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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
JCSP 34

Masters in Defence Studies

**THE CANADIAN WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH
TO STATE BUILDING: HOW EFFECTIVE IS IT?**

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ABSTRACT

As part of the 2005 International Policy Statements on Diplomacy, Defence and Development, the Canadian government discussed the requirement to implement a coordinated and integrated whole-of-government approach towards failed and fragile states. This paper explores the effectiveness of this new approach.

While this analysis uses Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, the Darfur region of Sudan and Haiti as case studies of Canada's whole-of-government approach, the majority of examples are drawn from Afghanistan due to the preponderance of Canada's efforts in this country.

The results indicate that while there are some successes to this approach in the field, a great deal of work remains to be done at the policy and program management levels of government to allow for the rhetoric to meet reality. The analysis is then used to provide a number of basic recommendations that would act as enablers towards a more streamlined and effective whole-of-government approach, such as the requirement for a common lexicon, the creation of true measures of effectiveness, the reorganization of the current governmental structure devoted to this approach, and the commissioning of a study on the whole-of-government approach focusing on a variety of issues related to improving Canada's effectiveness.

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INTRODUCTION

Attaining our national objectives requires the efficient and effective use of the diplomatic, informational, economic, and military instruments of national power supported by and coordinated with those of our allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional organizations.¹

In today's post 9/11 world, the issue of failed and fragile states is on the foreign policy agendas of most western powers. The menace posed by terrorism has heightened the requirement to deal with failed and fragile states with an urgency and magnitude not seen in the pre-September 11 'halcyon' days of development and humanitarianism. While previous failures had fewer repercussions to the global community from a peace and security perspective, that situation has been reversed. It is now imperative that countries do what is within their means to either prevent states from failing or to restore those that have.²

The global community, and in particular the western nations, have found themselves in the situation of determining how they ought to approach the increasingly complex situations surrounding 'state-building' activities. All realize that the old style of peacekeeping is a thing of the past and with it the narrow focus that characterized a nation's original approach. Canada is no different. The Canadian government recognized that September 11th fundamentally altered the approach Canada must take to protect not just her national interests, but to also ensure the safety of her citizens and institutions from acts of terrorism and intimidation.³

¹ United States, Department of Defence, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations – Joint Publication 3-08*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 17 March 2006), vii.

² Robert I. Rotberg, "Failed States in a World of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (July/Aug 2002): 127-140; <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed February 20, 2008.

³ Hugh Segal, "A Grand Strategy For a Small Country," *Canadian Military Journal*, 4, no 3 (Autumn 2003), 4.

Canada also recognized the potential threats posed by failed and fragile states and that nations must address the root causes of state failure, rather than simply dealing with the symptoms. Nor can these issues be tackled haphazardly; they must be addressed in a holistic fashion that is capable of bringing to bear *all* the necessary tools of government – tools found primarily within the realms of diplomacy, defence and development but also others as required. By integrating these tools, a whole-of-government approach can be achieved, resulting in a unified, coherent and integrated governmental strategy on how to deal with the complex issues associated with state-building.⁴

This paper will discuss three areas related to Canada's whole-of-government approach to state-building. Firstly, it will describe the current situation from a post-September 11th perspective. This will require a brief depiction of three countries that Canada has focused on post 9/11: Haiti; Sudan (predominantly Darfur); and Afghanistan; -- all three very different countries, with different problems and issues, yet with one distressing thing in common - - all three were rated within the top 10 failed states according to the 2006 Failed States Index.⁵

Secondly, the paper will discuss Canadian participation and involvement in state-building efforts in Haiti, Sudan and Afghanistan and will use this involvement as the litmus test to analyze the effectiveness of Canada's whole-of-government approach. The analysis will demonstrate that while Canada has had a number of 'successes' in the 'field,' a great deal remains to be done at the policy and program management level to achieve a level of

⁴ Hugh Segal, *"A Grand Strategy For a Small Country..."*, 4.

⁵ Fund for Peace, "Failed States Index 2006," http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=104&Itemid=324; Internet; accessed 17 February, 2008.

effectiveness and efficiency articulated and desired in the 2005 publication *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Overview*.

Finally, the paper will provide some recommendations to improve Canada's whole-of-government approach, based on the information and observations gathered from the sources researched for this project.

CHAPTER ONE – THE WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH

Section One - Christening the Ground

The discussions surrounding state-building and one nation's involvement in the affairs of another must include, as part of the preamble, a discussion on the Westphalian system of sovereign states. In essence, the main principle of the Westphalian system is that a sovereign state or government is responsible for the control over its own population and territory and that no other state or government is allowed to interfere in the jurisdiction of that state.⁶ This principle was enshrined within Article Two of the Charter of the United Nations when it declared that “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”⁷

However, the modern day corollary of this principle is that it is the responsibility of the state to ensure that they are able to provide actual control over their territory and population and “act as sovereign entities in the sense of cooperating with other states, govern according to law, respect international legal obligations, prevent crime, etc.”⁸

The issue, however, is that the dramatic increase of failed states since the end of the Cold War (as a result of the United States' and the former Soviet Union's withdrawal from active participation in the political arena of many of the developing world's governments)

⁶ The African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, The Center of Social Studies, Coimbra University, and The Peace Research Center- CIP-FUHEM, Madrid, *Failed and Collapsed States in the International System*, (n.p., December 2003) 3 [report on-line]; available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/failed/2003/12failedcollapsedstates.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2008.

⁷ United Nations, “Article Two of the Charter of the United Nations,” <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>; accessed 02 March 2008.

⁸ Failed and Collapsed States in the International System ..., 3.

has placed the current Westphalian system under a considerable amount of pressure.⁹ The many humanitarian interventions that occurred during the 1990s in countries such as Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia further exacerbated the pressure upon the Westphalian system. It was through these actions that the “international community ceased to be an abstraction and took on a palpable presence as the effective government of the country in question.”¹⁰

Sub-Section One – The Requirement for Definitions

With the transformation of the security-development nexus that occurred in the half-dozen years since 9/11, the concepts of 3D, 3D +C, “whole-of-government”, failed, failing and fragile states, nation-building, etc., have come to the forefront. The defining of terminology associated with the above concepts is an extremely contentious issue where many organizations or even personnel within the same organization (governments, for example) have different meanings for the same word. Part of the explanation for this contentiousness lies in a discussion of organizational ambiguity by Francis Fukuyama stating that root causes of organizational ambiguity are the often contradictory and unclear goals of the organization, and that many organizational disagreements are a result of differing interpretations on how to achieve a common goal.¹¹ Those differing interpretations are just as applicable to something as basic, yet important as definitions and terminology within an organization (i.e. the Canadian government), where a ‘sub-organization’ such as Canadian

⁹ Ibid., 3.

¹⁰ Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004), 97.

¹¹ Francis Fukuyama..., 51-52.

International Development Agency (CIDA) has a significantly different view than that of the Department of National Defence (DND) or the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Official Canadian government literature has often used terminology interchangeably, while not providing the necessary context or definitions for its use. For example, the Canadian government's publications *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Overview* (IPS -Overview) and *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Diplomacy* (IPS – Diplomacy) both use the terms 'failed and fragile' whereas *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence* (IPS – Defence) predominantly use the term 'Failed and Failing.'¹² CIDA, in its *Estimates 2007-2008 Part III: Report on Plans and Priorities* refers to the 'fragile' states of Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan, all in the top 10 of the failed states index.¹³ Nor do these documents provide a clear definition of what these terms mean within the context that they are written. The lack of definitions or classifications for fragile states and the lack of interagency-wide strategies on assessing state fragility within the IPS documents was considered a "glaring omission" by Patrick and Brown in their article on whole-of-government approaches to fragile States.¹⁴ A proper definition placed within the necessary context allows for two things: a common understanding and baseline for interdepartmental discussions and the

¹² Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Overview," <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/overview-en.aspx>; Internet; accessed 07 January 2008. All three documents can be found on-line at this website.

¹³ Canadian International Development Agency, "2007-2008 Report on Plans and Priorities, Part III Estimates," (n.d., n.p) 1 [report on-line]; available from <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca>; Internet; accessed 21 March 2008.

¹⁴ Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing "Whole Of Government" Approaches to Fragile States* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 60 [book on-line]; available from http://www.cgdev.org/doc/books/weakstates/GREATER_THAN_THE_SUM%20E-Book2.pdf; accessed 20 March 2008.

ability to focus on the issues at hand - - how to approach the complex and diverse problems associated with each nation-state one is trying to assist. Therefore, an exploration of the key terms is provided below.

The term ‘failed state’ is referred to by Helman and Ratner in their article *Saving Failed States* as “a nation-state utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community [and is the result of] civil strife, government breakdown and economic privation”¹⁵ and are, in the main, indicative of cases where the central authority of the state has already been collapsed for several years.¹⁶ The underlying cause of the central authority collapse is normally based on the activities of one (or more) of the four following categories: a revolutionary war involving prolonged conflict between the government and the organization trying to arrange its demise; ethnic wars whereby minorities (whether religious, ethnic or other) attempt to change their status through conflict against the central government; adverse regime change that involve large, sudden moves in governance (and that may or may not be preceded by either of the first two categories); and genocides or politicides resulting in the slaughter of large segments of a communal, religious, ethnic or political groups.¹⁷

Helman and Ratner refer to ‘failing states’ as those that still have some remnant of government structure and where the threat of collapse is not imminent but could occur in the near to mid-term. These states have typically suffered from some form of civil unrest, either

¹⁵ Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 89 (Winter, 1992-1993): 3-20; <http://links.jstor.org>; Internet; accessed 25 Feb 2008.

¹⁶ Jack A. Goldstone et al, *State Failure Task Force Report*, September 30, 2000, pg 3 [report on-line]; available from <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/SFTF%20Phase%20III%20Report%20Final.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 Feb 2008, 3.

¹⁷ Jack A. Goldstone et al, *State Failure Task Force Report...*, 3.

political and/or economic, but parts of the government structure and civil society remain.¹⁸

While these are states that would benefit most from some form of ‘preventative’ activity, it is a delicate balancing act between the rights of the sovereign state (in accordance with Westphalian tradition), the desires of the government still in control and the ‘responsibility to prevent’ as articulated in the *Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*.¹⁹ Many states in this category are reluctant to allow any type of internationally approved preventative action for two reasons: fear that it will increase the likelihood of eventual full intervention by the international community and fear that it will provide legitimacy to the organizations or groups opposing them.²⁰

There appears to be a great deal of ambiguity regarding the definition of a fragile state. The United Kingdom Department for International Development unofficially defines a fragile state as one whose “government cannot or will not deliver the core functions to its people, including the poor,”²¹ the core functions being defined as “territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves.”²²

¹⁸ Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 89..., 3, 13.

¹⁹International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001), 25 [report on-line]; available from <http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2008.

²⁰ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to...*, 25.

²¹Claire Vallings and Magui Morento-Torres, *Drivers of Fragility: What Makes a State Fragile ?*, Working paper No. 7, Prepared for the Department for International Development, United Kingdom (April 2005), 4 [paper on-line]; available from <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragile-states/drivers-fragility.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 Feb 2008.

²² Claire Vallings and Magui Morento-Torres, *Drivers of Fragility...*, 4.

Jean-Marc Chataigner and François Gaulme offer a different perspective on fragile states. They believe that a fragile state has two principal standards by which to measure its fragility: its economic performance (or lack thereof) and the impotence of the government as measured against criteria such as the provision of the rule of law, ability to control the country's sovereign territory and the provision of basic services and respect for minorities (religious or ethnic based).²³ While somewhat similar to the United Kingdom's version, Chataigner and Gaulme believes that theirs allows for preventative action if necessary, which in their opinion is a step forward as previous debates had limited involvement to post-conflict, post-crisis nations. The conundrum remains the varying interpretations of the fragile state and whether actions taken to assist them should be done in accordance with the national interests of the donor nation or whether fragile states should be dealt with in an apolitical or technical fashion.²⁴

While IPS-Overview discusses the concept of an 'integrated' approach and a '3-D' approach, it does not provide any real definition, expanding the terminology to mean the integration of stabilization (military and police), governance assistance (Canada Corps) and economic / social revitalization (development assistance and private sector initiative).²⁵ However, to understand the context of a 'whole-of-government' approach requires a more holistic definition such as the one provide by the Organization for Economic Co-operation

²³ Jean-Marc Chataigner and Francois Gaulme, *Beyond the Fragile State: Taking Action To Assist Fragile Actors and Societies*, Working paper no. 4, Prepared for the Agence Française de Développement Direction de la Stratégie Département de la Recherche, France (November 2005), 3 [paper on-line]; available from <http://www.afd.fr/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/users/administrateur/public/publications/documents-de-travail/dt4-etats-fragiles-VA.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2008.

²⁴ Jean-Marc Chataigner and Francois Gaulme, *Beyond the Fragile State: Taking Action To Assist...3*.

²⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Overview* (Ottawa: Canada, 2005), 11.

and Development (OECD). They consider it to be the active use of formal and informal arrangements across the spectrum of government departments and agencies to design, implement and coordinate the government's involvement in the activity it undertakes with the express view of increasing its effectiveness in obtaining its stated objectives.²⁶ Such a definition provides the breadth and scope necessary to articulate how a government could harness the institutional capabilities at its disposal to solve the complex issues of failed, failing and fragile states. Such a definition is required because of the realization of the interdependence of things such as security, governance and development within the operating environment of the failed and fragile state and particularly "without security, development cannot happen, and without development, lasting security cannot be sustained."²⁷

This is also important from a resource perspective, as many underlying themes behind a whole-of-government approach are intertwined. A properly coordinated approach espoused by government will avoid duplication of effort by the departments involved, will de-conflict activities that may run counter to the objectives of other departments and will achieve greater efficiency with limited resources. This will, in turn, improve the understanding and appreciation of the second and third order effects of governmental decisions. It will also have a positive impact on strategic planning and decision making capabilities thus reducing demand on resources.²⁸

²⁶ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2006), 14 [paper on-line]; available from <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2008.

²⁷ Jon Baker, "Quick Impact Projects: Towards a 'Whole of Government' Approach," *Paterson Review*, 8 (Fall 2007) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.diplomatonline.com/patersonreview/home.html>; Internet; accessed 22 February 2008.

²⁸ Jon Baker, "Quick Impact Projects:..., 2.

While the term nation-building has often been interchanged with state-building, it is probably the latter that the international community (and Canada) is trying to achieve. As pointed out by Fukuyama, the ability to build a nation ‘in the sense of the creation of a community bound together by shared history and culture is well beyond the ability of any outside power to achieve [whereas] states can be deliberately constructed.’²⁹

He further describes the three distinct phases of state-building. The first deals with those countries that are coming out of a state of conflict and into post-conflict reconstruction. In these countries, the state authority has normally collapsed and must be recreated from scratch. It is in these types of situations that the international community provides stability through the allocation of enablers such as military and police forces for security; humanitarian assistance; and aid in the restoration of essential services such as electricity, water and economic assistance. Examples in this instance would include Afghanistan and Kosovo.³⁰ The second phase, while more difficult, is essential for the international community to be able to leave the country in question. This phase involves the creation of “self-sustaining state institutions that can survive the withdrawal of outside intervention.”³¹ The third phase involves reinforcing or strengthening the capabilities of a weak state whereby the state may not be able to provide specific functions such as education or health care, but the architecture of the state still exists and is relatively stable.³²

There are several other terms such as governance, security, development, and humanitarian aid that require additional clarification to provide the context necessary for the

²⁹ Francis Fukuyama..., 99.

³⁰ Ibid., 100.

³¹ Ibid., 100.

³² Ibid., 100-101.

upcoming discussions. Governance refers to the central concerns of “competence, efficiency, effectiveness and the ability to provide citizens with the necessities of life,” and it includes the various governmental institutions, such as a civil service along with its administrative, political and electoral processes, etc.³³ Within a failed or fragile state, this would mean the resumption of public services and the restoration of public administration.³⁴

Security, in this instance, refers to an amalgam of complementing types of security such as human security, national security, etc. Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan described human security as encompassing “economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law,”³⁵ which enhances both national and international security and strengthens the legitimacy of the state.³⁶ Within a failed or fragile state, this would manifest itself in the tasks of “peacekeeping, law enforcement, rule of law and security sector reform.”³⁷

In essence, there is no consensus on either the meaning of development or its indicators; however, it generally refers to a number of longer term factors such as the “building of institutions and economic infrastructure to steer the general modernization of

³³ Kate Jenkins and William Plowden, *Governance and Nation-building: The Failure of International Intervention*, ed. Edward Elgar (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2006), 8.

³⁴ James Dobbins et al, *The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2007), 14 [book on-line]; available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG557.pdf; Internet; accessed 01 March 2008.

