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Master of Defence Studies (MDS) Research Project

**The Whole of Government Approach, Nation Building and  
The Political Economy of International Intervention**

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**Abstract**

The study of Canadian Forces participation in acts of international intervention from a military, economic and political perspective is an emerging requirement in view of the Department of National Defence's expanding focus on "Whole of Government" operations. This essay surveys the historical background, motivations, and components of international intervention, and its effects on the host nation.

This research covers the history of intervention in the context of events pre and post Cold War and covers the impact of military operations, development, and aid on host nations. As the political and economic impacts of a military force in a Whole of Government initiative may only manifest themselves after the departure of a Task Force, an understanding of the political economy of a nation building and intervention by military forces is necessary to minimize the harmful effects of the deployed contingent on a foreign state.

This paper concludes that successful intervention and nation building is an expensive, complex and time intensive endeavour that needs to be understood by the Whole of Government team. In order to effectively direct the intervention, military and civilian planners need to produce an effective and coordinated campaign plan that synchronizes the efforts of the Whole of Government force.

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## Acronyms

3D+C	Development, Diplomacy, Defence and Commerce
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
BG	Battle Group
CAN	Canadian Dollar
CF	Canadian Forces
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CMC	Contract Management Cell
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DIME	Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Force
FFS	Failed or Failing State
FINNIDA	Finnish International Development Agency
FOB	Forward Operating Base
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“The Dayton Accords”)
GoA	Government of Afghanistan
GoC	Government of Canada
HA	Humanitarian Aid
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFOR	Implementation Force (NATO)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organizations
IPS	International Policy Statement (DFAIT)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (NATO)
KAF	Kandahar Air Field (Afghanistan)
MOB	Main Operating Base
NCE	National Command Element
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSE	National Support Element
OC	Officer Commanding
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OMLT	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PDPA	Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan



PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
QIP	Quick Impact Projects
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCO	Regional Contracting Office
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SAT	Strategic Advisory Team
SFOR	Stabilization Force (NATO)
START	Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force
TF	Task Force
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protective Force
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
WGA	Whole of Government Approach
WoG	Whole of Government
WW	World War

## CHAPTER ONE - INTERVENTION AND GOOD INTENTIONS

My experience is that international peacebuilding is genuinely well intended by people who are deeply concerned and want to make a difference. But good intentions are not sufficient for ensuring appropriate action, process and outcome.

- John Paul Lederach<sup>1</sup>

### 1.1 Foreword

Between February and June 2007, I was the Officer Commanding (OC) the National Support Element (NSE) Contract Management Cell (CMC) on the third rotation of Operation ATHENA, Task Force 1-07. The CMC was responsible to provide contracting support to the Canadian contingent in Afghanistan, and in the five months that I worked out of Kandahar Airfield (KAF), not once was I visited by a representative from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) or the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). As I trained in Canada and later deployed under the impression that the CMC would be a component of the 3D (defence, diplomacy and development), 3D+C (defence, diplomacy, development and commerce), or Whole of Government (WoG) approach in Afghanistan, I fully expected to participate in inter-agency discussions on how the NSE was spending Canadian public funds in the region. However, this did not occur. Upon reflection, I presume now that I was occupied with addressing my responsibilities in the NSE and content with the assumption that the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar City was the focus of the Department of National Defence's (DND) contribution to the WoG effort in theatre. By the time that I realised that the CAN \$1.5 million in monthly expenditures that the CMC was making

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<sup>1</sup> John Paul Lederach, and Janice Moomaw Jenner, *A Handbook of International Peacebuilding: Into the Eye of the Storm* (San Francisco: Jossey-Boss, 2002), xv.

could or should have been part of a larger Canadian economic and developmental strategy in the region, I had returned to Canada and Rotation 4 was managing the contracting activity on the mission.<sup>2</sup> From this perspective, I have a number of concerns that surround the WoG approach that the Government of Canada (GoC) is espousing and this research paper has been produced with the intent to contribute to the increased situational awareness and effectiveness of future military task forces deployed in the WoG construct.

In terms of responsibilities, the KAF-based CMC was tasked to manage direct from trade contracts, coordinate the management of the Canadian Contracted Augmentation Program (CANCAP), and conduct liaison with Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC). The CMC also undertook contract liaison with the KAF-based United States (US) Regional Contracting Office (RCO) and identified Canadian contracting requirements with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA). From the leasing of explosive detector dog services and the purchase of defensive works to the hiring of local translators and labourers, the CMC led the contingent's regional acquisition efforts. Higher headquarters conducted two inspections on the Rotation 3 CMC during its tenure, but the activities of the section were not reviewed in the context of the WoG framework. Although the mandate of the inspection teams was to focus on how well the CMC was run administratively, this research will show that military task forces can be more productive

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<sup>2</sup>This CAN \$ 1.5 million reflects the average monthly amount that the CMC spent on locally engaged employees, "jingle truck" rentals, direct from trade contracts, Forward Operating Base contracted support, and interpreters. Breakdown of costs available from the NSE Rotation 3 After Action Report, August 2007.

in supporting the WoG efforts in Afghanistan if the organization is included in a larger GoC synchronised effort (i.e., the NSE). Considering the daily interaction that the CMC had with political leaders and businessmen from the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon and Afghanistan, this is an important issue considering the interactions that occur on interventions focused on nation building.

## 1.2 Introduction

In the realm of international affairs, there is an axiom that proposes “it is easier to stop a war than to build a peace.”<sup>3</sup> As the world struggles with the news of random neighbourhood bombings in Algeria, opposition leader Benazir Bhutto’s assassination in Pakistan, and ethnic-economic based election violence in Kenya, these recent events are testing the foundation of this altruistic theory. For a world that repeatedly voices its desire for peace, there are significant contradictions and challenges to the stability and security that we all profess to attain. From a Western liberal-democratic point of view, these three violent acts could have elicited a number of reactions. While some may have queried the history behind the violence, others may have questioned who was responsible and who could gain from the acts. Similarly, others may have wondered if the matter will be solved internally. Will the region come to the aid of the troubled state and offer assistance? Will the situation worsen into a security issue that will necessitate intervention from the United Nation’s (UN) more powerful states? If one supports the view that “military intervention cannot solve humanitarian or conflict resolution problems; it can only alter them,” then it is reasonable to assume that for intervention to

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<sup>3</sup> Timothy Donais, *The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia* (New York: Routledge, 2005), xv.

succeed, applications of force need to be accompanied with diplomatic, social, political and economic assistance.<sup>4</sup> It is from this holistic perspective that this research has been produced.

Considering the rise of globalisation, multinational trade, travel, communications networks and the development of concepts such as “responsibility to protect” (R2P), this research contends that the metaphysical distance between nation states, ethnic groups and economic powers is shrinking.<sup>5</sup> And as this distance begins to contract, tensions based on differences in ethnicity, religion, or economic circumstance may surface and manifest themselves through conflict. Where terrorist plans financed and hatched from a secluded farming compound in Afghanistan can now effectively alter the course of history, the actions of failed or failing states (FFS) and their associated trans-national organizations are no longer isolated from the rest of the world. As result, they pose greater threats to the security of the international community each passing year – and from this author’s perspective, the opportunity for global intervention to maintain peace and security in domestic affairs appears to be a growth industry.

In the Canadian context, consecutive budget surpluses and a healthy economy has allowed it to focus on international affairs as a means to both support domestic interests and to extend its international influence. As result, Canada will continue to support UN and/or NATO sanctioned interventions as a means to resolve foreign domestic conflict to

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<sup>4</sup>Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, “Humanitarian Intervention Is Problematic,” in *Interventionalism*, ed. Paul A. Winters, 48-56 (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc. 1995), 56.

<sup>5</sup>For more information on R2P, refer to *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (December 2001) [report on-line]; available from <http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

diminish the security threats that these conflicts may pose. However, as this research hypothesizes, the history, motivations, and impacts of intervention are little understood concepts and need to be considered by the military personnel and the Canadian Forces (CF) as an institution. While the CF is deployed on operations with the benevolent intention to improve the security and living conditions of host nation inhabitants, it is not well known if military actions in the locale have in fact improved the regional economic, social or political conditions. With a proliferation of discussion on WoG based initiatives and how they will be employed on the international stage, it is necessary for the CF to consider and be able to measure the level of security, political stability and economic influence that it has in its area of operations.

This study will utilise existing research pursued by economists and academic scholars to analyse the impact of intervention on a host nation's political economy, and illuminate the factors that must be considered by the military in WoG operations.

In terms of format, this paper will be divided into three components, namely the history and nature of intervention, a brief examination of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, and commentary on the political economy of intervention. Following this introduction, Chapter Two will begin by analysing the concept of intervention from a historical perspective and discuss the various motivations that have played a role in a state's decision to intervene in the affairs of a foreign sovereign state. This research will show that world history is full of self serving and coercive acts of intervention that now cast a shadow over contemporary motivations and potentially jeopardizes their chances of success. As result, future interventions must respect this reality and incorporate

coordinated security, economic development, reconstruction efforts and information campaigns into their respective strategies.

Following the historical review of intervention, Chapter Three will provide a brief analysis of the current Canadian mission in Afghanistan and provide generic recommendations regarding this high profile WoG mission. For as this military operation continues and Western ideologies and measures of wealth are introduced into the developing economy, I hypothesize that the CF needs to take co-ordinated steps with its fellow agencies to ensure that its particular actions meet the mission's larger political, economic, and social intent. And as the continued violence in Afghanistan has proved, achieving peace during nation building can be more difficult, expensive, and time consuming than initially planned.<sup>6</sup> With 47,000 military forces now operating in Afghanistan and billions of dollars devoted to the mission, the end of the April 2008

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<sup>6</sup>The costs supporting the Afghanistan mission are significant. Considering that the cost/benefit analysis of the operation is ongoing and being discussed at length by governments, the media and tax payers, there are true expectations that this mission will succeed. The following financial data has been released on expenditures supporting efforts in Afghanistan:

- a. The Canadian military is expected to spend CAN \$ 6.3 billion between 2002 and 2009. CIDA is expected to spend CAN \$ 1.2 billion during this timeframe; and
- b. The Netherlands will spend CAN \$ 1.4 billion from 2006 to August 2008.  
Source Murray Brewster, "Dutch Tally Cost of Afghanistan," [news source on-line]; available from <http://www.globeandmail.com>; Internet; accessed 16 April 2008.
- c. The UK spent £742 million in 2006/2007 and is forecasting to spend £ 1.6 billion in 2007/2008.  
Source Michael Evans, "Costs of Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Has Doubled to £ 3.2 billion," [news source on-line]; available from <http://www.timesonline.co.uk>; Internet; accessed 16 April 2008.
- d. The US has budgeted US \$140 billion "for Afghanistan and other counter terrorism operations."  
Source Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terrorism Operations Since 9/11*, Report Prepared for the Members and Committees of Congress (Washington: Congressional Research Service, February 8, 2008), CRS-7.

NATO Bucharest Summit has witnessed renewed commitment to this intervention that is now in its sixth year.<sup>7</sup>

To close the work, Chapter Four will cover the numerous and often competing political and economic challenges that are prevalent in nation building, including a detailed look at the scope of the problems facing militaries, governments, international organizations (IO), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This last chapter has been produced with the intent to improve the situational awareness of military personnel and to identify the difficulties facing the WoG team. In the historical context of the cultural and financial challenges overcome by the Allies rebuilding Japan and Germany after the Second World War, Canada needs to be reminded of the considerable expense and effort required to rebuild a nation-state as fractured as Afghanistan. What are these challenges? What are the costs? What forms can intervention take? Who is involved? By the end of this research, it will be apparent that successful intervention and nation building is an expensive, complex and time intensive enterprise, which has to be understood by the WoG team and its home state population.

## **CHAPTER TWO – PERSPECTIVES OF INTERVENTION**

### **2.1 Intervention – The History of an International Tool**

In early 2008, the UN and NATO were encouraging their member states to participate in a number of operations dispersed throughout the world. Comprised of military, diplomatic, social and economic components, these operations are coined

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<sup>7</sup>At the Summit, NATO concurred with French President Sarkozy's statement that "Afghanistan is a strategic issue for international security. It's a central issue for relations between Islam and the West. It's essential for the Alliance." Paul Ames, "NATO Nixes Georgia, Ukraine Membership," [news source online]; available from <http://news.yahoo.com>; Internet; accessed 4 April 2008.



“missions” but they can also be considered acts of “intervention.” Terms such as military intervention, humanitarian intervention, and international intervention are often used interchangeably, but they possess different connotations which can confuse their debate. To some, intervention conjures up images of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives undermining the efforts of foreign governments throughout South America. In El Salvador for example, American intervention was carried out by the CIA in the 1980s whose surveillance programs routinely supplied government security agencies “with information on, and the whereabouts of, various individuals who wound up as death squad victims.”<sup>8</sup> This perception was echoed by Neil Macfarlane, who surmised that “the negative connotation inherent in the word intervention is reflected in the tendency to limit its use to situations in which the intrusion is deemed illegitimate.”<sup>9</sup> Author David Gibbs similarly denoted this perception when he simply defined it as “the manipulation of the internal politics of one country by another country.”<sup>10</sup> Under this cloud of negative opinion, the motivations behind future interventions will have to be transparent and clearly identified by the intervening force if its legitimacy is to pass international scrutiny and domestic support in the target state.

To others however, intervention is viewed as a positive international tool when it is employed in a benevolent manner such as peacekeeping (e.g., in countries like

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<sup>8</sup> William Blum, “El Salvador 1980-1994: Human Rights Washington Style,” *Killing Hope* [book on-line]; available from [http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blum/KillingHope\\_page.html](http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blum/KillingHope_page.html); Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

<sup>9</sup> Neil Macfarlane, *Intervention and Regional Security*, Adelphi Paper 196 (Dorchester, UK: The Dorset Press, 1985), 2.

<sup>10</sup> David N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1.

Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone). Depending on ones background, political experience, and personal biases, this will shape ones perception of intervention. That said, this paper will adopt the tenets of intervention espoused by Frederic S. Pearson. Although Pearson’s work was published in the 1970s, his observations are still valid today. His work has been used as a benchmark to study domestic conflict occurring within states and the potential reactions of the international community. Acknowledging that incidents of domestic conflict will be reacted to differently by the world’s states, one fact remains constant – that internal motivations and interests of an intervening power will drive the scope and construct of an intervention. To illustrate, a troubled state undergoing domestic strife such as riots, assassinations, revolution, general strikes, and election irregularities may not necessitate intervention by the international community. Yet the construction of an airstrip and perceived threat of communist expansion in the Caribbean resulted in the US and Jamaican invasion of Grenada in 1983. Pearson’s classification of foreign military intervention and a number of his key observations are summarized in Table 1. A brief interpretation of Pearson’s work will now be provided to establish the tone and context for the remainder of this research.

