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**CAN THE INSURGENCY IN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN AFGHANISTAN BE
DEFEATED?**

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ABSTRACT

The current campaign in Afghanistan involving the Afghan National Government, supported by a coalition of countries, is a modern counterinsurgency. The Taliban insurgency seeks to undermine the Afghan Government by eroding its support from the population through violence, propaganda, subversion and intimidation of the Afghan people in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. This paper proposes a way ahead to defeat the Taliban insurgency, allowing for a lingering yet manageable level of violence, while at the same time shaping the Afghan Government to cope with this violence.

Insurgency was defined as distinct to terrorism and the wider global terror situation was assessed as having limited impact on the Afghan theatre. However, it was determined that Pakistan does play a major role in the future of Afghanistan: the two countries are inextricably linked and have been since before independence. The tribal code that unifies the Pashtun tribes straddling the border, Pashtunwali, could provide leverage for negotiations and reconciliation, which has been a theme of many bygone successful counterinsurgencies.

Historical examples of counterinsurgencies allowed for insights to a future campaign plan that would seek to defeat the Taliban insurgency. This defeat can be achieved through more unity of effort and a reconciliation and negotiation strategy to incorporate moderate Taliban into the political and social structure and by using a surgical military approach to destroy extremists. In essence, the Taliban can be defeated, but it will not be through a military solution alone and it will require a negotiation strategy, which is currently not supported by leading nations in the Coalition.

CHAPTER ONE – DEFINING THE DILEMMA

Introduction

The notion of an insurgency has changed little over the past century. During the First World War the British employed insurgent tactics, albeit through a proxy force, to distract the Ottoman Empire and prevent it supporting Germany's efforts in Europe. Thomas Edward Lawrence in his odyssey, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, recalls his Arab tribesmen were difficult to defeat, as...

... we were an influence, an idea, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas. The Turkish army on the other hand was like a plant, immobile as a whole, firm footed, nourished through long stems to the head, and easily targeted stems. We might be a vapour, blowing where we wished. Our kingdoms lay in our minds, and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so perhaps we offered nothing material to be targeted. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only that what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at.¹

Lawrence's insurgency provides many insights for today's insurgencies. In Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine, an insurgency is defined as, "A competition involving at least one non-state movement using means that include violence against an established authority to achieve political change."² The current military campaign in Afghanistan involving the Afghan National Government, supported by a United States led coalition of countries, fits this description. Indeed, the insurgency seeks to undermine the Afghan Government by eroding its support from the population through violence, propaganda, subversion and intimidation of the Afghan people mostly in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. The question is how to defeat this insurgency?

¹T.E. Lawrence, "Seven Pillars of Wisdom a triumph", (London: Jonathan Cape, 1946), 198.
²Dept. of National Defence. B-GL-323-004/FP-003 *Counter-insurgency operations*. Ottawa : Issued under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, (Dept. of National Defence, 2007), Ch1: 2/25.

Defeat is a term not defined by the Australian, British, Canadian or the United States militaries in the vast array of military operational glossaries; nevertheless, the Oxford Dictionary defines defeat as, "... 1 win a victory over. 2 prevent from achieving an aim or prevent (an aim) from being achieved. 3 reject or block (a proposal or motion)..."³ Under this hypothesis, it could be inferred that the defeat of the Taliban would be a victory over them or, possibly, preventing them from achieving their aim or, another alternative is blocking their proposal or motion. Under this notion it could be argued that if the Taliban remains then they have a victory!

In a full offensive military operation, such as Gulf War Two, victory and defeat are measurable activities where enemy assets and personnel can be destroyed, but what does it mean when endeavouring to measure against other more intangible elements of countering an insurgency? The measurements required to define defeat are difficult to grasp and as a consequence, qualitative rather than quantitative notions of measurement are required. This was evident in the Malayan campaign when Sir Robert Thompson stated:

The two best guides, which can not be readily reduced to statistics or processed through a computer, are an improvement in intelligence voluntarily given by the population and a decrease in the insurgents' recruiting rate. Much can be learnt merely from the faces of the population in villages that are subject to clear-and-hold operations, if these are visited at regular intervals. Faces which at first are resigned and apathetic, or even sullen, six months or a year later are full of cheerful welcoming smiles. The people know who is winning.⁴

Nevertheless, some measures of effectiveness, such as: the number of weapons captured; the number of females receiving education; the number of weapons handed or mines


³The Pocket Oxford Dictionary, 9th ed.

⁴Sir Robert Thompson, "Defeating *Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*," (St Peterburg FL: Hailer, 2005), 170.

recovered; polling and medical conditions do have a quantitative feature that can be ascertained throughout the course of a campaign.

Defining southern and eastern Afghanistan is best described by the Regional Commands South and East as depicted on the map at Figure 1.

Figure 1. Map of Regional Command areas in Afghanistan.



Source: Nato Maps and Logos

This paper proposes a way ahead to defeat the Taliban insurgency in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan, where a tolerable level of violence will likely still be experienced, but establishes the Afghan Government to cope with this violence. The proposal will

suggest a way forward, mitigating against a Coalition withdrawal, and allow the Afghan security forces to develop sufficiently in order to conduct unilateral task force operations.

The paper will firstly define some terms used in the context of insurgency; secondly, it will relate the Afghan insurgency to the wider global insurgency and Afghan and Pakistan border; thirdly, it will introduce socioeconomic and cultural issues that impact on the insurgency; fourthly, it will examine historical counterinsurgency campaigns to determine linkages between them and the Afghan campaign. Finally, the paper will propose a way ahead using a typical campaign plan to show what additional tenets are necessary and what extra focus is crucial to defeat the insurgency. To illustrate classical insurgency tactics of the First World War have changed little from more contemporary tactics an overview of the philosophies adopted in each will be analysed.

The Classical Insurgency

In Lawrence's memoirs of his time in the desert, he wrote that insurgents require three guiding principles to deny an opponent victory: time, space and will.⁵ Through the use of these principles the insurgent does not need to win: he only needs not to lose. These guiding principles apply as much in contemporary warfare as they did in Lawrence's epoch.

Time for the insurgent is about convincing their opponent that the insurgency will last indefinitely, as few nation states are willing to commit to a prolonged war. Lawrence constantly harassed the Turkish lines and eventually the Turks had to withdraw from the desert regions for fear of becoming completely isolated from their logistic bases. This was also observed in Vietnam during the French and, soon after, United States campaigns

⁵T.E. Lawrence, "Seven Pillars of...", 193-202, 231-3, 345-8.

to stem the spread of communism and during the colonial secessionists' wars in Africa and Southern Arabia.

Insurgents require safe havens, or space to operate from, indeed, a sanctuary from where operations can be planned in relative safety and then allow them to strike at whim. The deserts of Arabia provided Lawrence his space: his sanctuary. He also had sanctuary using the border of a neighbouring country. However, in the modern era sanctuaries can also exist in the virtual realm: the internet, banking systems and media.⁶ Finally, to complete the arrangement the insurgent requires will: the will to succeed versus the will to resist. The insurgent more often is on the offensive and the nation state is on a defensive or containment footing. The will of the people is a consideration by both the insurgents and the state: the state requires the peoples' support to defeat the insurgents, whereas the insurgents can easily erode this by offensive action and terror.

The Taliban insurgency, presently gripping Eastern and Southern Afghanistan, is primarily a Pashtun led insurgency. This is where the Taliban find their will. The insurgency straddles the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and although the majority of the fighting conducted by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the United States led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is on the Afghan side, Pakistan bears much of the burden too. Since 2001, over 700 Pakistani military have been killed in the Northwest Frontier province of Pakistan.⁷ This area of Pakistan is where the insurgents have their space. This insurgency is complex and, although historically insurgency defeat requires 10 to 15 years, western governments operate from an election

⁶United States, Department of Army, *Army Counterinsurgency Handbook*, (New York: Skyhorse, 2007), 1-16.

cycle and a typical time line of between three to five years is more typical of the tenure available for counterinsurgency forces to attempt to defeat an insurgency.⁸ This provides the insurgent's their time. Prior to delving further into this, some discussion is necessary to define exactly what an insurgency is and how it may be different from the present War on Terror label attached to it.

Distinguish between Terrorists and Insurgents

The terminology of terrorist and insurgent have been used interchangeably in the recent War on Terror. In fact there could be some confusion as to what the current anti-coalition fighter in Afghanistan could be considered. Are they terrorists, insurgents or are they a combination of the two? The dichotomy between the two is significant and requires some discourse, as the essence of the problem is linked to this issue: does the Coalition fight a counter terrorist war or a counter insurgency war?

O'Niell defined terrorism as, "...the threat or use of physical coercion, primarily against non-combatants, especially civilians, to create fear in order to achieve various political objectives."⁹ Terrorists are seen generally as a few atypical individuals who are disaffected from society, such as the European terrorists of the 1970s.¹⁰ The use of the word terrorists created a level of legitimacy for any national government coping with terrorists, indeed; it conjured up images of bombers and assassins who would stop at naught to achieve their aims. This imagery also allowed for a commensurate response

⁷ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (New York, London & Toronto: Simon & Schuster Inc, 2006), 272.

⁸The successful insurgencies examined later in this paper typically took between 10 to 15 years for stabilisation. The Conservative Government of Canada demonstrated this with the decision in late 2007 to pull out of Afghanistan in December 2011.

⁹Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*. (Dulles: Potomac, 2005), 33.

¹⁰David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism," (Australian Army paper, Canberra and Washington D.C. 2004), 12.

from governments when dealing with these same terrorists. Tighter laws were frequently introduced, such as State of Emergency Laws of Northern Ireland, and law enforcement agencies were allowed a reasonably *laissez-faire* hand when dealing with terrorists than when compared to dealing with criminals.¹¹

O'Neill suggests an insurgency is different from terrorism because when referring to violence it is, "...purposeful rather than mindless violence..."¹² Insurgents, unlike terrorists, occupy a space where they are perceived as representing a more generalist view of the local population where they find sanctuary. The insurgency wars of the post Second World War era were examples where the colonial powers refused to relinquish authority to the local population. Insurgents, like terrorists in this case, conduct illegitimate acts of violence against the national authority or government. These acts are generally considered socially unacceptable, but often the reasons for the acts are considered legitimate, such as the 1970s-1990s African National Congress campaign to overthrow the White Minority Government in South Africa or the Mujahedin campaign to oust the Russian backed Afghan Government of the 1980s. More often than not, the insurgent approach is to use controlled violence, measured against public support that transcends mere military and police attrition but also includes a political and economic attrition. In essence, the insurgent seeks to erode the will of the government to continue the war on a number of fronts, politically, militarily, and psychologically.

In Afghanistan the current campaign being waged by the Taliban is best characterised as an insurgency, rather than terrorism. Despite this, the Taliban utilise

¹¹David Benest, "Aden to Northern Ireland, 1966-76" in *Big Wars and Small Wars: the British army and the lessons of war in the twentieth century* ed. Hew Strachan, 115-145 (London: New York: Routledge, 2006), 117.

terrorism in pursuit of their insurgency goals. Nevertheless, it has been argued by some that the entire War on Terror would be better termed as a global counterinsurgency.¹³ In the localised Afghan theatre, the Taliban are conducting a campaign that is not completely focused on the ruin of the coalition militarily: it also includes economic, development and diplomacy components. This is demonstrated by the Taliban's desire to often thwart infrastructure reconstruction, to control the poppy crops and to have an influence in the local jirgas and shuras. The Taliban have recognised that success in the Afghan theatre will need to transcend mere military objectives.

There is a sizable portion (26%) of the Pashtun population who support the ideals of the Taliban and generally speaking the Taliban attempts to avoid civilian casualties by attacking Coalition forces directly.¹⁴ Nevertheless, some recent suicide bombings in Kandahar Province would suggest otherwise. The Taliban has demonstrated a clear ability at identifying their centre of gravity – the support of the Pashtun tribe. In dealing with an insurgency, it is crucial to deal with the cause of the problem, rather than focusing on the destruction of the insurgents. Modern and classical counterinsurgency doctrine is applicable in Afghanistan, especially when compared against Lawrence's three guidelines for the conduct of a successful insurgency: space, time and will. It is important to distinguish between different types of insurgency, as the cause of the insurgency and the solution necessary stems from the ability to correctly diagnose the problem.

¹²Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism...*, 34.

¹³David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency:...", 14.

Type of Insurgency

According to Bard O'Neill's categorisation of insurgents, the Taliban would be most appropriately labelled as a traditionalist insurgent movement, although some linkages to egalitarians and preservationists exist.¹⁵ Traditionalists and egalitarians are revolutionary in their approach, as they seek to change an existing status quo but in the Afghan case, since the Taliban regime is still recently imprinted on the populations psyche, the preservationist model also applies.¹⁶

Traditionalists are those insurgent groups who espouse the virtues of sacred values based on ancestral ties and religion. Furthermore, they seek to position political power in a ruling core group or, as is more often the case, an individual, supported by a military, economic and clerical elite with limited political participation by the remainder of the population. Nevertheless, some local political level representation is allowed but kept fairly controlled, which would be representative of the past Taliban regime.¹⁷

Egalitarians seek to bring about a new order, which is restored through a centrally controlled structure with distributed equality. The population of southern and eastern Afghanistan seek a system, akin to the Pashunwali tribal philosophy, where all people are equal as they currently feel dispossessed and disenfranchised with the erosion of their culture and safety. This egalitarian insurgency type was popular during the post Second World War colonial wars of liberation, such as the Malayan emergency. Notably, however, often the insurgents modify their egalitarian rhetoric on gaining power and a more repressive and authoritarian regime develops than existed during the struggle. This

¹⁴ Environics Research Group, "2007 Survey of Afghans," http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653; Internet; accessed 19 March 2008.

¹⁵ Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism...*, 20-7.

was demonstrated subsequent to the Baath Party gaining control in Iraq and Mugabe's rule in Zimbabwe.¹⁸ This desire for a new order is not a recent aberration, as the Pashunwali code was the guiding philosophy until the collapse of the Taliban in October 2001. Potentially, the more closely aligned insurgency is the preservationist type, so as to reclaim a way of life that was cemented in the border regions until the Taliban demise.

Preservationist types are concerned with maintaining the status quo (*ante bellum*), keeping their social, economic and political privileges and as such the present Taliban insurgency is not quite captured in this definition. Nevertheless, in areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan the Taliban assumes that it still has control, albeit discreetly, and this type of insurgency must be examined. More importantly, should the Taliban achieve some level of future political involvement then the post conflict trends associated with the various insurgencies would likely be manifested.¹⁹

The conclusion is that the Taliban do not correspond into any one particular type of insurgency and therefore require a distinct campaign plan. Additionally, the problem of insurgent groups presenting more than one message or changing goals has manifested in Afghanistan.

Changing Goals and Mixed Messages

The changing goals and messages of any insurgency will always present a dilemma to the nation state. The Taliban have not clearly stated their aims and objectives through one unified message and on several occasions the goals have been changed. This was evidenced during the Korean Hostage catastrophe in July 2007, where differing

¹⁶Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism...*, 20.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 20.

demands and conditions were being expressed by the different Taliban groups in negotiations with the Korean and Afghan governments.²⁰

A Taliban spokesman, Qari Yousuf Ahmadi, who claims to speak for the kidnapers, said that a hostage was killed because the government had not agreed to an initial release of eight Taliban prisoners in exchange for eight Koreans. [subsequently the Taliban then stated that it] . . . was running out of patience and would start to kill hostages if the government did not meet demands for 23 Taliban prisoners to be released and South Korean troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan.²¹

It was further highlighted when Gulbuddin Hekmatyar the Hizb-i-Islami' leader and Qari Yousef Ahmadi a Taliban spokesman, stated differing views on what would bring them to the negotiating table.²² In a recent media survey of 42 Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan differing views were expressed. Most claimed that their main goal was a return to a stricter Islamic government in Afghanistan, while others alleged that they were involved in poppy production and the Coalition had targeted their livelihood, yet others, about a third, claimed revenge as a motive stating that Coalition air strikes had killed family members.²³ Many of the Afghan population view the Taliban as disparate groups also.²⁴

¹⁹Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism...*, 28.

