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**TOWARDS A MORE SECURE CARIBBEAN:
ENHANCING MILITARY COOPERATION WITHIN
THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY**

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Abstract

Contemporary globalised security threats such as the trafficking in narcotics, arms and people impact on the security of the Caribbean Community's Member States. The Caribbean Community's Treaty on Security Assistance Among Member States provides the framework for collective action to respond to these threats. Increasing the level of cooperation among the Defence Forces of Caribbean Community Member States can help in this regard.

This research thesis examines variables of the Caribbean security context, threats, existing strategies and alliance theories and finds that: (1) intra-regional cooperative strategies should be based on autonomous concepts; (2) there is a role for the Defence Forces in countering the threats to the region's security and (3) the Defence Forces should increase their level of cooperation by building upon the existing robust structures and Treaty instruments. Strengthening the Headquarters for the Regional Security System and better utilising the processes and output of the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre are two key requirements.

Declaration of Originality

I declare that my work entitled “Towards a More Secure Caribbean: Enhancing Military Cooperation within the Caribbean Community” for the degree of Master of Defence Studies, embodies the results of an original research programme and consists of an ordered and critical exposition of existing knowledge in a well-defined field.

I have included explicit references to the citation of the work of others or to my own work which is not part of the submission for this degree.

GS GRANNUM

Major

23 April 2008

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Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association South East Asian Nations
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CDERA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency
CDRU	Caribbean Disaster Response Unit
CJCSC	Caribbean Junior Command and Staff Course
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus-Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
JSCC	Joint Strategic Coordinating Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Agreement
OAS	Organisation of American States
OECS	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
RIFC	Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
RSS	Regional Security System
RSS CLO	Regional Security System Central Liaison Office
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNODCCP	United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
US	United States of America
US SOUTHCOM	United States of America Southern Command

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background. The 21st Century global security environment presents multidimensional challenges for all states whether large or small. The Caribbean region has historically enjoyed relative peace but it is perhaps inevitable that the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity that exist globally will have a greater impact on the region's security. The security threats currently affecting the region and those existing or emerging in the wider world, directly or indirectly worsen the Caribbean's security situation with far-reaching outcomes that retard Nation States' development. In the modern world the military plays an integral role in the protection of a state's interests that facilitate such development.¹

Hence, recognising the vulnerabilities of the region and accepting the possibility of a worsening in the global security environment, this thesis asserts that greater cooperation among the Defence Forces of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) would enhance Caribbean security.

In order to lay the foundation for the thesis this introductory Chapter first establishes the conceptual framework which guides the research. The research

¹ Dr Harry Yarger, "The Strategic Environment," in *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, 17-29 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2006), 17-20.

methodology, contribution of the study, description of the Caribbean and finally concepts of national security, in general and from CARICOM’s perspective, then follow.

1.2 Conceptual Framework. This research is guided by the arrangement of variables as shown in the conceptual framework at Figure 1.1.




Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework.²

The conceptual framework illustrates that the Caribbean’s security is set within a global framework and hence is impacted, both directly and indirectly, by globalised security threats. Existing policy and strategy are shaped by theories and models of security cooperation which are themselves responsive to security threats. Cooperation among the Defence Forces of CARICOM is the dependent variable, a corollary to the

² The conceptual framework is developed by the author.

independent variables on the left side of the model. The strategic outcome is that of an enhanced contribution to Caribbean security.

The thesis analyses these variables in order to make recommendations on how improved intra-regional military cooperation can contribute to Caribbean security.³ After this introductory Chapter the thesis next defines security in the Caribbean context, analyses the global security environment, examines extant policy and strategies and explores collective security theories and models. From this body of research the thesis then develops recommendations on how improved military cooperation would benefit Caribbean security.

1.3 Research Methodology. The reality of research demands use of both primary and secondary sources.⁴ Whilst some information pre-existed the start of this research project, there are aspects that had to be explored for the first time. Hence data and information was gathered from:

- (1) Primary sources in the form of resource persons from the Defence Forces of CARICOM Member States and other regional institutions; and from,
- (2) Secondary sources in the form of previous literature on global, hemispheric, CARICOM and other sub-regional security and strategic issues.

³ Uma Sekaran, *Research Methods for Business: A Skill Building Approach*, 4 ed (John Wiley and Sons Inc, 2003), 120-122.

⁴ Sekaran, *Research Methods for Business: A Skill Building Approach*, 59-60.

A multi-method approach was taken for collecting data and information. Data from primary sources was collected using interviews. The interview structure is attached as Appendix 1. Information was collected from secondary sources using manual and electronic methods. Despite consuming more resources than a single method, the multi-method approach adds rigour and confidence, helps identify bias and provides for mutual reinforcement of data, information and theories.⁵ The research plan consisted of two overlapping phases. The first phase, the collection of information from secondary sources, was executed over the period November 2007 to the end of March 2008. The second phase consisted interviews to collect data from primary sources and was conducted during the months of February and March 2008.

The thesis examines three research questions in proving that increased cooperation among CARICOM's Defence Forces would contribute to enhanced security in the Caribbean. The research questions are:

- (1) What defines security in the Caribbean context?
- (2) What is the nature of threats to this security?
- (3) How can the military contribute to improved security of the region?

The research will address these questions based on the following five assumptions. Firstly, that CARICOM's integrationist policies, its structures and strategies will continue to evolve. Secondly, that enhanced security among the fifteen CARICOM Member States will benefit the wider Caribbean and vice versa. Thirdly, it is assumed that the policies of the individual CARICOM Governments will continue to

⁵ Sekaran, *Research Methods for Business: A Skill Building Approach*, 63-64.

maintain their Defence Forces as instruments of that state's national power and security infrastructure. Fourthly, that greater use of a state's security resources such as the military, particularly in a joint, multi-national and inter-agency way, will accrue security benefits. Fifthly, that the world's great powers will continue to be seized by their global interests limiting the extent to which they can reinforce the regional security apparatus but will remain supportive of independent approaches which reduce the impact of threats on their domestic spaces. Evidence supporting these assumptions will be provided throughout this thesis.

1.4 Contribution of the Study. It is intended that this research will add to the body of knowledge on Caribbean military and security studies bringing value to military organisations and their strategic level leadership. This is useful since the research faced challenges of gathering data from primary sources and a relatively limited volume of secondary source literature produced by Caribbean military strategists. Additionally, based on a joining of military and political thinking, this research may be used to inform at the national/grand strategic level and by extension at the regional level.⁶ Towards these purposes, it is now essential to clarify concepts of the Caribbean and of national and CARICOM security. This will show the commonality of values across the region.

1.5 The Caribbean Region and CARICOM. The Caribbean region tends to be defined based on three differing perspectives.⁷ The first is in geo-strategic terms where

⁶ Richard Betts. "Should Strategic Studies Survive?" *World Politics* 50, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), 8.

⁷ The Caribbean is viewed as the archipelago plus Belize and the three Guianas (Guyana [formerly British Guiana], Suriname [formerly Dutch Guiana] and French Guiana). It is from this definition that the

the Caribbean is viewed as an area of influence affecting the United States' (US) interests and in which the Central American States and the archipelago are linked together. The second definition takes a political-economic approach and groups all developing countries washed by the Caribbean Sea to distinguish them from the industrialised North. The third definition takes an ethno-historical approach and joins together the island states plus Belize and the three Guianas based on their common history of plantation economy, slavery and large African contingents.⁸ The CARICOM grouping takes an influence from the third definition although its functioning reflects aspects of the previous two. This will become clearer as the thesis progresses.

The Caribbean is richly diverse, reflecting a blend of socio-cultural influences. Ancestral ties to Africa, Asia, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain and also the indigenous Arawak, Carib and Lucayan Indians are visible. For centuries, struggles between European powers have played themselves out in the Caribbean. Most islands changed colonial masters at least once, depending on the outcome of continental wars, treaties, rivalries over lucrative trade routes and the influence of pirates and privateers. Today, this heritage remains but has been contemporised and enriched with the traditions, festivals and cuisines that have evolved domestically. A common and dominant thread of influence remains that of African and Asian ethnicities and the trade in sugar and slaves. The result is a community of states with similar cultures, experiences, social capital and

Caribbean Basin moniker, or for the Soviets in Cold War terms *Karibiiski Basin*, surfaces. Andrés Serbin, "The Caribbean: Myths and Realities for the 1990s," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, 32, No. 2 (Summer 1990), 122-123.

⁸ Serbin, "The Caribbean: Myths and Realities for the 1990s," 122-123.

political systems.⁹ The unique blend of independent sovereign states, United Kingdom (UK), US, French and Dutch dependent territories, languages and dialects, cultural nuances and ethnicities, islands and continental states which constitute the Caribbean however makes any study of the area a complex undertaking.¹⁰

This research focuses on the nine CARICOM States which have regular military forces – Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, the Bahamas, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, since the CARICOM union makes it historically and politically natural to do so. The historical commitment to political, economic and legislative harmonisation and more recently on security matters supports the military considerations contained herein. Since its creation by the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973, CARICOM has incrementally broadened its scope of endeavours.¹¹ The 2001 Revised Treaty provides for the CARICOM Single Market and Economy and for the Caribbean Court of Justice. In 2006 the *Treaty on Security Assistance Among CARICOM Member States* was signed providing for mutual security

⁹ Laszlo Buhasz, “Travel,” *The Globe and Mail*, Saturday, 12 October 2002 available from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/travel/static/caribbean.html>; internet; accessed 20 January 2008.

¹⁰ Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, “CARICOM Member States,” http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member_states.jsp?menu=community; internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

¹¹ CARICOM is the successor of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (1965–1972), which had been organized to provide a continued economic linkage between the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean following the dissolution of the West Indies Federation (1958 to 1962). Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, “History of the Caribbean Community,” available from http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member_states.jsp?menu=community; internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

assistance. Conceptually, the CARICOM Defence Forces can now be viewed collectively as an institutional asset in keeping with the current thoughts of integration.¹²

Each of the Forces' military capability contains land and maritime components and some Forces are endowed with air assets.¹³ Geographically this capacity is spread across the region from archipelagic states to states on the Central American land mass (Belize) and on the South American continent (Guyana and Suriname) as Figure 1.2 illustrates. This spread can be viewed as strategically valuable if assets are used in a highly-coordinated manner to provide collective benefit.



Figure 1.2: The Caribbean:

Source: University of Texas at Austin, "Maps of the Americas,"¹⁴

¹² Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, "CARICOM Member States," http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member_states.jsp?menu=community; internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

¹³ Dr Ivelaw Griffith, "Probing Security Challenges and Change in the Caribbean," In *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, edited by Dr Ivelaw L Griffith, 1-51, (Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston, Jamaica, 2004), 4-6.

¹⁴ University of Texas at Austin, "Maps of the Americas," *Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection*, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/camericacaribbean.jpg>; internet, accessed 17 March 2008.

The other full members of CARICOM, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Montserrat, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, do not have military forces. CARICOM's Affiliate Members – Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands are all British dependencies and their military arrangements are the responsibility of the Government of the UK.¹⁵ While dependent states and states without military forces will not be considered within the same fold as the CARICOM Member States with military forces, in keeping with the theme of this thesis they would derive benefits from enhanced security.

In order to further establish the background for the thesis it is now essential to examine CARICOM's concept of security. This requires an understanding of national security which is obtainable from the work of some notable theorists.

1.6 National Security and CARICOM Security. Undeniably security, whether personal, national or regional, ranks prominently among mankind's problems. Despite huge strides along humanity's development and modernisation journey, security remains a contested issue as over the centuries, states always seemed to struggle to co-exist. John Herz's 1950 work *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*, visualises a security dilemma as a difficulty of coexistence.¹⁶ He describes a structural notion that as

¹⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, "Central America and the Caribbean," *CIA World Factbook*, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/reference_maps/central_america.html; internet; accessed 22 January 2008.

¹⁶ John H. Herz, "Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma," *World Politics*, 2 (1950), 157-159.

a state attends to its national security needs through self-help; others misinterpret the defensive intentions and view the actions as threatening. An action-reaction dynamic results.¹⁷ This was particularly characteristic of the Cold War era but more recently the increasing influence of sub-state, stateless or virtual-state entities have further complicated the situation. Karl Deutsch et al in *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* found that political integration resulted primarily from a demand for greater capabilities, performance, responsiveness and more adequate services of some kind from government. The formation of large-scale security communities rested less on factors like common language or high levels of mutual responsiveness and, as with the development of nationalism, more on intra-state and intra-societal communications.¹⁸

Further, Robert Jervis in *Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma* attempted to build on Herz's and Deutsch's theories noting that unintentional and interdependent elements of international security relations can occur¹⁹ but where states share sufficient interests in common, they can form alliances and welcome increases in each other's power.²⁰ Jervis concludes that a polar arrangement between power, the realist's approach, and peace, the idealist's approach, results. As will be shown later in this

¹⁷ Herz, "Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma," *World Politics*, 2 (1950), 157-159.

¹⁸ Karl Deutsch, Sidney Burrell and Robert A. Kann, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press), 1957.

¹⁹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2ed (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 1-4.

²⁰ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the security dilemma," *World Politics*, 30, No. 2, (January 1978), 175.

thesis, CARICOM States share sufficient interests in common, have avoided security dilemmas and have formed valuable alliances.

CARICOM's desire for peace during the period of increased Cold War tensions induced the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1979 to pass a resolution urging recognition of the Caribbean as a zone of peace.²¹ Thus, CARICOM's idealist ideological base is established. Whilst these concepts appear straightforward, a baseline definition of security from which to undertake a comprehensive study of CARICOM's security is more complex.²²

Arnold Wolfers' 1952 thesis *National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol* asserts that security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values and, in a subjective sense, measures the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.²³ Richard Ullman in *Redefining Security* theorises that a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that drastically threatens over a relatively brief period of time to degrade the quality of life for the citizens of a state, potentially narrowing the range of policy choices available to the government, private or nongovernmental entities within that state.²⁴ Laurence Martin's thesis *Can there be*

²¹ Organisation of American States, "The Caribbean as a Zone of Peace (Resolution adopted at the 12th Plenary Session 31 October 1979)," *General Assembly Resolution 456 IX-0/79*, available from http://scm.oas.org/doc_public/ENGLISH/HIST_07/AG03793E02.doc, internet, accessed 11 March 2008. See also Ramon Lopez-Reyes, "The Central-American Zone of Peace," 4 March 2004 International Centre for the Study and Promotion of Zones of Peace in the World, http://www.transcend.org/t_database/articles.php?ida=301; internet, accessed 11 March 2008.

²² Buzan, *People, States and Fear*. . . , 2.

²³ Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Discord and Collaboration*, (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1962), Ch 10.

²⁴ Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, 8. No. 1 (1983).

national security in an insecure age sees security as the assurance of future well-being²⁵ whereas John E. Mroz in *Beyond Security: Private perceptions among Arabs and Israelis* theorises that security is the relative freedom from harmful threats.²⁶

Barry Buzan in *People, States and Fear* found that security is a relational phenomenon, existing in a seamless web of inter-relations between states.²⁷ One cannot understand the national security of a given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded. This pushes logically towards a complicated, holistic perspective which possibly makes the study of security unrealistic. Progressive widening then runs the risk of endangering the intellectual coherence of security. Such widening is however necessary to the extent that it could be linked to the key concerns, facilitates understanding of relevant issues and ultimately the development of an appropriately nuanced response to threats.²⁸ Buzan concluded that regional security complexes do exist as this research will show in subsequent Chapters is the case in the Caribbean.²⁹ The preceding concepts on national security can be seen as according with strategic thoughts on Caribbean security.

. . . Security can no longer be achieved by merely building walls or forts. The very large and the very small states of this hemisphere have found that security, in an age of globalisation, is rather complex. Security includes the

²⁵ Laurence Martin, "Can there be national security in an insecure age?" *Encounter*, 60, No. 3 (1983), 12.

²⁶ John E. Mroz, *Beyond Security: Private perceptions among Arabs and Israelis*, (New York; International Peace Academy, 1980), 105.

²⁷ Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 16-17, 187-188.

²⁸ Barry Buzan, "Rethinking Security after the Cold War." *Cooperation and Conflict*, 32 (1) (March 1997), 9-10.

²⁹ Buzan, *People, States and Fear*. . . , 187-188.

traditional notions of yesteryear, but today, security must now be extended, in the case of the small-island state, to encompass several non-traditional aspects. Natural disasters, for example, pose a greater threat to our security than does the loss of national territory to an enemy.³⁰

Additionally, in 2002 CARICOM's Regional Task Force on Crime and Security

defined security as:

. . . A state or condition in which, within the context of a constitutional framework, freedom is enjoyed without fear of victimisation from crime, and in which the functioning of governance by a constitutionally elected Government is not inhibited or disrupted through criminal activity.³¹

Considering too that the modern threats to security may originate from outside a state and may assume dimensions beyond that of domestic criminality,³² CARICOM further recognises that security threats, concerns and challenges are now visibly multidimensional in nature. Traditional security concepts and approaches must be expanded to include political, economic, social, health and environmental dimensions set within the framework of a regional interdependency.³³ Importantly, CARICOM's concept provides for human security.³⁴ Taken together, these illustrate the theorists

³⁰ Dr Ivelaw L. Griffith "Security in the Caribbean: State Sovereignty or Public Order?" Chapter 3 in *Public Security in the Americas: New Challenges in the North-South Dialog*, eds. John Bailey and Roy Godson, (Washington, DC: Centre for Latin American Studies, Georgetown University, 2003).

³¹ Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, *Report of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security*, (Georgetown, Guyana), September 2002, iv.

³² The challenge facing CARICOM States is not of criminality narrowly defined; rather, it is a broader threat to national and regional security from domestic and transitional criminal enterprises. Jamaica Gleaner, "Coordinating Regional Security," *Editorial*, 26 February 2008, available from www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20080226/cleisure/cleisure1.html; internet, accessed 27 February 2008.

³³ Additional evidence of threats other than domestic criminality will be presented in Chapter 3. Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, *Report of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security*, iv.

³⁴ Human security can be said to have two main aspects. First, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and secondly, protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 23.

thinking on the objective and subjective elements of security, the protection of a state's values, interests and quality of life of its citizens and the assurance that government remains functional.

Interdependencies raise issues of cooperation. Security cooperation, like all cooperative efforts, is seen as a function of a common understanding, shared values and interests which form a motivation to attain common goals. Cooperation involves a compatibility of ideologies among the security community.³⁵ Security cooperation facilitates collective action where the efforts of two or more entities, such as CARICOM States, are needed to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome. By its nature, collective action involves interdependencies among entities in which the contributions or efforts of one entity influences the actions of others thus implying strategic interaction. Cooperation and collective action enables the provision of pure public goods whose benefits are non-rival and non-excludable.³⁶ Security and by extension its defence dimension constitute public goods that are necessary for the region to continue to develop and prosper. Hence security cooperation within CARICOM supports strategic efforts in the political, diplomatic, developmental, socio-cultural and economic dimensions.³⁷ The cooperative interdependencies and limited power competition among states set the preconditions for a viable regional security partnership.³⁸

³⁵ Deutsch, Burrell and Kann, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*.

³⁶ Todd Sandler, *Global Collective Action*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004), 17-18.

³⁷ Duncan Brack, "Introduction," in *Trade, Aid and Security: An Agenda for Peace and Development*, edited by Oli Brown, Mark Halle, Sonia Peña Moreno and Sebastian Winkler, 1-17, (Sterling, Virginia, Earthscan, 2007), 3-4.

1.6 Chapter Summary. This Chapter established that cooperation among the Military Forces of CARICOM States was the dependent variable of four factors – the perspective of Caribbean security, threats to that security, extant policy and strategy and alliance theories and models. Shaped by similar historical and cultural events the region today is the better for CARICOM’s cooperation in matters of politics, economics, justice and security. Rooted in an idealist approach CARICOM recognises the multidimensionality of security and the interdependencies among States. The thesis now proceeds by examining the context of Caribbean security.

³⁸ Fulvio Attina, “Regional security partnership: the concept, model, practice and a preliminary comparative scheme.” *Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics* No. 58 (July 2005), 6.

CHAPTER 2: CARIBBEAN SECURITY IN CONTEXT

2.1 Chapter Outline. This Chapter places the Caribbean and its security in context in order to establish an essential condition for a closer regional military partnership – a consensus for cooperation.³⁹ To achieve this, the Chapter starts by providing an understanding of the geo-strategic significance of the region including an examination of the strategies employed by the world’s major powers. Secondly, a review of the signature events in the history of military cooperation within CARICOM will be undertaken. Thirdly, the Chapter presents some primary data gathered from the Defence Forces on the strengths, weaknesses and lessons learned from past collective actions.

2.2 The Geo-Strategic Significance and Strategies of the Global Partners. The Caribbean region’s geographical location is the basis for its strategic importance. The region lies along major transit routes on north-south movements within the Americas and east-west movements (Europe to Asia-Pacific) via the Panama Canal.⁴⁰ The region’s closeness to and interdependence with tourist markets, in particular with North America, makes it of vital socio-economic interest.⁴¹ This geo-strategic significance then enables Caribbean States to play a role as regional actors within the global system, a complex political, security, economic, social and cultural structure of both power and interdependence. Within the global system, states interact through cooperation and

³⁹ Attina, “Regional security partnership: the concept, model, practice and a preliminary comparative scheme,” 6.