³⁵ Kofi Annan, *Definitions of Human Security, United Nations Definitions*, [document on-line]; available from <http://www.gdrc.org/sustdev/husec/Definitions.pdf>; Internet; accessed 09 April 2008.

³⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Freedom From Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy on Human Security*, (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), 2 [document on-line]; available from http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/cip-pic/library/freedom_from_fear-en.pdf; Internet; accessed 09 April 2008.

³⁷ James Dobbins et al, *The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building...*, 14.

traditional societies, thus it includes the provision of infrastructure programs, the cultivation of economic growth and poverty reduction.”³⁸

Humanitarian aid generally refers to assistance provided to “disaster and conflict-affected people such as security, food, water, health care and shelter”³⁹ and is based upon four general principles which are; humanity - - referring to the saving of lives and alleviation of suffering; impartiality - - in that actions or activities must be based on need without discrimination; neutrality -- so that no side in a conflict or dispute is shown favoritism; and independence -- whereby the humanitarian objectives “must be autonomous from their political, economic, military, or other objectives in the affected areas.”⁴⁰

Many analysts now acknowledge both the correlation between the various terms mentioned above and the requirement to “recognize the need for a wider approach, a development and security ‘nexus’ that would yield more effective and longer lasting solutions.”⁴¹ Canada has seen this ‘coming together’ of security and development as an evolutionary aspect of the human security discussion and growth of security sector reform,

³⁸ *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations*, Volume 1 A-E (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2002), 428. See also James Dobbins et al, *The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building...*, 15.

³⁹ Canadian International Development Agency, “Humanitarian Assistance,” <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-1261545-RJU>; Internet; accessed 09 April 2008.

⁴⁰ Canadian International Development Agency, “Humanitarian Assistance...”, However, an interesting observation is the issue that while on the one hand CIDA has cited the principle of independence, on the other hand, this is in direct conflict with what the whole-of-government approach is trying to achieve and may be part of the reason why CIDA refused to officially sanction the IPS-Development which advocates a more integrated approach.

⁴¹ Ann M Fitz-Gerald, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for Joined-Up Government," *Policy Matters* 5, no. 5 (2004), 8 [article on-line]; available from <http://www.irpp.org/pm/archive/pmvol5no5.pdf>; Internet; accessed 09 April, 2008.

and recognizes that development opportunities will be limited in post-conflict states without a wide-ranging security structure.⁴²

There are, however, many development and aid organizations who are opposed to having any complementary activities between military forces and developmental organizations. Many players within the non-governmental organization (NGO) community have questioned not only the value of a whole-of-government approach but have grave concerns regarding military involvement in the delivery of developmental assistance within a failed or fragile state. Canada's Coalition to End Global Poverty is on record as saying the "integrated whole-of-government approach ... has had adverse effects... and has served to militarize peace building and humanitarian and development assistance."⁴³ It recommended to the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan (the Manley Report) that the government must 'de-link' development and military activities as the two activities are "critically at odds with one another... and hinder vital progress."⁴⁴ A separate paper by Dr. Omar Zakhilwal and Jane Murphy Thomas also called for the separation of military and development activities, specifically citing as an example the requirement to 'de-link' the military and development roles of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.⁴⁵

⁴² Ann M Fitz-Gerald, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus...", 8.

⁴³ Canada's Coalition to End Global Poverty, *Briefing Paper, Canada's Whole-of Government Approach in Afghanistan: Implications on Development and Peace-Building, Submission to the Independent Panel on Afghanistan, November 2007* [Briefing paper on-line]; available from <http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/pdf/Submission-155.pdf>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2008.

⁴⁴ Canada's Coalition to End Global Poverty, *Canada's Whole-of Government...*,

⁴⁵ Omar Zakhilwal and Jane Murphy Thomas, *Afghanistan: What Kind of Peace? The Role of Rural Development in Peace-Building*, Working paper (Kabul: November 2005), 31 [paper on-line]; available from <http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/afghanistan/doc/Afghanistan%20WKOP%20paper%20Nov%2013.pdf>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2008.

Finally, a quick discussion on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). At the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000, a set of measurable goals were created by the world's leaders, to "combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation and discrimination against women."⁴⁶ The declaration also summarized additional commitments to promote "human rights, good governance and democracy."⁴⁷ The MDGs have been used as a baseline for the international community's involvement in many failed and fragile states world-wide.

Section Two – Post-September 11th

The catalyst which changed the way the Canadian government looked at its participation in state-building can be traced back to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11th, 2001. Prior to this event, Canadian involvement in failed and failing states was, generally speaking, looked at through the individual stovepipes of defence, diplomacy and development with relatively little interaction between the communities in the setting of governmental goals. This mirrored the perceptions of the international community, as states in crisis were mainly seen as facing severe developmental challenges with a government incapable of (or unwilling to) meeting those challenges

⁴⁶ United Nations, *Implementing the Millennium Declaration, Fact Sheet*, available on-line at <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/MDGs-FACTSHEET1.pdf> last accessed 09 April, 2008. As per the reference the eight MDGs are: Halve extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; empower women and promote equality between women and men; reduce under-five mortality by two-thirds; reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters; reverse the spread of diseases, especially HIV/AIDS and malaria; ensure environmental sustainability and; create a global partnership for development, with targets for aid, trade and debt relief.

⁴⁷ United Nations, *Implementing the Millennium...*

through the provision of legitimate political institutions, economic management of the country or the provision of basic human needs (security, health, etc).⁴⁸

This lack of ‘vision’ was discussed in Jennifer Welsh’s article *Reality and Canadian Foreign Policy*, where she articulated the requirement for conscious, long-term planning when dealing with foreign policy issues in order to “provide a clear and overarching objective and the necessary priorities to support it . . . [and how without it] policy making becomes fragmented and ineffective.”⁴⁹ There was also the realization that failed states could no longer be looked at through the lens of development and humanitarian aid, but the requirement had shifted to that of national security. It was now recognized that many of these states are connected to intra-state and regional conflict, crime, genocide and terrorism, and that “precarious statehood is considered to have ramifications for regional and global stability.”⁵⁰

In his article *Grand Strategy for a Small Nation*, Hugh Segal discusses the requirement to link Canadian freedom and security and preservation of Canadian core values with the absolute requirement to combat the sources of terrorism (political, ethnic, socio-economic, etc.) and those who promote it “in their homeland and not ours.”⁵¹ It should be a principal of foreign policy that Canada’s national interests can best be served by reducing the

⁴⁸Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Whole of Government Approaches...*, 17.

⁴⁹ Jennifer Welsh, “Reality and Canadian Foreign Policy,” in *Canada Among Nations: Split Images*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, 23-46 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005), 26-27.

⁵⁰Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Whole of Government Approaches...*, 17.

⁵¹ Hugh Segal, “*A Grand Strategy For a Small Country...*”, 6.

effects failed and fragile states (from transnational crime, poverty, terrorism, etc) have upon world stability.⁵²

It became apparent that a ‘strategic vision or strategy’ was required that would integrate the various instruments of governmental power (defence, diplomacy, foreign aid, police, as well as private sector skills, if needed), to safeguard security in Canada while effectively responding to threats from abroad with constructive and effective post-conflict transition skills.⁵³ These lessons had begun to be learned from the experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo, where the international community realized that “multidimensional state-building and post-conflict peace-building processes”⁵⁴ require much more than just a military response.

It wasn’t only the ‘security conscious’ who realized the need for a comprehensive integrated strategy. Many development organizations now comprehend that the ability to deliver long-term development is, in effect, unworkable if the state cannot provide even a rudimentary form of security or governance.⁵⁵ For example the North-South Institute, a not-for-profit development ‘think tank’ presented a submission to the Canadian International Policy Review which “urge[d] prime ministerial leadership...[to work towards] a whole-of-government approach and a whole-of-Canada approach”⁵⁶ that would not only encompass the

⁵² Jennifer Welsh, “Reality and Canadian Foreign...”, 38, 41.

⁵³ Hugh Segal, “*A Grand Strategy For a Small Country...*”, 5.

⁵⁴ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Whole of Government Approaches...*, 17.

⁵⁵ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Whole of Government Approaches...*, 17.

⁵⁶ John W. Foster, “The Challenge of Doing Better, in Towards 2015: Meeting our Millennium Commitments,” in *The North-South Institute Canadian Development Report 2005*, ed. Lois Ross, 23-30 (Ottawa: Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd., 2005), 25.

many departments and agencies at its disposal, but also provide a role for provincial and municipal governments as they expand into the global economic village.⁵⁷

The creation and release of Canada's IPS-Overview and the subsequent ones for Diplomacy, Defence and Development appears to have been the result of a convergence of events. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the Canadian government, under then-Prime Minister Jean Chretien, was focused mainly on debt and deficit reduction. To achieve this goal, many government institutions (including those required to conduct an integrated approach) underwent significant reductions and restructuring. This was in line with that government's foreign policy perspective as Jean Chretien was considered a minimalist who "was prepared to embrace only a few initiatives."⁵⁸

By the time his successor, Paul Martin (considered a maximalist regarding his ambitions on foreign policy),⁵⁹ came into power, Canada's fortunes had turned around as a result of a stronger economy and the rejuvenated integrity of its financial situation.⁶⁰ Jennifer Welsh stated that these changes offered Canada a unique opportunity to revive its standing within the global community and had provided us with that "strategic moment" to capitalize on it.⁶¹ As a result, under the leadership of Paul Martin, the creation of a 'whole-of-government approach' was prioritized in an attempt to define Canada's foreign policy priorities within the construct of '3D' that would "provide a comprehensive and integrative

⁵⁷ John W. Foster, "The Challenge of Doing Better, in *Towards...*, 25.

⁵⁸ Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, "A State of Disconnects – The Fracturing of Canadian Foreign Policy," in *Canada Among Nations: Split Images*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, 3-20 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005), 5.

⁵⁹ Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, *A State of Disconnects...*, 5.

⁶⁰ Jennifer Welsh, *Reality and Canadian Foreign Policy...*, 23.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 23.

blueprint for reconstruction and nation-building activities in high-profile cases of intervention” with a focus on the states of Afghanistan, the Darfur of Sudan and Haiti.⁶²

Section Three - Canada’s International Policy Statement 2005

The release of Canada’s International Policy Statement in 2005 was meant to display to both Canadians and the international community how the Canadian government wanted to “best express itself to the world.”⁶³ The document identified that the principal function of any government is to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. This function has become increasingly more complex since the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 through the rapid rise of “new threats: rogue states, failed and fragile states, international crime syndicates, weapons proliferation, and terrorists prepared to act with no concern for the cost of human lives.”⁶⁴ The IPS-Overview articulates the need for an integrated multilateral approach in the form of “defence efforts to strengthen security and stability, diplomacy to enhance prospects for nation-building, and reconstruction [to make certain] development contributions are brought to bear in a coordinated and effective way.”⁶⁵

The rationale for the change to a ‘security’ focus is straightforward, as the destabilizing effects emanating from failed and fragile states as well as non-state actors have both regional and global consequences, and that security in this new environment is both ‘a

⁶² Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, *A State of Disconnects...*, 6.

⁶³ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Overview* (Ottawa: Canada, 2005), Forward.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Forward.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Forward.

common interest and a shared responsibility.’⁶⁶ This dictates that part of the overall strategy must be the stabilization of failed and fragile states by the international community. Prevention is considered part of the stabilization effort under the form of “long-term developmental assistance that helps to build a set of institutions, civil society and political culture conducive to security and prosperity.”⁶⁷

The government also realized that ‘structural’ changes were required within the government itself, such as the creation of a governmental organization with the skills to plan and coordinate the necessary responses to an international crisis and to ensure that the requisite funding was available. The government’s solution was the creation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), which would call upon the resident expertise in the various departments as necessary, and the establishment of the Global Peace and Security Fund within DFAIT to provide the resources necessary for post-conflict stabilization and recovery.⁶⁸

The IPS also highlighted Canada’s commitment to human security as part of good governance, while keeping in mind the importance of a sovereign state’s autonomy and the requirement for the state to “take the lead in charting its own path”⁶⁹ with Canada acting in both an advisory and partnership capacity. The close interaction of all key Canadian players from inception through execution is essential to this commitment. The issue when dealing with failed or fragile states, however, is the distinctive and often overwhelming governance challenges they face when “insecurity undermines prosperity and underdevelopment

⁶⁶ Ibid., 1, 11.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 12-13.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 14.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 20.

generates instability.”⁷⁰ Solutions within this context must therefore be able to function inside the security-development nexus to achieve the complementary goals of a safe and secure environment for the flourishing of human development.⁷¹

Canada believes that it can achieve this in the framework of the failed state through the establishment of stability and the provision of developmental assistance that will further the process of state-building.⁷² Canada also recognized that it required international cooperation and burden sharing with our partners and allies for this type of approach to be effective, as the collective assumption of responsibility by the international community ensures a greater aura of legitimacy of the task at hand and is likely the only way by which sufficient resources can be brought to bear.⁷³

The IPS-Diplomacy recognized that the “stabilization of post-conflict societies needs to be followed by the re-establishment of effective public institutions – law enforcement and judicial systems, education and health care, functioning legislatures and regulatory regimes.”⁷⁴ It also recognized the sometimes delicate balancing act required to uphold the cultural and religious expression of the fragile state while making certain that the universal standards of human rights are respected.⁷⁵ There was also the recognition that many facets outside of the realm of Defence, Diplomacy and Development can augment their efforts, such as access to Canadian markets as well as debt relief. IPS-Development specifically

⁷⁰ Ibid., 22.

⁷¹ Ibid., 22.

⁷² Ibid., 23.

⁷³ Ibid., 27.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 22.

⁷⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Diplomacy* (Ottawa: Canada, 2005), 17.

discusses the importance of debt relief as a viable form of financial assistance within developing countries although it links debt relief to other requirements including an acceptable human rights record and the ability to use the savings achieved in support of development.⁷⁶

Charged with the responsibility of Canada's overall international effort, DFAIT was designated the 'first among equals' in dealing with the international community as it relates to Canada's participation in state-building.⁷⁷ This also meant transforming the way DFAIT conducted its 'affairs,' making it responsible for the interpretation of international issues on behalf of the government, the translation of Canadian international policies to the international community, and acting as the lead representative (with the requirement to integrate all functions of Canadian involvement) to the international community in the formulation of international policy and whole-of-government strategies. This required not only the creation of additional policy capacity in Ottawa but also the empowerment of Canadian Ambassadors to coordinate all of Canada's whole-of-government activities in the nation being supported.⁷⁸

The IPS-Defence reiterated many of these same themes; however, there are a few interesting deviations. The tone is along the lines of consultation and sharing as necessary when employing military and civilian resources in an international mission, yet it does not seem to imply the clear necessity for complete integrated efforts in all circumstances. Also of interest is that the IPS-Defence was the only document that discussed the requirement for

⁷⁶ Ibid., 10.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 30-31.

a “clear exit strategy or desired end-state” to be included as part of the deliberations during the government decision making process.⁷⁹

The IPS-Development (which was never officially endorsed by CIDA) carries many of the same themes as the IPS-Diplomacy. However, its discussions focused primarily on long-term development activities within a prevention construct, rather than the reconstruction requirements of a post-conflict scenario such as in Afghanistan. The term ‘reconstruction’ as it applies to failed and fragile states was only used once within the IPS-Development, when it discusses “humanitarian and reconstruction assistance through the Global Peace and Security Fund . . . coordinated in a whole-of-government manner involving Foreign Affairs Canada, The Department of National Defence, CIDA and other relevant agencies.”⁸⁰ This, however, was also given in the context of providing support to the area of governance.

Section Four – Country Studies

Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan are three countries with pasts rife with violence and upheaval. The one thing these three countries have in common is they all meet the criteria outlined in the definition of a failed or fragile state. Canada’s objectives for each of these countries vary significantly. Afghanistan represents “the most extensive concentration of resources” where the international community is in essence trying to “provide the security and stability necessary for the systematic reconstruction of the country.”⁸¹ The current tasks

⁷⁹Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence* (Ottawa: Canada, 2005), 26-27.

⁸⁰Canadian International Development Agency, “Canada's International Policy Statement (2005),” <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ips-development>; Internet; accessed 07 January 2008.

⁸¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada and Afghanistan,” <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/afghanistan/menu-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 11 April 2008.

in Afghanistan are massive, requiring significant involvement in all three aspects of security, governance and development, but predominantly security.

