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EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS

**THE JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE (JDF) CURRENT  
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IS NOT CONFIGURED TO  
COUNTER THE NARCOTRAFFICKING THREAT TO JAMAICA IN  
THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This paper argues that the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) is not configured to counter the narco-trafficking threat to Jamaica in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The activities of narco-traffickers in the Caribbean involve the movement of illicit narcotics such as heroine, cocaine and marijuana to drug consuming nations outside the Caribbean. Narco-trafficking constitutes a threat to any society in terms of its negative effects. These effects undermine legitimate governments, creates corruption and fuel criminal behaviour. The Jamaican State is presently at risk, as a high level of criminality linked to narco-trafficking does exist. A critical organization in countering this threat to Jamaica is the JDF, however it is presently configured with an infantry biased organizational structure. Historically, the JDF has constantly been involved in internal security operations in support of the Jamaica Constabulary Force, which has served to perpetuate the present structure. It is argued that the JDF reconfigured with an emphasis on maritime and aviation capabilities, used to control the sea lines of communication and air corridors into and out of Jamaica can counter the narco-trafficking threat. Two reconfiguration options for the JDF are proposed.

**THE JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE (JDF) CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL  
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“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, c. 500 BC<sup>1</sup>

Introduction

At the global level the existence of illicit narcotics and the trafficking in these narcotics (narcotrafficking)<sup>2</sup> is ranked as one of the major problems confronting a number of States today. The production and trade in illicit narcotics has an impact on both drug producing and consuming nations. Narcotrafficking brings a host of negative effects to any society. The negative effects comprise the undermining of legitimate governments, the corruption of public officials, money laundering, gang warfare, drug related killings and drug dependency and constitutes a threat to that particular country.

Given the negative effects of the narcotrafficking threat it is understandable that the existence of this activity creates a security problem. A number of countries have enacted legislation and employed various tactics and methods to deal with this problem. The War

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<sup>1</sup> United States, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07.4, Director, Joint Staff, 13 June 2007, I-10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, I-19. The terms narcotics trafficking and drug trafficking will be used interchangeably. The US military defines narcotrafficking/drug trafficking as a composition of a set of related activities which undermine the security of States, and involve the growing, production, smuggling, shipment, transshipment (by a variety of means of means such as aircrafts, ships, motor vehicles, and people) distribution and dealing in narcotic substances. Financing and money laundering activities are also part of narcotrafficking activities.

on Drugs led by the United States (US) in the 1990's reflected the importance of the ill effects of narcotics on American society, and stability and governance in a number of countries, specifically in Latin America and the Caribbean region. Military forces have also been used to counter narcotrafficking in some Latin American and Caribbean States where traditional law enforcement agencies have lacked the capabilities to deal with this problem.

This paper will demonstrate that the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) present structure is not configured to counter the narcotrafficking threat to Jamaica in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The JDF configuration is a critical factor in neutralizing the activities of narcotraffickers, and countering a threat which undermines governance, fosters the corruption of officials, criminality, and a drug dependency culture in Jamaica.

The paper argues that the narcotrafficking threat to Jamaica has the capability to affect Jamaica in fundamentally negative ways. It examines the effects the threat has on Jamaican society, the nature of the threat at the regional level, and the present configuration of the JDF, which is an infantry biased structure primarily conducting internal security operations with the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). Finally, the paper concludes with a consideration of configuration options.

There are a number of illicit drugs trafficked in the Caribbean,<sup>3</sup> however the paper will concentrate on cocaine, marijuana and heroin in the region as these are viewed by the governments of the Caribbean region as being of immediate concern. Jamaica will be examined specifically in terms of marijuana and cocaine trafficking as the island is used as a source of shipment for marijuana and a transshipment point for cocaine. These two illicit narcotics are of significant importance as they relate to the negative effects on the stability of the Jamaican State.

### The Effects of Narcotrafficking on the Jamaican State

The existence of narcotraffickers in any society creates a host of criminal and social effects. The activities of narcotraffickers run contrary to the rule of law and in an effort to continue their illegal activities, narcotraffickers create a culture of criminality. Some members of society become intertwined, whether knowingly or unknowingly, in the activities of these individuals. Homicides, gang warfare, money laundering, arms trafficking, corruption of public servants, private sector business men and politicians are the common denominators of countries which suffer the effects of being production or transit locations.

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<sup>3</sup> Caribbean Community, "Member States," [http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member\\_states.jsp?menu=community](http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member_states.jsp?menu=community); accessed 17 March 2008. The Caribbean is defined as the countries which comprise the fifteen nation Caribbean Community (CARICOM) bloc – Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.

