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## NATO ENLARGEMENT AND RUSSIA: THE NEED FOR A DUAL-TRACK POLICY

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**JCSP 34**

**Master of Defence Studies**

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## Abstract

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has expanded a number of times since its original inception in 1949. As a policy, enlargement has proven very ad hoc, and arguably has demonstrated a lack of strategic vision. While the parameters for enlargement have proven to be varied, there has been one common thread connecting almost every enlargement debate, and that has been the negative reaction of first the USSR and then the Russian Federation. This paper will show that as NATO struggled with the challenge of reformulating itself and redefining its role or *raison d'être* in the post-Cold War period, it was fortunate to not be confronted by a credible Russian threat. Given this, the Alliance was largely able to disregard Russia in undertaking enlargement up to and including the last round announced in 2002. It will be argued, however, that to continue on such a path would expose the Alliance to long-term risks that are both unnecessary and unacceptable.

The contemporary global security environment is confusing and replete with challenges. To confront and defeat the emerging threats posed by extremism and rogue states is not something NATO can hope to do alone. The cooperation of other powerful and influential states will be necessary to achieve success. The Alliance needs to work harder to bind Russia to the West through common interests, and avoid policies with the potential to fracture NATO-Russia relations. This paper will recommend that NATO adopt a dual-track engagement policy. As the Alliance considers membership applicants such as Ukraine and Georgia, it needs to do so with caution. On the one hand, in keeping with the Alliance's open door policy, it remains important to encourage aspirants to believe that membership is a realistic goal. At the same time, the Alliance needs to seriously explore and develop a true, enduring strategic partnership with Russia. By adopting such an approach, NATO will demonstrate the strategic vision necessary to position the Alliance to meet the challenges and demands of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

*In the desert of life the wise person travels by caravan, while the fool prefers to travel alone.*

*Arab Proverb*

## INTRODUCTION

Expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or as it is now termed ‘enlargement’, has been approached in a very ad hoc fashion since the Alliance was created in 1949. Over the past 19 years, following the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Bloc, the Alliance has struggled with not only redefining itself at a functional level, but equally so at a structural and organizational one. As the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe coped with the challenges of sweeping political and economic change they too sought out new security relationships with their former adversaries in NATO. Membership in the Alliance quickly became seen as the best and most rapid segue into the wider European collective.<sup>1</sup> Given the far more stringent conditions placed on European Union (EU) accession, NATO was obviously the next best thing. In light of significant residual fears over the future intentions of their former master, Russia, many looked to NATO as the guarantor of stability, without which economic and political progress would be in jeopardy.

Believing that enlargement should be mutually beneficial, the Alliance attempted to identify benchmark standards which could be used to guide accession decision-making.<sup>2</sup> Interestingly, if NATO had applied these same benchmarks to many of the Cold War entrants, they would have found great difficulty making the grade. As it were, NATO only loosely followed their own guiding parameters in proceeding with

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<sup>1</sup> Zoltan D. Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 30.

<sup>2</sup> Anton A. Bebler, “A Research Note on Eligibility for NATO Membership,” in *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*, ed. Anton A. Bebler, 49-57 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 50-51.

enlargement; indeed some would argue that they didn't actually follow them at all. In the period from 1989 to 2008 the Alliance grew from 16 to 26 members, a phenomenal expansion by any standard organizational theory.

Parallel to this, the Alliance undertook significant functional and structural change. With the end of the Cold War NATO found itself without a clear *raison d'être*. Operationally, a changing world security environment launched NATO down new, previously unimaginable paths. The challenges created by the break-up of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and the terrible events of September 11, 2001 which led to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, have given NATO cause to not only look, but act beyond the geographical confines of the Alliance. The gradual and growing realization that North Atlantic and arguably Western security required a broader 'out of area' approach to be adopted by the Alliance, has propelled NATO well beyond the foundation of its original conception.<sup>3</sup> Structurally, the Alliance adapted its command and control functions, eliminating significant overlap which in turn improved flexibility and responsiveness.<sup>4</sup> The capstone of NATO's new look was the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept which provided the Alliance with a framework capability to conduct combined, joint operations where-ever the North Atlantic Council (NAC) saw fit.<sup>5</sup> Recognizing the challenges of the new environment, the CJTF was designed to facilitate the integration of non-NATO forces into NATO

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<sup>3</sup> Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2000), 18-22.

<sup>4</sup> John R. Deni, *Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), 38-44.

<sup>5</sup> Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, "The New NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: Managing European Security in the Twenty-first Century," in *Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security*, ed. Charles Krupnick, 17-45 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 18.

missions. With a new functional strategy and the organizational changes to support it, the Alliance was stepping out and demonstrating a willingness to assume a new security role that surpassed simple collective defence.

This paper will examine the shifting dynamics within the Alliance, with an emphasis on the enlargement process. It will argue that while past conditions have allowed enlargement to proceed relatively unfettered, the current security environment is one under which NATO must demonstrate a more clear strategic vision. In effect, it will be recommended that the Alliance adopt a dual track approach. Under such an approach, NATO would, on one hand, continue to pursue further growth with caution, while on the other it would exert a serious effort to engage Russia with a view to leveraging common concerns, and ultimately binding Russian interests to the West and NATO.

Chapter One will provide a historical foundation, examining not only the enlargement experiences of the Cold War era, but just as importantly, looking back to the very creation of NATO and the drivers behind this process. This will serve to underline that the Alliance, from its very outset, has displayed flexibility and adaptability; critical attributes to any organization seeking long-term success. What will be highlighted in looking back at the three rounds of Cold War enlargement, are those similarities with the recent and ongoing enlargement processes. Chapter Two will open with a summary of some of the key structural and functional changes that NATO implemented to maintain its relevance in the post-Cold War era. With this in hand, it will then be possible to provide a detailed review of the enlargement debate, covering first the arguments put forward by those in favour of rapid enlargement followed naturally by those who were either against enlargement or who recommended the Alliance adopt a deliberate and cautious approach to considering new members. While it might be suggested that this



latter group is actually two distinct groups, the fact is that their arguments were almost exactly the same.

Chapter Three will build on these initial enlargement debates and examine how the process evolved and to what effect between 1989 and 2004. As the very spirited debate on enlargement developed, NATO tried desperately to control and dictate the pace of events. In this regard, notwithstanding their own efforts to define clear parameters for accession, the Alliance found itself caught out by the internal lack of consensus on how to proceed, and ultimately, was forced to follow the cue of its senior member, the United States (US). And so, despite alarmist predictions of dire results and negative effects, NATO pushed through two successive rounds of enlargement. What will be clearly demonstrated is that those arguing for caution were quickly proven wrong and on the whole, neither of the two rounds created internal or external problems and thus, gave little if any cause for regret.

As NATO proceeded down the enlargement path, the Alliance was constantly developing its strategic security assessments. Insofar as this strategic overview of the challenges that NATO anticipates in the coming years is also critical to the issue of continued enlargement, Chapter Four will delve into a general analysis of those elements of the current and future security environment that are of importance to NATO. The focus here will lean towards the challenges presented by those regions of the globe where the potential for internal and external strife is dramatically elevated; where the threat of extremism and terrorism, coupled with the disruptive and destabilizing influence of rogue regimes, is greatest. Of particular consequence to Alliance relations with Russia has been the decisions by both the US and NATO to continue in their efforts to develop and deploy

a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system. This will be examined in detail as a friction point that could well be turned into a fusion point in the US/NATO-Russia relationship.

This security overview will dovetail into Chapter Five, which will examine the future of NATO enlargement and make key recommendations on how the Alliance ought to proceed. A short discussion of the prospects for current membership candidates will be followed by a more detailed examination of the circumstances of Georgia and Ukraine, the states most likely to be considered for membership after the current round. The tumultuous relations that both of these nations have had with their Russian neighbour has created a situation where it becomes difficult, if not counter-intuitive, to discuss membership in NATO without a serious consideration of the collateral impact this would have on NATO-Russia relations. It will be argued that this is where the speed of NATO enlargement now needs to be curtailed. For the Alliance to enlarge in the absence of serious engagement with Russia, would be a significant error and would place NATO at great risk of geographic and strategic overreach. Instead, it is imperative that the Alliance adopt a transparent, dual-track approach; one that still encourages candidates for future membership, but at the same time, and more critically, strives to realize a true collaborative strategic partnership with Russia.

## CHAPTER 1 - NATO, THE COLD WAR AND ENLARGEMENT

### The Creation of NATO

In April of 1949 twelve countries came together in Washington, DC, and signed what was then known as the Washington Treaty, and more popularly identified as NATO. The Treaty Charter identified a number of collective provisions and commitments to be met on the part of its members. Included amongst these and found in Article 2 were clear aspirations to achieve increased political and economic cooperation.<sup>6</sup> The initial importance placed upon this element should not be underestimated. The Treaty signatories had only just emerged from the horrors of the Second World War and indeed many were experiencing great difficulties in facing the challenges of the post-war environment. The war had brought about the physical and financial ruin of many of its key participants; and this in turn had resulted in fundamental shifts in both the European and global balance of power. Old Europe was in decline and the new powers of the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were in the ascendant. Undeniably though, the core of the Treaty was contained in the collective defence mandate of Article 5, which read:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it

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<sup>6</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington D.C., 4 Apr 1949, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 Feb 2008, Article 2. This Article was largely the result of a Canadian initiative led by Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson. In the immediate years following the signing of the Treaty, Pearson continued to press for greater emphasis on the 'community' aspect of the Alliance. See Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in the 'New Europe': The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), 51.

deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.<sup>7</sup>

Interestingly, many of the original signatories of the Washington Treaty were not immediately concerned about the Soviet threat. Indeed it was not until the Communist-sponsored invasion of Korea in 1950 that Western Europe truly recognized the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup> In the negotiations leading up to the formation of NATO, many of the Europeans, and arguably even the Americans, were more concerned about the potential for a resurgence of the ‘German Problem.’<sup>9</sup> Having faced down the continental hegemonic aspirations of Germany for a second time in a thirty year span, residual fears were hard to quell. With France leading the charge, the belief was that a collective defence organization which bonded the Americans to a unified Western Europe was the best method to keep Germany in check, or as Lord Ismay put it, “keep the Americans in, the Germans down and the Russians out.”<sup>10</sup> The corollary of course was the clear benefit of formally linking the US to the European continent. It did not take long, however, for the focus of the Alliance to shift further east as the USSR began to show its true colours. The importance of noting this is simply to highlight that from its very outset, NATO has served differing purposes and has demonstrated significant flexibility.

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<sup>7</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The North Atlantic Treaty...*, Article 5.

<sup>8</sup> It can be argued that the Czech coup of Feb 1948 actually started the ball rolling in this regard, as it effectively “lost” Czechoslovakia to the East and demonstrated to what end the USSR was prepared to go to create and preserve its sphere of influence in Central Europe

<sup>9</sup> William E. Odom, “Russia’s Several Seats at the Table,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* Volume 74, Number 4 (Oct. 1998), 810-811.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 811.

One of the other interesting themes that emerged during the initial creation of the Alliance was a concern, expressed on the part of France, as to encroachment towards the USSR. Specifically, this was evident as the negotiators struggled with the issue of initial membership and whether Italy should or should not be offered a place at the table. French authorities thought that Italian membership could be seen as provocative by the Soviets.<sup>11</sup> This early initial concern over growth, geographic encroachment and ultimately, how it would be perceived by Soviet Russia has carried through to the post-Cold War enlargement vis-à-vis the position of the Russian Federation.

### **Cold War Enlargement**

As one examines the current issues surrounding enlargement, it is worthwhile to note that this process is not wholly new. In the period between 1949 and 1989, NATO went through four rounds of growth. Many of the debates, methods and approaches adopted towards enlargement during the Cold War demonstrate how little has really changed.

The first round of expansion saw the accession of Greece and Turkey into the Alliance in 1952. This was an early example of the Alliance adjusting its original conception of security, which to that point had been focused on the Western European core. This geographic shift demonstrated recognition that European security required a more expansive outlook. In light of the American articulation of the Truman Doctrine, which declared as a point of policy that the United States would confront the rise of communism and its efforts to expand its global influence and interest, the integration of

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<sup>11</sup> Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance...*, 19-22.

both nations into the NATO fold was quite natural.<sup>12</sup> In 1948, as Greece was in the midst of a civil war, and receiving significant American military and financial assistance to defeat the communists, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff had declared both it and Turkey to be strategic interests of the United States.<sup>13</sup> This in itself framed the security argument for their inclusion in NATO. That neither was comparable to any accepted standard of democracy or economic development of the extant members of the Alliance was cause for some concern.<sup>14</sup> This resulted in prolonged discussion over the possibility of associate membership as an interim measure. But this was not to be and while both countries campaigned vociferously for membership, it was the Turks who presented full membership as an ‘acid test’ of US interest and resolve to counter the Soviet threat.<sup>15</sup> That Turkey had made the significant contribution of an infantry brigade (4,500 troops) to the fighting in Korea was presented as an example not only of their commitment to the cause, but more importantly, as a down payment on NATO accession.<sup>16</sup> This effectively sealed the deal. The approach taken by Turkey in the early 1950s would provide a model for many of the Eastern European nations in the post-Cold War era.

The second round witnessed the rehabilitation and acceptance of the Federal Republic of Germany into the community of Western democracies, with accession to NATO occurring in 1955. With the American realization that they would no longer be able to speak of either significant downsizing of force levels in Europe, and most

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<sup>12</sup> Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance...*, 66-67.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*., 69.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*., 68-69.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*., 68.

certainly could not fathom a full departure from the continent, the potential strength and importance of Germany as an ally increased substantially. American pressure on the Europeans to accept this integration of Germany into the collective security framework was compelling and relentless. For the Americans, this was a clear and simple expedient, necessary to increase the strength and capacity of NATO's military force as well as to more fairly distribute the burden sharing of European security.<sup>17</sup> The French, who clearly still harboured great enmity towards their old foe, were forced to yield in recognition of the greater Soviet threat, and just as importantly, their own weakened state.<sup>18</sup> Many of the other members, who recognized German admittance as inevitable, viewed it as the most sensible way to bind the Federal Republic to the Alliance. This, in effect, would serve to subordinate Germany to the Alliance, thereby mitigating any perceived threat of a re-nationalized German foreign policy.<sup>19</sup> This same concern over nationalized security policies would be applied to the Central and East European states during the debates over post-Cold War enlargement.

The third round of Cold War enlargement saw the entry of post-Franco Spain in 1982. Spanish perceptions of threat were largely regional and not nearly as heavily influenced by the confrontation between the Warsaw Pact as her NATO friends. Spanish interests were more clearly focused on her North African possessions and over the painful matter of Gibraltar. That said, the Spanish were also cognizant of, and

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<sup>17</sup> Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 36-39.

<sup>18</sup> The French were desperately trying to retain their colonial possessions and had committed significant forces to first Indochina and then Algeria. Their ability to meet any expanded NATO demands was questionable, at best.

<sup>19</sup> Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged*...36-39.

implicated in, the larger European security question. While under the Franco dictatorship Spain was deemed too politically unpalatable for either NATO or European Economic Community (EEC) membership. Accepting this, but recognizing the strategic importance of the country, the US developed bilateral security relations, in the form of the Madrid Pacts. These agreements provided US forces, under NATO command, with basing rights in Spain. Importantly, while they did not form any sort of unconditional mutual defence arrangement, they did serve to bond Spain to NATO indirectly. Indeed, by the time of Spain's accession in 1982, her air and naval forces were virtually interoperable with NATO as a result of years of combined planning, training and operations.<sup>20</sup> Of import, Spain's accession did not receive full domestic unanimity. Shortly after joining, the Spanish people elected a socialist government that had questioned membership as part of its election platform. This resulted in the decision to conduct a referendum in 1986 on the question of continued NATO membership. In the intervening four years, the socialists themselves, once in power had slowly transformed their own policy and actually came to favour NATO. Critically, one of the ulterior motives behind their newfound desire to remain within NATO was the perception that NATO membership was a key segue to the more prized membership in the EEC.<sup>21</sup> This was frequently raised during the run-up to the referendum, notwithstanding European efforts to de-link the two issues. In the end, the results were in favour of NATO, but not overwhelmingly so.<sup>22</sup> What is important here was the perceived linkage between NATO and EEC membership;

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<sup>20</sup> Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance...*, 135-136.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*., 150.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*., 152-153. The question posed in the referendum was: 'Do you consider it advisable for Spain to remain in the Atlantic Alliance according to the terms set forth by the Government of the nation?' The results were: Yes - 52%, No - 40%, and Blank votes - 7%.



a thread which would continue to run clear through future enlargement debates across Eastern Europe.