²⁰Editorial, "Korean hostages leave Afghanistan," *Al Jeezra English News*; <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/814A7593-A11F-44A2-BDB2-1B5AE1E3BEC3.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

²¹Carlotta Gall, "Taliban Kill South Korean Hostage as Demands Go Unmet," *New York Times*; <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/26/world/asia/26afghan.html?fta=y>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

²²Graeme Smith, "What the increasingly confident Taliban want in exchange for peace." *Globe and Mail*; http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/Page/document/v5/content/subscribe?user_URL=http://www.theglobeandmail.com%2Fservlet%2Fstory%2FRTGAM.20070912.wafghanmain12%2FBNSStory%2FAfghanistan%2F&ord=73753973&brand=theglobeandmail&force_login=true; Internet; accessed 12 Sept 2007; Hizb-i-Islami is the largest band of fighters that aligns itself with the Taliban and conducts insurgent operations in Pashtunistan.

²³Graeme Smith, "Portrait of the enemy," *Globe and Mail*, 22 March 2008, A16.

²⁴Enviro-nics Research Group, "2007 Survey of Afghans..."

Table 1: Afghan Population's View of the Taliban

<i>Taliban best described as</i>		
	National	Kandahar
Divided into factions that do not agree on important issues	35	43
A united political force	29	14
Neither / Other	23	20
Don't Know / No Answer	12	23

Source: Environics Research Group, 2007.

Overall, the mixed messages on the Taliban and other like minded groups in Afghanistan will create additional problems for the Coalition if negotiations between belligerents are to be conducted.

Summary

The insurgency in Afghan environment was defined as a political struggle where military means is subordinate, where measurement of defeat of an insurgency is subjective. It is more qualitative than quantitative, and when linked to the type of insurgency it is also apparent that the Taliban do not meld nicely into any of O'Neill's groups, rather, they could be viewed as an amalgamation of several groups where no template is evident on how to deal with them. This dilemma presents as many difficulties as pinning down the Taliban's demands.

Identifying the Taliban and other insurgents' demands will be necessary for any progress to be made in countering the insurgency and eventually conducting negotiations with the various actors. However, as a general rule there seems to be one thread that comes through all discussions, and it was quite clearly articulated by Qari Yousef Ahmadi when he stated, "If they want to talk, we have two demands: All foreign troops

must leave, and we must have an Islamic democracy in Afghanistan."²⁵ This demand is not dissimilar to demands articulated in other theatres; undeniably, Afghanistan is one of many regional theatres where insurgent behaviour and terrorism have found a supportive public ear. To understand Afghanistan, first an understanding of other theatres is necessary.

²⁵Graeme Smith, "What the increasingly confident Taliban...."

CHAPTER TWO – WIDER INVOLVEMENT

Introduction

The majority of Taliban who were surveyed for Smith's 2008 *Globe and Mail* article stated that they were not fighting in any global 'jihad'. Furthermore, they showed a remarkable lack of knowledge on world events and, even more disturbingly, Afghanistan's recent history. Indeed, it appeared that the previous Afghan conflicts may have been romanticised creating an attractive proposition for young men to follow the way of the warrior, still, this is the foot soldiers view and the higher levels within the Taliban ranks would surely be keen for their cause to gain leverage from United States and Coalition setbacks elsewhere in the world.²⁶

To understand the Taliban and, to a larger extent, where al Qaeda's position in the global insurgency is situated some examination is necessary of the other theatres currently active in the world. Kilcullen suggests that the global insurgency is linked and requires a comprehensive approach to create the conditions necessary for its defeat.²⁷ This paper only seeks to outline the requirements necessary for the defeat of the Afghan insurgency; nevertheless, a wider perspective is necessary.


International Insurgencies

The global pattern of militant Islamist movements has its roots in distinct regional areas of operation, rather than through a coordinated global milieu. Al Qaeda is the body that provides the ideology for these regions and it is generally accepted that most regions have quite distinct approaches to their observance of al Qaeda's ideology, or narrative, and conduct of tactical operations. Indeed, al Qaeda is more so a guiding approach to the

²⁶Graeme Smith, "Portrait of the enemy," ..., A16.

conduct of activities and within this fundamental Islamist organisation the complexity is difficult to unravel. To understand the complexity of the situation and the notion that one gigantic structure could not control the global fundamental Islamist movement, a general outline of the global theatres will be listed. This list will allow for some contextual balancing to be achieved and is aligned along the United States Command Areas as determined in 2002.²⁸ Figure 2 highlights the areas on a global map.

Figure 2. United States Military Unified Commands



Source: Generic Mapping Tools, Hawaii

< NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. The Americas, including Canada and the South American continent, represent a theatre where the defining attack took place. The attack on the economic heart of New York on September 2001 resulted in the world changing and

²⁷Kilcullen, David, "Countering Global Insurgency:...", 12.

²⁸Center for Defense Information – US Military Commands, <http://www.cdi.org/issues/USForces/commands.html>; Internet; accessed 18 March 2008.

the War on Terror being declared by the President of the United States.²⁹ Although continental United States is not directly involved in any insurgency activity, the United States is the major target for the fundamental Islamists and this was highlighted by Osama bin Laden on 23 February 1998, when he declared war on the United States and its allies. In this avowal, bin Laden stated,

. . . in compliance with Allah's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies - civilian and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which is it possible to do it. . .³⁰

This announcement singled out America and its allies as permissible targets throughout the world.

◁ EUCOM. Western Europe, other than London and Madrid, has been relatively immune to the major attacks that have beset other regions. This is not to say that these regions do not have their share of underground groups who facilitate fundraising and provide education and training to their fellow fundamental Islamists. Also, Western Europe and its more liberal democratic political systems have afforded the fundamental Islamists with a means of isolating Europe from the United States and any major terror activities conducted in the region would further cement this relationship. Indeed, London and Madrid were key allies in Operation Iraqi Freedom and OEF and it could be reasoned that both attacks occurred as a result of those two countries physical and political support for the Iraq and Afghan wars. Southern Russia (together with the Caucasus) has been engulfed in a fundamental Islamist insurgency since the fall of the Union of Soviet

²⁹President George Bush, speech, 15 Sept 2001; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915.html>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2008.

³⁰ Editorial, Al-Quds al-Arabi (London Arabic newspaper), <http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/fatw2.htm>, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2008.

Socialist Republics (USSR). Primarily, this has been manifested in the Chechen War, but has also seen a fundamental Islamist infiltration into Azerbaijan and Georgia. These wars were initially nationalist, but through religious linkages al Qaeda was co-opted to assist and the nationalists' cause were subjugated.

< CENTCOM and AFRICOM. North-eastern Africa is linked to the Middle East regional cells. It was from Yemen that several attacks against the United States emanated. In a speech in December 2002, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) claimed that the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were the responsibility of Ali Qaeda Sunain al-Harithi who lived in Yemen and was, "al Qa'ida's operations chief for the Persian Gulf", furthermore, he added that al-Harithi had "helped plan. . . the attack on USS Cole in 2000."³¹ There is evidence that al Qaeda has a presence in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan.³²

The Middle East, more locally defined as Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and Syria is the most active area. It was the Western encroachment of this area that bin Laden was referring to when he issued his fatwa,

The Arabian Peninsula has never -- since Allah made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it with seas -- been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations.³³

The level of activity in this region is by far the most potent. Indeed, many of the terror activities conducted in the rest of the world originate from this region. The Yemeni cell

³¹George Tenant, speech, 11 December 2002 [speech on-line]; available from https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2002/dci_speech_12112002.html; Internet; accessed 9 November 2007.

³²Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, "Knowledge Base Directory: Countries / Areas," <http://www.tkb.org/Category.jsp?catID=10860>; Internet; accessed 19 March 2008.

has already been discussed and the majority of the New York bombers on September 2001 were from Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, there is still no governing body that dictates the overall campaign from this region. In Iraq, the continuing insurgency against the United States led Coalition has only eased the as a result of the surge operation of mid 2007 and negotiations with the Sunni leadership. In many instances the Sunnis are now providing their own security in villages and rural areas. Despite this reduction in violence against Coalition troops, the Shia and Sunni terror cells are still at war with each other but at a reduced level.³⁴

Central Asia, including Afghanistan, was the principle al Qaeda sanctuary until shortly after September 2001, when the United States invaded Afghanistan. Al Qaeda also found fertile ground in the border regions of Pakistan, where the Pashtun tribe predominate and Pakistan's authority is uncertain due to the autonomy of the Northwest Frontier Province. Additionally, Pakistan is listed near the top (12) on the Failed States Index for 2007, which, as one of the measures, indicates a reduced capacity to deal with security.³⁵ India, as a result of the Kashmir situation, has also found minor flare ups with regard to fundamental Islamists. The Stans, of the former USSR, and China have also witnessed their fair share of activity and insurgencies.

< PACOM. South East Asia has been dominated by Jemaah Islamiyah, which has operated in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah is linked to al Qaeda and cross training with al Qaeda cells in Afghanistan occurred prior to September

³³Editorial, Al-Quds al-Arbic (London Arabic newspaper),
<http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/fatw2.htm>,
<http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>

2001. Indeed, the Bali Bombing, although carried out by Jemaah Islamiyah, was linked to al Qaeda. Jemaah Islamiyah, like Hezbollah, has regional and global Islamic aspirations. Jemaah Islamiyah's endstate would see a pan-Asia Islamic zone. The Abu Sayyaf Group has been linked to numerous activities in the Philippines and southern Malaysia and allegedly is connected to Jemaah Islamiyah.³⁶

Overall, the fundamental Islamist global insurgency activities vary from region to region. Only central Asia, South East Asia and the Middle East have ongoing insurgencies, involving PACOM and CENTCOM; however, the other regions are occasionally the theatre for terror activity which has a disproportionate effect on the global and, particularly, Western psyche. Terror tactics leave a lasting impression on the memory of the public.

Solving the Afghanistan insurgency, as part of a global initiative, will close a major sanctuary and training ground for fundamental Islamists. This, however, is only one part of the sanctuary puzzle in the region, as Pakistan's border area offers al Qaeda and the Taliban the sanctuary once freely available in Afghanistan.

The Afghan/Pakistan border (The Durand Line of 1893)

The Durand Line, created by Sir Mortimer Durand, a representative of the British-Indian Government in 1893, currently marks the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan (See Figure 1) but it is contested by Afghanistan.³⁷ Since then the Line has

³⁵Editorial, "The Failed States Index 2007," *The Fund for Peace and the Foreign Policy magazine*, (July/August 2007), 57.

³⁶Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism Database; <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=204>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

³⁷Amin Tarzi, "The Durand Line – From imagination to an international border," *Global Security – Afghan Report*, vol 2, No. 28 (7 August 2003): <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/08/28-070803.htm>; Internet; accessed 19 March 2008.

created many problems, including being instrumental in the ongoing bitter relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan due to Afghanistan's challenge to the Line's legitimacy.³⁸ These matters have spilled over into confrontations at the border between troops, embassy invasions and demonstrations in Kabul.³⁹ Secondly, is the notion that this border created what Lawrence termed 'space' for the Taliban and has provided them with the requirements of sanctuary and sponsorship from the Northwestern Frontier Provincial.

The Durand Line, although cutting through the Pashtun tribal lands has been in existence for over one hundred years, and was signed in good faith by the British and the then Afghan Amir, Abdur Rheman. Despite this good faith, the Amir would have been at a disadvantage when dealing with the might of the British Empire and, either implicitly or explicitly, this Empire's influence would have been exerted. The border created a large buffer between the Indian colony and the Russian empire in Central Asia. In 1947, following the granting of independence to India by the British and the creation of Pakistan, Afghanistan claimed that the Durand Line did not represent Afghanistan's borders. Afghanistan stated that the Pashtun tribal areas on the southern side of the Durand Line, which lay in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, should be ceded to Afghanistan. Despite claims by Afghanistan officials that the agreement was signed under duress by the Amir, all evidence points out that the Amir, as well as Durand, were satisfied with the negotiations that contributed to the agreement. The Amir, in his memoirs, mentions that, "I thank God for bring about friendly relations that now existed

³⁸Ahto Lobjakas, "Afghanistan: Kabul Sharing Intelligence With Pakistan, NATO," *Radio Free Europe* <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2007/intell-070124-rferl01.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

between the two governments and putting them on a closer footing than they had been before.”⁴⁰ Sir Mortimer recalls that the Amir gave a speech where, “After each period of his speech, there were shouts of ‘Approved, Approved’ on this occasion he was a great orator.”⁴¹

The notion that the agreement is not valid, based on duress at time of signing, is difficult to prove, as the signing parties both agreed in separate memoirs that the ceremony post the signing was a fancy affair where everyone was satisfied with the outcome. Under International Law the border is valid and as such Afghan claims to the contrary will be difficult to sustain, even if the British Empire was exercising power over the Amir. However many Pashtun still claim the tribal areas inside should be reunited with Afghanistan.⁴² In essence, despite Pakistan’s claims that the border is valid, international arbitration such as through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) may be needed to solve the border dispute.

Of more concern, and despite the 1947 claim, the Pashtun tribes that straddle the border areas have continued to operate as though there were no border. The maintenance of trade links between the tribal areas astride the border has continued unabated as has the passage of people. This porosity of the border continues today, despite attempts by Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Coalition to stem this flow of people and materials. The portion of the line that dissects the Pashtun’s land is significant and is currently not able to be policed. The free tribal areas of Northwestern Pakistan allow fighters to recoup,

³⁹Editorial, *Dawn* (Karachi), 9 July 2003, <http://www.dawn.com/2003/07/09/top1.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2008.

⁴⁰Professor Ralph Baribanti, *Durand Line*, (Duke University Library), 7.

⁴¹Sir Perry Sykes, *Sir Mortimer Durand* (London: Cassell, 1956), 217.

⁴²Graeme Smith, “Portrait of the enemy,” *Globe and Mail*, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/talkingtothetaliban>; Internet; accessed 27 March 2008.

receive medical attention, conduct training, live with their families during the rest months and, most importantly, avoid harassment from Afghan and Coalition security forces. The sanctuary allows them to plan and develop new tactics, techniques and procedures for subsequent operations in Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Right now the border is not policed adequately, and sealing of the border will allow for a more stable environment in South-eastern Afghanistan. It may also stifle trade in the region, as discrete smugglers' routes and more predictable border crossing posts will require surveillance and a quick reaction capability to interdict insurgents and supporters. Typically, the insurgents and support resources are channeled through the more discreet crossing points; nevertheless, sealing more routine crossing points is also necessary, as bulkier items, such as heavy weapons and ammunition, are moved through this means. Afghan border police supported by ISAF personnel are capable of this task, while ISAF, or OEF personnel will be required for the more environmentally challenging crossing points in mountainous regions.

