CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
JCSP 34 / PCEMI N°34

MDS RESEARCH PROJECT/PROJET DE RECHERCHE MED

CHALLENGING EXPECTATIONS: THE CANADIAN FORCES' FOCUS ON DOMESTIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE

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ABSTRACT

In Canada, most emergencies are limited and managed by either municipal first responders or with the assistance of provincial or territorial authorities. Only when the nature of an emergency overwhelms the capabilities of these groups will a federal response be necessary. The Canadian Forces (CF) could contribute to the emergency response. There are, however, differences between what the general public expects of the CF during an emergency situation and what the CF has been mandated to provide.

In this paper, the public expectations regarding the government emergency response are examined. The following five areas are then reviewed in the context of domestic emergency response: the CF role in national emergencies, the CF Reserves, the coordination of the CF response, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) response capabilities and the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). In each of these areas, there are particular changes that could be made to improve the CF emergency response. Moreover, the review of these five areas highlights two common problem areas: the lack of government direction with respect to required CF capabilities, as well as clear communications to ensure that the public understands what should be expected of the CF as part of the larger government emergency response.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The nature of domestic emergency preparedness in North America has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, concerns over the possibility of a catastrophic event on domestic soil, such as a nuclear or military attack, would gradually dissipate and the population would generally regain its sense of security. This led to a reduction in emergency preparedness measures both in the United States and in Canada.

Following the surprise terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, more attention has been focused on emergency response, including terrorist attacks and calamitous natural disasters. National governments now prepare themselves for the heightened likelihood of attacks being launched from their domestic soil, with the possibility of extensive damage and the need for quicker and more effective responses. In Canada, just like the situation in the United States, the increased focus on anti-terrorism and emergency preparedness has led to significant changes in policy, organizational changes at the federal level and reviews of the readiness of emergency response plans.

The military is part of the response that a national government can offer in the event of an emergency. It is a large, national organization with specialized equipment and personnel located across the country. Government policy changes announced in 2004 and 2005, combined with direction from the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, have placed greater emphasis on the duty of the Canadian Forces (CF) to improve its capability to respond to domestic emergency situations. The CF has therefore been part of the debate with respect to its specific capabilities, roles and responsibilities as part of the larger government emergency response.

The CF is now perceived by the general population as a ready force able to provide assistance when the magnitude of events overwhelms local or regional emergency response

capabilities. Given the recent scale and tempo of changes undergone within the Canadian Forces, however, it is worthwhile to consider whether the CF has the capability to continue to meet the high expectations of Canadians with respect to domestic emergency preparedness and response.

This paper will address this question by first discussing the nature, structure and limitations of emergency preparedness and response from the point of view of the Canadian federal government and the Canadian Forces. Recent Canadian federal policy documents will then be examined to review the core sources and expectations regarding emergency response. Reports from federal government audits and committees will then be examined to identify possible problem areas in meeting expectations. This paper will demonstrate that there are significant gaps between expectations and current capabilities of the CF, particularly in the areas of their assigned roles, the CF Reserve Forces, the coordination of CF response, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) response capabilities and the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). This paper will also provide recommendations to address those gaps.

PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS

THE GOVERNMENT'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Although the nature of major natural disasters and terrorist events are quite different, members of the general public have similar expectations that the government will intervene quickly to restore public order and reassure them that the danger has subsided. While the government's emergency response is often the main focus of public attention, there are in fact four phases of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.[1] Mitigation refers to disaster prevention and also loss reduction in the event of an emergency.

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[1]David A. McEntire, *Disaster response and recovery: strategies and tactics for resilience* (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2007), 3.

Preparedness refers to the efforts to increase readiness for a disaster, including the planning and exercising of various agencies that would respond in the event of an emergency. Response is the activity in the aftermath of a disaster to protect life and property. Finally, recovery is the activity to return the affected community to pre-disaster or, preferably, an improved state.

The government's role in a large emergency is important as it is the only institution with both the resources and the authority to help all citizens during the response and recovery phases.[2] Furthermore, the perceived success in the government's emergency response depends on both the expectations of the public of what types of relief the government should provide, as well as the expectations of the government of how the public will react in the event of a disaster.[3] The government must therefore plan, coordinate and communicate in a cooperative and transparent manner so that emergency response leaders and the public understand what to expect from the government in the event of an emergency. A successful planning process should also involve community leaders and supporting agencies, such as non-governmental and charitable organizations, as they will be part of the overall emergency response.

There are three general patterns for disaster relief, usually dependent on the size of the disaster.[4] When an emergency situation is relatively small, it can usually be handled at the local level according to pre-established plans. A more extensive emergency that goes beyond the means of the local level can cause greater confusion. While local level resources would be involved in initially managing the situation, the next level of response (the regional or provincial level) would likely need to intervene to direct additional resources to the emergency. The type

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[2]Sandra K. Schneider, *Flirting with disaster: public management in crisis situations* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 5.

[3]*Ibid*., 6.

[4]*Ibid*., 7.

of emergency that could cause the most problems in the coordination of response would be a larger emergency causing deaths and major property damage. This is primarily because individuals at the national level would now become involved in coordinating the response. Each level of government will likely have its own objectives and operating procedures, as well as different reporting structures. Unless emergency response scenarios have been coordinated, planned and exercised extensively between all levels prior to the event, there will be many opportunities for failure. The disastrous three-level emergency response in New Orleans following the devastating Katrina hurricane in 2005 is an example of inadequate readiness, coordination and communications at all three levels.[5]

The bureaucratic nature of a typical government emergency organization does not lend itself well to a rapid response in the event of an emergency. Such organizations are risk-averse, are usually focused on policy development, are divided into specialized areas and are often limited by contracting and other types of red tape.[6] While their hierarchical structures are efficient in performing policy development and routine functions, they cannot adapt easily to providing new types of functions which are often required in emergency situations.[7] Charles Wise, a former director of intergovernmental affairs for the US Department of Justice, proposes as an alternative a networked model for emergency response, in which all participating organizations would share common goals and could contribute their strengths in a flexible

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[5]Charles R. Wise, "Organizing for Homeland Security After Katrina: Is Adaptive Management What's Missing?" *Public Administration Review* 66, no. 3 (May-June 2006): 302-309; http://www.proquest.com; Internet; accessed 15 January 2008.

[6]Sandra K. Schneider, *Flirting with disaster*…, 46-48.

[7]Charles R. Wise, "Organizing for Homeland Security After Katrina: …," 309-311.

manner.[8] According to this model, instead of directing the emergency response, the government emergency organization would help establish in advance the roles and responsibilities of the contributing organizations and then help coordinate the collaborative emergency measures in the event of a major emergency. An additional advantage of this approach would be that community leaders could be involved in the planning and execution of the recovery efforts, thereby reducing the gap between public expectations and government response.

A major emergency event, especially when it occurs without warning (such as a terrorist or unexpected natural disaster), causes great difficulty for governmental organizations to respond.[9] The government first needs to determine if the emergency is serious enough to merit intervention. The decision to intervene creates additional responsibilities for government authorities and also places the government organizations in a risky situation, with new possibilities of failure being introduced. The challenges brought by an emergency situation can include new types of events that could not be anticipated, complicated by limited and contradictory information (such as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks). Moreover, members of the general public expect prompt and decisive action by their government officials, who must sometimes coordinate their response across several organizations and levels of government. Public officials have to accept that the decisions taken within the short period of time will be analyzed in detail by opposing parties, the press and the public for a long period to follow. On

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[8]*Ibid*., 309-316.

[9]Uriel Rosenthal and Alexander Kouzmin, "Crises and Crisis Management: Toward Comprehensive Government Decision Making," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART* 7, no. 2 (April 1997): 277-289; http://www.jstor.org; Internet; accessed 14 January 2008.

the other hand, if an emergency situation is handled particularly well, it can contribute to political success and even facilitate the consolidation of emergency powers.[10]

The need to respond quickly and appropriately to emergency events therefore suggests that it is in the best interest of government organizations to have at their disposal pre-coordinated plans and procedures. The reality, however, is that limited government budgets lead to limited resources for emergency management organizations. As compared to other government priorities, emergency planning also usually does not provide tangible results until an emergency situation actually occurs, which can be infrequently. Furthermore, while government organizations at lower levels will be constantly seeking financial support from higher levels for emergency planning, the funding that is eventually allocated is often used to provide infrastructure or equipment that can be shared for other purposes.

The senior Canadian and US governments have both understood their leading roles in ensuring that emergency planning takes place at a variety of levels. As visible outputs of their activities, they have drafted national emergency response plans which cover a wide range of emergency events and describe the responsibilities of the various organizations. A particular challenge has been the completeness and level of detail of those response plans. At the national level, the primary efforts have been to identify the roles and responsibilities of the different governments and supporting organizations, as well as specifying the types of capabilities that the various levels of response need to have in place.[11] At lower levels of response, however, where the emergency response within the population actually occurs, much greater level of detail is

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[10]*Ibid*., 287.

[11]Brian Friel, "Unstrategic Plans," *Government Executive* 37, no. 21 (December 2005): 88; http://www.proquest.com; Internet; accessed 15 January 2008.

expected. Given the little attention that emergency planning receives from the general public, it will continue to be an unrewarding burden that the government must carry.

The nature of emergency response offers several challenges, due to high expectations from the public and the internal challenges of bureaucratic governments. Given these challenges, a shared emergency response plan would be useful to coordinate the efforts of the various response organizations.

THE US NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK

In an attempt to improve its emergency response capabilities following Hurricane Katrina,[12] the Department of Homeland Security embarked on a review of its National Response Plan, leading to the National Response Framework which went into effect on 22 March 2008.[13] As a comprehensive document, it provided an example of a national-level framework as a foundation for emergency response involving multiple government levels and supporting organizations. At the same time, the criticism it attracted also pointed to some of the difficulties in establishing a unique document for a wide variety of responsibilities.

