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TOWARDS A CARICOM DEFENCE FORCE

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ABSTRACT

The global change in the security environment continues to evoke different reactions from various regions of the world in order to survive. In the case of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the goal of advancing the regional economic integration is continually facing a myriad of challenges, including the threats of international terrorism, crime and violence, HIV/AIDS, and the trafficking of illegal drugs. The individual CARICOM states do not possess the resources to combat these threats on their own and as such, this paper proposes the collective use of the region's resources towards the achievement this aim.

The paper therefore argues for the establishment of a CARICOM Defence Force (CDF), along the model of the Multinational High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). The proposed force is a Brigade sized one, comprising seven major units, inclusive of land, sea and air components. Because of the limited financial capacity of the region, it was also determined that external assistance will be required in establishing the proposed CDF. To this end, the recommendation is that the CDF be developed in conjunction with the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom which, among other things, would facilitate interoperability with the leading Western Coalition partners.

TOWARDS A CARICOM DEFENCE FORCE

INTRODUCTION

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), is an integration movement comprising fifteen (15) member states namely: Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, the Republic of Guyana, the Republic of Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Federation of St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, the Republic of Suriname and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. There are also five affiliate members in: Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands.[1]

CARICOM is not the genesis of Caribbean integration, but is in fact pre-dated by two other organizations that were formed to bring the islands of the Caribbean together. The first of these two organizations was the West Indian Federation which lasted for only four years before it collapsed in January 1962.[2] The second organization was the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) which was formed in October 1967. In 1973, CARIFTA eventually gave way to CARICOM, which had the mandate of furthering the process of regional economic integration within the Caribbean.

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[1] CARICOM Secretariat. *CARICOM: Our Caribbean Community - an Introduction*. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2005, 4

[2] Andy W Knight and Randolph B. Persaud. "Subsidiarity, Regional Governance, and Caribbean Security." *Latin American Politics and Security* (2001), 34; http://www.accessmylibrary.com Internet; accessed 10 March 2008.

The changing security environment, however, has been presenting a myriad of challenges towards the region's efforts at economic integration. The traditional security threats are being rapidly replaced by more non-traditional ones such as poverty, drugs, crime and violence, terrorism and HIV/AIDS. Added to these, are the lack of resources and the inability of the individual CARICOM Member States to effectively impact the regional security landscape.

This paper therefore argues for the establishment a CARICOM Defence Force (CDF), through the collective efforts of the existing defence forces within the region. The paper will first give an overview of CARICOM and its objectives, and then conduct an assessment of the existing threats against the region, leading to a broad framework for a regional defence force. Armed with the threat analysis, the paper will then assess the state of the current defence capabilities within the region versus those required to combat or deter the threats identified, in order to determine the capability gaps within the region. Taking into consideration the capability gaps identified, the paper will then propose a way forward by the establishment of a unified CARICOM Defence Force.

OVERVIEW OF CARICOM

CARICOM was established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas, which was signed on July 4, 1973. The Treaty is essentially two agreements, the first of which is the Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community and the second, the Annex to the Treaty, which outlines the details of the Caribbean Common Market. Both agreements were signed

separately and as such, permit a country to be a legal member of one without being a member of the other.[3] The Bahamas exercised this option when, in July 1983, they became a member of the Community but not of the Common Market.

Although the Treaty was signed on July 4, 1973, both the Treaty and its Annex came into effect on August 1, 1973 and allows for any state of the Caribbean Region to join CARICOM. Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were the original signatories to the Treaty and by July 1974, all the other members of CARIFTA had signed the Agreement to become full members.

Objectives of CARICOM

The objectives of the Community (as set out in Article 4 of the Treaty) are based on three pillars:

a. Economic Integration – through a common market and common trade policies;
b. Functional Cooperation – that is, the pooling of resources and sharing of services in the area of human and social development; and
c. Coordination of Foreign Policies – that is, presenting a united front in its relations with countries outside the grouping.[4]

[3] CARICOM Secretariat. *CARICOM: Our Caribbean Community,* 50

[4] Ibid, 52

CARICOM's two main decision making bodies are the Conference of Heads of Government, commonly called "The Conference" and the Common Market Council of Ministers, commonly called "The Council". The Conference is the Supreme Organ of the Community and consists of the Heads of Government of all Member States, except in the countries of Guyana and Suriname, which are represented by their Executive Presidents. In the case of Montserrat, a British dependency, the Chief Minister is the representative.