The homicide rate in Jamaica has risen steadily since the 1990's, "drug related murders, reprisal killings and turf wars account for almost half of all murders."<sup>4</sup> It is well known that globally organised criminal gangs have linkages to the drug trade and that this aspect of their illegal activity represents a major source of income. In Jamaica, such gangs continually assert themselves in communities where unemployment is high and the income or the spoils from the trade, which are distributed in the communities by 'Dons,'<sup>5</sup> are seen as the only means of economic survival. These so called Dons have linkages to Colombia and members of the Jamaica Diaspora in North America, the United Kingdom and Europe.

According to Trevor Munroe, one study in 1998 identified almost 150 gangs operating in Jamaica, six of which were very highly active and possessed an organizational structure. "These six gangs were engaged in transnational drug trafficking, extortion, money laundering, and arms dealing. They utilize violence to secure internal discipline, deterring external threats and for purposes of intimidating witnesses."<sup>6</sup> Money laundering by narcotraffickers is present in a number of Caribbean islands and these activities are no different in Jamaica. Money is laundered in Jamaica through the construction industry, car dealerships and foreign exchange cambios.

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<sup>4</sup> Trevor Munroe, "The Menace of Drugs." In *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror – Challenge and Change*, ed by Dr Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 154-175, (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 162.

<sup>5</sup> Max Manwaring, "A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica and Brazil," available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB837.pdf>; internet, accessed 19 March 2008. . . , 35.

<sup>6</sup> Munroe, "The Menace of Drugs." In *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror – Challenge and Change...*, 162.

This laundered money is used for payments to corrupt individuals in customs and law enforcement and distributed to community members in impoverished communities to purchase their support and silence in withholding information from local law enforcement. With the monetary resources to be gained from drug trafficking and drug related activity, there is limited impetus to find meaningful employment on the part of some individuals in a number of depressed communities in Jamaica and a preference for taking on roles such as couriers or foot soldiers. Foot soldiers for narcotraffickers specialize in enforcement and armed violence against rival gangs that have the potential to infringe on turf, thus reducing profits.

The occurrence of arms trafficking is another feature of narcotrafficking. In the Jamaican context, the proximity of Jamaica to Haiti provides a ready supply of weapons, law and order has broken down in parts of that country. Jamaicans and Haitians trade marijuana



agendas which involve the use of violence against civilians as a means to achieve their objectives.

. . . The Caribbean has experienced the terror of criminal gangs but not, so far, the terror of religious-political groups involved in illicit drugs. Of course, this distinction can be overdrawn. ‘Narco-terrorism’ for financial gain is no more nor no less terrorist than ‘narco-terrorism’ for political objectives. The suffering of the innocent is the same no matter the motivation nor the purpose of terrorism. Moreover narco-terrorists of one variety very often strike up alliances of convenience with narco-terrorist of the other brand. Indeed, narco-terrorism for “business” can mutate into narco-terrorism for politics and vice versa. Even without mutation, the two types can and do interpenetrate as narco-traffickers pursue political purpose provide protective cover and political groups utilize drug money for political causes.<sup>8</sup>

Narcotrafficking is clearly a threat to Jamaica, whether it is in the form of a violation of Jamaica’s airspace or territorial waters or high levels of criminality that affect the stability of Jamaican society. The possibility of Narcotraffickers associating with terrorists would exacerbate the threat and if it becomes a reality, may have to be addressed by the JDF.

### The Caribbean- An Overview of the Narcotrafficking Threat

An overview of the Caribbean situation as it relates to the broader narcotrafficking threat provides an insight into the nature of the problem. Thus there is the need to look briefly at two main issues (a) the geography of the region in relation to its proximity to South America and the US, and (b) the efforts of CARICOM governments in attempting to deal with this problem.

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<sup>8</sup> Munroe, “*The Menace of Drugs.*” *In the Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror- Challenge and Change.*, 167.

The Caribbean is defined in the US government's anti-drug strategy as a transit zone, an intrusive and problematic border that must be controlled to keep drugs away from US shores.<sup>9</sup> Within this context, a transit zone is the path taken by either airborne or seaborne smugglers to move shipments of illicit narcotics; the zone can include transfer operations to another carrier (airdrop, at-sea transfer, etc).<sup>10</sup> The Caribbean lies to the south of the US and is "characterized by its vast geographic area, by its heterogeneity, and by the varied effects of the drug problem on the many nations and territories that form the region."<sup>11</sup> As shown in Figure 1 the region comprises numerous islands which vary from sovereign states to island colonies of Britain, the US, France and Holland. The following definition of the Caribbean as a narco-trafficking "transit zone" adequately describes the role of geography in the threat:

...the geographic outlay of the Caribbean region adds to the complexities of counter drug measures in the region. These tropical islands are in proximity to major sea lines of communication – the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea areas. They extend from the Trinidad and Tobago islands in the south (near the northern Venezuelan coast line) to the Bahamas Islands in the north (approximately fifty miles off the US east coast). The proximity of the Caribbean chain of islands to the major sea lines of communication, and its vast coast lines and territorial seas make the region a natural transit route for narcotics trafficking into the United States and Europe.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Jorge Rodriguez Beruff and Gerardo Cordero. "The Caribbean: The 'Third Border' and the War on Drugs." In *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America – The Impact of US Policy*, edited by Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, 15-60 (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne River Publishers Inc, 2005), 303.