**Table 1 – Intervention Defined**

Component	Description / Definition
Domestic Disputes	Political conflicts, violent and non-violent, within countries which have occasioned military intervention by foreign powers.
Foreign Military Intervention	Defined as the movement of troops or military forces by one independent country, or a group of countries in concert, across the border of another independent country (or colony of an independent country), or actions by troops already stationed in the target country. These troops or forces will have then undertaken some form of direct military action.
Classifications of the Intentions behind Intervention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Hostile – entailing opposition to the target government.</li> <li>b. Friendly – entailing support of the government or opposition to rebel groups.</li> <li>c. Neutral.</li> </ul>

Component	Description / Definition
Characteristics of Intervention (by Powers)	a. Major powers are inclined to undertake economic or diplomatic-military protective, ideological or regional power balance interventions in distant targets. b. Middle and small powers are likely to undertake territorial and social-protective interventions, as well as regional power balance interventions, in nearby targets.
National Interests	The probability of foreign military intervention is likely to depend on the identity and mutual relations of prospective intervener and target, their location and their interests in each other, the nature of perceived threats to such interests, the capacity to intervene, and political, economic, military, and social circumstances.

Source: Pearson, Frederic S, "Foreign Interventions and Domestic Disputes," 259-268.

In the context of a potential intervention, states possess a number of motivations and intentions than can be classified as hostile, friendly or neutral. Throughout world history for example, acts of colonialism were not undertaken to support local governments (or forms thereof), so their motivations as lead nation were self serving and thus deserving of the title hostile. More recently, after World War Two (WW II) when the League of Nations folded and the UN was founded, the nature of intervention started to change. Where colonialism once dominated the intervention agenda, the Cold War effectively changed this approach. Not only were colonial powers returning authority and control back to target states in acts of what has been described as "decolonisation", but the US and USSR were starting to engage themselves in an increased number of subversive and unpublicised acts of intervention. Then, with the fall of the "Iron Curtain" in 1991, the nature of intervention started to transform again from its foundation of dominance, military might and coercive influence to more the maintenance of peace, security and market economy norms.

As the nature of intervention transformed from its historic construct of colonialism and imperialism into contemporary ideals of supporting market economies and development, this was attributable to the changing motivations and interests of the

world's states. Where once colonial powers undertook unilateral action to maximise resource exploitation, the evolution and rise of the stature of the UN speaks to the increased promotion of collective welfare, solidarity, security and developmental initiatives. For example, recent UN developments associated with R2P have resulted in the increased recognition and acceptance of the ideals of humanitarian intervention. A classic R2P mission occurred in Kosovo in 1999 where NATO coerced Serbia into abide by the agreements of the Dayton Peace Accord. With humanitarian intervention defined as the right of the international community to intervene militarily upon verification of "human rights violations by a sovereign member...against its people - especially when the level of such atrocities reaches a point of humanitarian crisis that endangers peace and stability beyond the boundaries of the given nation," this philosophy is now a key motivator behind acts of international intervention.<sup>11</sup>

Although problems with the UN missions in Rwanda and Sudan reflect the extent of existing challenges pertaining to humanitarian intervention, it again reflects the role that national interests play in the decision to intervene in the operations of a sovereign state. If an intervention is deemed necessary through the cost/benefit findings of the state (or states), a new development in this process is that nations are forming coalitions or partnerships and operating as a unified force in order to spread the military, financial and political risks amongst the participants.<sup>12</sup> In terms of risk management and legitimacy,

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<sup>11</sup> Massoud Barzani, "Humanitarian Intervention Can Protect Human Rights," in *Interventionalism*, ed. Paul A. Winters, 19-23 (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc. 1995), 19.

<sup>12</sup> Frederic S. Pearson, "Foreign Interventions and Domestic Disputes," *International Studies Quarterly* Vol 8, no 3 (Sep 1974): 259.

coalitions or single states considering intervention as a tool to resolve humanitarian issues are also endeavouring to operate under the legal authority of UN under Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR). For those interventions operating without this legal authority, this lack of legitimacy threatens the success of the mission as the host nation and region are likely uninspired to support the incursion that may be considered more of an invasion than an intervention. Theorizing that external actors must have a reason for intervening in the affairs of another country (examples may include ideological commitment, the quest for international influence, considerations of status and prestige, strategic and security concerns and economic gain), the recipients of an intervention must also support the initiative for it to succeed.<sup>13</sup> While a legitimate intervention welcomed by the host nation will generate its own success, the opposed intervention will be met with additional obstacles such as organized resistance, acts of insurgency and the amplified effects of government corruption and organized crime.

## **2.2 The Dawn of Modern Day Intervention**

If you can find an Afghan rebel that the Moscow bullies missed,  
Ask him what he thinks, of voting communist.

- Joe Strummer, The Clash

In 1989, the Cold War between the Soviet States and the West “came to an end with the opening of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of Communist party dictatorship in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, and the disintegration of the Soviet

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<sup>13</sup> Neil Macfarlane, *Intervention and Regional Security*, 11.

Union.”<sup>14</sup> With the Cold War over, the world’s balance of power between the superpowers had shifted and a new level of international instability had been initiated. At the time, author Francis Fukuyama proposed that the fall of communism left liberal democracy as “the final form of human government” and that it had constituted the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution.”<sup>15</sup> Although criticised for simplifying the debates pertaining to the impacts of the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama theorised that “Western liberal democracy – characterised by free and fair elections, the rule of constitutional law, and respect for human rights – emerged from the Cold War as the only acceptable and viable form of government.”<sup>16</sup> Accepting this theory, it can then be argued that a new political standard had been established and the developing world was left with no other alternative than to adopt this social and political system. Any settlement for less than liberal democracy would create internal levels of tension, resulting in the increased severity of domestic disputes and conflict which would be met with disdain by the international community. With the end of the Cold War leading to optimism and fantastical forecasts of peace dividends, it never fully materialised. Rather, the world was left with “liberal democracy standing as the only credible theory for organizing politics” and not the full realm of political stability as initially expected.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> “Cold War,” The Columbia Encyclopedia On-Line; available from <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-coldwar.html>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

<sup>15</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1992), xi.

<sup>16</sup> Commentary from the Introduction to *Interventionalism*, edited by Paul A Winters, (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc. 1995), 14.

<sup>17</sup> Jack Hitt *et al.*, “Interventions for Democracy – An Overview” in *Interventionalism*, ed. Paul A. Winters, 68-76 (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc. 1995), 73.

Considering the internal conflicts and ensuing acts of intervention in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, and East Timor, these incidents are indicative of the economic, ethnic and religious tensions that were once constrained by the reaches of the Cold War, but have since scarred the political landscape. More nations are now seeking self-determination, and they are proving that they are willing and increasingly able to fight for it.

Before the strife in Yugoslavia, Somalia *et al* surfaced on the world scene, the years 1945 to 1991 gave witness to the tense events of the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War, the US's loss in Southeast Asia, and Russia's defeat in Afghanistan. Despite these incidents, the era was also characterised as a timeframe where the balance of military, political and economic power between the superpowers created a relative state of international stability. Robert Neuman, former US Ambassador to Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, described the Cold War as a time where the East and West were able to "channel and contain conflicts because of the horrible risks associated with their escalation to nuclear conflagration."<sup>18</sup> As result, conflicts between the US, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and even China were for the most part avoided under threat of nuclear annihilation. However, with the fall of the Soviet brand of communism in the 1990s, the removal of East-West induced constraints allowed for the "brutal expression of historical grievances" in the form of "violent civil wars" based on religious and ethnic

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<sup>18</sup> Robert Neuman, "The United States Should Intervene to Preserve International Order," in *Interventionalism*, ed. Paul A. Winters, 188-192 (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc. 1995), 191.

foundations.<sup>19</sup> As observed by Massoud Barzani, “the end of the Cold War has produced more trouble spots, more conflicts and more humanitarian crises” than anticipated.<sup>20</sup> And faced with this rise in regional conflict, the world entered a new age that this research coins as the “Dawn of Modern Day Intervention.”

In the post Cold War era, the burgeoning of democracy has resulted in tension and violence that has necessitated the use of international intervention as a means to mediate and assist in the resolution of the conflict. In the First World of capitalist, industrialised, and economically developed states, the comforting effects of wealth and the spread of liberalism has also led to an increase in the population’s calling for their respective governments to “do something” in response to incidents of international conflict, and “governments are understandably expected to respond.”<sup>21</sup> But it has not always been this way. Where once developed states operated within the paradigm of colonial or imperial expansion, the world’s poorer states were isolated and left to fend for themselves. To expand upon this observation on colonial and imperial expansion, these concepts will now be examined in greater fidelity.

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<sup>19</sup> Thomas G. Weiss, “The United Nations Should Stress Prevention Over Intervention,” in *Interventionalism*, ed. Paul A. Winters, 170-175 (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc. 1995), 170.

<sup>20</sup> Massoud Barzani, “Humanitarian Intervention Can Protect Human Rights,” in *Interventionalism*, ed. Paul A. Winters, 19-23 (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc. 1995), 23.

<sup>21</sup> Alexander Downer, “ ‘Increasing Interconnectedness’: Globalisation and International Intervention.” Speech by the Hon Alexander Downer, MP, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Australia), to the Sydney Institute, 17 July 2001; [speech on-line]; available from [http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2000/000717\\_intervention.html](http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2000/000717_intervention.html); Internet accessed 25 March 2008.



### 2.3 A History of Intervention – Colonialism

Previously in this research, brief reference was made to the current unrest and conflicts occurring in Algeria, Pakistan and Kenya. While the ethnic and cultural histories of these states are uniquely distinct, one common thread in their lineage is their identification as a former colony of France or Britain. However, before Western Europe had mastered this form of international expansion, it is recognised that the ancient Greeks are reputed to have invented colonialism – reputed as the world’s first form of international intervention. Where the Greeks “founded city-colonies to spread their civilization,” the Romans later inherited the Greek Empire and continued practising colonialism so successfully that ironically, “most of the people thus colonized welcomed this form of rule and lamented the destruction of the Roman Empire in the fifth century A.D. as a catastrophe.”<sup>22</sup> Regardless, as Greek and Roman civilizations developed, so did their societal needs. Governmental systems arose and their society matured into urban and rural components as their economies developed. The expansion of wealth and power led to the conquest of weaker military societies, periodically characterized as acts of “plunder, capture of slaves, and the establishment of colonies.”<sup>23</sup> This early form of intervention was economically based and while it may be true that a small percentage of the population enjoyed the benefits of colonization, the majority suffered from its effects.

Accepting that colonialism is the “control by one power over a dependant area or people,” its purpose includes the economic exploitation of the colony’s natural resources,

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<sup>22</sup> Paul Johnson, “The United Nations Should Foster Self-Government in Africa,” in *Interventionalism*, ed. Paul A. Winters, 88-94 (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc. 1995), 89.

<sup>23</sup> Harry Magdoff, *Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 3.

the establishment of new markets for the colonizer and finally to extend “the colonizer’s way of life beyond its national borders.”<sup>24</sup> With colonialism often referred to as “empire building, territorial expansion, and domination of weaker by stronger powers,” the analysis of colonial impacts can admittedly “get lost in a welter of detail or end up with meaningless generalizations.”<sup>25</sup> Author Patrick Manning tried to contain the rhetoric surrounding the study of colonialism when he theorized that the assessment of the colonial period should focus on assessing the cost and benefits of colonialism through the full analysis of trade balances, technical advances, investment, government expenditures, taxes, the monetary system, governmental regulatory action, opportunity cost, education, law and order, and the political system.<sup>26</sup> Only in this context then, can the impacts of colonialism be most appropriately commented upon.

With Europe leading colonial practises between 1500 and 1900, the continent witnessed a “rise in mercantile capitalism” as its wealth and influence was augmented by mastering the trade routes to Asia, the seizure of gold from the Americas, the procurement of American and Asian goods, and the “development of the African slave trade.”<sup>27</sup> In the early 1800s however, the “replacement of mercantile by industrial enterprise as the main source of national wealth” started to erode national colonial

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<sup>24</sup> “Colonialism,” *Encyclopedia Britannica* 2008 [encyclopedia on-line]; available from <http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article-9361159>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

<sup>25</sup> Harry Magdoff, *Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present*, 2.

<sup>26</sup> Patrick Manning, “Analyzing the Costs and Benefits of Colonialism,” *African Economic History Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (Autumn, 1974): 15-16.

<sup>27</sup> Harry Magdoff, *Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present*, 4.

policy.<sup>28</sup> As result, the development of domestic enterprise was viewed as a means to obtain greater commercial and financial influence and the shine of colonial conquest started to fade. The mastery of the British Royal Navy over the world's seas also resulted in a decline in the colonial rivalry of the European powers, and European expansion had temporarily slowed.<sup>29</sup> The government led and sanctioned colonial era had reached its apex in the early 1800s and European influence was now growing towards emigration. The point drawn out here is that early forms of intervention were arguably based on colonial or imperialistic motivations, and this legacy issue remains with the former colonies to this day.

Concerning the notion of imperialism, this system can be defined as the “state policy, practise, advocacy of extending power and dominion...by direct territorial acquisition, or by gaining political and economic control of other areas.”<sup>30</sup> It involves the use of military force and has thus been regarded throughout its history as “morally objectionable” by the political theorists trying to discredit the foreign policies of their opponents.<sup>31</sup> With this perspective, the arrival of the nineteenth century saw the first era of decolonization where most of the America's were freed from their European powers. But between 1870 and 1914, the world endured an era known as the age of “New

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<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>30</sup> “Imperialism,” *Encyclopedia Britannica* 2008 [encyclopedia on-line]; available from <http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article-9367848>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

Imperialism” which saw a resurgence of colonial activity in Africa where control of the continent by European powers grew from ten to ninety percent. Concurrently, Japan expanded its influence in Korea and China and the US enhanced its influence into Latin America and the Hawaiian Islands. Thirty years later, the imperial designs of expansionist Japan, fascist Italy and Nazi Germany reached their peak and “culminated in the outbreak of World War II.”<sup>32</sup> By the end of WW II, the colonial era was over as European control over non-Western peoples came to an end with the rise of international debate and discussions on justice, natural law, and liberal thought.<sup>33</sup> With the US emerging from WW II as the world’s greatest superpower, a new paradigm had also transpired. Intervention had started to take on a North American twist, where American involvement in the affairs of developing countries was not for benevolent or humanitarian reasons, but rather to protect the economic “interests of U.S. owned international corporations.”<sup>34</sup> Here, the message reappears that as the world’s powers exert their influence to protect their national interests, they may be criticised for it. And in the context of this research, as the end of WW II saw the birth of the UN and the start of the Cold War, this era ushered in the latest age of imperialism that was witness to widespread, violent and covert acts of intervention.