The Conference primarily provides policy direction for the Community and is the final authority for the conclusion of Treaties on behalf of the Community and for entering into relationships between the Community and International Organizations and States. It also has responsibility for making the financial arrangements to meet the expenses of the Community but has delegated this function to the Community Council. Decisions of the Conference are generally taken unanimously.

THREATS TO THE REGION

Traditional Security Threats

Border and territorial disputes along with geopolitics are the remaining traditional security threats in the Caribbean today. Some of the most serious of these disputes involve Belize and Guatemala, Suriname and Guyana, Venezuela and Guyana and most recently, Trinidad and Barbados. The case between Belize and Guatemala is a unilateral

territorial dispute in which Guatemala is claiming half of Belize's territory south of the Sibun River.[5]

The Suriname and Guyana land dispute involves a boundary matter in which Suriname has made a territorial claim over New River triangle in south east Guyana. According to Griffith (2003), "a new map showing Suriname's claim to New River has frustrated the negotiations, but the parties continue talking."[6] In the case of Guyana and Venezuela, the dispute is an ongoing one in which Venezuela is claiming up to five-eighths of Guyana's territory.[7]

Non-traditional Security Threats

Whilst the traditional security concerns are yet to be resolved, more urgent attention needs to be paid to what have been described as the nontraditional threats, among which are the drugs trade, organized crime, terrorism, natural disasters, and HIV/AIDS. A brief examination of these concerns is as follows.

[5] Ivelaw L. Griffith. The Caribbean Security Scenario at the Dawn of the 21st Century: Continuity, Change, Challenge." *The North-South Agenda* no. Paper Sixty Five (September, 2003), www.iadb.org/sds/doc/SGC-Paper Internet, (Accessed March 10, 2008), 7

[6] Ibid, 8

[7] Ibid, 10. {According to Griffith (2003, 8), this case had gone to arbitration but in 1970, Venezuela signed a 12 year moratorium with U.K and Guyana. Venezuela has, however, refused to renew the moratorium, surfacing and abating claims periodically.}

a. Drugs

The drug trafficking trade (mainly in marijuana and cocaine), is probably the singly largest contributor to the overall instability within the Caribbean, whether it is social, economic or political. The major components of this industry are: drug production, drug consumption, trafficking, and money-laundering. As it relates to drug consumption, the largest demand for narcotics is in North America, (followed by Europe), whilst the largest supplying source is South America.[8] Therefore, by virtue of its geographic location (between North and South America), the Caribbean region is strategically located in the heart of the main transshipment routes.

It is also believed that the majority of the drugs passing through the Caribbean do so by sea. There is also a direct link between the drug trade and the increase in crime, corruption (both systemic and institutionalized) and arms trafficking within the region. This is very evident in the lucrative guns for drugs trade, primarily between Haiti and Jamaica, and which is now being seen in Suriname as well.[9] "The police [in Jamaica] have repeatedly reported that Jamaicans have been using small fishing boats to travel to Haiti where they trade ganja for high-powered weapons."[10]

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[8] Ivelaw L. Griffith "Caribbean Security on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century." McNair Paper 54, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Washington DC (October, 1996), 34

[9] Jane's Sentinel. "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: 2007; Suriname http://sentinel.janes.com/docs/sentinel/SAMS_country.jsp?Prod_Name=SAMS&SentCountry=Suriname&.

[10] Glenroy Sinclair, "Kingfish Lands Gun, Ammo Find," *Jamaica Gleaner* April 11, 2008. http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20080411/news/news2.html (accessed 11 April 2008).

b. Crime

In confirming the link between the illegal drug trade and the rising levels of crime and violence in the Caribbean, Ivelaw Griffith (2003) noted that:

> "the countries with the highest or most progressive crime reports in the theft, homicide and serious assault categories are the same ones featuring prominently over the last decade as the centers of drug activity. These countries include the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guyana, and St Kitts-Nevis."[11]