The last piece of expansion, which punctuated the end of the Cold War, was realized with the unification of West and East Germany (GDR) and the integration of a now much larger Germany into the Alliance framework. That this was negotiated with Premier Mikhail Gorbachev spoke to the uncertainty of the rapidly changing security environment as well as the Alliance's yet undiluted respect for Soviet military power. In order to achieve Soviet agreement, both US President George Bush (Sr) and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl are supposed to have guaranteed Gorbachev that no NATO troops or nuclear weapons would be based in the former GDR and that NATO would not expand further east.<sup>23</sup>

In the years following German reunification the situation on the European landmass would gradually achieve clarity. The USSR and finally the truncated Russian Federation proved limited in its capacity to hold sway over its former satellite states. Of greatest consequence was the unmasking of the condition of the once formidable Russian military machine as it quite literally imploded in the face of critical materiel rust-out and stumbled terribly in its confrontation with rebel forces in Chechnya. In the face of these facts, the Alliance was confronted with the daunting question of further enlargement and notwithstanding any past guarantees, formal or informal, NATO and the larger foreign policy-making community began to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of continued growth.

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<sup>23</sup> Jonathan Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* Volume 73, Number 4 (Oct. 1997), 698-699.

## CHAPTER 2 - THE POST-COLD WAR SECURITY DILEMMA AND THE ENLARGEMENT DEBATE

### Security & Institutional Challenges

Before embarking on an examination of the arguments swirling around the enlargement issue, the context of the broader security and institutional challenges being faced by NATO bear study. As NATO and the West undertook this review, the Alliance was simultaneously undergoing a structural transformation of significant consequence. As highlighted in the introduction, the focus of NATO since 1949 had been one of collective defence. With the demise of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact many opined that NATO would fall by the wayside.<sup>24</sup> Many of its members were quite keen to realize a peace dividend, to slash defence spending and reallocate funds to other more critical governmental programs.<sup>25</sup> Surprisingly though, within the Alliance there was little talk of ‘decommissioning’ NATO. As with many large, successful and time-proven organizations, NATO had created its own institutional value and purpose; this alone served to justify self-perpetuation.<sup>26</sup> By developing an intricately interwoven bureaucracy, the Alliance literally made itself indispensable to its member nations. The end of the Cold War simply forced NATO to search for new challenges to direct its energies and resources towards.

As the debate over enlargement played out, NATO began to take its tenuous first steps towards revitalization. The issuance of a New Strategic Concept (NSC) in 1991 at

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<sup>24</sup> Charles L. Glaser, “Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe,” *International Security* Volume 18, Number 1 (Summer 1993), 5.

<sup>25</sup> Julian Lindley-French, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: The Enduring Alliance* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 59-60.

<sup>26</sup> Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War.” *International Organization* Volume 54, Number 4 (Autumn 2000), 711-712.

the Rome Summit served to plot a new course for the Alliance to follow.<sup>27</sup> It recognized for the first time that security for NATO was no longer limited to those issues and events directly occurring within the geographic confines of the member states. The NSC articulated a new role for the Alliance; that of crisis management. This new directive indicated that NATO was willing and prepared to take on new roles and tasks that could well see the Alliance operating “out of area.”<sup>28</sup>

NATO leadership recognized that structural and functional change needed to occur in advance of enlargement. Following a series of reviews, and much prodding by the Americans, the Alliance began to reform its command and control architecture. This resulted in a gradual downsizing in the number of functional headquarters, and by 2003 what was once a top heavy, bloated structure with sixty-five different command headquarters was streamlined down to a core of eleven.<sup>29</sup> The most significant development, and one that was clearly linked to the NSC, was the creation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept in 1994. CJTF not only provided NATO with an appropriate construct for conducting out of area operations, but it did so in such a fashion to facilitate non-Alliance participation. The CJTF framework was developed to build a force that could be task-tailored to meet the demands of literally any mission set that NATO opted to deploy it for.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Washington, D.C., 24 Apr 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 Feb 2008.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War.” ..., 719.

<sup>30</sup> Paul Cornish, “European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* Volume 72, Number 4, The Americas: European Security (Oct. 1996), 761-762.

## **The Enlargement Debate**

The enlargement debate of the 1990s was notable for the range and depth of opinion presented. The fact that the debate surrounding the second tranche in 2004 was largely muted and anti-climactic served to highlight how similar the issues were and how little the regional security situation had changed between the two rounds. The only exception to this was in the focused attention placed on the circumstances surrounding the Baltic States.<sup>31</sup>

In general there were those who believed it was not only right, but necessary, to expand the Alliance rapidly, taking advantage of the unique circumstances presented by the demise of the USSR. Some believed that speed of process was critical to encouraging and sustaining the new democracies of Eastern Europe. Others viewed it as a way to place an emphatic stamp on the West's victory over the Soviets. Whatever their reasons, they were united in the belief that NATO needed to be proactive. Opposing them were those arguing caution, recommending that NATO allow the dust to settle before considering the admission of new members, particularly members who only just recently had been avowed enemies. This group was concerned that any enlargement would risk overextending the Alliance, unnecessarily increasing the threat to its current member states. In large part, this latter group focused much of their energy on the question of NATO's encroachment of Russia. Recognizing that the Cold War had been won, many opponents of enlargement were wary of creating a Versailles peace, where the vanquished was humiliated to the point that all their national energies were eventually

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<sup>31</sup> Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies...*, 9.

devoted to righting the wrongs of history.<sup>32</sup> While some in this group were diametrically opposed to enlargement, the majority simply urged caution, recommending that the Alliance move forward, but in a very deliberate and structured program of enlargement. As time would tell, and for a variety of reasons we shall examine below, the course NATO followed was an incoherent blending of both rapid and tempered enlargement. What was clear however, was with the announcement of the ‘open door’ policy in 1997 in Madrid,<sup>33</sup> the group opposing enlargement had been swept aside and largely ignored.

### **The Case for Enlargement**

#### Enhance and Extend Democracy

Invariably, the most common theme behind the clarion call for NATO enlargement was the critical role the Alliance could play in reinforcing and extending democratic values and institutions across the former communist states. Unfortunately, this was also one of the harder claims to actually measure or quantify. From the perspective of then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, herself of Central European émigré stock, the West, having emerged victorious from the Cold War now needed to embrace and where necessary shore up the newly freed nations of the East. As she noted:

The purpose of NATO enlargement is to do for Europe’s East what NATO did 50 years ago for Europe’s West; to integrate new democracies, defeat old hatreds, provide confidence in economic recovery and to deter conflict.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Andrew Kydd, “Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement,” *International Organization* Volume 55, Number 4, The Rational Design of International Institutions. (Autumn 2001): 808.

<sup>33</sup> Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies...*, 32.

<sup>34</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, “US Senate Foreign Relations Committee – Nomination of Secretary of State-Designate Madeleine Albright,” Washington, D.C., 8 Jan 1997, <http://www.fas.org/man/nato/congress/1997/s970108t.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 Mar 2008.

From the point of view of the potential applicants, NATO membership would provide the security guarantee that would afford them the necessary comfort to proceed with much needed political and economic reforms. Given their recent circumstances and accepting the lingering uncertainty that remained regarding Russia's regional intentions, it was anything but surprising that security concerns were paramount to the new democracies of Europe. As Edward Kolodziej framed it, the new democracies were seeking to use NATO membership to buttress immature values and interests.<sup>35</sup> He identifies order, welfare and legitimacy as the three core concerns common to all the applicants. The sense being that the three were inextricably linked, but clearly without order (security) there was no hope for the development of welfare and legitimacy.<sup>36</sup>

From this basis then the linkage between NATO enlargement and the fostering of democracy and its institutions becomes a more indirect one than direct. Notwithstanding some of the more obvious collateral effects of working with and within the Alliance, such as transparency, consensus-building, civil-military relationships and other highly transferable 'democratic-type' skill-sets and functions, in the end, it was all about creating the security environment to allow the democratic experiment to proceed unhindered by external forces.

### Regional Binding and Pre-emption of Nationalized Security Policies

In developing the case for expansion, the Germans were clearly the most aggressive of the European members and where possible attempted to influence the

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<sup>35</sup> Edward A. Kolodziej, "Introduction: NATO and the *Longue Durée*," in *Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security*, edited by Charles Krupnick, 1-16 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 8-10.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 8-10.

debate in favour of rapid action. This can largely be attributed to a different facet of the ‘German Problem;’ specifically their geographic position on the continent has through the centuries drawn them into entanglements that have not always been of their own choosing. In this regard, German leadership viewed instability and uncertainty on their Eastern borders as highly undesirable.<sup>37</sup> Chancellor Kohl and his successors were of the opinion that NATO expansion was necessary to increase regional binding thereby achieving levels of political, economic and security integration that would foster stability. In the absence of such integration, the prevalent fear was one of nationalized security policies which could only serve to introduce tension and perhaps chaos in a region of great concern to Germany.<sup>38</sup> It must be recalled that in the early stages of the debate both Ukraine and Belarus possessed WMD capabilities and had not yet articulated their intent to demobilize or revert control of these assets back to Russia. Neither Germany, nor the US for that matter, wished to see the development of new regional alliances with specific national or ethnically driven agendas.<sup>39</sup>

### Burden Sharing

The articulation of the NSC was the first step in formally shifting the Alliance from one predicated on collective defence to one more focused on the broader concept of collective security. In suggesting that NATO’s role needed to be expanded to undertake a wider range of missions (to include peacekeeping, peace support and more generally,

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<sup>37</sup> Ulrich, “The New NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: Managing European Security in the Twenty-first Century,”...21-22.

<sup>38</sup> Daniel J. Whiteneck, “Germany: Consensus Politics and Changing Security Paradigms,” in *Enlarging NATO: The National Debates*, eds. Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald, 35-53 (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001). 35-39.

<sup>39</sup> Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War.”..., 723.

crisis management activities) the Alliance started to move away from the direct interests of its original members to interests that were more indirect and by virtue of this, perhaps harder to achieve consensus on.<sup>40</sup> In light of this newfound role, it was argued that enlargement would serve to facilitate burden-sharing. The premise was that the new nations of NATO would be more willing and prepared to demonstrate their worth to the Alliance through the commitment of forces to these new endeavours.<sup>41</sup> Much as they had done under Partnership for Peace (PfP)<sup>42</sup> as a way to curry favour on the road to membership, it was suggested that this desire to ‘prove worth’ would continue once membership had been achieved. Of course the flaw with this was the belief that the interests of the new members were so dramatically different from the old members. It failed to account for the possibility that once in; new members would quickly behave and act like the older members.

#### US Domestic Politics

One of the last justifications for enlargement was the potential impact it would have on American domestic politics. At the outset of his administration, President Bill Clinton had demonstrated little interest in the future of NATO. This began to slowly shift in the face of European prevarication over the ongoing humanitarian and security crisis in the Balkans.<sup>43</sup> When the US decided to assume the lead and propelled NATO into the

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<sup>40</sup> Karl Kaiser, “Reforming NATO,” *Foreign Policy* Number 103 (Summer 1996), 140.

<sup>41</sup> Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies...*, 14.

<sup>42</sup> PfP was introduced in 1994 to enhance cooperation, foster political, military and economic evolution and to encourage transparency in defence-related matters between NATO members and partner nations. See Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged...*, 152-156.

<sup>43</sup> Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision”...,704.



region, first through a truncated air campaign, followed thereafter by a significant ground force known as Implementation Force (IFOR), the Americans became increasingly engaged in the debate over enlargement. While the administration had a relatively balanced mix of proponents in favour of rapid enlargement and those who counselled a more patient and deliberate approach, it has been suggested that the 1997 decision to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic was largely predicated on the positive effect this would have on the upcoming elections in the US.<sup>44</sup> With a significant number of electoral votes coming from key states with very large populations of Central and eastern European heritage, enlargement was presented as a win-win for the President.

### **The Case against Enlargement**

#### The Russia Factor

Since 1949, Russia, in its various forms, has been at the heart of every debate over NATO enlargement. Even when the USSR was the clear and open adversary, there were those who urged caution. The fear was that NATO's growth could be perceived as aggressive by a paranoid Soviet state, prompting retaliatory acts that could quickly spiral out of control. The end of the Cold War and the evident decline in Russian military power did little to shift Russia from being the focal point around which enlargement discussions centred. George Kennan, the famed American statesman credited with the creation of the doctrine of containment in the early Cold War, asserted that enlargement was "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era."<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Jonathan Halsam, "Russia's Seat at the Table: A Place Denied or a Place Delayed?" *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* Volume 74, Number 1 (Jan. 1998), 124-125.

<sup>45</sup> George F. Kennan, "A Fateful Error," *New York Times*, 5 Feb 1997, p. A-23, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=115944058&SrchMode=1&sid=3&Fmt=12&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=HNP&TS=1206501569&clientId=1711>; Internet; accessed 4 Mar 2008.

He believed that expansion

...may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.<sup>46</sup>

While Kennan was not naïvely optimistic that Russia could transform itself overnight, he did believe that the democratic experiment in Moscow needed breathing space, and that NATO enlargement would unnecessarily threaten the forces of change.<sup>47</sup> His precept was in line with those recommending a more moderate approach based on an altruistically hopeful view of Russia. This group were mainly concerned about the potential effects of enlargement on the domestic political environment in Russia. The thrust of their argument was not necessarily that enlargement was a bad thing, but rather that NATO needed to proceed with great caution and deliberation, with due regard for Russian concerns, be they real or perceived. They based this recommendation on a number of points.

First, they cautioned that Russia should not be treated or humiliated like a vanquished foe. Some cited Weimar Germany as an example to be avoided.<sup>48</sup> On this basis, what might be seen by the West as a short-term gain while dealing from a position of strength, could be turned about in the future to the long-term detriment of the West. By taking advantage of present Russian weakness, the West could fuel long-term resentment. While the ability of Russia to actually return to its former status may have

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<sup>46</sup> George F. Kennan, "A Fateful Error"...

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> Robert E. Hunter, "Maximizing NATO: A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach," *Foreign Affairs* Volume 78, Number 3 (May/Jun. 1999), 192.

been questionable at best, the heart of the issue was really more along the lines of ‘why create or build resentment which could only serve to unleash negative, deconstructionist powers within Russia?’ Rather, Russia should be handled with the care of France in 1815 or Germany in 1945; integrated and embraced by the community of victors and rehabilitated in an open, transparent fashion. By facilitating recovery in this manner, Russian interests would be gradually merged with and bonded to Western interests, forging a common community rather than a confrontational one.

Secondly, the cautionary element argued that time was not pressing and that NATO needed to drive the agenda for enlargement. This was in the face of mounting pressure from those new democracies clambering at the door for entry. While it was undeniable that their unique circumstances and their recent past certainly gave them cause to be concerned as to the security of their newfound liberty, the reality was that no credible threat to that security existed.<sup>49</sup> NATO had the luxury of time to better inform itself before taking the momentous steps towards enlargement. In effect, the Alliance had the ability to shape the environment, and particularly to focus greater effort on mitigating Russian concerns, in advance of Eastern enlargement.

Finally, there was the clear recognition of the nature of the Russian understanding of power politics and how this played to the domestic audience in Russia. In the immediate post-Cold War period Russia struggled with economic crises and great internal instability under first Gorbachev and then Boris Yeltsin. There are perhaps few if any examples in history of an empire undertaking such a dramatic and rapid fall as that experienced by Russia. Internally, there were two broad groupings aligning themselves for the ensuing struggle for power. First, there were the moderates with Western

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<sup>49</sup> Odom, “Russia’s Several Seats at the Table”...,814.

leanings. This group recognized the need for dramatic political and economic change in Russia. Much as Peter the Great had tried centuries before, they hoped to tie Russia to the West and they believed that her future success was inextricably linked to Europe. The formidable challenge that this group faced was twofold; time and results. In order to convince the people of Russia that such a dramatic shift in approach was necessary and indeed viable, they needed to demonstrate success in a very short order. Arguably, the odds were set against them from the outset. The difficulties of transforming a society that had been both physically and intellectually closed since the early 1920s, that operated along highly inefficient bureaucratic lines and that had effectively been running a war economy for more than a half-century were almost insurmountable. This dilemma played directly to their opponents in the domestic power struggle; the nationalists who saw strength and purpose in maintaining an independent Russia, free from Western influence and interference.

This group ranged from those who simply harkened back to the internal stability and external prestige once present in Russia through to the ultra-nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky that spoke in more ominous tones of re-establishing control over the ‘near-abroad’ and regaining Russia’s place as a world power.<sup>50</sup> By preying on Russia’s inherent xenophobia and citing each and every instance where the West involved itself in what was long believed to be Russia’s sphere of influence as evidence of malicious intent, these groups increasingly garnered more support.