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<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> “Colonialism,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (9 May 2006) [encyclopedia on-line]; available from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/colonialism> ; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

<sup>34</sup> “Imperialism,” *Encyclopedia Britannica* 2008.

## 2.4 Cold War Intervention – The Latest Age of Imperialism

The end of WW II saw the end to the imperialistic gains achieved by Germany, Japan and Italy. While their defeat was soon followed by their occupation, development and rebuilding, 1945 also saw the US taking on the self imposed task of organizing and managing the “mantle of leadership of the non-communist world.”<sup>35</sup> With the US now regarding the USSR as its political foe, it believed that “the main danger facing the capitalist world was the spread of communism” and its new national priority was to “keep as much of the world as possible economically and politically hospitable to the continuation of traditional patterns of trade and investment.”<sup>36</sup> As the US and USSR established their respective positions and policies on trade and diplomacy, a stand-off quickly developed in Europe, Asia and Africa.

In terms of intervention and its manifestations, “the ‘third world’ became an arena in which the two blocks competed for political influence.”<sup>37</sup> While the US and USSR fuelled the global economy largely through defence spending, other developmental aspects such as “world trade, international capital flows, and the global technology markets” were subordinated to national security considerations.<sup>38</sup> And as security

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<sup>35</sup> Harry Magdoff, *Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present*, 74.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Mihaly Simai, *The Future of Global Convergence: Managing Risk and Change in the International System* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), 112.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 122.

dominated the political landscape between the competing philosophies of socialism and capitalism, these ideals clashed with severe consequences in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

For the US, the Vietnam War was conducted incrementally between 1959 and 1975. Initially comprised of military advisors and financiers who supported the French battle the communist Viet Minh in the early 1950s, the scale of the conflict grew such that by the end of hostilities, 2,000,000 Vietnamese were killed, 58,000 American lives were lost, and US \$ 150 billion was spent in the effort to affect the outcome of the conflict between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the United States-supported Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).<sup>39</sup> The arguably misguided US fear of communist expansion and “The Domino Theory” ultimately ended with the fall of Saigon in April 1975, but it was the American distrust of the USSR and ignorance of the history between China and the Vietnamese that led to the US intervention, which escalated throughout the tenures of five American presidents – Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon.

The Americans, desiring to defeat the tenants of communism, “sought to discourage revolutionary movements throughout the Third World – including areas which did contain American investments.”<sup>40</sup> Creatively describing the political-economy of the American intervention into Vietnam, John Stoessinger described the protracted conflict as a “Greek Tragedy in Five Acts” and contended that the war was the product of misperceived reality that saw the “phantoms” of fear and later hope misshape American

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<sup>39</sup> John G. Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1982), 112.

<sup>40</sup> David N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention*, 18.

foreign policy.<sup>41</sup> This commentary aptly describes the mire of the American policy in Vietnam, but while the full review of this conflict exceeds the scope of this research, one aspect of the intervention that deserves mention is the subject of the American withdrawal. David Gibbs theorized that Vietnam War policy decisions were based on spreading freedom and democracy, but also to support free market economies and capitalism. He proposed that unilateral withdrawal was never considered because it would be “regarded as anti-capitalist” and that other national liberation movements throughout the world would be encouraged that could “weaken the very structure of internationalist power.”<sup>42</sup> Herein lays the dilemma that cost of millions lives, billions of dollars and changed the course of American history. Does the US pullout from Vietnam and risk jeopardizing its perceived political and ethical values? Or does it continue to participate in the conflict? As the study of the US involvement in Vietnam continues to this day in the context of the US participation in Iraq, this recurring dilemma is ironically prophetic.

In terms of the other historic Cold War intervention, this one deals with the Russian involvement in Afghanistan. From the Soviet military occupation in 1979 and the following involvement of the CIA covertly arming the mujahideen, the Soviet-Afghan War epitomizes the intrigue of the Cold War years. While there are those in the political realm who profess that the USSR had a “Grand Strategy” to spread socialism throughout the Third World, there are others who believe that this Russian intervention was based on

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<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

simpler reasons.<sup>43</sup> Andrew Hartman described the invasion of Afghanistan on “25 December 1979 as a prime example of Soviet initiation and expansion, and falls within the context of US expectations that the Soviet Union wished to expand southwards to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.”<sup>44</sup> Conversely, David Gibbs offered a differing perspective. The Soviets were largely ambivalent towards Afghanistan as they had long regarded it “as hopelessly backward and inappropriate for the socialist model of development” and that in the words of one Soviet official, “If there is one country in the developing world where we would like *not* to try scientific socialism at this point in time, it is Afghanistan.”<sup>45</sup>

Between December 1979 and 1989, the Soviet campaign killed more than a million Afghans and 14,000 Soviet soldiers and political leaders. With the CIA training the mujahideen in the use of C4 explosives, wire-guided anti-tank missiles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and sniper rifles “to assassinate senior Soviet military officials,” the full scale of the American and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is still being exposed.<sup>46</sup> And while contemporary debate continues over NATO strategies followed in Afghanistan, it is evident that the theories surrounding intervention continue to ring true – that the world’s nations will intervene in the affairs of sovereign states as long as their

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<sup>43</sup> David Gibbs, “Does the USSR Have a 'Grand Strategy'? Reinterpreting the Invasion of Afghanistan,” *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 24, no 4 (Dec., 1987): 373.

<sup>44</sup> Andrew Hartman, “The Red Template: US Policy in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan,” *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 23, No. 3. (Jun., 2002): 468.

<sup>45</sup> David Gibbs, “Does the USSR Have a 'Grand Strategy'? Reinterpreting the Invasion of Afghanistan,” 373.

<sup>46</sup> Andrew Hartman, “The Red Template: US Policy in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan,” 476.



actions are perceived to protect their economic and political interests, and ultimately their foundation of power.

## **2.5 The Post Cold War History of Intervention**

With the Cold War leading the world through an unprecedented arms race, nuclear brinkmanship and the ultimate break up of the Soviet Union, it is relatively easy to identify the negative characteristic of the period considering its costs in lives and resources during its forty-five year tenure. Conversely however, little has been publicised on the peripheral benefits of the Cold War that were directly or indirectly enjoyed by the states involved. In addressing this intellectual vacuum, Mihaly Simai studied this particular aspect of the period and proposed three related Cold War benefits. Firstly, the war strengthened the role of national governments in the economy; secondly, that the era saw the increased presence and development of modern state bureaucracy; and finally, that the four decades of the conflict lead to the recognition of the strategic importance of domestic socio-economic stability.<sup>47</sup> This stability is viewed to have increased standards of living in the developed world and to have served as a diplomatic and political example, manifesting itself in the “revolution of rising expectations” in postcolonial countries and the states of the former Soviet bloc.<sup>48</sup> Ironically, to the surprise of politicians and historians alike, the stability established during the Cold War did not continue after the fall of the Berlin Wall. As the world then turned to the UN and US to provide security, the West was being looked upon to play a greater role in

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<sup>47</sup> Mihaly Simai, *The Future of Global Convergence: Managing Risk and Change in the International System*, 122.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 123.

establishing and maintaining peace and global order. And when political chaos and ethnic strife erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia, the West was forced to intervene in an attempt to re-establish peace and security in these regions.

With the break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Europe faced a unique situation. Where once strong central governments controlled the affairs of the state, new fledgling countries were dealing with discord resulting from severe economic problems and tensions fuelled by embellished differences in ethnicity. From Albania on the Adriatic to Romania on the Black Sea, 130 million people were “burdened with 14 divisive minority issues, 6 of which range from volatile to actively violent, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia.”<sup>49</sup> Although the groups in the Balkans had lived amongst one another for hundreds of years in a rich, complex and captivating history, their newly found independence was not enough to propel themselves into the First World of Western Europe’s market economy. Instead, war erupted which led to the massive UN, NATO and European Union (EU) intervention.

In 1980, Yugoslavian President Joseph Tito died that led to tensions between the six Yugoslav Socialist Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. With the death of Tito (a national Croatian), the strong leadership and control that he maintained over the Yugoslav republic had ebbed. The six states maintained a tense arrangement together for eleven years but by 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from the Serbian based central government with Macedonia and Bosnia following suit in 1992. Serbia under Slobodan

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 68

Milosevic responded by assuming the role of protector of the Serbian interests residing in the neighbouring states and conflict between the Croatians, Serbians, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims (“Bosniacs”) erupted into war in 1992. In response, the UN enacted a number of UNSCRs and deployed the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) into Croatia in an act of humanitarian intervention. As conflict, rape and ethnic cleansing spread throughout the region, UNPROFOR expanded its peacekeeping role by coordinating the flow of humanitarian aid (HA) into Bosnia. The mandate of UNPROFOR expanded to meet each new demand and the UN discovered that its mission was increasing in complexity. UNPROFOR’s mixed performance reflected the changing dynamics and inexperience of the world handling such a difficult mission, and the UN was faced with a new paradigm of simultaneous efforts of peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian assistance. Steven Burg described the complexity of the intervention undertaken by these soldiers and statesmen, where “the distinction between ‘humanitarian’ and ‘peacekeeping’ activities, and even military intervention, became blurred” and that since “most of the UNPROFOR troops were drawn from European NATO-member states, the distinction between UN involvement and Western intervention also became blurred.”<sup>50</sup> In the end, under pressure from the US, the semi-effective UNPROFOR transitioned into the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995 and its clearer mandate was to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in

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<sup>50</sup> Steven L. Burg, “Intervention in Internal Conflict: The Case of Bosnia,” in *Military Intervention*, ed. William J. Lahneman, 47-66 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 54-55.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), commonly referred to as The Dayton Accords or The Dayton Agreement.

The Dayton Agreement was signed in 1995 and accomplished two key tasks. First, it “stopped the killing” (which remains as “Dayton’s most enduring achievement”) and secondly, it “laid down a rough blueprint for transforming Bosnia from a killing zone into a peaceful market democracy that could one day take its place within the broader European community.”<sup>51</sup> As IFOR transitioned into the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 2004 and later into the European Force (EUFOR), the scope of the intervention ebbed from a peak of thirty-two countries and 54,000 troops down to the current strength of 2,200 soldiers from twenty-two countries. While the NATO intervention into Bosnia has been characterized as a relative success, the UN intervention into Somalia has been characterized as a failure and an example of what not to do to resolve the effects of a famine and civil war.

In 1960, Somalia was formed by combining the British and Italian Somalilands, which had been under colonial control since the 1880s. The independent Somali clans were forced to unite under the borders drawn by the Europeans, and in 1969, General Siad Barre assumed control of the fractured nation in a coup that brought relative stability to the country. Throughout his strict authoritarian rule, Barre was supported by the US in Somalia’s war with the USSR-backed Ethiopia, and Cold War politics played a role in the domestic affairs of the country until 1991. That year, Barre was ousted by Ali Mahdi Muhammad but opposition to Muhammad’s rule was served by General Mohamed Farrah

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<sup>51</sup> Timothy Donais, *The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia*, 1.

Aidid. Civil war broke out between the clans in both Mogadishu and the countryside, with warlords claiming “control over bands of well-armed youths, who with their armed Land Rovers (called "technicals") roamed the cities and roadways, plundering, extorting and killing.”<sup>52</sup> By late 1992, “the entire infrastructure of the country was ruined, mass killing, starvation and disease afflicted much of the population” and there was no “central government that could negotiate on behalf of the state.”<sup>53</sup> Despite the political and diplomatic vacuum, the UN managed to negotiate a cease fire between the clans and the UN established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) that would monitor the cease-fire and to provide emergency humanitarian assistance. With the UN mission clashing with the warlords over the distribution of food shipments and possessing limited military rules of engagement, the force was not able to influence the situation and the efforts of the UN operation were ignored by the warring clans. As UNOSOM I floundered, the US formed a coalition to enhance the effectiveness of the humanitarian operation and deployed the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) on “Operation Restore Hope” and later UNOSOM II. In 1993, clashes between the UN and Aidid escalated. At the height of the conflict, the skirmishes resulted in the deaths of twenty-four Pakistani soldiers and eighteen US Rangers. With international support for the mission dropping due to the violence and casualties suffered, the operation was suspended and the forces were withdrawn. From a high of 38,000 troops from twenty-one nations supporting the benevolent aims of the mission, Somalia was abandoned

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<sup>52</sup> David D. Laitin, “Somalia: Intervention in Internal Conflict,” in *Military Intervention*, ed. William J. Lahneman, 29-46 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 30.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

without a functioning government and the legacy of a humanitarian intervention that failed.

In the study of the operations into the Former Yugoslavia and Somalia, a theme emerges that pertains to the potential for mission success. Where the military and political goals were clear and the diplomatic overtures made in the form of The Dayton Accords, the efforts in the Balkans resulted in the cessation of hostilities. In Somalia however, this did not occur. The mission was understaffed and the military component was not accompanied with the requisite civilian participation, where the international community specifically failed to provide the “decisive diplomatic action” necessary to support a state authority that could have lead to the aversion of a “costly and gruesome civil war.”<sup>54</sup> What surfaces here, is that nation building interventions will fail if the combination of military and civilian assets are out of balance, uncoordinated or under-resourced. Taking the lessons learned from the missions in the Balkans and Somalia, the West is now demonstrating an increased ability to deal with these types of wide ranging challenges. And this is proving useful in Afghanistan, which this research contends is the model for the nation building interventions of the future.

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<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

## 2.6 Tomorrow's View of Canadian Intervention

If R2P, conflict resolution, nation building and peace and stability operations are now the motivations for the West's support of an intervention, an anomaly in this development was the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. While Canada avoided this intervention and focused on Afghanistan, it demonstrates that Canadian actions will be based on the national interests of the state and legitimacy as sanctioned by the UN. Canada is neither a colonial power nor an imperialistic nation. And while our motivations for intervention are arguably recognized as self serving, they are still based on a combination of liberal democratic, market force and humanitarian principles rather than capitalist exploitation and the spreading of an agenda or political ideology. For this reason, Canada will continue to be engaged in countries suffering domestic disputes such as Haiti, Bosnia and Afghanistan, where our efforts will be scrutinized not only for our aims, but also for what we accomplish. The Canadian intervention of tomorrow must not be into Iraq, but into the Third World suffering from humanitarian issues. Quoting David Laitin, "humanitarian horrors rather than national threat" will now drive intervention.<sup>55</sup> And where intervention may have once been measured in strictly economic results, military terms, or measures of colonial power, this is no longer the focus. The political, social, and economic impacts of nation building and intervention are now in the public spotlight, and the CF will need to shape its particular endeavours to support this diplomatic construct. On future missions, the deployed Task Force's National Command Element (NCE), NSE, Battle Group (BG), training teams, reconstruction teams, etc, will all need

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<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* 32.

to coordinate their respective efforts in order to support the mission's larger political goals. Failure to do so will result in disappointing missions as witnessed in Somalia.