This situation is further compounded by the fact that the criminal activities in the region are being executed by highly organized networks to which criminal deportees have been linked. Whilst the levels of involvement on the part of the deportees have not yet been ascertained, there has been sufficient evidence linking some of them to these criminal networks.[12]

c. Terrorism

To date, the Caribbean has never been used a staging area for acts of terrorism but this in no way means the region is immune from such activities or the effects of such activities. The transnational nature of the threat of terrorism means that if not properly monitored, the region's air and maritime networks could be used as launching pads for terrorist activities, including the use of the region's banking systems to finance their operations. The proximity of the Caribbean to the main shipping routes between North and South

[11] Ivelaw L. Griffith. The Caribbean Security Scenario at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 12

[12] Tony Best. "Crime Wave Rampant in Region," available from *NationNews.com*, *Local News Story*, 10/7/05, http://www.nationnews.com/story/323625782621262.php. Internet; accessed 9 April 2008.

America and the Panama Canal also highlights the region's vulnerability to terrorism by sea.

The Caribbean region is also heavily dependent on the service industry and suffered severely from the impacts of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. The attacks lead to a fall out in both the tourism and airline industries, which significantly affected the economic stability of a number of CARICOM Member Countries.

d. HIV/AIDS

The HIV/AIDS epidemic is currently seen as one of the most devastating threats to the Caribbean region. According to the 2000 Report of the United Nations Program on AIDS (UNAIDS), the epidemic has spread to the extent that the Caribbean region is now the second most seriously affected region in the world, next to sub-Saharan Africa, with prevalence rates averaging 2.4 percent of population and reaching in excess of 6.0 percent in Haiti. [13] If the current prevalence rates remain unchecked, the prediction is that by 2010, the region's population will have shrunk to 95 percent of what it would have been had there been no AIDS, and by 2020, it would have further shrunk to 92 percent.[14]

[13] CARICOM Secretariat. *CARICOM: Our Caribbean Community*; 149

[14] Ivelaw L. Griffith. The Caribbean Security Scenario at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 16

e. Natural Disasters

The Caribbean region is also vulnerable to naturally occurring disasters, the more regular occurring and most devastating of which have been hurricanes. The Atlantic hurricane season runs from the month of June through to November and since the turn of the century, no less than seven hurricanes have made landfall in the Caribbean. The more recent Hurricanes were: Dean in 2007, Emily and Wilma in 2005, and Francis, Ivan and Jean in 2004.

Many CARICOM countries are also of volcanic origin and some still have active or in some cases, dormant volcanoes that are easily identifiable.[15] The most active volcano today is the Soufriere Hills Volcano in the south of Montserrat, which had a major eruption in 1995 and has been active ever since. The other volcanoes of concern are La Soufriere in St Vincent and the Grenadines which last erupted in 1979, and the underwater volcano, 'Kick em Jenny', off the coast of Grenada and which last erupted in 1991.[16]

Earthquakes and the threat of flooding, particularly in low lying areas during periods of heavy rainfall, are other forms of natural disasters which generally affect the Caribbean region.

[15] CARICOM Secretariat. *CARICOM: Our Caribbean Community*; 170

[16] Ibid

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

Current Defence Capability

There are nine CARICOM countries with standing Defence Forces,[17] ranging form a low of 200 to a high of 3,150 members. The Regional Security System (RSS), a sub-regional security organization, has a total of 1000 personnel, comprising a mixture of military and police personnel. The RSS is made up of seven countries, five of whom do not have military forces. Haiti is the only member country which has neither membership in the RSS nor its own defence force. It however, possesses a National Police Force, following the disbandment of their armed forces in 1994.[18]

In relation to the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF), Jane's Sentinel Country Assessment noted that despite it being inadequate in size, organization and equipment, "the land element appears to be well trained and efficient."[19] The assessment further went on to on the say that the "[JDF] Coast Guard now has counter narcotics capability to intercept if not to outrun suspect craft from South America."[20] Whilst the JDF has long been a professional force, the Coast Guard capability referred to came out of the modernization

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[17] See CARICOM Military Balance in Appendix 2.