<sup>10</sup> US Joint Counterdrug Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.4, GL-10.

<sup>11</sup> Jorge Rodriguez Beruff and Gerardo Cordero. "The Caribbean: The 'Third Border' and the War on Drugs," . . . , 303.

<sup>12</sup> Lieutenant Commander Tellis A. Bethel, "Caribbean Narcotics Trafficking: What is to be Done?" *The Defence Institute of Security Assistance Management Journal*, Fall 2002/Winter 2003, 80.

## Map Central America and the Caribbean



Figure 1:

Source: University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection<sup>13</sup>

The geographic location of the Caribbean makes it an ideal location for the movement of drugs. The Caribbean is considered one of the world's major transshipment points for narcotics into one of the world's largest markets for illicit drugs, the US, which is considered the world's single largest drug consuming nation.<sup>14</sup> The European Union has also acknowledged that Europe is a huge drug consuming area.<sup>15</sup> The Caribbean is

<sup>13</sup> University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Maps of the Americas, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/camericacaribbean.jpg>, accessed 26 March 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Humberto Garcia-Muniz, "The United States and the Caribbean at Fin de Siecle: A Time of Transitions." In *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, edited by Joseph S Tulchin and Ralph H Espach, 45-120. (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne River Publishers Inc, 2000) 138.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

recognized as a major channel for cocaine, heroin, and marijuana bound for Europe. Two explanations for this are the proximity of the Caribbean and South America and, the commercial communications and other linkages between Europe and the Caribbean that facilitate trafficking as Figures 2 and 3 illustrate.<sup>16</sup>

### Major Cocaine Routes in the Caribbean



Figure 2

Source: Caribbean Drug Trends 2001-2002<sup>17</sup>  
Major Marijuana Routes in the Caribbean

<sup>16</sup> Anthony P. Maingot and Wilfredo Lozano. *The United States and the Caribbean – Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty*, (New York, Routledge, 2005), 138.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, *Caribbean Drug Trends 2001-2002*, Caribbean Regional Office, Bridgetown, Barbados, February 2003, 6. The arrows on the right hand side of Figure 2 represent transshipment of cocaine to European markets.




Figure 3: Source: Caribbean Drug Trends 2001-2002<sup>18</sup>

Against the background of the movement of illicit narcotics and the negative effects on the region, narcotrafficking has been one of the major agenda issues which have been discussed by the CARICOM Heads of Government. It is also said that the sovereignty of many countries in the region is subject to infringement, both by state and non-state actors because of drugs.<sup>19</sup> In 1996 at a special CARICOM Leaders Summit, the leaders issued a statement indicating the fact that “narcotrafficking and its associated evils of money

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*,9. The arrows on the right hand side of Figure 2, represents transshipment of marijuana to European markets.

<sup>19</sup> Dr Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, “Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge Intrusion and Governance.” *In Governance in the Age of Globalisation- Caribbean Perspectives*, edited by Kenneth O. Hall and Denis Benn, 383-415.(Kingston,Jamaica:Ian Randle Publishers,2002) 389.

laundering, gun smuggling, and the corruption of public officials, criminality and drug abuse constitute the major security threat to the Caribbean today.”<sup>20</sup>

According to Trevor Munroe, at the beginning of the 1990s the West Indian Commission concluded that CARICOM countries are threatened today by the onslaught from illegal drugs as crushing as any military incursion.<sup>21</sup> This assertion was made within the context of the negative effect the presence of illicit narcotics was having on Caribbean Society. The governments of the Caribbean have launched a number of initiatives to combat the drug threat. In May 1996 the Caribbean governments, in collaboration with a number of inter-governmental organizations, regional bodies and specialized agencies produced a plan of action for drug control coordination and cooperation in the Caribbean. Under the auspices of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), a drug control coordination mechanism was created.<sup>22</sup>

In attempting to deal with the narco-trafficking in the Caribbean, the military has been used by some CARICOM governments. CARICOM States have also received military assistance from the US, Canada and the United Kingdom (UK) in their effort to counter the activities of narco-trafficking in the region. The defence forces within CARICOM are small with only Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Kitts, Suriname, Antigua, Guyana, Belize, Bahamas and Barbados having standing defence forces. With limited resources

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 390.