Summary

The international insurgency in relation to Afghanistan is interesting and when aligned with the United States Unified Command regions, it can be seen that the CENTCOM, and to a lesser degree PACOM and AFRICOM areas have been, and will remain, challenging for the United States and its allies. Overall though, the notion of a global jihad through a global insurgency does not appear to bear out in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda and the Taliban appear to have lost some alignment and Taliban spokespersons are always pointing out that no foreign fighters are currently in Afghanistan.

Despite the denial of foreign fighters, several sanctuaries exist in the vicinity of Southeastern Afghanistan where foreign fighters have found 'space'; in particular this is Pakistan's Northwest Tribal Frontier Province.⁴³ The border drawn up in 1893 is legally binding and Afghanistan must either relinquish claim on the territory or seek international arbitration, likely through the UN and ICJ, to assist in solving the issue. More importantly, the border must be restricted to fighters and the movement of resources that feed the insurgency in Afghanistan. The global and regional aspects of terrorism are important to understand the Afghan problem, however, equally important is the cultural issues so as an appreciation of the Pashtun societal complexity is possible.


⁴³David Rohde, "Foreign Fighters of Harsher Bent Bolster Taliban," *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/30/world/asia/30afghan.html>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

CHAPTER THREE – SOUTHEASTERN AFGHAN CULTURAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

Modern Afghanistan is defined by the tribal mix that permeates the countryside, as demonstrated in Figure 3. No where is this more defined than in southern and eastern Afghanistan, where Pashtun culture overshadows government authority and the rule of law. Pashtun culture is dictated by a common law, a set of values, a code and a manner of living termed Pashtunwali. It dominates the social connections in southern and eastern Afghanistan and for any solution to the present insurgency to be achieved a comprehensive understanding of the Pashtunwali methodology is crucial.

Figure 3. Map of regional ethnic groups



Source: GlobalSecurity.org

Figure 3 also depicts the tribal areas extending beyond Afghanistan's borders and highlights the difficulty of dealing solely within Afghanistan to solve the present insurgency by the Taliban. A solution to defeat the insurgency must involve Pakistan, as the Pashtun tribal lands where Pashtunwali is practiced, extend towards Islamabad.

Pashtunwali

Pashtunwali is a series of tenets on how a Pashtun must live. These tenets define how the tribe interacts and provides guidelines for normative behaviours in living a Pashtun lifestyle. The number of tenets differs depending on the particular source utilised; nevertheless, Strickland provided a pragmatic list and the series listed below is indicative of Pashtunwali and provides a background for analysis.⁴⁴ The tenets apply equally to males and females and are generally accepted as: ghayrat/nang, or bravery; badal, or revenge; melmastia, or hospitality; pirdah, or gender differences; namus, or face/honour; and shura, or council.⁴⁵ These tenets form the basis of the Pashtun 'way of life' and although some historical evidence suggests that the same principles existed in the 17th Century these tenets are equally as important to modern Pashtun existence. By examining each one in some detail, an analysis of Pashtunwali is possible.

Bravery. The tenet of nang, or bravery, is central to Pashtunwali, as young Pashtun boys have it reinforced in them that actions on the battlefield define a man.⁴⁶ The use of the battlefield to display honour and gain respect, also assumes that those involved act in a proper soldierly fashion, by not attacking civilians and when spoils are available

⁴⁴Major Richard Tod Strickland, "The way of the Pashtun: Pashtunwali," in *The Canadian Army Journal*, 10.3 (Fall 2007), 47.

⁴⁵ John Griffiths, *Afghanistan: A History of Conflict* (London: Carlton Books, 2001), 66.

⁴⁶ David Edwards, *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 162-163.

they must be distributed evenly.⁴⁷ The Qur'an also suggests displays of honour are required of the warrior, especially on the battlefield:

O you who believe! when you meet those who disbelieve marching for war, then turn not your backs to them. And whoever shall turn his back to them on that day-- unless he turn aside for the sake of fighting or withdraws to a company-- then he, indeed, becomes deserving of Allah's wrath, and his abode is hell; and an evil destination shall it be.⁴⁸

Indeed, the notion of equal distribution of war spoils also touches on the egalitarian nature of the Pashtun tribal system: all people are considered equal and no-one has the right to establish superiority over another member of the tribe.

< Revenge. This tenet is a key attribute of the Pashtunwali code, as it defines a men's, or families' and sub-tribes', ability to maintain respect and honour. An offended party who did not react to an insult, in essence, communicates to the rest of the tribe that they do not deserve any respect or honour. Interestingly, the act of revenge must be in proportion to the insult received. The Qur'an also stipulates limits to revenge:

And fight in the cause of Allah with those who fight with you, and do not exceed the limits, surely Allah does not love those who exceed the limits. And kill them wherever you find them, and drive them out...⁴⁹

In Pashtunwali this act of revenge is decided by the tribal council or shura.

< Hospitality. This tenet has several layers within Pashtun society, as it not only involves hospitality but also sanctuary and, in a peculiar form of chivalry, it also includes

⁴⁷Bernt Glatzer, "Being Pashtun – Being Muslim: Concepts of Person and War in Afghanistan." *Essays on South Asian Society: Culture and Politics II*, (Berlin: Das Arabische, 1998), 4: http://www.wardak.de/tribes/being_pashtun.pdf; Internet; accessed 24 February 2008.

⁴⁸Qur'an 8:15, quoted in Compendium of Muslim Texts, University of Southern California, <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/notislam/misconceptions.html>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

⁴⁹Qur'an 2:190, quoted in Compendium of Muslim Texts, University of Southern California, <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/notislam/misconceptions.html>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

affording asylum to a vanquished foe.⁵⁰ Hospitality transcends the gender separation of the culture. This tenet of the code is a physical component and manifests itself, not only in the social niceties of being polite to guests, but through feeding them, caring for them and, if necessary, defending them and their property from others, including other Pashtuns. This notion of hospitality and sanctuary affords the host greater honour especially if the host's participation is generally acknowledged, with the larger the number of networks the greater the influence. This tenet generally extends to providing criminals, indeed anyone, sanctuary if they request it. Those afforded sanctuary could be Pashtuns, Hazarns, Tajiks or any of the Afghan tribes. The key aspect is that once provided hospitality the guest is assumed to be under the protection of the host and great loss of honour will result should the guest be harmed. As Pakistani Colonel Mohammad Effendi states in a National Geographic article in 2004,

Anyone who hands Bin Laden over to the Americans might be 25 million dollars richer in reward money, but the disgrace would hang over this person, along with his family, clan and tribe for many generations. Whoever betrays him, why, his life wouldn't be worth an onion.⁵¹

Lastly and an area that, although not related to the insurgency, requires highlighting due to its complexity and closeness to the gender aspects of Pashtun society, is the termination of blood feuds. Female guests, once accepted into the host's care, can request that blood feuds be terminated. Also, females can sidestep marriage to someone who they do not desire, by being accepted into another male's house. However, this then

⁵⁰Tim McGirk, "On bin Laden's Trail," *National Geographic*, <http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/print/features/world/asia/pakistan/pashtun-text>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

⁵¹*Ibid.*

obliges the male host to marry the female, which if not handled correctly could set off another round of blood feuds between the female's family and the offended male.⁵²

< Gender. This aspect of the code is difficult to analyse, as few if any writings exist on the topic. Nonetheless, for completeness it is necessary to mention, as it confronts counterinsurgency efforts with many cultural, or moral, dilemmas. In some Pashtun areas the female is treated very liberally. The socioeconomic conditions and the geographic location of the sub-tribe dictate the severity of gender separation. In some areas females are not permitted to walk outside unless accompanied, while in other areas females may walk the street only while wearing a burkha. Each sub-tribal area is different and this is often a follow-on from the shura that sits in that particular area – some shuras are stricter and follow Sharia Law rather than deferring to the shura or jirga of the village. Prior to the United States invasion of Afghanistan, in late 2001, most females were excluded from the benefits of education, freedom of speech and health care; however, this was an extreme case. It is worth noting that, although they appear individually impotent to a Western eye, the Pashtun female when in council with other Pashtun females, such as at the water well, can wield a significant element of power.⁵³

< Face. This tenet is related to hospitality and revenge, as it deals with honour and respect. Overall, it is best categorised as saving face, and is very similar to South East Asian culture, where business deals are more often about everyone feeling comfortable with the deal as opposed to anyone walking away as the outright beneficiary.⁵⁴

⁵²Editorial, "The Pashtun's Tribal Code", *The Economist*, 19 December 2006.

⁵³The Pashtun Advocacy Network, "Pashtun Women," <http://pashtuns.org/aboutpushtun.html>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

⁵⁴Bernt Glatzer, "Being Pashtun – Being Muslim: . . . , 4: http://www.wardak.de/tribes/being_pashtun.pdf; Internet; accessed 24 February 2008.

Additionally, it refers to the notion that rumors must be curbed, particularly between males and females. It is this area where females appear to have their power base: male Pashtun appear very concerned that females will spread rumours and undermine a male's standing in society.

< Council – Shuras. A shura, which means consultation in Arabic or in some cases a jirga, is any council and is made up of the distinguished men from any particular area or village and requires that they all partake in Pashtunwali. Occasionally, females have been known to participate but this is more so at higher political levels and in larger cities. It is a system whereby each member of the shura contributes to a ruling, which impacts on the village or region where the shura sits. No votes are cast and this can place the better speakers at an advantage when delivering their particular concern. The better the speaker, or the more weight they hold in the society, the more profoundly they influence the outcome of the decision. It must be emphasized that this system is similar to that of a local government council in Western society. It deals with day to day issues on how people live their lives in a regional or village setting. The recent manifestation of the loya jirga (grand assembly or council) in Kabul as part of the national government is not representative of a typical shura. Furthermore, the regional shuras have no relationship with the loya jirga and as such there appears to be a dichotomy between national and regional levels. Does the loya jirga have influence over village shura – not presently, and until some measure of influence can be injected into the village shuras from the loya jirga the national government will have difficulty influencing at the regional level.

Underlying all these tenets is the sense of power in the tribal areas. This is difficult to define, but there is undoubtedly a hierarchy in each community, despite the

notion within Pashtunwali of an egalitarian society. Generally, the older and the more wealthy the man the more power they wield. This is fairly typical of most societies, but in the Pashtun tribal areas, due to the culture and a lack of rule of law, power has significant benefits.

Pashtunwali is a complex interrelated set of tenets that form a code of living for the Pashtun people. It is a way of life and has been in existence since before the spread of the Muslim religion into Pashtunistan. It presents many difficulties for Western Troops operating in the region, as the Pashtun people are a proud and historic ethnic group and any erosion of their culture and code will surely also see an increase in crime and other more Western type anti-social activities. Pashtunwali maintains a close affiliation with the more basic fundamentals of life, albeit it also created a sanctuary for terrorism. Osama bin Laden did not follow Pashtunwali, as he hailed from Yemen and, it could be suggested, he took advantage of the culture under the Pashtun's hospitality code.

Sharia law also has a strong influence in the village areas and often the two coexist, but there is also friction between Mullahs and village elders in steering rules for the village to abide by. Next an examination of Sharia will occur so as to understand Sharia and how it relates in the Pashtun areas.

Sharia Law

Sharia is religious law that is based upon the Qur'an and the work of Muslim scholars in the first two centuries of Islam. Sharia extends beyond just civil law and in a true Islamic State it is the law that supersedes all other laws. Applied fully, Sharia is a code for living for Muslims. Taken to its complete status it includes prayers, fasting and donations to the poor. Sharia is the totality of religious, political, social, domestic and

private life. Sharia is primarily meant for all Muslims, but applies to a certain extent also for people living inside a Muslim society, such as Westerners in the Middle East.

According to Mohammad Omar Farooq, there are 13 essential but general principles associated with Sharia and, although not an exhaustive list, it represents what all Muslims should aspire to live by.⁵⁵ Farooq's list of principles is below with amplification inserted after quotations:

◁ “Fundamental human dignity [each human as a human being, not an object].” Every human should be treated as an individual and not an item or possession. This appears to contradict some aspects of the Pashtunwali code, such as the hospitality and gender tenets, particularly when a guest seeks asylum from a former foe they are considered a prisoner, although this is never explicitly declared by the foe. Additionally, under Pashtunwali the females of a family are repressed by a sense of belonging to a man, likely their father, brother or husband.⁵⁶

◁ “Justice.” The Qur'an suggests that even-handedness in all things is necessary and unambiguous. The notion that Islam is not fair is an aberration founded in the behaviour of the Taliban prior to the United States invasion; without a doubt, the regular execution of Afghans for trivial crimes underscored this and was at odds with the Qur'an:

Nor take life - which Allah has made sacred - except for just cause. And if anyone is slain wrongfully, we have given his heir authority (to demand retaliation or to forgive): but let him not exceed bounds in the matter of taking life, for he is helped (by the Law).⁵⁷

⁵⁵Mohammad Omar Farooq, “Sharia Law and Islam,” (draft paper, Upper Iowa University, 2006).

⁵⁶The Pashtun Advocacy Network, “Pashtun Women,” <http://pashtuns.org/aboutpushtun.html>;....

⁵⁷Qur'an 17:33, quoted in Compendium of Muslim Texts, University of Southern California, <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/notislam/misconceptions.html#HEADING8>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

◁ “Equality [and non-discrimination].” In the non-spiritual world of humanity, all people are created equal. This is especially so in relation to the population’s rights pertaining to life, honour and material goods. Pashtunwali also covers these tenets and, in essence, suggests no one has superiority over others.

◁ “Freedom.” The basis of Sharia is founded on choice and not on intimidation, bullying, terror and any form of subjugation is not to be tolerated. Once again it can be observed that Taliban methods of coercion have no place in Sharia, nevertheless, through distortion of perceptions in the Pashtun areas this has been allowed to occur.

◁ “Universal moral values.” Sharia acknowledges the universality of good and evil of right and wrong: it allows for moral values to be stated despite cultural differences. This suggests that Taliban intolerance of local or Western cultural differences is not within Sharia, and again presents a deviation between Taliban rhetoric and Sharia. This presents opportunity as part of a ‘wedge’ campaign to split Taliban moderates and extremists.

◁ “Humanity-orientation and Global Belonging.” Sharia suggests that Muslims belong, at various levels, to different families. The family, the tribe, the nation, the Muslim faith and to humanity. Sharia intimates the concept that no conflict need arise with any of these levels and, in fact, in most cases the various levels can even be mutually supporting. There is a notion of alliance in this tenet, which could be leveraged for developing a national Afghan family.

◁ “Seeking common ground for good common causes.” In this Sharia principle, it is suggested that Muslims must try and concentrate on people’s similarities, rather than

focusing on what differentiates people. In that sense it is aligned to the humanity tenet and allows for similar notions of alliance or, more notably, negotiation.

“Rejection of violence as normal.” Violence in Sharia is only to be conducted within the constraints of self defence: Islam does not imply that violence is a way of life and, in particular, the concept of peace is to be promoted as the prevailing ideology.