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<sup>50</sup> Hall Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the Future of NATO* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 80.

It was this domestic dynamic that gave opponents of rapid enlargement cause for concern and provided their rationale for recommending that NATO proceed slowly and surely down the enlargement path.

### Cost and Increased Burden

In the lead up to the first round of enlargement it was abundantly clear that the issue of how costly the process would be to the Alliance and its new members received less scrutiny than it probably should have. The Americans, who undoubtedly would bear the brunt of the fiscal burden, were probably the most concerned, particularly given the requirement for Congressional approval of enlargement, which would inevitably be tied to questions over cost.<sup>51</sup> In attempting to assess the costs of enlargement, there were a number of inter-related difficulties. First and foremost, the speed and scope of force rationalization would be largely proportional to the assessment of the threat faced by the Alliance. In this there was considerable variance. Some argued that NATO faced no immediate, credible threat and that this situation was unlikely to change in the mid-term (10-15 years). Others viewed this as naïve and while acknowledging that while Russia had certainly been weakened, her potential to act militarily remained considerable and that this was only likely to grow over time; all the more so if Russia perceived NATO efforts at growth as an attempt to achieve strategic encirclement.

A second challenge was the lack of comparable historical data on the costs of enlargement. It was argued that the costs of integrating Spain in 1982 were negligible,

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<sup>51</sup> Gale A. Mattox, "The United States: Stability Through Engagement and Enlargement," in *Enlarging NATO: The National Debates*, eds. Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald, 15-33. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 23-25.

but the value in applying that datum was questionable at best.<sup>52</sup> Spain's military forces had achieved virtual interoperability well before accession. Although Spain was also a relatively new democracy, she had been a functioning capitalist economy for decades and already had the infrastructure and core capacities to fully join and contribute effectively to the European community of states.

This then led directly to the third challenge in assessing costs, and that was attempting to gauge who would fund what. Some argued that many of the costs would be borne by the new members. Others believed that if NATO was to push hard for rapid force and equipment standardization, there was little hope that the new members would or could fund it. Many, if not most of the Eastern European states would find themselves being pulled in multiple budgetary directions.<sup>53</sup> The challenge to meet increased military expenditures associated with NATO membership would be countered by equally compelling demands to fund social programs and maintain the pace of change being dictated by their new market economies. In advance of the first round there were four commonly cited estimates: the Congressional Budget Office study; a RAND Corporation study; a Pentagon Report to Congress; and a NATO assessment on the costs of enlargement.

The 1996 CBO study estimated the cost of enlargement as running upwards of 125 billion dollars over a 15 year period.<sup>54</sup> As the highest of all assessments by a significant margin, the CBO predicated their figures on a worst-case scenario with Russia representing a real and credible threat against which the Alliance would be required to

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<sup>52</sup> Amos Perlmutter and Ted Galen Carpenter, "NATO's Expensive Trip East," *Foreign Affairs* Volume 77, Number 1 (Jan./Feb. 1998), 5.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

undertake significant measures to secure the territories of new members. Parallel to the CBO work, the RAND Corporation released their study on enlargement, which provided a more optimistic outlook. RAND researchers based their analysis on a largely benign environment in which Russia did not present an immediate or mid-horizon threat to the Alliance and as such reduced overall costs to a sum between 30-50 billion dollars over a 10-15 year period.<sup>55</sup> RAND cited equipment standardization as the most significant cost, though they made the point that once admitted, these new members would form the largest coherent grouping in NATO with common equipment and doctrine, albeit all from the Soviet period. RAND determined that costs would be manageable over the extended timeline provided. The main difference between the RAND and CBO studies was the former's belief that enlargement would not require accompanying deployments of additional forces into the new areas.

The Pentagon Report to Congress of 1997 utilized many of the same parameters as the RAND study, including the low-threat assessment and no requirement for changes to force levels or re-positioning of NATO forces to the territories of new members. The Pentagon's assessment was however significantly lower at 10 billion dollars over 10 years.<sup>56</sup> Their optimism was founded in the belief that the bulk of the new costs would be borne by the new members. Finally, the last study was the assessment of enlargement costs done by NATO in 1997. Easily the most optimistic of all the studies, NATO determined that the real costs to the Alliance would run between 1 to 2 billion dollars over 10 years.<sup>57</sup> The assessment focused on those key areas that would require

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<sup>55</sup> Perlmutter and Carpenter, "NATO's Expensive Trip East" ..., 3.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

immediate upgrading to ensure interoperability. These included command and control, air defence and a number of infrastructure issues. NATO believed that most if not all of these costs could be covered under a formula which balanced NATO common funding against the national responsibilities of new members.

Suffice to say, given these wide-ranging uncertainties, the variances between the different cost analyses were considerable and that fact in itself could have been taken as sufficient cause for a more deliberate approach to the process. Of note, little rigour has been applied to accurately capturing the costs of enlargement after the event. What little evidence there is seems to point to the costs having been at the lower end of the spectrum, and certainly nowhere near the astronomic levels feared by the CBO. The absence of a direct threat to the Alliance allowed NATO to temper its integration of the military forces of the new members. The fact that several of these states have been slower than anticipated in meeting the demands of standardization has been quietly ignored. Overall, common costs have proven manageable, and Lord Robertson's concern over new members becoming "consumers of security vice contributors to security" does not appear to have been realized.<sup>58</sup>

### Overreach and Credibility

Linked closely with the cost issues, the concern over NATO's moral willingness and physical ability to actually secure an expanded Alliance was highlighted as a problem with enlargement. The fact that NATO lacked a coherent strategy and appeared to be lurching down the enlargement path, subject largely to the desires of the senior member,

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<sup>58</sup> Then Secretary-General of NATO, Robertson was addressing the concern that new members could be viewed as creating further burden-sharing problems. In this sense 'consuming' security implied bringing increased security burdens to NATO without the requisite offsetting capabilities. See Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies...*, 28.



did not necessarily instil confidence that all members would be prepared to meet their Article 5 commitments in the case of a real threat to the territorial integrity of a new member. The faith being placed in a benign security environment seemed tenuous to some. Others argued that PfP membership provided an implicit extension of the NATO security umbrella, and accepting this, the Alliance should not willingly shoulder the increased security obligations that new members would create.<sup>59</sup>

This potential for unbounded geographic expansion had been further complicated by the Alliance's concomitant acceptance that enlargement would not result in the repositioning or stationing of significant NATO forces within the new member states. Whilst the CJTF concept was viewed as a simple mitigation strategy to counter any perceived risk associated with this policy, many argued that the costs to reinforce the new members in times of crisis would be prohibitive; enough perhaps to weaken the credibility of the extended security commitment.<sup>60</sup>

### The Challenge of Consensus-Building

Organizational theory is relatively clear on the correlation between the size of a group and the ability to achieve consensus. Simply put, the larger the group, the harder it becomes to find the common ground necessary to make decisions.<sup>61</sup> Although the original Washington Treaty did not mandate that all decisions or actions be based on consensus, it did establish the collaborative and consultative foundation upon which the

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<sup>59</sup> Michael Mandelbaum, Susan Eisenhower, Jack Mendelsohn and Jonathan Dean, "The Case Against NATO Expansion," *Current History* Volume 97, Number 617 (Mar. 1998), 132-136.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 136.

<sup>61</sup> Kamp, Karl-Heinz, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," *Foreign Policy* Number 98 (Spring 1995), 122.

Alliance would build.<sup>62</sup> From the outset though, the members adopted consensus-building as the fashion in which NATO would operate. De facto, internal disputes were resolved through sometimes laborious negotiations, and only once all were agreed was policy formed or action taken. This was not always easy to achieve, but with 12 initial members that eventually grew to 16 during the Cold War, it was manageable. Many of those cautioning against enlargement were wary of the effect this would have on the consensual nature of NATO decision-making. Purely from a perspective of size, they suggested that the ability of the Alliance to act as a cohesive, unified body would be undermined, which in turn would directly damage the credibility of the institution.

They buttressed their argument further by suggesting that NATO's 1991 NSC compounded the challenge to achieving unanimity. NATO's gradual shift from a collective defence alliance towards a collective security alliance was introducing an important change in how security values were going to be assessed by member states.<sup>63</sup> In drawing on alliance theory, they asserted that NATO as a collective defence alliance served the direct security values of each individual member.<sup>64</sup> This was what Article 5 of the Treaty was all about. There could be no more clear direct national value than the defence of territorial integrity.

The NSC recognized that global security conditions were important to the maintenance of security for NATO members. In adopting this broad approach, and identifying future roles for the Alliance in crisis management, peacekeeping and

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<sup>62</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington D.C., 4 Apr 1949, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 Feb 2008, Article 4.

<sup>63</sup> Robert J. Art, "Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* Volume 113, Number 3 (Autumn 1998), 395.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 396.

humanitarian operations, NATO was moving towards a range of more indirect security values.<sup>65</sup> While the logic of this shift was not at question, those cautioning against enlargement believed that this shift from direct to indirect security values would further degrade the ability of a larger membership to achieve consensus.<sup>66</sup> In particular, they argued that the applicant states were largely focused on joining NATO to resolve direct security concerns. They were looking to the Cold War NATO to function as a collective defence organization, to secure their respective territorial integrity from residual Russian threats. As such, their willingness to meet the resource demands resulting from NATO's new indirect security commitments, could be found wanting.

#### An Ill-Defined End-State

The last concern with the enlargement process was the absence of a long-term strategic vision. In effect, with the 'open-door' approach, nobody understood where or when enlargement would stop. In the absence of a comprehensive, long-term vision the potential for NATO to expand beyond practical utility was real. If the Alliance became too large, the span between increasingly divergent interests and values could severely degrade consensus-building. Indeed, some argued that it could result in the eventual fragmentation of NATO and a return to smaller regional or interest-based power clusters.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe"..., 15-18.

<sup>66</sup> Art, "Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy"..., 398.

<sup>67</sup> Joseph Leggold, "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem," *International Security* Volume 23, Number 1 (Summer 1998), 90. While Leggold is speaking of the CJTF as a remedy for addressing the range of interests allies may wish to involve themselves in, his theory underpins the idea that interest and value-based fragmentation will become more prevalent in a larger NATO.

**Summary**

There should be no mistake that the enlargement debate was both highly fractious and emotional. It was viewed as the most significant issues facing the Alliance in the post-Cold War era, and one that would serve to define the course of NATO into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Interestingly, and no different from period 1949 to 1989, Russia and its relations with NATO and the West, touched in some way almost all of the arguments both for and against enlargement.

## **CHAPTER 3 - THE PATH TO MODERN, POST-COLD WAR ENLARGEMENT**

### **Lack of Consensus and the Transatlantic Difference in Approach**

Given the myriad of arguments both in favour and against enlargement, and accepting the possible difficulties in achieving total consensus amongst the extant members, one would expect that NATO would have opted for a more deliberate approach to the issue. Based on the evidence, it would appear that this was indeed the original course of action preferred by the Alliance. While working along multiple tracks to increase engagement with Russia and her former satellites, NATO was also seeking ways to slow the process in such a way that any decision would be based on clear parameters and subject to a timeline of the Alliance's choosing. The greatest challenges to the Alliance included: mounting external pressure being exerted by the potential applicants for membership; the overall lack of internal consensus on how to proceed; the absence of intellectual rigour being applied to the enlargement question; and most importantly, the lack of strategic vision within NATO as to the future role of the Alliance within Europe and beyond its geographic confines. In this context, it has been suggested that NATO's approach to enlargement was "policy without strategy."<sup>68</sup>

### **Structural and Functional Change**

To this end NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 as a forum to institutionalise the diplomatic and military contacts between NATO and the East. The NACC focused on political and security policy issues to include:

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<sup>68</sup> Mandelbaum, Eisenhower, Mendelsohn and Dean, "The Case Against NATO Expansion"..., 134.

defence planning, civil-military relations and defence industry and economics.<sup>69</sup> The same year witnessed the issuance of the NSC which, for the first time, articulated a new security role for the Alliance that would see it lead or participate in missions outside the confines of NATO's geographic boundaries.

This new framework and NSC were augmented by the PfP program announced at the 1994 Brussels Summit.<sup>70</sup> PfP was to further enhance cooperative efforts between NATO and non-NATO nations. Included amongst these were not only the former Warsaw Pact states, but also a number of the European neutrals like Austria, Finland and Sweden, who recognized the benefits of association with NATO short of membership. PfP was aimed at increasing force capability and readiness, to improve interoperability of the partners with NATO and in general, to foster cooperative military relations with NATO. This latter focus would encompass combined military planning, training and exercises all with a view to enabling partner forces to participate in NATO non-Article 5 missions. PfP was validated in 1996 when, as a result of the Dayton Peace Accord, NATO embarked on its first out-of-area operation. Many of the partner states made significant and effective military contributions to both IFOR and its successor, Stabilisation Force (SFOR).

The new democracies of the East however, while generally enthusiastic in their support for PfP viewed this as a transitional stage in their march towards full membership. The United Kingdom House of Commons Defence Committee termed PfP

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<sup>69</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Declaration on Peace and Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including decisions leading to the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC))* ("The Rome Declaration"), Rome, 8 Nov 1991, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b911108b.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 Feb 2008.

<sup>70</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization *Partnership for Peace: Framework Document*, Brussels, 10-11 Jan 1994, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 Feb 2008.

as a “pre-nuptial association,” implying it was indeed a signpost on the path to membership.<sup>71</sup> For some in NATO, including many Americans, PfP was being viewed more hopefully as an alternative to membership, and more cynically as the “Policy for Postponement;” a way to defer a final decision on enlargement.<sup>72</sup> As the new democracies began to accelerate their campaigns for NATO membership, the lack of consensus within the Alliance on how to proceed became more glaring.

### **NATO Study on Enlargement**

In 1995 NATO seemed to create a workable standard to be applied to the question of enlargement. With the release of its “Study on NATO Enlargement” the Alliance formally provided parameters for potential applicants to gauge their suitability for membership.<sup>73</sup> Effectively, this document articulated many of the items that would be contained in the post-round one Membership Action Plan policy. Although the study retained a very general approach, it did recommend certain criteria that NATO should apply in considering the suitability of applicants:

#### **Domestic Political Situation**

Potential applicants were expected to have demonstrated a “commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility.”<sup>74</sup> Given the fact that the argument in favour of enlargement that was

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<sup>71</sup> *Tenth Report, House of Commons Defence Committee, supra* n.16, at para. 26, in John Woodliffe “The Evolution of a New NATO for a New Europe,” *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* Volume 47, Number 1 (Jan. 1998), 178.

<sup>72</sup> Halsam, “Russia’s Seat at the Table: A Place Denied or a Place Delayed?” . . . , 124.

<sup>73</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Study on NATO Enlargement* (Brussels: NATO, Sep 1995).

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

deemed most compelling was the idea of extending the concepts of freedom and democracy, it was no surprise that the study group placed emphasis on applicants having shown a sincere willingness to undertake what for many was dramatic change.

### International Relations

The study drew on Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) standards for defining acceptable norms and principles of international behaviour and dispute resolution.<sup>75</sup> While focused on territorial disputes and seeking to ensure the peaceful resolution of these, it applied equally well for internal ethnic or jurisdictional claims. The expectation here was that applicants would either have resolved such disputed claims in advance of consideration for membership, or they would have undertaken serious commitments towards resolution through peaceful means. One of the other concerns that the study identified as a possible issue was the potential for new members to employ their veto to deny entry to future applicants.<sup>76</sup> This spoke of harmonizing regional relations to limit the likelihood of such an occurrence.

### Civil-Military Relations

A hallmark of democracy has been the exercise of civil control over the military. While some of the potential applicants had more experience with this than others, most did not have it in a democratic context. This meant not only working to develop and reinforce such basic controls, but more importantly, to educate, train and instil confidence in these new agents of civilian oversight. Be they politicians or bureaucrats, their role

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<sup>75</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Study on NATO Enlargement...*, 23-25.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.



was to assert and exert control over their militaries. This was assessed as a critical step in de-politicizing national armed forces.<sup>77</sup>

### Military Situation

Reform and doctrinal realignment were key criteria identified in the study. It was recognized that many of the potential applicants would be required to undertake significant organizational, functional and materiel changes to prepare them for membership. Issues ranged from the adoption of myriad NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) to force development, generation and employment programs.<sup>78</sup> Although the requirement for significant equipment recapitalization to bring new members in line with NATO standards and to ensure sufficient interoperability was noted, the daunting nature of this resulted in it not being identified as a pre-condition, but rather as a commitment on the part of the applicant to aspire and progress towards.