<sup>21</sup> Trevor Monroe, “The Menace of Drugs.” In *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror – Challenge and Change*. Edited by Dr Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 154-175. (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 154.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 155.

and capabilities, Caribbean countries conduct interdiction in collaboration with Colombian, US and UK authorities. These operations usually involve intelligence sharing with the Caribbean police forces, Scotland Yard, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Co-operation through joint operations with the US, Canadian and British Navies, intelligence agencies and law enforcement have accounted for a number of seizures in the Caribbean region. Tables showing data on seizures of cocaine and marijuana are attached at Annexes 1 and 2.

Although there have been coordinated attempts by Caribbean Governments to deal with the drug issue, the Caribbean/Central American zone ranked number four in the world in terms of cocaine seizures in 2000.<sup>23</sup>

....In 2001, the countries and territories that comprise the Caribbean region accounted for aggregate seizures of 24.7 MT of cocaine, 112.9 MT of marijuana, 223 kilos of heroin and over 115,000 ecstasy tablets. With only 0.5% of the world's population, the law enforcement agencies of the region contributed to 7.4% of the global seizures of cocaine. For cocaine, heroin and marijuana this represented a significant increase over 2000 and the trend continued into 2002. The total amount of cocaine going through the region increased to over 400 MT and close to 50% of the cocaine introduced into the US \$35 billion United States cocaine market in 2001 passed through the Caribbean corridor.<sup>24</sup>

When these figures are examined within the context of the volume of production passing through the Caribbean, it is clear that the Caribbean can be considered a significant player in the global illicit drug trade.

Some perceive that there has been a militarization of the response to the drug threat in the Caribbean; however, the engagement of the military is an immediate solution to the

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 156.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

activities of narcotraffickers. The drug problem requires a comprehensive solution which encompasses more military forces. Legal, social and economic policies have to be considered if the problem is to be addressed fundamentally in the long term. What may be needed is a plan lasting a number of years along the following lines of operation, namely: (a) military; (b) constabulary; (c) social; (d) economic; (e) political; and (f) legislative. Governments having acknowledged that there is a drug problem and, in the past have attempted to use laws, monetary polices and other creative initiatives, however there has never been the marrying of one comprehensive plan which attacks all aspects of the narcotraffickers' activities.

#### The Problem of the Narcotrafficking Threat to Jamaica

In understanding the threat to Jamaica, it is important to address issues of geography, the history of Jamaica's involvement in illicit drugs, and the methods used to get drugs into and out of the island.

Jamaica is an island measuring 10,991 Square Kilometres. It possesses 1,022 Kilometres of coastline, and its numerous beaches and bays make it ideal for illegal maritime activities.<sup>25</sup> With over 100 unmonitored landing strips it is conducive to the landing of small aircraft in isolated areas and hence an ideal transshipment point for cocaine and marijuana.<sup>26</sup> Figure 4 is a map of Jamaica which provides a general overview of the island.

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<sup>25</sup> United States, Jamaica, "CIA World Factbook, available from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jm.html>; internet, accessed 20 March 2008.

<sup>26</sup> United States, US Department of State "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2007." *The Caribbean*, available from <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/vol1/html/80857.htm>; internet, accessed 1 February 2008.



## Map of Jamaica



Figure 4:

Source: University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection<sup>27</sup>

In terms of location, Jamaica is the second most northern English speaking Caribbean island (Bahamas being farthest north) and closest to the United States. This provides Colombian drug lords with the ideal location for the transshipment of cocaine from Colombia. Cocaine is mainly transited from Colombia whilst marijuana grown on the island is shipped directly from Jamaica to markets in Europe and the US.

Jamaica has had a long history of producing marijuana. Beginning in the late 1970's, marijuana production in Jamaica steadily increased in the 1980's to the point that the Government had to embark on a marijuana eradication programme. The efforts of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), the JDF and the US DEA resulted in fluctuations in

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<sup>27</sup> University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Maps of the Americas, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/camericacaribbean.jpg>, accessed 26 March 2008.

the levels of production and export of this illegal commodity. The introduction of this eradication programme had an overall adverse effect on the local farmers and dealers, who in order to compensate for their marijuana production shortfall, became involved in the storage, liaison and transshipment of cocaine through Jamaica for Colombian traffickers. This liaison by Jamaicans, coupled with the increased need for Colombians to use Caribbean routes resulted in a sharp increase in the volume of cocaine passing through Jamaica in the mid 1990's.<sup>28</sup>

The methods used to take cocaine into Jamaica and get marijuana and cocaine out of Jamaica have varied over the years. The primary means currently being utilized by the Colombians are maritime conveyances (fast boats) which depart Colombia for Jamaica. However, the system of delivery varies as it relates to whether the drug is left at sea to be collected by local drug dealers, comes directly to the coastline or is taken in by small aircraft. It has become evident in recent times that a number of Jamaican fishermen act as intermediaries in the recovery of the drug at sea using their small fishing boats to take the drug ashore. From Jamaica, the drug is then transhipped to the US or to Europe. The primary means of transport are through maritime vessels, aircraft and, in a number of instances, by human couriers using commercial air transport. Despite the efforts of law enforcement agencies and the JDF, drugs continue to enter and leave the island.