In this chapter, twenty-five hundred years of intervention history has been covered in a brief few pages of text. The concepts of colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, socialism and humanitarianism have all been introduced which contribute to the shaped perception of contemporary intervention. And in each future act of intervention, this historical baggage will accompany the military personnel and civilian agencies that comprise the intervening force. Should the coordinated WoG effort be legitimized through a UNSCR and/or invitation from the target state, then this is will contribute to the successful establishment of a nation building mission. Should the intervention be considered illegitimate by the target state and its population, then severe obstacles will be encountered on the operation. With this historical perspective, Chapter Three will now describe and analyse the current Canadian mission in Afghanistan.

### **CHAPTER THREE - THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OP ATHENA**

It is easy to criticize what is happening in Afghanistan. It is a far more difficult task to recommend what *should* be done. In my long professional life I have not encountered a more difficult policy challenge.

- Gordon Smith<sup>56</sup>

#### **.1 Canadians in Afghanistan – A Continuation of “The Great Game”**

In Afghanistan's history, there is a recurring pattern of foreign powers transiting the region and leaving their respective scars on the social fabric of this tribally based

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<sup>56</sup> Gordon Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?* Report Prepared for the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2007), 3.



nation-state. Located at the crossroads of trading routes in Central Asia, the country has been over-run by a number of ethnic and religious groups, most notably Persian King Darius in 500 BC, Alexander the Great in 300 BC, Arab conquerors in 642, and Genghis Khan in 1219. Five hundred years of subsequent rule by the Mongols, the Mughals of northern India and the Safavids of Iran witnessed the devastation of agricultural centers and cities, but by the mid 1700s, Ahmad Shah was able to bring stability to the region by uniting the principalities and provinces into one country. By 1807, modern day Afghanistan was founded and it found itself in the middle of international interference between Britain and Russia. In fact, the British and Russian expansion of their empires led to the competition of “exploration, espionage, and adventure” in Afghanistan that became referred to as “The Great Game.”<sup>57</sup>

In this era, Afghanistan endured two British invasions and remained a British protectorate until 1919, after which it was granted its independence. Social reforms and the changing of religious leaders followed until 1973, when the country declared itself a republic. After the Soviet invasion in 1979 and its subsequent withdrawal in 1989, the rise of the Taliban and its capture of Kabul in 1996 was described by N. Kellet as the “New Great Game.”<sup>58</sup> With the US led post 9/11 invasion only adding to the rich history of this country, NATO and Canada now find themselves key contributors to the military, political and developmental efforts in a diplomatic game that has lasted over one hundred

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<sup>57</sup> The term “The Great Game” was attributed to Captain Arthur Conolly who was later executed in Bukhara in 1842. Source N.A. Kellett, *External Involvement in Afghanistan*. Report Prepared for the Department of National Defence (Ottawa: Directorate of Strategic Analysis, 2000), 2.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, 5.

years. And in this context, NATO now finds itself in the middle of an intervention where the political economies of the West and Afghanistan are both being tested.

According to Economywatch.com, the term political economy is defined as “a study drawing upon branches of economics, politics and law aiming to explain to existing relations between different countries of the world.”<sup>59</sup> With this definition, and in view that “in today’s globalized world, political economy is not only linked with politics and economics but also with ecology, anthropology, history, international relations and human geography,”<sup>60</sup> studying the political economy of Afghanistan through a Western lens is an academic challenge. Despite tens of thousands of military troops, billions of dollars in aid, and over six years of effecting change, the nation building efforts there continue. Considerable advances have been made in the construction of irrigation systems, roads, schools, and health facilities, but low level violence continues to temper the progress of the mission. The best intentions of the West are being challenged by a religious and ideologically based insurgency, and it clearly identifies the West’s naivety and lack of patience in its attempts to develop a tribal culture into a modern society.

In this context of naive beliefs, when the UN passed Security Council Resolution 1368 on September 12, 2001 (that condemned the attack and called for states to work together to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks), Canada quickly pledged support to the effort that included “military,

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<sup>59</sup> “Political Economy Defined,” <http://www.economywatch.com>; Internet; accessed 5 April 2008.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

humanitarian, diplomatic, financial, legislative and domestic security” initiatives.<sup>61</sup> The Canadian response was self-serving in the sense that it lived up to its international obligations with NATO membership and UN ideals, but also altruistic through the quick contribution of more than mere military forces. Canada had covered all its bases, and in light of recent GoC decisions in March 2008, Canada’s commitment will continue in Afghanistan until 2011 when its military contribution is expected to cease.

## **.2 International Responsibility and R2P**

In studying the political economy of the Afghanistan intervention, Dr John Ferris theorizes that “NATO’s sole reason to be there is self-interest and self-defence: to maintain a government able to keep Afghanistan from threatening us. Such government may take many forms but it will not be one we like.”<sup>62</sup> This proposal is insightful in that the West has an incentive to develop the country to a level where it is able to support itself and constrain the harbouring of terrorist networks. As overplayed as the term is, terrorism is a threat that nevertheless continues to linger on the agendas of liberal democracies. This reality may be tiresome to many, yet it is as real a menace as is North American economic recession, American financial institution failures, and the continued violence in Iraq and Israel. Most notable though, is the acceptance that the construct of the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) under President Hamid Karzai may not present itself in the image desired by many, as government corruption, drug profiteering, and

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<sup>61</sup> Notes for a Statement by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, “An Address to the Nation Concerning the International Campaign Against Terrorism” (October 7, 2001) [http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/301/prime\\_minister-ef/jean\\_chretien/](http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/301/prime_minister-ef/jean_chretien/) ; Internet: accessed 25 March 2008.

<sup>62</sup> John Ferris, “Invading Afghanistan, 1836-2006: Politics and Pacification,” in *Canada in Kandahar: Vol 1, 2007* ed. Dr John Ferris and Dr James Keeley, 19-43 (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2007), 39.

inexperience continue to hamper the country's efforts to expeditiously battle state poverty, malnutrition, access to clean water, etc. Regardless of the pace of progress, NATO still continues to assume the responsibility to protect the population and finish what it deemed necessary to start in late 2001.

Despite assuming this responsibility, the NATO intervention into Afghanistan cannot be solely characterized as an R2P mission as defined by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The ICISS, established in September 2000, produced a report titled "Responsibility to Protect" that proposed "that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from unavoidable catastrophe...but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states."<sup>63</sup> While conflicts in Kosovo, Sudan and the Darfour region best typify R2P operations, Afghanistan can be viewed in the light of a protective mission where the GoA is unable to provide the level of security necessary to protect itself from the Taliban and its association with anti-government elements. Afghanistan was abandoned by the West at the end of the USSR-Afghan war, and it cannot afford to do so again. For as aptly stated by Dr Ferris, "Afghanistan is only a problem when it is invaded or ignored," and allowing the country to fall back into failed state status would be unacceptable to the international community.<sup>64</sup> Further, and in the words of the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence,

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<sup>63</sup> *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (December 2001) [report on-line]; available from <http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

<sup>64</sup> John Ferris, "Canada in Kandahar," in *Canada in Kandahar; Vol 1, 2007* ed. Dr John Ferris and Dr James Keeley, 5-10 (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2007), 5.

“we cannot let instability abroad ruin the prosperity of our country.”<sup>65</sup> Consequently, Afghanistan is first on the GoC international affairs agenda and the challenges to battle government corruption, narcotic financed organized crime, resource scarcity, and religious differences between the intervening force and ethnic Afghans will continue to test the ability of the world’s best nation builders.

### **3.3 Afghanistan First**

The successful WoG campaign plan that leads Afghanistan out of its disadvantaged position must place the needs of Afghanistan first. At the operational and tactical level, this philosophy manifests itself at the military NCE, BG, NSE, PRT or civilian NGO level where funds are channelled to local contractors to provide services, goods or complete provincial or municipal development projects. At a strategic level, this planning effort manifests itself at the level of civilian diplomatic assistance and international aid delivered to the host nation (ideally with minimal political or economic ties attached to the recipient – read “tied aid”). Coordinating these multi-level initiatives requires a comprehensive campaign plan that is agreed upon by the international community and host nation. In the case of Afghanistan, a by-product of this NATO/GoA plan was produced at the 31 January – 1 February 2006 London Conference on Afghanistan, through the publishing of “The Afghanistan Compact”.

From an international perspective, The Afghanistan Compact provides the vision of fifty nations, fifteen participating organizations and fifteen observers on how to best proceed with furthering the goals of Afghanistan. Based on three pillars of activity

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<sup>65</sup> *Canadian Troops in Afghanistan: Taking a Hard Look at a Hard Mission*. An Interim Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (February 2007), 11.

comprised of Security; Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and Economic and Social Development, the compact provides principles of cooperation and establishes timelines for the international community and Afghanistan to achieve by the end of 2010. The compact is ambitious, and the intent is for tangible achievements to be made by 2011 in areas of security and stability established by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Afghan National and Border Police, and in areas pertaining to counter-narcotics, mine action and ammunition destruction, public administration reform, anti-corruption ratification, census and statistics formulation, increased female participation, land registration and human rights treaty obligations.<sup>66</sup> And while the strategic view is admirable, the true challenge is to translate this strategic vision into operational and tactical plans that can be coordinated amongst the levels of Afghanistan's government, NATO, IOs, NGOs, and the tribal leaders in the provinces. In the Canadian military context, these plans are being executed at the operational and tactical level by the Op ATHENA Task Force, with assistance provided by the Kabul-based Strategic Advisory Team (SAT). In this research, three aspects of the military Task Force will be briefly examined - the NSE CMC, the PRT and the SAT.

### **3.4 The National Support Element Contract Management Cell**

Introduced in this study's Forward, the NSE CMC is a contracting cell that satisfies goods and services requirements through procurement activity on the local economy. Requirements were staffed to the CMC, and if the CMC could secure local sources of supply to satisfy the requirement, contracts were let, bids were evaluated and

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<sup>66</sup> "The Afghanistan Compact – The London Conference on Afghanistan" (31 January – 1 February 2006), Annex I.

winners were advised – all in accordance with theatre contracting limits and Treasury Board Contracting Regulations. Between mid-February and the end of July 2007, 220 local contracts and “call-ups on contracts” were awarded by the CMC valuing CAN \$ 5.3 million.<sup>67</sup> As these contracts were let, there was no interaction between the CMC, DFAIT or CIDA regarding the contracting process, so economies of scale information and local supplier data was not shared between the departments. While there is no evidence that CMC funds were spent in an inefficient manner through unscrupulous suppliers, any economic or market intelligence or strategy that DFAIT or CIDA may have possessed was not shared with the CMC. While the NSE CMC and PRT Contracting Officers shared data on a continual basis, there was an absence of information sharing between the CMC and the other government agencies that may have had an effect on the mission in Southern Afghanistan. In this light, the author recommends that DFAIT, CIDA and DND make greater attempts to coordinate NSE contracting activity with the other government departments in order to maximize the effectiveness and situational awareness of the Whole of Government approach (WGA). There is more to the WoG effort than simply focussing on the PRT, for the NCE, NSE, BG and deployed training teams are all contributing to DND’s mission in Afghanistan.

### **3.5 The Provincial Reconstruction Team**

Located sixteen kilometres north of KAF in Kandahar City, the PRT is comprised of 330 military and civilian personnel whose mission is to support the Afghanistan Compact, namely through the provision of security, the extension of governance, and the

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<sup>67</sup> Contracting details found in Annex G to the NSE Rotation 3 After Action Report, August 2007.

provision of developmental programs. Representatives from DND, DFAIT, CIDA, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and Corrections Canada comprise the team and a targeting board of these members “is convened periodically in order to approve large projects of strategic value” that will be “implemented centrally through the Afghan government” (to build its capacity and enhance its legitimacy).<sup>68</sup> As well, smaller quick impact projects (QIP) below \$ 5,000 Canadian are approved by the PRT Commander and managed by civil-military coordination (CIMIC) teams.<sup>69</sup> While on the surface this latter process seems appropriate, it has been criticized by some in the NGO community as the “militarization of aid” that has been met with severe resistance.<sup>70</sup>

With the CF preparing comprehensive campaign plans and developing means to successfully fight the “Three Block War” (combat, stabilization operations and humanitarian relief and reconstruction), the result is that military leadership gains an appreciation of the political and military situation in the WoG construct.<sup>71</sup> Increasing situational awareness expands influence and effectiveness, but it also blurs the lines between military forces and NGOs who, for the most part, possess the qualifications required to coordinate the reconstruction efforts in their respected areas of expertise. Consequently, NGOs have been the target of increased violence, with the more public

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<sup>68</sup> Jon Baker, “Quick Impact Projects: Towards a ‘Whole of Government’ Approach,” in *Paterson Review* Vol 8 (Ottawa: Carlton University, 2007), 10.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> Lisa Schirch and Aaron Kishbaugh, “Leveraging ‘3D’ Security: From Rhetoric to Reality,” *Foreign Policy In Focus* on-line, November 16, 2006; <http://www.fpiif.org/fpiftext/3711>; Internet accessed 3 April 2008.

<sup>71</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World - Overview* (Ottawa: Canada, 2005), 11.



occurrences happening in May 2006 when ten aid workers were killed – two from UNICEF Staff, four from ActionAid and four from the Afghan Health Development Services Group. As result, the NGOs have voiced their concerns and the requirement for political and military organizations to respect their “humanitarian space,” referring to the independence and neutrality from them that can allow the NGOs “to provide life-saving aid to needy civilians on all sides of a conflict.”<sup>72</sup> This argument is not intended to detract from the necessity for the military to occasionally provide aid, but rather to identify the fact that the military may need to temper developmental projects with the higher requirement to provide security. If one views the campaign plan as the product of the “operational art” of the planning process, then planners must respect this reality, recognize the threat that the military may pose to NGOs and plan accordingly.<sup>73</sup> With the military’s primary focus to use force to safeguard the security of Afghanistan over the delivery of aid in the context of the Three Block War, then this issue should be able to be resolved to the satisfaction of those in theatre. Should disagreement continue between the parties, then this research contends that the host nation government should arbitrate the matter between the competing interests. For while it is difficult to argue the necessity of the BG and PRT to provide security to the region, is the degree to which aid and

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<sup>72</sup> Lara Olson, “Fighting for Humanitarian Space: NGOs in Afghanistan,” in *Canada in Kandahar; Vol 1*, 2007 ed. Dr John Ferris and Dr James Keeley, 45-64 (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2007), 51-52.