The National Response Framework established a response doctrine, which consisted of five principles:[14]

- Engaged partnership: Need for joint preparedness prior to the emergency events (planning, resources, training, exercising and organizing), as well as communications and mutual support during the response;

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[12]"U.S. Alters its Approach to Disasters," *New York Times,* 23 January 2008; http://www.proquest.com; Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

[13]"National Response Framework in Effect," *US Fed News Service, Including US State News*, 21 March 2008; http://www.proquest.com; Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

[14]United States, Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 8-12; http://www.fema.gov/NRF; Internet, accessed 17 April 2008.

- Tiered response: Handling of the incidents at the lowest level, with higher levels ready to respond upon request;
- Scalable, flexible and adaptable operational capabilities: Provision of a flexible response corresponding to the nature of the incident, which can also change during the event;
- Unity of effort through unified command: Respect of the chain of command of the different organizations, while ensuring that mutually supporting roles and responsibilities are clearly understood; and
- Readiness to act: Decisive action, supported by clear communications and information.

In addition to the underlying doctrine, the document included the general response processes and the roles and responsibilities of the various government response organizations. The framework document itself was only 90 pages, while supporting annexes and other documentation were to be maintained and continuously updated on-line.[15]

One major criticism of the framework document is that while iy discusses the principles, roles and responsibilities of emergency response, it is primarily focused at the national level and therefore does not provide the necessary level of detail which is required at lower levels of response. As stated by a representative of the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA):[16]

> Overall, the most critical issue for NEMA is that the current framework is not a plan. The document reads more like a primer for state and local officials,

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[15]*Ibid*., 1.

[16]Tim Manning and National Emergency Management Association, "Post-9/11 and Katrina Readiness," *FDCH Congressional Testimony*, 11 September 2007; http://www.ebscohost.com; Internet; accessed 15 January 2008.

which is a valuable resource, however not the national plan for responding to disasters.

Another criticism of the document was that it did not properly take into account numerous volunteer and support organizations at the local level which contribute to a great extent towards the disaster response.[17] These include faith-based organizations, nonprofit organizations and even neighbours and friends. While a national level plan can explain the responsibilities of various government officials and organizations, the local coordination of emergency response depends to a greater extent on the nature of the incident and therefore requires additional planning and preparedness at the local level. A national document cannot therefore cover a large part of the emergency response planning that is required at the local level. This is often an additional burden for the local level, given a limited number of officials and resources to prepare the necessary additional local emergency plans.

Despite its shortcomings, the US National Response Framework could be useful as a starting point for the Canadian government. However, it would have to be adapted to the unique Canadian circumstances, as will be examined in the next section. The government and the military, in particular, have specific responsibilities detailed in legislation.

GOVERNMENT ROLES AND EMERGENCY LEGISLATION

In Canada, there are clear delineations between federal and provincial (and territorial) responsibilities with respect to emergency response.[18] The provinces and territories have jurisdiction over public security and therefore have the prime responsibility for managing emergency situations within their geographical regions. Municipalities, as legal entities of the

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[17]William L. Waugh, Jr, "Post-9/11 and Katrina Readiness," *FDCH Congressional Testimony*, 11 September 2007; http://www.ebscohost.com; Internet; accessed 15 January 2008.

[18]Canada, Department of Justice, *The Constitution Act, 1867,* http://laws.justice.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 18 April 2008.

provinces, generally provide the "first response" to an emergency situation, often through the fire or police department.[19] When the scale or area of the emergency goes beyond what the municipalities can manage, they can call for assistance from the provincial (or territorial) authorities, usually through a provincial (or territorial) Emergency Management Organization. The province (or territory) can then assign additional resources to assist them in dealing with the emergency. If the scale of the emergency situation goes beyond what the province (or territory) can manage, it can request specific resources from the federal government.

There are two key pieces of legislature that cover federal responsibilities for emergency response: the *Emergencies Act*[20] (which replaced the *War Measures Act* in 1988) and the *Emergency Management Act*[21](which replaced the *Emergency Preparedness Act* in 2007).

The *Emergencies Act* authorizes the federal government to take special temporary measures in the event of national emergencies in any of the following categories: public welfare emergencies, public order emergencies, international emergencies or war emergencies. For each of these categories, the *Emergencies Act* specifies what special measures can be undertaken by the federal government and the limitations to those measures. The *Emergencies Act* defines "national emergency" as follows:

> … an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that
> (a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or
> (b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada.

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[19]Sandra K. Schneider, *Flirting with disaster*…, 47.

[20]Canada, Department of Justice, *Emergencies Act (1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.))*, http://laws.justice.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 15 March 2008.

[21]Canada, Department of Justice, *Emergency Management Act (2007, c. 15)*, http://laws.justice.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 15 March 2008.

The *Emergency Management Act* designates the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness as the lead Minister responsible for emergency management in Canada. It also specifies several additional responsibilities for the other federal Ministers with respect to emergency preparedness, including the preparation, implementation and exercising of emergency management plans within their areas of responsibility.

Public Safety Canada, on behalf of the federal government, encourages government organizations at all levels, including provincial and municipal, to have coordinated and rehearsed emergency response plans in place. It oversees and supports the progress of emergency planning within Canada and also coordinates federal, intergovernmental and interagency emergency preparedness and response. In some cases, the types of assistance to be provided by the federal government have been predefined through Memoranda of Understanding or through emergency response plans. The federal government can also take control of a particular emergency situation if it determines that such coordination by a federal department is of national interest.[22]

THE MILITARY ROLE IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

The *National Defence Act*[23] provides the legal basis for existence and activities of the Canadian Forces. It documents two different types of assistance that the CF can provide in the event of a domestic emergency. *Part VI Aid of the Civil Power* covers possible assistance by the CF in the event of a riot or disturbance that goes beyond the powers of civil authorities to suppress. *Article 273.6 Public Service* covers other circumstances when the government may authorize the CF to perform "any duty involving public service." This last article was added

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[22]Canada, Public Safety Canada, "Emergency Management," http://www.ps-sp.gc.ca/thm/em/index-eng.aspx; Internet; accessed 3 February 2008.

[23]Canada, Department of Justice, *National Defence Act (R.S., 1985, c. N-5),* http://laws.justice.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 15 March 2008.

through *Bill C-25* in 1998.[24] It allows the government to direct the CF to provide assistance beyond what was previously limited to "duties in relation to a national disaster."

Despite the wide range of support that the Canadian Forces must be prepared to offer during emergency situations, the type of support that is actually provided has to be carefully considered and properly authorized.[25] In domestic emergency operations, the CF contributes in support of government agencies (federal, provincial or municipal). The rule of law continues to be enforced by the civilian police force (including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police), which severely restricts the nature of security related duties that can be assigned to CF personnel. Other examples of the need for careful consideration of the use of military personnel are in the provision of health services (which is a generally a provincial responsibility) and logistics and engineering support, which should not deny opportunities from Canadian commercial service providers. The Canadian Forces must also ensure that if a significant relief force is provided for an extended period of time, it can still continue to meet priority national security responsibilities, including ongoing overseas operations.

Over the last decade, the Canadian Forces have provided support to a number of domestic emergency situations which have enhanced both their reputation and popularity.[26] The following

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[24]Canada, Library of Parliament, "Bill C-25: An Act to Amend the National Defence Act," http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/LS/361/c25-e.htm; Internet; accessed 1 April 2008.

[25]Canada, Canadian Armed Forces, Canada Command, *Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2006), 4-1/4, 4-2/4.

[26]Canada, Canadian Armed Forces, *Domestic operations: Canadian Army perspectives* (Ottawa: 33 Canadian Brigade Group, 2005), 21-31.

is a summary of the most significant recent domestic emergency operations (in chronological order):[27]

- OPERATION ASSISTANCE (21 April – 19 May 1997): On 20 April 1997, in response to severe flooding in the Winnipeg area, the Manitoba provincial government requested military aid. The military provided approximately 8,500 personnel to assist civilian authorities, at the time the largest domestic operation ever conducted. Many of the military performed simple tasks, such as filling sandbags to build floodwalls and assisting citizens around the region.
- OPERATION RECUPERATION (8 January – 8 February 1998): In response to an extended ice storm and power failures in eastern Ontario and Quebec in 1998. Further described below.
- OPERATION PERSISTENCE (2-14 September 1998): As a result of the crash of Swissair flight 111 off Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia. The Canadian Forces personnel worked under the direction of the Transportation Safety Board and in conjunction with the Canadian Coast Guard, the RCMP, police forces and many volunteers. In addition to the recovery of the bodies of the passengers and crew, it was also important to recover as many parts of the aircraft as possible, in order to determine the cause of the accident.
- OPERATION SUPPORT (11-14 September 2001): Immediate support following the US terrorist attacks. Following the decision to ground all aircraft in the US, many aircraft were diverted to Canada. CF units throughout the Atlantic region provided shelter and support to stranded passengers and aircrew. In addition, while many of

[27]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Past Operations, " http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Operations/past_ops_e.asp; Internet; accessed 28 February 2008.

the military personnel were put on emergency standby, the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) was also placed on standby for deployment if required.

- OPERATION PEREGRINE (3-16 September 2003): Due to the extent of forest fires burning across the province, the Government of British Columbia declared a state of emergency on 2 August 2003 and requested military assistance on 3 August 2003. Within 24 hours, soldiers from Land Force Western Area were deployed to perform fire-fighting. More than 2200 CF personnel were involved in fighting five major fires. The CF also provided medical and logistical support to the civilian and military firefighters.