### Building Bridges

In May of 1997, NATO signed the Founding Act with Russia, formalizing a cooperative partnership that, through the body of the Permanent Joint Council, would give Russia a seat at the NATO table. Importantly, how the Founding Act was viewed by the two signatories gave cause for early friction. Whereas Russia believed that the PJC would allow them to influence and ideally veto future expansion by the Alliance, NATO was quick to counter that the Act in no way empowered Russia with a veto over any NATO action.<sup>79</sup> Indeed, the PJC was created in such a way that it allowed NATO

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<sup>77</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Study on NATO Enlargement...*, 25.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*., 25-26.

<sup>79</sup> Paul Kubicek, "Russian Foreign Policy and the West," *Political Science Quarterly* Volume 114, Number 4 (Winter 1999-2000), 555.

representatives to formulate a coherent unified policy approach before meeting with the Russian representative, and thus as a consultative body, the '16+1' formula was to prove unhelpful in advancing Russian interests.<sup>80</sup>

In recognition of its regional importance and unique circumstances NATO extended an offer of a special relationship to Ukraine shortly after implementing the Founding Act. In July 1997 a Distinctive Partnership was signed between the two parties and a NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) was created to foster bilateral dialogue and cooperation. At this juncture, Ukraine was endeavouring to follow a multi-directional foreign policy, walking a fine line between Russia and the West. The Distinctive Partnership was viewed as a measure to support and encourage political and economic progress in a fashion that managed future expectations.<sup>81</sup> From the outset, the Alliance was sensitive to the unique status of Ukraine. Much like Poland had been viewed in the immediate post-Cold War period, Ukraine was already being seen as a potential bridge to forging improved relations with Russia. Failing that, if Ukraine determined in the future to integrate with the West, Ukraine could play the role of NATO's Eastern bulwark against Russia.

In seeking to build upon the success of the NACC, it was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997. The EAPC remained a body for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues, but it was afforded a broader mandate and wider membership (49 countries) than its forerunner.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged...*, 156.

<sup>81</sup> Volodymyr Furkalo, "NATO Enlargement and Ukraine," in *NATO Looks East*, eds. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson, 169-176 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 173-175.

<sup>82</sup> Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War."..., 722.

## Round One Enlargement 1997-1999

The first round of post-Cold War enlargement was announced at the Madrid Summit in 1997. As has been already highlighted, while the growing momentum behind this decision was unstoppable, the Alliance had still not fully agreed upon its approach to the issue. In fact, there was considerable disunity on the matter, to the point that it threatened the release of the Summit communiqué. Potential entrants had been lobbying quite aggressively for inclusion, even though the original shortlist of four countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) had been common knowledge for some time. Romania in particular had pressed hard, arguing that they had progressed significantly over the past two years in meeting the ‘pre-conditions’ identified in the NATO enlargement study. France, a long-time friend and ally of Bucharest was very supportive of their claim.<sup>83</sup> The Baltic States were favoured for consideration by Norway and Denmark and were garnering the increasing support of Germany.<sup>84</sup> As the most contentious of any potential entrants, given their historic relations with Russia, a move by NATO here would have been truly adventurous on the part of the Alliance.

As it was to transpire, closed-door discussions were brought to an emphatic conclusion by the senior member. For a variety of reasons, not the least being the desire to garner domestic political benefit from a decision, while at the same time not going so far as to assume unnecessary risk, the US declared that NATO would grow by three, and

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<sup>83</sup> Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision”..., 707-710. The non-admittance of Romania was viewed by many as emblematic of flaws in the selection process. The fact that Romania publicly campaigned for admittance on the basis of meeting NATO’s criteria, thereby showing how empty they were, offended some Alliance leaders.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid* ., 706-707.

only three countries in the first round.<sup>85</sup> While some were disappointed, the final communiqué underscored the ‘open-door’ policy as a salve for the future.<sup>86</sup> What was also clear though, as a result of the decision and the process leading up to it, were three facts: first, that NATO truly lacked a unified approach to enlargement; second, any decision would be subject to the whim and wishes of the US; and third, that the standards for entry as put forward by NATO itself, were open to wide interpretation.

By the time of the Madrid decision, Russia was well aware that their arguments and warnings to NATO to refrain from expansion (or as they called it, encroachment), had fallen on deaf ears. The pattern that NATO would follow vis-à-vis engagement with Russia on expansion issues was also established during the lead-up to the offers. While trying to remain sensitive to Russian fears, NATO asserted that no nation had the right to hold up enlargement. The Germans, for a variety of reasons, were particularly concerned that NATO develop policies and procedures to improve relations and collaboration with Russia in parallel with the enlargement program.<sup>87</sup> The 1997 Founding Act and the PJC embodied this approach. The problem with these frameworks is that they were not really designed or structured to resolve NATO-Russia problems. Rather, as has been highlighted above, the 16+1 approach to the PJC served to affirm to Russian delegates that they were to remain on the outside looking in.

On March 16, 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, deposited their documents of accession in Washington and were formally welcomed into the Alliance as full members. With the enlargement issue having generated significant diplomatic,

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<sup>85</sup> Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision”..., 709-710.

<sup>86</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation*, Madrid, 8 Jul 1997, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 Feb 2008.

<sup>87</sup> Whiteneck, “Germany: Consensus Politics and Changing Security Paradigms,”..., 46-51.

military and academic debate in the preceding decade, once the decision was taken, the subsequent review and analysis of the outcome was notably lacking. In large part this can probably be attributed to the inability of Russia to impede or impair the process and as such, the fact that it occurred under relatively benign, supportive circumstances. For the naysayers, it would prove difficult following round one to point to any issue of import or consequence as evidence of enlargement policy gone awry. Certainly, the Czech Republic was not supportive of NATO's decision to attack Serbia during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, but the challenge was, like so many internal Alliance disputes, smoothed over diplomatically.<sup>88</sup> Hungary experienced difficulty in meeting its declared defence spending targets and has proven much slower than anticipated at progressing with force standardization and modernization efforts, but they continue to move forward, which is viewed in a positive light.<sup>89</sup> Poland has certainly proven that it seeks to contribute as much as gain from membership in NATO. That Poland has worked equally hard to foster strong relations with the US has arguably served to increase its standing within the Alliance. Overall, given the frequently alarmist concerns, round one could best be described as 'much ado about nothing.'

### **Round Two Enlargement 2002-2004**

Round two of enlargement had the potential to create a new stir, largely thanks to the involvement of the three Baltic States. Given the generally positive and at worst neutral impacts of the first round accessions, those pleading for caution had little they

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<sup>88</sup> Rebecca R. Moore, *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2007), 73.

<sup>89</sup> Stuart Croft, "Guaranteeing Europe's Security? Enlarging NATO Again," *International Affairs* Volume 78, Number 1 (2002), 106.

could point to for justification. The majority of their efforts at dissuasion focused on the Russian question and the potential for long-term negative effects on NATO-Russia relations should enlargement continue. For some, it was inexplicable how NATO could purport to care about developing stronger ties with Russia on the one hand, yet discount so rapidly Russia's own security concerns, be they real or perceived. In effect, the Alliance's phased approach to enlargement was seen as being akin to scratching at a scab that had only just started to heal.<sup>90</sup>

NATO-Russia relations had reached a nadir in 1999 during the Kosovo crisis. The dramatic intervention by NATO and the relative inability of Russia to shape or influence events had underscored Russia's weakness.<sup>91</sup> While a party to the eventual solution and having deployed forces to Kosovo to work with NATO in creating a safe and secure environment, Russia had clearly been marginalized by the Americans, who viewed their support for the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia as counter-productive for long-term regional stability. For Russia, partnership with their traditional ally Serbia, now considered the pariah of Europe, served no purpose other than to assuage the ethnically driven emotions of her own populace.<sup>92</sup>

The events of September 11, 2001, as devastating as they were for the US and the West, marked a potential turn for the better in US/NATO-Russia relations. As the Alliance invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time ever, the Russian Federation declared itself willing and prepared to join with NATO in fighting the scourge

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<sup>90</sup> Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision"... , 714.

<sup>91</sup> Paul Kubicek, "Russian Foreign Policy and the West," *Political Science Quarterly* Volume 114, Number 4 (Winter 1999-2000), 553.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 551-552.

of international terrorism.<sup>93</sup> Having engaged rebel guerrillas in Chechnya since 1994 and borne witness to the ferocity and disruptive capacity of Islamic extremism, Russia adopted a very pragmatic view of the attack on the US.<sup>94</sup> In effect, President Vladimir Putin recognized that the greater threat, one which his state had even feared under the communist regime, was the influence of extremist forces biting at the fringes of Russia's South. Chechnya had been an early taste of the potential effect, and having been chastised by the world for the brutality they employed in repressing the rebels, Russia now claimed that the events of September 11 not only proved the nature of the extremist threat, but fully justified Russia's actions in the Caucasus.<sup>95</sup> From a relationship perspective, it could be condensed quite clearly down to 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend.' Russia volunteered to share intelligence and to coordinate combined efforts to face and defeat the terrorists. When the Americans decided to act against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Russia proved supportive and applied its influence in the region to facilitate US force staging.<sup>96</sup>

### The Baltic Dilemma

In the background to the newly emerging GWOT, NATO continued to look forward to a second round of enlargement. From the outset of the debate it was abundantly clear that of all the post-communist states seeking entry into NATO, the

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<sup>93</sup> Ira Straus, "NATO: The Only West that Russia Has?" *Demokratizatsiya* Volume 11, Issue 2 (Spring 2003), 252.

<sup>94</sup> Martin A. Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 115-116.

<sup>95</sup> Straus, "NATO: The Only West that Russia Has?" ..., 241.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 247-248.

Baltic States seemed to be Russia's proverbial 'line in the sand.'<sup>97</sup> After round one, it appeared that Russia understood that they had limited ability to deny NATO enlargement into Central Europe and the Balkans; but the Baltic States were different, or so they thought. But for an exceptionally short stretch between 1918 and 1939, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been under Russian or Soviet rule since the 16<sup>th</sup> century. In the post-Second World War period, a significant migration of ethnic Russians to Estonia and Latvia had taken place. This large minority population had emotionally cemented the region to Russia as the nearest of the 'near abroad.' In the case of Lithuania, although the ethnic Russian population was nowhere nearly as large as the other two, it was a key transit corridor to the Russian military enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea. The idea that NATO could eventually control land and air access routes to a key Russian military installation was anathema.<sup>98</sup> In a bizarre twist, Kaliningrad would bear a striking resemblance to West Berlin, isolated in the heart of East Germany and surrounded by the forces of the Warsaw Pact. The Russian's devoted all of their efforts, subtle and frequently not so subtle, at stopping NATO expansion along the Polish-Lithuanian border.

Of course, the bullying and blustery talk out of the Kremlin only served to heighten the fears of the Baltic leaders.<sup>99</sup> The treachery that had seen their states and

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<sup>97</sup> Judy Dempsey, "Moscow Warns NATO Away from the Baltics: Envoy says Alliance Troops or Equipment in New Member Countries Would not be Acceptable," *Financial Times*. London, 1 Mar 2004, p. 6, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=9&did=565051921&SrchMode=1&sid=11&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=POD&ROT=309&VName=POD&TS=1206491129&clientId=1711>; Internet; accessed 11 Feb 2008.

<sup>98</sup> Irina Kobrinskaya, "Russia: Facing the Facts," in *Enlarging NATO: The National Debates*, edited by Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald, 169-185 (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 178-182.

<sup>99</sup> Tatiana Kostadinova, "East European Public Support for NATO Membership: Fears and Aspirations," *Journal of Peace Research* Volume 37, Number 2 (Mar. 2000), 237.



peoples subsumed under Josef Stalin as part of his pact with Adolf Hitler in 1939, had created an enduring distrust and enmity towards Russia.<sup>100</sup> In many ways, this historical baggage steered the Baltic States towards NATO as the only credible guarantor of their newfound freedom. What the Russian's had truly failed to grasp was that their heavy-handed approach had lost much of its credibility, and while it could still create genuine fear amongst its smaller and weaker neighbours, NATO and especially the US, could no longer be cowed. The Russian bear had no claws and as events in Chechnya had demonstrated, most of its teeth were well and truly rotten. In 1998 President Clinton undertook a serious open commitment to support the Baltic States in their quest for NATO membership. In signing a Charter of Partnership, referred to as the Baltic Charter, Clinton committed the US to helping defend "the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the three states..."<sup>101</sup> While the President was personally unwilling to be pinned down on the question of future accession to NATO, the text of the Charter sent a clear signal to all concerned that external pressures would not unduly influence NATO's decision:

The United States of America welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. It affirms its view that NATO's partners can become members as each aspirant proves itself able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve European stability and the strategic interests of the Alliance.

The United States of America reiterates its view that the enlargement of NATO is an on-going process. It looks forward to future enlargements, and remains convinced that not only will NATO's door remain open to new members, but that

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<sup>100</sup> Yaroslav Bilinsky, *Endgame in NATO's Enlargement: The Baltic States and Ukraine*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 9.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 77.

the first countries invited to membership will not be the last. No non-NATO country has a veto over Alliance decisions.<sup>102</sup>

In an attempt to conciliate the Russian's in advance of the November 2002 Prague summit, at which it was expected that the offers of second round membership would be announced, the Alliance created the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NRC superseded the PJC and was given a broader agenda of engagement issues. Increasing importance was placed on terrorism and controlling the proliferation of WMD and associated means of delivery. The NRC was presented as an improvement over the PJC, in that it moved beyond the 16+1 approach and now included Russia in Alliance consultations from the outset, i.e. Russia stood as an equal amongst the 19 NATO members, albeit still with no veto over Alliance decisions.<sup>103</sup> The pattern of NATO diplomacy very much resembled that employed in round one; being seen to make the effort to engage Russia prior to making the announcement of further enlargement. Six months later in Prague, NATO formally offered membership to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Much to the chagrin of Russia, the Baltic States were in, not out. On March 29, 2004 all seven states formally deposited their documents of accession in Washington and the Alliance grew from 19 to 26 full members, extending from Vancouver, Canada to the Western borders of Russia.

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<sup>102</sup> Bilinsky, *Endgame in NATO's Enlargement: The Baltic States and Ukraine...*, 103.

<sup>103</sup> Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged...*, 172.

## CHAPTER 4 - THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT; FRAMING THE FUTURE

### NATO's Expanding Interests

In the months following the second round of enlargement, relations with Russia cooled, but contrary to pessimistic predictions, they did not enter a deep freeze. In spite of growing nationalist rhetoric, Russia's leadership still accepted that the extremist threat remained strong enough to identify a common basis for limited cooperation with NATO and the West. Unfortunately, the momentum of 2001 was not fully exploited. The NRC did demonstrate progress on WMD issues and released a joint action plan against terrorism in December 2004; but overall, the results were not very significant.<sup>104</sup>

There was also increasing evidence that Russian influence strategies were moving beyond empty threats to exert military power to a more effective use of economic levers to shape regional affairs. While much of the Russian economy remained a confusing shambles by any acceptable Western standard, her plentiful natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas, were highly sought after by Europe and Asia.<sup>105</sup> This provided President Putin with a new powerful card in his diplomatic hand, and one which he seemed determined to play to its fullest. Russia's position as the sole fuel supplier for Ukraine, afforded her an implicit leverage in her bilateral dealings on issues relating to the Black Sea region, the Black Sea Fleet, and especially, concerns over ethnic Russian

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<sup>104</sup> Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?...*, 128.

<sup>105</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee, "Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs* Volume 85, Issue 6 (Nov/Dec 2006), 127.

rights in East Ukraine.<sup>106</sup> Further West, Germany had fostered strong relations with Russia for many years, largely thanks to her reliance on Russian natural gas and oil. Critics of the nature of this relationship were fearful that a crisis situation involving Russia could find Germany facing the dilemma of having to stand with the Alliance and suffer economic hardship, or choosing her own economic well-being and splitting with the Alliance.<sup>107</sup> Some opined that this was actually a deliberate aspect of Russia's new influence strategy, wielding economic power to create multiple friction points in the West.

As NATO displayed uncertain strategic vision in its dealings with Russia, the Alliance was taking significant strides in how it viewed its global security interests and potential role beyond Europe. The functional migration from a collective defence alliance towards a collective security organization was occurring with some rapidity. The stamp on this change was NATO's decision to take command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2003.<sup>108</sup> Out of area now assumed a completely new meaning for the Alliance. The Balkans had been external to the geographical confines of NATO, but it was still continental Europe. The risk of that conflict spilling over and impacting NATO members was real and arguably then, direct. Afghanistan was not quite so clear, certainly not so close, and as such the threat was far more indirect. While the Taliban support for Al Qaeda had been well-evidenced, once

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<sup>106</sup> Judy Dempsey, "Germany Drafts Policy for Europe to Strengthen Russian Ties," *New York Times*. New York, 8 Oct 2006, p. 1.14, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1142143951&SrchMode=1&sid=6&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=POD&RQT=309&VName=POD&TS=1206490129&clientId=1711>; Internet; accessed 11 Feb 2008.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, 128-129.