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<sup>28</sup> Maingot and Lozano, *The United States and the Caribbean – Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty ...*, 101.

### The Present Structure of the JDF

In presenting reconfiguration options, there is the need to look at the structure of the JDF since formation and the JDF Strategic Review 2005.

The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) was formed a few days prior to Jamaica becoming a sovereign independent State within the Commonwealth of Nations on the 6<sup>th</sup> August 1962.<sup>29</sup> Independence was gained from the UK. The Jamaica Defence Act (1962) mandated the role of the JDF. The Act stated that there shall be established in Jamaica a body of Her Majesty's military forces to be called the Jamaica Defence Force, and shall consist of a regular and a reserve force to be known as the Jamaica National Reserve.<sup>30</sup>

The JDF has been charged with the defence of and maintenance of order in Jamaica since 1968.<sup>31</sup> That role has been one of the primary activities in terms of providing internal security assistance to the Jamaica Constabulary Force in the conduct of their policing duties. Although initially conceived as an infantry force,<sup>32</sup> the security environment changed considerably throughout the 1960's and 1970's which necessitated the addition of maritime and air assets.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Jamaica Defence Force, "Jamaica Defence Force, Overview – Background," available from <http://www.jdfmil.org/overview/background/background.html>; internet, accessed 1 February 2008.

<sup>30</sup> Strategic Defence Review 2005 – A Transformed JDF Enhancing Jamaica's Security, (Kingston, Jamaica, Jamaica Defence Force Headquarters, 2005), 2.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

The Raison D'être of the JDF is to defend Jamaica against external and internal aggression.

. . . Mission: To provide military capability to deter and/or defeat threats against the Jamaican State and/or its interests.

Responsibilities:

- (1) To defend Jamaica against military or paramilitary threats.
- (2) To provide military aid to the Civil Authorities, namely relating to:
  - Restoration/maintenance of law and order;
  - Counter-narcotics operations;
  - Search and Rescue (SAR);
  - Casualty Evacuation;
  - Humanitarian and disaster relief operations;
  - Defence diplomacy;
  - Nation building projects;
  - Contingency planning; and
  - State ceremonial duties.
- (3) Maintaining the integrity of Jamaica's waters and airspace by demonstrating sovereignty over the territorial space and protecting the rights and interests in the maritime and aeronautical areas of jurisdiction (including marine environmental and fisheries protection).
- (4) Counter Terrorism Operations by monitoring and analyzing potential terrorist activities, and preventing or responding to terrorist incidents, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) detection, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD).<sup>34</sup>

Hence from the outset of the creation of the JDF the expectation of the state has always been wide and varied. The current structure is depicted in the organisational chart shown below as Figure 5.

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<sup>34</sup> Jamaica Defence Force, "Overview – Background," available from <http://www.jdfmil.org/overview/background/background3.html>; internet, accessed 18 March 2008.

## The Current Organisational Structure




Figure 5: Source: JDF Website<sup>35</sup>

In 2005 the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) commissioned a strategic review of the JDF, which has been intertwined into the National Security Strategy for Jamaica (NSS). According to the NSS and JDF Strategic Review, in order to achieve the defence mission, a number of tasks were identified for the JDF. In essence, this represented responsibilities being expanded into specific tasks and included internal security operations, disaster relief, support to other government agencies and departments, monitoring of airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction, peace support and regional cooperation.

Unfortunately, based on the levels of crime in Jamaica, the JDF has continually been involved in internal security operations with the JCF, which from time to time heavily consume the resources of the JDF. The JDF in the past has conducted battalion size

<sup>35</sup> Jamaica Defence Force, "Jamaica Defence Force, Overview – Background," available from <http://www.jdfmil.org/overview/background/background.html>; internet, accessed 1 February 2008.

operations in support of the JCF in some communities in the nation's capital, as a consequence of violent confrontation between drug trafficking affiliated gangs and the JCF. This highlights the fact that there is a correlation between the level of JDF internal security activities and the narcotics trafficking trade.