⁴⁰ G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System*, 4 ed (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, Perseus Books Group, 1999), xix – xx, 4.

⁴¹ Millions of tourists (mainly Americans and Europeans) vacation in the Caribbean annually. Caribbean Tourism Organisation, *Latest Statistics 2007*, (Collymore Rock, Barbados, 4 February 2008).

conflict, informal power relationships and formal international rules and institutions. Over the centuries, many of the world's major powers have been engaged in the region in many ways. Today the major player is the US but transnational actors have joined the complex network of actors. Latin America and the Caribbean have been identified as a subsystem of the global system and the Caribbean by itself a key element therein.⁴²

CARICOM's States, as part of the global community of modern states, are endowed with the attributes of sovereignty and the relationship of nationalism to statehood. The characteristics enable systemic links between states to exist. Although sovereignty has been challenged and penetrated by transnational actors the concept is still key to defining the authority exercised over citizens and physical territory. However, relative ease of movement, uneven development and pockets of poverty and depression create vulnerabilities which threat operatives exploit.⁴³ Thus, CARICOM States and the world's major powers must pay continuous attention and employ effective strategies in enhancing security to protect their interests.

The US in the Caribbean. The US' interest in the Caribbean has been described as long yet inconsistent. The US' security relationship predates the early days of its War of Independence where American colonists maintained an arms trade with the Dutch on the island of Saint Eustatius.⁴⁴ The US has viewed the Caribbean as an area of

⁴² Pope Atkins, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System*. . . , xix – xx, 4.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 4-7.

⁴⁴ General John J. Sheehan, "Preface," in *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century* ed. Dr Ivelaw L. Griffith v-ix (McNair Paper 54, October 1996, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Washington, DC), v-vi.

potential subversion or larger conflicts involving non-regional powers such as the British, French, German, Spanish and Soviet. That paradigm endured from the War of Independence, the period of the Monroe Doctrine, the Spanish-American War, the German U-boat sallies of the Great Wars, throughout the Cold War and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The fear that extra-regional powers, principally the Germans and/or the Soviets or their proxies might establish military footholds in the region seized the US' attention and shaped their reflexive hemispheric security policy.⁴⁵ The concern for subversion aside, the US' main interest in the region and the hemisphere on the whole lay in political and economic development, responding to instability and in assisting in stemming the flow of narcotics into North America. The geo-strategic rationale for such interests is based on the need for a response to crises whether of a political, economic, environmental, criminal or social form (for example the 1994 mass migrations from Cuba and Haiti).⁴⁶

In 1995 the US' National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement represented the stimulus for a new Caribbean strategy and incorporated inputs from the hemisphere's 34 democratic states. Since then the themes of the Strategy have been reaffirmed and expanded in other regional forum and the initiatives it has facilitated

⁴⁵ Examples of US concerns and their reflexive US policy could be seen in the 1917 Zimmermann telegram where the Germans offered US territory to Mexico in return for joining the German cause. The diplomatic dispatch convinced the US that Germany was courting Mexico. The rampant World War II Nazi U-boat attacks on allied merchant shipping in the Caribbean (336 ships sunk in 1942 alone) and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, a close encounter with superpower nuclear conflagration, are two other instances. General Sheehan, "Preface," in *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century*, vi.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, vi-vii.

exemplify an integrated regional approach.⁴⁷ It emphasises a cooperative US/Caribbean approach where intra-regional synergies are key.⁴⁸ These synergies are particularly valuable given the concept of access to North America through the US’ “third border.”⁴⁹

Significant amongst the initiatives embarked upon has been the annual TRADEWINDS exercise – a CARICOM Defence Forces’ collective effort with the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the US military’s regional headquarters. The exercise has its genesis in the 1980s and has been central to regional collective training. Also, in the latter half of the 1990’s some CARICOM States signed *Agreements Concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking* (commonly referred to as *Shiprider* Agreements) with the US. These Agreements facilitate US Coast Guard or Navy vessels, with Caribbean maritime service personnel embarked on board, freedom to enter Caribbean States’ territorial waters.⁵⁰ Regrettably, Shiprider Agreements were undertaken on a state-by-state basis and vary one from the other. The result is a bifurcated approach to Caribbean security.

⁴⁷ Governments participated in crafting a comprehensive plan dealing with such diverse but related fields of health, education, the environment, enhancement of democratic institutions, technology and counter-narcotics. General Sheehan, “Preface,” in *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century*, vii. More recent reaffirmation of joint interests and commitment to cooperation is at United States of America, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement: Conference on the Caribbean,” *White House Press Release* 20 June 2007 available from US Department of State, Washington, DC, <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/prsr/07/q2/86952.htm>; internet, accessed 22 March 2008.

⁴⁸ General Sheehan, “Preface,” in *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century*, viii.

⁴⁹ Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, “Joint Statement by the United States of America, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic on the Third Border Initiative,” available from *US Department of State, Press Statement*, Washington, DC, 13 January 2004, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/28136.htm>; internet, accessed 12 March 2008.

⁵⁰ Barbados, Government of Barbados-Government of the United States of America, *Agreement the Government of Barbados and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking*, Bridgetown, Barbados, 25 June 1997.

The UK in the Caribbean. A former colonial master for many of the States in the region, the UK's presence may not be as dominant as that of the US but its interests and contribution remains significant. The effects of modern transnational security threats demand a cooperative UK/Caribbean security approach. In an effort to combat these threats and their disparaging consequences, the Governments of the UK and CARICOM States have been continuously focussed on a range of crime and security issues of common concern.⁵¹

The UK's security strategy in the region is the product of both proactive strategic analysis and responses to emerging trends. Engagements at the Ministerial level such as the 2004 UK/CARICOM Ministerial Forum have re-energised cooperation between the Governments of the UK and the Caribbean on a broad range of regional security and law enforcement matters. Four strategic priority areas – border security, maritime cooperation, information and intelligence sharing and training for security sector personnel, receive emphasis.⁵² The UK security interests in the Caribbean are visible through engagements with the Regional Security System (RSS) and the deployment of naval assets.⁵³

⁵¹ CARICOM Secretariat, *Report of the Joint Management Committee of the CARICOM/UK Security Cooperation Plan*, (Fifth UK/CARICOM Ministerial Forum, Bridgetown, 26 – 28 April 2006), 1.

⁵² CARICOM Secretariat, *Report of the Joint Management Committee of the CARICOM/UK Security Cooperation Plan*, 1-3.

⁵³ The assets are commonly referred to as the West Indies Guard Ship. Royal Navy, *Global Operations*, available from <http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/globalops/>, internet, accessed 1 March 2008. See also Royal Navy, "HMS SUTHERLAND Sails For West Indies To Join Fight Against Drugs" available from <http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/server/show/conWebDoc.3578/changeNav/3533>, internet, accessed 1 March 2008.

Others. Other major powers have also been involved geo-strategically in the region. France maintains Military Forces comprised of naval and marine infantry assets in their dependencies on French Guiana, Guadeloupe and Martinique.⁵⁴ The Netherlands maintains permanent naval and marine forces as part of its foreign affairs engagement strategy which serves a threefold purpose:

- . . . (1) To protect the integrity of the territory of the Netherlands and that of allied countries;
- (2) To help maintain stability and the international legal order; and
- (3) To help civil authorities enforce the law, control crises, respond to disasters and provide humanitarian assistance.⁵⁵

In pursuit of these roles they maintain a special operational alliance with UK forces in the Caribbean.⁵⁶

Canadian interests in the Caribbean are a part of its Latin America and Caribbean engagement strategy which has deep historical roots and spans a broad spectrum of activities. Those ties have been reinforced in the course of the 20th Century by immigration patterns which have helped alter the complexion of Canadian society and

⁵⁴ The Central Intelligence Agency, “France” available from *CIA World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html>; internet, accessed 10 March 2008. Some details of the role of these forces are set out at Centre Spatial Guyanais, “Summary of the Armed Forces in French Guiana” available from <http://www.cnes.fr/web/4865-summary-of-the-armed-forces-in-french-guiana.php>; internet, accessed 10 March 2008.

⁵⁵ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Western Hemisphere Department” available from http://www.minbuza.nl/en/ministry_organisational_structure/Regional-Departments.html#a4, internet, accessed 1 February 2008.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

increased cultural affinities.⁵⁷ Canada's current engagement thrust is in trade, aid, investment and immigration.⁵⁸

In recent years China, an emerging world major power, has become more involved in the region. The main effort of Chinese engagement has been through economic and development projects in CARICOM States on a bilateral basis.⁵⁹ Military assistance in the form of matériel and training has also been provided.⁶⁰

CARICOM States recognise that it is in their collective best interest, especially in the demanding 21st Century globalised environment, to create stronger links with non-traditional regions and countries. Simultaneously, good relations with the more traditional partners in North America, Europe and Asia are maintained and intra-regional integration intensified.⁶¹ At this stage the evidence suggests that there are political,

⁵⁷ FOCAL Papers, *Towards a New World Strategy: Canadian Policy in the Americas into the Twenty-first Century*, (Canadian Foundation for the Americas, Ottawa, 1994), 12-13. See also Glyn. R. Berry, "The West Indies in Canadian External Relations: Present Trends and Future Prospects," in *Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean*, ed Brian Douglas Tennyson, 347-366 (Lanham, Maryland, University Press of America Inc, 1988), 347.

⁵⁸ During the period of the Great Wars Canadian military units were based in Bahamas, Bermuda, British Guiana (now Guyana) and Saint Lucia. David Murray, "Garrisoning the Caribbean: A Chapter in Canadian Military History," in *Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean*, ed Brian Douglas Tennyson, 279-301 (Lanham, Maryland, University Press of America Inc, 1988), 279-280.

⁵⁹ Steven W. Mosher, "Red China on the March – The People's Republic moves onto Grenada," available from *National Review on Line*, 14 February 2006 <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=Y2EwZmZkNDdhYjAwNGI2OGNIM2Y2ZTQ4YTU3MzlmZjg=>; internet, accessed 6 February 2008.

⁶⁰ Roger F. Noriega, "China's Influence in the Western Hemisphere," *US Department of State – Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs*, Washington, DC; April 6, 2005, available from <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2005/q2/44375.htm>, internet, accessed 6 February 2008.

⁶¹ His Excellency Bharrat Jagdeo, President of Guyana, "Address at the Inauguration of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, Headquarters Building," *CARICOM Press release 49/2005*,

economic, cultural, security and developmental factors which make the Caribbean important to those outside the region. Security engagements by global powers and cooperative strategies are multidimensional and provide an opportunity for a robust collaborative security apparatus once properly coordinated.

2.3 The History of CARICOM Military Cooperation. While this thesis argues for a deepening of military cooperation to derive greater benefits, past cooperative endeavours among the CARICOM Defence Forces have routinely been successful. The history of Defence Forces working together on operations demonstrates the potential to help meet the region's future security challenges.

The West Indies Federation and the West Indies Regiment. As part of its decision to advance modified self-government, the British Colonial Office authorities experimented with confederation of the West Indies.⁶² Established in 1958, the West Indies Federation comprised ten countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla (then one state), Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. During its brief existence from 1958 – 1962, a number of fundamental issues including defence and security were debated with a view to strengthening the alliance of states. The West Indies Regiment existed during this time as a provision for the defence of the Member States. The

<http://www.caricom.org/jsp/speeches/headquartersinauguration-jagdeo.htm>; internet; accessed 26 January 2008.

⁶² Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, *Islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean: A Regional Study* (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC), edited by Sandra W. Meditz and Dennis M. Hanratty, 1989.

Federation faced several problems including disagreements among its Member States on governance and administrative structures and collapsed in January 1962. This was the beginning of a period in which each of the colonies individually sought their independence from Britain.⁶³

Post Independence Era. The evolution of the traditional form of military security for the protection of sovereignty takes its genesis from colonial times. Some states have faced threats to their security in the form of insurrection, and all, the effects of natural disasters and narcotics trafficking. Efforts have been made since the early 1970s for the establishment of a collective security mechanism in the region. Fears about Cold War external aggression, coups d'état and the October 1976 terrorist bomb which downed a Cubana Airlines aircraft off Barbados' west coast served to heighten security awareness across the region. One such effort was in October 1981 when the Bahamas, Barbados, Britain, Canada, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago agreed to cooperate in the event of a threat to the independence of Belize but the defence aspect of the pact was never implemented.⁶⁴

The most successful step in advancing regional security issues occurred on 29 October 1982. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), desiring a common security and defence arrangement, established the Regional Security System

⁶³ Jamaica was first, becoming independent on 6 August followed by Trinidad and Tobago on 31 August 1962. Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, "The West Indies Federation" available from http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/west_indies_federation.jsp?menu=community; internet; accessed 26 January 2008.

⁶⁴ Ambassador Odeen Ishmael, *Approaches on Security in the Caribbean Region*.

(RSS) by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Barbados. Signatory states at that time were Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. As a testimony of the cooperative spirit existing in the region, the MOU included Barbados which is not a member of the OECS. Moreover Barbados was assigned a central role in the organization. Saint Kitts and Nevis and Grenada joined within the next three years.⁶⁵ The signatories agreed to prepare contingency plans, assist each another in national emergencies and cooperate on a range of security issues using the Member States' military and police resources collectively.⁶⁶ To maintain operational effectiveness, the RSS practices for various security scenarios on its annual UNITY exercise.⁶⁷ Despite several recommendations and although at one time Guyana expressed interest in joining, the RSS has not expanded.⁶⁸

The 1983 counter-revolutionary campaign in Grenada saw the cooperation of military units from Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and Jamaica in the US-led intervention – Operation Urgent Fury. Set in the Cold War environment, this operation was a response to the violent overthrow of the Maurice Bishop regime, itself an

⁶⁵ The OECS is a sub-regional grouping consisting of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Ambassador Odeen Ishmael, *Approaches on Security in the Caribbean Region*, Statement of Guyana at the Meeting of the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the OAS Washington DC, 29 October 2002.

⁶⁶ There are 3 Defence Forces and 7 Police Forces directly available within the RSS Treaty structure. Central Liaison Office, Regional Security System, "Article 4, Purposes and Functions of the System" in *Treaty Establishing the Regional Security System*, 1996, (St Georges, Grenada, 1996), 3.

⁶⁷ Barbados, "Barbados to be Venue of RSS UNITY Exercise 2006," *Government Information Service - News*, available from <http://www.barbados.gov.bb/ViewNews.asp?ID=4301&Dat=9/26/2006>; internet, accessed 4 April 2008.

⁶⁸ Ambassador Odeen Ishmael, *Approaches on Security in the Caribbean Region*, Statement of Guyana at the Meeting of the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the OAS Washington DC, 29 October 2002.

administration which seized power by a coup, albeit bloodless, in 1979. The operation, although controversial, also served to deny Cuba a satellite in the Southern Caribbean at a time when Cuba, itself a Soviet proxy, was suspected to be pursuing an agenda of regional expansion.⁶⁹ The planning and execution of this operation was led by the US but the recently established RSS played a key coordinating role. The mission transitioned from an intense operations phase in October-November 1983 to a peacekeeping phase throughout 1984. Overall the commitment of CARICOM troops to the mission lasted until 1985 during which time Grenada returned to fully democratic systems of governance. Although this operation represented an opportunity for the US to repulse communist influence in the Caribbean, CARICOM States' Defence Forces gained valuable operational experience whilst the region benefited from enhanced stability.⁷⁰

On 27 July 1990 Yasin Abu Bakr led the Jammāt Al-Muslimeen of over 100 members in a coup in Trinidad and Tobago. During the coup the Islamist rebels took the Prime Minister and most of his Cabinet hostage in the Parliament building, a Government Minister was killed and a television and radio station taken over. The crisis lasted for five days while rioting and looting gripped the capital, Port of Spain. Scores were killed and millions of dollars worth of property was destroyed. In response, a similar operational campaign to that of Operation Urgent Fury was conducted but comprised only of CARICOM Defence Forces. After the rebels surrendered, then Prime Minister of

⁶⁹ Ronald H. Cole, *Operation Urgent Fury – The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 12 October - 2 November 1983*, (Washington, DC 1997: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Library of Congress), 77.

⁷⁰ David Isenberg, "The Reagan Doctrine," *Collective Defence or Strategic Independence? Alternative Strategies for the Future*, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter, 175-191 (Cato Institute, Lexington Books, Washington, DC, 1989) 176.

Barbados Sir Lloyd Sandiford made a strong demand for the expansion of the RSS to include all CARICOM Member States in order to prevent a recurrence. He suggested that the RSS be given the increased authority and resources to deal with all aspects of regional security including threats to constitutional democracy by terrorists, mercenaries and insurgents.⁷¹

The 1994-1996 peacekeeping mission in Haiti represents another significant event in the history of CARICOM Military Forces' cooperative deployments. With the exception of Saint Kitts and Nevis and Suriname, all CARICOM Member States with Defence Forces deployed personnel to form a composite unit in the US-led intervention (Restore Democracy) and subsequent United Nations peacekeeping mission (Uphold Democracy).⁷² The mission contributed to the stability of Haiti and the wider region and also helped to professionalise the military forces of contributing states.⁷³

Over the years, the military has also taken part in mitigation tasks following environmental calamities. Given the annual threat posed by severe weather systems, CARICOM's Defence Forces play an important civil defence role for disaster preparedness and response under the auspices of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency

⁷¹ Ambassador Odeen Ishmael, *Approaches on Security in the Caribbean Region*, Statement of Guyana at the Meeting of the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the OAS Washington DC, 29 October 2002.

⁷² United Kingdom, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, "CARICOM: A Regional Response to a Nation in Crisis – Haiti," *Colleges and Components, Royal College of Defence Studies*, <http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/Information/Library/ResearchPapers/SHP2000Files/Graham>; internet, accessed 5 April 2008.

⁷³ María Christina Rosas, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Security and Defence in the Post-Cold War Era," 251-282, in *SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security*, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, 2005), 251-252.

Response Agency (CDERA).⁷⁴ CDERA is a regional inter-governmental agency which encapsulates disaster management and response functions and requires the performance of assistance to civil power and civil ministry tasks. CDERA's purpose is to make an immediate and coordinated response, on request, to any disastrous event affecting a participating state. CDERA uses a combined military and police resourced Caribbean Disaster Response Unit (CDRU) to execute reconnaissance, relief aid distribution, resource mobilisation management and security tasks.⁷⁵ Over the years, the larger CARICOM deployments in response to disasters have been:

- (1) In 1988 following the devastation from Hurricane Gilbert in Jamaica.
- (2) In 1989 in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo in Montserrat.
- (3) In 1995 following the destruction caused by Hurricanes Luis (in Antigua and Barbuda) and Marilyn (in Saint Kitts and Nevis).
- (4) In 2004, for massive disaster relief and reconstruction efforts in Grenada in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan. Given the scale of damage caused by the severe weather system and the disruption of the country's administrative and security infrastructure, the Defence Forces were also required to conduct assistance to the civil power tasks.⁷⁶

Intra-regional military resources have also been leveraged in response to the pervasive regional narcotics trafficking threat. Although not under the auspices of

⁷⁴ Regional Security System, "Activities of the RSS," available from <http://www.rss.org.bb/rss1b.htm#OPERATIONAL%20UNITS>; internet, accessed 10 March 2008.

⁷⁵ Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency, "CDRU completes review of disaster relief operations," available from (CDERA News Centre: Press Releases, Fri, 18 Feb 2005, 12:05), http://www.cdera.org/cunews/news_releases/cdera/article_905.php, internet, accessed 10 February 2008.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

CARICOM but rather the smaller 7-nation RSS, Military Forces have participated in counter narcotics operations in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Dominica to destroy cannabis crops.⁷⁷ These operations saw the deployment of military land and maritime units over the latter half of the 1990's in support of the State's law-enforcement agencies. Regrettably, despite the pervasiveness of maritime narcotics trafficking there is no comprehensive and sustained regional operational programme managed at CARICOM level. The efforts of the RSS over the first half of the 1990's to establish a coordinated maritime patrol programme are commendable however a paucity of surface assets caused intermittency and resulted in the entire programme becoming unsustainable in the long-term.⁷⁸

The 2007 Cricket World Cup tournament, a global sports event, represented an unprecedented, inter-agency, CARICOM wide security project in which the military played a significant role. Deliberate planning of the security coverage for the tournament commenced as early as 2003. The Defence Forces were key participants in developing specific operational and contingency plans and coordinating national resources across the spectrum of government services within States and regionally. As a part of a multi-disciplinary synergy that included police, public health, disaster management, border and maritime entities, CARICOM Defence Forces' land, maritime, air and special operations forces were arranged into operational units and reinforced with military resources from

⁷⁷ United States, Directorate of the Joint Staff, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, (Joint Publication 3-07.4, 13 June 2007), xiii, II-1-II-2, II-17.

⁷⁸ Brigadier General Edmund Dillon, "Regional Security Cooperation: Traditional and Non-traditional Areas," in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, 462-484 ed Dr Ivelaw Griffith (Kingston, Jamaica, Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 475.