<sup>73</sup> The term “operational art” was used by Dr Allan English to describe the orchestration of campaigns at the operational level, sited between tactical actions and strategic objectives. Alan English, “Introduction”, in *Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives Context and Concepts*, ed. Alan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Laurence Hickey, ix-xi (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), xi.

development is coordinated from the military that is in question. To that end, the answer to this may lie with the Canadian SAT located in Kabul.

### **3.6 Strategic Advisory Team**

According to Colonel M. Capstick, former Commanding Officer of the SAT, “three decades of insurgency, invasion, resistance, civil war, and ultimately, the American led attack on the Taliban, have left Afghanistan shattered.”<sup>74</sup> As result, the SAT was created as a tool to provide direct and unfiltered CF assistance to the Afghan government, where the team has been described as a “team of strategic planners that has been assigned to the Presidency to assist in the development of the kind of plans” identified as necessary in The Afghanistan Compact and the subsequent Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).<sup>75</sup> The SAT is a joint military and civilian organization whose mission is to manage “national and rural development programs” while assisting in the effort to build a capable, effective, and accountable civil service.”<sup>76</sup> Interestingly, during the Soviet presence in the country, the “period after the 1978 coup witnessed a rapid increase in Soviet involvement in Afghan domestic affairs” when hundreds of Soviet civilian advisors were seconded to ministries depleted by the voluntary departure and subsequent purges of Afghan officials.<sup>77</sup> Despite this ironic reality, the SAT is still

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<sup>74</sup> Colonel M.D. Capstick, *Strengthening the Weak: The Canadian Forces in Afghanistan*. Paper Provided to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs Conference in March 2006, 2.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>76</sup> Government of Canada, “Overview of Canada’s Contribution to the International Mission in Afghanistan,” <http://canada-afghanistan.gc.ca>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

<sup>77</sup> Neil Macfarlane, *Intervention and Regional Security*, 27.

regarded as a respected component of the mission that epitomizes the WGA professed by Canada.

For those in the Canadian public who criticize the CF's focus on combat operations in Southern Afghanistan, the SAT is a CF organization that "applies generalist military planning skills to the solution of civilian problems."<sup>78</sup> Where the BG, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) and PRT are focused on the security component of the compact's security pillar, the SAT is focused on facilitating development. The challenges overcoming government corruption, narcotics production from poppies, and drug trafficking are immense. And the inputs from DFAIT and the SAT are contributing to the generation of Afghan solutions to Afghan problems. With the Canadian *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan* (commonly referred to as "The Manley Report") recognizing the enormity of the challenges ahead, it also noted the improvement in living conditions in the country since 2001 and the Afghan's respect for the Canadian WGA. As Canadian "officials from the three departments" continue to work together, further advancements will be made.<sup>79</sup> It took several years in Afghanistan for the 3D approach to materialize, but the benefits of a focused and functioning WGA to assist a failed state are crucial to the progressing of nation building initiatives.

In this chapter, components of the Canadian WGA have been discussed in the context of Afghanistan. Although low level conflict and counter-insurgency operations

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<sup>78</sup> Colonel M.D. Capstick, *Strengthening the Weak: The Canadian Forces in Afghanistan*, 5.

<sup>79</sup> *Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*. The Honourable John Manley (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 4.

continue, the process of nation building has been initiated, progress has been made and the world has reinforced its dedication to the country's further development, as demonstrated through the findings of the NATO Bucharest Summit. And while the specific challenges in Afghanistan may differ from those in another FFS, this research will now turn to the global challenges that a military force must be cognizant of in developing its campaign plan to develop a failed state with its civilian partners. From this perspective, planning components and considerations in nation building will now be addressed.

#### **CHAPTER FOUR - THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATION BUILDING**

Political economy is the name given to an important division of the science of government. The object of government is, or ought to be, the happiness of men, united in society... The physical well-being of man, so far as it can be produced by his government, is the object of political economy.

- J.C.L. Simonde de Sismondi, 1815<sup>80</sup>

##### **4.1 A Domestic Conflict – A Call for Canadian Intervention**

From a utilitarian perspective, one can support the spirit and intent behind J.C.L. Simonde de Sismondi's theory provided above. And from a national point of view, Canada finds itself supporting de Sismondi's theory every time it supports acts of international humanitarian intervention. In illustrating this point, the GoC's 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) stated the importance that Canada and the international community needs to place on preventing events of "state breakdown" and to possess the capacity for rapid intervention to stabilize situations and restore security for

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<sup>80</sup> J.C.L. Simonde de Sismondi, "Political Economy," (1815) <http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/sismondi/poliec> ; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

the populations of failed and fragile states.<sup>81</sup> With this government intent clearly expressed, it is apparent that this country is prepared to consider intervention when diplomatic pressure fails to prevent a humanitarian crisis. This is an important message to the world's weaker states as it acknowledges that “no matter how much political diplomacy is conducted throughout the world,” there will always be warlords, zealots, and tyrants who establish power and the conditions for violent conflict.<sup>82</sup> And in this context where domestic conflict can threaten world security, Canada must be prepared to act as a member of an intervening force on missions of humanitarian intervention, nation building, peacekeeping, etc. Whether supporting R2P principles or invited in as per the Afghanistan experience, Canada may be willing to deploy, but it will also need to be aware of its limitations. For as contextually framed by Hans Morgenthau, “We have come to overrate enormously what a nation can do for another nation by intervening in its affairs – even with the latter’s consent.”<sup>83</sup>

Concerning the concept of nation building, an intervention must be cognisant of its ultimate political aims. To that end, this research supports Harold Jacobson’s two-part definition of nation and state building. Where nation building is “the development of a

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<sup>81</sup> This research has focused on studying benevolent or friendly acts of intervention from a Canadian perspective. While it is acknowledged that the study of intervention from Table 1 definitions could include hostile acts, this research is based on the assumption that Canada will intervene to support a democratically elected government under physical threat or intervene to support R2P conventions (possibly under the leadership of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) as called for in the IPS). Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World - Overview* (Ottawa: Canada, 2005), 13.

<sup>82</sup> David McDonnell, “Guidelines for U.S. Humanitarian Intervention” (USAWC, Carlisle Barracks: Master of Strategic Studies Degree, 2004), 2.

<sup>83</sup> In Morgenthau’s article, he was focussed on the activities of the US. However, for purposes here, “we” could be extended to NATO or coalition forces in a Western context. Hans Morgenthau, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene,” *Foreign Affairs* 45, no 4 (1967): 435.

cohesive spirit on the part of the population, a sense of national identity,” state building is “the creation of a viable administration and political apparatus, the institutions of government’ and a self sustaining economic framework.”<sup>84</sup> And if one considers the hundreds of years that it took to develop current Western standards of liberal statehood, it is therefore understandable that contemporary acts of intervention and nation-state building will also require the requisite time and resources to produce the desired effects. Consequently, a full awareness of the political economy of intervention is necessary to establish realistic goals and manage expectations by the intervening powers. With these factors addressed, the WoG team will be better prepared to focus on resolving the challenges in the FFS rather than addressing rear-guard reactionary and justification efforts back in its home state.

#### **4.2 The Intervention Model – Nation Building**

In each intervention, the intent, strategic goals and objectives of the operation must be clearly identified and matched with the resources enabling it to reach the political end state. This end state needs to be understood and unequivocally supported by the force generating nations. Acknowledging that “the international community is an unwieldy entity with no single center and lots of contradictions,” it is entirely possible that having the international community agree on the end state will be problematic.<sup>85</sup> However, for the intervention to succeed, it is crucial for the contingent to deal with this

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<sup>84</sup> Harold Jacobson, “ONUC’s Civilian Operations: State-Preserving and State-Building,” *World Politics*, XVII (October 1954), 76, quoted in Andrew Sens, “The Newly Independent States, The United Nations, and Some Thoughts on the Development Process.” *The Journal of Politics* Vol 30 No 1 (Feb 1968): 121.

<sup>85</sup> Marina Ottaway, “Nation Building.” *Foreign Policy* No 132 (Sep-Oct 2002): 20.

challenge and make the attempts to identify this strategic end state. In the UN context, as professed by Marv Makulowich, “a long range strategy developed and agreed in the Security Council would minimize disharmony during the [plan’s] implementation” and enhance the nation building’s chance of success.<sup>86</sup> The campaign plan or model that will frame the nation building effort therefore has to be supported by the world’s powerful states which can then be executed by the countries, IOs, regional organizations and NGOs in the target state.

Simply stated, contemporary nation building can be described as a “multilateral project”, best enabled by a lead country providing military muscle and the other organizations assisting the failed state transition “from civil war to civil society.”<sup>87</sup> Most importantly, nation builders should not “attempt to rebuild countries in the image of the leading military power,” but rather to draw upon “a broader understanding of what legitimate states, societies, and economies look like, and they negotiate their vision with the local population.”<sup>88</sup> For it is the campaign plan based on the vision of the local population (rather than the vision of the intervening force) that is better situated to obtain the support of the host nation government, and thus be ensured of a greater chance of support throughout its implementation.

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<sup>86</sup> Major M. Makulowich, “UN Peacekeeping: Mandate for Change” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Joint Command and Staff Programme New Horizons Paper, 1995), 12.

<sup>87</sup> Michael Barnett, “Nation Building’s New Face,” in *Foreign Policy* No. 133 (Nov-Dec 2002): 98.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

In terms of the campaign plan, it is pictorially depicted in Figure 1 below and shows the “lines of operation” that need to be followed by the diplomats, military forces, economists, development agencies, etc, who are executing the plan. Based on lines of operation pertaining to Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic activities (the DIME model) or Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information activities (the PMESII model), campaign plans that follow this reasoning process are distinct from the nation building efforts that characterized the colonial era.<sup>89</sup> In fact, contemporary acts of intervention and nation building suggest a departure from historical “imperial ambitions” based on exploitation and reflect a new reality that values the expansion of democracy, the facilitating of economic development and the maintenance of peace and security.




Figure 1 - PMESII Nation Building Campaign Plan (Simplified)

<sup>89</sup> The DIME and PSEMII models are “lines of operation” that military or civilian leadership will use in their planning process. They will be comprised of decisive points and follow a critical path in time and space in order to reach an objective. Source Department of National Defence, *CF Operational Planning Process* (Ottawa: 2002-22-06), 2-4.




With the world's states now willing (in varying degrees) to invest the resources in developing FFS, a realist reality has arisen where paradoxically, it has been found that "effective nation building requires not only the heart of a humanitarian but also the hubris of an imperialist."<sup>90</sup> Depending on how well the mission can balance the scope of the suggested developmental program with the institutional capabilities of the FFS, this will determine the rate of success that will be incurred on the nation building mission.

#### **4.3 The Intervening Force Structure**

In future Canadian missions that deploy a WoG team in support of a FFS, the force's command and control relationship could be based on a model similar to Figure 2 below. The organization would be integrated into a larger international organization (read coalition or UN), and the senior civilian bureaucrat would be assigned the position of Senior Canadian, Head of Mission, or similar title. In the deployed setting, the Senior Canadian would receive direction from DFAIT and oversee the implementation of the Canadian campaign plan that would be synchronized with the respective missions and lines of operations of the higher or overarching coalition plan.

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<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.



**Figure 2 – Sample PMESSI Organization**

Although Figure 2 does not reflect the formal and informal reporting relationships to parent organizations back in Canada or the respective lines of communication with its peers in the UN, Host Nation, NGO community, etc, the ideal organization will be led by one civilian member who is responsible to coordinate the activities of the mission and deal with the potential inter-departmental or international rivalries that are sure to exist.

In the above model, the military force supports the civilian leadership and addresses the security requirements of its fellow governmental departments. In the case of an intervention into a state where an Ambassador is employed, DFAIT will establish the reporting procedures, command and control relationships and recommend mission specific training requirements. Contingent pre-deployment training by the WoG team is crucial, as it develops trust between members, clarifies responsibilities, solidifies jurisdictional boundaries, and most importantly, it best prepares the whole team for upcoming mission. This comprehensive training does not yet exist in the Canadian context, and is a major shortfall that needs to be addressed by the GoC.

#### 4.4 The Mission – The Reason Behind Intervention

Contemporary NATO, EU, UN or similar interventions in support of a nation building mission must follow a model in which to construct their campaign plan. While the force is free to use its own model, two recently published works by the UN and the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development's (OECD) are two products that can be used to frame a nation building effort. The UN's "Millennium Development Goals Report" and the OECD's "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States" provide the economic, humanitarian and security based objectives that must be achieved in an effective effort to rescue a FFS.<sup>91</sup> In terms of content, the OECD "Principles..." document takes the UN Millennium Goals and further develops them by providing a road map for the international community to follow through the WGA. Described as an approach where international actors and stakeholders help national reformers "build effective legitimate and resilient state institutions," the OECD WGA fully recognizes that "successful development in a fragile environment depends...on well sequenced and coherent progress across the political, security, economic and administrative domains."<sup>92</sup> Should this approach not be followed, it is theorized that the actions of international players may actually do more harm than good. But should the

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<sup>91</sup> The UN Millennium Development Goals Report contains the following eight goals: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDs, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development. United Nations. *The Millenium Development Goals Report 2006* (New York: United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, June 2006), 4-22.

<sup>92</sup> These domains will be addressed by the various departments providing security, political and economic affairs, development aid and humanitarian assistance. Source Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, "Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States," <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

principles be adhered to, a healthy operational foundation can likely be established that will “help maximize the positive impact of engagement and minimize unintentional harm” during a security and nation building mission.<sup>93</sup>

Considering the civilian geared contents of the UN Millennium Goals and the OECD “Principles...,” the role of the military in the WGA is unique. While each mission will be different, the mission statement (or stated function of the force) of the military component could read as follows: “In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions.”<sup>94</sup> With the maintenance of security the aim of the military force, the Commander will make every attempt to achieve those effects that will contribute to the diplomatic, political, economic and social objectives identified in the campaign plan. It is these military effects (otherwise known as the “outcomes, events, or consequences resulting from specific actions”) that the Commander will need to link to the civilian strategic and operational objectives.<sup>95</sup> More and more, military leaders will be assigned tasks across the spectrum of conflict contained in the Three Block War concept, and thus contribute to the achieving of effects in support of the larger civilian led campaign. For

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<sup>93</sup> Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States,” <http://www.oecd.org/dac/fragilestates>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

<sup>94</sup> This phrase as the “function of the military force” was agreed upon by the UN in UNSCR 186 (1964) that led to the deployment of a peacekeeping force into Cyprus. Colonel Robert Mitchell, “Military and Diplomatic Aspects of Peacekeeping,” in *The Cyprus Conflict and the Role of the United Nations*, ed. Kjell Skjelsbaek, 19-38 (Nicosia, Cyprus: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1988), 19.