<sup>108</sup> Moore, *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World...*, 102-103.

the regime had been toppled, the risk to NATO and the West was open to dispute. Those in favour of intervention viewed Afghanistan as a failing state that needed to be saved and allowed to re-establish itself as a free and stable nation. In the absence of this support, it was argued that the extremists would be free to return and operate unhindered therein and most importantly, they would use Afghanistan again as a hub from which to export their evil to the West. This logic was well in keeping with the Alliance's NSC, and after some initial reservation by France was overcome, NATO forces deployed to Kabul.<sup>109</sup> Had the Alliance ministers known just how potent the Taliban resistance was to become in the following years, it is questionable whether NATO would have willingly accepted the mission, let alone expanded it in 2005 to assume full responsibility for operations across all of Afghanistan.

While the ISAF mission in Afghanistan grew to become NATO's top priority, the Alliance continued to pursue other interests and worked to develop new expansive security relationships. In 1994 NATO had introduced its Mediterranean Dialogue, an engagement policy aimed at addressing concerns of some of the Southern membership.<sup>110</sup> States like Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey were disturbed that NATO's focus had appeared to solely rest on its West-East axis. Worries over relations with several of the North African states had prompted NATO to examine ways to improve dialogue and cooperation. At the 2004 Istanbul Summit an 'enhanced' Mediterranean Dialogue was put forth which would build and reinforce both bilateral and multilateral relations

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<sup>109</sup> Moore, *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World...*, 102-103.

<sup>110</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Mediterranean Dialogue*, 1994, <http://www.nato.int/med-dial/summary.htm>; Internet ; accessed 23 Feb 2008.

between NATO and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.<sup>111</sup> The summit also witnessed the roll-out of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which sought to further NATO ties with other interested states and organizations in the broader Middle East, offering practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO.<sup>112</sup> Many of the aims of the Initiative are similar to those under the PfP, with particular emphasis on the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The sole signatory to the ICI remains the Gulf Cooperation Council, consisting of the states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

### **GWOT, Extremism versus Moderation & the Disconnected Zone**

In seeking to better understand NATO's approach towards collective security, it is worthwhile to provide a general overview of some of the key challenges that the Alliance is facing today and will likely face in the future. As previously noted, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed perceptions of security in a dramatic fashion. The actions of a well-developed trans-national terrorist organization, working to an irreconcilable extremist agenda had demonstrated an ability to strike at the heart of the most powerful nation on earth. The subsequent bombings in Madrid, London and Bali reinforced the obvious; that the extremists possessed the advantage of selecting the time, place, scope and nature of the message they wished to deliver to their intended target, and to the world at large. What NATO leaders, both political and military, quickly realized was that old concepts of security were insular and insufficient to meet the new and future

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<sup>111</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership, launches Istanbul Cooperation Initiative*, Istanbul, 29 Jun 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/06-june/e0629d.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 Feb 2008.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid* .

challenges of a world confronted by extremism.<sup>113</sup> As the Americans embarked on their GWOT and introduced the concept of The Long War, NATO accepted that it too was involved in the fight.<sup>114</sup>

To the Alliance, the battleground is one of moderation versus extremism, be it religious, ideological or ethnic-based, and the once clearer dividing line between US and European perceptions has become increasingly blurred.<sup>115</sup> It so happens that much of the breeding ground for extremism is found in those regions of the world suffering extreme poverty, social decay and political instability. Analysts like Thomas Barnett, have termed these areas as being ‘disconnected’ from the progress and development being experienced in the rest of the world.<sup>116</sup> The option to ignore these regions is no longer viable or acceptable for three largely inter-related reasons: first, many of these places are replete with raw materials and resources that the connected, functioning world desperately needs, thus like it or not this economic interaction will continue to exist and in some cases will give cause for enmity; second this interaction exposes the developed world to the worsening plight of the disconnected, and should serve to ignite humanitarian concern and intervention; and finally, there is the realization that failed and failing states are more willing supporters and even participants in extremism. To deny

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<sup>113</sup> Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged...*, 232-235.

<sup>114</sup> The Long War was first articulated as a new strategy in early 2006 by General Peter Pace, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The strategy acknowledges the threat of extremism as its main focus and is largely directed at the regions of the world that Barnett has characterized as ‘disconnected’ (see footnote 116). The strategy envisions a shift from dependence on the traditional, heavy conventional forces to a force structure that will be nimble, flexible and rapidly deployable with increased reliance on intelligence gathering and precision strike capabilities. Special Forces will become valuable and relevant as the first choice in deployment options to meet the increasingly asymmetric threats.

<sup>115</sup> Moore, *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World...*, 136.

<sup>116</sup> Thomas Barnett, “The Pentagon’s New Map,” *Esquire*, March 2003, <http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/published/pentagonsnewmap.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 Mar 2008.

the extremists support or sanctuary necessitates shoring up failing states and re-building failed states. NATO's mission to Afghanistan was undertaken in this new security context.

### **WMD Proliferation and Rogue Regimes**

Concern over the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery gained increased attention with the break-up of the USSR. Significant quantities of chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and materials were spread across the region, creating an arms control and security nightmare. Equally, if not more disconcerting, was the potential for an incredibly large collection of scientists, with years of practical experience and expertise in all matters CBRN, available for hire on a lucrative world market.<sup>117</sup> Faced with this threat, NATO and other concerned parties saw it in their own self-interest to provide financial and technical support to Russian efforts to 'keep the genie in the bottle.'

Early concern was over rogue states like Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea acquiring WMD materials or scientific knowledge and expertise.<sup>118</sup> With the onset of the GWOT, this quickly transitioned to focus on terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, which had the necessary funding, a clear desire to obtain WMD in any form, and the willingness to employ them without hesitation.<sup>119</sup> Denial of access has been the main tenet of a number of different proliferation programs. Most of NATO's bilateral and multilateral relationships (EAPC, NRC, NUC, Mediterranean Dialogue, and ICI) include

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<sup>117</sup> Brian Finlay, "Russian Roulette: Canada's Role in the Race to Secure Loose Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," *International Journal* Volume 61, Number 5 (Spring 2006), 411-413.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, 415.

<sup>119</sup> Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged...*, 139-141.



commitments to work in cooperation to stop the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. While the terrorist threat remains extant and continues to draw attention, the Americans have chosen to shift the spotlight onto the rogue regimes of North Korea and Iran, who have both pursued nuclear programs with alacrity. While the former has made clear its intent to pursue weapons applications, the latter has vehemently insisted its efforts are directed at the purely peaceful production of nuclear energy.<sup>120</sup>

Both states have leveraged their access to Soviet era systems and technology to develop credible indigenous missile industries, and both have cooperated in the transfer of technologies, particularly in the field of delivery systems. At present the two possess credible mid-range ballistic missiles and it is known that both aspire to develop long-range systems which could have the capacity to strike Europe and parts of the US.<sup>121</sup> Whereas the absolute disarray of the North Korean economy has proved a key limitation in its ability to pursue a more aggressive development program, Iran's wealth and resources have allowed it relatively unconstrained action. While significant world pressure combined with its own internal challenges gave North Korea cause to reconsider

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<sup>120</sup> Iran's leadership has repeatedly asserted their right to pursue civil nuclear power and that the Iranian program does not violate its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has vowed that "The Iranian nation will not succumb to bullying, invasion and the violation of its rights..." See "Q&A: Iran and the Nuclear Issue." *BBC News*. 8 Apr 2008. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4031603.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4031603.stm); Internet; accessed 14 Apr 2008.

<sup>121</sup> Mistry Dinshaw, "European Missile Defense: Assessing Iran's ICBM Capabilities," *Arms Control Today* Volume 37, Issue 8 (Oct 2007), 19-23. North Korea has wilfully flaunted non-proliferation efforts and become a purveyor of rudimentary mid-range ballistic missiles. The No-Dong system has a range of approximately 1300 kilometres, but is believed to have accuracy problems. That said, a 2 or 3 kilometre circular area of probability would not likely degrade the effect such a missile would have as a WMD terror weapon. The North Koreans program has been attempting to develop long range missiles (Taepodong-1 range 2200km and Taepodong-2 range 5000-6000km) which would give them the ability to strike most of Europe and some of the US (Alaska and Hawaii). Although the last test of a Taepodong-2 in 2006 failed shortly after launch, it has given cause for the Americans to step up their defensive efforts to counter such a future capability. Equally disconcerting is the transfer of technology between North Korea and Iran. Many of the missile systems in the Iranian arsenal have either been purchased from North Korea, or produced as derivatives of North Korean models. The Shahab-3 is a variant of the No-Dong, while the longer range Shahab-4 and 5 are based on the Taepodong-1 and 2 models.

their programs and particularly their development of weapons grade fissile material,<sup>122</sup> Iran has resolutely stood firm to its claim that their nuclear endeavours are purely peaceful. Their ongoing efforts to develop nuclear power infrastructure, with the collateral production of weapons grade fissile material, has caused great consternation in the US and the West. Even France, who had endeavoured to maintain positive relations with Iran, has now come down against their continued intransigence.<sup>123</sup>

### **Ballistic Missile Defence**

#### The US Approach

The American response to the perceived threat has been to accelerate the development of a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system. When President Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) was first announced in 1983, the Soviets viewed the possibility and potential of such a system with alarm.<sup>124</sup> If successful, SDI presented the ability for the West to negate the Soviet strategic missile threat. The fact that Western and largely American military technology was progressing at rates far more rapid than the USSR could ever hope to match or sustain, gave cause for dire concern. Interestingly, while the state of the global security situation has altered dramatically since the mid-80s, the Russians remain gravely worried over the destabilising effects of a workable BMD. While SDI was gradually accepted to be more

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<sup>122</sup> In Feb 2007 North Korea had agreed to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons and to provide a full accounting of the state of its nuclear program in return for aid in a six-nation deal brokered with the US, Japan, South Korea, China and Russia. While the terms of the original agreement remain to be fulfilled, ongoing negotiations have checked the re-emergence of a credible threat to date.

<sup>123</sup> Moore, *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World...*, 133.

<sup>124</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "Reagan-Gorbachev Transcripts – Reykjavik, Iceland, 11-16 Oct 1986, <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/22/documents/reykjavik/>; Internet; accessed 8 Mar 2008.

theory than reality, the intervening years have allowed technology to begin to match theory and indeed BMD is the beginning of the practical application of its dreamy predecessor.

In 2002, based on their threat assessment and a new confidence that the technology for BMD was promising, the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.<sup>125</sup> This move prompted a Russian outcry harkening back to the days of SDI. They viewed the ABM Treaty as an effective guarantor over the security and continued viability of their strategic missile forces. The Americans argued that their emerging BMD system was not intended to meet or negate the Russian capability. However, though the initial BMD force will be insignificant in the face of the Russian numerical capability, the Russians believe that once the capability exists and is in place, nothing is to stop the Americans from gradually improving it and augmenting it.<sup>126</sup> To the Russians, while a concession on BMD may not seriously impact their strategic missile force today or perhaps even in the next five to ten years; it is perceived as one which could eventually do so some time in the future. Given that much of the technology that has enabled the 'rogue threat' originated in Russia, and that Russia continues to export both technology and knowledge for profit, the Americans have little sympathy for the professed Russian fears.

Based on worst-case assessments that predict a long-range delivery capability available to rogue states in the 2012-2015 timeframe, the Americans have started fielding critical elements of their system.<sup>127</sup> BMD is based on an interwoven layer of sea-based

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<sup>125</sup> George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, "European Missile Defense: The Technological Basis of Russian Concerns," *Arms Control Today* Volume 37, Issue 8 (Oct 2007), 13-14.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>127</sup> Dinshaw, "European Missile Defense: Assessing Iran's ICBM Capabilities"..., 19.

(largely Aegis vessels firing Standard Missile 3), land-based (Ground Based Mid-Course Interceptors and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence (THAAD)) and airborne systems (airborne laser (ABL) systems).<sup>128</sup> Ground sites have already been established in Alaska and California. In seeking to broaden the system's coverage, the US is looking to Europe for a possible third site.

In the past two years, the US has undertaken bilateral negotiations with the Czech Republic and Poland as desired locations for key infrastructure in the Ground-based Mid-course Defence (GMD) system.<sup>129</sup> The goal is to construct a tracking radar installation in the Czech Republic and a ten-silo missile interceptor site in Poland. While the Czechs are supportive of investment in their country, they have been relatively quiet during negotiations. The Poles have been very enthusiastic, but frank about their terms; asking the Americans for both funding and support for the modernization of the Polish military.<sup>130</sup> As of mid-March 2008, the Americans were responding positively to these proposals, and the likelihood of an agreement being reached appeared high. The Americans have also been very clear that they see their full-spectrum approach to BMD as complementary to European and NATO efforts, which will be discussed below.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> U.S. Missile Defense Agency, *Global Ballistic Missile Defense: A Layered Integrated Defense*, U.S. Department of Defense, Apr 2006, <http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/bmdsbook.pdf>; Internet; accessed 3 Mar 08.

<sup>129</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "US Missile Defence Spreading to Europe." *Military Technology*. Volume 31, Issue 8 (Aug 2007), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1329666271&SrchMode=1&sid=4&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=POD&ROT=309&VName=POD&TS=1206493769&clientId=1711>; Internet; accessed 2 Mar 2008.

<sup>130</sup> Desmond Butler, "Polish PM, Bush to Discuss Missile Defense," *Associated Press*, 10 March 2008, <http://www.wtopnews.com/?nid=116&sid=1326928>; Internet; accessed 10 Mar 2008.

<sup>131</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, *U.S. Missile Defence: Cooperation With NATO and Russia*, U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, 16 Apr 2007, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/83123.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 Mar 2008.

The challenge in all this is that whatever the US chooses to do in Europe will be viewed by the Russians as a NATO activity, regardless of the bilateral nature of the agreements. As such, American BMD is seen as another provocative effort by NATO to encircle Russia.<sup>132</sup> The development of these sites on the territory of new NATO members also serves to undermine earlier claims by the Alliance that enlargement would not result in the re-stationing of NATO forces into these regions. BMD then appears as yet another broken NATO promise, and because it directly undermines the credibility of the Russian strategic missile force, it is perceived as inherently destabilizing.

The Americans and NATO have naturally stressed that BMD and more specifically GMD in Europe, is oriented against the worst-case rogue state threat. Both NATO and the US have asserted that the limited interception capability of GMD could in no way counter the massive Russian capability to strike with impunity. In fact, based on the positioning of the interceptors, it has been argued that simple physics demonstrates that in a strike launched against the US from Russia, the interceptors would find themselves in a chase scenario in which they could not catch-up to their targets.<sup>133</sup> Against a European strike, they would only suffice to take out a comparably insignificant number of Russian missiles.

President Putin and his advisors have listened but remain unconvinced. The Russians have adopted a dual-track approach to the problem. On the one hand, they are engaging NATO and the US in dialogue, which has included offers of cooperation,

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<sup>132</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "US Missile Defence Spreading to Europe"...

<sup>133</sup> Anne Roosevelt, "European Missile Defense Sites Expand Deterrence, Obering Says," *Space & Missile Defense Report* Volume 8, Issue 36 (24 Sep 2007). <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1340822961&SrchMode=1&sid=5&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1206493966&clientId=1711>; Internet; accessed 2 Mar 2008.

collaboration and even system integration. At this point they have offered to integrate Russian early warning radars into the BMD architecture, with the goal of deferring on the issue of interceptor locations.<sup>134</sup> While the Americans have not rejected this offer outright, they remain hesitant on a number of counts, one being a more pragmatic concern over interoperability challenges, and a second unspoken concern, which gives credence to the latent mistrust, exists over the requirement to share information and technology. This has led Russia down the more traditional path of employing ‘old world realpolitik.’ In 2007 Russia declared a moratorium on any further participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty talks and even went so far as to voice threats to target European states that join the US BMD with nuclear missiles.<sup>135</sup> This is not likely to achieve favourable results on the international stage, but it plays to the domestic, nationalist audience. In large part that is because it is what they expect to hear from their leadership, and arguably they need to hear it because to Russians, strength remains one of the sole touchstones of their nation.