Colombia, France, India and South Africa.⁷⁹ A critical provision was for intelligence coordination and analysis through the CARICOM Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC).⁸⁰ The mission was dubbed a success as the tournament was held without significant security incident.⁸¹

Another activity of note relative to the cooperative efforts among CARICOM Defence Forces is the Caribbean Junior Command and Staff Course (CJCSC). The programme of study is conducted by the Jamaica Defence Force and supported by the Canadian Forces. Students are drawn from CARICOM Defence Forces and Canada and Directing Staff from all CARICOM Defence Forces, Canada and the UK. The institution was established in 1993 and conducts courses annually. It builds on a model initially piloted by the UK in Barbados and Belize in early 1990's and today represents the maturity of a concept to conduct aspects of officer professional development within the region. Curriculum development and increased contribution of staff from the Defence Forces is needed to increase the value of the institution.⁸²

⁷⁹ CARICOM Secretariat, *One Team, One Space, One Caribbean*, (CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, Port of Spain, 2007), 19-25.

⁸⁰ CARICOM Secretariat, "Some Regional Security Arrangements to remain after CWC 2007." available from http://www.caricomimpacs.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=66&Itemid=2; internet, accessed 9 March 2008.

⁸¹ CARICOM Secretariat, *One Team, One Space, One Caribbean*, (CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, Port of Spain, 2007), 19-25.

⁸² Headquarters Barbados Defence Force, "Junior Command and Staff Course" (Saint Ann's Fort, Bridgetown, Barbados, Registry File Series: 1/120/5A, Vol 1).

Overall, the effectiveness achieved in the history of CARICOM and RSS operations indicates that there is tremendous strategic benefit to be obtained from using the military in a joint, multi-national and multidisciplinary way. It is sensible to combine the physical and intellectual resources of the Defence Forces, and in so doing increase the quality of the regional security public good.⁸³ The existence of the RSS Treaty and more recently, the Treaty on Security Assistance Among CARICOM Member States sets the stage to advance the cooperative process further.⁸⁴ As products of national security deliberations these treaties show that the region's Governments wish to avoid blundering into any security disaster by establishing an interdisciplinary framework that includes strategic use of the military at the regional level.⁸⁵

But there have been occasional criticisms made relative to the necessity for the military and about the financial resources they consume. For example it has been proposed that Defence Forces be disbanded in favour of less expensive volunteer forces based on part-time militia models and the trained soldiers be absorbed into Police Forces. The costs of maintaining professional military forces have been set against perceived limited benefits and the remoteness of the possibility for conventional warfighting, akin to Cold War scenarios. Proponents see disbanding of the military as a means of freeing

⁸³ Brigadier General Rudyard Lewis, "Initiatives for Cooperative Regional Security: The Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System," in *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, 177-183, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 179.

⁸⁴ Caribbean Community Secretariat, *Treaty on Security Assistance Among CARICOM Member States*, 2006, (Basseterre, Saint Kitts and Nevis), 1.

⁸⁵ Steven Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (2), (June 1991), 211-213, 229.

up substantial revenues for investment in productive sectors.⁸⁶ The argument against the retention of military forces is premised on the implication that there is no longer an external threat to the CARICOM States.⁸⁷ It however fails to realise the strength of the military as an institutional asset and the relevance of its preservation to help cope with the emerging threats of the 21st Century which include dangerous transnational actors. Overall some essential lessons can be drawn from the military operations over the years.

2.4 Primary Data Collected and Lessons Learned. Primary data as contained at Appendix 1 was gathered from the Forces in order to supplement the secondary sources used in the research. The data shows that the Forces view security in broad terms where the citizens of a state are the focal point of security which facilitates their freedom to live peacefully, in a stable environment that is conducive to sustainable development. Security is a necessary foundation and a protective envelope for the state's values, interests and future prosperous development.⁸⁸

The multidimensional and transnational challenge created by narcotics trafficking is considered to be the most serious threat and central to a network of other threats. The network includes proliferation of firearms and criminality of all forms. The primary data indicates that the trafficking network will become more entrenched and more dangerous in the future. Against these threats effective security cannot be achieved by either

⁸⁶ Nation Newspaper, "PEP: Too Much Spent on BDF," *NationNews.com*, 6 January 2008, available from <http://www.nationnews.com/>; internet, accessed 15 January 2008.

⁸⁷ Anthony Harriott, Mission Effectiveness, Environmental Change and the Reconfiguration of the Jamaican Security Forces, (Security and Defence Studies Review 2, No. 1, Summer 2002), 4.

⁸⁸ Interviewees' 1 and 5 Responses, CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008.

organisations or states acting on their own. The data indicated that there is a security interdependency among CARICOM States. Closer ties among Defence Forces and across a broad spectrum of agencies are necessary. Whilst the military provides higher ordered skills that contribute immeasurably to the application of state-authorized force, future contributions of the military to preserving security could be enhanced.⁸⁹

CARICOM Defence Forces' past collaborative efforts have helped build solidarity among the Forces and the CARICOM States, acting as a catalyst for raising the level of military professionalism to a standard comparable to that found in the more established military forces around the world. Ultimately an effective military capability relevant to regional needs has been built.⁹⁰

Notwithstanding these strengths, weaknesses in the areas of limited operational assets, dependency on extra regional support, equipment integration challenges and operational sustainment have been observed. Limited permanent infrastructure for strategic and operational planning and management was also identified as a weakness.⁹¹

The key lessons learned from the joint and collaborative experiences are that:

- (1) National security must be viewed by Governments in the region as a national responsibility and as such States must not be dependent on foreign and defence policy dictates of extra-regional powers;

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Interviewee 1 Responses, CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008.

⁹¹ Interviewees' 2 and 3 Responses, CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008.

- (2) Subsequently, Governments must provide the necessary resources to support their national security forces. The acquisition of adequate, regionally controlled strategic and operational assets to support mobilizations needs attention;⁹² and,
- (3) In keeping with the principles of cooperation and economy of effort there must be greater collaboration and coordination among the military and other security forces in the region.⁹³

The primary data indicates that the RSS and CARICOM treaties are essential elements for developing an overarching security strategy from which critical supporting operational provisions can be built. Procedures for improving coordination between RSS and CARICOM should be included especially if the RSS will not be expanded.⁹⁴

The data reveals a need for the military's role to be more formally accepted as more than simply defence but inclusive of the broader national security requirements. The military instrument of national power must of necessity play a more contemporary, non-traditional role in the establishment and maintenance of stable, safe and secure environments.⁹⁵ Accordingly, it is essential that the Defence Forces work closer with

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Interviewee 3 Responses, CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008.

⁹⁴ Should all CARICOM Member States join the RSS there would be a threefold increase in the number of Defence Forces – from 3 to 9. Interviewee 2 Responses, CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008.

⁹⁵ Interviewee 1 Responses, CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008.

each other, with the police and other law enforcement agencies to build a credible deterrent to threats. Specific attention should be placed on enhancing information and intelligence sharing and in assisting with the training and development of skills.⁹⁶

Past observations made at the political level are also instructive as they concord with the primary data collected. In 1990, then Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, A.N.R Robinson, asserted:

. . . It is becoming increasingly apparent that no single state, large or small can in isolation ensure its own security from subversion or external threat. In this era of interdependence of states and the globalisation of activities relating to almost every sphere of life – economic, politic, cultural and criminal to name a few – the preservation of national security can no longer be seen purely in national terms.⁹⁷

In a similar vein Sir Lloyd Sandiford, stressed the need for regional States to work together.

. . . The preservation of law and order and national security contribute uniquely to growth and development through the promotion of stability. We must therefore expand our integration effort to include the area of regional security and we must seek further cooperation with friendly governments in our region and beyond. One thing is certain; no single territory can do it alone. We have to work together if we are to ensure that Caribbean remains a zone of peace, prosperity and democracy.⁹⁸

2.5 Chapter Summary. The Chapter saw that throughout CARICOM's history the threats to security have ranged from insurrections to narcotics trafficking and natural disasters. In response, cooperation in security across CARICOM follows from strategic

⁹⁶ Interviewees' 4 and 5 Responses, CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008.

⁹⁷ Brigadier General Edmund Dillon, *Security Cooperation in the Caribbean*, (Headquarters, Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, Port of Spain), 4.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

efforts in the geo-strategic and regional political domains. The military as an active participant in the security domain, and within an inter-agency framework, has supported the execution of regional strategies. Whilst employment of the military has mostly been reactive there is an opportunity to adopt a more strategic approach.

The geo-strategic value of the region to those outside it is visible in the engagement of the world's remaining super power, emerging and other major powers through their multidimensional strategies. The RSS Treaty and CARICOM Treaty on Security Assistance provide the strategic setting for military strategic and operational advancements.

Finally, the Chapter highlighted some three decades of accumulated mission experience which, it is concluded, constitutes valuable organisational knowledge that can be harnessed for future applications. This knowledge and experience reinforces physical capacities. Given this base of evidence, the thesis will next examine the existing threats and the continuously evolving global security environment in order to show the impact on the security of the Caribbean and reinforce the need for building military cooperation.

CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACT OF THE WORLD –
THREATS TO CARIBBEAN SECURITY

3.1 Chapter Outline. As the global security environment fluctuates between periods of dynamic instability and peace, specific regions have become known for the threats which emanate from them. The Caribbean's security environment is buffeted by a range of security threats that prevail across the world and others which may be unique to the region.⁹⁹ CARICOM Governments are ultimately responsible for the safety of their citizens and must specify the values and interests they wish to protect. In so doing Governments are challenged on how to allocate scarce resources among competing ends. Considerations include the protection from which threats, the time-frame, means and costs.¹⁰⁰ What is the nature of the global security environment and what does it portend for the Caribbean? What conditions threaten the interests and values of CARICOM Member States?¹⁰¹

This Chapter will examine the global security environment, identify threats and assess the impact they may have on the region. The Chapter first examines prevailing threats and next, global areas of interest from which may come future threats with the potential to influence CARICOM's security climate. At the end of the Chapter the nature of the threats to Caribbean security will be clarified.

⁹⁹ Dr Harry Yarger, "The Strategic Environment"..., 18.

¹⁰⁰ David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23 (1), January 1997, 12-17.

¹⁰¹ Attina, "Regional security partnership: the concept, model, practice and a preliminary comparative scheme," 6.

3.2 Prevailing Threats. In the past there was once the threat of secession in multi-island states (for example, the 1967 secession of Anguilla from the Saint Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla union and others such as the 1969 violent secessionist rebellion in the Rupununi region of Guyana).¹⁰² Coups d'état, military mutinies and Cold War external aggression were also concerns¹⁰³ but in the latter years of the Cold War a shift in the regional security agenda occurred.¹⁰⁴

Today a wide range of security threats are challenging the region and the main one is the trafficking in illegal drugs and its attendant increase of illegal small arms and violent crime. Threats to human security caused by forces of the natural environment and concerns about terrorism also form aspects of the regional threat dynamic. In some States socio-economic imbalances and concerns about ethnic tensions compound the mix.¹⁰⁵ HIV/AIDS is also categorised as a threat to national security or at the least, a threat to human security and national development.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Ambassador Odeen Ishmael, *Approaches on Security in the Caribbean Region*, Statement of Guyana at the Meeting of the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the OAS Washington DC, 29 October 2002.

¹⁰³ There was a military mutiny in Trinidad and Tobago in 1970 and coups d'état in Grenada in 1979 and 1983 and in Trinidad and Tobago in 1990. Ambassador Odeen Ishmael, *Approaches on Security in the Caribbean Region*.

¹⁰⁴ Andrés Serbin, "Transnational Relations and Regionalism in the Caribbean," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 533, Trends in US-Caribbean Relations. (May, 1994), 141.

¹⁰⁵ Political polarisation and tension between African and Indian ethnicities has been identified in Guyana. Jane's, "Central America and the Caribbean," Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, available at <http://sentinel.janes.com/>; internet, accessed 2 February 2008.

¹⁰⁶ Caroline Allen, Roger McClean and Keith Nurse, "The Caribbean, HIV/AIDS and Security," in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, ed Dr Ivelaw L Griffith, 219-251, (Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston, Jamaica, 2004), 221-251. See also Organisation of American States, Preparatory Committee, "Aide Memoire on the Theme of Multi-Dimensional Approach to Hemispheric

Narcotics Trafficking. The expanding narcotics trade is an example of the way global crime creates and facilitates integrated threats. In both production and transit regions, it generates a variety of interconnected threats to political, economic, human and even military security.¹⁰⁷ Trafficking in narcotics is a major component in the global crime industry with heroin, cocaine and cannabis the principal commodities. Although cannabis is the leader in terms of users, unit prices and profits are highest for heroin and cocaine. The industrialised countries are the major markets for narcotics, although consumption has been increasing steadily in the developing world.¹⁰⁸

While the heroin trade originates in Asia, the cocaine and cannabis trades are centred in the Americas. In respect of cocaine production, three countries within the western hemisphere, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, account for global production as Figure 3.1 shows. Their illegal goods transit the Caribbean area.

Security for the Ministerial Dialogue of the 32nd OAS General Assembly,” (OEA/Ser. P AG/CP/doc. 643/02; 5 April 2002), 2.

¹⁰⁷ Niklas Swanstrom, “The Narcotics Trade: A Threat to Security? National and Transnational Implications,” *Global Crime*, Vol 8, No. 1, (February, 2007), 1-3.

¹⁰⁸ Norman Girvan, “Crime and Security (2): The Caribbean Corridors, The Greater Caribbean This Week,” available from *Association of Caribbean States: Press Centre*, February 7, 2003, <http://www.acs-aec.org/PressCenter/column/index73.htm>; internet, accessed 5 February 2008.




Figure 3.1: Global Cocaine Production (Metric Tons) 1990 – 2006.¹⁰⁹

An OAS' *Report on Maritime Drug Trafficking Routes and Methods in the Americas* identifies two major trans-shipment corridors, known as the Amazon corridor and the Caribbean corridor, for cocaine produced in South America.¹¹⁰ Within these corridors multiple routes are used as Figure 3.2 shows. The Amazon corridor involves parts of Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela and Guyana whereas the Caribbean corridor more heavily utilises the countries in the island chain. The Caribbean corridor subdivides further into two routes – one centred on Puerto Rico or an alternative which blends with normal maritime traffic through the eastern Caribbean islands. “Go-fast boats” follow the Venezuelan coastline and proceed either directly to the northern

¹⁰⁹ Research and Analysis Section, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *2007 World Drug Report*, (United Nations Publications, New York), 66.

¹¹⁰ Organisation of American States, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, *Maritime Drug Trafficking Routes and Methods in the Americas*; (Twenty-Fourth Regular Session, 26-30 October 1998, CICAD/Doc.984/98, Tegucigalpa, Honduras), Annex I.

islands or via the islands in the Eastern Caribbean.¹¹¹ It has been assessed that Venezuela is growing rapidly as a major transshipment centre and departure point for South American cocaine destined for the US market.¹¹² The usage of the CARICOM Member States and maritime littorals is clearly visible.



Figure 3.2: Major Cocaine Trafficking Routes in the Caribbean.¹¹³

The effect of South American drug cartels' routing cocaine shipments through the Caribbean is very destabilising especially given the price of the illegal commodity and

¹¹¹ Norman Girvan, "Crime and Security (2): The Caribbean Corridors, The Greater Caribbean This Week."

¹¹² There are also concerns about the ideological closeness of Venezuela to Iran and that this can create an avenue for radical Iranian elements to move more freely to the Western Hemisphere and perhaps access US interests. J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment February 2008*. . . ,2-6.

¹¹³ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2001-2002, *Caribbean Drug Trends* (Caribbean Regional Office, Bridgetown, Barbados, February 2003), 6.

the extreme violence associated with its trafficking.¹¹⁴ Whilst there has been a decrease in volumes shipped through the region when compared to previous periods, the greater Caribbean region remains a major transit area for moving cocaine by sea into North America and Europe to the detriment of the security of CARICOM Member States.¹¹⁵

Cannabis is the largest narcotics market in the world and its size is one of its most important characteristics. There are an estimated 160 million consumers worldwide and its production centres are widely dispersed, existing in almost every country in the world. Nevertheless, the Central/South America and Caribbean region collectively accounts for 23% (9660 tons) of the world's production.¹¹⁶ Most countries in the region produce cannabis although there is great variance in volumes produced and exported among these states.¹¹⁷ The following charts (Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4) help to illustrate the regional production volumes.

¹¹⁴ Anthony Bryan, *Transnational Organised Crime: The Caribbean Context*, (University of Miami, The Dante B. Fascell North-South Centre Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1, October 2000), 2.

¹¹⁵ Research and Analysis Section, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *2007 World Drug Report*, (United Nations Publications, New York), 72-74.

¹¹⁶ It should be noted that two States within CARCIOM (Jamaica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) are significant cannabis producers especially at the regional level. Research and Analysis Section, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *2007 World Drug Report*, (United Nations Publications, New York), 95-98.

¹¹⁷ Norman Girvan, "Crime and Security (2): The Caribbean Corridors, The Greater Caribbean This Week."




Figure 3.3: Cannabis Production (Metric Tons) 1988/89 – 2005
Central/South America and the Caribbean.¹¹⁸




Figure 3.4: Global Cannabis Production (Metric Tons) 1988 – 2005.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Research and Analysis Section, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *2007 World Drug Report*, (United Nations Publications, New York), 97.

The Figures show the large volume of cannabis produced relative to the global market share and which translates into significant threats to the human security of CARICOM citizens and to the national security of States. Health problems, violence, organised crime and corruption of institutions are the visible manifestations as the narcotics traffickers conduct their illegal activities.¹²⁰ The Caribbean region occupies a central position in the global cannabis trade¹²¹ as the patterns in routes to North American and European markets in Figure 3.5 illustrate.¹²²

¹¹⁹ Research and Analysis Section, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *2007 World Drug Report*, (United Nations Publications, New York), 97.

¹²⁰ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2001-2002, *Caribbean Drug Trends* (Caribbean Regional Office, Bridgetown, Barbados, February 2003), 2.

¹²¹ Organisation of American States, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, "Maritime Drug Trafficking Routes and Methods in the Americas," Twenty-Fourth Regular Session, 26-30 October 1998, CICAD/Doc.984/98, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, Annex I.

¹²² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2001-2002, *Caribbean Drug Trends* (Caribbean Regional Office, Bridgetown, Barbados, February 2003), 6.




Figure 3.5: Major Cannabis Trafficking Routes in the Caribbean.¹²³

Caribbean cannabis production and exports have declined in the last two decades of the 20th Century and so far into the new millennium have not recovered. Although cannabis demand in the Caribbean, North America and Europe increased slightly, exports from the Caribbean to the industrialized countries fell. The reduction is due to high-quality production, both indoors and outdoors in the Caribbean/South American narcotics traffickers' traditional market countries. The cannabis trade in the Caribbean has shifted to become an internal one rather mainly an export-oriented enterprise. The trade is fragmented with Jamaican traffickers exerting a greater influence in the northern Caribbean and Colombia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in the south.¹²⁴

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 9.

Comparing Figures 3.2 and 3.5 reveals a striking feature – cocaine and cannabis trafficking both use multiple complex routes which violate the sovereignty and security of several CARICOM Member States. In some instances common routes and means of conveyance are used, evidence of an existing alliance between cocaine and cannabis trafficking organisations. Cocaine and cannabis traffickers have largely returned to the sea routes they favoured during the 1980's, a response to the US' law enforcement authorities' post 11 September 2001 (9/11) shift in focus closer to continental North America.¹²⁵ The steep increase in homicides in several CARICOM countries in recent years is seen as a result of narcotics trafficking, further evidence of the security impact.¹²⁶ The trafficking in narcotics represents a dangerous bellwether for the territorial security of CARICOM States and the health of Caribbean citizens.

Organised Crime. The tentacles of mafia style globalised crime organisations have been observed across the Caribbean region and linked to gangs in North America and Europe. The entire Caribbean region is facing a wave of criminal activity mostly associated with narcotics trafficking and including mobile groups committing violent acts. The criminal activities transcend language boundaries within the region as a pattern of inter-change between Anglophone States, Francophone Haiti and Spanish speaking

¹²⁴ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2001-2002, *Caribbean Drug Trends* (Caribbean Regional Office, Bridgetown, Barbados, February 2003), 8-9. See also Tony Best, "Dope Alert." Available from *NationNews.com*, *Local News Story*, 10 March 2008, <http://www.nationnews.com/story/291186406491673.php>; internet, accessed 11 March 2008.

¹²⁵ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2001-2002, *Caribbean Drug Trends* (Caribbean Regional Office, Bridgetown, Barbados, February 2003), 22.

¹²⁶ Norman Girvan, "Crime and Human Security in the Caribbean (1): The Greater Caribbean This Week," available from Association of Caribbean States: Press Centre, February 7, 2003, <http://www.acs-aec.org/PressCenter/column/index71.htm>; internet, accessed 5 February 2008.

Colombia, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and Venezuela exists. The transnational nature of organised crime, once absent from the Caribbean, is now a hard fact of life. For example, it is believed that every major criminal grouping in Jamaica has an outpost in North America and in the UK, sometimes in more than one city.¹²⁷ Organised crime has been assessed as having many aspects which include money laundering, the trade in light weaponry and human smuggling. It is estimated that US \$60 Billion out of US \$300 - \$500 Billion worldwide is laundered annually within the Caribbean region and unfortunately make the region a significant player in the global problem.¹²⁸

Additionally, criminal deportees from North America and Europe have been the subject of concern as it is felt that this inflow has been a source of criminal knowledge transfer.¹²⁹ It is estimated that more than 610,000 persons with criminal convictions or criminal charges were deported between 1998 – 2005 and a high percentage of these were sent to the Caribbean. Criminal deportees represent a body of experienced law-breakers who are potential recruits for regional criminal organisations or become criminal entrepreneurs themselves.¹³⁰ There is data, however which suggests that the level of recidivism among these deportees is low (13% in Barbados where 332 deportees were received from 1994 – 2000; 15% in Trinidad and Tobago with 565 deportees from 1999 – 2001) especially when compared to the re-offence rate of prisoners released from

¹²⁷ Tony Best, “Crime wave rampant in region,” available from *NationNews.com, Local News Story*, 10/7/05, <http://www.nationnews.com/story/323625782621262.php>, internet, accessed 9 February 2008.