<sup>95</sup> United States, United States Air Force, *Air Force Basic Doctrine Document 1* (17 November 2003) [doctrine on-line]; available from <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil>; accessed 25 March 2008, 38.

the remainder of this research, it is these military effects, both intended and unintended, that will be discussed in this analysis of the political economy of intervention.

#### **4.5 The Military Footprint – The Base**

Where today's larger military missions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan are primarily based out of large main operating bases (MOB) and smaller detached forward operating bases (FOB), there is a dedicated support structure that provides life support to the military and civilian forces serving in that location. For example, the base at KAF is a MOB that draws upon military and civilian contracted support services from local and international sources and pushes commodities such as rations and fuel out to the FOB. The days where a deployed force took "whatever they required" off the land under a system of "well organized plunder" ended in the seventeenth century, as the sizes of military forces grew to an extent where they were too large for that foraging system to be successful.<sup>96</sup> In this context, contemporary bases are the products of host nation support, extensive urban planning, and are supported by a logistical network that is based on the mutual support arrangements established within the local and regional economy.

While a MOB can be described as a small city in itself, in reality their "footprints" are larger than the simple geographical space they occupy, and their impact on the local economy is greater than being a simple tenant in the local area. A recent Canadian example that reflects the MOB construct was in Bosnia in the late 1990s, where the NCE, NSE, and Helicopter Detachment were sited in a camp in the Northwest Bosnian town of Velika Kladusa. Velika Kladusa supported a number of satellite locations at Banja Luka

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<sup>96</sup> Martin Van Crevald, *Supplying War – Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 7.


and Zgon, and was one of the larger NATO military organizations supporting economic activity and development in the area. The base employed local labourers and translators and procured select commodities from the local area, thus having two types of impact on the local economy. As theorized by L.M. Lafleur, economists and geographers can attribute the economic impact of a military base on a region to either “direct effects” or “indirect effects” (otherwise known as first stage or second stage effects respectively). Where first stage effects represent “the expenditures actually made by the base itself and its personnel,” the resulting second stage effects represent the additional expenditures generated because of the first stage expenditures.”<sup>97</sup> Stated differently, the direct impact that a base has on a locale is the sum of the wages paid to locally employed personnel and the scope of the procurement activity exercised on the local economy (i.e. land lease rates, utility charges, food products purchases, rental vehicle leases, fuel purchases, etc). As for the second stage effects which are more difficult to quantify, these indirect effects are linked to the “multiplier effect” of wages where these wages and revenues create a regional “chain reaction” (or multiplier effect) which causes further expenditures to be made in the local area.<sup>98</sup> Figure 3 below displays the economic relationship between a military MOB, a local work force, local industry and the applicable multiplier effects.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> L.M. Lafleur, *The Economic Impact of CFB Cornwallis On Its Micro-Environment* (Ottawa: Defence Research Analysis Establishment, 1974), 16-17.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>99</sup> Figure 4 based on Chart 1 from within L.M. Lafleur’s study on the economic impact of CFB Cornwallis on the local environment. *Ibid.*, 9.



**Figure 3 - The Path of Income Flow through a Region (arrow indicates direction of dollar flow)**

To explain Figure 3 in more detail, as the MOB injects financial resources directly into the economy, the economic health of the local market will determine the indirect impacts through the multiplier effect. If the multiplier effect in the region is 1.5, then the value of \$ 1,000.00 paid out in wages will create \$ 1,500.00 in additions to the economic base of the region. The higher the multiplier, the more impact that \$ 1.00 of military spending will have on the local economy. Depending on the rate of “leakage” that is inherent in the economic model (i.e. taxation, savings, investments, transfers outside the region, imports of goods and services into the region, etc), this will slow down the rate of re-spending that occurs which will have a negative effect on rate of economic growth in the area.

With respect to economic growth, this value can be quantified by measuring the activity surrounding “basic” and “non-basic” industry. Where basic industry consists “of those industries or segments of industries which supply a market external to the region,” the size of this base can be measured by quantifying the “injection of new funds into the

income stream of the region's economy."<sup>100</sup> As for non-basic or "residential" industry, this measure is produced by analysing demand in the local area which is induced by additional income of the regions inhabitants.<sup>101</sup> Therefore, the arrival of a military force that employs locals and procures goods and services and/or products of industry is said to contribute to both the basic and residential industries. The military provides an injection of new money into the economy like a new exporting industry in the area, and expanded employment resulting from the base's needs creates a multiplier effect as income is circulated throughout the region. The same can be said of the NGOs working in the area, who also inject new income into the region with their social initiatives, infrastructure projects, administrative support teams, etc. While it may be a relatively simple task therefore to measure the economic impact of a MOB and NGO component in a region, there are other issues to consider when reviewing the full spectrum of effects of an intervention. Interventions now include diplomats, economists, NGOs, etc, who are all vying to address issues such as security, development and social welfare, state level economic reform humanitarian aid requirements, corruption, organized crime, and physical reconstruction.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>102</sup> For purposes here, economic reform consists of deregulation, privatization, and macro-economic stabilization. Timothy Donais, *The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia*, 3.



#### 4.6 Security

In an intervention into a FFS, the environment will likely be chaotic and the WoG force will be focussed on providing security, enhancing political stability, initiating economic development, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. In this atmosphere, achieving security may be initially difficult to achieve. Years of distrust, the suffering of atrocities, and the pain of loss may have created deep rifts and sense of grievance between belligerents and the making, keeping or enforcement of peace between these parties will be an intricate task for the military Commander. Once the military and local police are able to attain a certain level of success, the military's vision is for the political leadership to leverage the situation and establish a foundation of political and economic permanence. Once local leaders can take advantage of the "purely public benefits" that security provides, peacetime's more efficient allocation and expenditure of resources will result in its own security foundation that will in turn support further political and economic development.<sup>103</sup>

At this point, this research acknowledges the "chicken or the egg" argument that exists pertaining to security and the role it plays in the development of a FFS. While one side may argue that discussion, agreements, and compromise between the government and belligerents may create its own level of political stability that will breed regional security, others argue that a purely military solution is the first step in security, political legitimacy and follow-on economic development. In the event that an intervening force is of a different cultural mix than the FFS (i.e. race, language, religion), then this will

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<sup>103</sup> Binyam Solomon, "The Political Economy of Peacekeeping." *In Handbook of Defense Economics Defense in a Globalized World* Volume 2, ed. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, 741-774 (New York: Elsevier, 2007), 742.

only add to the complexity of the situation. The intervening force will need to develop credibility with the population and regional players, and gain the trust of the host nation. If this is achieved, then more complex threats such as unconventional warfare may be avoided.

In a conventional setting, an effective and heavily resourced military force deployed under legitimate authority will gain the confidence and appreciation of the region, thus generating its own critical mass that supports stability and subsequent development. In an unconventional, irregular or asymmetric setting however, the opposite may be true. Insurgency operations that include assassinations, car bombings, suicide bombings, etc, create inherent instability that hampers government progress and tends to breed further discontent amongst the population. Needless to say, it is the asymmetric threat that poses the greatest security challenge to the host nation government and the intervening force. To combat these unconventional threats, it is important for the members of the campaign to not enter into theoretical arguments about what line of operations to pursue first (as identified in Section 4.2), but rather to focus on a multi-agency and coordinated approach between soldiers, diplomats, and development workers whose efforts will simultaneously provide the security that is required to develop the FFS. This coordinated approach is crucial and must be integrated with the efforts of the host nation government. Herein lies another irony in managing an effective intervention. As aptly characterised by Hans Morgenthau, “Intervention must be brutally direct in order to overcome resistance or it must be surreptitious in order to be acceptable.”<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Hans Morgenthau, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene,” 428.

#### 4.7 Economic Development

With the intervening military force, host nation military and local police forces operating as a coordinated team, the greatest contribution that this component provides is the “restoration of basic peace and security.”<sup>105</sup> Once this is achieved, this sets the condition that expedites investment in the legal economy. This in turn provides employment and income that acts as an “upsurge in economic activity” that supports further stability – for the quicker that security is established and economic development is initiated, this will result in a positive developmental spiral that manifests itself in “faster mission draw-downs and reduces the likelihood of mission reinforcement or return to quell newly-erupted disorder with economic roots.”<sup>106</sup> Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. For while it is recognized that military solutions are difficult to achieve in the months or years associated with interventions, economic development takes years and decades to mature and manifest themselves.

When addressing economic development, it is important to realize that failed states are starting from positions of great disadvantage. Where the West’s industrial economies are characterized as already “capital absorptive,” industrialized, organized and technologically advanced, underdeveloped states have low capital absorptive capacities due to their structure around local and regional economies, simple organizations and low

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<sup>105</sup> Michael Carnahan, Scott Gilmore, William Durch, “New Data on the Economic Impact of Peacekeeping,” *International Peacekeeping* Vol 14 Number 3 (June 2007): 384.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

levels of technology.<sup>107</sup> For this reason, the intervening powers need to acknowledge the potentially expensive and time consuming task at hand, the distant timeframe to expect to start realizing gains, and therefore set achievable goals within these periods. And despite these challenges, just as the definition of intervention may vary between political theorists, agreement on the term economic development also has to be established. For purposes here, this research will adopt Paul Koefod's definition of economic development as:

The process of enlargement, adaptive change, or transformation of the general framework of any societal economy together with enhancement of the sophistication, education and technological competence of the people whose enterprise and livelihood are affected.<sup>108</sup>

In the context of this definition, it is apparent that for an intervening force constructed on the PMESII model, its efforts will not only need to be orchestrated with the host nation, but also with IOs such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

When transforming the economy of a FFS, major challenges will be encountered during the “art of forcing modernizing change on societal economies,” managing the “impatient income aspirations of indigenous peoples” and dealing with the problem of “willing workers’ whose enthusiasm on the job exceeds their competence for it.”<sup>109</sup> Regardless, once a minimal level of peace, security and stability has been achieved in the target state, the government will be in a better position to communicate its expanded goals, build upon its creditability established with the urban and rural populations and

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<sup>107</sup> Paul E. Koefod, “Some General Problems with Economic Development,” *Land Economics* Vol 42, no. 3 (August 1966): 247.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 248.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 253-255.

plan the delivery of infrastructure programs and upgrades in concert with the intervening powers. Only then, can the more difficult tasks take place, pertaining to “education, legal and security systems, generalization of weights and measures, monetization of economic life, extension of transport and communications facilities, widening of markets, and improvement of health” services.<sup>110</sup> This is truly a daunting task, so it is no wonder that the fundamentals of economic development require competence in “philosophy, social psychology, sociology, cultural and social anthropology, comparative law and government, and public administration.”<sup>111</sup> For this reason, the WGA is aptly suited to address the full range of requirements that must be addressed in effective nation building, as the modern day intricacies of economic development have necessitated this approach.

#### **4.8 Government Reform**

Intervention into a FFS will be plagued with conflicting micro and macro level issues that will need to be dealt with on a continual basis. Where individual experts will possess their beliefs on the reasons for the poverty and underdevelopment of the FFS, these same convictions will manifest themselves at the state level in the national offices of the intervening powers. In the case of former colonies suffering from underdevelopment, there is a natural tendency for the populations and governments of intervening powers to believe that the West is responsible for the plight of the world’s poorer states. Indeed, this philosophy may breed varying degrees of guilt between the

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<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, 257.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 259.

intervening powers and will need to be addressed before undertaking government reforms, proposing economic development strategies, and coordinating the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Remembering that “a colonial government is not sovereign: it has to accept the instructions of the metropolitan government,” this research supports that government reform must not be imposed – it must be developed within the resources of the international community and the host nation.<sup>112</sup> Sovereignty of the legitimate host nation government must reign supreme and reforms will need to be slowly threaded into the cultural and social capabilities of the state. That is not to say that recognized international diplomatic and economic principles can be ignored by the host nation, but rather that a partnership between the FFS and the intervening powers is the best approach to deliver reforms that will enhance stability, problem solving capabilities, standards of living, investment and further security. The host nation and intervening powers will need to acknowledge the historical baggage that the intervening force may be bringing into the theatre, and deal with it transparently. For while some believe that the colonial powers are responsible for the “material backwardness of the poor countries,” it is also true that the “colonial governments established law and order, safeguarded private property and contractual relations, organized basic transport and health services, and introduced some modern financial and legal institutions.”<sup>113</sup> It is in this atmosphere of subjective

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<sup>112</sup> P.T. Bauer, “The Economics of Resentment: Colonialism and Underdevelopment,” in *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol. 4, No. 1, Colonialism and Decolonization. (January 1969): 62.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

arguments and counter-theories that the intervening force and host nation will discuss sensitive issues, and deal with them throughout the nation building effort.

In terms of specific governmental and economic reforms that will deliver the FFS from its state of underdevelopment and poverty, they will need to be tailored to the state and the characteristics of the surrounding region. As professed by Marina Ottaway, where once “nations were forged by ‘blood and iron,’” contemporary nation building through government reform will need to be sought through “conflict resolution, multilateral aid, and free elections.”<sup>114</sup> The goal of reform will be not to “impose common identities on deeply divided peoples but to organize states that can administer their territories and allow people to live together despite differences.”<sup>115</sup> Necessary reforms to battle poverty will need to be based on the capabilities of the state involved and take into consideration the history of the region. In Sub-Sahara countries, John Kenneth Galbraith accredits poverty to a lack of a cultural base which consists of an effective government, economy, internal security, communications and foreign policy. As result, reforms will be difficult as the government is unable to attract personnel “with the requisite education, training and honesty” to perform public tasks such as collect taxes, enforce laws, manage larger scale industry and commerce, prepare educational systems, and administer communications and transportation systems.<sup>116</sup> In Latin America and

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<sup>114</sup> Marina Ottaway, “Nation Building,” 16.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>116</sup> Of note, Galbraith acknowledges that tact is required while phrasing this theory and that “the problem is not an absence of aptitude but absence of opportunity.” Source J.K. Galbraith, “The Causes of Poverty: A Classification,” in *Imperialism, Intervention and Development*, ed. Andrew Mack, David Plant and Ursula Doyle, 222-232 (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 224-225.