[18] Jane's Sentinel. "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: 2007"; Haiti http://sentinel.janes.com/docs/sentinel/CACS_country.jsp?Prod_Name=CACS&Sent_Country=Haiti&

[19] "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: 2007"; Jamaica http://sentinel.janes.com/docs/sentinel/CACS_country.jsp?Prod_Name=CACS&Sent_Country=Jamaica&

[20] Ibid

of the fleet which included the acquisition of three new OPVs between September 2005 and September 2006.

Jane's Sentinel Assessment of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF) regarded the TTDF as very small relative to the economic importance of the country, and the manpower available. The report also said that in order to effectively deter narcotic trafficking and infringements on national sovereignty, "the [TTDF] land element could be usefully doubled, to include a small armoured element and some field and air defence artillery."[21]

Whilst Table 1 in Appendix 1 illustrates the CARICOM Military Balance in terms of manpower, Appendix 3 gives a more detailed picture of the major CARICOM Assets, broken down into the three environments. With the exception of the seven new OPVs acquired within the last three years, (Bahamas 2, Barbados 2 and Jamaica 3), most of the others are aged vessels which were first commissioned in the early 1980's or earlier. Hence, it follows that not all of the vessels are in serviceable condition and whilst some may be serviceable, they are not necessarily reliable.

The consensus therefore, is that the defence forces within CARICOM States are very weak and for the most part, poorly equipped. Infantry weaponry across the region are restricted to small arms, consisting of pistols, assault rifles, machine guns and mortars, up

[21] "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: 2007"; Trinidad http://sentinel.janes.com/docs/sentinel/CACS_country.jsp?Prod_Name=CACS&Sent_Country=Trinidad%20and%20Tobago&

to 81 mm in diameter. Guyana also has an Artillery Battery which includes six x 130 mm M1946 Towed Howitzers, eighteen x 120 mm M-43 Mortars and twenty x 120mm T-55 Mortars among others.[22]

Required Defence Capability

In order to realistically determine the required capability for the proposed CARICOM Defence Force, it is best to first establish the roles for this Defence Force. After reviewing the regional threat assessment along with the current roles of the Defence Forces within the region, the following roles were identified:[23]

a. Defend against External Aggressors

b. Internal Security

c. Counter Terrorism Operations

d. Monitor Air and Maritime areas

e. Disaster Relief Operations

f. Search and Rescue

g. Support to Regional Institutions

h. Peace Support Operations

i. Ceremonial

j. Any other duties assigned by CARICOM

[22] "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: 2007"; Guyana http://sentinel.janes.com/docs/sentinel/SAMS_country.jsp?Prod_Name=SAMS&Sent Country=Guyana&

[23] The ten roles listed are similar to those identified by the Jamaica Defence Force in its 2005 Strategic Defense Review.

It is to be noted that Internal Security has been identified as a separate role of the CDF because it is a common phenomenon in the Caribbean for the conduct of joint Military and Police Operations. Whilst it is accepted that the Constabulary is the principal law enforcement agency, there will be times when the military will need to get involved in Internal Security, particularly where insurgents are concerned or when the violence has gone beyond the capability of the Police Force.

In light of the roles identified, an assessment was done to determine the required capabilities for the proposed CDF, the detailed results of which are broken down per role, in the Task-Requirement Matrix at Appendix 2. The main determinant, however, was that at a minimum, a brigade sized force comprising air, land and naval components will be required. Equipment wise, there is critical need for electronic surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities/platforms (land, air and sea) in order to detect and respond to the threats. There will also be the need for an integrated communications suite, to facilitate effective communications. Another critical requirement is that of troop lift capability, both air and sea. From the perspective of the land component, a systematic re-tooling and upgrading will be required in the basic weaponry of the regional land forces.

Capability Gap

From the analysis of the regional defence capabilities, it is evident that there are a number of deficiencies between the desired capabilities for the CDF and those that currently exist

within the region. Starting with the human resource aspect, manpower was the first of the capability gaps identified. This shortfall was highlighted by Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment which, in part, described JDF as "inadequate in size, organization and equipment," and the TTDF as being "very small to the manpower available."[24] In relation to Guyana, the report concluded that the elements of GDF were "unable to fulfill their ... role ... both in terms of manpower and equipment."[25] Another aspect of human resource that is required involves the development of crucial core competencies which are currently lacking in the region.