While Canada has fortunately not experienced terrorist attacks on its own territory over the last decade, the immediate emergency response would be similar to an unforeseen natural disaster. Both terrorist attacks and natural disasters require the mobilization of an emergency response at the local level to prevent further loss of life, minimize infrastructure damage and contain the situation. Local emergency services, perhaps augmented by regional services, can handle most types of localized emergencies. Therefore, such events would not usually require military assistance.[28]

When the magnitude of the catastrophe overwhelms the capabilities of municipal first responders, they cannot simply call their local military base for support (unless such support is pre-arranged through existing agreements). Even if military commanders in the vicinity would like to provide assistance, there are several legal and constitutional limitations to doing so. A request for military assistance would need to be passed through provincial authorities to the federal government, which would consult with the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of

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[28]James F. Miskel, *Disaster response and homeland security: what works, what doesn't* (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2006), 54.

Defence Staff. Considerations in providing military support include the urgency of the situation, financial implications, liability, the availability of personnel and equipment and the state of ongoing operations and security commitments.[29] Nevertheless, in the event of catastrophic events such as natural disasters covering extended regions, the Canadian Forces can be relied upon to bring important equipment assets and a large contingent of military personnel to help with emergency relief, restore public order and minimize suffering.

OP RECUPERATION

The Canadian Forces participated in their largest domestic operation during the recovery after a severe ice storm in Eastern Ontario and Western Quebec in 1998. As a result of the ice storm, more than one million households lacked electricity (900,000 in Quebec and 100,000 in Ontario).[30] This operation, named OP RECUPERATION, serves as a good example of the use of CF personnel in the response phase following a large emergency and also provides considerations and lessons learned for future domestic operations.

There were approximately fifteen thousand Regular Force and four thousand Reserve force personnel from all over the country who assisted in the emergency response.[31] While some of the military units arrived from local areas as whole teams, many of the forces arrived as reinforcements flown in by air. A large challenge for the supervising military personnel was to coordinate the arrival and tasks for the large number of military forces into an area that was already lacking electricity and warm shelters.

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[29]Canada, …, Canada Command direction for domestic operations …, 1-1/8 – 1-8/8.

[30]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Past Operations, " http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Operations/past_ops_e.asp; Internet; accessed 28 February 2008.

[31]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Past Operations. "

The government had a major role in the emergency response and recovery. At the municipal level, municipal managers and politicians struggled to obtain assistance to arrange for shelters, emergency food and water, cleared roads and the removal of safety hazards. At the federal and provincial levels, the government provided financial assistance, both directly to organizations assisting in the recovery and also to the affected people and businesses. Moreover, the government emergency organizations arranged for assistance from other provinces and from the United States, which assisted in reducing the impact of the emergency and speeding up the recovery efforts.[32] However, there was still some criticism with respect to the Quebec premier, Lucien Bouchard, who only requested federal assistance 72 hours after the storms began.[33] Moreover, the use of the available military forces caused disagreements between provincial and municipal authorities.[34]

The military personnel were called to perform many tasks in support of civil authorities. One of the roles was to support security efforts, with CF personnel assisting police authorities. At the request of the Quebec Government, the Canadian Forces were given special powers as peace officers, partly in order to curb the large number of thefts (particularly around the Montreal region).[35] A major deficiency in the military orders provided by the higher

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[32]Charles Gordon, "The Warm Lessons of Ice Storm '98, " *Maclean's* 111, no. 7 (16 February 1998); http://www.proquest.com; Internet; accessed 22 April 2008.

[33]Anthony Wilson-Smith, "Great Ice Storm of 1998," *Maclean's* (19 January 1998); http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0011472; Internet; accessed 22 April 2008.

[34]Canada, Department of National Defence, The Army Lessons Learned Centre, "Lessons Learned in Civil-Military Cooperation, " *Dispatches* vol 5, no. 3 (February 1999): 21; http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/ALLC/Downloads/dispatch/Vol_5/vol5no3e.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 April 2008.

[35]Nelson Wyatt, "Canadian Forces Personnel Get Special Arrest Powers [in Quebec: Ice Storm]." *Canadian Press NewsWire* (13 January 1998); http://www.proquest.com; Internet; accessed 22 April 2008.

headquarters to the CF units was the lack of Rules of Engagement.[36] These rules should specify (in very clear terms) in what circumstances the CF personnel can use force against civilians, in order to ensure that only minimum and appropriate force is used at all times. Due to the fact that many of the military personnel had never practiced security in domestic operations (only for war situations), there was a risk that they would take matters into their own hands to resolve situations, especially if they had to operate in isolated areas without the support of civilian police. This problem of security training continues to exist as, due to concerns over the possible perception of military control over civilians, general crowd confrontation training continues to be severely limited by the military.[37]

Another major task performed by the military personnel was to support hydro crews to clear out roads and fallen trees in order to assist in the recovery of the electrical power.[38] Military engineers and technicians worked with hydro and telephone crews to repair and replace transmission towers and utility poles.[39] However, even in such a critical emergency situation, there can be conflicts between civilian employees and military personnel working side by side. In the case of the ice storm, hydro employees were receiving a lot of overtime money and some of the employees resented the loss of some overtime opportunities due to the work being performed by the military personnel.[40]

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[36]Canada, Canadian Armed Forces, *Domestic operations:…,* 23.

[37]Canada, …, Canada Command direction for domestic operations …, 1-8/8.

[38]Mike Blanchfield, "Military Came in Like Movie Cavalry: Ice Storm made Soldiers Real Heroes," *The Ottawa Citizen*, Jan 7, 1999; http://www.proquest.com; Internet; accessed 22 April 2008.

[39] Canada, Department of National Defence, "Past Operations. "

[40]Canada, …, "Lessons Learned in Civil-Military Cooperation, " 33.

The specific responsibilities of the military personnel had to be determined as part of the larger relief effort, with the military performing a supporting and not a lead role. Liaison officers from the military assisted in ensuring proper coordination with the rest of the supported organizations. The importance of clear reporting relationships for the liaison officers and the designation of areas of responsibility were other important lessons learned from this operation.[41] The military was not the only group helping out in emergency response. There were many charitable and voluntary organizations that helped out during the recovery, as well as many friends and family helping each other.[42] These volunteer groups greatly assisted in the emergency response, however, they also required additional coordination with the military liaison officers and public officials, to ensure maximum effectiveness of the relief efforts.

The public response towards the Canadian Forces was generally favourable after the ice storm, with a 90 percent approval rating in Quebec[43] and 79 percent rating across Canada.[44] Within the overall assistance provided by the military, it was largely the personal contact of the military personnel with the civilian population that led to greater credibility and support for the CF.[45] The emergency response provided by the military also allowed the CF to develop better relationships with both emergency management organizations and the communities.

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[41]Canada, …, "Lessons Learned in Civil-Military Cooperation, " 14, 16.

[42]Charles Gordon, "The Warm Lessons of Ice Storm '98. "

[43]Guylaine Fortin, "A light in the darkness, " *The Maple Leaf* vol 11, no 6 (13 February 2008): 6; http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/community/mapleleaf/vol_11/vol11_06/1106_full.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 April 2008.

[44]Mike Blanchfield, "Military Came in Like Movie Cavalry: Ice Storm made Soldiers Real Heroes," *The Ottawa Citizen*, Jan 7, 1999; http://www.proquest.com; Internet; accessed 22 April 2008.

[45]Martin Shadwick, "Of Cormorants … and Ice," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 27, no 3 (Spring 1998): 4.

The increased national emphasis on emergency preparedness, combined with recent CF domestic operations, have led to particular scrutiny with regards to the abilities of the Canadian Forces to provide assistance in response to catastrophic emergency situations. The following sections will review the issue of emergency preparedness in further detail, with a particular focus on the expected capabilities of the CF.

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY

At the turn of the century, there was a significant lack of a Canadian policy with regards domestic security and emergency preparedness. The last formal Canadian policy statement, *Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995* [46] had been primarily outward looking and thus did not provide much insight into national needs or expectations for national emergency preparedness. Several national emergencies during the late 1990s, such as the Winnipeg floods and the Ice Storm, were generally well handled by the Canadian government and received notable CF support. The next potential crisis was the "Year 2000" (Y2K) problem, for which the Canadian government and the military considered itself ready. In the end, it was a non-event. Therefore, there was not much emphasis by either the general public or the federal government on the necessity of maintaining a strong and effective national emergency response capability.

The 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States increased public concern with respect to the likelihood of a domestic terrorist emergency. Within the next two years, the Canadian Liberal government would produce two significant policy documents in succession, both addressing international and national security issues: *Security and Open Society: Canada's*

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[46]Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995,* http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp; Internet; accessed 18 April 2008.

National Security Policy (2004)[47] and *Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* (2005).[48] While neither of these policy documents have been officially adopted by the current Conservative government, they have not been discounted either. They, along with relevant speeches and press releases from Public Safety Canada, provide the latest official Canadian federal policy statements upon which expectations regarding domestic emergency preparedness can be derived.

Security and Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy (referred to in this paper as the *National Security Policy*) was introduced by the majority Liberal government in April 2004 as "Canada's first-ever comprehensive statement of our National Security Policy."[49]

Security. The *National Security Policy* also included a specific chapter on "emergency planning and management," recommending the implementation of the following key measures:[51]

- a new Government Operations Centre, to coordinate across government departments and with key national players in the event of national emergencies;
- an updated Emergency Preparedness Act, to support the required national emergency management system;
- a permanent federal-provincial-territorial forum on emergencies;
- co-location (where practical) with provincial, territorial and municipal emergency measures operation centres;
- a position paper setting out the key elements of a proposed Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy for Canada;
- an increase in its capacity to predict and prevent cyber-security attacks against its networks; and
- a national task force, with public and private representation, to develop a National Cybersecurity Strategy.

While calling for new initiatives in the area of emergency preparedness, the *National Security Policy* also recognized several CF ongoing initiatives in the area of emergency preparedness, including:[52]

- improved coordination of Canada-US emergency response planning, through a new Bi-National Planning Group (at Colorado Springs);
- improvements in nuclear, biological and chemical incident response;

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[51] *Ibid*., 21-27.

[52] *Ibid*., 23-24.