¹²⁸ Anthony Bryan, *Transnational Organised Crime: The Caribbean Context*, 2-7.

¹²⁹ Tony Best, “Crime wave rampant in region.”

¹³⁰ Luigi R Einaudi, “Trans-American Security: What’s Missing?” *Strategic Forum* No. 228 September 2007 (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University), 3.

Caribbean prisons.¹³¹ Although the quantity might be small, the quality of their activities may cause an effect that is disproportionate to the number. This disproportionate effect may be sufficient to exacerbate existing security problems. The dynamics of globalisation over the past two decades have created suitable conditions for the penetration and spread of transnational organised crime.

There is compelling evidence that the steep increase in criminal violence in the Greater Caribbean region is linked to broader developments in the hemisphere and globally. A series of inter-linked factors such as globalisation, the end of the Cold War, socio-economic inequalities, narcotics trafficking, proliferation of small arms and increasing urbanisation appear to be at work. Russian organised crime has also been suspected to be present in the Caribbean region where institutional weaknesses combined with the pervasive narcotics trade worsen the region's vulnerabilities.¹³² Deregulation of financial systems and trade liberalisation have been exploited by organised criminals. Prostitution and human smuggling have also become integral parts of global criminality and the Caribbean region is vulnerable due to its location and its geographic and political fragmentation (there are 25 independent states and 12 affiliated territories). Added to this is the small size of the majority of its jurisdictions; 23 of which have less than 1 million people.¹³³ While crime fits squarely in the domain of law enforcement agencies, the

¹³¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and Caribbean Region of the World Bank, *Crime, Violence and Development: Trends, Costs and Policy Options in the Caribbean*, (Report No. 37820, March 2007), vii-viii.

¹³² Bruce Bagley, "Globalisation and Latin American and Caribbean Organised Crime," *Global Crime*, Vol 6, No 1, (February, 2004), 32-34.

¹³³ Norman Girvan, "Crime and Human Security in the Caribbean (1): The Greater Caribbean This Week."

increasing complexity, violence and overall impact on national security will continue to seize the attention of Governments. In response, the judicious application of military resources as a part of a joint and inter-agency approach may increasingly be required to counter threats.

Environmental Threats. Apart from man-made security threats there are a number of environmental challenges which present problems by themselves and compound other challenges. Climate change particularly caused by global warming is forecasted to have a severe impact on the world's population. The Caribbean region, where more than half the population lives within a mile of coasts, is assessed to be at great risk and the whole region described as vulnerable.¹³⁴

The destruction of the Amazon rainforest affects the entire world but it has a particular impact in the Latin American and Caribbean region. The decrease in vegetation reduces evapo-transpiration from plants, which is expected to reduce precipitation in the region creating arid conditions. Coupled with this, the effects of extreme El Niño/La Niña oscillations will negatively affect weather and fish stocks. Increased flooding is also predicted. Much of Latin American and Caribbean agriculture specializes in sensitive commercial crops such as bananas and coffee and more extreme weather would harm these delicate crops. Also, tropical diseases such as malaria and

¹³⁴ Michael Melia, "Caribbean islands urged to brace tourism industry for effects of climate change," *Associated Press*, Tuesday, October 23, 2007, available from <http://climate.weather.com/articles/caribbean102307.html>, internet, accessed 10 February 2008.

dengue fever could expand as the range of disease carriers shifts.¹³⁵ Fragile economic and human security dimensions are affected.

The rise in sea levels with the predicted accelerated polar sheet ice disintegration presents yet another problem for CARICOM States. A small increase in sea level would erode away significant portions of coasts. It is estimated that a 50 centimetre increase in sea levels will result in a loss of one-third of the Caribbean's beaches. An increase of 1 metre would permanently submerge about 11 percent of the land area in the Bahamas. The loss of desired beachfront negatively affects tourism, a major economic activity of CARICOM States. Water stress and scarcity caused by higher global temperatures coupled with the intrusion of salt water would compromise freshwater supplies, exacerbate drought conditions and force Governments to undertake costly investments in desalination.¹³⁶

The projected effects of global warming on hurricane frequency and intensity are an area of ongoing research and tremendous concern.¹³⁷ Warming seas will fuel more intense tropical storms which will have devastating consequences for CARICOM countries. Similarly to the impact on coastal populations, sections of the population

¹³⁵ Climate.org, "Regional Effects of Climate Change: Climate Change Impacts in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Protecting the Balance Between Climate and Life on Earth*, (A Project of the Climate Institute) available from http://www.climate.org/topics/climate/impacts_la.shtml; internet, accessed 10 February 2008.

¹³⁶ Global temperature increases of 3–4° Celsius could result in 330 million people globally being permanently or temporarily displaced through flooding. Small island states in the Caribbean would suffer catastrophic damage. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change – Human Solidarity in a Divided World*, (United Nation, New York), 9, 101.

¹³⁷ Climate.org, "Regional Effects of Climate Change: Climate Change Impacts in Latin America and the Caribbean."

living in depressed urban areas, on fragile hillsides or flood-prone river banks face acute vulnerabilities. Increased numbers and intensities of severe weather systems will mean increased production and operation costs especially in the agricultural sector's vulnerable food crops.¹³⁸ While the role of humanity in global warming remains a source of controversy, climatic trends are already driving decisions on economic investment which may serve to indirectly worsen socio-economic problems.¹³⁹

It is clear that at current rates of climate change the region's vulnerabilities are significant in relation to human security and development¹⁴⁰ and would spawn or exacerbate other security problems.¹⁴¹ CARICOM States have demonstrated leadership in managing the challenges of climate change. Since the 1994 Global Conference on Sustainable Development in Small Island Developing States the focus has been on adaptation and capacity building.¹⁴² Cognisant that climate change will touch all aspects of social, economic and ecological life, CARICOM Governments have developed an integrated strategy linking national and regional planning. The Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change programme, initiated in 2002, promotes the integration of adaptation and risk management functions into areas such as water resource management,

¹³⁸ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change – Human Solidarity in a Divided World*, 183.

¹³⁹ Michael Melia, "Caribbean islands urged to brace tourism industry for effects of climate change."

¹⁴⁰ Climate.org, "Regional Effects of Climate Change: Climate Change Impacts in Latin America and the Caribbean."

¹⁴¹ Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," *International Security* Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994): 5-7.

¹⁴² Caribbean Community Secretariat, "Caribbean Planning for Adaptation to Climate Change (CPACC) Project" available from <http://www.caricom.org/jsp/projects/macc%20project/cpacc.jsp>, internet, accessed 10 February 2008.

tourism, fisheries and agriculture.¹⁴³ Capacity building includes the reinforcement of CDERA and the CDRU where the Defence Forces have been valuable assets.

Terrorism. There are two strains of terrorism which seize the attention of CARICOM's policymakers and security authorities – radical Islamists and *narco-terrorism*. The 9/11 Al-Qaeda coordinated attacks had an impact on the Caribbean.¹⁴⁴ Among other things, there was a noticeable economic impact on tourism revenues.¹⁴⁵ There is now heightened awareness of the vulnerabilities within CARICOM¹⁴⁶ since Al-Qaeda's proxy actions like those in Bali in 2002 and 2005 reiterate that small powers are vulnerable to the terrorist's application of illegitimate violence. CARICOM States can be affected by terrorism if only indirectly through the region's geographic linkages through the US' third border and via political, socio-economic and security ties.¹⁴⁷

A specific terrorist concern is that of Adnan Gulshair Muhammad el Shukrijumah, categorised as an Al-Qaeda operative and one of the world's most wanted terrorists. He

¹⁴³ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change – Human Solidarity in a Divided World*, 196.

¹⁴⁴ Dorith Grant-Wisdom, "US-Caribbean Relations: The Impact of 9/11," in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, edited by Dr Ivelaw L. Griffith, 252-272, (Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston, Jamaica, 2004), 252-254.

¹⁴⁵ Ransford Palmer, "Economic and Trade Impact of 9/11" in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, ed Dr Ivelaw L Griffith, 334-349, (Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston, Jamaica, 2004), 336. The economic benefit from tourism and related foreign business investments is well known. Major Rocky R. Meade, Jamaica Defence Force, *The Relevance and Optimal Structure of the Military in Jamaica in the Current and Emerging Geo-Security Environment*, (MMAS thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, Kansas, US, 2003), 9–10.

¹⁴⁶ Norman Girvan, "Agenda Setting and Regionalism in the Greater Caribbean: Responses to 9/11," in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, ed Dr Ivelaw L Griffith, 310-333, (Kingston, Jamaica, Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 315, 322.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 315.

is suspected to have Caribbean parentage, other personal ties within the CARICOM region and possibly hiding within the region. CARICOM's security services especially those serving at border ports of entry remain networked regionally and internationally and vigilant for all such persons of interest listed on global security threat watch-lists.¹⁴⁸ More recently, US Authorities allege that the 2007 John F. Kennedy International Airport terror plot had its roots in South America and the Caribbean inferring that terrorist threats can originate within the region. Key personalities implicated in the plan were resident in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago and one, Abdul Kadir,¹⁴⁹ was linked to the Jamaat al Muslimeen organisers of the 1990 coup in Trinidad and Tobago.¹⁵⁰ This implies that as the campaign against terror is conducted globally,¹⁵¹ CARICOM should remain vigilant if only to protect its own interests.¹⁵² A higher level of intra-regional coordination and global connectivity of CARICOM's security resources is therefore appropriate.

¹⁴⁸ He is allegedly linked to the 1993 bombing at the World Trade Centre and potentially a terrorist sleeper agent. He was also believed to have a passport issued by one of the CARICOM States for use to enter the US. The US' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is seeking his arrest. Nation Newspaper, "Trinidad, Guyana Alert for Terrorist," *NationNews.com Brief*, 5 September 2006, available from <http://www.nationnews.com/story/286962763692968.php>; internet, accessed 4 February 2008 and Trinidad and Tobago Express, "FBI Hunts Al-Qaeda Chief," available from *Trinidad and Tobago Express Monday September 4th 2006*, http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_archive?id=161007813; internet, accessed 4 February 2008.

¹⁴⁹ Anthony Faiola and Steven Mufson, "NY Airport Target of Plot, Officials Say: 3 Held in Alleged Plan to Bomb JFK," available from *Washington Post, Nation: National Security*, Washington Post.com, Sunday, June 3, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/02/AR2007060200606.html>; internet, accessed 9 February 2008, A01.

¹⁵⁰ Douglas Farah, "Snakes in the backyard: South America and the Caribbean islands are fertile ground for anti-US terrorism," available at *NYDailyNews.com, Daily News: Opinions*, Wednesday, June 6th 2007, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2007/06/06/2007-06-06_snakes_in_the_backyard.html; internet, accessed 2 February 2008.

¹⁵¹ The unipolar influence of the US' macro-securitisation strategy is significant in this regard. Barry Buzan, "Will the 'global war on terrorism' be the new Cold War?" *International Affairs* 82: No. 6 (2006) 1102, 1117–1118.

¹⁵² Douglas Farah, "Snakes in the backyard: South America and the Caribbean islands are fertile ground for anti-US terrorism." There has been discussion on the terrorist/belligerent status of the FARC at Jane's, "FARC: terrorists or belligerents?" *Foreign Report: Americas*, available from

There have also been concerns about the influence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), an insurgent enterprise thriving on criminality (narcotics trafficking and kidnappings), on their strategic allies and the drug trafficking networks throughout the CARICOM region. The FARC uses terrorist like actions often described as *narco-terrorism*.¹⁵³ While this strain of terrorism is mostly economically motivated it nevertheless uses extreme and indiscriminate violence for the sake of intimidation. This violence is commonly used between rival drug trafficking groups or to create fear in a community to provide traffickers freedom of action. It is also known that terrorists sometimes obtain money through narcotics trafficking.¹⁵⁴ Poverty, organised crime and narcotics trafficking are described as terrorism enabling capabilities which, when coupled with anti-American attitudes in parts of Latin America, can create and sustain safe havens, financing, recruiting, illegal travel documentation or access to US' continental or regional interests.¹⁵⁵ The observed linkages between narcotics trafficking and terrorism in recent times have resulted in a coherent nexus between anti-narcotics and anti-terrorist

http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/frp/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/frp/history/frp2008/frp70458.htm@current&Prod_Name=FREP&QueryText=; internet; accessed 15 February 2008.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Some argue that in strict narco-terrorism terms, violence (for political ends) is the objective and the illegal drug trafficking the means. A country does not have a narco-terrorism problem when the trafficking, or control of the trafficking, is the end and the violence merely the means. Bernard Headley, "Narco-terrorism: Let's not call a spade a bulldozer," *Jamaica Gleaner* available from <http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20020210/focus/focus2.html>; internet, accessed 8 March 2008.

¹⁵⁵ John T. Fishel and Mary Grizzard, "Countering Ideological Support to Terrorism in the Circum-Caribbean," available from *International Relations and Security Network – Managing Information, Sharing Knowledge*, CSRC Discussion Paper 05/52, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&ord61=alphaNavi&id=44053> (September 2005), 2, 11, 17-18.

policies. The development of enhanced strategies involving comprehensive operations and military resources could be contemplated.¹⁵⁶

3.3 Areas of Interest. Globalisation has lessened relative distances enabling problems in one area to network and impact in others.¹⁵⁷ CARICOM therefore needs to take a global and strategic view in order to understand the potential for threats to affect the security of the region either directly or indirectly. This section briefly examines regions and events in three areas – the Middle East/Arab World and Africa because of their significance in shaping the world’s security environment since the turn of the century and naturally the Americas due to the direct geographical, economic and social connections to the CARICOM region.¹⁵⁸

US foreign policy actions in the Middle East/Arab World may trigger reactions that affect oil prices and hence affect highly-dependent oil importing states in the western hemisphere. Economic shocks associated with increases in oil prices impact on the societies of the Caribbean region, exacerbating problems in the impoverished and vulnerable sectors and indirectly fuelling criminality. Developments in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan and Palestine should also be watched and analysed as should US’

¹⁵⁶ Chris J. Dolan, “United States’ Narco-Terrorism Policy: A Contingency Approach to the Convergence of the Wars on Drugs and Against Terrorism,” *Review of Policy Research* 22, No. 4, 451–452.

¹⁵⁷ Moisés Naím, “The Five Wars of Globalisation.” *Foreign Policy Magazine*, (January – February 2003): 29-35.

¹⁵⁸ J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment February 2008 –Unclassified Statement for the Record*, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, (Washington, DC, 5 February 2008), 2-6.

foreign policy towards Iran which has had a demonising and isolating effect.¹⁵⁹ Thus, US foreign policy may stir ideological extremist sentiments including the desire to attack US interests in the western hemisphere.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, the US' need to rebuild Afghanistan, Iraq and its own image and position of influence in the world will place great strain on its diplomatic and other resources and thus reduce its reach. A change of strategy with which the US engages the Arab world may be required.¹⁶¹ The need to deal with domestic and economic matters will also absorb much of the US' attention and resources.¹⁶²

Poverty, disease, environmental degradation, corruption, violent conflict and failing states continue to plague the African continent, a vast and complex continent. Standards of governance, economic growth and political standards are uneven in even the most dynamic states. There are concerns of terrorist bases in North Africa and the Greater Horn of Africa, areas of strategic importance due of their location and/or energy supplies. Conflicts in West and Central Africa remain substantially unchecked and have

¹⁵⁹ The US also faces continuing challenges in nuclear power Pakistan where many of their most important interests intersect. Gwynne Dyer, *The Mess They Made: The Middle East After Iraq*, (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd, 2007), 42-43. See also The Economist, "Iran's Bomb Programme – Pressure works (high confidence)," *Leaders* 13-14 and "Iran's nuclear programme: What's not to celebrate?" *Middle East and Africa*, 53-54, 8 – 14 December 2007.

¹⁶⁰ Patrick Armstrong, "Extremist Islam – Jihadism," in *Strategic Assessment 2006/2007: Threats*, 31-35 (Canada, Department of National Defence), 31, 35. See also Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad," *Middle East Policy* VIII, No. 4, (December 2001): 18-24.

¹⁶¹ Peter Singer and Hady Amr, "Restoring America's Good Name: Improving Strategic Communications with the Islamic World," in *"In the Same Light as Slavery" – Building a Global Anti-Terrorist Consensus*, ed by edited by Joseph McMillan, 179-221 (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University Press, Washington, DC, 2006), 179-181, 193-195.

¹⁶² Alternate strategies that include the devolution of responsibility to local actors and re-energising regional integration may be needed. Gwynne Dyer, *The Mess They Made: The Middle East After Iraq...* 253-267. See also Charles Kupchan, "Strengthen Regional Cooperation," *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, Issue No. 6 (Fall 2007), 24.

the potential to destabilise the wider region where the Darfur crisis seizes the attention of the world's major powers.¹⁶³ The Central Africa region is still extremely poor, dislocated and dominated by armed conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Although most Southern African states have progressed democratically, high levels of crime and corruption, relatively poor economic growth rates, poverty and declining human development present huge obstacles to progress. The spread of HIV/AIDS, narcotics trafficking and human trafficking are significant in several regions.¹⁶⁴ Trafficking in cocaine already links West Africa (as a transit area to Europe) to the Western Hemisphere production sites creating the potential for a worsening of security within CARICOM.¹⁶⁵ Human smuggling transnational links are also a concern.¹⁶⁶ The patterns of social deviance and generalised banditry will consume the attention and resources of the World's major powers and potentially could become exported concepts copied by threat operatives in depressed and other areas within the CARICOM region.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Although there are a number of Islamist groups, allegedly with links to the Algerian-based Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), operating in the area these appear to be connected more to smuggling rackets rather than to any wider transnational organisation. There are also concerns that Al-Qaeda and other militants may seek to establish bases in the "Greater Horn of Africa". Jane's, "Regional Overview: Africa," *Sentinel Country Risk Assessments*, available from <http://sentinel.janes.com/public/sentinel/index.shtml>, Internet, accessed 13 February 2008.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ Research and Analysis Section, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *2007 World Drug Report*, (United Nations Publications, New York), 19. West Africa is identified as a global transshipment area. The Economist, "Nigeria's drug trade: That's all they needed," *Middle East and Africa*, 56-57, The Economist, 8 – 14 December 2007.

¹⁶⁶ There is evidence that human smuggling both within the Western Hemisphere and globally impact the security of the Caribbean region. United States Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report – June 2007," (Washington, DC), 67, 76, 81, 92, 111-112, 215.

¹⁶⁷ Jane's, "Regional Overview: North Africa," *Sentinel Country Risk Assessments*, available from <http://sentinel.janes.com/public/sentinel/index.shtml>, internet, accessed 13 February 2008.

States in the Western Hemisphere have become increasingly integrated, both with each other and globally. As has been suggested, the US' focus on issues in the Middle East and Africa will present challenges for its neighbours.¹⁶⁸ Developments in South, Central and North America naturally warrant the close attention of CARICOM by virtue of the geographic linkages and movement of people and ideas.¹⁶⁹ Four connected factors are significant.

Firstly, social factors such as the unintended consequences of economic modernization, individual and societal ambitions may widen gaps and tensions between rich and poor segments of populations. Poverty, social displacement, migration and urbanisation especially of the youth may exacerbate the spread of disease significantly HIV/AIDS for which the Caribbean region has one of the highest infection rates worldwide.¹⁷⁰ The stress of years of high population growth invites social rupture in which individuals and groups may resort to organised and violent forms of crime.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ Einaudi, "Trans-American Security: What's Missing?" 1-2.

¹⁶⁹ CARICOM's concept is to provide free movement for citizens of its Member States. Such a provision would require heightened security and border control measures to (1) deny access for illegal immigrants, criminals and terrorists and (2) monitor or restrict the movements of persons of interest. Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, "Single Market," available from http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/skill.jsp?menu=csme; internet, accessed 28 March 2008. Concerns of movement of CARICOM nationals and attendant security issues are included in Nicholas George, Superintendent of Police, "The Free Movement of Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Citizens: The Security Dimension." A paper prepared for the Regional Security Coordinator, Regional Security System, April 2003.

¹⁷⁰ United Kingdom Department for International Development, "Regional Assistance Plan for the Caribbean," (June 2004), 3-6.

¹⁷¹ Einaudi, "Trans-American Security: What's Missing?" . . . , 3.