### The NATO Approach

In 2002 at the Prague Summit, NATO initiated a feasibility study into missile defence. The study was to review options for the protection of Alliance territory, population centres and deployed forces. In light of the technology then available, it was

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<sup>134</sup> Roosevelt, “European Missile Defense Sites Expand Deterrence, Obering Says,”... The Russians have offered up the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan for integration. US technicians have joined their Russian and Azeri counterparts to determine the feasibility of the proposal.

<sup>135</sup> Adrian Blomfield, “Russia Suspends Arms Pact; Kremlin Angered by US Plan for New Missile-Defence System in Poland, Czech Republic; Cold War Treaty,” *National Post*. 27 April 2007, p. A.12, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=8&did=1262351241&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1206489580&clientId=1711>; Internet; accessed 11 Feb 2008.

apparent from the outset that theatre missile defence (TMD) of deployed forces was likely the first stage with respect to realistic, achievable goals.<sup>136</sup> Aware of the sensitivities of the Russians to the subject, NATO initiated discussions on the possibility of a cooperative approach to missile defence. The belief was that a more transparent approach would serve to allay Russian fears as to the object of the enterprise.<sup>137</sup> Once the limited scope of the program, and specifically the small number of interceptor missiles involved, became clear, it was hoped that the Russians would accept that BMD could in no way serve to counter their far larger missile force. The NRC undertook to develop a Missile Defence Initiative, aimed at unifying a NATO-Russian approach to BMD.<sup>138</sup> As highlighted above, the challenge of separating NATO's approach from that of the US was made all the more difficult given the likelihood that these systems will at some point support each other.

In March of 2005 NATO introduced the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme. Much like the grander American system, ALTBMD will weave together a variety of sub-systems to create a centrally controlled missile defence umbrella over deployed forces. The system, which will focus on short to mid-range ballistic missiles, is anticipated to start coming online in 2010.<sup>139</sup> A number of NATO countries have also initiated bilateral and multilateral BMD programs focused on

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<sup>136</sup> David S. Yost, "Missile Defence on NATO's Agenda," *NATO Review*. Autumn 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue3/english/analysis1.html>; Internet; accessed 6 Mar 2008.

<sup>137</sup> Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?...*, 104.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.

<sup>139</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Program Office*, NATO, <http://www.tmd.nato.int/>; Internet; accessed 14 Mar 2008.

short to mid-range threats.<sup>140</sup> The challenge and yet unresolved question for NATO is whether the threat demands a more comprehensive, full-spectrum missile defence capability. At the Riga Summit in 2007, NATO leaders directed that the Alliance adopt a three-track approach to BMD: continue to pursue a NATO TMD for protecting deployed forces, with a goal of initial capability in 2010; assess the implications of the US system for the Alliance; and continue to cooperate and consult with Russia on BMD and related issues. In effect, no decision was reached on NATO's possible integration with the American BMD.<sup>141</sup>

Of note, one of the non-NATO countries most interested and involved in BMD has been Israel. The Israeli government is acutely sensitive to the threat such weapons pose to their security and has been intimately involved in the US Patriot Programme from the outset and has also worked hard to develop indigenous capabilities within their own considerable means. Given Israel's charter membership in the Mediterranean Dialogue group, they have already formed a cooperative relationship with NATO. It has been suggested by Israeli officials that linking the NATO missile defence architecture with that of Israel may be an avenue worthy of further investigation.<sup>142</sup> While this could well include a formal relationship short of Alliance membership, it likely presents more

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<sup>140</sup> France and Italy have developed *Sol-Air Moyenne Portée Terrestre* (SAMP/T), a tactical, deployable interception system. These two nations have joined with the US on development of the Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS). Germany, the Netherlands and the US have collaborated on the Patriot programmes.

<sup>141</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Riga Summit Declaration*, Riga, Latvia, 29 Nov 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 Feb 2008.

<sup>142</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "Israeli Leader Livni Says Israel Seeks 'Formal Partnership' with NATO," *Space & Missile Defense Report* Volume 9, Issue 4 (28 Jan 2008), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=7&did=1419751481&SrchMode=1&sid=6&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1206494412&clientId=1711>; Internet; accessed 2 Mar 2008.



questions and concerns than answers and is therefore an improbable course of action for NATO in the short to mid-term.

## CHAPTER 5 - THE PATH FOR FUTURE ENLARGEMENT

### Current MAP Countries

In keeping with the ‘open door’ policy first announced at the Madrid Summit in 1997 and subsequently reaffirmed by key NATO leaders, the Alliance has continued down the enlargement path. At present there are three countries that are active under the MAP (Albania, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and there are two more that have formally requested to join the program (Georgia and Ukraine). It is anticipated that the Alliance will offer full membership to current MAP participants during the March 2008 Bucharest Summit, with accession likely to occur in or about 2010.<sup>143</sup> Notwithstanding intent, there remain several points of contention that could give NATO leadership cause to defer on a final offer, or perhaps choose to only offer membership to one or two of the applicants.

### Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

As highlighted in the September 1995 Study on Enlargement, one of the pre-conditions for membership consideration is the resolution of border and territorial disputes. In the case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece has expressed concern over the use of ‘Macedonia’ as the state name, believing it implies a residual and future claim to the Northern Greek region of the same name. In the absence of a satisfactory resolution, the Greeks have threatened to veto Macedonian membership.<sup>144</sup> The Greek government appears to desire a formal name change, which

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<sup>143</sup> The 2010 timeline is based on the two previous enlargement rounds which saw membership offers made in 1997 and 2002 with accessions respectively in 1999 and 2004.

<sup>144</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, “Greece Rejects Macedonia NATO Bid,” *BBC News*, 6 Mar 2008, <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7280723.stm>; Internet; accessed 7 Mar 2008.

may prove difficult to implement. Given that admission actually requires total consensus under the Washington Treaty, the potential for Macedonia to be passed over in 2008 is quite likely.

#### Albania

The recent decision by Kosovar authorities to unilaterally declare independence from Serbia may give NATO cause to reconsider and postpone further enlargement in the Balkans. Although the issue of finalizing Kosovo's status had been under negotiation for years, little progress had been achieved. In large part the process had been effectively frustrated by Russia, which supported its ally Serbia and argued against independence. Importantly, the lack of international consensus on this issue, with some states questioning the legality of 'enabled secession,' only served to complicate matters. NATO's decision to intervene in 1999 was not universally supported and as has been highlighted, even within the Alliance there was reticence and some dissatisfaction with the actual conduct of the campaign.<sup>145</sup> Notwithstanding the almost universal abhorrence for the actions of the Milosevic regime against the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo, the idea that NATO was prepared to intervene against a sovereign state, and thereby in effect sanction a secessionist movement, was discomfiting to some.

Fast forwarding to 2008 and the unilateral declaration of independence, these differences in opinion within the Alliance were quick to resurface. In particular, states with their own minority national issues, such as Spain and indeed even Canada, have

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<sup>145</sup> Charles A. Kupchan, "The Origins and Future of NATO Enlargement," in *Explaining NATO Enlargement*, ed. Robert W. Rauchhaus, 127-148 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 135-137.

either been set against or hesitant to recognize Kosovo.<sup>146</sup> Within the region, there is evidence of collateral impact resulting from the Kosovar decision. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic Serbs in Banja Luka, the capital of the majority-Serb province of Republika Srpska, protested en masse demanding the right to secede just as that exercised by Kosovo.<sup>147</sup> A similar argument could easily be made on the part of the Bosnian-Croats. But, having staked so much on their initial and continued support for the ethnic Albanian populace of Kosovo and their movement, the US found itself obliged to provide immediate recognition. The potential for this drama to further upset a region that has only a tenuous hold on stability is real. As such, it may well be that the Alliance defers on a decision for Albanian membership, given that nation's particularly close bond to Kosovo.

#### Croatia

Of the three, Croatia seems to be the best bet for an offer. In the years following the Dayton Peace Accords and particularly with the end of Franjo Tudjman's hold on power, Croatia has demonstrated a desire to integrate into the community of Western nations. Post-Tudjman Croatian leadership was quick to realize that their primary goal of EU membership and economic security was only going to be fulfilled through a sincere demonstration of their commitment to reform and rehabilitation. This meant accepting responsibility before the international community for its role and conduct during the

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<sup>146</sup> Spain's reticence has been attributed to its long fight against Basque separatists. Canada eventually did proceed with recognition, but Prime Minister Stephen Harper made clear that the Canadian government did not accept any parallels between the situation in Kosovo, which had suffered through ethnic cleansing, and the status of Quebec.

<sup>147</sup> Tina Wolfe, "Bosnia Struggles to Contain Sectarianism, Reform Government," *World Politics Review*, 10 Mar 2008, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1748>; Internet; accessed 11 Mar 2008.

conflict in the Balkans. One of the key aspects of this involved cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and most importantly, facilitating the handover of persons indicted for war crimes or crimes against humanity by that body.<sup>148</sup> Despite some initial reservation, the Croatian authorities have managed to meet their obligations and have satisfied all current and outstanding requests of the ICTY. This was an immense hurdle on their path to integration. There is no denying that some enmity remains over a conflict that was extraordinarily vicious on all parts. Notwithstanding, Croatia has worked hard to maintain good relations with its neighbours, and has officially distanced itself with any residual Bosnian-Croat movement within Bosnia-Herzegovina. While EU membership remains their prime goal, Croatia has sought to bind itself to Europe in other ways, including membership in NATO. They have been active PfP members and under this aegis, deployed troops to work with ISAF in Afghanistan.<sup>149</sup> Croatia appears to have been pressing the right buttons, and if one was to apply the 1995 Enlargement Study parameters, should be offered membership.

### **Future MAP Countries**

While this paper has shown that the path to NATO membership has varied widely over the life of the Alliance, it would seem that a semblance of process has finally been agreed upon over the last decade. In effect it is a three-stage process. The initiating stage commences with membership and active participation in PfP. This has been accepted as fundamental in order to begin resolution of doctrinal and interoperability issues. It also provides the first demonstration of a cooperative spirit and more importantly, a

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<sup>148</sup> \_\_\_\_\_. "Background Note: Croatia." *U.S. Department of State*. Jan 2008, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3166.htm>; Internet; accessed 7 Mar 2008.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*

commitment to Alliance values. The next stage involves what NATO has called ‘intensified dialogue,’ a simple way of describing increased interaction. This could involve more detailed discussions on ways and means for nations to better prepare themselves for membership candidacy, and in some cases, it could result in the formal creation of a special-status relationship. Finally, the last stage will see an agreement to enter into the MAP, with the joint development of an action plan aimed at improving suitability for NATO membership.<sup>150</sup> Importantly, the Alliance has made clear that signing on to MAP does not guarantee membership. Just as importantly, since the MAP was introduced and in keeping with the “open door” policy, NATO has yet to refuse a request for joining the MAP.

In 2007 both Georgia and Ukraine requested that NATO engage them in the MAP to facilitate their preparation, in consideration of future membership. Accepting that the program remains no guarantee to accession, it is likely that both requests will be supported. But for a variety of reasons, some similar and some distinct, these nations represent a very significant leap in what has been a very ad hoc Alliance enlargement policy. This is where the road ahead becomes less clear. As with the previous entrants, Russia looms large over the process. But unlike the last two rounds, where there was very little of substance that Russia could do to interfere with or impede enlargement, circumstances in Georgia and Ukraine are not nearly so clear. While there are similar challenges and concerns with both states, the very difference in size, scope and regional influence highlights the need for separate reviews of the challenges to their accession.

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<sup>150</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Membership Action Plan (MAP)*, Washington, D.C., 24 Apr 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 Feb 2008.

## Georgia

Georgia is a neophyte democracy. Current President Mikhail Saakashvili has only just been re-elected for a second term, having defeated his mentor and the first president of independent Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze in 2004. The January 2008 election was preceded by a declaration of a state of emergency, which created some concern for the fairness of the electoral process. Notwithstanding these worries, international observers were generally satisfied with the conduct of the election and sanctioned the results.<sup>151</sup> Saakashvili presides over a state that continues to struggle with the political and economic challenges of independence. Russian interference in the affairs of Georgia, coupled with the exertion of economic influence, has served to foster extremely poor relations between the two neighbours.

Ethnically-driven discontent has encouraged separatist movements in two of the country's provinces, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In both cases regional authorities have recently requested that the United Nations and other international bodies formally recognize their independent status.<sup>152</sup> That Russia has actively promoted the two secessionist movements is readily apparent.<sup>153</sup> Russia unilaterally deployed 'peacekeeping' forces to both regions in the 1990s, which was viewed as an underhanded ploy to reinforce Russian interests.<sup>154</sup> That said, the South Ossetians and Abkhazians

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<sup>151</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "Country Profile: Georgia." *BBC News*. 29 Jan 2008, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country\\_profiles/1102477.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1102477.stm); Internet; accessed 7 Mar 2008.

<sup>152</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "Abkhazia in Independence Appeal," *BBC News*, 7 Mar 2008, <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7283192.stm>; Internet; accessed 7 Mar 2008.

<sup>153</sup> Paul Kubicek, "Russian Foreign Policy and the West," *Political Science Quarterly* Volume 114, Number 4 (Winter 1999-2000), 563.

<sup>154</sup> Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the Future of NATO...*, 200.

viewed the intervention as a way to guarantee security against further Georgian aggression.<sup>155</sup>

In 2006 relations reached their nadir as Russia banned the import of a number of key Georgian products, citing quality and health concerns. Like Ukraine, Georgia is highly dependant on Russia for energy supplies. Also in 2006 a section of an important pipeline carrying Russian gas to Georgia was destroyed, prompting accusations of Russian involvement.<sup>156</sup> In the past two years Georgia has worked hard and proven successful at finding other markets for its goods, which has facilitated some degree of economic recovery. Russia has continued to apply pressure and in 2007, claiming that Georgia was failing to pay its energy bills, closed air links and postal service to the country. In 2008 Abkhazia was permitted access to Russian markets, a move which was clearly seen as rewarding the separatists. Some have pointed to Russian anger with Georgia for their perceived support for the rebels in Chechnya during the fighting in that Russian Republic as the main reason for their disruptive engagement.<sup>157</sup> While this is likely valid, it has been exacerbated by recent efforts by Georgian leadership to seek closer ties with the West. The recent request for MAP consideration is only likely to further inflame animosity. Russia will likely play to recent events in Kosovo as

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<sup>155</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "Q&A: Russian-Georgian Ties," *BBC News*. 7 Aug 2007. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5393106.stm>; Internet; accessed 7 Mar 2008.

<sup>156</sup> Matthew Collin, "High Stakes in Georgia Standoff," *BBC News*, 10 Mar 2006, <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5403714.stm>; Internet; accessed 7 Mar 2008.

<sup>157</sup> Gregory Feifer, "Caucasus: Tensions Between Russia, Georgia Mount Over Pankisi Operations," *Radio Free Europe*. 26 Aug 2002. <http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/08/26082002150708.asp>; Internet; accessed 7 Mar 2008.



justification for recognition of the two separatist provinces, an argument that is not without value or basis.<sup>158</sup>

The question for NATO is whether it sees membership as a realistic pursuit in the short to mid-term (5 to 10 years) or whether it is best to forge stronger ties with Georgia through PfP and even possibly MAP, but to allow the situation to better stabilize before making an offer of membership. While many of the arguments that favoured enlargement in the first two post-Cold War rounds are certainly applicable to Georgia, the very nature of this state's fractious relationship with Russia significantly heightens the need for caution. This approach should further be tempered by a quick study of the inherent instability of the Caucasus region itself.

Events in Chechnya have quieted, but tensions remain and it is unlikely that this conflict will be declared resolved for some time yet. The conflict between ethnic Armenians and Azeris over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan started in 1989 and continued through a Russian-brokered ceasefire in 1994. This left the Karabakh region under the control of ethnic Armenians, but the conflict has never formally been settled and remains a potential hot spot.<sup>159</sup> Given the likelihood of real and perhaps significant security issues rearing up in the region, it seems that Georgian membership could well create a security burden that the Alliance might be unwilling to bear.

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<sup>158</sup> Salome Asatiani and Brian Whitmore, "Russia: Moscow Eases Sanctions On Georgia, But Rattles Sabers Over NATO," *Radio Free Europe*. 25 Mar 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/03/a99cdad2-991b-4a64-b4ea-9c2055e5dc38.html>; Internet; accessed 26 Mar 2008.

<sup>159</sup> Arnold Chloe, "Fear and Loathing in the Caucasus," *BBC News*. 15 Nov 2001, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from\\_our\\_own\\_correspondent/1644861.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/1644861.stm); Internet; accessed 7 Mar 2008.