Nevertheless, the Jihad concept is too often understood to be referring to war on behalf of Islam and is at odds with the rejection of violence ideal. However, the Qur’an states that this violence is still only permissible in self defence:

Permission to take up arms is hereby given to those who are attacked because they have been oppressed – Allah indeed has power to grant them victory – those who have been unjustly driven from their homes, only because they said: “Our Lord is Allah.”⁵⁸

Some argue that the contemporary Jihad is because Islam has been usurped by Western influences and it is a defensive campaign to re-establish the status quo. Another concept that fuels Jihad, especially suicide bombers, is:

Consider not those who are killed in the way of Allah as dead. Nay, they are alive with their Lord, and they will be provided for. They rejoice in what Allah has bestowed upon them of His bounty and rejoice for the sake of those who have not yet joined them, but are left behind [not yet martyred] that on them too no fear shall come, nor shall they grieve. They rejoice in a grace and a bounty from Allah, and that Allah will not waste the reward of the believers.⁵⁹

“Non-Judgmental.” Only Allah, in the afterlife, can judge members of humanity according to Sharia. However, normal daily rule of law activities do apply and Sharia allows for this. However, Pashtunwali appears to trump many aspects of the rule of law

⁵⁸Qur’an 22:39, quoted in Compendium of Muslim Texts, University of Southern California, <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/notislam/misconceptions.html>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

⁵⁹Qur’an 3:169, quoted in Compendium of Muslim Texts, University of Southern California, <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/notislam/misconceptions.html>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

and it would be fair to say that Sharia is subordinate to Pashtunwali, although this is more often done discreetly.

◁ “Rule of law.” Sharia, despite suggesting that only Allah can judge, is pragmatic and has defined several caveats for the application of the rule of law in modern society: firstly, it applies to everyone and should be formed on practical national laws; secondly, the courts must be autonomous and not linked to the state; thirdly, law enforcement is also autonomous and non-partisan; and finally, criminal and civil disagreement should not involve violence and, in most cases, would be determined through the courts, political apparatus or the shura. This correlates with the negotiation theme mentioned in previously.

◁ “Representation and participation.” Discussions through the council process, or *shura*, are an essential practice within Islam. It can be observed that the *shura* process has been incorporated into Pashtunwali and some leverage could be achieved in this principle to use Sharia and Pashtunwali for negotiations between the belligerents in the current insurgency.

◁ “Emphasis on substance over form.” This principle underscores the importance of value and spirit, rather than the focus being on the form or the physical aspects of an activity. It would appear that, in some areas at least, form has subordinated substance. Spirit, or value, has been estranged from form. Examples of this are the Taliban censoring the use of televisions, radios and other forms of media as they were deemed evil, yet conducting kidnapping and executions.

◁ “Embracing life-experience as part of our collective learning curve.” Sharia suggests that Muslims need to embrace all aspects of the world, “And one of His signs is

the creation of the heavens and the earth and the diversity of your tongues and colors; most surely there are signs in this for the learned.”⁶⁰ The use of texts should be complemented with actively engaged learning.

These principles have precedence when conflict occurs with any other source of Islamic lawful ruling, such as the Hadith.⁶¹ Furthermore, these laws and principles must not be incorporated in a myopic way: they need to be viewed holistically. Since these principles are Qur’an based principles, laws must not violate or compromise such principles, without undeniable evidence to the contrary.

The 13-principles listed above are generic and applies in all aspects of Islamic life. Farooq further defines the application of where Sharia Law can be applied as:

Rules for worship;
 Rules for social interactions;
 Rules for economic interactions;
 Rules for political interactions;
 Rules for propagation of Islam;
 Rules for Jihad (war);
 Rules for punishments;
 Rules for edibles; and
 Muslim etiquette and Islamic symbols.
 Rules regarding Oaths⁶²

As can be seen this is an extensive list and the application of Sharia law to each aspect of the list is more often open to interpretation by the particular Sharia court presiding or the individual endeavoring to live within the law. To call it a law would be restrictive, rather

⁶⁰Qur’an 30:22, quoted in Compendium of Muslim Texts, University of Southern California, <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/030.qmt.html#030.022>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

⁶¹The term Hadith is mentioned in Britannica Encyclopaedia as a ‘record of the traditions or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, revered and received as a major source of religious law and moral guidance, second only to the authority of the Qur’an or scripture of Islam. It might be defined as the biography of Muhammad perpetuated by the long memory of his community for their exemplification and obedience. The development of Hadith is a vital element during the first three centuries of Islamic history, and its study provides a broad index to the mind and ethos of Islam.’

⁶²Mohammad Omar Farooq, “Sharia Law and Islam...”

it is a set of guidelines from which Muslim people live their lives. There includes an element of human interpretation and the application of Sharia law by the Taliban prior to the 2001 invasion by the United States coalition was a harsh interpretation of “proper” Sharia law. Indeed, the regime trivialised Islam by punishing people, both male and female, for minor acts such as males not growing a beard or females exposing the ankles. Today, Afghanistan is endeavoring to incorporate Islamic law within its constitution; however, some debate exists as to the depth of Islam wording.

In Afghanistan’s constitution, except for the inclusion of Articles 1-3, there is limited mention of Sharia law. Additionally, the concept of sovereignty being granted to the people, rather than to Allah, symbolises the Afghan State as more secular than Islamic.⁶³ This is one of the grievances that the Taliban emphasise.⁶⁴ A proper Islamic state has Sharia law elevated to be the source of all laws in that country and, with Afghanistan maintaining a more secular approach to jurisprudence, the Taliban and aligned groups believe legislative change is necessary. If, however, Article 3 is analysed, “no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of Islam”, it is immediately apparent that, although appearing secular at first brush, the constitution is in fact adhering to the Sharia philosophy which would allow conservative Muslims to interpret many outcomes from this. Finally, in relation to the constitution, the president and the vice-president must both be Muslims and it clearly states that all political parties must conform to, “...the principle of the sacred religion of Islam.”⁶⁵

⁶³Republic of Afghanistan, Draft Constitution, <http://www.11aa.com/newdraft.html>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2007.

⁶⁴Graeme Smith, “What the increasingly confident Taliban...”

⁶⁵Amin Tarzi, “Assessing the draft constitution: Presidential powers and the role of religion,” Global Security – Afghan Report, vol 2, No. 39 (6 November 2003):

Another aspect is the schism between Sunni and Shia and the application of Sharia law to both parties. The majority of Afghans are Sunni and there would need to be debate in relation to which branch of Sharia law should be applied. Also, in small pockets of the population, slightly less than 10 %, there are still Buddhist and other religions that require representation.

Distinct religious groups have bestowed Afghanistan with several issues that require almost an ethereal solution. Other issues in Afghanistan are more tangible and provide a positive stimulus to the insurgency, such as poppy production. Consequently any solution to the insurgency will need to involve solving the material and financial support afforded by the illegal narcotics trade.

Drugs

Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of opium. It now provides 80-90% of the heroin consumed in Europe.⁶⁶ This has induced an expanding poppy cultivation, generating roughly US\$4 billion for criminals, which is emerging as one of Kabul's major economic concerns. Money laundering from the drugs trade is denying Kabul any tax revenue, but those involved in the agricultural industry, which is the majority of the rural population, require this to sustain their livelihood.

By 2010, with capacity building assistance from European nations, the Afghan Government will have implemented new measures for Afghan National Police (ANP) to disrupt the illegal narcotics trade, but in the mean time drugs will continue to be an

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/08/28-070803.htm>; Internet; accessed 19 March 2008.

⁶⁶CIA – The World Factbook – Afghanistan; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>; Internet; accessed 19 March 2008.

uncomfortable issue for the Government.⁶⁷ Further, the production of raw opium has reached such levels that the International Narcotics Control Board issued a warning that they expect some precursor chemicals to start appearing in Afghanistan, which suggests that an increased sophistication drug product is looming. Also identified in the report were Iran and Pakistan as the main drug trafficking routes, as the vast majority of drugs stem from the five Afghan provinces that border Pakistan.⁶⁸

In the 2008 *Globe and Mail* series on the Taliban, it stated that one of the major reasons that Pashtuns joined the insurgency was that they felt their livelihood, poppy production, was threatened by the Coalition. This is particularly the case since 2004, when yields increased due to supply and demand economics and favorable climatic conditions.⁶⁹ Overall, the drugs industry may provide financial prosperity for a few. However, the majority of the Afghan population in the provinces adjacent to Pakistan is still in need of rudimentary essential services, such as health and education.

Education and healthcare

Currently Afghanistan's literacy rate is 12% for females and 43% for males with a total population rate of 28%. These figures represent the lower end of the scale when compared to any other country in the region, such as Iran that has 77% overall, with 83% male and 70% female literate. Pakistan has slightly lower rates than Iran, with 50% overall, 63% male and 36% female literate.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, some success has been made with six million Afghan children now receiving an education, which is approximately

⁶⁷United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan, London Conference, The Afghan Compact, 1 February 2006, http://www.unama-afg.org/news/londonConf_docs/06jan30-AfghanistanCompact-Final.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

⁶⁸International Narcotics Control Board, Annual Report 2007, <http://www.incb.org/pdf/annual-report/2007/en/chapter-03.pdf>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008, 86-91.

⁶⁹Graeme Smith, "Portrait of the enemy," ..., A16.

half those eligible, but more is necessary and will take time to advance.⁷¹ The creation of a higher educated segment of the population is many years away.

The Soviets dispersed the majority of the intelligentsia and secular elite of the populace to dilute their influence and killed or imprisoned others. Despite the large scale oppression of the intelligentsia, the majority emigrated to the West, forming a significant diaspora that will not return to Afghanistan.⁷²

Those educated Afghans that remained in the region traveled the path of the refugee camps in the late 1980s to Iran and Pakistan were subjected to extreme Islamist education. This allowed the Taliban ideology to thrive. It is this group of refugees that has returned to Afghanistan and they have brought with them the Taliban philosophy that was sown in the refugee camps.

The lack of an educated portion of the populace will limit the rebuilding initiatives linked at driving a wedge between the insurgents and the population. Until such times as the technical education system is reestablished the West will be required to lead development. Similarly, the West will also be required to assist in the provision of health services until such times as the Afghan Government can generate health care professionals internally.

From a healthcare standpoint, 80 per cent of the population now has access to basic health care.⁷³ This is a significant improvement since the fall of the Taliban regime, however, it is as a result of foreign aid and the majority of healthcare professionals are

⁷⁰ CIA – The World Factbook – Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan....

⁷¹Noel Fitzgibbon, *Australian Defence Minister announces new deployments to Afghanistan*, Hansard 080219, 2008.

⁷²Larry P. Goodson, "Afghanistan's endless war: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban", (Washington: University of Washington Press 2001), 128-9.

⁷³Noel Fitzgibbon, *Australian Defence Minister*....

not Afghans. The Karzai Government does have ambitious plans to improve the state of the national health care system, which go towards addressing the living conditions of the Afghan people and detracting from the Taliban's legitimacy.⁷⁴ Plus, until the economy recovers the capacity to fund healthcare professionals will be limited.

Economy

The present Afghan economy has shown some improvement since the 2001 invasion by the US and its allies, but has been due to increases in services and international aid. Although limited, the Afghan economy is based on agriculture, and trade with neighboring countries.⁷⁵ Table 1 demonstrates that GDP has more than doubled in that period and the national growth rate has increased by almost a factor of three. Nevertheless, much is still required to be done, as most of the recovery is as result of foreign aid. Typical 2006 per capita GDP and growth figures for several of Afghanistan's neighboring countries are: Iran US\$3446 and 5.4%; Pakistan US\$913 and 7%; Tajikistan US\$424 and 7%; and Turkmenistan US\$1327 and 9%.⁷⁶

⁷⁴Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Office of the President, Health and Nutrition, <http://www.president.gov.af/english/np/health.msp>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

⁷⁵CIA – The World Factbook – Afghanistan...

⁷⁶United Nations Statistics Division – National Accounts; <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/SelectionCountry.asp>; Internet; accessed on 19 March 2008.

**Table 2. Afghan GDP at current and constant 1990 prices,
Per Capita GDP, Growth rate**

Period	Per Capita GDP	Growth rate
	US Dollars	Percent
1993	167	-20.3
1994	123	-7.8
1995	177	5
1996	168	9
1997	160	10.1
1998	155	11.9
1999	149	-5.9
2000	143	-33.6
2001	104	-9.4
2002	213	39.5
2003	207	14.3
2004	237	9.4
2005	273	14.5
2006	319	11.1

Source: UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database⁷⁷

By demonstrating that countries in the region are capable of producing sizable GDP, in one case (Iran) up to 10 times the Afghan GDP, it suggests that much can be done to improve the Afghan economy. It must be noted though that the neighboring countries are not suffering an internal insurgency and, other than Pakistan, all have been relatively stable for at least the past 20 years. The emergent illicit poppy farming generates \$4 billion on the Afghan black market and does not provide any revenue for the Afghan Government. Additionally, unemployment, corruption, national capacity and a lack of infrastructure present longer term difficulties for the country.⁷⁸ To capitalise on any economic development, first a legitimate government is required.

⁷⁷United Nations Statistics Division - National Accounts.... These figures do not represent the narcotics economy, and the bulk of the financial gains have been through foreign aid injections.

⁷⁸CIA – The World Factbook – Afghanistan....

Governance

President Karzai's term ends in 2009 and his Government has made many successful evolutionary steps towards democracy, by regional standards. The constitution was agreed to in late 2004, a loya jirga has sat on numerous occasions and generally legitimate regional governors have been established, although in Southern Afghanistan and especially Kandahar some claim the Governor is corrupt. However, there is a finite capacity in the Afghan population to generate untainted individuals due to decades of unrest, the educated diaspora having settled in the West and until recently a lack of Government educational facilities. Despite this momentum, some elements of the population see Karzai as a puppet of the United States, just as Karmal and Najibullah were viewed during the 1980's Soviet era.

Another related issue is the notion that Afghanistan, from a change management perspective, requires revolutionary change and a single charismatic leader is best suited for this. However, Pashtunwali, through the loya jirga system, being a committee is more evolutionary in approach. This must be creating friction and will require resolution, but the country is slowly improving, including the return of several million refugees, and Karzai's regime in consultation with the loya jirga may be able to achieve the change necessary.⁷⁹

The regular Afghan is disenfranchised with the Government and the ANP and is turning to other traditional security instruments: namely, the Taliban with its shadow

⁷⁹CIA – The World Factbook – Afghanistan....

government and security infrastructure.⁸⁰ The growing narcotics trade, with excess funds, has been instrumental in exacerbating the corruption in the public sector. Bribery reduces taxes and other forms of Afghan Government revenue collection and until an anti-corruption culture can be instituted Afghanistan will remain heavily reliant on foreign aid.

Summary

The cultural and religious aspects of life in South-eastern Afghanistan are different than anything Westerners experience normally. The Pashtunwali code is a throwback to the 17th Century, possibly longer, and any notion of fully understanding the complexity of the system would be naive. Nevertheless, an appreciation of the code in conjunction with exposure to Sharia allows for cultural differences to be appreciated and when conducting campaign planning it offers scope for unconventional thought to Westerners. Other socioeconomic issues, such as narcotics and education will require the Afghan Government, assisted by the international community, to formulate workable solutions within the constraints of the regional and cultural barriers.

Much has been done towards the successful eradication of some of the more negative aspects of Afghan governance, but it is likely that generational change will be needed for the perception of corruption to become unfamiliar. Having examined the cultural and socioeconomic issues in order to achieve awareness of the Afghan dilemma and, more particularly, the Pashtun psyche, formulation of a plan to defeat insurgency is closer. However, many other insurgency wars have been fought in the recent past and

⁸⁰Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan : [final report]*, [Ottawa, ON] : Public Works and Government Services, 2008, 16.

cultural and socioeconomic awareness is only one of many components to the solution. In

CHAPTER FOUR – COUNTERINSURGENCY CASES

Introduction

Insurgencies are more than solely military actions, as has been demonstrated by the Taliban in Afghanistan where they are utilizing many influence strategies. In order to properly defeat an insurgency it must be correctly diagnosed from the embryonic stage otherwise it may be inappropriately treated, which would extend the campaign further. Counterinsurgency is primarily about winning and keeping the ‘hearts and minds’ of the in-theatre population and, equally importantly in the modern era, the domestic population of the coalition forces on the side of the authorities.