In the JCF Corporate Strategy 2005–2008, it was stated that the constabulary force would develop strategies that would address the most serious forms of organised crime such as money laundering, illicit trafficking in drugs, arms and ammunition, as well as enhanced intelligence capabilities.<sup>36</sup> However, despite outlining this intent, the JCF still substantially relies on the JDF for intelligence and for the interdiction of narcotics traffickers. The NSS clearly outlines in Goal 5, Objective 1 that “protocols should be established governing the cooperation between agencies with similar or overlapping responsibilities particularly the JDF and JCF ensuring the clear indication of these roles.”<sup>37</sup> Judging from this, a fair assessment would be that in the near future the JCF will continue to rely on the capabilities of the JDF to counter the narcotics trafficking threat to Jamaica.

Given this background there is now the need to address the issue of the configuration of the JDF if the levels of criminality connected to narcotics trafficking activity continue to remain high. Clearly, it is more desirable to prevent marijuana from being grown in and exported from Jamaica, and cocaine being imported and then transhipped out of the

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<sup>36</sup> “Jamaica Constabulary Force Corporate Strategy 2005-2008 – Developing the JCF for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” (Kingston, Jamaica, Phoenix Printers, 2005), 14.

<sup>37</sup> Strategic Defence Review 2005- A Transformed JDF Enhancing Jamaica's Security...,27

island. In this regard it would be fair to assume that control of the air corridors and sea lines of communication into and out of Jamaica by the JDF would definitely counter the narco-trafficking threat. The question which arises is: Can a small military with limited resources and capability, tasked with protecting the State's maritime and aerospace jurisdiction, make a fundamental difference in addressing the threat if configured correctly?

In answering the question, what may be necessary is a reconfiguration of the JDF. The Strategic Review of the JDF indicated that within the present structure an expansion of air and maritime assets is necessary. There is a plan within the Review to replace the existing fleet of four Eurocopter AS 355N surveillance and utility assets and to acquire an additional Bell 412 EP helicopter to add to the existing three. It is also proposed that two maritime patrol aircraft be acquired. Also included in this plan is the opening of a local aircrew training facility and an expansion of the reserve flight to include air maintenance component.

It is proposed that the Coast Guard refurbish and reintroduce into service of two currently held offshore patrol vessels (OPV), and acquire three new ones. There is also the acquisition of twelve new inshore patrol vessels (IPVs) to complement the refurbishment of the seven currently in the fleet. Also, the proposal to expand the reserve element and construct additional berthing facilities and expand the maritime engineering workshop is in the review.

The proposed changes to the Air Wing and Coast Guard reflect an increase in capabilities and not the intent to move from an infantry bias in the structure of the JDF. Are there other options that need be considered as it relates to the present and proposed structure to reflect the configuration of a force capable of addressing the narcotics trafficking threat? In a recent paper, it was said that “Jamaica could do well with only one active marine infantry battalion, a larger Coast Guard and Air Wing, and a reserve brigade of four infantry battalions and an artillery battery.”<sup>38</sup> This observation indicates that possibly the JDF’s present structure may need revision, even if the changes are not specifically related to a narco-trafficking threat.

### The structure proposed by the 2005 Strategic Review




Figure 6: Source: JDF Strategic Review<sup>39</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Major Rocky R. Meade, “The Relevance and Optimal Structure of the Military in Jamaica in the Current and Emerging Geo-Security Environment,” (Masters of Military Art and Sciences Thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 47.

<sup>39</sup> Jamaica Defence Force, Strategic Defence Review 2005 – A Transformed JDF Enhancing Jamaica’s Security..., 31.



The structure developed through the analytical processes of the strategic review indicates that a combat support battalion will be created as Figure 6 illustrates. Figure 6 indicates an expansion to the existing capabilities of the Air Wing and Coast Guard as indicated before and also the creation of an engineering reserve squadron. This structure is similar to the existing one with no change in the force configuration or unit structure in the case of the Air Wing and Coast Guard. The traditional task of the JDF is provided for in this chart with no special emphasis on maritime threats. This structure is still defined by the infantry centric conception of the JDF.

#### Reconfiguration Options

In addressing the narco-trafficking threat and examining how a change in the structure can counter the threat, two reconfiguration options will be presented. In presenting these options for the reconfiguration of the JDF, the following assumptions will be made:

(a) There are monetary constraints in the Jamaican economy; however, resources will be made available to finance the reconfiguration of the JDF; (b) the existing manpower and equipment will be integrated into any new configuration; and, (c) based on the small size of the JDF, it can be easily reconfigured.

### Option1: Possible Configuration




Figure 7: Source: Author.

The first option as shown in Figure 7, involves two Coast Guard commands to engage the threat. These commands, one of offshore and the other inshore are organised along functional roles. The inshore command would have control of the territorial waters whilst the offshore command would be responsible for the nation's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). If the expectation of the present strategic review is met there would be no need for an increase in number of the existing or projected purchase of OPVs or IPVVs.