Canada's involvement in Haiti is different, focusing primarily on longer term reform and development assistance to counter the principle challenges of "rule of law, social and economic reconstruction as well as national reconciliation and the strengthening of democratic institutions."⁸² Together with the security challenges facing this country, Haiti is second only to Afghanistan in terms of the provision of Canadian developmental assistance.⁸³

Canada's primary concern in the Darfur region of Sudan is focused on the human rights and humanitarian situation. The Canadian government has channeled its efforts in two principle directions -- towards diplomatic activities in an attempt to achieve political solutions, and in the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and support to the African Union and United Nations' missions in the country.⁸⁴

A brief historical context of each country is necessary to understand the significant complexity of their political, security and humanitarian landscapes. This, in turn, can assist donor nations in determining the right 'mix' of involvement. A holistic (and common) understanding of the operating environment by both the participating nations and the international community is essential for an effective and efficient approach within a failed or fragile state.

⁸² Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Reconstructing Haiti," http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/current_discussions/reconstructinghaiti-en.aspx; Internet; accessed 11 April 2008.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Reconstructing....,

Sub-Section One - Haiti.

Haiti's past has been dominated by violence and authoritarianism since its inception. Over the course of the country's history, its political past has been marred by constant upheaval and unrest that has included at least 26 different leaders overthrown, assassinated or executed, as well as an occupation by the United States from 1915 to 1934.⁸⁵ Under the dictatorship of President François Duvalier and later his son Jean-Claude (spanning the late 1950s until 1985) the country descended from being a relatively prosperous sugar and coffee producer to a country wracked by poverty.⁸⁶ Over the past 20 years there has been a significant amount of political upheaval with sixteen different heads of state ranging from legally elected presidents to leaders of provisional governments to the leader of a military junta.⁸⁷ The international community's current involvement in Haiti really began in 1993 with the creation of a joint United Nations / Organization of American States (OAS) mission to the country (entitled the International Civilian Mission in Haiti or MICIVIH). This has had varied results from failure of the original mission to the mixed success of the current United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Overall, the United Nations has had five different missions to the country over the last 15 years.⁸⁸ Political unrest, the government's inability to provide the basic building blocks of an effective society, violence, poverty and

⁸⁵ The Library of Congress, "Country Study – Haiti," <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/htoc.html>; Internet; accessed on 01 March 2008 and; Webster University, "Heads of States of Haiti, Presidents, Kings and Emperors," <http://www.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/miscopic/leftover/headstate.htm>; Internet; accessed 01 March 2008.

⁸⁶ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Armed Conflict Database," <http://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-database/>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2008.

⁸⁷ Wikipedia, "List of Presidents of Haiti," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Presidents_of_Haiti; Internet; accessed 01 March 2008.

⁸⁸ United Nations, "The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti," <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minusta>; Internet; accessed 01 March 2008.

crime have been the underlying themes that have plagued Haiti and remain the largest threats to the human security of the country's population.⁸⁹ According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, there have been approximately 730 fatalities in Haiti since the unrest began again in 2003.⁹⁰ The United Nations Economic and Social Committee (ECOSCO) reported that progress in Haiti has been insufficient to achieve any of the Millennium Development Goals, primarily because of the enormity of the development challenges in the country.⁹¹

Sub Section Two – The Darfur Region of Sudan

In a country rife with violence, today's conflict in Darfur (a region of Sudan roughly the size of France) has its roots in the 1980s, when a protracted drought increased the environmental degradation and competition for land and water access. It was also during this time that the political structure of the regional government became aligned along ethnic divisions. To counter the increased control of the African groups in the region, the Sudanese president armed the Arabic speaking nomads, who organized themselves into 'militias' (which eventually became known as the Janjaweed), under the pretext of countering the threat from the non-Arab SPLM/A (the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army - - not to be confused with the SLM or Sudanese Liberation Movement, a group formed from one of the principal African tribes in Darfur to counter the effects of the militias). In turn, this led to

⁸⁹ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Armed Conflict...",

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

a gradual militarization of the various ethnic groups within the region, Arab and non-Arab alike.

The latest phase of the conflict began in early 2003 with an attack on government infrastructure by the SLM.⁹² Today, besides the involvement of the Sudanese government in the violence, the three principle non-state groups are the Sudan Liberation Movement / Army (SLM/A which has splintered into seven other factions), the Justice and Equality Movement (JLM – which has reputed to have splintered into four other groups) and the Janjaweed militia.^{93/94} Since 2003, the Darfur conflict has resulted in the deaths of over 200,000 persons (the majority of which were non-combatants) and the creation of at least 2.2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees trying to escape the violence,⁹⁵ causing instability within the neighbouring countries of Chad and the Central African Republic. The situation in Darfur has deteriorated to such an extent that it was labeled by some as genocide by the Sudanese government (while speaking before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2004, then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the actions in Darfur constituted genocide),⁹⁶ however, in a report to the Secretary General, the United

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ “Who are Sudan’s Darfur Rebels?,” *BBC News On-Line*, 12 October 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7039360.stm>; Internet; accessed 01 March 2008.

⁹⁵ United Nations News Centre, “Key role of policing in Peacekeeping must be recognized: UN Police Chief in Sudan,” <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=23779&Cr=sudan&Cr1=>; Internet; accessed 01 March 2008. In this instance the principle difference between an IDP and a refugee is that the IDP has not crossed an internationally recognized state border in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict or situations of generalized violence, whereas the refugee has crossed a border and left their country of origin. The IDP definition is attributable to; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division (IDD),” <http://www.reliefweb.int/idp/>; Internet; accessed 01 March 2008. The definition of refugee is from; *The Pocket Oxford English Dictionary*, ninth ed., ed. Catherine Soanes (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2002), 757.

⁹⁶ “Powell declares genocide in Sudan,” *BBC News On-Line*, 9 September 2004 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3641820.stm>; Internet: accessed 01 March 2008.

Nations has concluded that “the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide.”⁹⁷

Sub Section Three - Afghanistan

The history of Afghanistan is one wracked with incredible complexity, violence and war. With the Soviet invasion in 1979, a civil war occurred between the Soviet-backed Afghan government and the Mujahideen which lasted past the Soviet withdrawal (in 1989) until 1992. The next several years saw many of the original Mujahideen (Muslim rebel fighters) become the core components of the Taliban, centered upon the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar.

In 1997, the Taliban regime renamed the country the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and throughout the late 1990s attempted to expand its control into the northern part of Afghanistan, which was under the control of the Northern Alliance. By 2000, the Taliban controlled approximately ninety percent of the country. However, one of the key issues within the Afghanistan / Taliban context was its relationship to Osama Bin Laden and the terrorist organization al-Qaeda. As host to al-Qaeda, the Taliban had allowed Bin Laden and al-Qaeda to train, co-ordinate and conduct terrorist operations from Afghanistan.

The attacks of September 11th proved to be the catalyst for action against al-Qaeda and Bin Laden, with the US government backing the Northern Alliance and the entry into the country by US Forces (under Operation Enduring Freedom) to defeat the Taliban and to

⁹⁷ United Nations, *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General* (Geneva: n.p. 25 January 2005) [report on-line]; available from http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf; Internet; accessed 01 March 2008.

bring bin Laden and Mullah Omar to justice.⁹⁸ With the defeat of the Taliban in late December 2001, an interim government headed by Afghan Hamid Karzai came into power. In what would be the first phase of the plan to eventually provide security within Afghanistan and to replace the US forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deployed the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Kabul to maintain security in the capital in 2003, and NATO forces assumed responsibility for security in the country in 2006.⁹⁹

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the general overall improvements in Afghanistan have seen the return of approximately 3.5 million refugees from the neighboring countries of Iran and Pakistan (although an estimated 1.9 million refugees remain as of 01 January 2006)^{100/101} with the fighting accounting for just over 100,000 fatalities since 1992.¹⁰² Of interest is the fact that there remain almost 60,000 troops (between ISAF and OEF) within Afghanistan.¹⁰³ However, the Taliban has regained a great deal of its former strength, particularly in the south of the country, and NATO together with the Karzai Government) are in the midst of a counter-insurgency campaign against the Taliban for control of the country.

⁹⁸ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Armed Conflict...",

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, "Refugees by the Numbers; 2006 edition," <http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/3b028097c.html>; Internet; last accessed 01 March 2008.

¹⁰¹ United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, "UNHCR Afghan Refugee Statistics, February 2005," <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/openssl.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=421316072>; Internet; accessed 01 March 2008.

¹⁰² The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Armed Conflict...",

¹⁰³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO, International Security Assistance Force," http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf; Internet; accessed 01 March 2008.

In essence three different countries, each facing different problems that threaten the very being of their state; Haiti, with its rampant crime and corruption; Darfur in Sudan, with a government in power that has been accused of genocide-like activities against its own population; and Afghanistan, a country that has been wracked by invasion and civil war for more than a generation and now locked in a major counter-insurgency action. All require different solutions to a whole-of-government approach, and all highlight the complexity of their operating environment. Given the corresponding weight of effort the government has committed to each of the three countries, the preponderance of the examples used in this paper will be from Canada's involvement in Afghanistan; while examples from Haiti and the Darfur region of Sudan will be used as applicable to the discussion.

CHAPTER TWO - EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CANADIAN WHOLE-OF- GOVERNMENT APPROACH

Section One – Determining Effectiveness

The first thing that comes to mind in determining effectiveness is to question why we should be concerned over whether our efforts are effective or not. Isn't it enough simply to be seen as participating? The first logical response is we should be concerned because of accountability issues.

The Canadian academic and political communities have continually requested information on behalf of Canadians on assessment criteria as well as questioning how progress is being measured, but to no avail.¹⁰⁴ The viewpoint is that the Canadian taxpayer is funding Canada's involvement in state-building and therefore deserves to know whether monies are being utilized effectively on behalf of Canadians. CIDA itself has acknowledged "the demand for more accountability for the use of tax dollars."¹⁰⁵

However, the main reason why effectiveness matters is the cost Canada has paid and will continue to pay in what has been referred to by the Canadian Forces Chief of Defence staff as Canada's "National Treasure" - - Canadians who have lost their lives while

¹⁰⁴ Sue Bailey, "Audits not released on millions spent on aid in Afghanistan," *The Canadian Press*, 11 January, 2007 [article on-line]; available from <http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2007/january/jan112007.html>; Internet; accessed 12 April 2008. See also: CBC, "Radio Interview with Senator Colin Kenny on CIDA and Afghanistan, 22 January 2008," <http://www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/2008/200801/20080122.html>; Internet; accessed 21 March 2008.

For example, in one news article, NDP Foreign Affairs critic Alexa McDonough said that she had repeatedly asked for information and when provided it was "short on any clear sense of objectives and how you'd measure progress." Professor Attaran of the University of Ottawa has had the same difficulty "calling for a distinct tracking of Canadian cash" because of the inadequacy of the 'pooled' system. Senator Colin Kenny in his CBC interview of 22 January 2008, essentially reiterated many of these points.

¹⁰⁵ Canadian International Development Agency, "Results-based Management in CIDA: An Introductory Guide to the Concepts and Principles," <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/prnEn/EMA-218132656-PPK>; Internet; accessed 12 April 2008.

participating in the rejuvenation of failed and fragile states.¹⁰⁶ For example, since Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, 82 Canadian government representatives have been killed trying to carry out the objectives of their government¹⁰⁷ - a number that does not include Canadians killed in other regions of the world doing similar work on behalf of the Canadian government. The Standing Committee on National Defence recognized that the expenditure of "Canadian blood and treasure abroad is one of the most important and weighty decisions to be taken by government."¹⁰⁸

The government has a moral obligation to be as effective as possible in its application of whole-of-government strategies. The more effective the whole-of-government approach to failed or fragile states, the quicker the recipient state becomes self-sufficient. The quicker the recipient state becomes self-sufficient, the fewer Canadian resources are required in terms of time, money, aid, and most importantly 'national treasure' -- Canadian lives.

There are many troubling aspects regarding the determination of Canada's effectiveness in applying a whole-of-government approach. One is the perceived "ad-hoc" approach to the entire enterprise. For example, the lack of a common lexicon within government when dealing with a whole-of-government approach in failed and fragile states means that these terms are open to interpretation. A common lexicon would allow a base

¹⁰⁶ Rick Hillier, Speech delivered at the Conference of Defence Association General Meeting, 24 February 2006 [Transcript on-line]; available from http://www.cda-cdai.ca/CDA_GMs/AGM69/Hillier.pdf; Internet; accessed 11 April 2008.

¹⁰⁷ Kirsten Smith, "Assorted data on Canadian Casualties in Afghanistan," *Canwest News Service*, April 05, 2008 [article on-line]; available from <http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=d55f404d-6e0e-456b-82f1-6487d924faf8>; Internet; accessed 11 April, 2008.

¹⁰⁸ House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canadian Forces In Afghanistan, Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence* (Ottawa: Communications Canada Publishing, June 2007), 12 [report on-line]; available from http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/pdf/scond_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 29 March 2008.

level of understanding for all government agencies and departments and enable them to focus appropriate objectives. All the IPS documents have used words interchangeably. The IPS-Defence principally used the terms ‘failed and failing states,’ whereas the others predominantly used ‘failed and fragile states.’ CIDA’s *Estimates 2007 – 2008 Part III: Report on Plans and Priorities* refers to “fragile states such as Haiti, Afghanistan and Sudan’s Darfur region.”¹⁰⁹

Another omission within the IPS documents is the lack of proper definitions of the terminology used, thus leaving them open to interpretation. Secondly, there appears to be a significant lack (at least in the public domain) of benchmarks or parameters by which the effectiveness of the activities undertaken by the various departments can be measured. While there was recognition in the IPS documents of the requirement to determine whether Canada has made a difference, the statement was rhetorical rather than pragmatic. “We will know we have done so if there is demand for Canadian ideas and expertise, if Canadian priorities have pride of place on the international agenda ... and if the partners we support achieve their aspirations.”¹¹⁰ These statements were never backed up with supplementary documentation to explain *how* we would know.

This appears to be especially relevant regarding CIDA. In CIDA’s *Estimates 2007 – 2008 Part III: Report on Plans and Priorities*, they discuss the requirement for clear accountability for results and the importance of accurate data to ensure CIDA’s efforts have contributed to its objectives. For example, the report discusses how CIDA works with

¹⁰⁹Canadian International Development Agency, *2007-2008 Reports on Plans and Priorities, Part III Estimates*, (n.d, n.p.) 6 [report on-line]; available from http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/0708/cida-acdi/cida-acdi_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 February 2008.

¹¹⁰ Canadian International Development Agency, *2007-2008 Reports on Plans and ...*, 5.

partners to guarantee the effective use of Canadian aid contributions and that it dispenses aid funding through organizations such as United Nations or the World Bank. In turn, this provides “shared accountability for management of funds and achievement of results.”¹¹¹ While CIDA believes that a ‘pooled’ approach has “proven to be effective in mitigating and managing fiduciary, operational and developmental risks,”¹¹² it also means that the organization has tied itself to multilateral institutions. This effectively means there is little impetus to determine what parameters or benchmarks for success would be applicable or desirable within the Canadian context.

CIDA has tied itself to three principal documents, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG)¹¹³ (regarding its involvement in Haiti, Darfur and Afghanistan) as well as the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the Interim Cooperation Framework-Haiti (ICF). The issue is not that they have used those goals as a baseline; rather, it is that they have not established measures of effectiveness by which to successfully measure the progress of the Canadian contribution towards those goals. This will be covered in greater detail later in this paper. This has also been observed by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, which discussed the requirement for the establishment of specific benchmarks against which periodic assessment of the targets could then be conducted on an as required basis.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹Canadian International Development Agency, *2007-2008 Reports on Plans and ...*, 27.

¹¹²Canadian International Development Agency, *2007-2008 Reports on Plans and ...*, 28.

¹¹³Canadian International Development Agency, “Canada’s International Policy Statement (2005...., In the message from the Minister it states that “our progress toward this vision [understanding the link between acute poverty, state failure and global security] will be clearly measured against the Millennium Development Goals.”

¹¹⁴ House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, *Canada’s International Policy Put to the Test in Haiti: Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs*

There is also the conundrum of quantitative versus qualitative issues. It is very difficult to determine how effective the international community is, for example, when they announce the rebuilding of a certain number of schools or roads if there is no determination of what constitutes progress (e.g.; our target is 200 kilometres of paved roads in one year, and we have completed 220 kilometres –therefore this would be a very positive form of progress). Tied to this are the qualitative aspects of progress and the interdependence on other sectors of development. It wouldn't matter, for example, if the international community built a school in each village if there are no teachers to teach in the school or if the security situation was so unstable that the students couldn't attend the school.

In the end, the measurement of effectiveness is a very subjective and often contentious issue. Since there appears to be no definitive 'made in Canada' benchmarks within the public domain in which the effectiveness of Canada's approach can be measured, the matrix at figure one (based on the ANDS, which in turn was based upon the MDG¹¹⁵) is offered as a generic template to generate discussion on 'how well' Canada is doing in its integrated approach to state-building. While Canada's participation in Haiti and the Darfur region of Sudan is not as intense as Afghanistan, the areas where Canada is involved in each of the missions are covered within the model. This is also consistent with the approach used by the Government of Canada's *Re-building Afghanistan* website where it has broken down

and International Development (Ottawa: Communications Canada Publishing, December 2006), 6 [report on-line]; available from <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/391/faae/reports/rp2593086/faaerp04/faaerp04-e.pdf>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2008.