Often the root cause of an insurgency can be identified early and isolated from the insurgent’s narrative, or ideology, leaving the insurgency dislocated from popular support. The sooner this can be achieved the faster the insurgency can be neutralised through negotiation and if necessary physical destruction. Canadian Forces doctrine defines counterinsurgency as, “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency.”⁸¹

It must be noted though that despite physical and psychological isolation of an insurgency from the population, an exclusively military response has historically been unsuccessful. In several cases this has only gone to exacerbate the problem and bring more of the population to view the insurgent’s narrative as the only road.⁸² Canadian Forces doctrine does suggest that, civilian leadership combined with military support can use the following principles to achieve success, provided they are used as guidelines only:

⁸¹Canada. Dept. of National Defence. *Counter-insurgency operations...*, Ch1: 3/25.

Political primacy with a long term aim.
 Unity of purpose to coordinate all agencies.
 Appreciate the intricacy of the insurgency and environment.
 Develop and make use of intelligence.
 Isolate insurgents from their physical and moral sanctuary, including righting real and perceived grievances.
 Neutralise the insurgent through destruction or negotiation.
 Commit to apply political capital and resources over a long period.
 Conduct longer term post-insurgency planning.⁸³

It must be noted that there is no mention of judicial, correctional or, more importantly, reconciliation being required for success. Furthermore, negotiations are not mentioned.

To demonstrate several of these concepts and highlight where the present Afghan counterinsurgency could be best positioned, four counterinsurgency wars of the last century have been analysed in detail. First though, an examination of the Soviet-Afghan conflict is necessary, as it provides background to the current campaign.

Afghanistan has been embroiled in war for centuries. The Great Game was played out between the British Empire and the Russian Empire in the mid to late 1800s and since then both domestic and external participants have been the catalyst for further conflict and instability.⁸⁴ Much has been written on the Soviet Afghan conflict and drawing out several significant points highlights that some, but not all, of the Soviet philosophies in dealing with the Mujahedin have been become established in the ISAF methodology of dealing with the Taliban.

The Mujahedin, like the present belligerents, consisted of many disparate groups and could be labelled as traditionalist insurgents, with some overlap to egalitarians and

⁸²Canada. Dept. of National Defence. *Counter-insurgency operations...*, Ch1: 5/25.

⁸³*Ibid.*, Ch3: 3/25.

⁸⁴Sir Martin Ewans, *The Great Game: Britain and Russia in Central Asia*, (New York : Routledge, 2003).

preservationists.⁸⁵ The insurgency was more so an instinctive campaign against international involvement than any notion of nationalism. They received support from many Western and Middle Eastern countries and received sanctuary in Pakistan; however, there were as many Tajiks, Uzbeks, Baluch and Hazarans involved as Pashtuns which does not correspond to the present conflict. The support provided by the United States and others afforded the Mujahedin a level of sophistication in weaponry and communications equipment beyond the Soviets, but they lacked a critical mass to overwhelm the Soviets throughout the country.⁸⁶

The Soviets, in a similar position to ISAF, could not enter Pakistan. They relied heavily on the Afghan Government security apparatus to conduct offensive action, as particularly towards the end of the conflict Soviet public support waned. Additionally, Soviet bombing of villages alienated Afghans and ground tactical successes followed by withdrawals to safe areas dealt operational and strategic blows to the Soviet campaign to dominate the land. Disunity within the Afghan Government also played into the hands of the Mujahedin. Furthermore, the Soviets attempted to close the Pakistan border and, like today, were unsuccessful. An incomplete understanding of the insurgents and their narrative caused some of the Soviets to question their own legitimacy.⁸⁷

Towards the end of the war when the outcome was looking uncertain the Soviets implemented a strategy of reconciliation with the various belligerents, but it was too little

⁸⁵Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism...*, 35-37.

⁸⁶Dr Robert Baumann, *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan. : Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ; Washington, DC : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 1993), 131-138.

⁸⁷Scott McMichael, *Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan*, (London: Brassey's, 1991).

too late.⁸⁸ Another major point is that the Afghan population saw the Karmal and Najibullah regimes as puppets of the Soviets and it could be argued that Karzai is viewed as a puppet of the United States.

Capturing Soviet mistakes and aligning them against today's campaign the following issues have a resonance: a lack of understanding of the Pashtun society, or limited social network analysis; too many troops confined to garrison duties; heavy reliance on Afghan troops for combat duties; and the sanctuary afforded by Pakistan. Several of these issues have a common theme in counterinsurgency conflicts of the past century, especially the post colonial conflicts of World War II.

Following the Allied victory over the Axis powers in the European and Pacific theatres several small secessionist wars broke out in South East Asia, Africa and the Middle East. To provide a suitable backdrop for analysis, the campaign's selected were Western based and ranged in size so as to allow scale considerations to be dealt with. Notable, particularly for its final outcome when compared against the initial lack of success, was the Malayan campaign.

Malayan Emergency

This war, from 1948 through to 1960, was conducted by the British security forces against the Chinese communist separatists, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) and came on the heels of the jungle warfare in Burma during the Second World War. From the outset of this war, the British recognised that it would require a different type of approach, indeed, Brigadier Dennis Talbot, in a presentation to New Zealand officers in 1950, stated that unlike the Japanese the MNLA insurgents objective was to,

⁸⁸Dr Robert Baumann, *Russian-Soviet Unconventional...*, 169-174.

. . . avoid clashing with the security forces except when the latter was greatly outnumbered and taken by surprise. . . they do not defend or hold any particular area or function on a line of communication.⁸⁹

Moreover, the MNLA was almost exclusively Chinese and not supported by the Malayans, who were committed to independence as a Malayan state. They feared that a MNLA victory would mean a non-Muslim state linked to China.⁹⁰

The security forces mandated that jungle warfare training be conducted prior to deployment into theatre and that integrated military and police patrols be performed.⁹¹ Additionally, the British command initiated a system of inserting small reconnaissance patrols, cued by integrated police and military intelligence analysis, to find MNLA insurgents with much larger finishing forces then rapidly inserted to engage the insurgents.⁹² This was the first establishment of joint special forces and conventional forces operations. Typically, the reconnaissance patrols were made up of four to five personnel and the fighting patrols were of no larger than company sized organisations. Local tribesmen were used to assist in the reconnaissance patrols and local ‘home guard’ type units were formed to assist in the security effort and to create a sense of ownership in protecting the village, including resettlement villages.⁹³ This notion of resettlement

⁸⁹Lecture given in New Zealand regarding Malaya, Major General Dennis Talbot Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives Kings College University of London, internet accessed 22 February 2008.

⁹⁰Donald Mackay, “The Malayan Emergency, 1948-60 : the domino that stood”, (Washington, D.C. : Brassey’s, 1997), x.

⁹¹Daniel Marston, “Lost and found in the Jungle,” in *Big Wars and Small Wars: the British Army and the lessons of war in the 20th Century*; ed. Hew Strachan, 84-114 (Oxon: Routledge UK, 2006), 98.

⁹²Donald Mackay, “The Malayan Emergency, 1948-60...”, 133; Daniel Marston, “Lost and found in the Jungle,”..., 99.

⁹³Joel E. Hamby, “Civil-military operations: joint doctrine and the Malayan Emergency,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Autumn 2002) [journal on-line]; available from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_32/ai_105853016; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008; Donald Mackay, “The Malayan Emergency, 1948-60...”, 73-74,

isolated the MNLA from any resources, such as logistic support. Malaya Command tactics, techniques and procedures were disseminated in one pamphlet and training standardised throughout the Malaya Command, which by 1950 was an integrated police, military and civil apparatus.⁹⁴

The British adopted, what would be called today, a whole of government approach to the problem, in particular they established a single position that oversaw both security and political aspects of the insurgency in Malaya.⁹⁵ From an information operations perspective, subtle messages were sent when the Malayan Police Force was renamed the Malayan Police Service, and police officers' focus was changed from dominating the population to serving and protecting it.⁹⁶ Junior army officers were trained in local government issues, such as the powers of the police, the rights of citizens and emergency powers relevant under the law. Malaya Command also instituted a system whereby lessons learned, from battle field assessments and intelligence, were incorporated to refine tactics.⁹⁷ Junior leaders became the key to success in the Malayan jungles, as they conducted military operations with a keen eye on the political and civil ramifications of their actions.

Key points related to the principles listed above that can be drawn from Malayan Emergency and can be brought into the Afghan theatre include:

< The MNLA was physically and morally isolated by the introduction of 'home guard' type units to protect villages. This was not always successful as occasionally local

⁹⁴ Daniel Marston, "Lost and found in the Jungle," ..., 104.

⁹⁵ Joel E. Hamby, "Civil-military operations: joint doctrine and the Malayan Emergency," *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Autumn 2002) [journal on-line]; available from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_32/ai_105853016; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

⁹⁶ Donald Mackay, "The Malayan Emergency, 1948-60...", 132.

⁹⁷ Daniel Marston, "Lost and found in the Jungle," ..., 104.

villagers were overrun or capitulated. The Taliban has yet to be isolated from its support base, either in Pakistan or in the villages of Afghanistan. Physically and morally they have sanctuary in either country, but particularly Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province. Until control of this area is achieved or until the border is sealed then isolation will not occur. Also, forced migration of the population would be politically, and morally, unacceptable today. It is better to move the security forces to the population, rather than vice versa. Afghan Police are needed for this, backed by ISAF and Afghan National Army (ANA) troops.

< MNLA lines of communication were cut off as deep operations into jungle sanctuary areas attacked the source of MNLA physical sanctuary. In Afghanistan this parallels attacking inside Pakistan and under the present political climate this is not feasible for ISAF. This is a deep operation and is currently being conducted by the Pakistani Government's security forces and OEF unmanned aerial vehicles armed with missiles. Other forms of deep operations, such as modification of the madras's curriculum to stem the flow of radical young males could be investigated.

< The MNLA was morally and politically isolated, as it was predominately an ethnic Chinese communist organisation. The majority of the Malays were Muslim who sought an Islamic Malay nation and under the MNLA this would not have eventuated. The British promised and provided the Malays with independence in 1957, which amplified the isolation of the MNLA. Through negotiation with the Malays the British created a mutually beneficial situation for Malays and British.

Unfortunately, the Taliban are aligned with the Pashtun society who is the majority of the population in Southeastern Afghanistan. This presents a dilemma, as

political and moral isolation will be difficult. However, endeavoring to create preliminary isolation, social shortfalls need to be highlighted to the Pashtun population, such as general literacy, female education, electricity, clean water availability, economic prosperity, technology and an increase in law and order. Furthermore, physical isolation in Afghanistan can be achieved if security forces patrol major villages at night.

◁ The British adopted a unity of purpose to the conflict, with a non-conventional approach allowing junior leaders freedom of action within specified guidelines. In Afghanistan, tight constraints cover every facet of the campaign. Junior leaders are not sufficiently trained in the cultural, political and civil nuances of Afghanistan to deal with the complexity of the Pashtun tribal layers. This reduces their ability to target the insurgent accurately without avoiding collateral damage. Furthermore, ISAF contributing nations are not fully committed to the campaign, as demonstrated with the initial responses to Canada's request for an additional battle group to support its troops in Kandahar.

◁ The British quickly implemented an effective combined intelligence system, which was primarily human intelligence based. In Afghanistan, the intelligence network is primarily technical intelligence, with some forms of human intelligence being conducted in less hostile regions. For full intelligence fusion to occur the integration of technical and human intelligence is necessary and not until this is addressed in a combined, joint all source fusion cell will operational information be processed sufficiently fast for targeting to occur.

◁ The approach included long-term post-insurgency planning by co-opting the Malays into fighting alongside the British forces. This not only removed potential sources

of recruits for the MNLA but provided the Malay people with a common cause. In Afghanistan, the ANA, ANP and the Afghan Border Police (ABP) are involved in the counterinsurgency. In many cases the Afghans employed in these services are potential Taliban recruits, or indeed past Taliban members, who have been liberated and now shoulder arms for the Afghan Government.

All these steps are signs that certain aspects of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is progressing reasonably well, but more is necessary. Another British colony that erupted like the Malayan Emergency was Kenya. The Mau Mau, an egalitarian and preservation insurgency group, with separatist leanings, was conducting an insurgency to oust British Colonial rule.

Mau Mau Emergency (Kenya)

The Kenyan Emergency is an example of a successful offensive campaign, yet an outcome where the methods employed, certainly by today's moral standards, would be questionable and as a result Kenya gained its independence shortly after combat operations ceased. From 1952 through to 1960, the forests north of Nairobi were home to the Mau Mau as they fought an insurgency war with the British Colonial Government. Like the Malayan insurgency the 'rebels' were mainly confined to one ethno-group, which was the Kikuyu tribe. The emergency occurred, based equally on a secessionist ideology with long simmering political, economic and racial tensions combined with the apparent lack of a peaceful political forum for the Kikuyu tribe. In particular the distribution of arable land was contentious, as the white settlers occupied the majority of

agricultural land whereas the Kikuyu tribe was dispossessed of its land and a sizable portion moved into the urban centers in search of work.⁹⁸

Like the Malayan campaign, the Mau Mau emergency was initially not a great success, mainly through a lack of acceptance that it was an insurgency but also as a result of a lack of intelligence. It was not until the intelligence apparatus surged that the British authorities were able to control the emergency. Indeed, several Mau Mau units, 'pseudo-gangs', were created and these units fought very successfully against their previous allies, locating many Mau Mau leaders.⁹⁹ Furthermore, the Mau Mau were not a consolidated organisation with one voice after 1956, as the British prevented them from gathering a critical mass of personnel due to physical isolation. As a result of these successes the British were able to exploit the schism and entered negotiations which alienated, or placed a wedge between, the moderates and extremists.¹⁰⁰

Initially, the British dealt with the insurgency heavy handedly: large scale internment was conducted and detention camps were created. Beatings and torture were often the manner that confessions were acquired from supposed Mau Mau.¹⁰¹ This served to dislocate the Mau Mau from their sanctuary and cut off their support base but it also served to make the plight of the Kikuyu tribe worse. Eventually, the British civil administration recognised that the complaints of the Mau Mau had some substance and the African Affairs Officer in Nairobi, Thomas Askwith, believed that the only way to relieve the violence was to end racism and give the Kikuyu more land. Indeed, Askwith traveled to Malay to find solutions to the Kenyan problem and it was here that the British

⁹⁸Robert B. Edgerton *Mau Mau : an African crucible*. (New York : Ballantine Books, 1989), x.

⁹⁹Marshall S. Clough, *Mau Mau memoirs: history, memory, and politics*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 166.

High Commissioner to Malay, Sir Robert Thompson, told him that the solution lay in the, “hearts and minds of the people.”¹⁰² By 1959, with the insurgency almost ended, the British had adopted a philosophy of political concessions to the Kikuyu tribe and the Kenyan people more generally, as had been suggested to Askwith. In 1957, wages were increased, African seats were increased in parliament and additional land was allocated to the Kikuyu tribe, although this land may have been portioned off to loyalist Kikuyu rather than Mau Mau.¹⁰³

Nevertheless, through negotiations and righting real and perceived grievances the insurgency was defeated and not long after the insurgency ended Kenya gained independence from Britain in a non-violent transition of power.¹⁰⁴ Several key points can be drawn from Mau Mau Emergency that have application in the Afghan theatre including:

< The British use of African police and local kikuyu tribesmen to fight the Mau Mau was instrumental in isolating the Mau Mau. African police were able to infiltrate the sanctuaries and neutralise the Mau Mau easier than British or colonial troops could. This also assisted in the collection of intelligence. In Afghanistan, the use of turned Taliban or al Qaeda would facilitate this and allow for an accelerated targeting cycle.