The Air Wing would now comprise an internal security flight combined with a maritime flight. This structure would see the retention of the existing fleet of helicopters, however there would be the acquisition of four (4) maritime aircraft. There would be one regular battalion with two reserve battalions to assist the JCF in the internal security role when required and also other infantry type tasks. The remainder of the present structure would not be changed. Each command would have areas of sea lines of operations which would basically cover seaborne approaches and departure points from the island.

This option retains a more centralised command and control in the Coast Guard Headquarters but reduces the infantry's capacity in order to increase maritime capability. While this may be a more cost effective model as it immediately overcomes the need for a real increase in financial resource outlays for personnel, it represents the significant risk of depleting the land component's capacity to deal with internal security type operations or stated commitments of the JDF. This disadvantage can, however, be offset by the utilisation of the reserve battalions but there also lies the tactical and administrative problem of the routine mobilisation of reserve elements which may prove cumbersome over the long term.

## Option 2: Possible Configuration




Figure 8: Source: Author.

The second option for restructuring is shown at Figure 8 and involves two distinct Coast Guard Commands with less centralisation. In this option, additional OPV's would be required. The Air Wing would possess a domestic security flight comprising the existing fleet of helicopters to support domestic Air Wing task of the JDF, and a maritime flight of three long range surveillance aircraft to provide long range coverage at sea. In this option there are two regular infantry battalions and one reserve infantry battalion. The counter terrorism operations group (C-TOG) would be placed under the Coast Guard command. Despite this placement in the structure, C-TOG nevertheless retains its land/sea anti-terrorist capability, which would add an immense capability as it relates to maritime interdiction.

This structure provides for a more robust operational echelon to engage the narcotics trafficking threat in the maritime jurisdiction, whilst maintaining a good land based infantry capability needed to conduct other tasks at the current level. The organisation of the Coast Guard is based on geographic terms. This should provide for tactical flexibility in light of the characteristic differences in the island's operational space when, operating to the north of Jamaica (Haitian/Bahamas outbound routes to North America) as distinct from the south (Central American inbound routes). These characteristic differences can be inferred from the Figure 1 depiction of the Caribbean area, in particular the northern Caribbean space where Jamaica is located. This tactical flexibility is necessary especially when facing a persistent and innovative adversary like the narcotrafficker.

### Conclusion

The Caribbean region as a whole suffers in various degrees from the activities of the narcotraffickers. Limited in military capabilities, Caribbean States tend to rely on external military assistance, for example from North American and European forces, in addressing the narcotrafficking threat to their respective States. This threat is highlighted by the volume of illicit narcotics transhipped through the region and seizure levels. Also, the efforts of CARICOM as a collective regional organization in attempting to address money laundering, gun smuggling, corruption of public officials and overall governance, are a key indicator of the importance of this issue to regional governments.

Jamaica has traditionally been preferred by Colombians for narcotics activity, based on its location and Jamaican Diaspora links in the US and Europe, which continue to

facilitate easy command and control for their narco-trafficking activities. Jamaica will continue to be intertwined in the Colombian narcotics network. Also Haiti is geographically positioned to be a key transshipment point for Jamaican marijuana and Colombian cocaine and a source of illegal weapons coming into Jamaica through maritime routes, which ultimately impacts on Jamaica's crime levels.

The control of the sea lines of communication and air corridors into and out of Jamaica through the application of a military force's assets and manpower, configured to combat maritime and air violations of Jamaica's territorial waters and airspace is necessary in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The JDF was conceived as a predominately infantry biased force at its conception without specifically addressing a maritime threat. The Strategic Review of 2005 sought to expand the JDF, however, the bias towards an infantry dominant type organization continues to exist. If one concedes that there is a correlation between crime in Jamaica and narco-trafficking, the need for the possible reconfiguration which involve options outside of the infantry biased structure becomes more urgent.

The two reconfiguration models presented reflect options open to the GOJ and the JDF in addressing the security and stability of Jamaica in the near future. Narco-trafficking constitutes a real threat to the Jamaican society. The JDF has a duty to protect the State. In executing this duty, strong maritime and aviation components are important in addressing narco-trafficking. Although there has been a decline in the number of seizures of marijuana and cocaine over the last two years, narco-traffickers continue to develop

new and ingenious ways to smuggle illicit drugs, hence there is no reason to assume the threat has diminished.

The continued existence of narcotrafficking and the impact it has on the Jamaican society demands a review of the configuration of the JDF, and hence the claim that the JDF's current organizational structure is not configured to counter the narcotrafficking threat to Jamaica in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is a valid and relevant one.