Secondly, the narcotics trafficking trade when coupled with socio-economic dislocation and weak institutions will continue strengthen as the main threat. *Narco-terrorism*, a term once used exclusively to portray the use of narcotics trafficking to further politically motivated violence, has become an increasingly appropriate phrase in CARICOM policy group circles. The associated extremes in lawlessness by violent criminal gangs, the accompanying illegal arms trade and corruption are likely to continue.¹⁷²

Thirdly, the continuing expansion of organised crime is undermining national security of CARICOM countries by having a multiplier effect on violence and the economy.¹⁷³ Existing crime networks utilise redundancies in operating capacities making them resilient to the pressure applied at a specific point by security forces.¹⁷⁴ This makes them appear as a stateless decentralised network of acephalous (headless) or polycephalous (hydra-headed) character.¹⁷⁵ There are specific concerns about the South American continent's tri-border area where drug traffickers, organised criminals and other subversive groups concentrate¹⁷⁶ and form strategic alliances and short-term unions of convenience.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷² Patlee Creary, "The Strategic Implications of Maritime Security Cooperation among CARICOM States," *Bison, Defence and Security Report*, No. 3, November 2006, (Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba), 1.

¹⁷³ The OAS includes all of the CARICOM Member States. Einaudi, "Trans-American Security: What's Missing?"... 3.

¹⁷⁴ Tony Best, "Crime wave rampant in region," available at www.NationNews.com, Local News Story, 10/7/05, <http://www.nationnews.com/story/323625782621262.php>, internet, accessed 9 February 2008.

¹⁷⁵ Naím, "The Five Wars of Globalisation," 29-35.

Fourthly, as experience has shown in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, terrorists are highly adaptable and not averse to striking at US or European interests worldwide or to using developing or failing states as bases.¹⁷⁸ This raises important economic and security concerns that CARICOM States cannot afford to overlook.¹⁷⁹ For example the changing pattern of Venezuelan foreign relations, specifically its growing closeness to Iran, a US adversary, disturbs many in the US Government as it has been suggested that this could facilitate extremists entering the region.¹⁸⁰

3.4 Chapter Summary. Given the instability of the world's security environment CARICOM needs to look at the current, emerging, domestic and even distant problems. Monitoring and intelligence mechanisms must therefore be enhanced as is the CARICOM's capacity to conduct coordinated operations at a regional scale. A central challenge faced by all CARICOM States is that of threats which are more diverse and

¹⁷⁶ The tri-border area is where Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay borders meet. Rex Hudson, "Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America," *A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress*, (July 2003), 12-15.

¹⁷⁷ Douglas Farah, "Snakes in the backyard: South America and the Caribbean islands are fertile ground for anti-US terrorism."

¹⁷⁸ Martin Van Creveld, *The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat from the Marne to Iraq*, (New York, Random House Inc, 2006), 246-256.

¹⁷⁹ Any similar 9/11 terrorist attack in the West will negatively impact Caribbean countries' economies (16 of 28 countries in the wider Caribbean region were severely impacted economically by 9/11). Stephen E. Flynn and Anthony Bryan "Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for US - Caribbean Cooperation," available from *Transcript, October 21, 2001, Council on Foreign Relations*, University of Miami. http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism_porous_borders_and_homeland_security.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F3301%2Fstephen_e_flynn%3Fpage%3D5; internet, accessed 12 February 2008.

¹⁸⁰ Harold A. Trinkunas, "What is Really New about Venezuela's Bolivarian Foreign Policy?" *Strategic Insights*, Volume V, Issue 2 (February 2006), 3-4. Notwithstanding this concern there are indicators that most Latin American countries are more concerned with maintaining paths of development. Peter Johnston, "Latin America – Continuity or Change?" in Canada, Department of National Defence, 57-59, *Strategic Assessment 2006/2007: Area Studies*, 59.

readily cross borders.¹⁸¹ Based on the evidence presented in this Chapter it is anticipated that the future threats which will, either directly or indirectly, impact the region may be a potent blend of:

- (1) highly organised, globally networked crime linked to narcotics trafficking and human smuggling activities;
- (2) a scale of violent acts that undermines public safety and the authority of the state;¹⁸²
- (3) the effects of global climatic changes and economic turmoil which exacerbate societal depression and negatively impact human security, and;
- (4) the coincidence of interests between narcotics traffickers, terrorists and anti-American elements.¹⁸³

Such multifaceted and intertwined threats will compound complete understanding and the arrival at comprehensive long-term solutions.¹⁸⁴ “Unless urgent action is taken in the next five to ten years, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to avoid a highly unstable global system by the middle years of the century.”¹⁸⁵ The security threats discussed embed themselves in all states but are particularly damaging to those that are

¹⁸¹ Einaudi, “Trans-American Security: What’s Missing?”.... 5-6.

¹⁸² The wave of very violent crime continues to seize the attention of Governments and security authorities. The killing of 23 persons in Lusignan (11) and Bartica (12) in Guyana in January and February 2008 are a case in point. Rickey Singh, “Our Caribbean - Solidarity in face of criminality” available from www.NationNews.com; 22 February 2008, internet, accessed 15 March 2008.

¹⁸³ John T. Fishel and Mary Grizzard, “Countering Ideological Support to Terrorism in the Circum-Caribbean,” ..., 2, 11, 17-18.

¹⁸⁴ Dr Harry Yarger, “The Strategic Environment”..., 18.

¹⁸⁵ Chris Abbott, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda, “Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century,” *Briefing Paper*, Oxford, Oxford Research Group, (June 2006), 30.

developing, under-resourced, weak or failing. Most CARICOM States are in the developing category. The degree of connectivity among threat operatives and their activities across the hemisphere and globally will blur the lines between domestic and external spheres, defence and internal security thus creating a non-linear operating environment. It is essential that CARICOM policy makers and analysts respond to threat developments by proactively using the experiential knowledge as collectively accumulated by the Defence Forces.

CHAPTER 4: EXISTING STRATEGIES

4.1 Chapter Outline. Each CARICOM State's Defence Force is subject to the policy directions of their respective civilian government. While traditional definitions of security have concentrated on the state and military threats to sovereignty, a more nuanced and integrated perspective is required today.¹⁸⁶ The policies of governments provide such a perspective and shape how the military is employed relative to the security of national interests.¹⁸⁷ Thus, this Chapter is intended to review what policies and strategies exist in order to understand how they can be used to reinforce the structures and means to counter security threats.¹⁸⁸ This will further the process of building recommendations on how enhanced cooperation among the CARICOM Defence Forces would improve regional security.

The Chapter first examines the main instruments which set the broad strategic framework for cooperation among CARICOM Member States. Secondly, the Chapter looks at CARICOM's hemispheric and global linkages and thirdly discusses the preoccupation of the world's major powers. Analysis will be undertaken throughout this Chapter to identify what strategic gaps exist.

¹⁸⁶ Swanstrom, "The Narcotics Trade: A Threat to Security? National and Transnational Implications," 1-3.

¹⁸⁷ Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," 12-17.

¹⁸⁸ Attina, "Regional security partnership: the concept, model, practice and a preliminary comparative scheme," 6.

4.2 Existing Policies and Strategies. The interests of the Anglophone Caribbean and CARICOM are sometimes seen to be subordinate to those of others. This perception then causes the Caribbean States to be overlooked relative to the national interest pursuits of the major global powers and of middle powers in the region such as Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. In the circumstances therefore it is understandable that countries adopt different security measures to safeguard their national interests.¹⁸⁹ But in the face of the evolving highly networked hemispheric and global security threats such a bifurcated approach is perhaps counterproductive.

The period spanning the 1980's and 1990's have been significant in the formulation of security perceptions and policies with considerable attention to security problems in the Caribbean revolving among four main themes. Firstly, the US' actions in the region in pursuit of its political and strategic interests. Secondly, an amalgam of narcotics, political instability and other security challenges affecting the region. Thirdly, an increased sub-regional emphasis on military and paramilitary institutions and fourthly, the establishment and evolution of the RSS as a collective security mechanism.¹⁹⁰ As shown in Chapter 2, the RSS was formed as a defence policy initiative for the small states of the Eastern Caribbean.¹⁹¹ It has essentially been a flexible and strategic insurance policy supporting the development of its Member States and at times forming the impetus

¹⁸⁹ Dr Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Introduction" in *Strategy and Security in the Caribbean*, ed. Dr Ivelaw L. Griffith, xi-xv (Praeger, New York, 1991), xii-xiii.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, "Security Perceptions of English Caribbean Elites," 3-26. . . , 3.

¹⁹¹ Dion Phillips, "Change and Continuity in Barbados Defence Policy" in *Strategy and Security in the Caribbean*, ed. Ivelaw L. Griffith, 101-126 (Praeger, New York, 1991), 108-109.

for assistance to other non-RSS States.¹⁹² Since its formation the RSS has become more capable and its nascent Memorandum of Understanding upgraded to a Treaty. The purposes and functions of the RSS are:

. . . to promote cooperation among the Member States in the prevention of traffic in illegal narcotic drugs, in national emergencies, search and rescue, immigration control, fisheries protection, customs and excise control, maritime policing duties, natural and other disasters, pollution control, combating threats to national security, the prevention of smuggling, and in the protection of off-shore installations and exclusive economic zones.¹⁹³

The RSS has existed for over a quarter of a century, proof of the political vision that is manifested in its solid policy foundation, effective strategic management and most importantly because of the need for such an institution. The value it has brought to its Member States in facing a myriad of security challenges over the years has been a justification of the investment. The RSS represents a success story and an example in cooperation for the broader community of CARICOM States. The partnerships forged by the RSS with non-RSS and non-CARICOM States alike and the routine use of the RSS procedures and infrastructure for CARICOM wide engagements shows its immense value.¹⁹⁴ The role of the RSS' Central Liaison Office (RSS CLO), its Headquarters, in shouldering the responsibilities for mission planning and coordination for the UN

¹⁹² The RSS provided assistance to Montserrat in 1999 following the turmoil created by the Langs Soufriere volcano. Barbados provided medical assistance for the evacuation and safe storage for security equipment.

¹⁹³ Central Liaison Office, Regional Security System, "Article 4, Purposes and Functions of the System" in *Treaty Establishing the Regional Security System*, 1996, (St Georges, Grenada, 1996), 3.

¹⁹⁴ Brigadier General Lewis, "Initiatives for Cooperative Regional Security: The Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System," 177-178.

Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and for Cricket World Cup 2007 security operations among others provides evidence of this.¹⁹⁵

While CARICOM maintains an idealist approach, security concerns have been cognisant of Cold War threats of external aggression and the limited capacity of Member States.¹⁹⁶ Over the history of CARICOM its cooperative thrust has concentrated heavily on economic integration, foreign policy coordination and functional cooperation with emphasis on democracy, liberty and the rule of law in a conceptual three pillar concept. In more recent times, a fourth pillar, security has been added.¹⁹⁷ This inclusion recognises security as a necessary enabler for continued economic, political and social advancement and for overarching development.¹⁹⁸ It is deduced that the inclusion of the security pillar has become an urgent necessity due to the emerging threats. The paradigmatic shift required has been made easier due to the successes of the RSS.

As noted in Chapter 1, the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas and its 2001 Revision sets the framework for broader cooperation.¹⁹⁹ The 2006 CARICOM Treaty on Security

¹⁹⁵ CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, *One Team, One Space, One Caribbean*, 19-25.

¹⁹⁶ Dr Kenneth Hall, *Reinventing CARICOM: The Road to a New Integration*, (Kingston, Jamaica, Ian Randle Publishers, 2003), 68-69, 277-279.

¹⁹⁷ CARICOM Secretariat, "CARICOM Secretary General Praises Security Forces," *Caricomblog.com*, available from <http://www.caricomblog.com/index.php?itemid=258>, internet, accessed 19 March 2008. See also Michelle Thornhill, "Integration Studies: Practicum Report – Regional Security System," (MSc Thesis, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, Barbados, 1 October 2007), 5-8.

¹⁹⁸ Brack., "Introduction," in *Trade, Aid and Security*. . . , 3-4.

¹⁹⁹ CARICOM Secretariat, "History of the Caribbean Community," available from http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member_states.jsp?menu=community; internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

Assistance better defines the concept of the fourth pillar. Forged against a backdrop of the need for uniform security arrangements in those Caribbean States hosting Cricket World Cup 2007 events, it nonetheless is a strategic investment in CARICOM's best interest.²⁰⁰ Hence, the Treaty on Security Assistance is a huge step forward with expressed objectives of the:

- (1) . . . efficient and timely response to and management of natural and man-made disasters in order to reduce and eliminate the harmful consequences thereof;
- (2) expeditious, efficient mobilisation and deployment of regional security resources in order to manage and defuse national and regional crises and to combat serious crimes;
- (3) combating and elimination of threats to the national and regional security, however arising; and
- (4) preservation of the territorial integrity of the Contracting States.²⁰¹

As part of the Treaty's cooperative thrust CARICOM also established a Council of Ministers responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement as a key part of the regional security management structure.²⁰² Also, recognising the value of the RSS the Treaty makes the RSS' CLO²⁰³ responsible for coordination of the security assistance mechanism.²⁰⁴ This is an expanded and critical role for the RSS especially if security cooperation is to support longer term strategies for regional development. Recognising

²⁰⁰ CARICOM Secretariat, "Fifth UK-Caribbean Ministerial Forum Communiqué." *CARICOM News Release*; (CARICOM Secretariat, Georgetown, Guyana, 28 April 2006), 3.

²⁰¹ Caribbean Community, "Article 3: Objectives" in *Treaty on Security Assistance Among CARICOM Member States*. . . , 4. The Headquarters is located in Barbados in accordance with Regional Security System, "Article 2," *Agreement Between the Regional Security System and the Government of Barbados Regarding the Headquarters of the Regional Security System*, (Bridgetown, Barbados, 1997), 3-5.

²⁰² CARICOM Secretariat, *One Team, One Space, One Caribbean*, 45.

²⁰³ Regional Security System, Central Liaison Office, "Article 7, Secretariat" in *Treaty Establishing the Regional Security System*. . . , 5-6.

²⁰⁴ Caribbean Community, "Article 6: The Coordinating Secretariat" in *Treaty on Security Assistance Among Member States*. . . , 5.

that strengthening of the CARICOM security apparatus needs to be relevant within the wider Western Hemisphere and globally, it is instructive to examine the extra-regional connectivity.

4.3 CARICOM's Broader Engagements. Undeniably, as all independent states play a role in the international system, CARICOM as a treaty organisation forms a focal point for interacting within the international system.²⁰⁵ As a collective body CARICOM enjoys the recognition as a cooperative union of states and provides for the leveraging of greater strength on the world stage. This unity reinforces the position of CARICOM Member States which are individually signatory to a number of international treaties and conventions. In light of the prevailing and emerging threats as illustrated in Chapter 3 two key conventions through which CARICOM plays a role in the international system are the *UN Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*²⁰⁶ and the *OAS' Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism*.²⁰⁷

This thesis established that the entrenched nature of and danger posed by the trafficking in illegal drugs is a major reason for closer security cooperation. The UN Convention, of which all CARICOM Member States are party, identifies illegal drugs as

²⁰⁵ Barry Buzan, and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers – The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 24-25.

²⁰⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 – Status of Treaty Adherence as at 14 March 2008,” available from http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/treaty_adherence_convention_1988.pdf, internet, accessed 19 March 2008.

²⁰⁷ US Department of State, “Ratification by the United States of the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism,” available from *Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State*, Washington, DC, 15 November 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/56929.htm>; Internet, accessed 23 February 2008. The convention is Organisation of American States, *Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism*, DCAG/RES. 1840 XXXII-O/02 (Washington, DC), 2002

a serious threat to the health and welfare of populations and adversely affects the social, economic, cultural and political foundations of States. Developing states such as those within CARICOM are particularly vulnerable since they often struggle to allocate sufficient resources to sustain robust strategies that effectively counter the threat. The convention recognises that “the links between illicit [drug] traffic and other related organized criminal activities . . . undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of States.”²⁰⁸ The routine use of maritime conveyances draws the UN Convention’s attention as it calls on States to cooperate to the fullest extent possible to suppress trafficking of substances by sea.²⁰⁹ When the region’s geography and the narcotics trafficking patterns are considered this implies that the CARICOM States have a responsibility to secure their maritime jurisdictions and cooperate with their neighbours in doing so. Recognising the capabilities of the Defence Forces a coordinated military approach thus appears to be a worthwhile pursuit.

The OAS Convention encourages and facilitates regional cooperation in the campaign against terrorism thereby contributing to hemispheric security. It commits signatories to endeavour to implement the UN Anti-terrorism instruments (including the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1373). For example, to take measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the financing of terrorism and the denial of safe haven to

²⁰⁸ United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs and Economic and Social Council, “Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988,” (United Nations Headquarters, New York), 1.

²⁰⁹ United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs and Economic and Social Council, “Article 17: Illicit Traffic by Sea,” *Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988*, (United Nations Headquarters, New York), 15.

suspected terrorists, whether as refugees or asylum-seekers.²¹⁰ It also extends the terrorist acts covered under the relevant UN anti-terrorism instruments to include money laundering and the provisions of the *UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime*.²¹¹ Thus, it elaborates for CARICOM's use, the legal apparatus that have proven to be effective against globalised security threats. The cooperative framework requires enhanced information exchange, border control, security actions, training and technical assistance exchanges.²¹² Importantly, this identifies essential elements that should inform CARICOM's engagement in the global antiterrorist consensus.²¹³ These elements can be used to form an agenda for enhancing cooperation among the Defence Forces.

Cognisant of terrorism's nexus with narcotics trafficking and organised crime, CARICOM should also enhance the coordination of efforts at the national, sub-regional and regional levels in order to play a greater role in the hemispheric and international systems.²¹⁴ The protection of CARICOM's interests makes global engagements, strategic partnerships and multilateral arrangements necessary. Such engagements must

²¹⁰ US Department of State, "Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism," available from *Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State*, Washington, DC, 31 May 2002, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/10633.htm>, Internet, accessed 16 February 2008.

²¹¹ United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, (United Nations Headquarters, New York, 2000).

²¹² US Department of State, "Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism," available from *Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State*, Washington, DC, 31 May 2002, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/10633.htm>, Internet, accessed 16 February 2008.

²¹³ Joseph McMillan, "Introduction," in *"In the Same Light as Slavery" - Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus*, edited by Joseph McMillan, 1-8 (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University Press, Washington, DC, 2006), 1-2.

²¹⁴ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1373 (2001) Adopted at its 4385th Meeting on 28 September 2001," paragraph 4, (United Nations Headquarters, New York), 3.

transcend the strategic level and be supported by tangible operational arrangements if success is to be attained. The Defence Forces could therefore build a more comprehensive cooperative structure in accordance with the theme of this thesis.

4.4 Preoccupation of the Great Powers: No fireproof house! Despite being geographically, socially and economically close and sharing security interests relative to the US, the Caribbean does not live in a fireproof house. Notwithstanding the major powers' interventions to provide assistance in times of crisis, it would be unwise for any CARICOM State to base its security policy, to any significant degree, on external help. Certainly, if the US' continental neighbours do not benefit from such protection, then the more removed CARICOM States would be less so entitled.²¹⁵

The demands of the US' broad foreign policy engagements also present challenges and opportunities for the region's states. It is important to realise that the US' concern about homeland security impacts on policies and helps shape the security strategies of her geographic neighbours, but while this may appear entirely in the US interest, the social and economic well-being of the region is also at stake.²¹⁶ The preoccupation of the US has already been noted as presenting the likelihood of less capability or presence in the CARICOM area and therefore provides another reason to develop more robust strategies like the collective use of the Defence Forces.

²¹⁵ Adam Chapnick, "On protocols and fireproof houses – the re-emergence of Canadian Exceptionalism," *International Journal* Vol 61, No. 3, (Summer 2006), 713–715.

²¹⁶ Stephen E. Flynn and Anthony Bryan "Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation."

4.5 Chapter Summary. Acting individually, CARICOM Member States may never be able to completely defeat the threats of globalisation but through working with others, developing flexible notions of sovereignty and strengthening existing multilateral institutions they should be able to attain more success.²¹⁷ Fortunately, there is a widening of the view that the Caribbean's security agenda is best approached on a regional basis.²¹⁸

The evidence presented in this Chapter indicates that there is a fairly comprehensive policy and legislative construct existing for the benefit of CARICOM's security. This is evidenced by the existence of a range of regional and international instruments. The focus of the US, the world's remaining superpower and the hemispheric hegemon suggests that CARICOM will not enjoy the benefits of a fireproof house nor of a readily available fireman. Self-help arrangements need to be advanced through adding greater specificity for the collaborative use of the military. A model for security cooperation among military forces may help guide the development of such specifics.

²¹⁷ Naím, "The Five Wars of Globalisation," 36.

²¹⁸ Brigadier General Lewis, "Initiatives for Cooperative Regional Security: The Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System," 182-183.

CHAPTER 5: COLLECTIVE SECURITY THEORIES & MODELS

5.1 Chapter Outline. The preceding Chapters showed that there are opportunities to build on the past experiences, existing structures and a strategic framework for enhanced military cooperation. At this stage it can also be deduced that cooperative security is becoming increasingly important in light of the threats and trends posed by regional and international non-state actors.²¹⁹ This Chapter will examine some of the theories and collective security models that may be used to inform how CARICOM States' Defence Forces can enhance their level of cooperation.

Hence, the Chapter first examines some of the enduring theories on strategy that have guided military doctrine and the defence and security interactions with other spheres. Secondly, the Chapter looks at the principles of collective action and the related Regional Security Complex Theory. Thirdly, and because reality may vary from strict interpretations of theoretical models, the Chapter examines some of the existing cases of regional security cooperation in order to appreciate how the region can best adapt models to its realities. At the end of the Chapter, the stage will be set for a synthesis of the Caribbean security context, CARICOM polices and theoretical models into some recommendations on how to deepen military cooperation to meet the challenges of the security environment.²²⁰

²¹⁹ Cooperative security as both a concept and as a strategy for using the military (and other security resources) collectively. Dr. Michael Mihalka, "Cooperative Security in the 21st Century," *The Quarterly Journal*, (Winter 2005), 113-114.