¹¹⁵ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, *Progress Report of ANDS/PRSP Prepared for IMF/World Bank Board of Directors (2006/2007)* (n.p. December 2007), 2 [report on-line]; available from [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Afghanistan_PRSP\(Feb2008\).pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Afghanistan_PRSP(Feb2008).pdf); Internet; accessed 19 February 2008.

the three principal categories into Security, Governance and Development.¹¹⁶ Available information will demonstrate that an integrated, harmonized approach seems to work well in the field with each of the departments working well towards lower level concrete objectives, yet at the strategic level (domestically) there is a perceived lack of effectiveness.

	Security	Governance	Development	Other
Level	Includes topics such as intl security forces, national army, national police and border police, etc.	Includes topics such as governance, rule of law, human rights, etc.	Includes topics such as private sector development, agricultural and rural development, education, infrastructure and natural resources	Includes specific indicators such as measures of effectiveness, communications, political will, etc.
Field				
Policy & Program Mgmt				

Effectiveness Matrix - Canadian Whole-of-Government Approach
Figure one

Section Two - Development Effectiveness

The area of development effectiveness is quite likely the most difficult of the Security, Governance and Development pillars to assess. There is a significant difference of opinion between organizations as to the effectiveness and progress of Canadian aid and development activities in fragile states, particularly in Afghanistan. The SENLIS Council (an international policy think tank that focuses on issues such as foreign policy, security and development) has published a document entitled *The Canadian International Development Agency in Kandahar: Unanswered Questions* which is extremely critical of the work done by CIDA to

¹¹⁶ Government of Canada, "Canada's Approach in Afghanistan," <http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/mission-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2008.

date. The document was a summary of the research conducted by the SENLIS Council in an attempt to independently validate CIDA's statements on the provision of aid such as infrastructure development, food aid, the Mirwais Hospital in Kandahar, Refugees and Displaced persons etc.

The modus operandi for the SENLIS Council is to request the information and then send field representatives to independently determine its validity. Examples of the requested information included a list of funds provided to which agencies, the purpose of the funds, an accounting of the funds spent by the agency after the money was donated, the verification procedures utilized by CIDA to ensure accountability by the agencies in question, the monies that were allocated but not yet spent, as well as the Government's overarching plan for development in Afghanistan.¹¹⁷ None of this information was provided by CIDA, and "attempts to obtain information on the whereabouts of the many projects were evaded."¹¹⁸ The SENLIS Council was also of the opinion that not only was Canada's official position regarding refugees and food aid unclear, but that there was no strategy on how the Canadian government intended to influence the key players such as NGOs, the UN and the various levels of Afghan government.¹¹⁹

Gordon Smith, a council member of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, also had many of the same observations and comments made by the SENLIS Council. In March of 2007, he wrote an article indicating that the food aid distribution

¹¹⁷ SENLIS Council, *The Canadian International Development Agency in Kandahar: Unanswered Questions* (Ottawa: August 2007), 10 [document on-line]; available from http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/CIDA_Unanswered_questions; Internet: accessed 21 December 2007.

¹¹⁸ SENLIS Council, *The Canadian International Development Agency in Kandahar...*, 29.

¹¹⁹ SENLIS Council, *The Canadian International Development Agency in Kandahar...*, 10.

system in southern Afghanistan has failed and that distribution is hardly ever monitored outside of Kandahar City, resulting in corruption at various levels of the Afghan government. He also called for an immediate improvement in monitoring capabilities so that needs could be assessed and aid requirements adjusted accordingly to fill existing gaps.¹²⁰

CIDA's inability (or unwillingness) to provide answers was mentioned several times by Senator Colin Kenny, the Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. In an interim report entitled *Managing Turmoil: The Need to Upgrade Foreign Aid and Military Strength to Deal With Massive Change*, the committee "made repeated attempts to determine how aid is being distributed in Kandahar, only to be told that CIDA can only provide information on a countrywide basis, and cannot break it down for particular regions."¹²¹ The committee was also of the position that the distribution of Canadian aid through multilateral agencies (i.e. programs run by either international organizations or the Afghan government) was an unsatisfactory practice.¹²²

This position by Senator Kenny was reiterated in January of 2008 during a CBC interview regarding CIDA's Afghanistan work. During this interview, he reiterated many of the issues previously covered by the Senate's report as well as by others (i.e. the SENLIS Council). He specifically commented on CIDA's inability to provide information on their aid distribution, the lack of metrics for determining the effectiveness of the aid and what it is

¹²⁰ Gordon Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2007), 14, 18, 25 [document on-line]; available from <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Canada%20in%20Afghanistan%20Is%20it%20Working.pdf>; Internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

¹²¹ House of Commons, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Interim Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Managing Turmoil: The Need to Upgrade Canadian Foreign Aid and Military Strength to Deal With Massive Change* (n.p. October 2006), 29 [report on-line]; available from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/RepOct06-e.pdf>; Internet; accessed 21 March 2008.

¹²² Standing Senate Committee, *Managing Turmoil...*, 29.

actually accomplishing, CIDA's refusal to take parliamentary researchers to the aid and development sites in Afghanistan, and perhaps most importantly, the inability of CIDA to clearly identify Canada's development and aid goals in Afghanistan. In the words of Senator Kenny "it seems like they are shoveling money into a very large pit."¹²³ When asked how he would judge Canada's 3-D approach since Canada has been involved in Afghanistan, he replied that Canada's involvement was really "1-D (Defence) and that they haven't been able to spread it out beyond that."¹²⁴ Efforts by CBC to obtain CIDA's version of events were unsuccessful as the offices for the Minister of International Cooperation, Bev Oda (the minister responsible for CIDA) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maxime Bernier, both refused interviews.¹²⁵

CIDA has attempted to rebut these arguments. They have produced a "Myths and Realities" fact sheet which takes many of the complaints described by the SENLIS Council and Senator Kenny and provided responses to them. The problem, however, is that the responses still do not answer the questions posed. The responses outline much of the overall quantitative progress made by the multilateral agencies that CIDA provides funding for, yet does not provide the details to indicate the way Canadian aid money is spent or its effectiveness. For example, in response to the accusation that CIDA does not provide adequate support to refugees and internally displaced persons in Afghanistan, CIDA restated total monetary donations they have provided to multilateral agencies such as \$5 million dollars to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, \$13.9 million to the World

¹²³ CBC, "Radio Interview with Senator Colin Kenny on CIDA and...",

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

Food Program and \$4.9 million to UNICEF for emergency assistance.¹²⁶ The problem is that CIDA has not been able to provide a ‘detailed reckoning’ of how the monies have been utilized and therefore it must rely on unsubstantiated reports from its partner agencies. CIDA also provided statistics on the development of basic infrastructure in Kandahar province, such as the number of wells dug (more than 1300), water reservoirs created (more than 80), rural road rehabilitation (more than 370 kilometers) and bridge building (four under construction, one completed).¹²⁷ However the recurring theme is that there is nothing against which progress or effectiveness can be measured because goals are only vaguely identified at the outset.

The Manley Report recognized the shortcomings of Canada’s current development and aid activities in Afghanistan when it recommended that greater emphasis be placed upon aid that will directly benefit Afghans. However, they went further; they also recommended that “CIDA’s internal procedures should be altered as necessary to facilitate this shift in emphasis [and that] the government should conduct a full scale review of the performance of the Canadian civilian aid program.”¹²⁸

This should also apply to CIDA’s activities in locations other than Afghanistan, as they also appear to suffer from a lack of performance review. Using Darfur as an example, CIDA has provided information on many of the projects to which it has contributed, such as

¹²⁶ Canadian International Development Agency, “Myths and Realities,” <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/FRA-1121144711-R82>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2008.

¹²⁷ Canadian International Development Agency, “Development Results in Kandahar,” <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/ANN-824133111-NK2>; Internet; accessed 22 March 2008.

¹²⁸ *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan*, The Honourable John Manley, Chair (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 36 [report on-line]; available from http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/pdf/Afghan_Report_web_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 January, 2008.

the Protective Environment For Children In Darfur (\$2 million provided to UNICEF – New York), and Support to Displaced Persons in Darfur (\$488,000 provided to the International Development and Relief Foundation of Canada for the provision of shelter, access to clean water and hygiene facilities).¹²⁹ However, no determination of progress is available to provide guidance on how effective this funding has been. Development assistance to Haiti appears to be along the same lines. While CIDA can provide information regarding project funding such as its contribution of \$75 million to the Inter-American Development Bank roads program for the construction of roads in the southwest of Haiti and \$19 million to the United Nations Population Fund for the improvement of reproductive health care for women and adolescents,¹³⁰ it has not provided any information on either of the projects' effectiveness or the effectiveness of Canada's participation.

The issue of CIDA not being able to accurately determine effectiveness is consistent with its own documentation stating that “CIDA managers need to exhibit an increased confidence and trust in program/project delivery partners/executing agencies. This will require a flexible ‘hands-off’ approach to management” as the executing agencies become responsible for performance management.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Canadian International Development Agency, “Sudan: CIDA Funded Projects,” <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/fWebCSAZEn?ReadForm&idx=00&CC=SD>; Internet; accessed 22 March 2008.

¹³⁰ Canadian International Development Agency, “Canada Announces Seven Sustainable Development Projects for Haiti, February 15, 2008,” <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NAT-21513538-Q69>; Internet; accessed 22 March 2008.

¹³¹ Canadian International Development Agency, “Results-based Management in CIDA...”, section 5.1. It is interesting to note that CIDA has developed a manual on Results Based Management, in which it discussed issues such as Performance Measurement and a Performance Measurement Framework, (which includes many of the key terminology previously discussed such as Impact, Outcomes, Outputs etc), yet it is unable to provide accurate data as to how effective the organization has been in the delivery of its developmental assistance to either the public or to parliament.

In short, quantitative numbers or aid totals do not allow for an effective means of measuring effectiveness. In a peer review of CIDA, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development recommended that “Canada needs a clear, simple and consistent vision of development assistance – whether through legislation or other means – which would give CIDA a clear purpose and specific objectives that can be monitored by Parliament.¹³² The report goes further by recognizing the requirement for the Canadian government to articulate the specific roles and objectives of each department or agency that deals with multilateral assistance. It considered this critical for a successful whole-of-government approach to fragile states.¹³³ In the words of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, “aid totals are not themselves a measure of successful intervention...what will count in the end is the evidence on the ground of lessons applied and results achieved...the Canadian government must be able to demonstrate ... how its aid is making concrete progress.”¹³⁴

Section Three - Security Effectiveness

Within Afghanistan, there appears to be more security effectiveness information despite the lack of published Canadian goals. Canada (along with 22 other countries and organizations including NATO and the European Union) is a committee member of the Joint

¹³² Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development, “Canada (2007), DAC Peer Review, Main Findings and Recommendations,” http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_33721_39509628_1_1_1_1,00.html; Internet; accessed 22 March 2008.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, *Canada’s International Policy Put to the Test in Haiti ...*, 10.

Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)¹³⁵ -- a decision making body charged with the provision of high-level oversight, direction and regular reporting on the progress of the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact. It should be noted here that Canada's participation on this board is based upon its involvement as a major troop contributor and not within the development context.¹³⁶ As part of its obligations, the JCMB provides progress reports on a regular basis. Its 01 May 2007 report is an excellent example of where they have provided benchmarks that they would like to achieve compared against the progress made. In the case of the Afghan National Army (ANA), they have highlighted a 70,000 person ceiling by 2011 as a benchmark to be met, with current progress being a reported strength (as of 01 May 2007) of 42,283 personnel with intake meeting its targets of approximately 8200 personnel per year and the attainability of the 70,000 person ceiling considered "on-target."¹³⁷

Canadian participation in the training of the ANA is conducted through Operational Mentor Liaison Teams or OMLTs whose objective is to "progressively bring the ANA to a level where it can independently plan, execute and sustain operations to provide military security for Kandahar province."¹³⁸ This is further broken down into the number of ANA

¹³⁵ Kara Johnston Molina UNAMA Political Affairs Officer, JCMB Secretariat, Email to author dated 10 February 2008.

¹³⁶ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) Terms of Reference*, (n.d., n.p.) 1-2 [document on-line]; available from <http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/jcmb/site/src/Information%20on%20JCMB/JCMB%20TOR%20-%20English.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 February, 2008.

¹³⁷ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *JCMB Annual Report, Table Three: Executive Summary of All Afghanistan Compact Benchmarks* (n.p. 01 May 2007), 1 [document on-line]; available from <http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/jcmb/src/jcmb5/3C.%20Table%203%20Executive%20Summary%20of%20all%20benchmarks%20-%20Eng.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 February 2008.

¹³⁸ Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder, Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan, BG-07.009 August 14, 2007," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703#athena; Internet; accessed 17 March 2008.

soldiers the OMLT is supposed to be mentoring (in this case, they are responsible for the mentoring of approximately 1000 soldiers of the 1st Brigade 205 Corps in Kandahar province).¹³⁹ According to the JCMB report, the ANA's "independent operation capability has been significantly improved, conducting 1096 independent combat operations in 2006/07."¹⁴⁰ However, information is still missing regarding how to measure the effects of this increase in ANA capacity and operations. We know that the number of recruits appears to be on target, we know that there has been a significant improvement in independent operational capability (country-wide), but we are missing information regarding the effect of those operations (the outcome) within the Afghan security situation, and more specifically, the security situation in Kandahar province where the majority of Canadians are located.

The same can be said for the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Border Police (ANP/ANBP). According to the JCMB annual report, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior had reported the strength of the ANP/ANBP at 62,200 personnel, the allocated ceiling based upon the Afghanistan Compact.¹⁴¹ This was increased by the JCMB in April of 2007 to 82,000 ANP personnel in addition to the creation of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP – with a force size of 11,271), a temporary force designed to provide additional capacity in countering the growing insurgency. However, a study compiled by Andrew Wilder of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit suggests that the exact number of actual ANP personnel is not known as salary payments were being made on authorized positions vice actual police officers -- in effect meaning they are unsure of the

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *JCMB Annual Report, Table Three: Executive Summary...*, 1.


¹⁴¹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *JCMB Annual Report, Table Three: Executive Summary...*, 1.

number of ANP officers they actually have.¹⁴² While the inability to provide accurate numbers of ANP may indicate ongoing problems within this sector of the security environment, there are also areas of concern regarding substandard equipment and insufficient training as highlighted in a recent news article by Lieutenant General Gauthier, Commander of Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, when he discussed the ANP/ANAP's inability to operate independently within the Panjwahi district primarily as a result of insufficient training.¹⁴³

This inability to provide sufficient security is having an impact on the development pillar as the region is not secure enough for the NGOs to freely deliver aid. However, security is also the responsibility of NATO forces in Afghanistan, which has been hampered by issues such as insufficient troop contributions and national caveats on taskings.

¹⁴² Andrew Wilder, *Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police*, (n.p., Afghanistan Research and Development Unit, July 2007), vii, 7 [document on-line]; available from http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39&Itemid=73; Internet; accessed 20 January 2008. Note also on page 25 of the document which states that when the method in which they paid ANP salaries was changed they discovered approximately 21,000 'ghost police.'

¹⁴³ Brian Hutchinson, "'Nowhere Close to the Finish Line', Senior General Insists Progress is Being Made in Kandahar," *CANWEST News Service*, February 10, 2008 [article on-line]; available from <http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=76344a49-172b-44c9-9b90-c8b421e2e981&k=48818>; accessed 11 February 2008.



Map 4: Strategic landscape in Helmand, Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces (January 2008)

Figure one¹⁴⁴

However, there also appears to be some ‘mixed messaging’ occurring. On the one hand, the SENLIS council argues that the security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating, using as an example the map at figure two which highlights the areas of Kandahar province that are under government control versus the areas controlled by the insurgents as of January 2008. On the other hand, there is NATO and ISAF who are reporting success in their quest for greater security in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ SENLIS Afghanistan, *Afghanistan – Decision Point 2008* (London: MF Publishing Ltd., February 2008), 21 [document on-line]; available from http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/Decision_Point; Internet; accessed 28 March 2008.

¹⁴⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “ISAF Press Releases,” <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2008. One only has to go to the NATO website to view the ‘successes’ mentioned. For example in PR# 2008-075 entitled Successful Operations Target Top Taliban Leader an ISAF Spokesperson is quoted as saying “as a result of this successful attack, the Taliban’s networks have suffered another serious setback...each successful operation ensures insurgent disruption that gives way for stability operations to take place.”