## CARIBBEAN DRUG TRENDS 2001-2002

## Annex I - Cocaine seizures, 1994-2001 (in kilos)

	2001	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995	1994
Anguilla	926	0	0	0	0	289	611	342
Antigua and Barbuda	767	24	26	1	126	6	115	130
Aruba	266	346	465	794	408	203	153	146
Bahamas	1,468	2,774	1,857	3,347	2,565	115	392	492
Barbados	83	81	138	35	88	36	248	246
Belize	3,850	13	38	1,221	2,691	470	845	143
Bermuda	667	13	392	11	4	23	9	20
British Virgin Islands	1,334	534	0	75	838	1,765	1,194	457
Cayman Islands	1,001	1,813	1,402	1,213	1,054	2,219	143	5
Cuba	1,278	3,145	2,444	956	1,444	7,905	372	238
Dominica	6	10	83	29	101	3	7	1652
Dominican Republic	1,908	1,307	1,071	2,337	1,225	1,341	4,391	2,888
French Guiana	..	25	446	3	213	9	64	0
Grenada	83	103	43	44	21	1,224	95	10
Guadeloupe	593	292	593	3,222	66	91	0	6,211
Guyana	31	164	37	175	167	45	51	76
Haiti	436	594	380	1,272	2,100	956	1,357	716
Jamaica	2,948	1,656	2,455	1,143	414	254	570	179
Martinique	..	15	36	46	37	17	0	0
Montserrat	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	60
Netherlands Antilles	1,043	n/a	18	639	1,302	710	111	906
Puerto Rico	2,831	5,516	9,977	10,344	15,153	11,072	12,512	15,167
Saint Kitts and Nevis	20	53	10	1	150	0	6	420
Saint Lucia	63	110	122	58	8	20	27	18
St. Vincent & Grenadines	0	50	15	13	1	2	13	61
Suriname	2,510	207	180	283	117	1,413	0	219
Trinidad and Tobago	636	303	137	79	21	100	95	240
Turks and Caicos	4	0	0	2,025	1	393	45	20
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>24,729</b>	<b>19,169</b>	<b>22,565</b>	<b>29,416</b>	<b>30,326</b>	<b>30,461</b>	<b>23,427</b>	<b>30,160</b>

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Caribbean Drug Trends 2001-2002*, Caribbean Regional Office, Bridgetown, Barbados, February 2003.



## CARIBBEAN DRUG TRENDS 2001-2002

## Annex II - Marijuana seizures, 1994-2001 (in kilos)

		2001	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995	1994
Anguilla		1	0	8	0	1	1	2	90
Antigua and Barbuda	and	662	67	94	105	628	1,485	215	3,380
Aruba		1,159	12	142	..	13	77	366	31
Bahamas		4,091	4,134	3,610	2,598	3,763	2,606	3,536	1,420
Belize		245	249	392	1,557	263	202	40	142
Bermuda		32	N/a	n/a	83	92	107	79	0
British Virgin Islands	Virgin	104	26	26	84	85	119	236	1,932
Cayman Islands		11,818	6,621	5,100	4,063	3,423	3,188	2,673	1,728
Cuba		6,121	8,802	5,559	4,610	6,023	5,369	4,482	1,195
Dominica		521	467	192	361	405	136	499	741
Dominican Republic		3,816	2,934	184	650	788	246	1,056	6,810
French Guiana		58	134	127	123	191	0	35	..
Grenada		219	688	1,057	667	1,769	250	152	195
Guadeloupe		515	8,860	20,179	52,377	0	1,935	516	1,017
Guyana		3,528	51	40	99	56,716	10,995	..	4,387
Haiti		31	9,255	9,000	0	0	46	1,705	401
Jamaica		22,740	35,911	24,729	31,587	90,737	46,000	74,044	55,870
Martinique		199	136	355	166	0	0	..	749
Montserrat		2,677	0	3	1	2	1,597	0	0
Netherlands Antilles		112	541	0	650	810	25	3,772	N/a
Puerto Rico		12,605	1,285	1,337	8,635	0	0	24	1,982
Saint Kitts and Nevis		14,124	31	67	5	3	29	330	120
Saint Lucia		352	352	622	326	102	182	753	1,804
St Vincent & Grenadines		7,180	1,321	527	1,227	3,630	1,710	1,962	1,709
Suriname		177	105	65	17	35	39	6	107
Trinidad and Tobago		1,558	1,850	3,120	11,408	1,634	7,249	1,039	1,546
Turks and Caicos		0	8	22	17	10	15	24	27
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>82,575</b>	<b>74,728</b>	<b>77,822</b>	<b>123,992</b>	<b>169,488</b>	<b>87,953</b>	<b>112,896</b>	<b>96,231</b>

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Caribbean Drug Trends 2001-2002*, Caribbean Regional Office, Bridgetown, Barbados, February 2003.

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