- enhancements to the capacities of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART); and
- increases in the number and capabilities of the CF Reserves available in support of the response of natural disasters and local emergencies.

Chapter 8, "International Security," referred to the linkage between national security and the Canadian Forces:[53]

> National security is a key driver of Canadian defence policy. The primary obligation of the Canadian Forces is to defend Canada and Canadians, particularly from external military threats. They also play a key role in protecting Canadians from internal threats to their security, both accidental and intentional…The government recognizes that the Canadian Forces constitute an essential national security capability … getting the right balance between domestic and international security concerns will be an important consideration in determining the roles and force structure of the Canadian Forces.

Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World[54] (referred to in this paper as the International Policy Statement), released in 2005, provided the basis for a renewed foreign policy. Of note, there were in fact five documents associated with the 2005 International Policy Statement: overview, diplomacy, defence, development and commerce. The defence document soon became known as the Defence Policy Statement.[55] It announced major changes with respect to the structure and role of the CF. The focal point of change was an "update [of] the approach that the Canadian Forces take to domestic operations." In particular, it explained that "the first challenge is to strike the right balance between the Canadian Forces' domestic and international roles," and stated that the Government "believes

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[53]*Ibid*., 47-52.

[54]Canada, *Canada's international policy statement: a role of pride and influence in the world, Overview* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005).

[55]Canada, *Canada's international policy statement: a role of pride and influence in the world*, Defence (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005).

that a greater emphasis must be placed on the defence of Canada and North America than in the past."[56]

The creation of Canada Command, which was introduced in the *Defence Policy Statement*, was a significant command structure change which paralleled the relatively new "Northern Command" in the United States. It provided a headquarters to monitor and direct domestic operations within Canada and the rest of North America. It also allowed the direction of an "integrated military response" to respond to domestic emergency situations, which was recognized in the Defence Policy Statement as being as an area of weakness:[57]

> In the past, Canada has structured its military primarily for international operations, while the domestic role has been treated as a secondary consideration. At home, the military's response has been to assemble a temporary force drawn from existing structures designed for other purposes, using the resources immediately available to the local commander. Clearly, this approach will no longer suffice.

The *Defence Policy Statement* also included the following commitments by the Canadian Forces:

- to improve the coordination with other government departments and with allied forces;
- to work more closely with civil authorities at all levels of government;
- to dedicate specific resources in order to enhance the ability to carry out domestic roles;
- to enhance capabilities of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART); and
- to expand [its] presence across the country while improving [its] ability to move people and equipment more rapidly to where they are needed.

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[56]*Ibid*., 2.

[57]*Ibid*., 18.

When the Conservatives replaced the Liberals in February 2006, they did not institute major changes to the official defence policy.[58] Through the Speech from the Throne on 4 April 2006,[59] the Conservative government primarily focused its security measures on "tackling crime." During the response to the Speech from the Throne on 5 April 2006, however, the Prime Minister outlined in non-specific terms a new "Canada First" defence policy:[60]

> We will pursue a "Canada First" defence policy which will repair the damage done to our armed forces over 13 years of willful neglect and allow us to protect our sovereignty from the Atlantic to the Pacific and to the Arctic.

Despite the commitment to a new defence policy, it has not yet been published. Moreover, the expression "Canada First" was not publicly clarified, leaving some confusion to its meaning. It remains unclear, for example, whether it applies to the pursuit of additional equipment for the military, or an enhanced CF presence on the world stage to protect national sovereignty. The next Speech from the Throne on 16 October 2007 did not provide additional clarification.[61] Instead, in terms of "strengthening the security of Canadians," it reinforced the need to pursue anti-crime legislation and anti-terrorism initiatives. It also stated that the government would address the protection of Canadians through a "statement on national security." Nevertheless, it is not clear if this referred to the "Canada First" defence policy that

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[58]Kim Richard Nossal, "Defense Policy and the Atmospherics of Canada-U.S. Relations: The Case of the Harper Conservatives," *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 37, no. 1 (Spring, 2007): 30.

[59]Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, "Turning a New Leaf. Speech from the Throne 4 April 2006," http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1087; Internet; accessed 6 April 2008.

[60]Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, "Prime Minister backs the Speech from the Throne 5 April 2006," http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1090; Internet; accessed 6 April 2008.

[61] Canada, Government of Canada, "Strong Leadership. A Better Canada. Speech from the Throne October 16 2007," http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/eng/index.asp; Internet; accessed 6 April 2008.

was announced the previous year. The Prime Minister did not offer further clarification on this point in his reply to the Speech from the Throne the next day.[62]

As the Conservative government has not yet published an updated defence policy, the above mentioned 2004 and 2005 policy documents, as well as relevant speeches and press releases, remain the key documents to analyze government policy. They will be used as the basis to analyze the Canadian government's responsibilities and commitments in the area of domestic emergency preparedness.

The next section will review critiques from the Senate and the Office of the Auditor General with respect to the government's performance in meeting its responsibilities and commitments in that area.

PROBLEMS RELATED TO FEDERAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

GOVERNMENT REPORTS

Since 2001, there have been four key federal government reports that have critiqued the national capacity to respond to domestic emergencies: two from the Auditor General's office (March 2004[63] and April 2005[64]) and two by the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (March 2004[65] and June 2006[66]).

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[62]Canada, Government of Canada, "Prime Minister Stephen Harper addresses the House of Commons in a reply to the Speech from the Throne 17 October 2007," http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1373; Internet; accessed 6 April 2008.

[63]Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, *2004 March Report of the Auditor General of Canada,* http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/aud_parl_oag_200403_e_1123.html; Internet; accessed 4 February 2008.

[64]Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, *2005 April Report of the Auditor General of Canada,* http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/aud_parl_oag_200504_e_1120.html; Internet; accessed 4 February 2008.

[65]Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines, An Upgrade Strategy* (Ottawa: Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 2004), http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep03mar04-e.htm; Internet; accessed 13 January 2008.

The main role of the Office of the Auditor General of Canada is "to hold the federal government accountable for its stewardship of public funds."[67] It reviews official commitments made by the federal government and reports on the outcome of those commitments, as well as its use of public funds to achieve those commitments. The Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has greater latitude with respect to its examinations and reported findings. The Senate Committee's reports are useful because they examine specific areas of public interest. Furthermore, the Committee is multi-party and has significant powers to gain access to information from within the federal government. Nevertheless, due the detailed and non-binding nature of the Senate Committee reports, they tend to be ignored by the government when they are particularly critical. Moreover, as there is much public focus on the efficient use of taxpayer money, the Auditor General's reports tend to be more widely disseminated and therefore responded to by the federal government.

For each of the Auditor General and Senate Committee reports, this chapter will highlight findings in the area of emergency preparedness and response and then focus on the specific problems related to the Canadian Forces.

AUDITOR GENERAL REPORTS

The March 2004 Auditor General's report, Chapter 3, was entitled "National Security in Canada – The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative."[68] Its main focus was management of the Public Security and Anti-Terrorism initiative that was announced in the 2001 Budget, with $7.7 billion

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[66]Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, *The Government's no. 1 job: securing the military options it needs to protect Canadians* (Ottawa: Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 2006), http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/rep-e/repintjun06-e.htm; Internet; accessed 13 January 2008.

[67]Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, "Welcome to the Office of the Auditor General of Canada," http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/admin_e_41.html; Internet; accessed 18 April 2008.

[68]Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, *2004 March Report of the Auditor General of Canada.*

in new funds to be spent from 2002-2007. The report also included relevant findings with respect to domestic emergency preparedness. In particular, it acknowledged progress in this area, such as the creation of the new Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, the new position of National Security Advisor and the new Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies.

The April 2005 Auditor General's report included a further examination of the progress of the federal government in addressing required changes in the area of national security and emergency preparedness.[69] Chapter 2 was entitled "National Security in Canada – The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative: Air Transportation Security, Marine Security, and Emergency Preparedness." The Auditor General reported difficulty in tracing the expenditure of public funds relating to specific anti-terrorism initiatives.

With respect to federal emergency preparedness, the following were the key findings of the report:

- There was a need to complete changes to the legislative framework in order to provide PSEPC with the authority and powers it needs for strategic coordination;
- The command and control structure related to the federal response needed to be clarified;
- PSEPC should work with federal partners and the provinces (and territories) to improve the co-ordination of response plans;
- There was a need to further document and exercise response plans, with a more detailed analysis of exercise results;

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[69]Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, *2005 April Report of the Auditor General of Canada.*

- The chain of command for the federal response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) incident remained complex and therefore needed to be clarified;
- There was a need for further build up CBRN capabilities (particularly within the RCMP and the Canadian Forces);
- Better management of the National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS) was required by Health Canada; and
- Better management of funds and coordination of efforts with regards to Critical Infrastructure Protection was required.

The main focus of the report in the area of Canadian Forces emergency preparedness was its efforts in improving its CBRN response capabilities. It was acknowledged, however, that the primary Canadian Forces CBRN unit, the Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence (JNBCD) Company, had a limited role in responding to possible CBRN terrorist incidents. A DND news release in March 2005 explained that the JNBCD Company was a resource available to assist at the national level, coordinated through the Government Operations Centre and the Minister of National Defence.[70] However, there was no official DND media release within the next months regarding the findings of the 2005 Auditor General's report, and therefore it is difficult to assess if DND was planning to further expand the role of the JNBCD Company as a result of the recommendations.

As the 2005 Auditor General's report was published in April of that year, it could not address the government commitments that were announced during that same month through the

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[70] Canada, Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder – Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence (JNBCD) Company (BG-02.036a – March 22, 2005)," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=505; Internet; accessed 16 February 2008.

International Policy Statement and the *Defence Policy Statement.* However, it did emphasize the need for PSEPC, as the lead agency, to better coordinate the federal response to domestic emergency events. This emphasis would provide guidance to the newly formed Canada Command, which had primary responsibility for Canadian Forces response to domestic emergency events. The overlapping areas of responsibilities between PSEPC and the Canada Command would no doubt require improved coordination between the two organizations.