The question now becomes how an individual country defines its own effectiveness in the context of a coalition or organization such as NATO. The Manley Report specifically discussed the lack of benchmarks and measures of effectiveness in the NATO mission and stated that the nations involved (both ISAF and Afghanistan) need to “craft a much more unified and coherent security strategy and then to impose practical and verifiable criteria for gauging and analyzing the course of that strategy.”¹⁴⁶ This could then be translated into verifiable objectives for the individual countries. The Manley Report also concluded that there were insufficient forces in southern Afghanistan and inadequate coordination of the military and civilian components as they relate to security, stabilization, development and reconstruction. The panel determined that these shortfalls should be considered “failures of strategic direction” by the participating governments.¹⁴⁷

Despite the differences in the security threat (a counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan versus crime and corruption in Haiti), many of the same concerns can be found in Canada’s involvement in Haiti. The government of Haiti and the international community use a document entitled the *Interim Cooperation Framework-Haiti* (ICF) as a ‘blueprint’ for the strategic direction they wish to pursue in the reform of the various sectors of Haitian society such as security, police, justice, penitentiary institutions, among others.¹⁴⁸

Underneath the security umbrella, Canada has included funding for various projects such as the Haitian National Police Institutional Support Project, Strengthening the Rule of

¹⁴⁶ *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan*, The Honourable John Manley..., 13.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁴⁸ Republic of Haiti, *Interim Cooperation Framework 2004-2006, Summary Report*, (n.p., July 2004), 11 [report on-line]; available from <http://haiticci.undg.org/uploads/ReportVersion8%20Eng%20FINAL%20Low%20Res.pdf>; accessed 23 February 2008.

Law project and many others. Canada has also provided personnel from a variety of agencies, departments and governments such as police officers from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Sûreté du Québec, the Ontario Provincial Police, Durham Regional Police, Saguenay and Rivière-du-Loup Police Services, the Canadian Forces, Corrections Services Canada, Foreign Affairs and CIDA.¹⁴⁹ From that regard, Haiti could be considered a whole-of-government approach success in that Canada has representation from all levels of government – federal, provincial and municipal - all working together in the field, within a fragile state.

However, there are mixed views as to the success of the various projects undertaken. From a positive perspective, the Haitian National Police (HNP) have steadily increased their numbers – as of January 2008, they were approximately 8900 strong and on their way to the proposed ceiling of 20,000 for 2015. Additionally, crime is down and the security situation in the country is considered acceptable but fragile by the United Nations force commander.¹⁵⁰ However, the International Crisis Group report has stated that the HNP still suffers from a lack of personnel, insufficient training and corruption among some of their officers. The Crisis Group report also highlighted the lack of measures of effectiveness stating that “longer term improvements require donor-government agreement on benchmarked changes in justice practices...[and] the extent of future funding [should be] linked over time to progress in

¹⁴⁹ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “RCMP Commissioner Visits Haiti,” http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/news/2008/2008_02_14_haiti_e.htm; Internet; accessed 28 March 2008. See also Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Reconstructing Haiti,”...

¹⁵⁰ Jacqueline Charles, “Haiti Makes Strides In Modernizing Police Force,” *The Miami Herald*, 16 January 2008 [article on-line]; available from www.ebcghost.com; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

implementation.”¹⁵¹ This is consistent with the available CIDA documentation such as the *Canada-Haiti Cooperation – Interim Cooperation Framework – Result Summary* which discusses issues such as programming (which covers the project), budget, applicable partners, overall results, and the key short-term results (outputs). What it does not provide are the performance metrics by which one can gauge *how* effective the program has been. For example, within the project to rehabilitate the building for the Departmental Directorate, the Police Station and the Jacmel Civil Prison, it states as its over-all desired result a better work environment for civil servants and better living conditions for the prison inmates. What it does not provide is the level of improvement desired nor effective benchmarks for progress.¹⁵²

This is not to say progress has not been made, as there have been general improvements in many aspects of Haitian society. It is saying however, that without specific, clearly articulated goals, effectiveness cannot be accurately assessed. While solid successes (such as the dismantlement of the most dangerous gangs in Cité Soleil¹⁵³ or the day-to-day mentoring of Haitian police by Canadian police officers¹⁵⁴) can be seen on the ground, it is the strategic level that not provided the key benchmarks or measurements of effectiveness to determine overall policy effectiveness.

¹⁵¹ Mark Schneider, *Consolidating Stability in Haiti, Latin America/Caribbean Report no. 21*, Report Prepared for the International Crisis Group (n.p. 18 July 2007), 23 [report on-line]; available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4944&l=1>; Internet; accessed 26 March 2008.

¹⁵² Canadian International Development Agency, “Canada-Haiti Cooperation - Interim Cooperation Framework - Result Summary – 2. Presentation of Results,” <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NIC-61993852-HZU?OpenDocument#pillar1>; Internet; accessed 02 April 2008.

¹⁵³ Mark Schneider, *Consolidating Stability in Haiti...*, 1.

¹⁵⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Interview with Graham Muir,” <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/muir-haiti-en.aspx>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

Section Four - Governance Effectiveness

Within the three countries discussed, the Canadian government has provided support to governance effectiveness principally within Afghanistan and Haiti. While the title ‘governance effectiveness’ may be applicable to each country, the methodology with which it has been applied has varied. In Afghanistan, the governance aspects are outlined within the ANDS, which has a more ‘top-down’ approach calling for the central and sub-national establishment and/or strengthening of the various components and institutions of government over a five-year period. This included the reformation of the justice system, the civil service (including the requirement to address the corruption issue within both) and an increased adherence to human rights protection (especially for women and children).¹⁵⁵ As Canada has tied its goals to that of the ANDS, effectiveness has to be measured within the context of how well the international community has fared in meeting the ANDS’s desired goals. Again, there are mixed opinions as to the progress made by the international community. A comparison of two documents released in the October / November 2007 timeframe demonstrate the differences.

In October 2007, Environics Research released the 2007 Survey of Afghans it had conducted throughout Afghanistan including Kandahar, in which they asked Afghans their perspective on the progress their country was making and the role played by the international community. The survey results demonstrated several things: firstly, it showed that the slight majority of Afghans feel life in Afghanistan is improving because of the many improvements

¹⁵⁵ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Executive Summary* (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, n.d.) [document on-line]; available from http://www.ands.gov.af/admin/ands/ands_docs/upload/UploadFolder/Executive%20Summary%20-%20Final%20English.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 February 2008.

seen in their daily lives. Secondly, a significant majority (73 percent) thought that the situation for women in Afghanistan had improved when compared against their situation under Taliban rule. Thirdly, a significant majority (71 percent – 77 percent in Kandahar) appeared to have confidence in the current government under President Karzai and felt the government was representing their interests. Those who opposed this view cited corruption in government and insecurity (among others) as the principal reasons for their concern.¹⁵⁶

In contrast, the SENLIS council released a report in November 2007 entitled *Stumbling in Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink*, which had a different view. Its concerns were based on issues such as the application of western benchmarks to the rebuilding of Afghanistan and the West's inability to bring about lasting political reforms because of a misunderstanding of the Afghan political reality, where policies put into place need to strengthen the moderates, weaken the extremists and ensure that the effects they are trying to achieve are not counterproductive.¹⁵⁷ The report goes further, saying the “majority of Afghans are frustrated with the little progress achieved so far and consider their government incapable of delivering services and enforcing law and order” -- and because the government has been unable to govern throughout the country, especially in southern Afghanistan, it is losing its legitimacy to the insurgents.¹⁵⁸ Issues such as the elections, while seen by the international community as a success story, is considered more symbolic to the Afghans because it has had no impact on their daily lives. Nor does the focus on the central and sub-

¹⁵⁶ Environics Research Group Ltd., “2007 Survey of Afghans,” http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653; Internet; accessed 19 October 2007.

¹⁵⁷ SENLIS Afghanistan, *Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink* (London: MF Publishing Inc., November 2007), 102 [document on-line]; available from http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/Afghanistan_on_the_brink; Internet; accessed 26 November 2007.

¹⁵⁸ SENLIS Afghanistan, *Stumbling into Chaos...*, 103.

national levels of the ANDS (a document written with the assistance of the international community), take into consideration the local realities of “the relevance of decentralized consensus-based power at the local level” as ordinary Afghans identify most strongly with the local structure of government and traditional practices rather than the “widely ineffective and unpopular central government.”¹⁵⁹

Information on Canada’s specific involvement is sparse. There have been quantitative measurements such as the CIDA *sponsored* initiative with the International Development Law Organization, whereby they have trained judges and prosecutors, legal aid attorneys, as well as the establishment of a legal aid system and the creation of a ‘benchbook’ for the Afghan judiciary. One area positively commented upon is the success of the Strategic Advisory Team in its capacity as “a team of strategic planners to support the Government of Afghanistan in developing and implementing key national strategies.”¹⁶⁰ However, the Strategic Advisory Team’s participation is controversial within the Canadian government, as noted in the addendum to the government report *Canadian Forces in Afghanistan*, in which the Liberal members of the Standing Committee on National Defence believe the team should be under the leadership and reporting chain of the Department of Foreign Affairs in order to have a more ‘balanced’ approach.¹⁶¹ What makes this observation so interesting is that while the concept of the team was the brainchild of the CDS, General Hillier, the team was authorized under the leadership of a Liberal government. The Strategic Advisory Team will be covered in greater length later in section five, sub-section one of this chapter.

¹⁵⁹ SENLIS Afghanistan, *Stumbling into Chaos...*, 104-105.

¹⁶⁰ Government of Canada, “Strengthening the Rule of Law in Afghanistan,” <http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/idlo-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 10 Oct 2007.

¹⁶¹ House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canadian Forces In Afghanistan...*, 136.

Canada's effectiveness in Haiti can also be considered mixed. While Canada has had a long history of involvement with the nation, one area of concern was Canada's position in 2004 to "consciously choose to let Haiti's elected government fall" (a position opposite the one taken by the government in 1991).¹⁶² Yasmine Shamsie considered "Canada's failure to support Haiti's constitutional government, regardless of [President] Aristide's well-known flaws, of no small significance especially given our stated commitment to representative democracy in the region."¹⁶³

Once the transitional government took over, Canada became actively engaged once again in a variety of activities that included those related to governance, such as the deployment of Election observers (including Canada's chief electoral officer as Head of the International Mission for Monitoring Haitian Elections) in support of the 2006 elections. Canada's efforts in supporting Haitian governance have been tied to the MDGs and axis number one of the ICF, *Strengthen political Governance and Promote National Dialogue*, and have focused on strengthening the legislative role of Haiti's parliament and improving relations between the various branches of government. This has included the provision of funding to a number of organizations and government institutions.¹⁶⁴

Examples of Governance projects include Support for the Ministry of Justice (five million dollars) *in coordination with* the Agence Intergouvernementale de la Francophonie, aimed at establishing an independent judiciary and increasing access to legal information; the Democracy and Peace Support Fund (five million dollars) designed to support governance

¹⁶² Yasmine Shamsie, "Its Not Just Afghanistan or Darfur: Canada's Peace-building Efforts in Haiti," in *Canada Among Nations, 2006*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, 209-231 (Montreal: McGill – Queens University Press, 2006), 212.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 214.

¹⁶⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Reconstructing Haiti," ...

and human rights; and the Project State of Rights in Haiti (five million dollars), whose purpose is create a justice system based on fairness, accessibility and timeliness.¹⁶⁵ All are considered worthwhile projects when taken in the context of the state of Haitian politics.

However, there have also been reports of bribery amongst senators, absenteeism and incompetence amongst parliamentarians, and local administrations unable to fulfill their duties.¹⁶⁶ Part of the issue appears to be the intertwined relationship between security and governance, as represented by the symbiotic relationship of the omnipresent armed gangs in Haiti and the politicians. Jennifer Pierce suggests that a large segment of the governance issue (as it relates to corruption) is that the gangs in Haiti do not operate as a separate entity from the state, but that they are somewhat embedded within the culture of Haitian politics whereby there is a “continually shifting patron-client relationship with [the gangs and] either the state or opposition factions.”¹⁶⁷ She cites among her examples, the *chimères* that arose out of President Aristide’s local political networks, as well as the observation that the international community’s projects have ‘targeted’ the criminal elements of the equation (i.e. the armed gangs) but have done nothing to address the cultural issues of the extensive political and patronage networks existing between the gangs and various groups of the Haitian government.¹⁶⁸ The close ties between the armed gangs and the political authorities were highlighted in the interim ICF in July of 2004 as a serious issue that affected the “social

¹⁶⁵ Canadian International Development Agency, “Haiti: CIDA Funded Projects,” <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/fWebCSAZEn?ReadForm&idx=00&CC=HT>; Internet; accessed 29 March 2008.

¹⁶⁶ Mark Schneider, *Consolidating Stability in Haiti...*, 11, 12, 20.

¹⁶⁷ Jennifer Pierce, “Protection for Whom? Stabilization and Coercive Rule in Haiti,” *Paterson Review, A Graduate Journal of International Affairs*, 8 (Fall 2007), 100 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.diplomatonline.com/patersonreview/home.html>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2008.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 96, 100.

fabric and sociopolitical instability of the country.”¹⁶⁹ That this issue is still being highlighted as a major area of concern three years after the release of the Interim ICF, could be construed as an indicator of the limited success achieved thus far within this segment of the governance pillar. On the other hand, the success of the electoral reforms put in place and the stability of the national political scene since the 2006 presidential elections may be considered positive indicators of progress within other segments.¹⁷⁰

In summary, there are mixed results from both Afghanistan and Haiti as to effectiveness. The key issue, however, is that the responsibility for determining the effectiveness of Canada’s participation in state-building activities resides with the Canadian government. The lack of published Canadian outcomes (as opposed to inputs and outputs) has merely exacerbated the difficulty of measuring that effectiveness.

Section Five – Specific Whole-of-Government Approach Examples

Sub Section One - The Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A)

IPS-Overview discussed the issue of Canadian values as part of the overall approach to failed and fragile states. While Canadian values are important, Canadians do not want to impose those values upon another culture or state. It is in the best interests of everyone involved that the recipient state plan its own course through the development process with Canadian involvement in the form of advisors and assistants using Canadian experience and

¹⁶⁹ Republic of Haiti, *Interim Cooperation Framework 2004-2006, Summary...*, 12.

¹⁷⁰ Mark Schneider, *Consolidating Stability in Haiti...*, 11. See also; House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, *Canada’s International Policy Put to the Test in Haiti...*, 12.

knowledge to leverage the requirements of the recipient state.¹⁷¹ SAT-A is a direct reflection of that desire. As part of the ‘governance’ pillar, it was set up as a “Canadian multi-disciplinary, inter-departmental, civilian/military team” and was designed to provide strategic advice, guidance, mentoring and capacity building to the government of Afghanistan at the executive / ministerial level, all in support of the Afghan government achieving the objectives laid out in the ANDS. Although relatively small (20 members as of October 2007), it is composed of 16 Canadian Forces members, 2 DND civilians and 2 CIDA officers who, guided by input from the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan, assist senior Afghan civil servants in the development and implementation of strategic plans for the government of Afghanistan.¹⁷²

However, despite the apparent success of the SAT-A in assisting the development of a nascent Afghan civil service, there have been calls within Canada that it should not be staffed by (mainly) military officers and that the lesson to impart upon the Afghans is that “senior public service advisors to the government should not be military officers.”¹⁷³ It appears that this view has been pushed by disgruntled senior officials in Foreign Affairs and CIDA Headquarters in Ottawa who do not agree with the role and influence that DND has in SAT-A.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement – Overview...*, 20.

¹⁷² Serge Labbé, “Commander Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan,” (PowerPoint presentation Canadian Forces College, Toronto, ON, 10 December 2007).

¹⁷³ Commentary, “Put Real Civilians in These Positions,” *The Globe and Mail* January 15, 2008 [article on-line]; available from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080115.wwafghanistan15/BNSStory/specialComment/>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2008.

¹⁷⁴ Christie Blatchford, “‘Bureaucratic Jealousy’ Threatens Military Team,” *Globe and Mail*, January 14 2008, A7 [article on-line]; available from

This appears to be indicative of a certain amount of reluctance on the part of some senior public servants within the Canadian government to adhere to a ‘whole-of-government’ or integrated approach to state-building. This view was prevalent during the writing of the IPS documents whereby “the concept of an integrated comprehensive international policy statement, even among the key ministries, was alien to the system.”¹⁷⁵ This reluctance was immediately apparent within IPS-Development which begins with the statement “this document was never officially adopted by CIDA. It is available for reference only.”¹⁷⁶ In other words, while the SAT-A may be a success at the strategic level internationally and in Afghanistan; domestically, in Canada, the government still appears to have a ways to go to ensure ‘buy-in’ on a whole-of-government approach from some senior civil servants over what is essentially a ‘turf war’ over authority.¹⁷⁷ The Canadian government must ensure that SAT-A and its effectiveness does not fall victim to inter-departmental politics.