In light of this, is it reasonable to enter into a MAP agreement that could well run on for an extended duration? Since the introduction of MAP, no enrollee has waited longer than two or three years before being offered membership. While NATO has stated that no two applicants are the same, it certainly appears that a general timeline precedent exists. Is this a precedent that NATO is prepared to deviate from? If not, the challenges highlighted above need to be clearly understood and the scope of the undertaking embraced by all. If however, a long engagement is acceptable, the Alliance will need to make this clear to Georgia up front in order to properly manage expectations. It could also be argued, as it was during the first round, that PfP is a highly effective structure for enhanced collaboration and development and should be fully exploited before proceeding with the more formal commitment of MAP. Regardless of the approach adopted by NATO, domestic uncertainty coupled with regional instability, largely as a result of poor relations with Russia, should cause the Alliance to view Georgia as a mid to long-term membership candidate (10 to 15 years). It would be unreasonable, and indeed unwise, for NATO to extend itself prematurely into the Caucasus without first resolving the status of Ukraine, and implicitly then, Russia.

## Ukraine

Ukraine has presented a unique challenge to how NATO proceeds with enlargement; indeed it is a bit of a conundrum. Given that Ukraine is the second largest European state<sup>160</sup> with great human and industrial potential, coupled with its strategic position as the linchpin between Russia and the West, NATO cannot afford to treat it lightly. But the Alliance is also well attuned to the nature of Ukraine's relationship with

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<sup>160</sup> Ukraine encompasses just over 603,000 km<sup>2</sup>, ranking it behind Russia and ahead of Spain in total area for European states.

Russia, and to consider the possibility of membership in NATO without a clear understanding of how this would impact on that relationship, and in a wider sense the NATO-Russian relationship, would be extremely short-sighted.

NATO has been a strong supporter of Ukraine since it achieved independence in 1991. The Alliance respected the early administrations of Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma in their efforts to maintain Ukraine's precarious foreign policy balancing act. While Ukraine made clear its desire to integrate economically with the West and ultimately to join the EU, it was also equally apparent that any move west would not be to the detriment of relations with Russia. This foreign policy was known as the 'multi-vector' approach and envisioned a role for Ukraine as a neutral, non-nuclear buffer state.<sup>161</sup> This strategy was seen as necessary and desirable in light of the very dynamic ethnic challenges faced by the country. Approximately one in four Ukrainians self-identify as Russian.<sup>162</sup> They reside largely in the heavy industry centres of Eastern Ukraine and they maintain strong cultural and familial ties with Russia. Opinion polls on questions relating to attitudes towards the West and Russia are very rigid in their divide along these ethnic lines. Ethnic Ukrainians are more inclined to support westward integration while ethnic Russians wish to maintain close relations with Russia.<sup>163</sup> In both cases, neither wishes to see their position put in jeopardy; thus the multi-vector balancing act.

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<sup>161</sup> Jennifer D.P. Moroney and Stacy Closson, "NATO's Strategic Engagement with Ukraine in Europe's Security Buffer Zone," in *Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security*, ed. Charles Krupnick, 199-230 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 199.

<sup>162</sup> Bilinsky, *Endgame in NATO's Enlargement: The Baltic States and Ukraine...*, 20.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, 22-31.

For NATO, this approach seemed to work fine. Their main concern was to ensure that Ukraine did not regress into an authoritarian state, and to this end, the Alliance worked hard to foster cooperation and good will. Ukraine's very early decision to renounce nuclear weapons and to revert control of all such weapons and materiel to Russia was looked upon favourably by the West. Ukraine was one of the first PfP entrants and has enjoyed the benefits of a strong association with NATO. In July 1997 the two signed a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. This special status for Ukraine mirrored that established between Russia and NATO with the Founding Act signed only just six weeks earlier. The idea of the Charter was to recognize the importance the Alliance placed on Ukraine, and to increase cooperation and collaboration between the two on a number of issues.<sup>164</sup> In large part this was also an exercise in confidence building, setting Ukraine on a level of importance commensurate with their Russian neighbours. For Ukraine though, still very sensitive to Russian perceptions, it was essential that the Charter included the following text:

Ukraine welcomes the statement by NATO members that “enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO’s current nuclear posture and, therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so.”<sup>165</sup>

Russian regional security concerns have naturally factored heavily in relations with Ukraine and were evident during negotiations over the disposition of the military assets of the former USSR. In the case of the nuclear forces held by Ukraine at dissolution, what could have been an incredibly difficult and contentious issue was

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<sup>164</sup> Oleksandr. “NATO Enlargement and Ukraine”..., 85-86.

<sup>165</sup> Bilinsky, *Endgame in NATO’s Enlargement: The Baltic States and Ukraine...*, Article 18 of the Charter, 112.

resolved quite seamlessly thanks to Ukraine's decision to adopt a non-nuclear status. The Black Sea Fleet and the naval base at the Crimean port of Sevastopol were far harder matters to reach agreement upon. For Russia, prestige and influence in the Black Sea region was of paramount importance. Any thought of this being diminished following the break-up of the USSR was quickly and emphatically rejected. In 1997, after five years of contentious negotiations, the two countries agreed to partition the fleet with approximately four-fifths of the almost 600 vessels being retained by Russia.<sup>166</sup> Ukraine also signed a twenty-year lease for continued Russian use of port facilities and associated infrastructure in Sevastopol.<sup>167</sup> While Russia has expressed its desire to see this lease extended beyond 2017, it immediately began to develop its own Black Sea naval base near Novorossiisk. Ideally, this second base will only be necessary to augment Sevastopol and to allow the construction and basing of new vessels, which is forbidden under the terms of the partition agreement.<sup>168</sup>

Largely as a result of financial constraints, Ukraine has only maintained a small military in comparison to Russia. With little scope for discretionary expenditures Ukraine lacks the ability to field a force that could, of its own accord, deter Russian aggression. There is little doubt that in the event of armed confrontation Ukraine would find itself at a significant disadvantage without external assistance. The fact that the bulk of the country's industrial economy is located in the East, where the ethnic Russian population is strongest, further serves to underscore her vulnerability. In the face of this,

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<sup>166</sup> Paul Kubicek, "Russian Foreign Policy and the West," *Political Science Quarterly* Volume 114, Number 4 (Winter 1999-2000), 558-559. The original division was 50/50, but Ukraine effectively "sold-back" vessels to Russia as payment for mounting energy debts.

<sup>167</sup> Bilinsky, *Endgame in NATO's Enlargement: The Baltic States and Ukraine...*, 57-60.

<sup>168</sup> The Black Sea Fleet agreement does not allow Russia to base new vessels in Sevastopol, only those that were part of the original fleet.

Ukraine sought to develop closer political and military ties with Poland. Prior to the 1997 announcement on round one enlargement, the two had begun to explore a contingency that would see them forming the core of a regional buffer zone between NATO and Russia.<sup>169</sup> A joint peacekeeping battalion, known as PolUkrBat was stood-up, and after Poland's accession to NATO, the unit was deployed to Kosovo in 2000 to serve in the American sector.<sup>170</sup> Based on these strong ties, once Poland was in NATO she assiduously campaigned on behalf of Ukraine and sought to further strengthen Alliance ties with Kiev.

Following the Orange Revolution of 2004 which swept aside the more hard-line Kuchma supporters, the new leadership of President Viktor Yushchenko sought to push the country more firmly towards the West. In abandoning the 'multi-vector' foreign policy of his predecessors, Yushchenko made clear that even in the face of strong historical, ethno-cultural and economic ties to Russia; a successful and prosperous Ukraine was only possible through a deliberate policy that promoted integration with the West.<sup>171</sup> Not surprisingly, this decision was poorly received by ethnic-Russians in Ukraine. When the issue of NATO membership was raised, polls indicated that even ethnic-Ukrainians were not overly supportive. Clearly, Yushchenko's moves fostered increasingly icy relations with Russia proper.

In urging caution, President Putin reverted to the time-worn use of threats, both subtle and direct. In a display of Russia's new economic influence, he very adroitly used

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<sup>169</sup> Moroney and Closson, "NATO's Strategic Engagement with Ukraine in Europe's Security Buffer Zone"..., 222.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.* ., 222.

<sup>171</sup> Taras Kuzio, "Is Ukraine Part of Europe's Future," *The Washington Quarterly* Volume 29, Issue 3 (Summer 2006), 89.

Ukraine's energy dependency on Russia to achieve some leverage over the pace of change, but even with this significant economic lever, Putin proved unable to force Yushchenko to abandon his course.<sup>172</sup> As recently as February of 2008, in response to Ukraine's formal request to NATO for inclusion in the MAP, Putin raised the spectre of targeting Ukraine with nuclear weapons.<sup>173</sup> President Yushchenko sought to allay Russian fears by reminding Putin that Ukraine's constitution forbids the basing of foreign militaries on its soil (less the Sevastopol lease) and that any action by Ukraine was "not in any way directed at any third country, including Russia."<sup>174</sup> Equally though, he also asserted that Ukraine would continue to develop and maintain foreign and defence policies independent of external influences or pressures.

Having worked hard to encourage Ukraine along the path of democracy and integration, NATO now has to decide how to proceed on the matter of membership. Unlike Georgia, the crux of the problem here centres almost totally on the Russia question, and the challenge of dealing with a potentially negative Russian reaction to NATO encroachment. It is unlikely and perhaps even unreasonable to believe that NATO will forestall Ukraine's request for inclusion in the MAP. Further dissimilar from Georgia, Ukraine is far better positioned for an early accession, and realistically could expect an offer within two to three years of joining the MAP. The effect that such a decision could have on Russia bears significant consideration on the part of the Alliance leadership. In the absence of any discernable effort by NATO to improve ties with

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<sup>172</sup> Steven Pifer, "Ukraine-Russia Tensions," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, 4 Mar 2008, [http://www.csis.org/component/option.com\\_csis\\_pubs/task/view/id,4368/type,3/](http://www.csis.org/component/option.com_csis_pubs/task/view/id,4368/type,3/); Internet; accessed 15 Mar 2008.

<sup>173</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "Putin Raises Nuclear Spectre over Ukraine, NATO," *CTV News*, 12 Feb 2008, [http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20080212/putin\\_ukraine\\_080212/2](http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20080212/putin_ukraine_080212/2); Internet; accessed 12 Feb 2008.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*

Russia, Ukrainian membership could be expected to increase the sense of alienation and exclusion that Russia has claimed is NATO's intended purpose. In fact, it would be naïve to think that Ukrainian accession would not have a profound impact on the NATO-Russia relationship. For this reason, NATO needs to openly articulate an approach that continues to encourage Ukraine and affords it the opportunity to realize its goal of membership, but at the same time extends the offer of a more substantive, collaborative, integrated and arguably effective strategic partnership with Russia.

### **The Russian Challenge**

This brings us to the one nation that has, in its various forms, been at the heart of almost every NATO activity for nearly six decades. In the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia's relationship with NATO fluctuated between a desire for closer cooperation at one end and attempts to impair or impede at the other. Not surprisingly those who embraced change and sought to work with former adversaries were considered the moderating force in the new Russia, and at the outset possessed the benefits conferred by virtue of initiative and momentum. In the immediate post-Cold War, some of these moderates even floated the idea of joining NATO.<sup>175</sup> The Alliance actually didn't know how to react and eventually chose to ignore the proposal, which promptly ended any further talk of the idea.<sup>176</sup> While the degree of support for the original proposal may have been debatable, it served to demonstrate to Russian leadership that notwithstanding talk of change, the West retained a prejudicial view of the East. This viewpoint pandered to the other still powerful group in Russia, those of a

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<sup>175</sup> Ira Straus, "NATO: The Only West that Russia Has?" *Demokratizatsiya* Volume 11, Issue 2 (Spring 2003), 233-234.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 233-234.



nationalist bent who despaired of the lost empire and yearned for ways to regain national and international prestige. As unrealistic a goal as this may have been, it played extremely well to a domestic audience that was largely suffering through the shock of dramatic social and economic change. Given these two polar groupings, the NATO-Russia relationship was almost pre-ordained to be one based on pragmatism, or the politics of convenience, steering an uneven course between the two extremes of cooperation and conflict.

### Broad Choices for Russia

The future of NATO-Russia relations will depend on significant decisions and perhaps the assumption of not inconsiderable risks by both sides. For Russia, there are three broad foreign policy choices available: first, it can seek to integrate with the West; achieve the dream of Peter the Great and become a true European power; second it can opt to draw inwards, adopting a xenophobic isolationist posture; or third, it can seek to form alliances or partnerships outside Europe effectively offsetting the perceived western threat.<sup>177</sup> Of the three, the first is of course the approach that would be most desired on the part of NATO and the West. The degree to which it may or may not be achievable will be the main focus of this section. Understanding this, it is necessary and worthwhile to highlight aspects of the remaining two policy choices insofar as they serve to underscore the importance and value of current and future NATO-Russia relations.

No matter how nationalistic Russia may wish to be, it is almost impossible for it to adopt a truly isolationist policy. In large part, the present resurgence of Russian power has been highly dependant upon world energy markets, to which Russia has become a

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<sup>177</sup> Bruce Russett and Allan C. Stam, "Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China," *Political Science Quarterly* Volume 113, Number 3 (Autumn 1998), 363-364.

key producer and supplier. The economic linkages that have been formed over the preceding two decades have become critical enablers for Russian power. Importantly, President Putin has, by virtue of circumstances, come to realize that economic power is likely more relevant to the achievement of Russia's foreign policy goals. As such, any effort to insulate Russia and reverse the ongoing trend towards economic integration would have a detrimental effect on future power and influence.<sup>178</sup>

As for the third choice, this has been suggested as one of the most pressing reasons behind the need for a NATO strategy of engagement with Russia. The most commonly discussed spectre is the idea of a new Russia-China axis, which if realized could represent the 'near-peer' competitor to the US and NATO that has been missing since the end of the Cold War.<sup>179</sup> Bruce Russett and Alan Stam posit that history has shown that empires come and go. After an extended period of bi-polar confrontation, the US was left as the sole global superpower. They suggest that like Rome, France and Britain before her, the US will not be able to maintain its current hegemony in perpetuity.<sup>180</sup> While a resurgent Russia may once again become a great power, it is unlikely to ever achieve superpower status again. Most analysts concur that the only state with the potential to challenge the West and the US over the next 20-30 years is China.<sup>181</sup> Where the analysts diverge is in assessing whether China has, or will develop, real aspirations to make the leap from global economic powerhouse to global military

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<sup>178</sup> Margot Light, Stephen White and John Lowenhardt, "A Wider Europe: The View from Moscow and Kyiv," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* Volume 76, Number 1 (Jan. 2000), 81-82.

<sup>179</sup> Russett and Stam, "Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China"..., 362.

<sup>180</sup> Douglas M. Gibler, "East or Further East," *Journal of Peace Research* Volume 36, Number 6 (Nov. 1999), 627-630. Gibler provides an interesting discussion of power transition theory and argues that engaging Russia as an ally will serve to delay or defer a shift in global power to China.

<sup>181</sup> Russett and Stam, "Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China"..., 365.

superpower. It is not the intent of this paper to delve into the debate over China's future capability or intent, but simply to affirm that by virtue of its economic and military potential, China may represent a viable alternative for Russia to consider in terms of global cooperation and collaboration.

Whichever China ultimately emerges, it is beyond dispute that Russia will have played a critical role in facilitating her military modernization. Possessed of a vast military-industrial complex with a highly skilled technical workforce and eminently capable scientists,<sup>182</sup> Russia has provided China with both finished products in the form of hi-tech military hardware as well as raw scientific, technical know-how desperately needed by China to support the development of her own indigenous capabilities and capacities.<sup>183</sup> For Russia, the relationship has proven to be an economic boon, and the incentives to push hard for favoured access to the Chinese market of 1.2 billion consumers are readily apparent. But to this point, relations between the two have been almost universally centred on economic policy and resource and technology transfer. Russia signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with China and then joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001, with the main common security concern centred on potential terrorist threats; but there has been evidence of a gradual increase in military cooperation.<sup>184</sup> Russett and Stam have argued that avoidance of a Russia-China alliance should be one of the most important long-term strategies for NATO to pursue. In this light, they suggest that any further enlargement that is not linked to serious efforts to

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<sup>182</sup> Finlay, "Russian Roulette: Canada's Role in the Race to Secure Loose Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons"..., 414, 422-424.

<sup>183</sup> Russett and Stam, "Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China"..., 364-365.

<sup>184</sup> Elizabeth Wishnick, "Brothers in arms again? Assessing the Sino-Russian Military Exercises," *Pac Net* Number 35, 18 Aug 2005, <http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/pac0535.pdf>; Internet; accessed 23 Feb 2008.

engage and bind Russia to NATO and Europe would be fundamentally flawed. Indeed, if Russia is left believing that her exclusion from NATO and the West is intentional and irreversible, the likelihood that she would turn to China to form a mutually beneficial alliance grows exponentially. NATO needs to pre-empt such a move.