SENATE COMMITTEE REPORTS

While the Auditor General reports focused on expenditures and gaps between government commitments and actual performance, the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence performed two studies of emergency preparedness and national security. Based on work performed from July 2001 to January 2004, the Senate Committee published a report in March 2004 entitled *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines, An Upgrade Strategy*.[71] Its main focus was the interaction between emergency preparedness planners at the federal, provincial and municipal levels.

As a result of its work, the 2004 Senate Committee report provided nineteen recommendations in various areas, with the most relevant to this paper's analysis summarized here:

- The CF needed to enhance its capabilities for domestic emergency response (further expanded below);
- The federal government should provide four years of additional funding for the purchase of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection equipment;

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[71] Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines, An Upgrade Strategy.*

- The Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) should negotiate memoranda of understanding between the federal government and the provinces and territories in order to detail inter-jurisdictional responsibilities for both emergency preparedness and response;
- There was a need for improved communications capabilities to broadcast important messages to the public during emergencies;
- Communications capabilities between the various orders of government and first responders should be improved; and
- There was a need to update legislation with regards to OCIPEP's role.

The Senate Committee, by its nature, directed significant attention to areas where the CF could improve the ability of the federal government to respond effectively to emergency situations. As stated in the report, while explaining the CF's support for emergency response, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison informed the Committee that "domestic operations are not a primary responsibility of the armed forces, nor are the armed forces adequately equipped or trained to fill that role." The Senate Committee report reflected the view that the Canadian Forces should go beyond this limited support role and therefore should be prepared to provide greater assistance during domestic emergencies. Accordingly, the report also included the following specific recommendations on how the CF should improve its emergency response capabilities:

- The Regular Forces should be equipped and trained to deal with significant emergencies in Canada;
- The Regular Forces and the Reserves should be more involved in regional emergency planning;

- The Reserves should be expanded, equipped and trained to be a civil defence force capable of quickly aiding local authorities in the event of a national emergency;
- The Reserves should be involved in emergency planning and training in conjunction with municipalities across the country; and
- The focus of the Canadian Forces Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) should shift to domestic operations and its effectiveness should be increased accordingly.

Two years later, in June 2006, the Senate Committee produced a further report primarily related to the Canadian Forces entitled *The Government's No. 1 Job: Securing the Military Options It Needs to Protect Canadians.*[72] In its introduction, the position of the Senate Committee was clear: "The Canadian Forces must be rebuilt for one very good reason: Canadians need better military protection." It emphasized the expectations of the Canadian Forces towards emergency response, stating: "Whether Canada's crises are man-made or natural, our armed forces constitute the backbone of our response team." The report also included several recommendations meant to better prepare the Canadian Forces for emergency response:

- The CF should increase the presence of Reserves in major urban centres;
- The CF should rationalize the infrastructure of the Reserves in order to create multi-use community centres (thus providing a focal point for building relationships with the community and local first responders);
- The federal Government should consider expanding the DART's mandate and capabilities, with "greater focus to potential domestic operations as part of the government's 'Canada First' strategy";

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[72] Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, *The Government's no. 1 job: securing the military options it needs to protect Canadians.*

- The DART should establish a closer working relationship with other responding government departments (Public Health, the RCMP and Transport Canada), as well as with provincial, territorial and municipal first responders; and
- The CF should centralize all resources of the DART in one location (Trenton, Ontario) to improve its readiness and access strategic airlift.

In sum, the Auditor General and the Senate Committee provided a series of recommendations regarding possible improvements in the federal Government's capability to respond to domestic emergencies. The Canadian Forces were seen as an important component of that response. The next chapter will examine in further detail the capability gaps that were identified and provide recommendations.

CF CAPABILITY GAPS FOR DOMESTIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE

DETERMINATION OF GAPS

The last sections discussed the legal and policy frameworks for domestic emergency preparedness, as well as expectations and problem areas identified by Auditor General and Senate Committee reports. This chapter will further explore these problem areas, in order to derive the capability gaps between the public expectations for the Canadian Forces and existing (or planned) capabilities. It will also provide recommendations in each of these capability gap areas.

Overall, through its successes over the last decade in providing support in emergency situations, the CF has managed to meet the general expectations of the Canadian public for support when required. This support has been provided despite a large commitment to overseas operations, which has challenged the limited budget of the Canadian Forces and the availability of personnel.

There are areas, however, where adjustments can be made to better position the Canadian Forces for continued success in its domestic emergency response. The key is to match the needs of the CF with the expectations of the Canadians and the Canadian government. The examined reports identified five main areas in which the Canadian Forces needed to make changes to improve their capabilities for domestic emergence response. The following provides a summary of the key gaps and recommendations that will be identified in this chapter:

1. The CF Role in National Emergencies	Completion and publication of the Canada First Defence Strategy.
2. Employment of the CF Reserves in Domestic Emergencies	Clarification of the new role of Reserves in support of domestic operations and the role of the new territorial defence units.
3. Coordination of CF Response	Clearer capability goals and adequate resources for the new Canada Command Headquarters.
4. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) response capabilities	Clearer goals with respect to required enhancements to CBRN response capability.
5. Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) capabilities	Review of the role of the DART for domestic response, leading to clear expectations and equipment and personnel changes if necessary.

In order to monitor past and planned progress within the CF, two key departmental reports will be used: the *2006-2007 National Defence Departmental Performance Report*[73] (referred to as *DPR*) and the *2007-2008 National Defence Report on Plans and Priorities* (*RPP*).[74] The *DPR* is the yearly report to Parliament on departmental activities and expenditures for the reporting period, in this case for the period from 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2007. In addition to the necessary financial information, the *DPR* contains information on what department goals were actually fulfilled. The *RPP* is the yearly report prepared to support the

[73]Canada, Department of National Defence, *Performance Report for the period ending March 31, 2007,* http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/dpr_e.asp; Internet; accessed 16 February 2008.

[74]Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008,* http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/rpp_e.asp; Internet; accessed 19 February 2008.

next fiscal year's budget estimates and allocation process. It refers to the departmental plans and priorities for the next fiscal year, and therefore provides a useful public indication of the priority areas and commitments by the department. The 2007-2008 *RPP* covers the period from 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008.

THE CF ROLE IN NATIONAL EMERGENCIES

The 2005 *Defence Policy Statement* called for a renewed CF focus on domestic security. This theme appears to be understood by the current Conservative government, as reflected in the "Canada First" vision of its 2006 *Conservative Federal Election Platform*.[75] The "Canada First" approach would strengthen security at home, as well as see "large-scale investments in every region of the country" to enhance the defence forces. However, the "Canada First" approach was not translated into an approved Canadian Forces policy after the Conservatives took power in February 2006.

One major impact of not having an officially revised CF policy is that major decisions at the higher levels of government appear by the public to be made on a case by case basis. This approach also creates difficulty in planning for major changes in the role of the CF, such as performing a major shift in emphasis from foreign operations to domestic operations (as recommended in the policy documents).

The *DPR* explains that implementation of the Canada First Defence Strategy (referred to as CFDS) has already begun "with the initiation of a number of major acquisition projects to enhance the mobility and deployability of the Canadian Forces."[76] In a section entitled "Monitor Resource Utilization," however, the report acknowledged that the CFDS was still under

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[75]Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006,45,* http://www.conservative.ca/media/20060113-Platform.pdf; Internet; accessed 18 April 2007.

[76]Canada, Department of National Defence, *Performance Report… ,* i.

development, leading to "ongoing challenges" to link resource allocation to the unwritten policy document.[77]

Within the *RPP*, implementation of the CFDS was rated as one of four Defence Department priorities for 2007-2008; however, the description of the priority does not refer to the completion of the development of the strategy.[78] Instead, the description refers to the major acquisition programs and the need to "strengthen key multilateral and bilateral organization relationships." The *RPP* only refers to the actual development of the CFDS in two other places: one referring to its expected publication in the first months of the fiscal year,[79] the other referring to the need to properly communicate the CFDS when published.[80] The rest of the *RPP* uses the general concept of the CFDS to support investments in various areas, without referring to the specifics of policy.

Through its title, the Canada First Defence Strategy implies a more comprehensive focus on domestic security, including emergency preparedness. Nevertheless, the fact that the current Conservative Government has used this strategy as a generic term to support many procurements related to the current operations in Afghanistan raises questions about its true intent. Does Canada First now imply ensuring the Canada has sufficient assets, some of which can also be used for domestic purposes? Does it mean ensuring that the CF can meet all of its commitments?

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[77]*Ibid*., 51.

[78]Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008,* 9.

[79]*Ibid*., 15.

[80]*Ibid*., 65.

The Chief of Defence Staff, Rick Hillier, explained part of his "Canada First" vision in a speech to the Conference of Defence Association on 24 Feburary 2006.[81] In particular, he outlined the importance of quick domestic emergency response:

> […] whether routine or emergency, terrorist attack or natural disaster, the success [of operations] will be determined in that first 24 hours with the psychological impacts that come from perceived success or perceived failure being substantial. … Win those first 24 hours.

Such a rapid response requires a high degree of readiness on the part of the Canadian Forces, with the readiness translated in the availability of personnel on short notice, availability of air, land or sea transport and also pre-packaged equipment ready for shipment and immediate employment. Moreover, such a commitment to high readiness also requires properly exercised plans and clear procedures to cover a multiple of scenarios. As the time for planning and decision making is included in the desired 24 hour response, they will have to be streamlined, at the possible risk of incorrect decisions, such as expensive deployments that were not necessary.