Sub Section Two - The Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT)

Another success regarding a whole-of-government approach appears to be that of the KPRT. Despite its difficult start as a result of the differences of opinion in Ottawa regarding the composition of the team, its leadership and where it should be located,¹⁷⁸ it has become

<http://ago.mobile.globeandmail.com/generated/archive/RTGAM/html/20080114/wblatchford14.html>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2008.

¹⁷⁵ Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 140.

¹⁷⁶ Canadian International Development Agency, “Canada’s International Policy Statement (2005....,

¹⁷⁷ Francis Fukuyama is of the opinion that a “significant proportion of the conflicts and dysfunction that exist in organizations concern precisely this kind of disagreement over authority or, as it is more commonly termed, ‘turf.’” See Francis Fukuyama..., 53.

¹⁷⁸ Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar...*, 133.

“the best example of the whole-of-government concept at the tactical level as it includes a senior diplomat, CIDA expertise, . . . and RCMP officers.”¹⁷⁹ An evaluation of the KPRT conducted by the DND’s Chief of Review Services (CRS) noted a “significant gradual improvement in the functioning of the KPRT over time, particularly at the tactical and operational levels in interagency cooperation.”¹⁸⁰ The evaluation also believed that the KPRT is an effective tool to support the attainment of Canada’s goals as laid out in the ANDS.¹⁸¹ This is in part because the KPRT’s focus on both development and reconstruction allow it to support the requirements of the provincial, district and village development councils-- with the CIDA representative(s) helping to plan and organize the development and reconstruction activities, while the military component ensures the necessary security arrangements and other support.¹⁸² This is furthered by the use of Civil-Military Cooperation Teams within the KPRT to discuss development and reconstruction requirements through local officials like mayors and village elders. This policy “allows local leaders to share in the credit, reinforces their authority in the eyes of their people and has a net positive impact for the diplomacy and governance dimension.”¹⁸³ This type of approach is consistent with the SENLIS council comments mentioned earlier about ordinary Afghans identifying with local governmental structures vice the central government.

¹⁷⁹ Mike Capstick, “The Civil-Military Effort in Afghanistan: A Strategic Perspective,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 10, Issue 1 (Fall 2007) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.jmss.org>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2008.

¹⁸⁰ Department of National Defence, Chief Review Services, *Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team: Final* (Ottawa: December 2007), iii.

¹⁸¹ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial...*, iii.

¹⁸² Mike Capstick, “The Civil-Military Effort in Afghanistan: A Strategic Perspective...,”

¹⁸³ Jon Baker, “Quick Impact Projects:...”, 11.

While a success, the KPRT's coordination activities have been negatively impacted by the requirement of the non-military members to 'reach back' to Ottawa for much of its decision making processes. "The reality on the ground is that the period between project identification and implementation can be considerably drawn out due to the lengthy administrative oversight required to utilize CIDA funds."¹⁸⁴ The bureaucratic peacetime process required by Treasury Board to safeguard the accountability of financial expenditures does not have sufficient flexibility to allow for a quick decision making process on projects in an operating environment such as Afghanistan.¹⁸⁵

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development heard testimony to that effect from another source, Ms. Sarah Chayes of the SENLIS Council. "There were a lot of programs that took way too long in the pipeline . . . what I would look at, again, as a committee, is bypassing some of the extremely rigid procurement requirements and think about how we can make our public development agency more flexible."¹⁸⁶

This is a recurring theme as the timeliness (or lack thereof) was also evident in the length of time required (several months) to negotiate with Treasury Board for an increase in the mandated amounts the Theatre Commander, the PRT Commander and the Officer Commanding the Contract Management Cell was legally entitled to approve for the purchase of goods and services in Afghanistan.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 12.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 12.

¹⁸⁶ House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, *Evidence*, no. 058, Tuesday May 29, 2007, 6 [evidence on-line]; available from <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/391/FAAE/Evidence/EV2976196/FAAEEV58-E.PDF>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2008.

¹⁸⁷ This was a task undertaken by CEFCOM and CANOSCOM during fiscal year 2006/2007 and of which the author was a part.

This reach back issue was also captured in the CRS evaluation which recognized that “challenges exist at higher levels within Canada, where interdepartmental committees and working groups have been created to facilitate policy integration and the resolution of emerging issues.”¹⁸⁸ This slow pace of events is even evident in the framework agreement between the participating partners of the KPRT. When the KPRT was created in 2005, an ‘interdepartmental’ document was drafted which highlighted the various responsibilities for each of the participating departments. Three years later (as of Dec 2007), this document still has not been finalized as the departments have been unable to reach an agreement.¹⁸⁹

This is indicative of issues that remain unaddressed, such as the lack of sufficient authority delegated from the departmental level to the field. This problem is compounded by the ponderous processes related to the administrative oversight requirements in Ottawa. Canadian personnel, regardless of department, are being constrained by policies, legislation and regulations designed for doing business in downtown Toronto, rather than in the context of a failed or fragile state. An in-depth review of policies, legislation and regulations is necessary to ‘un-shackle’ the hands of personnel in the field.

Sub Section Three - The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force

In the study of interagency cooperation, it has been recognized as vital to be able to take the broad strategic objectives of government and convert these objectives into tasks of manageable proportions with clearly articulated and measurable outcomes. The importance

¹⁸⁸ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial...*, 23.

¹⁸⁹ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial...*, 22.

of involving all agencies and departments as early as possible in the planning process has also been recognized, as without a commonly accepted, understood and well communicated plan the end result will be fractured and unfocused.¹⁹⁰ Patrick and Brown recognized that a central standing interagency organization anointed with strong leadership responsibilities and capable of coordinating interdepartmental involvement in failed and fragile states can aid in the imposition of discipline on independent departments.¹⁹¹

The Canadian government acknowledged its shortfall in coordinated planning capabilities when it addressed, in the IPS-Diplomacy, the need for some form of overarching organization to integrate and consolidate its responses to the fallout resulting from the deterioration of failed and fragile states. The government's intent was to draw together staff from DFAIT and other government departments and agencies in order to provide the core nucleus of personnel necessary to plan and develop an integrated and coordinated response to crises (humanitarian or otherwise) in fragile or failing states.¹⁹² The result was the creation of an organization called the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), charged with focusing and coordinating the whole-of-government approach. Its two principle objectives are to "ensure timely, coordinated and effective policy strategies and operational responses [to crises], and plan and deliver coherent and effective conflict prevention, crisis response and stabilization initiatives in fragile states."¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial...*, 31.

¹⁹¹ Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of...*, 132.

¹⁹² Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Diplomacy...*, 11.

¹⁹³ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Year in Review: Mobilizing Canada's Capacity for International Crisis Response, September 2006-August 2007*, (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, February 22, 2008) 3 [document on-line]; available from

While a great concept, START faces a number of obstacles preventing it from living up to its true potential. The first obstacle is its placement as part of the Department of Foreign Affairs, which according to Patrick and Brown has been problematic from the viewpoint of interagency coordination. This has caused other departments and agencies to consider the organization as merely an additional organ of the Department of Foreign Affairs as opposed to a legitimate interdepartmental / interagency body. This viewpoint is legitimized in a briefing on START where their mission statement reads “*enhancing Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada’s (DFAIT) capacity* [emphasis added] to provide service and leadership that will enable the federal government to...”¹⁹⁴ This position is further legitimized by the actual composition of START, whereby the vast majority of their staff come from DFAIT, rather than a true mix of professionals from other government departments.¹⁹⁵ For instance, of the approximately 70 personnel listed within the organization chart of START, there are only two middle ranking military officers (one Major, one Lieutenant Colonel) representing DND in this interagency endeavour, equating to approximately three percent of the organization listed.¹⁹⁶

http://www.international.gc.ca/assets/fac/pdfs/year_in_review%20_0607_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 March 2008.

¹⁹⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “PowerPoint presentation, Mobilizing Canada’s Capacity for International Crisis Response, Overview, Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, September 2007.” This briefing was received by the author via email from a member of START along with a second 5-page document on START that articulated a more generic mission without the reference to enhancing DFAIT’s capacities.

¹⁹⁵ Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of...*, 66.

¹⁹⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) Year in Review: Mobilizing Canada’s Capacity for International Crisis Response, September 2006-August 2007* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, February 22, 2008) 16-17 [document on-line]; available from http://www.international.gc.ca/assets/fac/pdfs/year_in_review%20_0607_en.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 March 2008. Note; The author corresponded with START media centre (email 17 March 2008) requesting the composition of START including a breakdown of department each member of the team has originated from; however as 22 April 2008, no response has been received.

This inequality in representation does little to help the cause of START. DND, for example, believes that this level of representation “does not provide the balance needed for responsive interagency coordination and integrated planning.”¹⁹⁷ START has also had difficulty breaking down the bureaucracy and stove-piping of the individual agencies and departments in its search for unified strategies and objectives, as the departments are (individually) often under pressure to show the results of their own involvement in the “conflict prevention and peace building phases” of fragile states.¹⁹⁸ There is also concern within some organizations (i.e. CIDA) that the funding available to START will undermine traditional interdepartmental commitments through the creation of stand-alone programs.¹⁹⁹ This resistance appears to manifest itself at the senior management level of government as they attempt to balance time pressures with competing priorities rather than at the working level.²⁰⁰ However, it must also be noted that during high profile, crisis situations, START (and its Advisory Board comprised of senior representatives from the various departments including representation from the Privy Council Office) performed well in its task of providing coordination among the agencies involved.²⁰¹

Many of START’s difficulties have manifested themselves in Canada’s approach to Haiti, where according to Patrick and Brown, the three principal departments (DFAIT, CIDA and DND) “have continued to generate independent political, security and economic

¹⁹⁷ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial...*, 37.

¹⁹⁸ Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of...*, 68.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 68.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 68.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 67-68.

analyses” rather than taking an integrated approach: this has made it difficult for the government to produce a common operating picture on the Haitian situation.²⁰² This is exacerbated by the maintenance of individual and independent reporting chains from the field to Ottawa, seeming to reinforce the narrower views of the individual departments and agencies.²⁰³

Finally, there is concern that START is not sufficiently resourced to provide the necessary strategic level planning capabilities for an organization of this nature. In particular, the CRS evaluation noted there are few government departments (other than DND) that have sufficient human resources to create a strategic planning cell capable of long-term planning. As part of their evaluation, they recommended that a whole-of-government planning unit be established to provide the necessary strategic level capabilities. As an example, they cited the fact the Canadian Forces officers currently embedded in START are fully engaged with other duties to the extent that they cannot contribute to contingency planning in the manner in which START’s ‘sister’ organization in the United Kingdom routinely engages.²⁰⁴

One could conceivably draw a similar conclusion about the status and importance (or lack thereof) of START from two other sources. The first is DFAIT’s Report on Plans and Priorities. This organization, which could be considered the ‘jewel’ of Canada’s integrated whole-of-government approach, is only mentioned once as part of a table of audits to be

²⁰² Ibid., 74.

²⁰³ Ibid., 74.

²⁰⁴ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial...*, 37-38.

completed in fiscal year 2007-2008.²⁰⁵ The second is the creation of the Interdepartmental Afghanistan Task Force headed by Mr. David Mulroney in January 2007. While originally placed under DFAIT with the responsibility of coordinating the various departmental efforts in Afghanistan,²⁰⁶ the Afghanistan Task Force was removed from DFAIT on the recommendation of the Manley Report (to ensure a more integrated approach) and placed within the Privy Council office, as of 08 February 2008. Mr. Mulroney was elevated to deputy minister and given the responsibility of coordinating government activities on behalf of the newly formed Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan (whose mandate included “diplomatic, defence, development and security issues related to Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan”).²⁰⁷

This action implies that organizations responsible for coordinating whole-of-government activities should not be located within an individual department (i.e.; DFAIT), but rather they should be placed centrally within the heart of government (e.g. within the Privy Council Office). Such actions ‘level’ the playing field in terms of interdepartmental rivalries and ensure that the whole-of-government approach becomes a ‘partnership of equals,’ something Patrick and Brown espouse,²⁰⁸ and something from which START could benefit.

²⁰⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “RPP 2007-2008 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,” http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/0708/fait-aeci/fait-aeci06_e.asp#T3-10; Internet; accessed 19 March 2008. Note Table 14, Internal Audits and Evaluations.

²⁰⁶ Lee Berthiaume, “Manley Report Realizes Afghan Task Force Fears,” *EMBASSY: Canada’s Foreign Policy Newsweekly*, 30 January 2008 [magazine on-line]; available from http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2008/january/30/afghan/; Internet; accessed 22 March 2008.

²⁰⁷ Office of the Prime Minister, “Prime Minister Announces Decisive Action On Afghanistan Panel Recommendations, 08 February 2008,” http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/nr_2008_02_08-en.asp; Internet; 22 March 2008.

²⁰⁸ Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of...*, 129.

The final observation on START is related to the actual ‘ranks’ within the organization. Currently the START secretariat is headed by a Director General, which is normally one level below the Associate Deputy Minister level in most departments. This low ranking (relatively speaking) within government lends credence to the comments of Patrick and Brown whereby organizations of this nature do not normally have the “bureaucratic heft and political backing” necessary to prevent institutional agendas and jealousies from superseding many of their coordination efforts.²⁰⁹

In short, despite START’s mandate and noble objectives, a great deal must still be done to break down the existing institutional barriers and to bring the various departments and agencies to a common understanding on the interconnectivity of security, governance and development in failed or fragile states. A greater focus on interagency cooperation, coordination and information sharing across the spectrum of government is necessary to guarantee a clear and integrated approach to state-building,²¹⁰ as well as a restructure of the organization, including its make-up, size, capacities and reporting chain.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 133.

²¹⁰ Nima Abbaszadeh et al, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations* (n.p. Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, January 2008), 25 [document on-line]; available from http://www.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/www591b.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 March 2008. In fairness to START, this article also stated on page 23 of the report that START “has had quite a few successes since its creation.” However the article does not list these successes nor does it provide attribution for the source of the comment. The author contacted Mr. Robert Perito, the Project Advisor (who was fulfilling the role of Workshop Leader and Visiting Lecturer in Public and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs) who kindly forwarded the request for clarification to the author of that specific portion of the report. In her response (email M. Nutting/LCol Johnson dated 26 March 2008), it was stated that the successes that are referred to are based upon “things such as a greater commitment to inter-departmental coordination, an acknowledgment of the need for a new way of doing things due to the nature of the current conflict and Canada's involvement in it, and even the fact that START was built on existing capacity instead of layering on an extra level of bureaucracy.” While this is true, it is felt that comments provided above are still reflective of START's effectiveness within the whole-of-government construct. Additionally Robert Perito provided two Canadian contacts (one CIDA, one DND) from which he believed the source information for the comment came. The author received a response from the CIDA representative who was unaware of the origin of the statement. The response received from the DND representative in START provided only quantitative examples of successes achieved by START as outlined in

Sub Section Four - Measures of Effectiveness

At the beginning of this chapter the issue of determining effectiveness was briefly discussed. This must be expanded upon, for it is an area where the government's approach has been significantly lacking. According to the RAND Corporation's *The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building*, any type of program management requires the creation of the necessary measures of effectiveness in order to determine progress. They have broken it down into the three principal areas of inputs, outputs and outcomes; whereby inputs are the resources used (or input into the mission), outputs are the results that have been created by the input, and outcomes are the evaluations of the overall program's effectiveness in some form that can determine measurements of progress.²¹¹

Building these types of assessment mechanisms into a program is essential for an organization to either modify their existing program or design a new program to better specifications. The assessment mechanism must also include the necessary baseline information to act as a starting point against which performance can be measured. The key, however, is that inputs and outputs must be linked to the outcomes to allow for the compilation of the performance metrics.²¹² There are also certain characteristics that must be present with the performance metrics when dealing with a fragile state: they must be easy to interpret and they must be selective and prioritized to allow the ability to redirect the focus when progress is lacking.²¹³

the DFAIT Brochure entitled *Mobilizing Canada's Capacity for International Crisis Response*, dated December 2006.

²¹¹ James Dobbins et al, *The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building...*, 130.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 131.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 132.