²²⁰ Attina, "Regional security partnership: the concept, model, practice and a preliminary comparative scheme," 6.

5.2 Military Strategic Theories. Considering the extensive school of military theories on strategy reveals some features that could inform the concepts contained in this thesis. Helmuth Von Moltke theorised that strategy is the practical adaptation of the means placed at the general's disposal for the attainment of specific ends. In more contemporary times, Robert Osgood found that strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilising the capacity of the armed forces, in conjunction with economic, diplomatic and psychological instruments of power, to support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert and tacit means.²²¹

Carl Von Clausewitz's embryonic thoughts on the subject of security cooperation among states envisioned that strategic success lies beyond fragmented efforts or phases of tactical thrusts. Although related to the European continent of his time, his thoughts are applicable. He viewed successful strategic outcomes as shaped from simultaneous use of force that is unified in time dimensions and includes alliances between states forming pacts for mutual support. Such alliances are based on common interests but sometimes suffer from diplomatic reservations which retard action.²²² If guidance is taken from these theories then the military's use would have to be interconnected with other components of state power nationally and by inference internationally. CARICOM's strategic approach to attain its desired security ends should thus include provisions for a synergy of the Defence Forces' resources in time and geographical dimensions while remaining flexible to accommodate diplomatic variances.

²²¹ John Baylis and James J. Wirtz, "Introduction," 3-5 ed. John Baylis et al, *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford), 1-14.

²²² Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, (ed and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1989), 206-209, 603-604.

Furthermore, studies of the contemporary armies of Brazil, China, Egypt, France and the US reveal that despite cultural differences a common outlook exists. This outlook stems from intellectual developments and studies which lead to a common understanding of the basic character and use of the military.²²³ Today military strategy involves distinctive intellectual preparation in the area of strategy and the strategic use of force to advance or defend communal interests.²²⁴ Hence, there is benefit to be obtained from CARICOM undertaking strategic studies of defence and security matters in order to take sound approaches to the utilisation of its military resources. Furthermore, if as this thesis asserts CARICOM's Defence Forces can provide an enhanced contribution to Caribbean security then John M. Collins' observations in *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives* are also instructive:

. . . . Armed forces ashore, aloft and afloat . . . seldom do as well as they should unless skilled strategists think. Men of action who are organised and trained to employ technologically superlative weapons systems under adverse conditions may win every battle but nonetheless lose wars unless the overarching schemes they support are sound.²²⁵

A sound approach in CARICOM's defence and security matters demands tighter integration as opposed to a state-centric, bifurcated method. The building or reinforcement of the mechanisms to think, plan and act strategically must be included. Overarching schemes or strategies directing the utilisation of the resources should be the product of a common understanding, political commitment and intellectual processes

²²³ Daniel Moran, "Strategic Theory and the History of War," 18-19, ed. John Baylis et al, *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford), 17-44.

²²⁴ Moran, "Strategic Theory and the History of War," 17-44.

²²⁵ John M Collins, *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives*, (Brassey's Inc, Washington, DC, 2002), 1-2.

which create and sustain comprehensive and purpose driven plans. The treaties and policies outlined in Chapter 4 show that a political commitment exists regionally but at the functional level mechanisms for translating that commitment into strategic action can be made more robust.

5.3 Collective Action and Regional Security Complex Theories. Drawing on the foundation of strategy as a purpose-driven and practical means of utilising capacity, the concept of collective action among CARICOM States can be deduced. Like political communities, security communities are not illusions and are especially necessary in the face of transitory threats which affect a geographically close-knit neighbourhood of States.²²⁶ If there is to be more collaboration among the CARICOM's Defence Forces then guidance from the three rules of thumb of collective action could be considered.

Firstly, the size propositions rule establishes that larger groups may have difficulty forming since it is difficult to provide a sufficiently large collective good. Larger groups tend to have greater levels of inefficiency especially due to tendencies for individual uncoordinated behaviour. Secondly, the group composition propositions rule theorises that members with greater endowments of resources bear a disproportionate burden of collective provision in what is known as the exploitation hypothesis. While heterogeneous groups are more likely to achieve collective action, homogeneous ones are more apt to form. The third rule of thumb explains that collective failures may be overcome through selective incentives that augment individual gains or through

²²⁶ Andrew Hurrell, "An emerging security community for South America?" in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 243, 260.

institutional design. Coordination is an essential ingredient throughout all cooperative endeavours.²²⁷ These three rules of thumb then need to be applied as part of the intellectual processes for the crafting of appropriate strategies of enhanced military cooperation.

Collective action is particularly relevant in the context of regional security complexes, a theoretical construct that fits the CARICOM security realities. Regional security complex theory (RSCT) establishes that “since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes.”²²⁸ Thus, regional security complexes exist within specific geographical areas. As shown in Chapter 3, CARICOM’s security challenges are interwoven, threats are mobile to the point that the security of one state cannot be easily separated from the security of its neighbours. The geography, shared cultures and history of cooperation are key factors in the structure and relevant within the CARICOM security complex.

Regional security complexes have three perspectives – neorealist, globalist and regionalist. The neorealist perspective is a state-centric, power polarised, materialist determination of global political (and thereby also security) structure. The globalist perspective is the antithesis of realism and neo-realism. It is rooted in concepts of globalisation and in a cultural, transnational and international political economic approaches. It has a clear *de-territorialisation* theme which accords with the state of the

²²⁷ Sandler, *Global Collective Action...*, 31-33.

²²⁸ Buzan and Wæver. *Regions and Powers – The Structure of International Security...*, 4-5.

world today. The regionalist perspective contains elements of both neorealism and globalism.²²⁹ It stands as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states in the post-Cold War world. Regionalism features less penetration by superpowers exerting their interests globally and leaves local states to arrange their political and security relationships with less interference.²³⁰

While the Caribbean is often absorbed as a part of the surroundings of or hidden in the shadow of the US and the regional security complex of North America, it is felt that the characteristics of the region and the prevailing threats require that the region be viewed as a security complex in itself.²³¹ Using this approach can also be advantageous in working with the North American complex and implies that CARICOM would need to assume the responsibilities inherent in being conceptualised as a distinct complex or sub-complex.

RSCT and the concept of collective action fit the previously set out evidence on the history and characteristics of the Caribbean and the CARICOM alliance. The regionalist perspective has influenced CARICOM's security dynamics as is seen in the past and present cooperative efforts in the region. The effect of globalisation's hallmark of independence of transnational entities is also present in the reality of the CARICOM security complex. Non-state actors are able to exert forces which perplex each state and which deliver negative effects on each state simultaneously or sequentially.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 6-12.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ *Ibid.*..., 276-281.

Collaboration and coordination within CARICOM are vital and fortunately, the regionalist concept appears to be strengthening.

5.4 Models of Regional Security Complexes. Beyond this Chapter's discussions on strategy, RSCT and collective action several working examples exist. These can be viewed as models to show the tangible value of the concepts and to illustrate the detail which could be contemplated by CARICOM Authorities. In other words, lessons can be drawn from working institutions to show how to better operationalise military strategy, RSCT and collective action to attain the desired outcome of enhanced Caribbean security.

In the process of examining working institutions there is a temptation to look no further than the RSS. As has been already shown, the efficacy of the RSS has been demonstrated continuously over the quarter century of its existence. Despite its small size (7 countries) and only having three Defence Forces within its structure it has consistently proven its worth. When combined with other CARICOM and Caribbean resources this worth has been increased but this mostly occurs as a crisis response action.²³² It is clear that the RSS by itself has been successful despite its limited resources but similar ideas of security integration and cooperation within CARICOM seem elusive at times.²³³ It is therefore deduced that the RSS infrastructure should be permanently broadened in order to draw on those resources that presently reside beyond

²³² John Cope and Janie Hulse, "Hemispheric Response to Terrorism: A Call for Action," in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, ed Dr Ivelaw Griffith, 413-434 (Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston, Jamaica, 2004), 423.

²³³ Michelle Thornhill, "Integration Studies: Practicum Report – Regional Security System," (Master of Science Thesis, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, Barbados, 1 October 2007), 15.

the RSS ambit. Concurrently this would also benefit CARICOM and the wider Caribbean by reducing the mobility of threats within the security complex. In the past there have been recommendations made along these lines from within political, academic and operational/functionary circles.²³⁴ In pursuing a sufficiently large collective good to serve all CARICOM States there will however be a need to overcome the exploitation hypothesis where past perceptions have been that the smaller countries' military forces would become a strain on the larger ones.²³⁵

CARICOM's experiences with integration in the past have not always had full participation and have been hampered by differences in political ideologies and disparities in economic development fuelling perceptions of an exploitation hypothesis. Fortunately today there is progress in overcoming this and other challenges but the impetus must be maintained. A unified response is clearly best as the emerging threats will continue to create anxiety and challenge CARICOM's capacities and resolve to secure its interests and values. Loyalties need to move beyond the strict confinement to national interests.²³⁶

Three of the better known examples of collective action within security complexes are the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Agreement and the Association South East Asian Nations

²³⁴ Former Barbados Prime Minister Sir Lloyd Sandiford, Guyanese Ambassador Odeen Ishmael, Dr Ivelaw Griffith and Brigadier Generals Ruyard Lewis and Edmund Dillon among others have supported the broadening and deepening of regional security cooperation.

²³⁵ Thornhill, "Integration Studies: Practicum Report – Regional Security System," 15.

²³⁶ Brigadier General Lewis, "Initiatives for Cooperative Regional Security: The Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System," 177-179.

(ASEAN). The engagement of NATO in Afghanistan since 2001 represents a more global engagement beyond the strict limits of the RSCT while the other two more precisely fit the provisions of the RSCT.²³⁷

The NORAD Agreement provides for Canada/US cooperation within the North American continental space. The synchronised 9/11 terrorist attacks made it clear that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans no longer insulate continental North America from foreign aggression and put the focus on domestic security. As a result new strategies were needed to protect the homelands of the two States. Canada and the US responded to the evolving challenges working coherently within the provisions of the NORAD Agreement to increase the effectiveness of their joint security arrangements. Working from the permanent institutional platform that is NORAD enhancements were made to Canada/US intelligence sharing, counter terrorism, critical infrastructure protection, land and maritime surveillance and defence arrangements.

The enhanced approach was embedded in political agreements and operationalised in bi-national plans between the US military and the Canadian Forces. At the operational level enhancement of aerospace and maritime control were made.²³⁸ It is unfortunate that these enhancements were reflexive. “The US misinterpreted the emerging geo-security environment and was caught unprepared for the attacks on its

²³⁷ This groundbreaking mission is NATO’s first beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels, Belgium, Public Diplomacy Division, 2006), 155-158.

²³⁸ Lieutenant General Rick Findley and Lieutenant General Joe Inge, “North American Defence and Security in the Aftermath of 9/11,” *Canadian Military Journal*, (Spring 2005), 10-11.

homeland. This should serve as a warning.”²³⁹ The choice of complacency on national security invites peril!

While recognising that the lines between defence, security and law enforcement have become blurred since 9/11, it has been assessed that enhanced military cooperation is necessary to ensure the defence and security of continental North America. Such cooperation is particularly relevant in light of the modern asymmetrical threats where joint, combined and special operations are now a necessary capacity *within* domestic operational spaces. The broadening of constructs for the defence and security of North America in geographical terms to include Mexico (as part of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America) and conceptually from a “need to know” to a “need to share” culture represents a strategic response and investment for the future safety of the continent.²⁴⁰ Clearly, a similar approach would also be in the best interest of CARICOM but as in the case of the US, the blurred lines between defence, security and law-enforcement would need to be carefully managed.

Another model of regional security cooperation is that of the ASEAN. Amitav Acharya’s *Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN* examined regional military-security cooperation in ASEAN, a Third World region, and found that two concepts of

²³⁹ Major Meade, *The Relevance and Optimal Structure of the Military in Jamaica*. . . , 61.

²⁴⁰ Lieutenant General Findley and Lieutenant General Inge, “North American Defence and Security in the Aftermath of 9/11,” 16.

regionalism exist.²⁴¹ The use of this third world study is perhaps more relevant to the Caribbean, itself a region of developing states. These two concepts are the autonomous framework and the hegemonic framework. The distinction between the two is the extent to which the regional grouping depends on the security guarantee offered by a hegemonic Great Power. It was found that the autonomous regionalism framework required states of roughly equal power and resources to avoid entanglement in Great Power rivalry and devote attention and resources to socio-economic and cultural issues. The hegemonic regionalism framework involves close security dependence on Great Powers in the likeness of a fireproof house.²⁴²

Interestingly, Acharya finds that neither of the two frameworks has proven to be completely viable in the Third World. He does however, admit that four key lessons can be identified from the experiences of security regionalism and hence can be used to inform the strategy of greater CARICOM military collaboration. Firstly, that military-security cooperation cannot thrive unless attention is paid to intra-regional conflict resolution.²⁴³ Fortunately, disruptive conflicts are not numerous within CARICOM and those that exist are subject to adequate diplomatic efforts for resolution.²⁴⁴ The pitfalls of this problem would therefore be largely avoided.

²⁴¹ Amitav Acharya, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association South East Asian Nations)," *Journal of Peace Research*, 29, No. 1, (1992), 7-8.

²⁴² Acharya, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association South East Asian Nations)," 7.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

²⁴⁴ For some details of the main territorial disputes see (1) Eric Green, "Belize-Guatemala Accord Aims to Resolve Territorial Dispute: Organization of American States Brokers Deal to Deepen Bilateral

Secondly, Acharya argues that Third World states will struggle to develop formal institutions to operationalise military-security cooperation. While this is intuitively a valid observation based on the unavailability of adequate resources, the existence of some structures, most notably the RSS CLO, sets the stage for further development and provides a comparative advantage over similar regions where security complexes exist.²⁴⁵

Thirdly, Acharya surmises that regional groups need to address intra-state threats as much as external threats if they are to be realistic and relevant. The commonality of threats such as illegal drugs and organised crime which are also eroding from *within* CARICOM States needs to receive close attention if states are to have the capacity to help their neighbours.²⁴⁶ Indeed the commonality and mobility of threats can be viewed as a driver for closer cooperation.

The final lesson Acharya identified was that dependence on Great Power security guarantees within alliance frameworks is not necessarily the ideal way to achieve effective security. Again, the existence of treaty and cooperative mechanisms such as the RSS, CDRU and, in the past, valuable cooperative endeavours at CARICOM level

Relationship,” *International Information Programs*, 9 September 2005, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/09/mil-050909-usia01.htm>; internet, accessed 8 February 2008; (2) Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “All is Not Well in Georgetown: Guyana’s Emerging Hemispheric Role,” <http://www.coha.org/2008/01/23/although-all-is-not-well-in-georgetown-guyana%E2%80%99s-emerging-hemispheric-role/>; Internet, accessed 8 February 2008 and (3) Michael S. Garrison, “Sovereignty of Aves Island: An Argument against Standardized, Compulsory Arbitration,” available from *bePress Legal Repository, the Berkeley Electronic Press*, <http://law.bepress.com/expreso/eps/1362>, internet, accessed 13 March 2008.

²⁴⁵ Acharya, “Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World,” 9-10.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

can be seen as forging independence from hegemonic reliant approaches and working towards regionalism of a more autonomous form.²⁴⁷ Conclusively:

. . . the new security agenda will be considerably less monolithic and global, and considerably more diverse, regional and local in character than the old one, despite the global quality of many of the new threats and referent objects. Although there will be some shared issues, in the post-Cold War world the security agenda will vary markedly from actor to actor in terms of both the issues and priorities.²⁴⁸

Hence the development of a tailored CARICOM security complex which draws on the theories of strategy, RSCT, the rules of collective action and regionalism is the best approach. The temptation to absorb the region within the North American security complex, although reasonable, should be avoided and a more nuanced approach taken.

5.5 Chapter Summary. This Chapter used alliance theoretical and working models to identify what could be adapted to enhance cooperation among CARICOM Member States' Defence Forces. The following should be adapted into a strategic synergy which collectively uses the Defence Forces in meeting CARICOM's security needs:

- (1) Autonomous regionalism as opposed to state-centric, bifurcated methods should be employed. The building or reinforcement of the mechanisms to think, plan and act strategically should be included and would be advantageous in building a common understanding within CARICOM and for working with the larger North American security complex.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁸ Buzan, "Rethinking Security after the Cold War"..., 12.

- (2) CARICOM States, viewed as homogeneous entities and hence more apt to form partnerships, should provide selective incentives for States to maintain harmony through managing the exploitation hypothesis. States should be flexible to accommodate diplomatic variances.
- (3) The existing RSS infrastructure should be broadened enabling more resources to be employed in a coordinated way.
- (4) CARICOM should enhance its intelligence sharing, critical infrastructure protection, land and maritime surveillance capacities. A “need to share” culture needs to be adapted.

The evolving model can now be taken to the next stage.

CHAPTER 6: AN ENHANCED CONTRIBUTION TO CARIBBEAN SECURITY

6.1 Chapter Introduction. The preceding Chapters established concepts and the context of Caribbean security and also examined the threats to such security. It was also seen that CARICOM's moves towards tighter cooperation have generally set the tone for closer ties between the Defence Forces. This Chapter synthesizes the evidence and analysis of previous Chapters and provides recommendations on what should be included in the strategy of greater cooperation among CARICOM's Defence Forces.

The Chapter takes a *top-down* approach by first making recommendations relative to strengthening the coordination apparatus, that is the Headquarters entity responsible for the overarching planning and management of regional security operations. Secondly, proposals will be made relative to specific capacities to be developed. Thirdly, logistics aspects needed to support the enhanced cooperation will be outlined. Finally, the Chapter will examine some of the major challenges associated with increased cooperation.

6.2 Strengthening the Coordination Apparatus. As the evidence in Chapter 2 has shown the Caribbean region plays a geo-strategic role in diplomatic, development, socio-economic and security terms.²⁴⁹ There is a need for a higher level of coordination of security strategies with the US and other major players such as those from Europe,²⁵⁰ and

²⁴⁹ Atkins, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System...*, xix – xx .

²⁵⁰ General Sheehan, "Preface," in *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century...*, vii.

even with China.²⁵¹ There is a need for tighter coordination set within an overarching regional security strategy, a particularly relevant instrument given the prevalence of transnational threats. The regional security strategy should contain appropriate measures of effectiveness to ensure longitudinal analyses and important linkages to aspects of national and regional development.²⁵² This also implies that the design of strategies and operations and the management of operational programmes need to be well-grounded within the CARICOM security complex as a precondition for connecting with global entities. Additionally, each State would need to have a viable operational coordinating mechanism to support the regional architecture. Such a mechanism should have a joint and inter-agency base.²⁵³

The theory of collective action showed that coordination is central to success²⁵⁴ and it was seen that the RSS CLO currently performs such coordination functions to achieve security cooperation for its seven Member States.²⁵⁵ The signing of the CARICOM Treaty on Security Assistance signifies political intent to increase the level of intra-regional cooperation and means that additional responsibilities for coordination will

²⁵¹ Noriega, "China's Influence in the Western Hemisphere," US Department of State – Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington, DC; April 6, 2005, available from <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2005/q2/44375.htm>, internet, accessed 6 February 2008.

²⁵² Creary, "The Strategic Implications of Maritime Security Cooperation among CARICOM States," 2-3.

²⁵³ Interviewee 2 Responses, CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008.

²⁵⁴ Sandler, *Global Collective Action*, 32-33

²⁵⁵ Regional Security System, Central Liaison Office, "Article 7, Secretariat" in *Treaty Establishing the Regional Security System*, 5-6.

fall to the RSS CLO.²⁵⁶ Without an increase in staff resources within the RSS CLO, its ability to plan, coordinate and control will likely become overwhelmed, inefficient and ineffective. Primary data collected indicate that staff appointments are vacant in the RSS CLO making this situation worse. Despite the increased responsibilities assigned, no mechanism exists to ensure representation from all CARICOM States.²⁵⁷ This then represents an area where the contribution from CARICOM's Defence Forces can be increased. Certainly, each CARICOM Defence Force could endeavour to contribute to the staff at the RSS CLO. The expansion of the headquarters should represent the initial thrust of effort since critical functions of strategic planning set the foundation for enhanced operational effectiveness²⁵⁸ through ensuring that overarching schemes for employment of the States' military resources collectively are sound.²⁵⁹ The RSS CLO staff should be extended to contain all joint staff branches (J1 – J9) and a chief of staff to ensure the requisite capacity for the highest quality planning and management of the regional security strategy and operations.²⁶⁰

Increasing the number of military officers in dealing with the complex defence and security issues above national level would increase the individual's knowledge and

²⁵⁶ Caribbean Community, "Articles 5: Joint Strategic Coordinating and Planning Committee" and "Article 6: The Coordinating Secretariat" in *Treaty on Security Assistance Among CARICOM Member States*, 4-6.

²⁵⁷ Interviewees' 2 and 3 Responses, CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008.

²⁵⁸ Collins, *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives*, 1-2.

²⁵⁹ Moran, "Strategic Theory and the History of War," 17-44.