< Isolating sanctuary areas from the Mau Mau by removing population concentration from the forests allowed the security forces to eliminate the source of support from the Mau Mau. Food and weapons became problematic for the Mau Mau and

¹⁰⁰Marshall S. Clough, *Mau Mau memoirs: history...*, 163.

¹⁰¹Robert Edgerton, *Mau Mau : an African crucible...*, 189.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, 180-1.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, 227.

¹⁰⁴Richard Frost, “Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor of Kenya,” *African Affairs* 78, no. 313 (October 1979): 535-553; <http://www.jstor.org>; Internet; accessed 19 March 2008.

was eventually instrumental in their defeat. In Afghanistan, the areas of sanctuary are in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. Cross border operations are not possible; however, sealing the porous border with ABP, supported by Coalition troops is part of the solution to this issue. Additionally, the flow of people and goods across the border will always be difficult to stem, therefore a pass system may be worth examining where all travelers have a fingerprint or photo identification which must be presented at border crossing points. It could be suggested that in such an area of the world that photo identification, especially when females wear burqas, is too sophisticated, but the alternative of a completely sealed border would be more difficult to administer. Furthermore, discreet support to Pakistani troops is needed to assist in this initiative. Providing security to villages at night will severely limit the sanctuary afforded to the Taliban within Afghanistan.

< Exploitation of intelligence was achieved through the isolation and targeting of the Mau Mau leadership. When Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi was captured, and subsequently hanged, the organized Mau Mau resistance collapsed.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, the demise of the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership will have a resultant effect on the organised resistance. It may not bring about a direct end to hostiles but, by disaggregation

◁ The concerns and grievances of the Kikuyu tribe were eventually addressed. Wages were increased and land was apportioned for Kikuyu and political representation was increased. In Afghanistan, some aspects of the Taliban grievances may be justified, although currently gaining a consolidated message on their position is difficult. Some issues have a common thread, such as the establishment of a non-puppet Islamic State.

◁ Overall the heavy handedness of the authorities was instrumental in the insurgency being defeated but shortly after the end of major insurgency operations Kenya gained independence. This may have had a bearing on the reduction in insurgent activities towards the end of the campaign, as they would have appreciated that the end was in sight. In Afghanistan, establishing some form of Taliban representation in the political system, or through negotiations, may well bring them into a less aggressive stance and allow some of their grievances to be addressed.

The Kenyan experiences displayed that negotiations and righting grievances, coupled with military operations, can achieve a successful outcome in a counterinsurgency. Many lessons from Malay were transposed into Kenya and the same was true for operations in a lesser known theatre of the world, Oman, which was an example of a successful counterinsurgency. The majority of the conflict was in the south western corner of Oman adjacent to Yemen.

Dhofar War (Oman)

The campaign in Dhofar has had little coverage but its example as a successful counterinsurgency requires its mention here. Primarily, the counterinsurgency was fought by Omani, Iranian and British troops from 1962 to 1975. Up to and during the initial stages of the insurgency, which was predominately conducted with the insurgents

receiving tacit support from Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the Sultan of Oman had maintained a diffident approach to the nation's development.¹⁰⁶ This was particularly the case in Dhofar, a protectorate of Oman, where oppression of the population for the benefit of the Omani hierarchy was the norm. As a result the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) was formed. In 1970, a successful coup by the Sultan's son allowed for an immediate change in Government policy. This brought about substantial changes in the type of campaign that was conducted against the insurgents, known as the Adoo. A combined civil and military chain of command was created. Reconciliation through amnesty and protection toward villages was offered to Adoo who surrendered and irregular company sized units of Firquats (former Adoo) were formed to operate with British Special Air Service (SAS) liaison officers.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, British Army Training Teams (BATT) were created, and embedded into the expanded and re-equipped Sultan's regular Armed Forces, at 22 advisors per battalion. As a result of BATT, cultural barriers had to be overcome, particularly as the local tribe, the Chofari, was very forthright.¹⁰⁸ Distribution of small hand held transistor radios in the DLF's sanctuaries allowed for the Government's messages to be disseminated easily. Interestingly, Tony Jeapes, the SAS commander in Dhofar claims that the Ministry of Defence's plan called for,

An intelligence cell
 An information team
 A medical officer supported by SAS medics
 A veterinary officer
 When possible, the raising of Dhofari soldiers to fight for the Sultan¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶Tony Jeapes, "SAS Secret War – Operation Storm in the Middle East", (London: Greenhill Books, 1996), 29.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, 99-113; The *wali* or civilian governor (Braik bin Hamoud) was given equal status to the military commander of the Dhofar Brigade (Brigadier Jack Fletcher).

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, 32.

The five fundamentals were centered at a spirited but well-coordinated military campaign that avoided indiscriminate actions or reprisals. The medical part was to provide aid to the fifty-thousand people living in the Dhofar Mountains and the veterinary piece to improve farm stock, including the provision of fresh water. Finally the information team or the psychological operation persuaded the rebels to change sides and reaped much intelligence and targeting value, most of which was non-kinetic.

The modification to the military and civil procedures allowed for improved targeting of the Adoo's lines of communication and support base in Dhofar. Aggressive patrolling supported by air power in the Adoo's sanctuaries coupled with a 'hearts and minds' approach of establishing medical and veterinary clinics, schools, roads and fresh wells all eroded the DLF's claims that the Sultan was merely using Dhofar for resources. Finally, as a result of these successes, the DLF was unable to maintain coherent messaging to the public and its supporters and this compounded their problems which saw support reduce further.

Like Malay and Kenya, the Dhofar War offers several insights to the conduct of a successful counterinsurgency, particularly from a military and political perspective:

< The DLF has some justifiable complaints, and the replacement of the Sultan in 1970 addressed many of these grievances. The Taliban's grievances need to be fully understood and, if legitimate, some measures are required to address them.

< The civil and military diarchy was essential for the counterinsurgency to be successful. The Afghan National Government's intent, executed through the Provincial Governors, and the Afghan Security Forces, aided by ISAF, must be seen to have political primacy. For this to occur, a legitimate government is crucial.

◁ Reconciliation through amnesty for Adoo fighters and protection for their villages on surrender was a key factor in the establishment of the Firquats, which allowed for the sanctuary and support bases to be eroded. Furthermore, it allowed intelligence development to occur and long term post-insurgency planning to be established. Potentially, Taliban amnesty measures need to be more aggressive. Resettlement programs and security for villages is still an issue, as insufficient Afghan Security Forces exist to achieve this. Nevertheless, until security is possible for villages, pliable Taliban are not going to change sides. This is because the Taliban controls the countryside at night. Furthermore, the capacity for the ANA and Police service to absorb former Taliban will be difficult and it may be better to establish irregular fighting units managed by special forces, similar to the Firquats, who would then allow for more discriminate targeting of the Taliban in their sanctuaries.

◁ Civil infrastructure improvements in Dhofar contributed significantly to the defeat of the insurgency, which addressed the population's grievances and dislocated the Adoo from the population. In Afghanistan, electricity, roads, wells, schools are but a few requests that the Afghan people present. Reconstruction is underway, but potentially not at the level required to keep the people supporting the National Government. Also, the Taliban regularly attempt to destroy any infrastructure that is erected to maintain the current status quo, such as mobile phone towers.

◁ Aggressive foot and vehicle patrolling, supported by air power and, to a lesser extent, sea power eroded the Adoo's sanctuaries. In Afghanistan, the same philosophy applies in the border regions along the Durand Line and the mountainous regions in Orugzan Province. Neutralising the Taliban hardliners in their sanctuaries is necessary

prior to any real progress being made in negotiations with the more moderate and malleable Taliban.

The combined successes of the counterinsurgency eventually led the DLF to lose sight of its objectives and, when mixed messages started to emanate from the leadership, the public and regional support bases evaporated. This philosophy could also be applied to the Taliban. There is a lack of one clear message from the Taliban and to bring them to the negotiating table it would be better to have a clear set of objectives that could be addressed. Despite this lack of Taliban focus it is still necessary for negotiations to be conducted at some stage, as a significant portion of the public (14%) still strongly supports the Taliban ideology.¹¹⁰ Running parallel with the Oman insurgency was another insurgency on the South Arabian Peninsula, the Aden Emergency. This conflict has many lessons that can be taken as pointers for the South-eastern Afghan insurgency and they apply primarily at the operational and strategic political level.

Aden

Interestingly, Aden was an unsuccessful campaign, but where many comparisons exist with Afghanistan. Aden had been a British Protectorate since 1845, when it was used as a staging post for naval vessels traveling between India and Britain. However by the mid 20th Century, particularly with Indian independence, Aden as a sea-port was no longer so important to the British, plus Arab nationalism was growing. By 1963 anti-British insurgents with varying political objectives began to coalesce into three larger, rival organizations. Firstly and the eventual dominant group was the Egyptian backed and resourced National Liberation Front (NLF). Secondly, the Front for the Liberation of

¹¹⁰Environics Research Group, "2007 Survey of Afghans...."

Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY). These two groups fought each other as well as the British.¹¹¹ Thirdly, a smaller organisation, the South Arabian League (SAL), was made up of mainly middle class and intelligentsia but it succumbed to more radical elements and ceased to exist past 1966.¹¹² The insurgency in Aden was fought in the mountains of the Radfan and in the alleys and streets of the Crater. At the time it was a particularly brutal campaign, where beheadings and other forms of psychological warfare were conducted by the insurgents. However, claims by Amnesty International against the British Forces of widespread torture and inappropriate interrogations also surfaced, allowing the legitimacy of the campaign to be questioned.¹¹³

Intelligence collection played a crucial portion of the campaign for both sides; the NLF conducted such a successful counter-intelligence operation on the British that nearly all Aden Police Special Branch agents were assassinated.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, the Aden Police was riddled with inflators from the NLF and British Army and Police units would regularly search Aden Police vehicles, which eventually spiraled into a mutiny as the ‘face’ of the locally employed Aden Police commanders faded.¹¹⁵ In essence, on the Aden Police losing control of the Crater area, the security forces never fully recovered the initiative. From this point the insurgency shifted into an armed urban battle where sections of the general public were involved in the insurrection. British Army special units were tasked with developing intelligence and this was often not melded with the overall campaign plan. Regular units were not informed of intelligence collection or

¹¹¹Jonathan Walker, “Aden Insurgency – The savage war in South Arabia 1962-7”, (Spellmount: Staplehurst 2005), 220.

¹¹²Julian Paget, “Last Post: Aden 1964-1967”, (Faber & Faber: London 1969), 37, 116, 262.

¹¹³Jonathan Walker, “Aden Insurgency...”, 186-7.

¹¹⁴David Benest, “Aden to Northern Ireland, 1966-76...”, 184.

¹¹⁵Jonathan Walker, “Aden Insurgency...”, 234-5.

special forces tasking which resulted in a lack of cohesion or poor unity of purpose.¹¹⁶

National level collection techniques, such as that provided by the Information Research Department, were still providing human intelligence, but this was more at the political and strategic level, rather than the type needed to solve the urban insurgency in the Crater.¹¹⁷

The general public, not wanting to be involved with British rule of law, did not respond to ‘hearts and minds’ tactics and was involved, in passive and active means, in the fight against the British.¹¹⁸ Another issue that caused havoc in Aden was the declaration in 1964 by the British Government of a withdrawal date, which led the locals to believe that the British were not fully committed Aden’s Government.¹¹⁹ No long term planning was instituted. This resulted in the local administration officials having one eye on the future and ignoring the British and the local authority’s requirements. Much politic occurred where future alliances were formed and the population felt they were being watched by the insurgents. This was confirmed when the NLF and the FLOSY conducted assassinations of any future potential political rival.¹²⁰

The Aden Emergency offers several insights particularly from a military and political perspective, that have application in the Afghan theatre including:

< The loss of the less radical SAL, which was made up of mainly middle class and intelligentsia, removed the Government’s ability to have a rational dialogue or negotiation with the disaffected among the South Arabian population. Long term political commitment and post-insurgency planning was not possible. In Afghanistan, moderate or

¹¹⁶Jonathan Walker, “Aden Insurgency...”, 171, 190.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, 277.

¹¹⁸David Benest, “Aden to Northern Ireland, 1966-76...”, 121.

less radical disaffected elements of the population require nurturing, so as to increase the segment of the population capable of negotiations. These may include the religious Mullahs.

◁ British heavy handedness in dealing with alleged insurgents once captured eroded international support and legitimacy. Any further torture of insurgents in Afghanistan will erode the ISAF legitimacy in the eyes of the Red Cross and Amnesty International. Popular support locally and abroad will also suffer, as it did during the Abu Ghraib incident in Iraq. Strategic defeat through tactical victories may well be the result.

◁ The elimination of most of the Police Special Branch informants created an intelligence vacuum. Human intelligence takes careful preparation and, particularly, time to establish. In several months the NLF and the FLOSY achieved complete domination of the urban areas. Intelligence development, through the use of turned Taliban and others is necessary for depth in intelligence to be created. The Afghan national intelligence agency would benefit from mentoring and equipment, as Western intelligence could leverage from locally derived information.

◁ The declaration by the British Government of a withdrawal date was instrumental in dissipating any unity of purpose, post insurgency planning and intelligence. It sent a very negative message to the Aden public that caused support of the British Administration and the South Arabian Government to become futile, as the population perceived that the NLF and the FLOSY would eventually take control, which did occur and only a matter of days after the British departed. Many officials were murdered and others had to flee the country. In Afghanistan very similar views are held by the

¹¹⁹Jonathan Walker, "Aden Insurgency...", 287.

population. They feel that the Coalition does not have a long term view and that they will eventually have to deal with the Taliban. Many of the population is maintaining a ‘wait and see’ approach, as an Environics 2007 poll of Southern Afghans suggests, Table 2:¹²¹

Table 3. Likely Outcome of the Conflict

<i>Who will prevail in the current conflict?</i>		
	National	Kandahar
Afghan Government, with foreign assistance	40	45
Taliban, once foreign troops leave	19	16
Too early to say / Don't know	40	38

Source: Environics Research Group.

Any announcement by a Western government of a proposed pullout date, as Canada has done, only reinforces the notion the population hold that the Western Coalition is not committed to the defeat of the Taliban. A diplomatic solution is only part of the answer, and although negotiations are also required they must be approached from a position of strength in Afghanistan.

< The adjacent sanctuary of Yemen offered the insurgents respite and support and it also prevented ‘hot pursuit’ operations by the British.¹²² Similar circumstances exist in the eastern and southern areas of Afghanistan. In most provinces, insurgents can cross the Afghanistan/Pakistan border within one day of their area of operations, which are typically Helmand, Oruzgan and Kandahar Provinces. ‘Hot pursuit’ operations by any Coalition member are strictly forbidden yet the porous border allows insurgents to move freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some border security measures are required, otherwise the physical and moral support afforded by the Northwest Frontier Province

¹²⁰Julian Paget, “Last Post: Aden...”, 177.

will continue and there is little likelihood to defeating the insurgency unless this is isolated from the Taliban.