It is this linkage between inputs, outputs and outcomes that is missing within the Canadian context. The CRS evaluation highlights the difficulty and complexity associated with trying to measure the effectiveness of the KPRT in its whole-of-government approach because the performance measurement of the KPRT was tied to the goals and pillars of the ANDS and the 2006 Afghanistan Compact.²¹⁴ Jon Baker in his article *Quick Impact Projects: Towards a 'Whole-of-Government' Approach*, highlighted the KPRT's absence of measures of effectiveness. As a result, there is no indication of just how effective (or efficient) the quick impact projects have been. This lack of measures of effectiveness makes it difficult, if not impossible, to provide educated policy recommendations to improve the whole-of-government approach, as it relates to quick impact projects and the KPRT.²¹⁵

A Princeton University study on Provincial Reconstruction Teams noted that in order to assess and measure PRT performance, the following must occur: objectives must be clearly defined, metrics used for assessing performance need to be established, and they must be measured against clearly definable benchmarks. The study goes on to discuss the lack of a coherent vision regarding the KPRT objectives and what it was designed to accomplish, as well as a lack of metrics against which the success of the KPRT could be measured.²¹⁶ This position was mirrored by the CRS evaluation which found that the provision of suitable measurement mechanisms and performance targets was not easily accomplished. While the CRS evaluation discussed the early quantitative measurement activities, they found that these were “not particularly useful in measuring performance as they fail to capture the underlying

²¹⁴ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial...*, 2.

²¹⁵ Jon Baker, “Quick Impact Projects:..., 14.

²¹⁶ Nima Abbaszadeh et al, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and...*, 17, 25.

outcomes or effects that these sorts of activities had measured against a desired target.”²¹⁷

An operational interdepartmental working group (comprised of members of Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command and DFAIT) is attempting to address this shortfall through the creation of an “effects dashboard mechanism” designed to generate a “tactical level outcomes document” that could be used by the various departments and agencies involved in KPRT activities.²¹⁸

The lack of measurable metrics is also prevalent in other areas of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. The SENLIS Council argues that there is a “lack of coordinated management of the wealth of resources at the disposal of Canada in Afghanistan” and that the “absence of a plan with measurable objectives [regarding refugees and food aid] (critical success factors) is a disservice to the people who Canada is in Afghanistan to help, [and it] precludes accountability to the tax-paying voters in Canada.”²¹⁹ They further believe that the dearth of goals and objectives demonstrates a “weak and unacceptable management approach to the war [in Afghanistan].”²²⁰ This theme recurs in many of the documents dealing with Afghanistan.

The amelioration of the lack of measurements of effectiveness or benchmarks was one of the key recommendations of the Manley Report. It stated that “the effectiveness of Canada’s military and civilian activities in Afghanistan, along with the progress of Afghan

²¹⁷ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial...*, 23-24.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 24.

²¹⁹ SENLIS Council, *The Canadian International Development Agency in Kandahar...*, 10.

²²⁰ SENLIS Council, *Peace in Afghanistan – Made In Canada, A Companion Report to Peace Talks Simulation Game Afghanistan: A Way Out Of War?* (n.p., September 2007), 11 [report on-line]; available from http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/Peace_Afghanistan; Internet; accessed 21 December 2007.

security, governance and development, must be tracked and assessed more thoroughly and systematically.”²²¹ This activity was considered crucial by the panel to allow the assessment of performance and results which, in turn, would allow for the productive deliberation of future Afghan-related activities.²²²

However, the lack of measures of effectiveness is not just limited to Canada’s participation in Afghanistan. The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development noted in its report entitled *Canada’s International Policy Put to the Test in Haiti*, that the Canadian government needs to improve its communications with Canadians regarding the objectives and results of Canada’s involvement in fragile states. It recommended to the government that specific Canadian benchmarks be established for each country Canada is involved with. While it agreed that the benchmarks can be based on the Millennium Development Goals, it recommended Canadian benchmarks to enable the periodic assessment of Canada’s contribution against those goals.²²³

This situation is not likely to become more tenable, at least in the near to mid term, given the government response to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. While not explicitly stating that it would *not* create benchmarks or measures of effectiveness for Canada’s contributions, the government stated that “all

²²¹ *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan*, The Honourable John Manley..., 36.

²²² *Ibid.*, 36.

²²³ House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, *Canada’s International Policy Put to the Test in Haiti...*, 6. The issue of assessing mission effectiveness and the lack of clear metrics was also discussed regarding Canada’s mission in Afghanistan in a report of the Standing Committee on National Defence. “Interestingly the 2005 Defence Policy Statement presents eight factors to be considered by government before reaching a decision to deploy a military mission overseas. A clear exit-strategy or desired end-state is one of them, but the list does not include clear metrics against which the effectiveness or success of the mission can be measured. Without such measures of mission success, how can we be sure we are closing on the desired end state?” See also; House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canadian Forces In Afghanistan...*, 84.

government departments and agencies report annually to Parliament on their expenditures against established plans and priorities through their reports on plans and priorities.”²²⁴ It goes on to state that “Canadian actions and objectives with respect to diplomatic, development, stabilization and reconstruction efforts in fragile states will be highlighted”²²⁵ within documents such as the Reports on Plans and Priorities, and that these documents are available to the Public and therefore compliant with the Government of Canada’s general transparency obligations.²²⁶

While the government holds the position that current reporting practices and procedures are sufficient to measure Canada’s effectiveness, the detailed information regarding concrete benchmarks and specific measures of effectiveness is missing. For example, while DFAIT’s *Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008* lists some generic desired outcomes for its involvement in fragile states, it does not provide any specific benchmarks or qualitative measures of effectiveness by which to gauge success.²²⁷ What is known is that the call for proper measures of effectiveness is coming from a multitude of

²²⁴ Parliament of Canada, “Government Response to the Fourth Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, ‘Canada’s International Policy Put To the Test in Haiti,’” <http://cmtc.parl.gc.ca/cmtc/CommitteePublication.aspx?COM=10475&Lang=1&SourceId=201205>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2008.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “RPP 2007-2008...”, for example, under paragraph 2.1.1.2.1. Description of International Security Program Activity, it lists as part of Strategic priority 3, a 1-3 year ‘planned outcome’ of increased security, stabilization, reconstruction and strengthened governance in Afghanistan. As part of its determination factors it lists under the ‘as demonstrated by’ column, the number of Afghan police and security forces trained and equipped through GPSF funding. However in accordance with the RAND definition discussed earlier this is really equated to an output as opposed to an outcome which can measure the efficacy of the overall program in some form that can determine a measurement of progress. The author has also corresponded with the Government of Canada’s START communications group requesting whether START has created any benchmarks or measurements of effectiveness (and if so what they are) by which they can monitor how effective they are in their endeavour’s. As of 22 April 2008, the author has not received a response.

sources, both inside and outside government - - all saying in effect the same thing - - that measures of effectiveness are essential in determining the effectiveness of Canada's efforts to improve the lot of failed or fragile states. It is crucial that they be developed and implemented.

Sub Section Five - Communicating with Canadians and within Government

One of the frustrations facing the Canadian public is the lack of solid and frank information by which to judge the effectiveness of Canada's actions in Haiti, the Darfur region of Sudan or Afghanistan. The Manley Report highlighted the communications conundrum in which the Canadian government finds itself when it recommended the government provide Canadians with "more information and analysis on the diplomatic and reconstruction-development dimensions" of the Afghan mission in a continuous, constructive fashion, good or bad.²²⁸ The panel assessed that the government "failed to communicate with Canadians with balance and candour about the reasons for Canadian involvement, or about the risks, difficulties and expected results of that involvement."²²⁹

This governmental failure to communicate is occurring with agencies (as evidenced with the communications issues between CIDA and the SENLIS Council), with media, (such as CBC Radio's unsuccessful attempts to balance the Senator Kenny interview with requests

²²⁸ *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, The Honourable John Manley ..., 36. Nor is that the first time some form of government committee has stated something similar. For example the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development has said in effect the same thing about Haiti when it stated that "At present, it is doubtful that the Canadian public has a clear idea of the policy rationales and guidelines for Canada's interventions in a fragile state like Haiti, and of what is being accomplished by the large sums being expended upon Canadian's behalf...In the Committee's view, the government needs to do more to elaborate and communicate with Canadians both the objectives and the results of Canadian interventions in fragile states." See also; House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, *Canada's International Policy Put to the Test in Haiti...*, 6.

²²⁹ *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, The Honourable John Manley..., 20.

for interviews from the Minister of International Cooperation and Minister of Foreign Affairs) as well as within government itself, as seen by the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence attempts to obtain qualitative information from CIDA regarding the effectiveness of development and aid distribution in Afghanistan.

This could simply be a reflection of the government's inability to provide accurate information as a result of the way it conducts its activities. For example, the 'pooled funding' form of aid distribution that CIDA practices means that "CIDA must take much of what those [interagency] groups do on faith – the wisdom and efficiency of the spending, or the amount that actually reaches intended recipients."²³⁰ This communications issue may be addressed (for Afghanistan at least) with the creation in February 2008 of the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan and the revamping of the Afghanistan Task Force,²³¹ as they may serve as a focal point for all questions related to the mission.²³²

This inability to communicate is not simply limited to information on ongoing projects. One area highlighted as deficient is the lack of some form of capstone framework that outlines procedures on interagency cooperation. One of the recommendations from the CRS was the requirement for the "coordination of interagency concepts, doctrine, performance measurement and lessons learned above the tactical level" within DND. This requirement should be extrapolated to all of government. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has commented on the requirement for an "overall

²³⁰ Editorial, "Searching for CIDA," *The Globe and Mail*, January 23, 2008 [article on-line]; available from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080123.wecida23/BNSStory/Afghanistan>; Internet; accessed 06 February 2008.

²³¹ Office of the Prime Minister, "Prime Minister Announces Decisive Action On....,"

²³² Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial...*, v.

framework” to effectively manage whole-of-government approaches. Such a document would provide a solid understanding of the concepts behind state fragility, a ‘concept of operations’ on how the government would conduct its involvement, including the government’s key objectives and the importance of early, integrated planning. OECD also recognized that for a framework to be successful, it must be sanctioned by the highest political levels of government (at the level of prime minister) with appropriate engagement by the relevant ministers. The Manley Report applied this observation to Canada’s mission in Afghanistan when it wrote “a better integrated and more consistent Canadian policy approach should be led by the Prime Minister, supported by a special cabinet committee and a single full-time task force” so as to obtain the necessary political oversight and degree of implementation to achieve success.²³³

An initial model could be along the lines of the *Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook*, whose purpose is to describe the planning process necessary to “effectively integrate the operations of all USG [United States Government] actors in a complex crisis.”²³⁴ The goal is to ensure that the various organizations involved in planning operations are all in agreement with respect to purpose, mission and objectives, that critical issues are identified and dealt with early, that responsibility for the various components of an operation are assigned quickly and clearly, and that questions regarding the allocation of resources and competing priorities are answered as early as possible in the process.²³⁵

Finally, it provides information on coordinating mechanisms that can assist in the

²³³ *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan*, The Honourable John Manley..., 34.

²³⁴ *Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook*, National Defence University (n.p. January 2003), 5 [book on-line]; available from http://www.ndu.edu/ITEA/storage/518/ITEA_Handbook_2003.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 February 2008.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

development of an overarching plan; including interagency rehearsals, assessment tools to determine effectiveness, and the requirement to establish effective integration mechanisms at all levels.²³⁶

The Australian Government has gone even further. They have taken the whole-of-government approach to an entirely new plane, incorporating it into their Public Service. They have made agency heads and other key personnel responsible for ensuring cooperation between agencies, for ensuring success of the whole-of-government approach, and for finding solutions that are in the national interest, not in the interest of the individual department. They have put into place structures and processes aimed at improving the effectiveness of the whole-of-government approach, including amendments to their Public Service Act as well as their Financial Management and Accountability Act. They have focused on the ‘group effort’ when dealing with interagency issues, rather than maintaining a stovepipe mentality.²³⁷ The Australian approach is not just for crisis response – they have taken the concept and applied it pan-government for the resolution of issues requiring the involvement of more than one department.

In short, while the Canadian government has placed a significant amount of ‘rhetoric’ on the whole-of-government approach, it has fallen short in providing concrete information, not only to the Canadian public but also to parliamentary organizations. Nor does it appear that they have done the necessary background work (such as the creation of an interagency framework and procedures) or research into how best to implement such an approach. Some

²³⁶ Ibid., 15-19.

²³⁷ Australian Public Service Commission, “Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges, Summary Of Findings,” <http://www.apsc.gov.au/mac/connectingsummary.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2008.

would argue that the government continues to pursue this type of agenda so as to have sufficient room to manoeuvre within the political arena; however, this does not obviate the requirement for effectiveness in meeting its objectives for the price paid by Canadians, in terms of resources and ‘national treasure.’ As such, it is something that should not be so easily dismissed.

Sub Section Six – Rhetoric, Reality and Longevity

For years, the rhetoric of the Canadian government has been compared to the realities of their actions. In his article *Caught In-between Traditions: A Minority Conservative Government and Canadian Foreign Policy*, Chapnick suggested Canada actually pursues foreign policy in two forms -- one rhetorical in which it communicates its desire on how it would like to pursue its interests abroad, and the other the ‘reality’ of Canadian foreign policy whereby Canada “embraces membership in international institutions” and activities (which usually occurs because of domestic vice international political pressure) and then fulfills its obligations with trepidation, reluctance and (relatively speaking) few resources.²³⁸

This ‘tradition’ continued with the IPS-Overview, which set the bar high regarding what Canada should be doing in failed and fragile states. It recognized many of the previous decade’s problems when it stated that “the new multilateralism must put action ahead of rhetoric and results ahead of process,”²³⁹ noting also that the institutions required to put these new policies into place had suffered significant cutbacks in addressing the fiscal realities of

²³⁸ Adam Chapnick, “Caught In-between Traditions: A Minority Conservative Government and Canadian Foreign Policy,” in *Canada Among Nations, 2006*, ed. Andrew F Cooper and Dane Rowlands, 58-75 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2006), 63.

²³⁹ Canada. *Canada's International Policy Statement – Overview...*, 1.

the 1990's. IPS-Overview also acknowledged that Canada would almost always have to act multi-laterally to make a difference in the regions it wished to help,²⁴⁰ and that many of these activities would require continued Canadian involvement that could last for years.²⁴¹

However, the best example of the comparison of government responses against the 'rhetoric' it espouses is provided in Kim Nossal's article *Ear Candy: Canadian Policy toward Humanitarian Intervention and Atrocity Crimes in Darfur*, in which he discusses how "the prime minister's rhetoric about Canada's concern for the humanitarian crisis became so inflated that it was impossible ...to ensure its actions matched it rhetoric."²⁴² He provided several quotes by then Prime Minister Martin in an interview on Darfur: "We've got to get in there. And we'll do whatever is required," as well as, "I am prepared to increase our military expenditures," and "I think there is a role for Canadian troops there."²⁴³ These comments were followed by a donation of flak jackets, helmets and other gear (worth approximately \$250,000) in response to a United Nations call for donor commitments for African Union forces. While this was eventually increased to include armoured personnel carriers, helicopter contracts for tactical airlift support and other funding, Nossal suggested it was not in response to the ideals of humanitarianism, but rather, the response formed "part of its [the government's] efforts to preserve itself from a vote of non-confidence in the House of

²⁴⁰ Canada. *Canada's International Policy Statement – Overview...*, 1, 5.

²⁴¹ Canadian International Development Agency, "Canada's International Policy Statement (2005....,

²⁴² Kim R. Nossal. "Ear Candy: Canadian Policy toward Humanitarian Intervention and Atrocity Crimes in Darfur," *International Journal*, 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 1017-1032; <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=306&TS=1208384174&clientId=1711>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2008. See also Hal Klepak, "Haiti and Cuba: Test Cases for Canada, but Tests of What?," *International Journal*, 61, 3 (Summer 2006): 677-695; <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=306&TS=1208384174&clientId=1711>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2008. See also; Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, "A State of Disconnects...X.

²⁴³ Kim R. Nossal. *Ear Candy...*,

Commons.”²⁴⁴ Some would say this is in line with former Prime Minister Trudeau’s comment regarding foreign policy being an extension of domestic policy and Canada’s national interests,²⁴⁵ and is also applicable to Afghanistan. For example current official opposition leader, Stephane Dion’s original position while a member of Paul Martin’s cabinet was in support of the Afghanistan mission. This changed to a pullout of Canadian troops from Afghanistan after completion of the current February 2009 commitment once he became an opposition member,²⁴⁶ to an agreement on extending the mission. Many feel his final compromise with the conservative government was more about the potential timing of a federal election and the Liberals standing in the polls than about the Afghan mission and pursuing a comprehensive government approach to aid a fragile state.²⁴⁷

The issue here is that both the government and all political parties have a requirement to acknowledge that effective Canadian involvement in failed and fragile states requires clear and consistent policy and long-term commitment that should transcend partisan politics. In the case of Afghanistan, NATO and the Afghan government are conducting a counter-insurgency campaign in a country decimated by decades of conflict. The experts agree that

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ John J. Noble. “Do Foreign Policy Reviews Make A Difference?,” *Policy Options* (February 2005) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.irpp.org/>; Internet; accessed 03 February 2008.