Asia, contemporary nation building efforts will similarly address legacy issues pertaining back to colonialism. That said, while “nation building must be a consensual, democratic process,” government reforms will still need to be accompanied with the necessary “military muscle” that the intervening force will provide while reforms are undertaken and achieved.<sup>117</sup>

Given the above mentioned challenges, it is apparent that international intervention bringing stability to a region may be fraught with institutionalized barriers to expeditious reform and development. However, if the scope of the problem can be identified and awareness gained on the issues facing the host nation, this is a key step in bringing about the government reform deemed necessary.

#### **4.9 Humanitarian Assistance**

Given Francis Fukuyama’s assertion that “economic interpretations of history are incomplete and unsatisfying, because man is not simply an economic animal,” it is fitting that the notion of humanitarian assistance follows the preceding commentary on economic development and government reform.<sup>118</sup> As Canada deploys its team of military personnel and diplomats, they will focus on their respective niches while ensuring to coordinate the extent of their overlapping capabilities (including those of the NGOs in the locale). While the military force that has trained for the Three Block War will address combat and security requirements, stabilization operations and possibly

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<sup>117</sup> Marina Ottaway, “Nation Building,” 18.

<sup>118</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1992), xvi.



humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts, the diplomatic service and CIDA will address development strategies as guided by the GoC's 2005 IPS.

In the IPS, Canada established a policy for strategic aid that focused the delivery of aid to twenty-five developmental partners. Provided with the intent to support the UN's Millennium Development Goals, the C.D. Howe Institute studied the IPS in the context of the UN's goals and came up with four recommendations to increase the effectiveness of Canadian aid:

1. Design bilateral aid programs with attention to host-country governance and devote large share of aid to multilateral agencies [NGOs] with a strong analytic capacity and willingness to apply conditionality in the supply of aid to host governments;
2. Concentrate bilateral aid in a few countries only and devote resources to analyzing the economies of these countries;
3. Target aid expenditures on education and basic health services, sectors subject to complex "market failures" and be prepared to impose conditionality; and
4. Canada should lower the trade barriers it imposes to efficient developing-country policies.<sup>119</sup>

Considering the CAN \$ 3.7 billion provided in world wide official development assistance (ODA) in 2004/05 and the \$ 5 billion assistance scheduled for 2010, it is positive to note that the GoC and the C.D. Howe Institute are tracking this significant expensive and important endeavour focused on reducing poverty and enhancing "governance, private sector development, health, basis education, and environmental

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<sup>119</sup> Recommendations paraphrased here. Source John Richards, *Can Aid Work? Thinking About a Development Strategy*. Report Prepared for the C.D. Howe Institute No 231 (Ottawa: Renouf Publishing, April 2006), 20-23.

sustainability.”<sup>120</sup> As discussed below, the North American historic provision of aid has not always been so carefully prepared, channelled nor distributed.

In 1993, Michael Maren argued that humanitarian aid undermines self sufficiency. In certain circumstances such as earthquakes, tsunamis, droughts and other natural disasters, humanitarian aid simply saves lives. However, in more complex scenarios such as Kenya in 1980 or Mozambique in 1993, the provision of humanitarian aid can do more harm than good. According to Maren, “the development industry hurts people in the developing world” while “its greatest success has been to provide good jobs for Westerners with graduate degrees.”<sup>121</sup> In Kenya, Maren was provided almost a million dollars in US Agency for International Development (USAID) grants and a shipload of government surplus rice. He started food-for-works projects (water projects, agriculture projects, forestry projects) until he came to the realization that he “knew nothing about agriculture, forestry, road building, well dogging dam building, or any of the projects [he] was approving.”<sup>122</sup> As the approved projects mostly supported subsidized US farmers, the process continued despite that fact that Kenya was not facing starvation and that it decreased demand for locally produced commodities and fostered dependence among those who received the aid – thus producing “a never ending cycle of aid.”<sup>123</sup> In the early

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<sup>120</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World - Overview* (Ottawa: Canada, 2005), 24.

<sup>121</sup> Michael Marin, “Humanitarian Aid Undermines Self-Sufficiency,” in *Interventionism*, ed. Paul. A Winters, 62-66 (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc. 1995), 62.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

1990s, Mozambique's President Chissano was appreciative of foreign aid and stated "We salute the international community for its prompt and generous contribution, which has been fundamental in saving the lives of millions of Mozambicans."<sup>124</sup> However, as commented upon by Maren, when Mozambique entered a time of relative peace and tranquility in 1993, the only discussions that continued to take place in the media were linked to garnering additional aid and "jobs for expatriates" and graduate students and not the development of exports, investment opportunities, or permanent employment for Africans.<sup>125</sup>

Although Maren's comments are harsh and provide an older example, they still provide a valid perspective on the traps that surround the provision of humanitarian aid. The West's motivation and wealth to assist impoverished states exist, and the rise of globalism has expedited the provision of aid. However, the reality is that long term aid has to be linked to development and establishing self-sufficiency while short term aid has to be monitored and applied conditionally to ensure that perverse incentives and circular dependencies are avoided or minimized. To that end, Canada's IPS indicates Canada's intention to ensure the effectiveness of provided aid. Canadian aid has progressed considerably since its first project in July 1960, when it provided the newly independent Congo "20,000 lbs each of canned pork and dried milk" and the required transportation to

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<sup>124</sup> Shaun Vincent, "The Mozambique Conflict (1980-1992)," in *The True Cost of Conflict*, ed. Michael Cranna, 81-112 (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1994), 102.

<sup>125</sup> Michael Marin, "Humanitarian Aid Undermines Self-Sufficiency," 66.

move it.<sup>126</sup> From the provision of canned pork and dried milk in 1960 to CAN \$ 3.7 billion in 2004, the expansion of aid has grown in complexity and diversity. And in step, so has the opportunity for the process to be hindered by inefficiency, bureaucracy, and the outright economic and social leakage associated with corruption and organized crime.

#### 4.10 Corruption and Organized Crime

“The biggest security threat to this country [Bosnia] is not nationalism; It’s criminality, corruption and unemployment.”

- Donald Hays<sup>127</sup>

Corruption and organized crime are not a unique symptom of a FFS – they are but two of the challenges that have to be addressed in the scope of an intervention. Painting a broad brush over a developing state labelling it as corrupt is a misrepresentation of criminality. In Canada for example, March 2008 witnessed the sentencing of Mr Conrad Black (former Canadian citizen and Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Hollinger International) to 78 months in a US prison for fraud and obstruction of justice for “defrauding shareholders and skimming \$6.1 million” (US) from his international newspaper conglomerate” in acts described as lining his “pockets with company funds.”<sup>128</sup> This said, it is important to remind ourselves in the West that corruption and crime are not limited to the Third World.

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<sup>126</sup> Daniel Galvin, *A Role for Canada in an African Crisis: Perceptions of the Congo Crisis and Motivations for Canadian Participation* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, 2006), 14.

<sup>127</sup> Donald Hays was the Principle Deputy High Representative of the Office of the High Representative in 2002. Source Timothy Donais, *The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia*, 66.

<sup>128</sup> “Conrad Black Gets 6 1/2 Years in Prison,” [news journal on-line]; available from [http://money.cnn.com/2007/12/10/news/newsmakers/conrad\\_black/index.htm](http://money.cnn.com/2007/12/10/news/newsmakers/conrad_black/index.htm) ; Internet, accessed 25 March 2008.

In the challenges faced during an intervention, “greed” is a growing issue that needs to be considered within the campaign plan because corruption and organized crime can adversely affect mission success. With organized crime characterized by a continuous hierarchy; rational profit taking initiatives through crime; the use of force or threat; the corruption of public officials; the monopoly control of illegal markets; restricting membership; non-ideological approach; specialization of work tasks; codes of secrecy; and extensive planning, it is important that this powerful force be targeted and compromised by the host nation police and intervening force.<sup>129</sup> And as the characteristics of this social network are similar to those of an insurgency, it is reasonable for the intervening force and the host nation to treat this matter as seriously as a conventional or unconventional military threat.

When addressing crime and corruption, there are several points that need to be acknowledged by campaign planners. Since the intervention itself implies a compromised ability of the host nation to deal with crime, the campaign plan must provide for the resources and systems required to enhance the state’s legal system. Irv Marucelj, former peacekeeper turned author, classified the Bosnian mission as an example where social disarray and conflict brought in the peace organizations that were the only source of stable and well paid employment. This in turn attracted entrepreneurs and criminal organizations that pushed the “established limits of socially acceptable

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<sup>129</sup> Donald Liddick, *An Empirical, Theoretical, and Historical Overview of Organized Crime* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 31, quoted in Irv Marucelj, *Mature Peacekeeping Operations as Facilitators of Organized Crime*. Report Prepared for the Institute for Research on Public Policy (Montreal: IRPP, 2005) 4.

behaviour,” who were more than willing to take advantage of a weak legal framework.<sup>130</sup> Timothy Donais advanced this theory further, stating that “Bosnia in many ways the ideal environment for organized crime,” for it lies at the heart of a turbulent and unstable region, its borders are porous, its poorly paid officials are easily bought off “and the rule of law barely exists, making the country a low risk environment for organized crime.”<sup>131</sup> Add in the reality that unemployed demobilized soldiers, internally displaced persons (IDP), and international refugees add to the confused social mix of the country, and the opportunity for human trafficking, drug, cigarette, and alcohol smuggling, prostitution and the marketing of stolen vehicles creates a real challenge for the law enforcement officials.<sup>132</sup> If officials are incompetent, corrupt, inefficient or are in insufficient numbers to deal with the situation, then the relative level of peace and stability in the region will suffer. The intervening campaign plan must focus on the corruption free operation of governance, the functioning of the judiciary and the progression of law enforcement in order for prospects of the host nation to match the expectations set out by the international community (i.e., UN Millennium Goals). With an effective police force “a precondition for continued success once the peace operation [intervention] is over and

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<sup>130</sup> Irv Marucelj, *Mature Peacekeeping Operations as Facilitators of Organized Crime*. Report Prepared for the Institute for Research on Public Policy (Montreal: IRPP, 2005), 12.

<sup>131</sup> Timothy Donais, *The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia*, 73.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.

has left the region,” the campaign plan must advance this objective when it assigns military assistance, aid and resources to the host nation.<sup>133</sup>

#### **4.11 Military Assistance**

In an intervention involving military assistance, addressing this line of operation may be doctrinally problematic for the WoG team. Where IOs or NGOs may focus on delivering humanitarian aid, establishing open trading and financial systems, eradicating debt, building employment strategies, and enhancing the sharing of technology, this research contends that these endeavours largely address the achievement of the UN Millennium Goals and do not fully explore the benefits of military aid. These aforementioned goals, altruistically dealing with education, health, finance, gender equality and environmental issues, are linked yet distinct from the provision of military aid. For it must be acknowledged that peace and security achieved through military assistance and defence spending can provide the host nation the opportunity to start building its political, economic and social institutions. And without the trained personnel and hardware associated with an intervening military force and host nation police force, achieving the Millennium Goals will be impossible.

Often described as security assistance, military aid or military assistance, this form of aid has invoked ethical and cost/benefit discussions amongst political scientists and economic theorists. With assistance defined as “the transfer of resources from one country to another at some cost to the donor,” its donation is motivated by the interests of the donor country to allow the recipient to become more self-sufficient, more specifically

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<sup>133</sup> Irv Marucelj, *Mature Peacekeeping Operations as Facilitators of Organized Crime*, 14.

“to promote the economic and social development of the recipient country.”<sup>134</sup> Where heated debate often begins is during the process to quantify the degree of “resource diversion” or opportunity cost that is associated with the receipt of military aid.<sup>135</sup> For example, has the aid been provided as a grant or a loan? Have resources been diverted from other developmental initiatives to pay for arms? Has the import of military technology created regional instability or possibly a regional arms race? With national defence a component of nation building, the reality is that scarce financial resources must be dedicated to both military and non-military initiatives. The challenge is that during the process to create a secure nation-state, the military and civilian components of the effort will need to balance defence capabilities with the requisite civilian political, economic and social structures that are concurrently being developed.

As the host nation determines the degree to which military assistance will be sought and accepted, an issue that must be resolved concerns regional security. In the event that received military aid leads to regional instability, then this added tension may be counterproductive to the development of the host nation. However, if the aid program simply contributes to the survival of the state, then it has to be advanced.<sup>136</sup> The bottom line is that military projects and/or foreign military aid have to possess “favourable pay-

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<sup>134</sup> Gavin Kennedy, *Defense Economics* (London: Duckworth, 1983), 205.

<sup>135</sup> Charles Wolf, *Economic Impacts of Military Assistance*, Report Prepared for the Rand Corporation (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1971), 2.

<sup>136</sup> In January 2008, Canada donated 2,500 surplus C7 rifles (5.56 mm) to the Afghan Army. The donation was made after Canada coordinated the donation through a Foreign Military Sales case and obtained international approval concerning this transfer of this technology to Afghanistan. Source Tobi Cohen, “Afghan Army Gets Surplus C7 Rifles,” [news source on-line]; available from <http://cnews.canoe.ca>; Internet, accessed 18 April 2008.



offs compared to available alternative uses.”<sup>137</sup> Since military aid can *divert* resources from development goals but also be considered *additional* resources that are available to the country, it is the net effect of these two forces – diversion and additionality – that will determine the balance whether or not military aid contributes to the growth and development of the host nation.<sup>138</sup> With the resource addition concept consisting of aid in the form of roads, harbours, warehousing facilities, vehicles, power generation equipment, etc, any argument based on resource diversion principles against the receipt of this aid would need to be balanced against the scale of accelerated “economic development and technological progress” gained by the recipient country.<sup>139</sup>

The notion that military aid can destabilize a region is valid. During the course of an intervention and where the host nation is receiving military advisors, training, infrastructure projects and transfers of equipment, regional neighbours will be taking notice and be understandably concerned if the scale of assistance is considered excessive. With a principle of conflict avoidance and resolution being to achieve transparency through open lines of communication, then the motivations of aid donor and aid recipient must be open to view by the regional actors before the tension becomes untenable. With this in mind, the scope of military assistance that should be requested by a host nation and offered by an intervening power has to be in balance with recognized regional allowances.

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<sup>137</sup> Gavin Kennedy, *Defense Economics*, 207.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, 208.

<sup>139</sup> Charles Wolf, *Economic Impacts of Military Assistance*, 2.

