for information engagements, leaders are expected to educate their subordinates on the possible second and third order effects of their actions.¹⁶⁴ Even more profound examples of the military evolving to influence the popular opinion includes recent interviews conducted by Lieutenant General Caldwell. Over the last several months, he has appeared on *The Daily Show* with Jon Stewart and *Al Jazeera* in an attempt to inform

¹⁶³ Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV. "Changing the Organizational Culture (Updated)," available from <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/01/changing-the-organizational-cu-1/>; internet; accessed 8 April 2008.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

a wide international audience of the Army's emphasis on stability operations.¹⁶⁵ These media engagements highlight the cultural shift within the United States Army and demonstrate the institution's emphasis on building the public perception of trust and confidence in how the Army operates.

The cultural transformation within the United States Army has positioned the institution and its practitioners to strive for the knowledge required to better understand the nature of the conflict, to conceptualize the multitude of relationships among the variables affecting the conflict, and to strive for innovative solutions to managing the conflict. This transformation has materialized throughout Army operations abroad and in garrison. The entire institution continues to focus on gaining knowledge about the societies in which they are operating. Furthermore, the Army has embraced the importance of the human element of the environment, as demonstrated by the recent introduction of the Human Terrain System. This knowledge contributes to more effective decision making and the ability to better influence the perceptions of various actors in the operating environment. Understanding that it is impossible to fully control human behavior, the Army has shifted much effort towards non-violent methods that use information to influence behavior. In addition, the Army has shifted a large portion of its operations towards building host-nation institutions and capabilities in an attempt to empower the local governance with the tools necessary to maintain an enduring peace. These efforts are geared towards increasing the perception of legitimacy, trust, and confidence between local populations and their respective governments. All of these

¹⁶⁵ Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, "Address to Worldwide Public Affairs Symposium" (McLean, VA, 31 March 2008); available from <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/LTGCaldwellSpeech-200803300001-DOC.pdf>; internet; accessed 16 April 2008.

efforts demonstrate the cultural shift within the Army and the greater emphasis that the institution places on using the cognitive domain to transform and manage conflict.

Conclusion

The most powerful tool any soldier carries is not his weapon but his mind.

General David H. Petraeus¹⁶⁶
Commanding General,
Multi-National Forces Iraq

The Army is a professional institution that serves the people of the United States.

States Army has often had to assume the majority of the tasks associated with stabilizing conflict regions. In order to ensure that the Army and the other services can effectively accomplish these types of missions the civilian leadership within the Department of Defense made clear that stability operations are a core military mission, which shall be given priority equal to combat operations. Since management of conflict and reducing instability often requires more than the ability to use coercive or destructive force against an adversary, the Army has had to readdress its previously narrow focus on conventional warfighting.

To meet this need, over the last seven years the United States Army has broadened its culture from one solely focused on the physical domination of the battlefield to one that places special emphasis on the cognitive dimension of the operating environment. This transformation within the Army reinforces the importance of the human element of conflict. The Army has drastically changed how it develops and prepares its members for the operations that span the continuum from peacetime military engagements to major combat operations. Furthermore, this transformation has materialized in the innovative measures that units are employing in conflict regions. These practices extend well beyond the previous norms of military operations.

As a profession, the United States Army continues to develop and reinforce a specific professional knowledge base amongst its practitioners, better enabling them to effectively execute their assigned roles. The current transformation within the United States Army has positioned the institution and its practitioners to strive for a better understanding of the nature of the conflict, to conceptualize the multitude of relationships among the variables affecting the conflict, and to seek innovative solutions

to managing the conflict. No longer does the institution focus primarily on “what to think.” Rather, the institution is focused on ensuring that its members understand “how to think.” This shift, in turn, allows the soldiers and leaders to operate more effectively in the complex, ambiguous, ever-changing nature of the contemporary operating environment.

The Army has recently refined a process for gathering, storing and disseminating new knowledge and understanding across the institution at an accelerated rate. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, serves as one of the central features in this process. Soldier and leaders who have identified lessons learned from experience or study are encouraged to send updates to CALL. These updates and observations are made accessible to other members of the organization. Rather than relying on previously localized methods of transferring lessons learned by units, the institution has centralized the process to increase efficiency and effectiveness. This same information also contributes to changes within doctrine, leader development, and training.

Understanding the need to capture the lessons learned from contingency operations around the world and the need to provide its leaders and soldiers with relevant principles and theory concerning the changing nature of Army operations, the institution has recently updated a large majority of its doctrine. These updates include the recent releases of *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* and *FM 3-0 Operations*. Both references highlight the importance of the human element of the environment and the notion that wars can not be won by military forces alone. Additionally, these references outline the need for flexible, adaptable leaders who are able use offensive, defensive, and stability-

related tasks to shape the environment in a manner consistent with their assigned mission.

The institutional army has also transformed how it conducts pre-mission training for units preparing to deploy on contingency operations. In order to better replicate the complexity of the current operating environment, all of the combined training centers now utilize scenarios that incorporate warfighting, security, governance, civil affairs, and stability operations. These scenarios include role players that simulate the various adversarial, neutral, and friendly actors that units will have to deal with during contingency operations. Continuous feedback between deployed units and those individuals running the training centers ensures that the training conducted replicates the situations that units will face once they are deployed.