²⁴⁶ Jack Aubry, “Dion Says Canada Should Withdraw its Troops from Afghanistan,” *Canwest News Service: Ottawa Citizen*, November 22, 2006 [article on-line]; available from <http://www.canada.com/topics/news/politics/story.html?id=b476faeb-cd0e-4567-95f2-0c56cb1d6375&k=35236>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2008. See also; “Consensus Impossible on Afghan Mission: Dion,” *CBC News*, July 4, 2007 [article on-line]; available from <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/07/04/layton-afghan-070704.html>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2008. See also; New Democratic Party, “Reality Check – Dion to Canadians: ‘Do You Think It Is Easy to Flip-Flop on Afghanistan?’,” <http://www.ndp.ca/page/4929>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2008. See also Conservative Party, “Where Does Stephane Dion Actually Stand on Afghanistan, August 14, 2007,” <http://www.conservative.ca/EN/2874/85873>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2008.

²⁴⁷ James Travers, “Compromise Lets Federal Leaders Sidestep Afghan Issue,” *The Record*, 14 February 2008 [article on-line]; available from www.ebcghost.com; Internet; accessed 28 March 2008.

involvement in counter-insurgency activity requires a long-term commitment as this is usually a protracted affair.²⁴⁸ Timelines become even longer when dealing with the devastation as seen in Afghanistan. The Manley Report recognized this when it stated that “ending Canada’s military contribution in Kandahar is therefore not a matter of setting artificial deadlines in time. It is a matter of making real progress in the context of events on the ground.”²⁴⁹ Yet when Canada originally agreed to the deployment to Kandahar, the necessity of long-term commitment was not on the government’s mind. Then-Prime Minister Martin had originally wanted a ‘quick-in, quick-out’ approach as he wanted to use those resources elsewhere.²⁵⁰

The requirement for long-term commitment can best be seen through Canada’s involvement in Haiti. It is likely that the lack of a consistent long-term policy is one of the main reasons why Canada has deployed (and continues to deploy) military, police and civilians multiple times to Haiti. Robert Maguire discusses the requirement for ‘policy makers’ to realize that it does not do any good to ‘intervene’ only when a crisis is imminent, temporarily stabilize the situation and then try to exit as quickly as you entered.²⁵¹ The issue of long-term commitment was seen by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development as essential when it recommended that “Canada formally commit to a ‘whole-of-government’ strategy for Haiti that envisages involvement for *at least* ten

²⁴⁸ Eliot Cohen et al, “Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review* (March-April 2006): 49-53; <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=4&hid=7&sid=0e4eb145-bebd-4806-a609-b25204259f0a%40sessionmgr2>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2008.

²⁴⁹ *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan*, The Honourable John Manley..., 32.

²⁵⁰ Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar...*, 191.

²⁵¹ Robert Maguire, “Assisting a Neighbour: Haiti’s Challenge To North American Policy Makers,” in *Haiti; Hope for a Fragile State*, ed. Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew S. Thompson, 25-35 (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2006), 32.

years [emphasis added].”²⁵² It recognized that long-term political will and effort was required by Canada, the International Community and the Haitian government in order to turn Haiti into a “functioning democracy.”²⁵³ The government agreed with this recommendation in its response to the Standing Committee and pledged its commitment to Haiti “over the long haul,” including assurances from the Prime Minister to the Haitian president that “Canada’s commitment would be ongoing and long-term.”²⁵⁴

This response however, begs the question, how did our involvement in Haiti ‘extract’ a long-term commitment from the government while no such commitment is forthcoming for either Afghanistan or Darfur? Is it because of domestic political sensitivities (i.e. the Canadian Haitian community), or the perception that no Canadians are dying in Haiti? While acknowledging that both the circumstances of each failed or fragile state is different and that the government only has a finite set of resources to apply towards those states, the methodology by which a government decides to commit its involvement should be relatively similar. In other words there is a lack of policy consistency towards failed and fragile states.

²⁵² House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, *Canada’s International Policy Put to the Test in Haiti...*, 6.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁵⁴ Parliament of Canada, “Government Response to the Fourth Report of...,”

CHAPTER THREE – RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations below are a compilation of the observations made in the previous sections of this paper. None of the recommendations are resource-intensive when compared with the overall resource capabilities of the federal government, yet any or all would act as enablers towards the government's desire for an effective and efficient whole-of-government approach towards failed and fragile states. The recommendations are:

A Common Lexicon

A detailed analysis of the various government documents such as the IPS documents, the various departmental Reports on Plans and Priorities and Standing Committee Reports has shown that the terminology (such as failed state, failing state, fragile state, nation building, state-building, 3D, integration, coordination, etc.) has been used in an interchangeable and sometimes confusing fashion, with no real consistency between department or committee. The documentation rarely provided a definition or glossary to allow for a common understanding of the terminology within the context of the document. Also absent was some form of classification system on failed, failing or fragile states that could provide additional context when dealing with the subject. This is considered necessary for the provision of an assessment of state 'fragility.'

A common lexicon would also enhance the development of interdepartmental / interagency strategies, as there would be consistency and common understanding (at least in terminology) throughout the process. By necessity, any common lexicon would be some form of 'living' document in that the whole-of-government' approach to state-building is an evolutionary process that changes as lessons are learned. However, there must be a common

understanding of what each organization is discussing in order to focus the applicable government players towards a common objective. As such, the recommendation is that the government develop and publish a common lexicon for use by all departments and agencies to assist in ensuring 'clarity of purpose' in dealing with failed, failing or fragile states.

Measures of Effectiveness for each Mission

The key issue related to trying to determine the effectiveness of the Canadian whole-of-government approach has been a lack of benchmarks or measures of effectiveness that can determine whether Canada is meeting its security, governance and development objectives in the countries in which it is involved. Canadian government websites are rife with comments regarding Canada's support and successes in Haiti, Afghanistan and Darfur; however the comments are often without context. Generally speaking, the government -- particularly CIDA -- has taken a 'pooled' approach to its involvement which then ties its success to that of the donor partner and the international communities' interpretation of the ANDS, the ICF and MDGs - - without any apparent accountability. Generally, this success has been portrayed as a monetary value such as dollars spent on a project or quantitatively such as the number of kilometers of road rehabilitated. In other words, the focus has been on inputs and outputs rather than outcomes, which would provide an evaluation capability for determining both the progress achieved and the ability to link the activity to the desired second and third order effects. The provision of performance metrics (including the baseline information necessary to provide a reference point) would allow for adjustment programs if necessary and allow the government to determine the overall effectiveness of its involvement.

The lack of true measures of effectiveness have been observed upon by organizations such as the Standing Committee on National Defence, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, non-governmental organizations, international organizations and others, with the most recent example given by the Manley Report. All have called for the government to develop and implement systematic measures of effectiveness which have to date been ignored. The recommendation is therefore the development and publication of clear and definable measures of effectiveness linked to clearly stated objectives for each country in which Canada participates. This should be a pre-condition set prior to Canada's involvement in whole-of-government activities in a failed or fragile state.

Enhance and Move the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force

The concept of START, an interdepartmental coordination group to coordinate the conversion of strategic governmental objectives into definable and measurable outcomes, was an excellent beginning to a Canadian whole-of-government approach. However, it does not appear that the concept has survived 'first contact.' The issues with START appear to be four-fold. Firstly, the organization resides within DFAIT, reinforcing the perception of other government departments that it has more to do with DFAIT 'protectionism' than an attempt to integrate the inputs of individual departments and agencies into a holistic approach. Secondly, the perception is that the organization is insufficiently manned to carry out the necessary strategic planning and coordination activities it *should* be conducting, as personnel are consumed by their day-to-day activities, resulting in a myopic approach. Thirdly, the

organization's focus is 'unbalanced' as the vast majority of its personnel came from DFAIT. Finally, the personnel within the organization do not appear to have the 'rank' or seniority necessary to truly make a difference; either in the policy world or in breaking down the barriers that exist between the senior levels of the government departments. One only has to look at the recommendations of the Manley Report and the conservative government's establishment of an Afghan cabinet committee and a full-time task force (headed by a deputy minister equivalent) positioned within the Privy Council Office to see what efforts are required for the true integration of a whole-of-government approach.²⁵⁵

Based on the above, it is recommended that the START organization be enhanced to provide the necessary rank, that it be modified to reflect a more equitable distribution of departmental expertise, that additional personnel be added to the organization to improve its strategic planning capacities, and that the organization be taken out of Foreign Affairs and placed within the Privy Council Office reporting chain (figure three).

Whole of Government Relationship




Figure Three

²⁵⁵ *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, The Honourable John Manley..., 34. See also; Office of the Prime Minister, "Prime Minister Announces Decisive Action On...",

Commission a study on the Canadian Whole-of-Government Approach

The government's efforts to date have tended to focus on the immediacy of the practical problems associated with the coordination of a whole-of-government approach. It does not appear to have any detailed information or documentation (other than the IPS documents) about what it wants to achieve nor how it would like to achieve it. As a result, there exists a lack of information to assist government departments in formulating policy and practice. A comprehensive whole-of-government study should include, as a minimum, the following points.

Firstly, the study should provide a comparison of how our allies are confronting these issues. For example, the Australian government has completely revamped its public service, including changes in legislation to focus on cooperation and collaboration between agencies, rather than the traditional stovepipe approach. The United Kingdom has created an organization called the Stabilisation Unit (SU) – formerly known as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit that is jointly owned by the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The SU conducts a number of activities, including assessment and planning on behalf of either the parent department or the Cabinet Office (their version of the Privy Council Office).²⁵⁶

The study should lay out the strategic level objectives the government wants to achieve with START and provide recommendations regarding the size, construct, location and rank necessary to enable the organization to succeed in meeting its strategic objectives. The study would, by necessity, include an in-depth look at Canadian legislation, especially legislation currently inhibiting an effective and efficient Canadian approach (i.e. contracting

²⁵⁶ Stabilisation Unit, "What is the Stabilisation Unit?," <http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2008. See Also; Australian Public Service Commission, "Connecting Government...",

regulations, financial authorities, obstacles to the deployment of civilian members of the various departments, etc.). Many Treasury Board regulations, for example, do not take into consideration the unique operating environment of a failed or fragile state, and as a result, domestic legislative requirements are being applied within a counter-insurgency situation. The study would also need to propose solutions to overcome legislative shortcomings including amendments to existing legislation as required. This examination should also cover current limitations (benefits, risk, insurance, etc.) linked to the use of civilian government employees in failed and fragile states and the dangers they would face in taking a more active role.

The recommendation therefore, is for the government to undertake a strategic level study covering as a minimum the issues discussed above.

Develop a Governmental Capstone Framework on the Whole-of-Government Approach to State-Building

Another observation that has come to the fore is the lack of a ‘capstone’ framework to deal with an integrated whole-of-government approach. Such a document should cover the various aspects of the whole-of-government approach and be considered official government policy (unlike IPS-Development). It would describe the normal interdepartmental processes to be followed, the key functions required, procedures to be followed in the event of a crisis, mechanisms for integration and coordination such as committees and working groups, procedures and responsibilities of the various organizations involved, etc. It should provide guidance on issues such as planning, the creation of integrated strategies and how to construct the necessary effectiveness criteria to enable a continual assessment process of the

mission. It should also provide guidance on lessons learned (from a policy and program management perspective), the training requirements necessary for the creation of an interdepartmental / interagency team, and a communications strategy designed to allow for open, transparent communications with governmental organizations and the Canadian public. Therefore the drafting of a Capstone whole-of-government framework covering the above mentioned areas is recommended.

Commitment and Staying Power

This last issue, while not a recommendation, speaks to the requirement of the government and political parties in general to recognize the importance of commitment and staying power within a mission. For a government to live up to the ideals listed within the IPS documents requires strategic vision that transcends the reality of partisan politics within the Canadian political landscape. Canada's 'traditional' in-out (and often back in again) approach that has characterized much of Canada's previous involvement in failed and fragile states is an example what the government is trying *not* to accomplish. The government should acknowledge that for Canada to truly make a difference will require a detailed strategic, integrated analysis of the situation prior to a commitment of resources to determine whether Canada can be of assistance. Once the government has decided to commit, it must acknowledge the time (years to decades) and resources necessary to return a failed or fragile state to being a productive member of the international community.

CONCLUSION

This paper looked at several factors in determining whether Canada had an effective whole-of-government approach to failed and fragile states by using Haiti, Darfur and Afghanistan as case studies. It was observed that many initiatives were generally successful in the field due to the relationships created and the focus on ‘getting the job done.’ The significant issues which had a perceived negative impact on effectiveness generally manifested themselves at the policy and program management levels within Canada, and they are summarized below.

There is the lack of a common lexicon within government. The individual departments have not shown consistency in the use of terminology, nor have they provided the necessary definitions for the terminology used. This originated within the IPS documents but has shown itself in other documentation as well. A common lexicon is considered necessary to aid in the development of interdepartmental strategies to allow a ‘baseline’ of common understanding within government. This would, in turn, aid in the provision of clarity of purpose in the government’s approach to failed and fragile states.

There are mixed successes within the security and governance effectiveness dimensions, and to a much lesser extent, within the development effectiveness dimension. The issue is not that projects are not being completed or that progress is not being made, it is that the progress has been undefinable. This is predominantly a result of the lack of a clear Canadian end-state tied to clearly defined Canadian benchmarks or measures of effectiveness. This deficiency has been commented upon by numerous government committees, the Manley Report, as well as the NGO community. Without some form of valid performance metrics, it is impossible to determine the true effectiveness of the Canadian approach, to gauge the

progress made along the way or to allow for programs to be adjusted mid-stream. This appears to be particularly true within the development effectiveness dimension, where the majority of CIDA's support is funneled through partner agencies.

Areas where Canada appears to have been effective in the field are with organizations such as the KPRT, SAT-A, as well as the work conducted by Canadian police services in Haiti. However, this is more from the standpoint of the various departments and agencies working together in the field, as they still appear to lack definitive measures of effectiveness tied to inputs, outputs and outcomes.

Canada has the most work to do domestically at the policy and program management level. Concepts such as START are an excellent initiative; however it appears that it does not have the horsepower, the seniority or the correct placement within the governmental hierarchy to allow for a truly integrated whole-of-government approach as envisaged in the 2005 IPS documents. Changes such as increasing START's planning capabilities, providing a more equitable distribution of departmental expertise, and placing the organization within the Privy Council Office would enhance its capabilities and help streamline the whole-of-government approach.

The Canadian government has not communicated effectively regarding its goals toward failed and fragile states. This includes the lack of information regarding progress (which partially stems from the lack of measures of effectiveness), and the lack of coherent government policy or framework on whole-of-government operations. The best method by which to improve these deficiencies is the commissioning of a 'whole-of-government approach' study. By looking at issues such as governmental strategic level objectives, legislative shortcomings and policy requirements, (as well as determining the way our Allies

have approached the issue), the government would then be in a position to create an overall policy framework on the whole-of-government approach.

Finally, if the Canadian government wishes to live up to the ideals set within the IPS documents, it must acknowledge the time necessary to transform a failed or fragile state, domestic partisan politics notwithstanding. In the end, for the international community to make a difference requires ‘staying power’ and commitment, something that must be acknowledged up front prior to involvement.

In summary, Canada’s whole-of-government approach has been rated as per the chart at figure four below. It reaffirms that while there have been successes in the field, a significant amount of work is still required at the policy and program management level to improve Canada’s overall effectiveness. Without addressing the issues mentioned above, assessing Canada’s whole-of-government approach will remain difficult, and progress towards a more efficient and effective system will continue to be impeded.

	Security	Governance	Development	Other
Level	Includes topics such as intl security forces, national army, national police and border police, etc.	Includes topics such as governance, rule of law, human rights etc	Includes topics such as private sector development, agricultural and rural development, education, infrastructure and natural resources	Includes specific indicators such as measures of effectiveness, communications, Political will etc
Field				
Policy & Program Mgmt				

Effectiveness Matrix - Canadian Whole-of-Government Approach
Figure four

In the end, it is not a question of *whether* Canada has accomplished anything in its involvement in failed and fragile states, for there are positive, concrete, quantitative examples of this. The question is whether Canada is being effective in the application of its resources to resolve the complex issues associated with state-building. Canada needs to take an introspective look at what it wishes to achieve regarding its involvement, determine what it is willing to apply in terms of resources to further those achievements, then take the initiative and move towards the goal of an *effective* whole-of-government approach to state-building. There is recognition at many levels of government that improvements can and should be made given our current commitments in Afghanistan, Haiti and Darfur. The time is right, for in the words of Jennifer Welsh, “The current environment offers Canada a unique opportunity to reinvigorate its global role . . . this opportunity transcends the fortunes of any particular prime minister or political party”²⁵⁷ - - may we take advantage of it.

²⁵⁷ Jennifer Welsh, *Reality and Canadian Foreign Policy* . . . , 23.

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