Furthermore, a key principle in the development of new Canadian Forces capabilities is that they must be based on clear policy and direction. The current policy documents were published under a Liberal government and not formally endorsed by the Conservative government; however, they are the policy documents that continue to be used as the basis for the development of CF capabilities.[82] Moreover, there continues to be uncertainty at the senior levels of the Canadian Forces with respect to what will (or not) be supported by the current Conservative government. The CF has to turn to its Chief of Defence Staff for the required guidance and direction, which has been generally provided. However, this situation could lead

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[81] General R.J. Hillier, Transcript of the Speech Delivered by General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff, at the Conference of Defence Association Annual General Meeting, Ottawa, 24 Feburary 2006; http://www.cda-cdai.ca/CDA_GMs/AGM69/Hillier.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 January 2008.

[82] Canada, Department of National Defence, "Strategic Visioning – Overview," http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/dp_m/sv_e.asp; Internet; accessed 19 March 2008.

to public suspicions that the Chief of Defence Staff is dictating the Canadian Forces' needs to the government, instead of following government direction.

The desired emphasis of effort of the Canadian Forces towards domestic emergency response therefore has to be clearly provided through publication of the Canadian First Defence Strategy at the earliest opportunity. This will allow a better realignment of priorities and more focused development of new capabilities at the senior levels of the CF. It will also provide the general public with a better understanding of what it should expect in terms of CF's domestic emergency response, with adjustments as required through both public and political feedback.

EMPLOYMENT OF THE CF RESERVES FOR DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES

The Primary Reserve of the Canadian Forces consists of approximately 25,000 members, divided into six groups: Naval, Army, Air, Communications, Health Services, Legal and the National Defence Headquarters Primary Reserve List.[83] The majority of the Naval, Air, Communications, Health Services and Legal reserve personnel have clearly defined roles, either integrated with regular force units or as reserve units. The main reserve force that would respond to a domestic emergency on Canada's territory would be the Army Reserve (also called the Militia), which is part of the Land Force Command, consisting of approximately 17,000 personnel, of which about 3,900 are deployed or employed full-time across Canada to replace Regular Force personnel.[84] The Canadian Army has historically considered the Reserves as part of an integrated team of Regular Forces, Reserve Forces and civilian personnel. The role of the

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[83]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder - Canada's Reserve Force (BG-08.005 – February 20, 2008)," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2579; Internet; accessed 26 February 2008.

[84]Canada, Department of National Defence, *Performance Report… ,* 26.

Army Reserve is to "augment, sustain and mobilize in support of the Army."[85] However, such a broad statement of the role of the Army Reserve has led to considerable misunderstanding and variations in expectations of the contributions of the Army Reserve.[86] For domestic emergency operations, the Reserve Forces can provide emergency personnel either as individuals or as units, often proving to be a quicker on-site response that the Regular Forces (which are generally restricted to a fewer number of bases over Canada).

The United States has used the National Guard effectively as an emergency assistance force, with a key difference with Canada being that the National Guard can be deployed directly by order of the State Governors (comparable to provincial and territorial premiers). In Canada, a call-out of reserves for major domestic events would always involve the federal government, either directly in the event that a national emergency were declared, or upon request from provincial authorities for a more regional type of emergency.

In 1995, the Canadian Defence Minister launched a Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves in order to review the structure of the Reserve Force, in particular the Militia, in the "new global environment" (following the end of the Cold War).[87] One of the findings was to highlight the importance of the Reserves as the Canadian Forces' link to the

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[85]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder - Canada's Reserve Force (BG-08.005 – February 20, 2008)."

[86]J.L. Granatstein, *Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: ten years later* (Calgary, Alberta: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (Centre for Military and Strategic Studies), University of Calgary, 2005), 6.

[87]*Ibid*.

communities.[88] A further recommendation was to consider whether the Reserves should be given unique specialist roles, such as CBRN defence or Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC).[89]

Another report in 2000 for the Minister of Defence (Art Eggleton), *In Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*, noted severe problems with the CF Reserves, and in particular the Army Reserves.[90] In addition to providing a number of recommendations on how the restructuring of the Reserve Forces should proceed, the report also emphasized the need to reinforce the links between the Reserve Force personnel and communities and to consider some unique roles related to emergency response.[91]

The Army's 2002 document *Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy (One Army, One Team, One Vision)*[92] did not define a distinct role for the Reserve Forces. Instead, it stated that there had been an excessive draw on the Reserve Forces to compensate for gaps in the Regular Forces.[93] It also emphasized that the Land Forces would need to be ready to perform both international and domestic operations, with a multi-purpose and combat capable force.[94]

The 2005 *Defence Policy Statement* called for a renewed emphasis on domestic operations, but did not specify the number or relative percentages of Regular and Reserve Forces

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[88]*Ibid*., 7.

[89]*Ibid*., 8.

[90]Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces (Canada), *In service of the nation : Canada's citizen soldiers for the 21st century: a report to the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Art Eggleton* (Ottawa: Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, 2000).

[91]*Ibid*., 23-26.

[92]Canada, Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy (One Army, One Team, One Vision),* http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/6_3.asp; Internet; accessed 2 March 2008.

[93]*Ibid*., 6.

[94]*Ibid*., 12.

to be involved in these domestic operations. On the eve of the 2006 Canadian federal election, Conservative leader Stephen Harper called for the creation of "territorial defence units" in major metropolitan areas to help deal with emergencies.[95] These units would consist of 100 Regular Force personnel and 400 Reserve Force personnel, and would allow for a Canadian Forces presence in more cities. Dr. Granatstein, who had participated in the 1995 Special Commission, replied that while an increased CF presence was required in some regions, particularly in British Columbia, the distribution of Regular Forces in small groupings across Canada would not be effective.[96]

The federal Conservatives' first budget in May 2006 provided additional resources for increases in the size of both the Regular and Reserve Forces, as well as funding to start the implementation of the Territorial Defence Battalion Groups for home defence.[97] The *DPR* explained the expected growth in size of the Reserve Forces (and the Regular Forces), as well as initial plans for the creation of the new Territorial Defence Battalion Groups for home defence. However, the *DPR* continued to refer to the integrated nature of Regular and Reserve Forces personnel, along with civilian personnel, in response to operations.[98] Furthermore, the *DPR* continued to refer to the traditional role of Primary Reserve "to augment, sustain and support deployed forces."[99]

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[95]"Harper Pledges Military Units for Cities, *Toronto Star*, 28 December 2005; http://www.ebscohost.com; Internet; accessed 29 February 2008.

[96]*Ibid*.

[97]Canada, Department of National Defence, *Performance Report… ,* 11, 13.

[98]*Ibid*., 19.

[99]*Ibid*., 38.

The *RPP* was the first official report to explain that the Land Force Command was shifting the main role of the Reserve Force. The Regular Force would continue to provide the main forces for expeditionary operations, with augmentation by the Reserve Force. The main focus of the Reserve Force would now be changed to domestic operations, augmented by Regular Forces.[100] The particular wording used in the *RPP* implies that the differentiation between the roles of the Reserve Forces and Regular Forces was not the preferred approach: "[Land Force Command's] operational realities will force the army to move toward two mission streams …" The Reserves would also be expanding the breadth of their operations to provide capabilities that were not available or limited within the Regular Forces, such as CBRN response, civil-military co-operation and psychological operations.[101] The *RPP* also stated that the Canadian Army would be performing further analysis to determine which areas of growth in the Reserves were required.

The new emphasis in the *RPP* on the domestic role for the Army Reserves corresponded well with the announcement by the Conservative government regarding the role of Reserves as the main contingent of the Territorial Defence Units. However, following the publication of the *RPP* in early 2007, there have not been any official news releases or major speeches explaining this significant shift in the role of the Reserves.

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[100]Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008,* 22.

[101]*Ibid*., 31.

An internal Chief of Defence planning guidance document issued in June 2007[102] provided additional details with respect to the future of the Canadian Forces Reserves. It included a new version of the role of the Reserves:[103]

> The role of the Reserves is to augment the Regular Force on CF operations, to expand the CF in response to natural and manmade emergencies and crises, and to form the permanent connection between the CF and Canadian society in communities not served by major bases.

The document did not, however, provide clear guidance with respect to a possible change to the primary role of the Reserves for domestic operations, nor did it provide specific guidance with respect to the implementation of the Territorial Defence Units. Therefore, there are contradictions between this planning guidance document and the *RPP*. It is possible, however, that further details regarding these changes will be contained within the Canada First Defence Strategy when it is published.[104]

The role of the Reserves is undergoing significant change without much communication to the public or even within the Canadian Forces at large. Additionally, in the absence of further information from the Government concerning the new Territorial Defence Units, it is likely that the ever-increasing expectations will not be met. What speed of response will be expected? Will there be legislative support so that the Reserve Forces can be excused from their regular employment on short notice? Comparisons will likely be made between the CF Reserves and the US National Guard, which have a much larger number of personnel and a greater variety of

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[102]General R.J. Hillier, *CDS Planning Guidance - Future of CF Reserves*(National Defence Headquarters, 12 June 2007); http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/vcds-exec/pubs/reserve-issues/intro_e.asp; Internet; accessed 1 March 2008.

[103]*Ibid*., A-1/11, A-2/11.

[104]David Pugliese and Sarah McGinnis, "Ottawa plans military unit for Calgary: Troops to deliver crisis response in 14 major cities," *Calgary Herald*, 1 February 2007; http://www.proquest.com; Internet; accessed 23 September 2007.

emergency response capabilities and equipment. The importance of clear communications is

Canada Command.[106] This delegation of command permitted the Regional Commanders to more effectively direct the CF response to a domestic operation. The military staff would usually coordinate this CF response with PSEPC, other government departments (at all levels) and other provincial (or territorial) Emergency Management Organizations.

The introduction of Canada Command and its domestic focus helped the Canadian Forces to significantly advance domestic emergency planning with PSEPC and other government departments. In addition, because a large part of the Canadian population and key infrastructure is close to the US border, effective working relationships have been created with Canada's US counterpart, Northern Command. Specific new areas of cooperation with the US were in the areas of Critical Infrastructure Protection, joint response planning and interoperability. Furthermore, Canada Command has assisted PSEPC to build up the capabilities of its Government Operations Centre and has participated in joint exercises with PSEPC and US Northern Command.