◁ Special intelligence units and regular infantry battalion patrols often ‘bumped’ into one another in the Aden urban areas. Military cohesion is essential in any area of operations. Special units and conventional units require awareness of tasking in order to de-conflict patrols and intelligence collection periods. Failure to do so will create unnecessary personnel wastage and allow a schism to develop between the various units involved. Overall, one campaign plan must be developed and the entire force must work towards that endstate. This applies today more so than in the past, as a multi national force requires more coordination, which was unfortunately demonstrated at the 2002 Tarnak Farm incident.¹²³

◁ Air power had a decisive impact in the rural and mountainous areas of South Arabia. Close air support was provided by a combination of Army Forward Air Controllers and Royal Air Force pilots. During the campaign these two groups worked extremely well and many insurgents were destroyed through this means.¹²⁴ Afghanistan has demonstrated that air power in counterinsurgency operations is just as important as in major combat operations. However, it must be used discerningly as a recent Globe and Mail poll suggest that a third of insurgents joined out of revenge for a loved one killed as a result of coalition air strikes.

¹²¹Envionics Research Group, “2007 Survey of Afghans....”

¹²²David Benest, “Aden to Northern Ireland, 1966-76...”, 121.

¹²³Michael Friscolanti “*Friendly Fire: The Untold Story of the U.S. Bombing that Killed Four Canadian Soldiers in Afghanistan*,” (John Wiley & Sons: Canada, 2005).

¹²⁴Jonathan Walker, “Aden Insurgency...”, 174.

◁ Her Majesty's Government attempted negotiations with NLF and FLOSY on numerous occasions; however, the insurgent organisations believed that they had the upper hand and refused to cooperate. Indeed, these negotiations were not attempted until the twilight of the campaign suggesting a level of desperation on behalf of the British, which compounded the insurgents' awareness of imminent success.¹²⁵ This notion has some resonance in Afghanistan. Negotiations need to be conducted from a position of strength, rather than when the insurgents sense that their cause will get the upper hand and the end is in sight. Taliban and other insurgency organisations, such as Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin, must be brought to the negotiation table, if for nothing else, to determine what their goals are and to avoid mixed messages.

It is now necessary to conduct a synthesis of the cases examined and relate them back to the tenets for a successful counterinsurgency as suggested in Canadian doctrine.¹²⁶ The cases represented several successful and unsuccessful historic insurgency cases. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw five enduring concepts from all the cases so as to shape the campaign plan.

◁ Political primacy with a long term aim. The establishment of a political civilian head to promote the civil power and not the military was achieved in three of the four cases examined. Indeed, the insurgents were politically and morally isolated through the conduct of negotiations and the settling of grievances. This is not occurring in Afghanistan. The lead nations did not support a negotiation strategy; indeed, the United

¹²⁵Jonathan Walker, "Aden Insurgency....", 224-7.

¹²⁶Canada. Dept. of National Defence. *Counter-insurgency operations...*, Ch3: 3/25.

States, Britain and Canada have both stated they will not negotiate with the Taliban.¹²⁷

The Canadian Foreign Minister stated, "We do not negotiate with terrorists, for any reason. Such negotiations, even if unsuccessful, only lead to further acts of terrorism."¹²⁸

< Unity of purpose to coordinate all agencies. Police, military, government departments, media and any other agencies working from the same campaign plan, all focused to the one aim occurred in three of the four cases. This suggests that the campaign plan was made available to the tactical level and everyone operated with the same endstate in mind.

< Develop and make use of intelligence. Through reconciliation this was achieved and it allowed the authorities to get inside the psyche of the insurgent. This afforded the authorities, not only, intelligence but additional security forces, albeit not fully employable across the spectrum of operations. Furthermore, it demonstrated good faith that surrendering was not a death warrant. In Afghanistan, turned Taliban units could be established, and similar to Oman placed under special forces type arrangements.

< Isolate insurgents from their physical and moral sanctuary, including righting real and perceived grievances. Negotiation with less entrenched insurgents, deep operations and addressing grievances, produced insurgent isolation. This requires large numbers of troops, and in all cases analysed the troop numbers far outstretched the insurgents' numbers by factors of up to twenty.¹²⁹ This is not occurring in Afghanistan.

¹²⁷Jason Straziuso, "Afghan opposition says it's been talking to Taliban," *ABC News and Associated Press*, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/WireStory?id=4662174&page=1>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

¹²⁸Graeme Smith, "What the increasingly confident Taliban...."

¹²⁹United States, Department of the Army. *Army Counterinsurgency...*, 6-21.

◁ Neutralise the insurgent through negotiation or destruction. When negotiations fail to disengage radicals from the insurgency, these persistent individuals will need to be destroyed. This should be done as a last resort and as many as possible should be turned. In the Aden scenario, negotiations were attempted but failed to get traction due to the insurgents sensing an approaching victory, whereas in the other cases negotiations were conducted with varying degrees of success. In essence, if possible it is better to attempt negotiations early and from a position of strength.

Summary

Overall, the cases studies allowed for an historical perspective to be applied to the conduct of counterinsurgency, noting that many operational methods employed in the last century still have application in the contemporary environment. Maintaining an eye on the Soviet experiences in Afghanistan, plus aligning any campaign to the outcomes of the four cases analysed will allow for increased success.

A campaign plan that incorporates political and civil tenets in equal number to military will have a good chance of success. Indeed, the weighting will tend towards the political and civil lines of operations as the campaign plan progresses, and the need for a military response diminishes.

CHAPTER FIVE – THE CAMPAIGN PLAN

Introduction

The overall strategy for the successful defeat of the insurgency in southern and eastern Afghanistan will require a coordinated approach. Indeed, as demonstrated in the insurgency cases analysed, a sole military solution does not exist and it will call for an international and whole of government methodology. On an international level, the Coalition powers must be steadfast in their support of the National Government of Afghanistan. There must be a single purpose and all Coalition members must be aligned and display a commitment towards that purpose. However, intractable support, especially for illegitimate decisions and actions will be counterproductive and display to the international community that a sense of arrogance is developing in the campaign. The present regime in Kabul, under Karzai, only controls of the urban centers. Some Afghans claim that it is a puppet regime of the United States, which diminishes its legitimacy domestically and prevents it establishing power and influence throughout Afghanistan. This boost to legitimacy, particularly with the Afghan people, is necessary for the successful conduct of negotiations. In a recent survey (Table 3) of South-eastern Afghanistan, 74% supported Afghan National Government negotiations with the Taliban.¹³⁰

¹³⁰Environics Research Group, “2007 Survey of Afghans....”

Table 4. Negotiations with the Taliban

<i>Should the Afghan Government deal with the Taliban?</i>		
	Negotiations	Coalition Government
Strongly support	36	25
Somewhat support	38	29
Somewhat Oppose	9	14
Strongly Oppose	9	19
Depends / Don't know	8	13

Source: Environics Research Group

Negotiations coupled with a surgical military response will be the only way the present standoff is solved. The Taliban will have to be brought to the negotiation table. This will cause offense to some, especially those who have suffered as a result of the conflict; however, not every Taliban can be incarcerated or killed, especially those lower level Taliban who are involved through economic necessity. In fact, President Karzai has already hinted at a possible dialogue with the Taliban when he stated,

For the security and prosperity of the Afghan people, in order to be freed from al-Qaeda and terrorists and their inhuman actions, we are ready for any type of discussion and negotiations.¹³¹

However, mixed messages are being received from Kabul and the Afghan President. This was particularly the case when the National Government expelled several diplomats for conducting talks with Taliban senior figures.¹³²

The current actors in Afghanistan, such as the United States and its allies, the Afghan Government, non-government organisations, the Afghan people and the

¹³¹Graeme Smith, "What the increasingly confident Taliban..."

¹³²Damien McElroy, "Hamid Karzai's diplomat expulsion move halted efforts to split Taliban," *The Telegraph*, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/03/24/wtaliban224.xml>; Internet; accessed 27 December 2007; Editorial, "Diplomats expelled by Afghanistan," *BBC News/ South Asia*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7161004.stm; Internet; Accessed 27 December 2007.

insurgents and their sponsors will be required to have more dialogue and alignment. This alignment may require enemies to come together, discuss points of deadlock and, most importantly, for Pashtuns to subjugate their penchant for ‘revenge’ and ‘justice’ under Pashtunwali. This is not suggesting that past transgressions be ignored or that due legal process be neglected in order to display to a media sophisticated public in the West that headway is being made in the Afghan conflict. More so it is to bring the actors together, to hold discussions and map out a common framework from which a future Afghanistan can be steered on the right course.

One commentator in the debate over Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan is Houchang Hassan-Yari, an academic from the Royal Military College of Canada, and he stated that Canada must not just focus its attentions on war fighting, but must also cast an eye towards social issues, the environment and ultimately the involvement of the UN, as it is the only globally legitimate organization.¹³³ Despite Hassan-Yari’s suggestion, the present tempo of combat operations would hint that potentially the UN’s involvement is still some years off. The April 2008 meeting between ISAF coalition partners in Bucharest promoted some movement in relation to Afghanistan, indeed, there is rhetoric echoing the themes that were evident in previous counterinsurgency campaigns, with the Australian Defence Minister talking of a,

...new strategy to win. To win not just the military battle, but the battle for the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Broadly, there are five keys to winning the military campaign.

The first is reaching agreed and common campaign objectives


The second is securing a coherent campaign plan.

¹³³Hassan-Yari, Houchang. 2001. Canada must not be drawn into regional isolation. *Canadian Speeches* 15, (5) (Nov/Dec): 20; <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=348358441&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>; Internet; accessed 24 August 2007.

The third is clarifying chains of command and lines of responsibility.
 The fourth is securing new NATO troop commitments.
 The fifth is growing the ANA and the ANP Force to the critical mass and skill level they need to hold our military gains and to enforce the rule of law in their war-torn country.¹³⁴

This essence of the problem is that there are competing priorities and no campaign plan exists to which all ISAF nations will subscribe, at least explicitly. For ease of explanation, a typical model which is similar to that used by the United States in a 2005 Iraqi surge operation, Figure 3, will be used as the structure from which a campaign plan will be formed.¹³⁵ The lines of operation include: information operations; combat operations; train and employ the Afghan security forces; secure, create, restore essential services; promote legitimate governance; encourage economic pluralism.

Figure 4. Counterinsurgency Lines of Operation Model



Source: 1st Cavalry Division 2005

Information operations

This line of operation is the cornerstone of the counterinsurgency. It is the overarching philosophy for operations in the modern era, as the media cycle can turn

¹³⁴Noel Fitzgibbon, *Australian Defence Minister*....

¹³⁵Major General Peter Chiarelli, "Winning the Peace: The requirement for full spectrum operations," *Military Review*, (July-August 2005), 7.

around a message in less than 24 hours and the support of the Afghan population, plus the ISAF nations' populations, is critical to ensure success. Patience must also be incorporated into this:

The fight against the guerrilla must be organized methodically and conducted with unremitting patience and resolution. Except for the rare exception, it will never achieve spectacular results.¹³⁶

Information operations need to be interconnected through all the other lines of operation, to leverage from successful aspects, such as infrastructure projects and, to mitigate unfortunate outcomes from the more unsuccessful activities, especially combat operations where civilians may have been involved.

Although being conducted reasonably successfully presently, more can be done. More focus is needed on quality of life improvements and less on combat operations. At the national level, President Karzai must be seen by the Afghan population as the legitimate leader and he must not transmit mixed messages about negotiations with the Taliban. At the regional or local level the provincial governors must be seen to be legitimate and deal with issues such as Police security, health and education. On the international stage, heads of national governments must not meddle in Afghan politics, as was regrettably demonstrated by the Canadian Foreign Minister when commenting on the Kandahar Governor.¹³⁷ Furthermore, Western politicians must be honest and provide timely advice to the public, particularly when mentioning casualties as a result of combat operations.

¹³⁶Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: a French view of counterinsurgency*, (Westport CT: Praeger 1964), 54.

Combat operations

Similar to information operations, combat operations is on the whole being conducted reasonably well, but with the abundance of special forces in the Afghan theatre there is a requirement for closer cooperation of conventional forces and special forces to eliminate duplication of effort and to avert of fratricide.¹³⁸ This also applies to OEF troops and ISAF troops, who are under different mandates, which highlights a lack unity of effort between Coalition forces.

More importantly though, there is a requirement for more conventional troops, as historical evidence suggest that ratios of up to twenty times the insurgent numbers are required. In this case, with approximately 5,000 Taliban and associated insurgents, Coalition troop numbers need to be increased to at least 100,000. The current number is approximately 40,000 with many confined to garrison duties and unavailable for combat operations.

A typical targeting cycle would involve special forces being used in finding Taliban in the more inhospitable terrain by leading turned Taliban forces. These forces would then hand off to conventional forces, Coalition and/or Afghan, for finishing tasks but it must be done quickly so as to remain within the Taliban's operational cycle. Following clearing operations, conventional troops must hold ground in the Taliban's sanctuary areas in South-eastern Afghanistan. Rather than withdrawing to the safety of bases once the Taliban have been removed, ISAF or Afghan troops must handoff to police who are augmented with some Coalition elements. This is necessary so as to

¹³⁷Mike Blanchfield, "Colonel praises Afghan official in eye of storm," *The Ottawa Citizen*, <http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=a51522ef-90b0-4b4a-bc33-36c56c1f57bc&sponsor=>; Internet; accessed 18 April 2008.

maintain control of the area and allow development activities to commence. In a recent interview Haji Fezal, a farmer and transport business owner from South-eastern Afghanistan, stated:

In our hearts we don't support the Taliban, but people have no choice because the government can't provide them with security. [The Taliban are] . . . pouring across the border from Pakistan, and the government can't control what is happening in the districts.¹³⁹

In conjunction with the ISAF and Afghan ground troops, judicious use of air power will achieve better results and maintain popular support by avoiding bombing villages, which has contributed to about one third of Taliban recruits. Comparable to close air support as a combat multiplier to remain within the Taliban's operational cycle, it is essential that Coalition governments be prepared to permit troops to be deployed throughout the south and east of Afghanistan at short notice. The border regions, adjacent to Pakistan, require additional troops in order to deny the insurgents' movement between their sanctuaries in the Pashtun dominated Northwest Frontier Province.

To win the 'hearts and minds' of the Pashtun tribes, soldiers will need to interact with the population. They will need to dismount from vehicles, conduct foot patrols, speak to villagers and show a personable face to the population. This process will require additional risk for infantry and any personnel involved in close cooperation with Afghan Security Forces, as the likelihood of attacks from suicide bombs, or other similar tactics will be heightened.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸James F. Kiras, *Special Operations and Strategy*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 79.

¹³⁹Denis Gray, "A backwater Afghan village straddles the fence between government and the Taliban," *Associated Press*, <http://www.bookrags.com/news/a-backwater-afghan-village-straddles-moc/>; Internet; accessed 22 April 2008.

¹⁴⁰Canada. Dept. of National Defence. *Counter-insurgency operations...*, Ch6: 2/42.

Train and employ the Afghan security forces

The development of Pashtun trust and commitment in the Afghan Security Forces will require a long-term commitment from ISAF troops in embedded training teams, as the population currently has inadequate confidence in the ability or the legitimacy of the Afghan forces, but it is improving. Using turned Taliban to form ‘intelligence development’ units would demonstrate clear intent to the moderate Taliban and the Afghan public that legitimacy of the Afghan Government was improving, through reconciliation with ex-Taliban.¹⁴¹ Command and planning training is necessary, as the proposed ANA (ANA) will be slightly over 70,000 soldiers, and the ability of the ANA to operate above battalion level is required.¹⁴² More effort is required to increase the capability of the limited Afghan Army Air Corps and the provision of low cost and easily maintained aircraft, such as A10 and Mi8, would allow for an increased level of pride in the troops.¹⁴³ More importantly, it would also diminish the contentious issue of Coalition aircraft bombing villages.