### Three Tiers of Engagement

Having reviewed the second and third foreign policy approaches open to Russia, it is now possible to return to the first, and from a NATO perspective, the most desirable approach, that of increased integration with the West. Martin Smith has suggested a model for NATO-Russia relations based on three tiers of engagement: a pragmatic approach; a strategic partnership; and finally, normative integration.<sup>185</sup> These will be examined in detail below.

*The Pragmatic Approach.* Current Russian policy towards NATO is viewed by Smith as one based purely on a pragmatic cost-benefit rationale.<sup>186</sup> This first tier approach has been well-suited to the Russian style of diplomacy insofar as it remains wedded to balance of power and spheres of influence concepts.<sup>187</sup> It has facilitated cooperation when in the service of Russian interests, or conversely, obstruction and confrontation when events move against those interests. Enlargement has clearly been viewed by Russia along the latter lines but despite this obvious discomfort, the fact that two rounds of enlargement have taken place without a full-blown diplomatic freeze, or even worse any evidence of military measures that would hint at brinksmanship, are indicative of two things. First, that the Alliance has proven capable of managing Russian

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<sup>185</sup> Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?...*, 113-116.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, 113-116.

<sup>187</sup> Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," ..., 716.

perceptions through its policy of transparency and continued engagement, thereby denying any pretext for Russia to actively obstruct the enlargement process. Second, even if Russia truly desired to impede or impair enlargement, they have lacked the appropriate tools to give the West sufficient cause to delay or stop the process. While Russia's strategic missile force remains potent, in the absence of a truly credible conventional capability, it really only serves to guarantee Russia's own territorial integrity. It has not, and arguably cannot, empower Russia in deterring enlargement.

*A Strategic Partnership.* The second tier that Smith highlights has been spoken of frequently in NATO-Russia circles, and this is the idea of a 'strategic partnership.'<sup>188</sup> There have been two opportunities, discussed in the preceding pages, where interests of the Alliance and Russia appeared to move close enough to give hope for the development of a long-term collaborative relationship. The first was in the immediate post-Cold War period when for a very short time, Russia appeared willing and ready to take dramatic steps to integrate with Western Europe; and the second was in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. In both cases, the cooperative process simply seemed to lose momentum in the face of insurmountable differences in approach and outlook. Beyond these two periods, while NATO can rightly claim to have extended a hand to Russia, the truth is that the effort has been at best tentative and more often, superficial. While bodies such as the NACC and its successor the EAPC, as well as the PJC and then the NRC, have facilitated increased dialogue and cooperation, they have remained largely consultative forums. For a myriad of reasons, NATO and particularly the US have had great difficulty in seeing through the past, and looking to the future in their relations with Russia. For lack of

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<sup>188</sup> Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?...*, 116-120.

vision, and a collateral lack of focus and effort, a strategic partnership between the two remains unrealized.

*Normative Integration.* The last tier in Smith's model would be the development of a normative relationship, whereby Russia demonstrates a desire and capacity to embrace those values and norms which serve to define NATO membership.<sup>189</sup> Smith believes that this tier, if ever achievable, is not reasonable to be spoken of except as a very distant aspiration. Some would argue that Russia will never be able to move beyond her autocratic roots and that the likelihood of a true democracy emerging, in the sense of what the West believes constitutes democracy, is slim.<sup>190</sup> Unlike the arguments made on behalf of most, if not all of the former communist states, few in the West have argued that Russian membership in NATO should be pursued in order to extend democracy. Though the question of including Russia has been quietly debated in academic and diplomatic worlds since the fall of the Iron Curtain, it has simply not generated much support.<sup>191</sup> That the lack of support has been evident on both sides (NATO and Russia) speaks volumes as to the uncertainty over such a move. For NATO, the very idea of full Russian membership, whereby Russia as a co-equal would have the ability to veto any and all Alliance policy decisions is probably one which would cause most western leaders to shudder. The difficulty for the Alliance is one of gauging risk in how far it can actually trust its former adversary. Given the unpredictable behaviour Russia has demonstrated over the past decade, it is unlikely that NATO will have cause in the near-term to sufficiently elevate their confidence and trust to progress past old prejudices.

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<sup>189</sup> Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?...*, 120-127.

<sup>190</sup> Paul Kubicek, "Russian Foreign Policy and the West," *Political Science Quarterly* Volume 114, Number 4 (Winter 1999-2000): 549.

<sup>191</sup> Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies...*, 34.

The other aspect here of course is that Russia may well not be interested in membership at this time or in the future. NATO membership has been viewed by most aspirants as critical to achieve increased integration with the West, and for many it has been presented as a segue into the EU. Russia however has worked hard to regain lost status and whether it is credible or not, continues to view itself as one of the great powers in Europe. In this sense, independence in policy and action serves to buttress this self-image.<sup>192</sup> While NATO membership might result in a myriad of benefits to Russia, it could also serve to constrain its freedom of action in undesirable ways. While Russia may aspire to EU membership, it is more likely that this would be achieved independent of any linkage to NATO.<sup>193</sup>

Regardless of true aspirations, Russia has frequently voiced a concern that NATO enlargement is a policy designed to exclude Russia from the community of Europe. This is a difficult perception to influence, particularly if at the same time as they rail against exclusion, Russia refuses to take measurable steps to adapt and integrate itself into that very community. For the few proponents of Russian membership in NATO, the argument is made that by making the offer, by extending the open hand, Russia will be forced to make a clear, unequivocal choice. If Russia chooses to remain on the outside, the Alliance will have made the effort, effectively stripping away further accusations of a deliberate policy of exclusion. However, if Russia accepts, then the Alliance will have to embark down a path that is certain to be replete with challenges. Opponents of such an approach cite the potential for Russia to destroy NATO from the inside out.

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<sup>192</sup> Ira Straus, "NATO: The Only West that Russia Has?" *Demokratizatsiya* Volume 11, Issue 2 (Spring 2003): 239.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, 229-230.

Acknowledging that this leap of faith is not risk-free, supporters counter that if the experiment fails, and Russia becomes an internal block to external action, the Alliance can always fall back to its original collective defence role.<sup>194</sup> While this may be true, given the new reliance on NATO as the only security organization with the capabilities and capacities to achieve global effect, this approach is fraught with risk. The very idea that NATO would proceed with enlargement to include Russia, a policy that would be highly reliant on hope, appears premature given the immense demands being placed upon and faced by NATO at present.

#### The Realm of the Possible

This logic then takes us back to the strategic partnership as being the most realistic and perhaps achievable relationship for NATO to explore. Importantly, if NATO is determined to pursue Ukraine's request for membership, the Alliance must demonstrate through concrete action, a willingness to forge a stronger collaborative relationship with Russia. The argument that has been presented here is that the two are almost inextricably linked and NATO must employ a dual-track approach to potential Ukrainian accession. While membership for Russia may never be a realistic undertaking, it would be a mistake of great significance for the Alliance to proceed with Ukraine in the face of Russian unease and more importantly, in the absence of a new NATO-Russia strategy.

The Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council need to be viewed as only the baseline of a much stronger relationship. The ongoing BMD crisis has actually presented a new opportunity to re-energize the collaborative process. Events have taken an interesting turn as Russia has deviated slightly from its standard inflammatory and

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<sup>194</sup> Russett and Stam, "Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China"..., 372.



obstructionist approach; offering up what can only be seen as a bridging solution.<sup>195</sup>

While there may yet prove to be unsurpassable technical hurdles, the idea of a combined, integrated US/NATO-Russia BMD architecture seems to be gaining some favourable consideration. In mid-March a high level delegation led by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates presented the American case to Russian authorities. As part of this presentation, which included a personal note from President George Bush (Jr) to President Putin, measures were proposed that would afford Russia the opportunity to monitor BMD operations, thereby ensuring transparency of purpose.<sup>196</sup> While the Russians remain concerned about the real and future potential for BMD to negate their strategic missile forces, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed satisfaction at the American acknowledgement of their worries and appeared positive regarding the development of future cooperative efforts.<sup>197</sup> As a minimum, this dialogue has presented an opportunity for the examination of increased integration, which in the grander scheme, can only be a positive step.

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<sup>195</sup> Roosevelt, "European Missile Defense Sites Expand Deterrence, Obering Says"...

<sup>196</sup> Thom Shanker, "Bush Sends Putin Missile Defence Offer," *The New York Times*, 18 Mar 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/18/world/europe/18missile.html?ei=5090&en=223d4e5d102a5c1d&ex=1363492800&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=print>; Internet; accessed 18 Mar 2008.

<sup>197</sup> Thom Shanker, "Missile Defence System Hinders Progress at Russia and U.S. Talks," *International Herald Tribune*, 18 Mar 2008, <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2008/03/18/europe/russia.php>; Internet; accessed 19 Mar 2008.

## CONCLUSION

NATO has bumped its way down the enlargement path for almost sixty years. The one constant throughout the entire process has been Russia, in its various forms, and that nation's distrust and discomfort with the process. During the Cold War, everything was predicated on the concepts of balance of power and spheres of influence. The gain of an ally was viewed as a subtle shift in the relationship between the two opposing forces, the Americans and NATO facing off against the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. After forty years of confrontation the Cold War came to a rather abrupt end, leaving NATO on very uncertain ground. In seeking to reformulate itself and create a new *raison d'être*, NATO changed both functionally and organizationally. While both were clearly linked, the most heated debates centred on the issue of enlargement and specifically, the potential impact of this policy on the Alliance's relations with Russia.

For a variety of reasons, not the least being the significantly reduced power and capacity of the Russian Federation, NATO was able to proceed with enlargement unhindered by threat of Russian interference. The Alliance now stands at 26 and counts amongst its members many former communist-led states. That many of the alarmist predictions regarding enlargement have subsequently been disproved has allowed NATO to continue to maintain its open-door policy and as a result, the 2008 Bucharest Summit will likely see more offers of membership.

This paper has argued that NATO has now reached a critical juncture in the enlargement process. Notwithstanding the potential benefits of increased membership, the countries that are likely next in the cue, Georgia and Ukraine, should give the Alliance more cause for a deliberate and cautious approach. As a country rife with internal challenges that sits astride one of the most fractious regions of the world in the

Caucasus, Georgia should not be seen by NATO as anything but a long-term project. Most certainly, if Georgia is to be considered for membership, it should only be after Ukraine, which in keeping with the recommendation of this paper, should also only occur in parallel to a concerted Alliance effort to improve relations with Russia. While Ukraine has shown significant progress in the four benchmarks identified in the NATO Enlargement Study, the inextricable nature of its relationship with Russia sets Ukraine apart from any prior candidates. For a number of reasons highlighted throughout this paper, the potential for conflict, both military and economic, between Russia and Ukraine is far higher and more consequential than it was between Russia and any round one or two candidates.<sup>198</sup> This must bear consideration in the Alliance's decision-making process.

Acknowledging that NATO will continue to encourage Ukraine, which will ultimately include accession, the Alliance needs to focus increased energy and attention on its relationship with Russia. If one accepts Smith's suggestion that a normative relationship between the two is unlikely in the short to mid-term, and may indeed simply prove unrealistic, then the Alliance needs to focus on achieving gains towards the second tier in the model, the development of a collaborative strategic partnership. Given the nature of the global security environment that has been detailed in the preceding pages, it should be clear that Russian participation and cooperation would prove immensely valuable in countering current and future threats. Lord Robertson noted this in a speech in 2002 when he stated that:

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<sup>198</sup> Anatol Lieven, "Restraining NATO: Ukraine, Russia, and the West," *Washington Quarterly* Volume 20, Issue 4 (Fall 1997), 64.

Countering terrorism is at the heart of NATO's new relationship with Russia. Much has been said about this relationship. To my mind, the essence is this. September 11th confirmed what we already knew. That the Cold War alignment of adversaries is dead and buried. We need Russia to face new and common threats, just as much as Russia needs us. Russia is now willing to play an honest, cooperative role in working with us.<sup>199</sup>

Developing this relationship serves the long-term interests of not only NATO, but arguably, the global forces of reason and moderation. The recent BMD debate has provided the opportune framework for enhanced US/NATO-Russia cooperation. If grasped, reinforced and properly developed, it could well forge a bond between NATO policy and strategy, countering those who have rightly argued that NATO has repeatedly failed to link the two. The adoption of a dual-track policy vis-à-vis enlargement and relations with Russia would be evidence of long-term strategic vision, something the Alliance has had difficulty formulating since its inception in 1949.

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<sup>199</sup> Lord George Robertson, "Tackling Terror, NATO's New Mission," speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C., June 20, 2002.

## POSTSCRIPT

Following the writing of this paper, the NATO Heads of State and Government convened the NAC in Bucharest, Romania from April 2-4, 2008. A number of important decisions were announced in the final Summit Declaration<sup>200</sup> which relate to this paper and deserve mention here.

On the matter of enlargement, of the three MAP participants only Albania and Croatia were invited to proceed with accession talks. While NATO acknowledged ongoing concern for the situation in Kosovo, and the Balkans in general, there was no mention of any linkage to Albania, or any discussion of holding off on Albanian membership. As such, if all proceeds well, the NAC identified July 2008 as a possible date for their formal admittance into the Alliance. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, however, did not receive an invitation as a result of the ongoing country name dispute. The NAC expressed hope that this could be resolved quickly through further negotiations and committed to extend a membership invitation as soon as practicable thereafter.

In the days leading up to the summit there was very public discussion over the question of whether Ukraine and Georgia would be enrolled in the MAP. President Bush made it very clear that he supported the NATO aspirations of both nations and wished to see them offered MAP programs immediately.<sup>201</sup> In closed meetings, however, it became abundantly clear that both Germany and France were concerned that such a move would

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<sup>200</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, Bucharest, Romania, 3 Apr 2008, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html>; Internet; accessed 5 Apr 2008.

<sup>201</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "Bush Backs Ukraine's NATO Membership Bid," *Associated Press*, 1 Apr 2008, [http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20080401/bush\\_NATO\\_080401/20080401/](http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20080401/bush_NATO_080401/20080401/); Internet; accessed 2 Apr 2008.

unnecessarily jeopardize relations with Russia.<sup>202</sup> In the face of this opposition, the NAC opted for ‘intensified engagement’ with both Ukraine and Georgia, but conveyed this with the accompanying clear message that “these countries will become members of NATO.”<sup>203</sup> While some might choose to focus on the inability of the US President to force through his agenda, it might be better to consider this setback as a positive thing in the long-run. In deferring on the MAP, NATO has demonstrated a willingness to consider Russian concerns and in so doing, the Alliance may have effectively opened the door for a more serious engagement between Russia and NATO. At worst, it only delays Ukraine and Georgia temporarily, which, given the challenges highlighted in this paper is not necessarily a bad thing.

On the issue of BMD, the Alliance re-stated its concern over the threat posed by Iran and North Korea, calling on both nations to comply with the various UN Security Council Resolutions aimed at controlling further proliferation of nuclear technology and delivery means.<sup>204</sup> The Declaration voiced its support for US efforts to develop and deploy assets to be based in Europe, and committed to continue to explore potential linkages between the NATO BMD programme and its US counterpart; all with the goal of achieving a comprehensive missile defence architecture.<sup>205</sup> The NAC highlighted the wish for Russia to be involved in ongoing and future BMD endeavours with both the US and NATO.

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<sup>202</sup> Adrian Blomfield, “NATO Bars Ex-Soviet States in Win for Russia,” *Telegraph*, 4 Apr 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/core/Content/displayPrintable.jhtml;jsessionid=S1YVUQSNLCTOZQFIQMG SFGGAVCBQWIV0?xml=/news/2008/04/04/w NATO104.xml&site=5&page=0>; Internet; accessed 4 Apr 2008.

<sup>203</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Bucharest Summit Declaration...*, Article 23.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 41.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 37.

Finally, NATO acknowledged the need to reinforce relations with Russia and in particular to improve the functioning of the NRC. In commending past achievements in the fight against terrorism and in the area of non-proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, the NAC emphasised the need for even greater cooperation.<sup>206</sup> While affirming that the 'open door' policy would remain in effect, the Alliance cited the BMD program as a clear opportunity for Russia to engage in a collaborative activity that would serve the collective interests of all parties. In effect, the NAC, through both actions and words, has begun to link further enlargement to improving relations with Russia. This perhaps is the beginning of a deliberate long-term dual-track approach which finally links policy to strategy.

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<sup>206</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Bucharest Summit Declaration...*, Article 28.

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