At the regional level, the Regional Task Force Headquarters were built upon the existing foundations of Navy Headquarters (in Esquimalt BC and Halifax), Army Headquarters (in Edmonton, Toronto and Montreal) and Northern Headquarters (Yellowknife). Since these headquarters were already operating, they could build upon already established working relationships with regional emergency planners and municipality officials.

The new Canada Command structure has suffered from some "growing pains." The main focus of CF operations and resources has been on the Afghanistan mission, led in Canada since 2005 by the new Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) Headquarters. Due to the criticality of the success of this mission from a political and military point of view, military

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[106]Canada, …, Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations …, 1-2/8.

leadership and resources have been dedicated to making CEFCOM an effective organization, often attracting the best and brightest staff. Canada Command Headquarters, on the other hand, has been perceived as not yet proven its worth. This national Headquarters is also challenged as the Regional Task Force Headquarters have benefited from a longer existence and have therefore inherited some autonomy and considerable experience in the area of domestic operations.

The *DPR* highlighted the standing up of Canada Command Headquarters as of 1 February 2006 and its continuing evolution.[107] It also explained that both this headquarters and the Regional Headquarters were not at their expected personnel levels and would likely require further personnel to carry out its responsibilities.

The *RPP* stated that "Canada Command will continue to pursue the development and improvement of concepts of operations and command and control structures …"[108] It did not, however, discuss the level of capability expected from Canada Command, nor did it commit any additional resources to improve its response capabilities. As a new headquarters structure, it would be expected that its operations would be closely monitored, with resources adjusted as required as a management priority.

Within the Canadian Forces, the Canada Command Headquarters continues to struggle to find its true identity. The 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games is the first big operation to be planned and controlled out of Canada Command Headquarters. While CF planning is still in its early stages, part of the responsibility for planning is gradually being devolved to the new Joint Task Force Games, which was stood up in 2007 to provide be the focal point for regional CF command and coordination in support of the Olympics. This will no doubt be a complex

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[107]Canada, Department of National Defence, *Performance Report… ,* 27.

[108]Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008,* 47.

security operation, with many intergovernmental and international coordination challenges (the RCMP, not the Canadian Forces, have the lead for security). The fact that there was no official Department of National Defence news release in 2007 or early 2008 regarding CF preparations should be considered troubling, as it is possibly an indicator that CF planning for the Olympics is not very advanced.

If there is to be a strengthened commitment to domestic operations and emergency response, more attention must be be paid to ensuring a strong and effective Canada Command Headquarters. An increase in strength and expected capability goals, supported by a revised strategy and clear communications with the public, would allow the Canada Command Headquarters to be just as effective as its expeditionary counterpart.

CBRN CAPABILITIES

Civil emergencies involving CBRN are usually dealt with initially by first responders. They can then seek assistance from provincial or federal authorities if required.[109] The CF has both an international and domestic CBRN incident response role, and has maintained a limited Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Response Team (NBCRT) since 1976.[110] When responding to domestic CBRN incidents, the CF supports provincial or federal authorities, including the RCMP. Many other government departments are also involved in larger CBRN

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[109]Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence Research and Development Canada, "Backgrounder - Responding to CBRN threats: a federal perspective," http://www.css.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/crti/publications/backgrounders-documentation/2003_02_00-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 25 February 2008.

[110]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder – Expert Team Conducts Radiological Incident Exercise (BG-06.007 – March 28, 2006), " http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1885; Internet; accessed 26 February 2008.

incidents, including PSEPC as the lead coordinating agency, RCMP, Health Canada, Environment Canada and the Solicitor General.[111]

Improvements to the CBRN response capability of the Canadian Forces became a priority after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, due to heightened threat levels. The CF received $84 million in the 2001 federal budget to enhance its CBRN capabilities, including $30 million for the creation of a deployable Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence (JNBCD) Company. This military unit was formed in 2002 to provide an enhanced response capability for both international and domestic incidents.[112]

The main role of the JNBCD Company is to provide a broad spectrum of CBRN capabilities for the Canadian Forces, primarily in response to a terrorist CBRN incident. The specialist CBRN capabilities are located within a single CF unit, due to the very high cost of the equipment and the training of personnel. In order to limit the response time, the JNBCD Company maintains a small section always ready for immediate deployment, with the rest of the Company ready to follow on to provide additional capabilities on short notice if required. The Company can provide the following capabilities upon arrival at the scene:[113]

- CBRN defensive measures advice to the on-site incident commander;
- Determination if contamination is present;
- Hazard prediction, warning and reporting;
- Reconnaissance, survey and sampling;

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[111]Canada, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *The Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Strategy of the Government of Canada*, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/pol/em/cbrnstr-eng.aspx; Internet; accessed 25 February 2008.

[112]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder – Expert Team Conducts Radiological Incident Exercise (BG-06.007 – March 28, 2006). "

[113]Canada, …, Canada Command direction for domestic operations …, 7-2/5 – 7-3/5.

- Casualty extraction from a contaminated area; and
- Medical support and decontamination of its own members (it is not allowed to treat other people without higher approval).

In addition to the creation of the JNBCD Company, Defence Research & Development Canada (DRDC), which is the research arm of the Department of National Defence, was assigned a lead role in CBRN research for the federal government under a program called the "CBRN Research & Technology Initiative (CRTI)."[114] In the 2001 federal budget, $170 million was provided for a five year initiative in CBRN research and improvements to CBRN response capabilities.[115] In December 2006, CRTI received a further $175 million for another five years of research.[116] In addition to CRTI, DRDC created the Counter Terrorism Technology Centre (CTTC) at DRDC Suffield, which provides advanced training to first responders across Canada, as well as to the military. The start-up of CTTC was also funded through the 2001 Budget, with an allocation of $12 million.

PSEPC released a CBRN Strategy in 2005.[117] A total of fourteen federal departments were listed as having specific roles and responsibilities in support of the CBRN Strategy, in

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[114]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder – CRTI Interdepartmental Initiative (BG-02.032 – September 16, 2002)," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=437; Internet; accessed 26 February 2008.

[115]Ibid.

[116]Canada, Department of National Defence, "News Release – Government of Canada invests over $30 million for science and technology projects to enhance Canada's security and safety (NR-08.011 – February 22, 2008)," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2581; Internet; accessed 25 February 2008.

[117]Canada, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *The Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Strategy of the Government of Canada.*

addition to provinces, territories and municipalities. Within the document, the CBRN roles for the CF were listed in general terms:[118]

> The CF are responsible for the military defence of Canada, providing operational support to a CBRN response, supporting international counter-proliferation efforts, producing CBRN-related intelligence, and providing forces and assets to support the war on terrorism.

The lack of detail in the CF's CBRN role was also highlighted at a conference on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) Terrorism in March 2007.[119] The CF representative (from Canada Command) stated that the specific contribution and the desired level of capability needed to be better defined for every CBRN partner.[120]

The *DPR* highlighted the role of the JNBCD Company in support of training and development of CBRN capabilities, as well as the ongoing CRTI and CTTC initiatives.[121] However, there was no specific mention of increased capabilities for the JNBCD Company. Moreover, the *RPP* referred to CBRN as one of the areas where the CF would be improving its capabilities to support operations and civilian authorities.[122] However, no specific goals were set with respect to the JNBCD Company or the CF CBRN capabilities in general.

There is therefore a lack of clear direction with respect to the required CBRN capabilities within the Canadian Forces, at least from a public perspective. The CF was able to create and focus its CBRN capabilities relatively quickly, mainly through special allocations after the 11

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[118] *Ibid*., 7.

[119] Canada, Public Safety Canada, Emergency Management and National Security Branch, Summary Report – Rountable on Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) Terrorism: Progress, Challenges & Priorities for Action, March 6-7, 2007, Ottawa, Ontario, http://emscc.ca/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/finalcbrneroundtablesummaryreport.pdf; Internet; accessed 18 April 2008.

[120] *Ibid*., 17.

[121] Canada, Department of National Defence, *Performance Report… ,* 28.

[122] Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008,* 8, 17, 47.

September 2001 attacks. It has become a high-readiness unit that luckily has not really been

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- a limited engineering capability; and
- command and control capabilities, primarily for coordination purposes.

The DART is not formed of a complete unit ready for deployment; rather, it has a small permanent core of CF members, with the bulk of the members mobilized and deployed on short notice from CF units across Canada.[125]

The DART has been deployed only four times since its creation, all in support of international crisis situations:[126]

- OPERATION CENTRAL: Honduras, November-December 1998, as part of the international relief effort after Hurricane Mitch struck and left at least 11,000 people dead and more than 3 million homeless;
- OPERATION TORRENT: Northwestern Turkey, August-September 1999, after an earthquake measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale. More than 15,000 were estimated killed, 24,000 injured, 30,000 missing, and 500,000 homeless;
- OPERATION STRUCTURE: Sri Lanka, January-February 2005, in support of the international relief effort after the tsunamis in South-East Asia on 26 December 2004. In that area, there were over 10,000 people killed and approximately 180,000 people displaced; and
- OPERATION PLATEAU: Pakistan, October-November 2005, after a major earthquake in the Muzaffarabad region.

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[125]Captain K.J. Saunders, "The CF Disaster Assistance Response Team: Providing Humanitarian Relief To Crises Around the Globe," *Vanguard* Issue 1, 2001: 15.

[126]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Past Operations, " http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Operations/past_ops_e.asp; Internet; accessed 28 February 2008.