²⁶⁰ Interviewee 3 Responses, CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008. J1 – Personnel, J2 – Intelligence, J3 – Operations, J4 – Logistics, J5 – Plans, J6 – Communications, J7 – Doctrine and Training, J8 – Finance and J9 – Civil Military Cooperation in accordance with allied joint concepts and approaches such as in NATO HQ and Canadian DND HQ.

experience base and also benefit the providing Force. The depth and quality of military advice on regional security matters available to the political directorate would be increased. This is required by the Treaty on Security Assistance's provisions for a Joint Strategic Coordinating Committee (JSCC) hence ensuring a satisfactory support base for the JSCC would be most appropriate.²⁶¹ Also, given the contribution by regional police forces of officers assigned to the staff of the headquarters (the RSS CLO) an enhanced contribution of military officers would achieve greater balance in the joint, inter-agency and multinational operating environment. It is well accepted that in the future security environment military-police interface and *jointness* will be more common hence proactively improving the balance within the RSS CLO is essential.²⁶²

6.3 Operational Capacities. As shown in Chapter 3 the emerging threats are impacting or have the potential to impact on the CARICOM region. The tactics and scale of violence that the threat organisations employ make them highly effective and dangerous especially when they leverage their regional and global alliances.²⁶³ These threats have a cumulative effect of undermining state structures and security in vulnerable small states like those of CARICOM countries.²⁶⁴ It is thus deduced that the regional

²⁶¹ Collins, *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives*, 4.

²⁶² Girvan, "Crime and Human Security in the Caribbean (1): The Greater Caribbean This Week." A new paradigm exists where policing, nation-building and counterinsurgency approaches encapsulated in an interagency framework are required to be developed. David J. Kilcullen. "New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict." *E Journal USA*, available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijpe/kilcullen.htm>; Internet, accessed 31 October 2007.

²⁶³ Girvan, "Crime and Human Security in the Caribbean (1): The Greater Caribbean This Week."

²⁶⁴ United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs and Economic and Social Council, "Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988," 1.

cooperative network needs to be strengthened by retaining a capable military option that includes *inter alia* the capacities listed below.

High Readiness Forces. It is recommended that there be a designated high-readiness unit capable of deploying at short notice to CARICOM Member States to provide assistance – a CARICOM Rapid Reaction Unit. This could perhaps be done on a rotational basis among the nine Defence Forces. This concept has been operationalised within larger security complexes and cooperative mechanisms, for example NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps and NORAD's standby air intercept resources.²⁶⁵ The provision could also be broadened to a full inter-agency model with police and other agencies attached. The possibility of large scale, rapid-onset events such as those caused by man-made acts like terrorism and some types of natural disasters make this a desirable capacity.

In order to support this it will be necessary to develop arrangements for strategic/expeditionary lift most desirably by air but also with a maritime launched alternative. Provision for a logistics support and sustainment follow-on train would also be necessary. The current provisions for the CDRU make general provision for this and could perhaps form the conceptual basis for further expansion. Exercising the CARICOM Rapid Reaction Unit could form the basis of an annual major, regional, collective training exercise.

²⁶⁵ NATO's Response Force is an integral part of their transformation process. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels, Belgium, Public Diplomacy Division, 2006), 49, 175, 177-178. See also North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, "Allied Rapid Reaction Corps" available from <http://www.arrc.nato.int/>, internet, accessed 9 March 2008.

Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations. In Latin America and many States of the Anglophone Caribbean the military is actively involved in counter narcotics operations in both the maritime and land environments in support of the civil power. This is often a necessity where terrain and tactical considerations require military resources to be used against the modern narcotics-trafficking adversary.²⁶⁶ Cooperative efforts can therefore provide for the pooling of military resources to provide for more deliberate and robust counter narcotics operations.

Coordinated maritime operations using CARICOM's surface and air assets collectively should also be the given consideration. Available assets could be knit together in an operational tapestry that more comprehensively covers the region and is better linked to the UK's and US' regional engagement strategies.²⁶⁷ As has been previously noted, it is unfortunate that despite the best efforts of the RSS, coordinated maritime operations have not been sustained.²⁶⁸

It is significant however that the UK's West Indies Guard Ship has had some success with counter narcotics operations. This implies that it is possible to attain greater

²⁶⁶ United States, Directorate of the Joint Staff, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, (Joint Publication 3-07.4, 13 June 2007), xiii, II-1-II-2, II-17.

²⁶⁷ Improved linkages to the *Shiprider* arrangements and to the US' Joint Interagency Task Force operational programmes are desirable. See United States, *Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South*, <http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/>; internet, accessed 4 April 2007, US, Directorate of the Joint Staff, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, (Joint Publication 3-07.4, 13 June 2007), xi-x and CARICOM Secretariat, *Report of the Joint Management Committee of the CARICOM/UK Security Cooperation Plan...*, 1-3.

²⁶⁸ Brigadier General Edmund Dillon, "Regional Security Cooperation: Traditional and Non-traditional Areas," 475.

regional security benefit if these efforts are coordinated with a well-structured regional programme.²⁶⁹ Given the pervasiveness of the narcotics, arms and human trafficking threats which heavily use the seas and also the increasing possibility of illegal exploitation of maritime resources, this should be accorded a high priority.²⁷⁰ The intent should be to exercise greater control throughout CARICOM's maritime commons and this could be more effectively and efficiently achieved if a more collaborative approach is taken.²⁷¹ Also, as the quality of intra-regional cooperation increases, improved operational effectiveness and coordination with extra-regional entities should be achieved. The previously suggested regional security strategy should therefore include an enhanced counter narcotics component.

Special Operations Forces. Special operations forces capabilities are premium assets given the nature of emerging threats and possibilities for extremely complex tactical situations. The nature of globalised threats such as terrorism certainly underscores the value of having this organic capacity.²⁷² Enhanced cooperation in the areas of training, procurement of equipment and exchanges among CARICOM Defence Forces' special operations community forms another worthwhile venture. Indeed it may

²⁶⁹ Royal Navy cocaine seizures in the Caribbean have been significant. See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2001-2002, *Caribbean Drug Trends* (Caribbean Regional Office, Bridgetown, Barbados, February 2003), 33 and Dr Ivelaw Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege*, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 1997), 118 - 127.

²⁷⁰ There has been evidence of illegal fishing in Caribbean waters by extra-regional entities. This is more of a possibility if fish stocks suffer greatly from the consequences of climate change as some theories advance. Interviewee 4 Responses, CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008.

²⁷¹ Creary, "The Strategic Implications of Maritime Security Cooperation among CARICOM States," 4-6.

²⁷² United States, Directorate of the Joint Staff, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, IV-6.

be more cost effective and even accrue tactical advantages to combine or align individual States' special operations forces' training and operational engagements into a comprehensive regional concept as opposed to the current state-centred approach.²⁷³

Whilst the development of the preceding operational capacities represent relatively new spheres of endeavour there are, additionally some existing areas which could benefit from reinforcement.

Intelligence-Led Operations. The establishment of the CARICOM Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC) in 2006 represents a critical requirement needed for the design of relevant and focussed operations at national and regional levels.²⁷⁴ The RIFC's connectivity with global bodies is also significant.²⁷⁵ Increased military cooperation in the form of an expanded coordinating Headquarters and a larger pool of operational assets would together form a critical capability for the execution of effective strategies and operational plans based on sound intelligence. The RIFC should therefore be integrated into the Headquarters and its focus broadened to include the provision of actionable operational intelligence. Thus the RIFC's work process and analytical product outputs would drive higher quality operations and greater security benefits.

²⁷³ Interviewee 4 Responses, CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008.

²⁷⁴ The RIFC was developed as part of the security infrastructure for the Cricket World Cup 2007. CARICOM Secretariat, "Some Regional Security Arrangements to remain after CWC 2007" http://www.caricomimpacs.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=66&Itemid=2; internet, accessed 9 March 2008.

²⁷⁵ Interpol, "More INTERPOL resources to the CWC Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre to enhance Cricket World Cup security efforts," available from <http://www.interpol.int/public/News/2007/CricketWorldCup20070302.asp>; internet, accessed 9 March 2008.

Critical Skills Management and Training. The management of critical human resources is another area which could benefit from enhanced cooperation between CARICOM Defence Forces. For example, a centrally coordinated database could be used to track critical military specialist skills sets and qualifications that reside in the CARICOM military resource pool. Leadership development programmes and arrangements for state to state assistance within CARICOM and also for long term support from the wider international community could then be better managed. Strategic human resource planning could be improved through using a collective approach especially if the Headquarters fulfils a central coordinating role.

As an institution, CJCSC has delivered tremendous value and represents future potential for making an even greater contribution to the professional development of officers by enhancing their intellectual capacity to deal with the present and future challenges.²⁷⁶ There is however a need for CARICOM Defence Forces to take greater ownership of the programme specifically such areas as curriculum development, exercise planning and the provision of directing staff and subject matter experts to ensure CJCSC's year round functioning.²⁷⁷ Furthermore, recognising the somewhat limited engagement of and volume of literature produced by CARICOM's former senior officers and military strategists, it is recommended that CJCSC be used as a platform to fill this void by tapping into this rich intellectual resource. Certainly, Caribbean military

²⁷⁶ Moran, "Strategic Theory and the History of War," 17-36.

²⁷⁷ Major Glyne Grannum, "Recommendations for Improvement of CJCSC: Part 1 and Part 2," (JDF Newcastle Training Depot, St Andrew, Jamaica, Directing Staff's End of Course Report/Comments, 6 December 2004), 2-4.

strategists could be invited to provide more contributions to the institution's library and programmes for the benefit of future senior leaders.²⁷⁸

Training courses and exercises are necessary to build and maintain individual proficiencies and the basis for ensuring operational readiness and efficacy. The US-sponsored annual TRADEWINDS exercise has traditionally been the focus of annual joint and combined exercises at regional level. The RSS' smaller UNITY exercise is similar in design but only caters to the seven RSS Member States and hence only three of the nine CARICOM Defence Forces.²⁷⁹ This arrangement should be revisited so as to avoid any duplication of effort, real or perceived, and in the process increase value obtained for investment.

Direct Exchange/Attachments between Forces. In addition to the staffing at the regional Headquarters consideration should be given for increased exchange attachments between the nine Defence Forces. At present this type of cooperation is limited to short-term engagements of instructors and individuals made available for specialist projects or tasks. It is believed that there may be scope for attachment of persons to Forces' Headquarters and their subordinate units for longer periods of time

²⁷⁸ Notwithstanding the contributions of academia, the intellectual capacity of former CARICOM Chiefs Defence of Staff (for example Brigadier General Rudyard Lewis who was central to the formation of the RSS) can be better leveraged through forum like CJSC and writings in CARICOM military publications/journals. Daniel Moran, "Strategic Theory and the History of War," 17-44, ed. John Baylis et al, *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford), 17-19.

²⁷⁹ Barbados, "Barbados to be Venue of RSS UNITY Exercise 2006," *Government Information Service - News*, available from <http://www.barbados.gov.bb/ViewNews.asp?ID=4301&Dat=9/26/2006>; internet, accessed 4 April 2008.

thus amplifying one of the ideas of the UK/CARICOM cooperative initiative.²⁸⁰ An ongoing programme of exchange could be developed. Besides making functional contributions to the receiving Force, exchange and engagements in this way will help build local knowledge and confidence which could then benefit Forces operationally.

6.4 Logistics and Supply Matters. Harmonisation of resources, especially major capital assets, through joint procurement is another area which can be included in the forum of increased cooperation. Acting collectively, CARICOM Defence Forces would be better able to take advantage of economies of scale when purchasing unique military items.²⁸¹ This has been attempted with some success by the RSS and whilst there is the risk of increased inefficiency when group size increases, consideration should be given to a broader CARICOM approach.²⁸² Joint procurement programmes should therefore be resuscitated and expanded.

6.5 Challenges to Enhanced Cooperation. Early identification of some of the potential challenges which may hamper the effort to increase cooperation among the Defence Forces of CARICOM should prove useful in managing the subsequent implementation of any recommendations found acceptable. Whilst the theory of collective action identified some, there are some others that need to be mitigated against.

²⁸⁰ CARICOM Secretariat, *Report of the Joint Management Committee of the CARICOM/UK Security Cooperation Plan*, (Fifth UK/CARICOM Ministerial Forum, Bridgetown, 26 – 28 April 2006), 1-4.

²⁸¹ CARICOM Defence Forces, Interview Data Collected – Appendix 1, 1 February – 31 March 2008.

²⁸² Sandler, *Global Collective Action*, 32-33.

The Caribbean's integration process has been described as long, slow and sometimes frustrating.²⁸³ Hence, the need to overcome lengthy bureaucracy will need to be borne in mind. Furthermore, the failure of the West Indies Federation still looms ominously over efforts in realising concepts of enhanced regionalisation such as those proposed in this thesis. The rebuilding of confidence and of collaborative institutions has come a long way but there still needs to be a conscious effort to overcome the psychological effects of the failure of the Federation as one of the pioneering institutions for unifying the Caribbean.

While the post-colonial independence period saw dramatic increases in the sense of individual nationhood and national pride, the move to greater military cooperation will have to overcome a potential for *small state hubris*, the feeling that the more resource endowed states are able to manage threats by themselves. The strengths arising from existing institutional structures such as the RSS, strong leadership and past operational successes can be used to overcome this challenge. The realisation that the Caribbean is a security complex also helps reinforce the need for unity. Some new approaches to the concept of national sovereignty may be necessary as the desire not to lose control over one's assets may tend, somewhat naturally, to arise. Once the political will for cooperation and for ceding small elements of sovereignty is established, a greater good for the region becomes attainable.²⁸⁴ Another challenge in this regard is that of providing and sharing intelligence. Certainly, the 9/11 experiences of the US and the reflexive shift

²⁸³ Brigadier General Lewis, "Initiatives for Cooperative Regional Security: The Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System," 178-180.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 178.

to a “need to share” concept appears wise. It is believed that the benefits of working more closely together will offset any apprehensions that may be present or tend to develop.

Differing resource capacities of CARICOM States represents another challenge that will confront moves towards greater cooperation. Some of the larger States are more endowed with human and capital assets. Since there is not strict homogeneity among the Forces and the levels of financial investment by their respective governments vary, the exploitation hypothesis could come into effect.²⁸⁵ Selective incentives such as inviting Forces to contribute based on particular strengths thus creating niche appointments may offset the disadvantages in this regard but regardless of the choice of option to mitigate, careful management will be required. Linked to this and based on the implications of the recommendations made in this thesis, there will be challenges faced in allocating or reallocating appropriate financial resources – for example for staffing, equipment acquisitions and the conduct of operations. Hence, greater specificity with robust justification will have to be provided for all the recommendations mentioned. This area will need to be accorded further study but lies beyond the scope of this thesis.

6.6 Chapter Summary. This Chapter recommended strengthening the coordination and management Headquarters through assignment of more military personnel as the initial thrust of effort. It was shown that this would increase the quality of the Headquarters’ outputs and would be necessary to refine the concepts proposed in this thesis. Enhanced cooperation should also focus on developing a regional security

²⁸⁵ Sandler, *Global Collective Action...*, 32-34.

strategy, establishing high-readiness units, sustaining regionally coordinated counter narcotics operations, harmonisation of high-value, special operations forces and greater leveraging of the RIFC's capacity.

The management of critical human resources is another area which could benefit from enhanced cooperation between CARICOM Defence Forces. More direct exchange between Forces was also recommended and strengthening of the CJCSC. Collaborative efforts should also be applied to logistics and supply matters. Challenges such as embracing new approaches to the concept of sovereignty, financial and other resource costs would need to be overcome in tangibly strengthening the level of cooperation between Forces.

CHAPTER 7: THESIS CONCLUSION

7.1 Chapter Introduction. CARICOM is continually maturing, seizing a unique place in the world and its Member States developing by adequately attending to all responsibilities.²⁸⁶ These responsibilities include providing a level of security that meets the evolving threats. Security is perhaps the foremost responsibility since transnational and sub-state actors challenge the Westphalian concept where the state is the basic unit of analysis in international relations and the holder of the monopoly on organised force.²⁸⁷

This thesis researched the Caribbean security context, the global security environment, extant CARICOM policy and strategies and models of military cooperation to show that increased military cooperation will contribute to enhanced Caribbean security. In concluding this thesis this Chapter first summarises the major findings of the research, next outlines some of the limitations encountered in the research and then makes recommendations for future research related to this topic.

7.2 Major Findings of the Research. The major findings of the research are summarised as follows.

- (1) Based on the history of collaborative experiences, the existence of sufficiently robust structures and Treaty instruments, a strategic

²⁸⁶ His Excellency Bharrat Jagdeo, President of Guyana, “Address at the Inauguration of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat Headquarters Building.”

²⁸⁷ Dr Andrea J. Dew and Dr. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “Empowered Groups, Tested Laws and Policy Options: The Challenges of Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups.” (Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies and Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University, 2007), 11-15.

framework now exists that can be built upon to increase military cooperation within CARICOM. Thus, the Defence Forces should now cooperate more, fully embracing the concept of regionalism and collective security action and in so doing make a greater contribution to the security of the Caribbean region.

- (2) It is prudent that intra-regional cooperative strategies be advanced based on autonomous approaches rather than on hegemonic reliant concepts. Heavy commitments of the world's major powers in other areas across the globe will demand the focus of their resources adding to the reasons why cooperative endeavours are best. Through pooling regional resources and acting collectively, a more comprehensive operational tapestry covering the region should provide an improved public security good. This drives toward the development of a regional security strategic plan that would ensure greater coordination intra-regionally as a precondition for improved coordination within the wider hemispheric security complex and the world.
- (3) Globalised security threats such as the trafficking in narcotics, arms and people, organised crime, money laundering and terrorism will require the availability of a wide range of resources as instruments of state power. The challenge of responding to disasters caused by man-made or severe environmental forces is another area where greater military cooperation

within CARICOM is relevant. There is a role for the Defence Forces within the joint inter-agency partnership based on the nature of the threat and the special capacity resident in the military institution. It is critical that policy makers and analysts respond to threat developments proactively.

- (4) The coordinating Headquarters for regional security (a responsibility currently assigned by CARICOM to the RSS CLO) should be strengthened by the attachment of additional military personnel. This is an important first step to increased cooperation, enhanced Caribbean security and for advancing the key recommendations set out in this thesis.
- (5) The RIFC should be better utilised by integrating it into the expanded regional coordinating Headquarters. Higher quality operations employing regional assets should then result and yield greater regional security. Better linkages to extra-regional operational resources should also be achieved.
- (6) Whilst the harsh reality is that the provision of adequate security is costly and many small developing states do not have the wherewithal to do so, CARICOM Member States have been fortunate to have had governments that understand the concept of sovereignty, its attendant responsibilities for national security and the necessity for effective security strategies to

underpin national development. This understanding should be backed up by the allocation of appropriate resources.

- (7) The conceptual model as articulated in Chapter 1 served to focus this research thesis. Its utility in analysing CARICOM's strategic security environment through identifying the relevant variables and for studying their inter-relationships is evident at this stage. The model can therefore be developed and used for further regional strategic studies.

7.3 Limitations of the research. This research was affected by three significant constraints which, existing concurrently throughout, limited the study. First, it was found that literature from the Caribbean's senior military personnel and strategists was limited. This shortcoming restricted the depth of secondary research specifically that available from persons intimately familiar with CARICOM security challenges and concepts and the wider Caribbean security issues at strategic and operational levels. Secondly, the dual factor of time and researcher resources constraint also affected the study. More time would have permitted greater depth in data gathering especially given that there were limited researcher resources. This constraint was mitigated against by having an early start to the data gathering phase and through maintaining flexibility. Thirdly, there were challenges in obtaining primary research data from the nine Defence Forces. Such a limitation reduced the rigour of the research but not to the extent that it subtracted from the overall utility of this thesis. Notwithstanding these limitations, it is held that the

richness of the literature available and the data as obtained are qualitatively sufficient to make the study meaningful.

7.4 Recommendations for Future Research. The deductions arising throughout this thesis suggest that the following two recommendations for future research can prove worthwhile pursuits. Firstly, the issue of a comprehensive regional security strategy was raised. Having such a unifying instrument would help define CARICOM's strategic intent, goals and specifics on purpose-driven military collaborations, the efforts of other security agencies such as the police and the linkages between agencies. Future research can therefore consider the possible process of development and content of such a strategy. Secondly, research into the structure and composition for the expanded coordinating Headquarters or other entities such as the high-readiness unit could be undertaken in order to bring greater definition to these concepts.

In closing this thesis, “the Caribbean should recognise its undoubted achievements over thirty years acknowledging the value of numerous regional milestones reached and forge ahead.”²⁸⁸ Accordingly, greater cooperation among the Defence Forces of CARICOM Member States would provide an enhanced contribution to Caribbean security.

²⁸⁸ University of the West Indies/CARICOM Project, “Introduction,” vii-xxxiii in *CARICOM: Appropriate Adaptation to a Changing Global Environment. A Special Issue of the “Integrationist.”* Vol 2, No 2, December 2004, (Kingston, Jamaica, Ian Randle Publishers), xxix.

APPENDIX 1

CARICOM DEFENCE FORCES INTERVIEW DATA COLLECTED
1 FEBRUARY – 31 MARCH 2008: INTERVIEW RESPONSES

TOWARDS A MORE SECURE CARIBBEAN:
ENHANCING MILITARY COOPERATION WITHIN THE CARIBBEAN
COMMUNITY

Interviewee 1 Responses.