In terms of equipment, one of the critical gaps is the lack of an effective intelligence gathering mechanism. Integral to this capability will be the necessity of electronic surveillance equipment in order to effectively monitor the region's air and maritime spaces. The unfortunate situation, however, is that "intelligence and interdiction measures are among the most costly of counter measures, and they involve considerable technology, which the Caribbean countries lack."[26]

Communication is key to any military force and the CDF should be no exception. There are presently no commonalities in the communications platforms across the region and in some cases, even within the same defence force, the communication system used by one environment, is incompatible with those used by the other environments. There is therefore the need for an integrated regional communications suite.

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[24] These were previously discussed in the paper, under current defence capabilities.

[25] Jane's Sentinel 2007; Guyana

[26] Ivelaw L. Griffith. "Caribbean Security on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century.", 53

Other notable gaps in capabilities are centered on both air and naval platforms. From the air side, there is the lack of troop lift capability, maritime patrol aircraft, and sufficient utility aircraft, more specifically, rotary wing assets. On the naval side, there is also the lack of sea lift capability and insufficient OPVs to effectively patrol the region.

THE PROPOSED CARICOM DEFENCE FORCE (CDF)

In proposing the CDF, there are certain key features that should be ingrained into the modus operandi of the force. Among these should be the ability for rapid deployment, whether in order to deter a threat or in the conduct of humanitarian relief operations. Another desired feature is that of interoperability, thereby facilitating joint and combined interagency operations. With the exception of an invitation to assist in a member country, it is unlikely that the CDF would mobilize and deploy on its own. It is therefore critical that the CDF be capable of operating in conjunction with Western Coalition forces and international partners, particularly, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.

External Assistance / International Partners

Due to the economic constraints facing CARICOM states, significant external assistance will be required in establishing the proposed CDF. The United States, Canada and the United Kingdom have had longstanding relationships with the defence forces in the Caribbean and it is recommended that the CDF be developed in consultation with these

three major partners. Another key reason for the inclusion of the US in the defence building capacity of the region is the commonality of some of the threats in that, "the context and content of the security challenges facing the Caribbean are influenced by the terrorism and other threats to the United States."[27] It is also in the security interest of the United States and Canada that the countries in the Caribbean do not fall into the category of 'failed or failing states'.

From a developmental perspective, US military assistance to the region has been in various forms, including educational training and the donation of tools and equipment. The main vehicle through which this assistance is given, however, is through the International Military Education and Training program (IMET).[28] The Canadian equivalent to IMET is the Military Training Assistance Programme, (MTAP).

In terms of equipping the CARICOM Defence Force and re-tooling the existing forces, the United States provides the best option with their Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. This is a "government to government method for selling US defence equipment and training. [It also strengthens] bilateral defence relations, supporting coalition building, and enhancing interoperability between US forces and military friends and allies."[29] Already the beneficiary of ongoing US military assistance, equipping the

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[27] Ivelaw L. Griffith. The Caribbean Security Scenario at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 3

[28] US Defence Security Cooperation Agency website: http://www.dsca.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm; Internet; Accessed 20 March 2008.

[29] Foreign Military Sales (FMS), US Defence Security Cooperation Agency website: http://www.dsca.mil/home/foreign_military_sales.htm; Internet; Accessed 20 March 2008.

CARICOM Defence Force through the FMS program would certainly satisfy the region's requirement to be compatible and interoperable with the US and other western coalition partners.

Conceptual Framework

An ideal model on which to pattern the CDF is that of The Multinational High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). SHIRBRIG was established in December 1996 following a 1995 recommendation by the United Nations' Secretary General. Its mandate is to provide the UN with a non-standing multinational brigade at high readiness based on the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS). SHIRBRIG member countries decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not they will participate in any given mission and as such, national decision making procedures are in no way affected by membership in SHIRBRIG. There are three key entities that form the framework for SHIRBRIG. These consist of the Steering Committee, the Planning Element, and the Brigade Pool of Units.[30] Therefore, in keeping with the SHIRBRIG framework, the three entities of the proposed CDF could therefore be:

1. The CARICOM Defence Council CDC),
2. The CDF Headquarters (CDF HQ), and
3. The CARICOM Defence Pool (CDP).

[30] The information relating to SHIRBRIG was taken from SHIRBRIG's website at http://www.shirbrig.dk/html/main.htm, Internet, (Last accessed on 19 March, 2008).