One of the major areas of criticism related to the DART has been the significant delay in its deployment in response to humanitarian emergencies.[127] For example, due to the magnitude of the impact of the South-East Asian tsunamis (which occurred on 26 December 2004), there was significant pressure on the Canadian Government to immediately contribute the DART as part of the international relief effort.[128] The Prime Minister eventually announced the planned contribution of the DART on 2 January 2005, after which it deployed. These delays are sometimes perceived as indicative of inefficiencies in the CF response.[129]

What is not necessarily understood by those who have been critical is that the deployment of the DART involves several steps.[130] In response to an international emergency, a request for assistance needs to be made to the Government of Canada either by the affected country or the United Nations. The government's decision to deploy the DART must consider several factors, including its availability, the capability of other relief organizations to provide support, existing agreements for the deployment of military personnel and the accessibility of the site. As well, even before deployment of the DART, a small Canadian government team (including Canadian Forces personnel) needs to be deployed to determine and arrange for the most appropriate location to provide its services. There is also the issue of cost, as a typical international

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[127]"Upgrade Canada's DART Capability," *Toronto Star*, 14 October 2005; http://www.ebscohost.com; Internet; accessed 27 February 2008.

[128]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Transcript – The Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of Defence, gives a media availability following the deployment of the DART (16h30 – January 6, 2005)," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1567; Internet; accessed 27 February 2008.

[129]Cooper, Barry. "National Interests Critical to Aid." *Star - Phoenix,* 13 January 2005; http://www.proquest.com; Internet; accessed 27 February 2008.

[130]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Disaster Assistance Response Team."

deployment costs approximately $15 million.[131] If other organizations can provide relief more cost effectively, the deployment of the DART might not be the best option and the Canadian government might instead provide direct financial assistance.

Another factor which can possibly delay the deployment of the DART is the availability of strategic airlift. When the DART was initially formed, it was expected that the existing C-130 Hercules aircraft and possible also the larger C-150 Airbus could be used to transport its equipment.[132] However, for its four deployments, given the large amount of equipment to be transported, the CF had to arrange for the lease of commercial aircraft, usually the Russian-made Antonov transport. As part of its justification in the 2006 procurement of four C-17 Globemaster aircraft, the Canadian government highlighted the need to improve its capability to deploy the DART.[133] However, as the cargo volume capacity of the Antonov is more than twice of the C-17[134] and the C-17 aircraft will be heavily committed for operational use, additional leased strategic airlift support will still likely be required to rapidly deploy the DART.

As part of the Conservative party's pledges in advance of the January 2006 federal election, Stephen Harper stated that he would double the size of the DART.[135] This statement occurred shortly after the return of the DART from the successful relief operation in Pakistan

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[131]Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, *The Government's no. 1 job: securing the military options it needs to protect Canadians,* 168.

[132]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder – Canadian Forces participation in humanitarian disaster relief and assistance operations (BG-98.051 – November 8, 1998)," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=574; Internet; accessed 27 February 2008.

[133] ""Canada First" Defence Procurement-New Strategic & Tactical Airlift Fleets," *CCNMatthews Newswire*, 29 June 2006; http://www.proquest.com; Internet; accessed 27 February 2008.

[134]Herman A. Kurapov, "Boeing C-17 and Antonov An-124-100: A Comparison," http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-antonov-1.htm; Internet; accessed 28 February 2008.

[135]Chris Wattie, "Harper to Give Forces $5.3b More," *National Post,* 14 December 2005; http://www.proquest.com; Internet; accessed 27 February 2008.

and therefore was generally supported.[136] However, following the Conservative election victory in 2006, there have not been any significant announcements concerning an increase in the size of the DART. The *DPR* reported some improvements based on lessons learned from the 2005 DART deployments, without a clear definition of the size of the increases in equipment or personnel.[137] The *RPP* did not offer any additional information regarding the role or evolution of the DART.

As all four major DART deployments have been in response to international humanitarian crises, it is difficult to determine how effective the DART would be in a domestic response situation. Within Canada, there are a number of government and non-governmental agencies, as well as commercial companies, that could provide a rapid response in the event of a domestic crisis. The newly acquired strategic airlift or even existing cargo aircraft could be provided as part of the CF relief operations, in support of the distribution of emergency supplies, without necessarily deploying the DART itself.

In the event of a domestic humanitarian crisis, there could be a partial deployment of the DART, focusing on the immediate needs that would be difficult to otherwise satisfy. As example, a recent severe water quality problem in October 2005 at the Kashechewan reserve in Northern Ontario led to calls for the deployment of the DART. As part of the response, the CF chose to send a water purification unit from 8 Wing Trenton to the reserve, the same type of unit that is available through the DART.[138] In this case, due to the nature of the emergency, many of the capabilities of the DART were either not necessary, or else were provided by other service

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[136]*Ibid*., 17.

[137]Canada, Department of National Defence, *Performance Report… ,* 64.

[138]Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs, "News Release – Government of Canada Announces Plan to Resolve Situation in Kashechewan (2-02724 27 October 2005)," http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/nr/prs/s-d2005/2-02724_e.html; Internet; accessed 28 February 2008.

providers. For this emergency, the Ontario government arranged for the on-site medical assistance.

Given the generally advanced level of possible support that can be provided within Canada by first responders, emergency organizations, non-governmental organizations and even commercial service providers, the possible circumstances that would require the use of the DART within Canada remain unclear. This situation creates uncertainty within the Canadian population, potentially leading to severe criticism when a domestic emergency occurs and the government decides not to deploy the DART. The deployments of the DART as part of Canadian government relief efforts in international emergencies were highly publicized and received strong public support. It is likely, therefore, that the general Canadian public will expect the same type of contribution by the CF in response to domestic emergencies. If the Canadian government does not intend to support a domestic response role for the DART, it should explain this point well in advance of any serious domestic incident.

If the DART continues to be made available primarily for international operations, its current personnel staffing of a small headquarters with short-notice recall of its core personnel remains sufficient. This is primarily because it takes time to sort out the diplomatic and planning issues associated with an international event. If the DART is to be more focused domestically, a quicker response (with on-site relief within 24-48 hours) would require a larger dedicated staff and likely additional types of equipment (for example, more cold weather equipment). Clearer direction from the Canadian Government is therefore necessary in order to best align capabilities with public expectations.

In this chapter, the following five areas were examined in the context of domestic emergency response: the CF role in national emergencies, the CF Reserves, coordination of CF

response, CBRN capabilities and the DART. In each of these areas, there are particular changes that could be made to improve the CF response. Moreover, the five areas have all highlighted one common problem area: the lack of a clear communications strategy to ensure that the public clearly understands what should be expected of the military as part of the larger government response. As the CF must be responsive to political direction, senior government leaders must clearly set out what is expected from its military forces for domestic response. Once the policy direction is clarified, the CF can further develop the capabilities that match the political direction and assign the appropriate resources towards domestic emergency preparedness. In the absence of clear direction, however, the CF will continue to develop capabilities in an ad hoc fashion. Moreover, the federal government and the CF risk significant public criticism if heightened expectations for an effective government response are not met. Finally, without clearer political direction, the CF is restricted in the degree of planning and coordination that it can perform with other government agencies, provincial authorities, municipalities and non-governmental authorities, as it cannot pre-commit resources and response activities outside of the limits pre-authorized by political direction. Clarity in communications and political direction therefore become essential for effective emergency preparedness.

CONCLUSION

This paper has underlined the importance of national preparedness in the event of a large emergency. The federal government has the prime responsibility to ensure the safety its citizens. It has carried out this responsibility by setting policy, adjusting the legal framework, allocating resources, forming a lead organization (Public Safety Canada), coordinating inter-department efforts and overseeing emergency preparedness at all levels of government.

In reality, most emergencies are limited and managed by either municipal first responders or with the assistance of provincial or territorial authorities. Only when the nature of an emergency overwhelms the capabilities of these groups will a federal response be necessary and coordinated by Public Safety Canada. When necessary, the Canadian Forces could contribute to the emergency response. There are, however, differences between what the general public expects of the CF during an emergency situation and what the CF has been mandated or limited to provide. Given possible liabilities, restrictions and also sensitivities with respect to the use of military forces in domestic emergency situations, the CF must remain in a support role to civilian authorities. In considering the use of the CF as part of the emergency response, other factors also need to be considered, such as the ability of the CF to continue its other military missions, the possible dependence on a continued military presence during the emergency recovery and also possible competition with commercial service providers.

Government policy since the terrorist attacks of 2001 has placed a greater importance on the security of Canadians. This has been combined with a renewed CF focus on domestic operations. Two senate committee reports and two Auditor General reports have examined in detail the changes that have been made by the federal government in response to both its own promises and also the expectations of the general public. By examining these reviews, this paper has identified five "gap" areas in which public expectations in the capability of the Canadian Forces were either not met or not clearly understood.

The role of the Canadian Forces with respect to domestic emergencies needs to be more clearly articulated to the public. The expected Canada First Defence Strategy, when published, might provide the necessary clarification. A similar lack of direction or communications can also be observed with respect to the changing role of the Reserve Forces in domestic emergency

situations. From the examination of public documents, there appears to be conflicting information with respect to the new primacy of the role of the Reserve Forces towards domestic emergency response. Furthermore, the new Canada Command headquarters needs additional resources and more senior CF leadership attention to ensure that it can respond quickly and effectively in the event of a national emergency.

Two specialized functions of the Canadian Forces were also identified as gap areas through the government reviews. Although the JNBCD Company (now the CJIRU) possesses specialized CBRN resources and personnel, its use in domestic situations is unclear and its anticipated growth is difficult to determine based on public documents. The DART also has specialized resources in the event of international emergencies; however, debate continues on the possibility of its deployment in domestic emergency situations.

Two common themes arose through the review of identified gap areas. Firstly, there is a need for greater government direction on the required capabilities of the CF for domestic emergency response. In addition, the government, possibly through the CF, needs to provide clearer information on the capabilities and limitations of CF emergency response. With greater direction and better communication, the general public will be able to moderate its expectations in the event of a domestic emergency while having greater confidence that emergency planning has been properly coordinated in advance. A more effective government and CF emergency response is in everyone's best interests. The federal government must therefore act on its commitment to make emergency planning a real priority.

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