Security from criminal activity has been a recent area of concern for villagers. They claim that since the fall of the Taliban regime criminal activity has increased and they no longer feel safe in their compounds at night.¹⁴⁴ Police development, parallel to the ANA development is essential for this criminal activity to be stemmed. Corruption in

¹⁴¹This notion of reconciliation with enemy forces was successfully implemented in Oman with the employment of the Firquats, who were Adoo insurgents turned to the Oman Government’s side. See Tony Jeapes, “SAS Secret War – Operation Storm in the Middle East”, (London: Greenhill Books, 1996).

¹⁴²Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Office of the President, Security, National Defense, <http://www.president.gov.af/english/np/security.msp#NatDef>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

¹⁴³Editorial, “Op Shukran showcases ANA Air Corps,” *ISAF Mirror*, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/mirror/2007/mirror_42_200708.pdf; Internet; accessed 23 April 2008, 8-9.

¹⁴⁴Soutik Biswas, “Life in an Afghan Village,” *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4209480.stm; Internet; accessed 22 April 2008.

the Police, either National or Border, is systemic and requires constant monitoring. The dearth of professional police has been felt in the regional areas. It is here that the Taliban has been able to regain a foothold, by demonstrating that the National Government has no ability to control the country and the Taliban has been able to demonstrate an ability to impose security where the Police cannot. The Afghan Government's ability to hold ground once cleared of Taliban is negligible, even when supported by ISAF troops. Taliban return once the ISAF troops depart, driving out the Afghan Police.

The ANP with a remit from the National Government is primarily a standard constabulary, with criminal and general policing responsibilities. It is closely aligned to the Australian Federal Police or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This force is benefiting from a mentoring system. However the ABP, primarily a Provincial Governor sponsored force is more comparable to a paramilitary force and would suit alignment and mentoring from a paramilitary force such as the Portuguese *Guarda Nacional Republicana* or the Italian *Carabinieri*. This mentoring would increase the Border Police's legitimacy.

To date, the use of military forces rather than police forces has been necessary as the police were unable to protect themselves. However, as the situation becomes more controlled the police can take on a greater portion of the responsibility. Combined Police and ANA patrols could be instituted, which would allow the police officer to be protected by a section of ANA soldiers.

Remuneration for all the Afghan security forces must be improved, as it will assist in reducing corruption, increase retention of personnel and assist in reaching required personnel levels. One aspect that requires investigation is the notion that ISAF nations

pay Afghan soldiers and police through a system that guarantees the payment of the private and constable, rather than middle layer officials pocketing the money. Once this is achieved it is possible for the coalition to be involved more in a mentoring and training role, rather than conducting combat operations. Despite this change, the various national governments must still be prepared for casualties, as ANA will be leading the combat operations but limited numbers of coalition advisors will also be involved. It must be noted through that the Soviets attempted this strategy and it failed as the pro-Soviet Afghan troops were prone to withdrawing rather than engaging the Mujahedin.

Arms stocks, dating back to the Mujahedin and Soviet era, still exist in rural areas in South-eastern Afghanistan. To prevent re-seeding of weapons and mines, frequently from Afghan security forces to Taliban, a more stringent destruction campaign must be followed. In fact, issuing Afghan security forces with Western weapon systems, such as M16 rifles, would remove a source of Taliban supplies, allowing for destruction of all soviet arms and ammunition without impacting on the Afghan security forces supplies. This combined with a comprehensive cross border initiative to screen personnel and goods would see a significant reduction in the illicit trade in arms and ammunition.

Training Afghan security forces is a major component to get Afghanistan self sufficient again. Also essential is the provision of basic services to allow the population an increase in quality of life, which would differentiate between the Taliban era and the Karzai administration.

Essential services

Eastern and Southern Afghanistan have suffered extensively during the Soviet War, as well as under the Taliban Government and again undeniably as a result of the

offensive actions undertaken in the present conflict. As part of a plan to rectify this, the creation of employment in the urban and urban fringe areas will not only generate reconstruction, but deny the insurgents a source of available manpower.¹⁴⁵

Unfortunately, in insurgent areas there have been examples of Reconstruction Task Forces erecting infrastructure and the next day the insurgents dismantling it as a demonstration of power and influence in the local communities.¹⁴⁶ To mitigate against this, Afghan Security Forces, supported by Coalition forces, must be prepared to clear and then hold ground for development to occur, rather than the current philosophy adopted, where especially coalition forces, conduct a patrol and depart to the safety of the local base prior to nightfall. With this type of modus operandi, it is not so surprising that the Taliban control the rural areas at night.

Education, water, power and communications are development priorities for the population. The Taliban realises that with the introduction of essential services to the community their hold in the traditionalist philosophy will prove challenging.

Education of the younger population may be facilitated by better communications and a greater sense of enlightenment will be achieved with access to internet and audio visual media. The creation of Government sponsored schools is a fundamental step in educating the population and providing alternatives to the Taliban philosophy. It also provides an impression of progress to a war weary population.

¹⁴⁵Major General Peter Chiarelli, "Winning the Peace:...", 10.

¹⁴⁶Corporal Andrew Hetherington, "Contacts in Afghanistan," *Army: The Soldiers Newspaper*, 6 March 2008, 3.

The availability of clean water through well drilling and monitoring the water quality is possible in nearly every village. Power, operated from a localised town grid would allow the population to have visual media and other modern conveniences.

Telecommunications, through the creation of a cell tower network is the most appropriate system for southeast Afghanistan. This is underway; however, the Taliban declared that the network was to be deactivated at night, as they claimed that it was being used to track their whereabouts. Most networks complied and this demonstrated the level of control that the Taliban has in the urban and rural areas.¹⁴⁷ More importantly, the lack of network also caused a rift between the Taliban and the population who desired the network to remain.¹⁴⁸ This displays a positive yardstick for other infrastructure products, as it will provide a wedge between the population and the Taliban, while at the same time offering the population much needed essential services.

Sealed roads are important for the opening of the logistic routes for future development tasks. Roads are also extensively used by the Taliban to conduct improvised explosive device attacks on Coalitions troops, which often causes collateral damage on Afghan civilians; however, sealed roads offer less of an opportunity. In particular, capacity development of local trades and business will require the circular route around Afghanistan to be maintained, with its tributaries extending to Provincial Capitals.

Development capacity is limited and most villages have the capability to build only several infrastructure projects each year. This is limiting national infrastructure development, although the introduction of external contractors will assist but it also

¹⁴⁷Oliver Moore, "Taliban's new target: mobile phone towers," *Globe and Mail*, 11 March 2000, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080310.wafghanphone0310/BNStory/Afghanistan/home>; Internet; accessed 27 March 2008.

reduces local ‘ownership’ and the funding available to Afghan communities. The local ‘ownership’ perception is important, as the locals develop pride in what they construct but, also, the requirement for labour removes from the Taliban’s ranks many available fighting age males.

Provincial and national government departments must work together to formulate an essential services development programme and then set about constructing, in a coordinated approach with NGOs and NATO, the infrastructure grid. A restraining factor in producing this coordinated approach is the degree of corruption and the lack of good governance that exists at the local, provincial and national levels in the Afghan Government.

Promote governance

Canada’s Strategic Advisory Team, embedded within each of the Afghan National Government departments is an excellent example of generating good governance. It is currently populated by military officers but it should be civilians to stimulate increased support from departments and agencies other than ISAF countries’ defence departments. By western standards, most Afghan departments suffer from some form of corruption. The population’s support of a government perceived as illegitimate will be scant.

The loya jirga, as a means for discussions and debate, may need to be linked to the regional shuras and jirgas that convene at provincial government level. The shura and jirga concept would allow for dialogue and negotiation and potentially, considerable

¹⁴⁸Editorial, “Taliban Targets Afghan Cellular Service,” CBS News, 26 March 2008, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/03/26/world/main3971409.shtml>; Internet; accessed 27 March 2008.

reconciliation with the Taliban. The Pashtuns appear to be able to set aside previous emotions when the Pashtunwali code is a motivator.

Massive public sector reform, linked to mentoring will achieve some aspects of the necessary progress required for corruption to be eradicated, relative to the regional norms. The promotion of political and public sector employment is required, so as to recruit young intelligent Afghans to the various ministries consequently infusing economic benefits into the local community.

Economic pluralism

Despite the need for essential services, not everyone seeking employment will find suitable work through this avenue. Free market conditions, within the constraints of Afghan culture, are necessary for additional employment opportunities to be created, but it would require a level of incubation for security and stability to return prior to commencing economic business development.

Some areas that could be exploited in Southeast Afghanistan include enhancing agricultural methods for improved crop yields. This may ease poppy cultivation as higher crop yields allow farmers to sell surpluses at market. To achieve this NGO participation would be desirable, as the military is not equipped with agricultural knowledge. Additionally, international aid to entice crop production away from poppy is necessary. One concept is a guaranteed purchase of food crops at slightly above poppy value.

Summary

The six lines of the typical campaign are all linked, and the overarching information operations is necessary to reinforce to the Afghan and international populations, that the legitimacy of the Coalition and Afghan Government is sound.

Activities, such as the attacks on the telecommunications towers provide good examples of ‘wedge’ tactics, where information operations can be leveraged. Also, much is being done already in the lines of operations mentioned but several require much more to be done.

In the information operations line, quality of life improvements must be emphasized to the Afghan public, such as increased schooling. The Afghan Government must cease disseminating mixed messages, particular in relation to dealing with the Taliban. Karzai stated that he was willing to negotiate with any Taliban but then expelled to diplomats for related actions. Furthermore, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia are against negotiations. A coordinated approach is required. Foreign governments are best to avoid getting involved in Afghan politics as it undermines the Afghan National Government. Communication with Pakistan is necessary to assist in sealing the border and reducing the sanctuary allowed to belligerents.

In combat operations, a great deal more coordination between special and conventional forces is required. More unity of effort is vital, especially between ISAF troops and United States troops operating under Operations Enduring Freedom. Related to this is the requirement for more ISAF troops and for these troops to be deployable throughout Afghanistan allowing ISAF more flexibility, such as sealing the border with Pakistan. More judicious use of airpower is essential to reduce the number of Taliban who join out of revenge.

Securing the safety of the population, while reinforcing the legitimacy of the Afghan Government, is fundamental. This can only be achieved by clearing and then holding ground with a significant Afghan security forces involvement. Cleared ground is

presently not being held and the Taliban emerge when the security forces withdraw.

When villages are secured there will be greater numbers represented in polls that have confidence in the long-term and less who sit on the fence and adopting the 'wait and see' attitude. More coordinated weapon and ammunition destruction is necessary. Re-seeding occurs in arms and ammunition and to avoid re-circulating these materials, immediate field destruction must be authorised. Increased remuneration for Afghan security forces will alleviate many issues, but equally important is increasing the quality of life of Afghans.

Much of necessary essential services will be achieved if security forces clear and then hold ground, as it is a foundation for successful development to occur. Also, development can be used as a wedge against the Taliban, especially once the population becomes appreciative of a particular service. In an agrarian society, placing prices food crops slight above harvested poppy will alleviate much of the narcotics issues. However, narcotics issues are inked to the corruption in the country, which are deep rooted and will require a concerted effort to improve governance for progress to be measured.

From a governance perspective, the shura and jirga concepts must be leveraged to allow for dialogue with the Taliban and other belligerents. The Pashtun culture allows for reconciliation and forgiveness, as it is a tenet of Pashtunwali. This would allow for a greater emphasis on negotiation with Taliban, particularly as a wedge is driven between moderates and the more radical elements. Not all groups will come to the negotiation table, but to avoid a situation such as Aden, then negotiations must be commenced as soon as possible.

CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSION

This paper sought to provide a “potential solution” to defeat the current insurgency in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Yet, has any insurgency ever been absolutely defeated? This is a very broad and complex topic where, potentially, there is never any complete solution and no outright victor. This is especially the case when tenets of counterinsurgency are omitted. The steps taken in the paper to arrive at the methodology to defeat the Taliban were wide ranging.

Firstly, insurgency was defined as distinct from terrorism, although it was acknowledged that terrorism may be used as a tactic of insurgents. Further, insurgency was explored and recognised that it has changed little in the past 100 years, which allowed historic examples to be used as the basis for suggesting modifications to the current campaign. Defeat was categorised as a non-military term, such as prevent, block or reject, and then the area of the insurgency was defined as the current regions of ISAF’s Regional Commands South and East in Afghanistan. The notion that mixed messages emanated from the Taliban was recognised, but this could be used to the advantage of ISAF, as it is often a sign that the insurgent leadership is unsynchronised in its information operations messaging.

Secondly, the wider global context was discussed and it was discovered that the Afghan insurgency is likely not part of any wider global ideology, despite al Qaeda’s sanctuary originally emanating from Afghanistan. The border with Pakistan was examined, as it provides the majority of the sanctuary for the Taliban, however, it is also

the largest point of contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan and until this dispute can be resolved there will never be complete trust between the two countries.

Thirdly, the cultural and socioeconomic issues that predominate in Pashtunistan were analysed, as it is necessary for campaign planning and for anyone who moves in these circles to be aware of the nuisances involved in dealing with Pashtuns and not treat them like other Muslims. Additionally, health, narcotics, education and governance came under scrutiny for means of improvement. Overall, the Afghan Government is doing its best under the circumstances, although there will be an enduring commitment from the international community for many years to come. Domestically, many Afghans see the Karzai Government as a puppet, or under the control, of the United States and until this perception can be removed the legitimacy of the National Government will be fragile.

Finally, a typical campaign plan was used to highlight what extra measures can be incorporated to boost success in defeating the Taliban. In essence, they can be defeated. The major additional component required for their defeat in the present campaign plan is a coordinated negotiation scheme coupled with reconciliation and fused with a surgical military approach. Several aspects of the present campaign require modification in order to contribute to a Taliban defeat. They include: increased troop numbers throughout the south and east; better unity of effort between ISAF and OEF, in fact it could be argued OEF ceases and all foreign troops in Afghanistan come under one command; a change in tactical operations that includes clearing and then holding ground so as development operations can commence; dilute the economic capability of the Taliban through measures aimed at reducing poppy production; sealing the border with Pakistan to prevent sanctuary for Taliban; and, finally to reiterate previous comments, leveraging

from Pashtunwali to commence negotiations with Taliban elements through a shura or jirga type arrangement. If these aspects were incorporated into a campaign plan then surely a marked degree of success would be achieved.

Negotiations are crucial and, in many successful counterinsurgencies, negotiations have been the wedge that started the defeat of the insurgent belligerents. The only true path to an everlasting form of peace, by Afghan standards, will be to involve the Taliban in the political apparatus. Granted, not all of their grievances will be addressed, but a compromise can always be found. As Karzai stated,

For the security and prosperity of the Afghan people, in order to be freed from al-Qaeda and terrorists and their inhuman actions, we are ready for any type of discussion and negotiations.¹⁴⁹

Despite Karzai's statement he expelled two European diplomats in 2007 for negotiating with the Taliban. This gesture typifies some of the problems of defeating the insurgency in southern and eastern Afghanistan: inconsistent unity of effort.

¹⁴⁹Graeme Smith, "What the increasingly confident Taliban....."

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