The CARICOM Defence Council would be the executive body of the CDF, comprising the Defence Ministers of all the CARICOM Member States. It is proposed that chairmanship of the Defence Council be rotated on an annual basis. The CDF HQ would also be identical to the Planning Element of SHIRBRIG except that a "US / UK / Canada Liaison Office" would be established as part of the headquarters. The CDF HQ would be a permanently stood up Brigade Headquarters with the staff drawn from the regional security forces. The CARICOM Defence Pool, the third of the three entities mentioned above, would comprise members of the RSS and all the Defence Forces within CARICOM. The structure of the proposed CDF HQ is as shown in figure 1.

Proposed CDF Headquarters



Figure 1.

Source: Adopted from SHIRBRIG Website at http://www.shirbrig.dk

In order for the member countries of the CDF to adequately meet their national obligations as well as those of the CDF, it is proposed that only the CDF headquarters be permanently stood up whilst the troops are drawn from the member countries as required, similar to what pertains in SHIRBRIG. The staff of CDF HQ could then be assigned on two or three year postings at a time.

An immediate task for the very first CDF HQ team would be to generate the ideal force composition, in terms of Units, skill sets, and who would be drawn from where. Another critical task would be to concentrate on producing a regional doctrine which would then be circulated among the Member States for approval and then implementation. Figure 2 below is the author's recommendation of a possible force structure.

Proposed Structure - CARICOM Defence Force



This structure represents a Brigade level force comprising seven major Units, namely: two Infantry Battalions, a Combat Service Support Battalion, an Engineer Regiment, a Coast Guard, an Air Wing and a Military Police / RSS Battalion.

Conclusion

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a regional integration movement which was preceded by the now defunct West Indian Federation and the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA). Today, CARICOM totals fifteen member states and five affiliate members.

The objectives of the CARICOM are threefold: Economic Integration, Functional Cooperation and the Coordination of Foreign Policies. However, as the Community strives towards it goals, it is faced by a myriad of challenges, spanning the military, political, economic spheres. Whilst the traditional security threats such as land and border disputes are still evident in some cases, it is the nontraditional threats that the region is most vulnerable to, and which have been making the most negative impact on the member states. These non-traditional security threats include issues such as drug trafficking, crime and violence, terrorism, HIV/AIDS, natural disasters and poverty, among other things.

Recognizing that the individual CARICOM Member States are lacking the resources required to adequately address the threats facing the region, this paper argued for the

establishment of a CARICOM Defence Force (CDF) to better address the threats to the region, using its collective resources. To this end, ten major roles were identified as the core mandate for the CDF, with the expectation that the force would be manned by a highly developed human resource component, whose elements would be drawn from across the member states.

Among the requirements of the proposed CDF is the need for a reliable intelligence gathering capability, supported by modern weaponry and equipment. Based on the transnational nature of most of today's threats, the proposed force should be capable of rapid deployment as well as performing a range joint and combined operations involving elements from the land, sea and air components. The CDF should also be flexible enough to be tailored to fit the threats they arise.

The capability analysis conducted revealed some gaps between the capabilities required for the new force and those that currently exist in the region. Due to the cost of acquiring these capabilities, it was determined that significant external assistance will be required, particularly form the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, in establishing the proposed CDF. Modeled after The Multinational High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), the proposed CDF would consist of three main elements, namely the CARICOM Defence Council, the Headquarters and the CARICOM Defence Pool.

It was also proposed that a Brigade-size force comprising two Infantry Battalions, a Combat Service Support Battalion, an Engineer Regiment, a Military Police / RSS

Battalion, a Coast Guard and an Air Wing be explored as the likely structure of the CARICOM Defence Force. The Brigade headquarters, in addition to the required staff, will also house a 'USA / UK / Canada Liaison Office' which will maintain direct contact with their National or Regional Headquarters in their respective countries.

In conclusion, this paper had set out to argue for the establishment of a CARICOM Defence Force. Having considered all the factors highlighted, the paper also proposed a framework, using the model of the Multinational High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), on which such a regional defence force can be developed. In light of the ever changing security environment and the nature of the threats against the region, it is further proposed that CARICOM leaders act sooner rather than later towards the establishment of the CARICOM Defence Force.