#### 4.12 Reconstruction and Infrastructure

In contemporary interventions, it can be anticipated that reconstruction services will be required by the host nation. As developing countries have historically identified the need for improved access to clean water, additional road construction, bridge repairs, upgraded power generation capabilities, unexploded ordinance removal, etc, the intervening force will likely offer or be canvassed to provide reconstruction as a key deliverable in the campaign plan's "infrastructure" line of operation. While the visible results of reconstruction are quick to manifest themselves as measures of success, the problem is how to effectively coordinate this multi-jurisdictional reconstruction effort. For as succinctly summarized by Jean Elshtain, "there are many good reasons for rich nations to assist poorer ones. The challenge is always to determine how to do that most effectively."<sup>140</sup> With the military possessing engineering capabilities, CIMIC cells identifying requirements, CIDA providing funding to development projects and NGOs who are capable of carrying out projects, these organizations must coordinate their respective efforts to meet the needs identified by the host nation. For unwanted and unsupportable projects delivered to a developing state are quick ways to erode the legitimacy and popularity of an intervention.

In any large organization, issues such as interdepartmental competition, interagency rivalry and personality conflicts can create friction leading to inefficiencies. Each organization will deploy with its own administrative culture and respect for personalities, position, careers and habits will need to be maintained while still dealing

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<sup>140</sup> Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Terrorism," in *The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Charles Reed and David Ryall, 118-135 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 135.


with the natural tendency for each organization “to justify their fields of activity.”<sup>141</sup>

Diplomats, soldiers and development workers all carry their respective biases, the extent of which may also extend into the host nation. Work ethic, communication practises, religious views, ethnical background and political perspectives will be in full view of the multi-national team, and the challenges to provide a focused effort will be significant. International strategic pressures originating from home states on the intervening force will also need to be considered, but strict project management skills exercised at the municipal, provincial and national level will help maintain the progress to be made at the operational and tactical levels.

From a military perspective, the CIMIC organization is responsible to represent the military amongst the host nation authorities, the host nation population, international organizations and NGOs. In this mix, the CIMIC cell is tasked to identify potential projects and coordinate their respective prioritization, funding requirements, planning, execution and delivery. As for determining the types of projects that are deemed worthy of investment, there are political, economic and developmental considerations that need to be factored into the decision making process. In their experience in repeatedly dealing with project management issues in developing states, the Red Cross and Red Crescent have built upon a Finnish International Development Agency (FINNIDA) model to help them determine optimal courses of action. Figure 4 below graphically represents the model which helps determine the projects deserving of approval.

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<sup>141</sup> Pierre Laurent, “Political Constraints,” in *Responding to Emergencies & Fostering Development: The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*, ed. Claire Pirote, Bernard Husson, Francois Grunewald, 62-65 (London: Zed Books, 1999), 63.



**Figure 4 - The Project Decision Model**

To best explain the model, a simple question needs to be asked, “If the project was not embarked on – what would happen?”<sup>142</sup> If the project is endorsed by the host nation, if the benefits of the project are clear, if funding is available, if the project is locally sustainable and if the estimates of the impact of the project are significantly positive, then the project is likely to proceed.<sup>143</sup> If the tenets of this model are followed, then the completed project will have contributed to the development of the locale. If not, then resources will have been squandered and host nation confidence in the reconstruction mission will have been compromised – all contrary to the larger aim of achieving mission success.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> Ian McAllister, *Sustaining Relief with Development: Strategic Issues for the Red Cross and the Red Crescent* (Dordrecht, NL: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 234.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>144</sup> Canada is among the top five contributors to the National Solidarity Program (NSP), Afghanistan’s primary program for community development. Through the NSP, 11,400 projects have been completed that has improved access to drinking water, sanitation, and transportation. “Rebuilding Afghanistan” [Government of Canada FAQ on-line]; available from <http://canada-afghanistan.gc.ca> ; Internet, accessed 1 January 2008.

#### 4.13 Measuring Success

In order to facilitate mission success, a WGA campaign plan must have been logically established at its initiation and supported during its execution. A mission ill conceived, ill prepared and ill resourced will be difficult to correct back on track mid-course and even the experience, skills and capabilities of diplomats and soldiers in the field may not be able to right a floundering mission. The mission will require strategic vision, a clear mission statement and established success criteria, but even then mission success is not guaranteed. For strategic success to be attained, this will require success at the operational and tactical levels where campaign plan objectives have been met during the tenure of the mission.

If the intervention was to follow the lines of operation pertaining to PSMEII model, then the achievement of decisive points will be used to measure the mission success rate (decisive points are defined as an event, the successful outcome which is a precondition to achieve the objective and end state).<sup>145</sup> The WoG team would establish their criteria for success based on these decisive points and allocate resources to meet the objectives set by the host nation, with evaluation of the plan maintained on a continual basis. To illustrate, possible mission success factors (i.e., line of operation decisive points) could consist of the measures listed below in Table 2. Admittedly, establishing criteria for success and planning to meet targets which reflect overall development is an easier task than setting the plan into action, supervising its execution and initiating corrective actions. Set backs such as military losses, financial constraints, personnel

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<sup>145</sup> *Canadian Force College Combined and Joint Staff Officer's Handbook* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2005), II-1-10/16.

shortages, shifting governmental priorities, and changing external market pressures will all potentially harm developmental progress. The arrival of an intervening force may see a rise in drug trafficking, prostitution and worst case, perverse incentives where peace and security are violated to keep the intervening force on the ground and its sources of income flowing into the region. Inflation in labour rates, rental rates, and retain markets can all be expected, and the impact on the local economy will have to be monitored.

**Table 2 – Mission Success Factors**

Line of Operation	Measurement of Success
Political	Elections held post conflict termination Government ministries established Federal and local governance established Tax policies, employment laws and environments laws drafted Independent and impartial judiciary established Political freedoms supported
Social	Aid delivered Public support of intervention initiatives garnered Education systems improved Health improvements initiated Safety attitudes improved
Military (Police and Security)	Military and police units trained and equipped Rule of law infrastructure established Increase in crimes reported Increase in crimes solved Support for insurgents reduced
Economic	Measurements of economic growth, interest rates, exchange rates, inflation rate Unemployment rate drops Gross Domestic Product increases Foreign investment increased Exports increased
Infrastructure	Power generation increased, roads built, bridges built Water sources and distribution systems established Rail and air links established
Information	Media outlets established Telecommunications links established Research funding increased Information technology established Access to technology increased Intellectual property issues respected Global communications increased

Source: Stoddard, “The Whole of Government Approach: Nothing Enduring Can Be Accomplished Instantaneously,” 33.

The point to take from Table 2 is that mission success will need to be measured in the short term through military success and ensuing stability, and then in the medium and long terms through measures of social and economic development. As aptly captured by Neil Macfarlane, an intervention is successful in the short term when the “military and immediate political objectives are satisfied” and in the long term when “the durability of the political solution” can be judged.<sup>146</sup> With this view, it is apparent that developing a FFS is a full time commitment, an expensive initiative, and a lengthy process.

## **CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION**

### **5.1 Conclusion – Peace, Order and Good Government**

The title of this research is “The Whole of Government Approach, Nation Building and the Political Economy of International Intervention.” While these three subjects are complex and wide-reaching themselves, their combined scope is significant today in the context of the current challenges endured by Canadians deployed with the UN throughout the world and with NATO forces in Afghanistan. Throughout this study, reference has been made to the history of intervention, the common aspects of nation building and the key contemporary characteristics of the WGA. Where once intervention was characterized by the expansion of control over distant city states by ancient Greece and Rome, the states of Europe later used intervention as a tool to expand its political power and economic base through colonialism. With Germany, Italy and Japan exercising intervention thorough imperialism in the mid-1900s, the world was witness to the coercive and destructive power of international intervention. And as the Second

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<sup>146</sup> Neil Macfarlane, *Intervention and Regional Security*, 32.

World War ended and the internationally led rebuilding of Germany, Italy and Japan began, the world faced not only the challenges of comprehensive nation building, but the new realities associated with the paradigm of the Cold War.

With the US and USSR tabling their respective capitalist and socialist agendas in the international arena during the Cold War, each entity faced one another not only face to face in the European theatre, but also by proxy throughout the Third World. As the US assumed the responsibility to protect the world from Soviet expansion and the spread of communism, the US and USSR became embroiled in conflicts in Viet Nam and Afghanistan respectively, where both the intervening power and target state suffered the devastating effects of the conflicts. During the Cold War, millions of deaths were suffered, fantastic environmental damage was endured, and billions of dollars were spent over the struggle that lasted four decades. And with this, the perception of intervention was molded in the context of the misguided and damaging effects that the actions of the superpowers had on the world's poorer states. But as the world dealt with the components of the Cold War, it also witnessed the development of benevolent ideals progressed through the UN such as R2P. As result, the nature and connotation of intervention started to change. In the 1960s, as decolonization and the growing influence of liberalization, democratic ideals, market economics and globalization took root, these principles ultimately helped contribute to the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, and the newest forms of benevolent-founded international intervention.

In the early 1990s, a page had arguably turned in the history of intervention, where peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts in the Former Yugoslavia and Somalia were now



the face of this political tool. Where states once invaded or intervened into the affairs of another states for economic gain, political advantage, or strategic influence, the motives behind intervention were changing for the better. And where terminology such as colonialism or imperialism were once used to best describe the political economy of intervention, new terms such as nation building and humanitarian intervention were beginning to appear in mainstream use. In 2008, as the world deals with security threats from failing states, intervention has taken on a whole new meaning and purpose. In FFS, “where citizens cannot trust the authorities” in their own country, intervention today has taken on an altruistic and a practical tone.<sup>147</sup> Contemporary intervention is now more comprehensive than simple military operations with civilian oversight, for it now operates under a complex and coordinated approach that involves economists, social scientists, anthropologists, engineers and aid experts. Campaign planning is required from the outset, and the coordinated efforts need to be delivered with the interests of the international community and recipient state in mind. The new philosophy is based on the belief that once the military and local police are able to attain a certain level of security, the vision is for the host nation political leadership to leverage the situation and establish a foundation of political and economic permanence that will breed further levels of spiralling peace and stability.

At the beginning of this research, it was proposed that “it is easier to stop a war than to build a peace.” For the military personnel who stand between belligerents and act as a physical barrier, an interpreter, or facilitator, this will take special skill sets, training,

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<sup>147</sup>Theo Caldwell, “The ‘Vimy Effect’ – 91 Years Later,” [News source on-line]; available from <http://www.nationalpost.com>; Internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

moral standing, courage and dedication. And in today's operational paradigm, these scenarios present themselves on a recurring basis in the context of the Three Block War. For the current Canadian mission in Afghanistan, this operation lends itself to the 3D, 3D +C or the WGA, and the results have been significant. The mission has not been without its costs, delays and challenges, as identified in early April 2008 by Canadian General Hillier when he mused that "if the job were easy, it would be done by now."<sup>148</sup> With the Canadian mission in Afghanistan considered a benevolent military, social, economic and political initiative, the next steps now are to improve and build upon the level of inter-agency cooperation between the departments deployed in the operational theatre.

With contemporary nation building interventions deployed in the historical context of their predecessors (and their often dark history), the motivations of the international community have to be understood by the population of the target state and its actions need to directly contribute to the development of the host nation economy. While the decision to intercede to resolve domestic conflict may appear benign, it is crucial to appreciate, anticipate and thus mitigate the potentially harmful and far-reaching effects that these decisions will have in the domestic setting. As foreign aid workers, government officials and military forces deploy into a FFS and as income starts to flow into a developing state, the impacts will be immediate. In the case of Operation ATHENA, the NSE CMC at the MOB and the deployed PRT in Kandahar City were both contributing to the income flow into Afghanistan. And as these sites inject financial resources directly into the economy, the economic health of the local market will be

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<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

expanded through the multiplier effect which will breed further investment and opportunities for peace and development.

As the components of the WoG team jockey for position, power, and influence, the diplomats, military personnel, developmental representatives, NGOs and host nation representatives will all bring their belief systems, agendas, experience and personalities to the table. In this fray, the team must remain focused on addressing threats to security, maximizing the effects of reconstruction projects, minding the direct and indirect impacts of injecting revenue streams in the local economy and dealing with the crime and corruption that surround the mission. Once gain, it has to be acknowledged that a unified vision, clear objectives and a synchronized campaign plan will address the nation building challenges that will deliver a FFS from its predicament. Years and decades are now recognized as the timeframe to deliver a failed state from its plight, with this reality reflected in the fact that First World states continue to deal poverty, corruption, organized crime within their own borders.

To conclude, this research contends that successful nation building is an expensive, complex and time intensive consuming endeavour that needs to be understood by the WoG team. With the intervention deployed under the benevolent intentions to assist in the development of a FFS, the reality prevails that interventions may be received with understandable trepidation by the host nation population. The intervening force must respect this reality, conduct pre-deployment training together and produce a comprehensive campaign plan that keeps them deployed for only as much time as the government can establish itself and create an environment inviting political, social and

economic stability. From this perspective, WoG intervention is a tool that reflects international desire to improve the living conditions of the less fortunate. It also supports the theory that although we originate from distant nation-states, we may be more alike than we are aware. Colonel Mike Capstick captured the spirit of this international relationship theory perfectly, when he mused that, “In the simplest terms, most Afghans want the same things that Canadians wanted in 1867 - peace order and good government. Our development aid efforts must focus on helping them achieve this.<sup>149</sup> With security and diplomacy rounding out this 3D+C intervention formula, Afghanistan is on the right track to achieve this reality.

In terms of final recommendations calling for future study, this research has one. With the WGA becoming entrenched in the mindset of the members of DND, DFAIT and CIDA, the peripheral issue of increased inter-departmental cooperation and pre-deployment training should be explored further. With the release of The Manley Report recommending that Canada establish a “strategy that integrates military, diplomatic, and development actions for a more coherent, effective engagement in Afghanistan,” this research reinforces Manley’s comments and shows that the WGA is an effective nation building tool if it is resourced and coordinated by a strategic campaign plan.<sup>150</sup> As Canadian governmental departments share in the struggle for financial resources, personnel recruiting and retention, and reconciling military and civilian professional

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<sup>149</sup> Mike Capstick, “The War Will Be Won In Kabul,” News source on-line; available from <http://www.canada.com>; Internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

<sup>150</sup> *Report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan*. The Honourable John Manley (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 39.

norms, it is arguably appropriate for the GoC to institutionalize the 3D+C construct rather than build the organizations on an *ad hoc* basis. In that light, future investigation into the establishment of a START based WoG, 3D or 3D+C training organization merits attention. And if the organization was established with the aim to promote international peace order and good government, then it definitely merits further Canadian study.

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