Q1. How would you define “security” in your national context?
I consider people to be the focal point of national security since the citizens are the foundation of the Nation State and if they are not secure it stands to reason that the State will not be secure. As such, I view security in the broadest contexts as the relative freedom of the people to live in a peaceful and stable environment that is conducive to sustainable development.
Q2. What do you consider to be the most serious threat to this security?
The most serious threat to the security of the State and its people is the multidimensional and trans-national challenges of illegal drugs and the related violent criminal activity stemming from the trafficking in illegal drug and firearms.
Q3. Do you agree that the military contributes to maintaining security of your Nation State?
Most definitely. The military, as an instrument of military power, provides higher ordered skills which contribute immeasurably to the application of force as and when deemed necessary by the political directorate.
Q4. Based on your answer to the previous question, If yes, how does your military force contribute? If no, should it, and how?
(1) Intelligence sharing with the Police. (2) Military assistance to the civil power through active participation in joint operations in support of the Police [counter-drug, internal security operations, mobile rural patrols, beach patrols in areas frequented by tourists, crowd control at major national events etc]. (3) Support to other State and agencies that impact on national security. (4) Domination of the nation’s maritime space to detect, deter, disrupt and, if necessary, destroy threats [including drug traffickers] to the State.
Q5. Do you agree that a “security interdependency” exists among CARICOM States?
While there is evidence to suggest that some measure of security interdependency exists, I am of the view that more needs to be done to forge even closer ties. This becomes even more critical when one considers the reduced level of technical and financial support from traditional international donors. This was most apparent during the recently held Cricket World Cup 2007 where more assistance to CARICOM was provided by non-traditional partners.

Q6. Over the past thirty years CARICOM military forces have joined resources to execute a wide range of operations. Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, the 1994 US-led Operation Restore Democracy and its follow on UNMIH/Uphold Democracy and 2007 CWC Joint Task Force deployments are three of the better known engagements. Whilst not all forces have participated in all the missions, what would you consider the strengths of these military engagements?

- (1) Regional solidarity and commitment.
- (2) Quality military leadership and professionalism comparable to that in more developed and established military forces around the world.
- (3) Regional cooperation.
- (4) Raising the quality troops/military skills.

Q7. What do you consider to be the weaknesses borne out during these engagements? Considering the experiences of these operations, what are the key lessons learned? (3-5 would be adequate).

Weaknesses

- (1) Limited organic resources at the national and regional level.
- (2) Dependency on external support which may not always be available.
- (3) Limited intra-regional mobility which hampers expeditionary deployments to troubled areas in the region.
- (4) Lack of standardization in equipment.
- (5) Inability to sustain operations over extended periods.
- (6) Limited finances at national and regional level to sustain operational efforts.

Lessons

- (1) National security must be viewed by Governments in the region as a national responsibility. National security must not be dependent on the foreign and defence policy dictates of other States.
- (2) Governments must provide the necessary financial resources to support national security forces.
- (3) There must be greater collaboration and coordination among security forces in the region.

Q8. The provisions of the Regional Security System Treaty (1996) and more recently the CARICOM Treaty on Security Assistance (2006) set the

Q9. How can the military enhance its contribution to improving security of the region?

The days of the military's focus being solely that of defence are long gone. Within the Caribbean region, the military instrument of national power must of necessity play a non-traditional role in the establishment and maintenance of stable, safe and secure environments throughout the region. To this end, it essential that national military forces:

- (1) Work closer with other military forces in the region to build a solid deterrent to those who would wish to threaten the security of the region.
- (2) Work closer with the police and other law enforcement agencies such as Customs and Immigration.
- (3) Enhance the sharing of information and intelligence.
- (4) Assist with the training and development of skills in the regional law enforcement agencies to enhance their operational planning.
- (5) Increase its involvement and presence at the national and regional level as a means of deterrence.
- (6) Utilize its skills to assist in national development, particularly with youth development.

Q10. What areas would you suggest are most beneficial to strengthening cooperation among CARICOM's Military Forces? These may include but are not limited to (1) information and intelligence sharing; (2) staff/personnel exchange attachments; (3) training exchanges; (4) joint procurements.

Additional Comments.

In addition to the areas outlined above, I would suggest frequent meetings at levels below the Chiefs [e.g. Intelligence Officers, Operations/Training Officers and Logistics Officers]. Very few intelligence officers in the military forces have ever met each other. Such meetings will help to forge close cooperation, build mutual trust and enhance the coordination of efforts].

Interviewee 2 Responses.

Q1. How would you define “security in your organizational context?”
The protection of the RSS jurisdiction from danger by maintaining adequately trained and resourced forces to respond to Member States threats and to keep its intelligence secure from intercept.
Q2. What do you consider to be the most serious threat to this security?
(1) Narcotics trafficking and associated threats, and (2) Inadequate resources to carry out critical mission tasks.
Q3. Do you agree that the military contributes to maintaining security within the RSS?
Yes.
Q4. Based on your answer to the previous question, If yes, how do military forces contribute? If no, should they, and how?
Military forces are the principle defence mechanism. They also provide critical support to the police and other civil powers.
Q5. Do you agree that a “security interdependency” exists among RSS and CARICOM States?
Yes. This is manifested both within the RSS and across the entire Caribbean.
Q6. Over the past thirty years RSS and CARICOM military forces have joined resources to execute a wide range of operations. Operation Urgent Fury in 1993, the 1994 US-led Operation Restore Democracy and its follow on UNMIH/Uphold Democracy and 2007 CWC Joint Task Force deployments are three of the better known engagements. Whilst not all forces have participated in all the missions, what would you consider the strengths of these military engagements?
The significant enhancement of inter-agency cooperation.
Q7. What do you consider to be the weaknesses borne out during these engagements? Considering the experiences of these operations, what are the key lessons learned? (3-5 would be adequate).
Mainly interoperability, as it relates to equipment is the key weakness.
Q8. The provision of the Regional Security System Treaty (1996) and more recently the CARICOM Treaty on Security Assistance (2006) set the strategic and legislative framework for security cooperation among the signatories/Member States. In the context of this strategic framework, what are the supporting operational provisions, elements or arrangements that need to be established or enhanced?
The mode and competent authority for activating the regional security assistance mechanism have to be established.

<p>Q9. How can the military enhance its contribution to improving security of the region?</p> <p>(1) Create a culture of exercising jointly, at least annually. (2) Forging better working relationships with the civil power and other government departments and non-governmental organisations.</p>
<p>Q10. What areas would you suggest are most beneficial to strengthening cooperation among RSS and CARICOM's Military Forces? These may include but are not limited to (1) information and intelligence sharing; (2) staff/personnel exchange attachments; (3) training exchanges; (4) joint procurements.</p> <p>(1) Non-RSS Forces must acquire a better understanding of the RSS although it is highly desirable that the organisation be expanded to include all CARICOM States. (2) All those mentioned in the question must be developed where appropriate and generally maintained.</p>

Interviewee 3 Responses.

Q1. How would you define “security” in your organisational context?
The protection (which includes prevention, defence or response) of any of the RSS Member States from an attack or condition that threatens their national interests.
Q2. What do you consider to be the most serious threat to this security?
Currently organized crime which contributes to major narcotics trafficking, gun related violence, money laundering and human smuggling.
Q3. Do you agree that the military contributes to maintaining security within the RSS?
Yes.
Q4. Based on your answer to the previous question, If yes, how do military forces contribute? If no, should they, and how?
The military brings their planning capability, intelligence framework, resources (human and material) and training to the table. This is a vital skill set resource in the present environment and against the asymmetrical enemy we are facing.
Q5. Do you agree that “security interdependency” exists among RSS and CARICOM States?
Yes. Given the unique nature of this region, one threat to national security affects all. The politicians have recognized this and it is now reflected as the fourth pillar of Caribbean Community (CARICOM). There needs to be some effort made for using the forces (their operational assets) more economically to deliver more regional benefit.
Q6. Over the past thirty years RSS and CARICOM military forces have joined resources to execute a wide range of operations. Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, the 1994 US-led Operation Restore Democracy and its follow on UNMIH/Uphold Democracy and 2007 CWC Joint Task Force deployments are three of the better known engagements. Whilst not all forces have participated in all the missions, what would you consider the strengths of these military engagements?
(1) Easy integration of the military forces. (2) High levels of discipline. (3) High levels of professionalism. (4) Effectiveness – the ability to get the job done.
Q7. What do you consider to be the weaknesses borne out during these engagements? Considering the experiences of these operations, what are the key lessons learned? (3-5 would be adequate).
(1) Lack of resources. (2) Dependency on US for airlift and sustainment. (3) There was an initial need for common standards in training but although rectified this needs to be continuously worked at. (4) Doctrine needs to be examined and should the larger states decide to join the RSS modifications will be required. Such changes are quite natural in growing a capable security apparatus and all advantageous.

<p>Q8. The provisions of the Regional Security System Treaty (1996) and more recently the CARICOM Treaty on Security Assistance (2006) set the strategic and legislative framework for security cooperation among the signatories/Member States. In the context of this strategic framework, what are the supporting operational provisions, elements or arrangements that need to be established or enhanced?</p>
<p>(1) A formalized logistics framework which will support all actions from the time of mobilization to deployment, the conduct, sustainment, redeployment and demobilization. (2) A centralised procurement system.</p>
<p>Q9. How can the military enhance its contribution to improving security of the region?</p>
<p>(1) Sharing of knowledge base – senior personnel writing periodicals, security seminars, copyright region’s unique product and sell it to bigger forces. (2) Influence more of the political directorate at the national and regional levels. (3) Conduct regional exercises without outside assistance. (4) Enhance the regional staff school in Jamaica – take more ownership.</p>
<p>Q10. What areas would you suggest are most beneficial to strengthening cooperation among RSS and CARICOM’s Military Forces? These may include but are not limited to (1) information and intelligence sharing; (2) staff/personnel exchange attachments; (3) training exchanges; (4) joint procurements.</p>
<p>(1) More political buy-in and support. (2) Militaries develop centres of excellence where each force would be trained. (3) Develop compatibility in critical areas of equipment – e.g. communications and intelligence. (4) More formal collaboration amongst militaries. (5) Development of a regional security strategy which would drive how forces will operate together.</p>
<p><u>Additional Comments:</u> The desired level of security must ultimately address the need for human security within the context of the state (national security). Along these lines, the role of the military in responding to hurricanes and other disaster response operations such as medical assistance for the evacuation in Montserrat in the 1990’s are significant. There is a need for more staff in the RSS CLO. Currently vacancies exist but even when these are filled there is a need to expand the staffing/appointments to better serve the purposes of the coordinating Headquarters. RSS CLO should have the full J1 – J9 staff.</p>

Interviewee 4 Responses.

Q1. How would you define “security” in your national context?
<p>The concept of safety and security are interlinked in the national context and therefore any threat to the society requires the attention of the security forces. Although broad in description the issues of subversion, natural and man-made disasters, terrorism, illegal migration, illegal drugs and gun running constitute some of the major threats. In the future food security and water security will also feature prominently. One can visualize the resultant problems from the rise in oil prices and the rise in food prices that the less fortunate will resort to means that will ensure their survival. If the population is happy and comfortable then there is no need for them to rebel therefore a critical aspect of security is to include protection from influences which threaten life-enhancing qualities. Anything which seeks to undermine the Constitution of the State and the areas of national interest constitutes a threat to national security.</p>
Q2. What do you consider to be the most serious threat to this security?
<p>There has to be a more holistic effort/approach to security where all the forces (police, military, Immigration, Customs and Excise, etc) are on the same page to include intelligence sharing and joint planning and execution. Additionally the issue of national security should come under a ministerial portfolio to allow for better command and control.</p>
Q3. Do you agree that the military contributes to maintaining security of your Nation State?
Yes.
Q4. Based on your answer to the previous question, If yes, how does your military force contribute? If no, should it, and how?
<p>The Defence Force provides a ready response to mass casualty incidents as well as disaster response and mitigation as required. The military also works closely with the police and provide that additional level in the escalation of force in security related incidents but this has its shortcomings in terms of joint planning and training and also the sharing of information. There has to be an improvement in the connectivity between the forces, locally and regionally, however to make the arrangement more viable.</p>

Q5. Do you agree that a “security interdependency” exists among CARICOM States?
<p>Absolutely, the region comprises many small states with varying levels of security however the threats are similar in nature and so easily transportable just like the easy movement of people. From URGENT FURY in Grenada to the recent deployment of humanitarian and disaster mitigation personnel and equipment in response to Hurricane IVAN indicates that there is interdependency. In simple terms many of the CARICOM states have not invested in the kind of security infrastructure that is required to maintain a safe secure and stable environment. Perhaps with the exception of Bahamas, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana and Barbados the other states are woefully inadequate. Recent developments arising out of meeting of ministers responsible for security indicates that at the political level it was recommended that there is a need for a standing force capable of responding to a threat in any member state as was the case for Cricket World Cup 2007.</p>
<p>Q6. Over the past thirty years CARICOM military forces have joined resources to execute a wide range of operations. Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, the 1994 US-led Operation Restore Democracy and its follow on UNMIH/Uphold Democracy and 2007 CWC Joint Task Force deployments are three of the better known engagements. Whilst not all forces have participated in all the missions, what would you consider the strengths of these military engagements?</p>
<p>Similar history and consequently similar military training and traditions. Language and understanding of the area of operation.</p>
<p>Q7. What do you consider to be the weaknesses borne out during these engagements? Considering the experiences of these operations, what are the key lessons learned? (3-5 would be adequate).</p>
<p>(1) Joint planning and training. (2) Logistics, re-supply and sustainment should be dealt with regionally as opposed to per nation (home country to look after own troops). (3) Disparity in assets and manpower. (4) Similar political will and motivation among the leadership in the States.</p>
<p>Q8. The provisions of the Regional Security System Treaty (1996) and more recently the CARICOM Treaty on Security Assistance (2006) set the strategic and legislative framework for security cooperation among the signatories/Member States. In the context of this strategic framework, what are the supporting operational provisions, elements or arrangements that need to be established or enhanced?</p>
<p>It all comes down to financing the deployment of troops and sustaining those troops in theatre. This includes aircraft and vessels and all the logistical requirements. The movement of troops has to be assessed critically. The region has limited ability (maritime platforms) to move troops to operational areas. There either has to be a Memorandum of Understanding or the one of the states has to look at troop carrying aircraft or ships to move at least 2 x infantry companies and vehicles to support that deployment to an area of operation.</p>

<p>Q9. How can the military enhance its contribution to improving security of the region?</p> <p>The militaries of the region have to view security as a multidimensional and international phenomenon and shape (organise) to respond to those threats. It could be suggested that some of the more developed nations accept responsibility for some areas of the response mechanism and be committed to the task without exception to a stricken nation. Nations also have to take into consideration the vast Exclusive Economic Zones that they have a responsibility for and invest in protecting the resources that are therein. Additionally it is known that the vast maritime areas are used to move drugs, weapons and migrants that are the primary sources of threat to many regional governments. There is also the exploitation of maritime resources (fisheries) by external entities. Trends in illegal fishing should be watched. To this end military and police forces have to convince their respective governments to provide the resources to aid in the fight and it has to be consistent across the region as one crack will always be exploited by the enemy.</p>
<p>Q10. What areas would you suggest are most beneficial to strengthening cooperation among CARICOM's Military Forces? These may include but are not limited to (1) information and intelligence sharing; (2) staff/personnel exchange attachments; (3) training exchanges; (4) joint procurements.</p>
<p>All of the above but I think that we should employ one of the so called 'legacies' of Cricket World Cup 2007. There is a need to maintain the regional HQ format that facilitates the training and logistics and sustainment that is required for regional deployments. That HQ would facilitate all that is needed and may be an expansion of the RSS CLO could achieve this although that also has its issues but it could be used as the genesis. Along with the HQ is the joint training and this has to be done annually with the troops committed for that year as is the case with CDRU. This Regional Intelligence infrastructure should be tied into the HQ as well.</p>
<p><u>Additional Comments.</u></p> <p>I think that as mostly island nations we need to look critically at maritime security and special operations capacities especially given the global threat of terrorism. The movement of oil and natural gas throughout the region as well as nuclear/radioactive material is of concern given the potential fallout if there was an incident with one of those vessels. To put it more succinctly the scale of catastrophic damage to the environment and economy of an island should one of these tankers have a serious accident offshore during the tourist season is unimaginable. The threat to cruise ships is also a point that was not mentioned but is critical to the survival of many on the CARICOM nations. Illegal migration is becoming more problematic in most of the regional states. Global terrorism trends need to be urgently considered as well. There is also a need to leverage value out of the CJCSC currently run in Jamaica. The regional military forces need to take greater 'ownership' of the institution.</p>

Interviewee 5 Responses

Q1. How would you define “security” in your national context?
Security in a national context can be defined as a state of being free from harm. It is a state by which the civil liberties afforded by the constitution are enjoyed by all without unlawful infringement or deprivation. Security can be divided in to two categories: hard and soft security. The former speaks to the threats that relates to serious crimes and often times requires force to deal with. The latter speaks to threats that are of a socio-economic nature.
Q2. What do you consider to be the most serious threat to this security?
<u>Threats relating to crime.</u> This includes: risk of collapse of the Rule of Law; high levels of violence, armed crime and murder; organized crime; narcotics trafficking; illicit flow of arms and ammunition; gangs and gang related activities; extortion; kidnapping; endemic corruption; white collar crime; human trafficking; cyber crime; overcrowding in correctional facilities and violation of community orders. <u>Socio-economic threats.</u> The individual threats included under this heading are large in number and varied in nature. In economic terms, the threats include: external economic shocks; financial crimes including tax evasion and fraud; industrial unrest; high unemployment and poverty. On the community level: public order issues; erosion of social values; inadequate community support for vulnerable groups; entrenchment of garrison communities and informal settlements. Border security is also a concern. The smuggling of contraband (illegal drugs, firearms, ammunition) and the connection between smuggling and organized crime has the potential to lead to violence and corruption.
Q3. Do you agree that the military contributes to maintaining security of your Nation State?
Yes
Q4. Based on your answer to the previous question, If yes, how does your military force contribute? If no, should it, and how?
(1) Assist and protect the citizens in times of disaster and crisis. (2) Secure the state’s borders against the illegal entry of weapons, drugs and people. (3) Joint operations with the Civil Power/Constabulary Force. (4) Counter terrorist operations. (5) Employ defence diplomacy to support the Government’s objective in promoting peace at home and abroad.
Q5. Do you agree that a “security interdependency” exists among CARICOM States?
Considering that generally, the security threats in the CARICOM region are ubiquitous; interdependency has to be in existence. The level to which this ‘interdependence’ exists needs to be developed.
Q6. Over the past thirty years CARICOM military forces have joined resources to execute a wide range of operations. Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, the 1994 US-led Operation Restore Democracy and its follow on UNMIH/Uphold Democracy and 2007 CWC Joint Task Force deployments are three of the better known engagements. Whilst not all forces have participated in all the missions, what would you consider the strengths of these military engagements?
The variety of skills and expertise that came from the various Forces proved to be a strong point in these operations. The ability to share intelligence and resources: both human and material were vital to the execution of these operations.

<p>Q7. What do you consider to be the weaknesses borne out during these engagements? Considering the experiences of these operations, what are the key lessons learned? (3-5 would be adequate).</p>
<p><u>Weaknesses.</u></p> <p>(1) Disparity in standards. (2) Differences in tactics. (3) Variations in capability as each Force will be trained to deal with their domestic situations (threats).</p> <p><u>Key lessons learnt:</u></p> <p>(1) While there may commonalities with regards to security concerns at a regional level it is a mistake to assume that everyone has the same interests. (2) Institutional weaknesses and incapacities are areas often over looked. Thinking that the consensus emerging at a regional level on new security challenges affecting CARICOM states is automatically matched by a corresponding increase in capacity would be an error. (3) In addition to political will, the existence of effective state institutions, with the capacity to do what is needed in ways that work. That is to say the aim has to be jointly decided on by listening, then planning, ultimately arriving at a consensus. Secondly, tasks have to be allocated to match resources available to individual states.</p>
<p>Q8. The provisions of the Regional Security System Treaty (1996) and more recently the CARICOM Treaty on Security Assistance (2006) set the strategic and legislative framework for security cooperation among the signatories/Member States. In the context of this strategic framework, what are the supporting operational provisions, elements or arrangements that need to be established or enhanced?</p>
<p>Domestic legislation and funding must be put in place in order to operationalise these treaties.</p>
<p>Q9. How can the military enhance its contribution to improving security of the region?</p>
<p>The military can enhance its contribution to the improvement of security in the region by way of, defence diplomacy, domestic border security, intelligence and resource sharing.</p>
<p>Q10. What areas would you suggest are most beneficial to strengthening cooperation among CARICOM's Military Forces? These may include but are not limited to (1) information and intelligence sharing; (2) staff/personnel exchange attachments; (3) training exchanges; (4) joint procurements.</p>
<p>(1) The establishment of a regional command structure with a rotating system of heads and staff positions. (2) Information and intelligence sharing. (3) Staff/personnel exchange programmes. (4) Joint training (courses, exercises, etc). (5) Joint procurement.</p>

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