Appendix 1

CARICOM Military Balance as at 28-Feb-2008

Country	Total Active Armed Forces	Army	Air Wing	Coast Guard
Antigua and Barbuda	175	125	-	50
Bahamas	858	150	-	922
Barbados	900	800	-	100
Belize	1,100	1000	50	50
Dominica	-	-	-	-
Grenada	-	-	-	-
Guyana	2,550	2,300	100	150
Haiti	-	-	-	-
Jamaica	2,860	2,500	140	224
Montserrat	-	-	-	-
St Lucia	-	-	-	-
St Kitts and Nevis	200	155	-	45
St Vincent & the Grenadines	-	-	-	-
Suriname	3,140	2,800	100	240
Trinidad and Tobago	3,150	2,964	66	1,500
Regional Security System	1,000	-	-	-

Table 1.

Source: Table complied with information from *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments* http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/CACS_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Jamaica

Appendix 2

Task - Requirement Matrix

Srl	Tasks	Requirements	Remarks
1.	Defend against External Aggressors	- Ability to detect and respond to threat - Brigade group of Land, Air and Sea Assets - Requisite intelligence support	
2.	Internal Security	- Ability to detect and identify the threat/insurgents - Medium lift and surveillance helicopters - Patrol vehicles	Done in support of the Police
3.	Counter Terrorism Operations	- Specially trained Counter Terrorism Unit - EOD / IED teams and equipment.	
4.	Monitor Air & Maritime areas	- Adequate Air Wing and Coast Guard fleets - Long range maritime aircraft - Offshore and Inshore Patrol Vessels - Electronic surveillance devices	
5.	Disaster Relief Operations	- Infantry troop and Engineers - Appropriate assets, e.g. air/land/sea as reqd. - Post disaster relief and reconstruction	May involve working alongside Relief Agencies
6.	Search & Rescue	- Air Wing and Coast Guard assets - Infantry as required.	
7.	Support to Regional Institutions	- Air, Marine and Engineer Assets	
8.	Peace support Operations	- Troops and Equipment as required.	
9.	Ceremonial	- Infantry troops or as required.	
10.	Other duties assigned by CARICOM	- As tasked	

Table 2.

Source: Table was compiled by the Author using information from a number of sources including assessments of requirements from elsewhere in this paper and the *2005 Jamaica Defence Force Strategic Defence Review.*

Appendix 3

Major CARICOM Assets by Environment

Country	LAND COMPONENT				AIR COMPONENT		NAVAL		Remarks
	APC	Anti Tank	Engineers	Artillery	Fixed Wing	Rotary Wing	OPV	IPV	
Bahamas	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	7	2 x OPVs acquired in Jan 08. (Jane's)
Barbados	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	7	2 x new OPVs – '07
Belize	-	68			- King Air **x** 1 - BN2A Islander **x** 3 - 182J Skylane **x** 1 - T67200 Firefly **x** 1	-	-	8	
Guyana	10	11	1 x Bn	- 130 mm - 120 mm	- Harbin Y-12 **x** 1 - Sky-van **x** 1	- Bell 412 **x** 1	1	4	
Jamaica	13		1 x Bn		- Cessna 210M **x** 1 - Diamond DA40 FP **x** 2 - BN2A Islander **x** 2	- Bell 407 **x** 3 - Bell 412 **x** 3 - ES 355 Ecureuil **x** 4	4	10	3 x new OPVs acquired in 05-06.
Suriname	30				- C-212-400 **x** 2 - BN2B Defender **x** 2 - 172 Skyhawk **x** 1	-	3	5	Suriname is now considering the use helicopters in its fleet.
Trinidad and Tobago	-	37	1 x Bn		- Panther Navajo **x** 2 - C-26A Metro III **x** 2 - Cessna 310R **x** 1	-	2	11	Considerations underway re the acquisition of armed helicopters.[31]

Table 3.

Source: This table was created using data from a variety of sources, including *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments*, JDF website: www.jdfmil.org, and the author's personal knowledge of some of the Caribbean's military assets.

[31] Jane's Sentinel 2007; Trinidad

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