While the training centers are geared predominantly towards preparing deploying units for operations, the Army's education system focuses on instilling general bodies of knowledge and habits of the mind throughout the entire organization. Recent changes in the education system aim at fostering diverse perspectives, abstract reasoning, and a better understanding of the multitude of variables that can possibly affect military operations. This includes an increased focus on culture, societies, governance, and human relations. These changes aim at creating "pentathlete" leaders who are skilled at warfighting, but also demonstrate the attributes of diplomats, scholars, statesman, and, most importantly, flexible and adaptive thinkers.

Along with the various changes within the institution that focus on developing the intellectual capabilities of soldiers and leaders, units in the field are continually adapting how they think about and approach current operations. Leaders have come to realize

that, while the ability to close with and kill enemy forces is vital to the mission, this tactic, when used in isolation, will not ensure a lasting victory. Due to the fact that conflict is inherently a human dynamic, leaders have refocused efforts to engage the cognitive processes of adversaries and local populations.

In order to accomplish tasks aimed influencing behavior, the Army has realized that it is important to understand the culture, society, and motives of the various actors within the environment. In a revolutionary initiative, the United States Army has developed and deployed teams of academics, scientists, and regional experts to better enable commanders and their staffs to understand the complexities of the human terrain. These teams are linked into a networked system that allows for the gathering, sharing, and dissemination of knowledge concerning the foreign societies in which these units are operating. This system enables Army units to better understand and shape the environment.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, it is clear that effective management of conflict, consistent with national objectives, requires much more than the use of military force. This realization has caused the United States Army to focus a majority of its efforts towards building the host nation's capacity to effectively govern its own territory. In order to accomplish these tasks, the Army has contributed to the joint, multi-national, multi-agency, and private-sector effort aimed at establishing a new domestic order within each of these countries. The Army's contributions to and use of the provincial reconstruction teams demonstrates that the institution is fully committed to increasing the legitimate government capability to provide for the interests and needs of the local population. Furthermore, the Army's effort towards building and training security forces

within both of these countries shows its enduring commitment to the security of the host nation and its people. All of these actions support the concept that conflict is inevitably a human feature that is often best-influenced or managed by non-lethal means.

Another demonstration of the Army's focus on the cognitive domain is the recent importance placed on using information to increase its own decision-making ability, while decreasing the enemy's ability to make effective decisions. Rather than a sole reliance on technology, the Army is now emphasizing human aspects of information operations. Through the employment of a wide variety of capabilities, the Army now uses information operations to gain the trust and confidence of the people and win the support of the world audiences. Furthermore, the Army continues to seek innovative methods to inform and influence various actors throughout the environment.

Since culture is largely developed through the interpretation of experiences, it is expected that the last seven years of combat would have had a resounding effect on the current Army culture, as is the case. The Army, as an institution, and its individual members have come to realize that the Army culture must extend beyond its ability to physically dominate the battlespace. Furthermore, the institution has recognized that, in order to effectively perform across the entire spectrum of conflict, from peace time engagement to total war, the Army culture must fully embrace certain tasks that were once perceived as outside the norms of military operations. In order to increase its effectiveness, the Army and its units have altered how they are preparing for and executing current operations in the contemporary environment.

The Army is committed to meet the nation's call, regardless of the mission it is asked to accomplish. In this era of persistent conflict, the United States Army continues

to re-address its core competencies and the knowledge required amongst its members to successfully execute the wide variety of tasks associated with fighting and winning the nation's war, as well as establishing the foundations for lasting peace. The newly-emphasized competencies include a better appreciation for and understanding of the human aspects of the operating environment. Furthermore, the Army has focused on gaining the intellect and skills that allow the organization to effectively integrate combat skills, civil-military relations, and innovative thinking in the management of conflict. The Army has deliberately refocused much effort towards training and educating leaders and soldiers in an attempt to increase their effectiveness when confronted by complex and unfamiliar challenges. In doing so, the Army has broadened its culture to focus on the cognitive skills that will enable flexibility and adaptability throughout the institution.

Although change is not entirely new within the Army organization, there is an essential difference between the cultural changes occurring in America's Army today versus those that occurred in the past. Today, the organization is focusing on the intellectual ability to address the full spectrum of conflict as opposed to a specific problem set. Following the Vietnam War, the United States Army underwent extreme professional, doctrinal, and structural changes that produced an unmatched warfighting organization, capable of dominating any opponent in a conventional, high-intensity fight. In doing so, the institution failed to maintain a majority of the lessons learned regarding operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. Now the Army is equipping the current generation of soldiers and leaders with the knowledge, intellect, and experience that will better allow them to operate in complex situations. Furthermore, the Army institution is codifying many of the lessons learned within its doctrine and other repositories such as

the Center for Army Lessons Learned. All of these changes and the resulting newly-broadened culture ensure that, regardless of the current and future challenges, the Army will be able to quickly, and less painfully, adapt to meet the needs of the nation.

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