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EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS

**WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN
IS DEFENCE ON THE RIGHT TRACK?**

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ABSTRACT

This paper illustrates how a leadership model is used to evaluate the Canadian Forces' (CF) participation in the whole of government approach in Afghanistan. It begins with a description of the command capability model developed by Dr. Ross Pigeau and Ms. Carol McCann. After examining the current roles of the CF in Afghanistan, it utilizes key dimensions of command and control within the model to evaluate the organization's performance. It will demonstrate that although the CF's level of competence is generally high, areas for improvement exist. The lack of both specific assets and effective liaison with DFAIT and CIDA has contributed to a whole of government approach that requires improvement. Despite these problems, the paper demonstrates that the CF continues to accept full responsibility for the mission and endeavours to meet the government's overall commitment. It concludes with a recommendation for the Government of Canada to provide the required strategic leadership to significantly improve the whole of government approach in Afghanistan.

Introduction

Canada has been actively involved in the global war on terror since the attacks against the US in September 2001. The initial deployment of a Canadian Task Group and associated air support to the Arabian Sea in October 2001 was followed by an army presence in Afghanistan in January 2002. Currently, Canada continues to support UN and NATO efforts in the country with a significant commitment of approximately 2500 troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) whose mission is guided by the Afghanistan Compact.

The Afghanistan Compact is a statement of mutual obligations signed by the Government of Afghanistan and the international community. The document identifies three critical and interdependent areas that will guide activity for all signatories over next few years – security, governance and development.¹ Beyond the military involvement through the Department of National Defence (DND), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) have contributed to Canada's whole of government approach to international aid.²

In 2008, the government-mandated Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan (the Manley report) identified several problems that detracted from the whole of government approach mission in Afghanistan, including a lack of coordination between DND, DFAIT, and CIDA.³ Additionally, several other reports have criticized the performance of the

¹ "The Afghanistan Compact," (31 January - 1 February 2006), available from <http://www.unama-afg.org/news/londonConf/docs/06jan30-AfghanistanCompact-Final.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2008.

² Government of Canada, "Canada's Approach in Afghanistan," available from <http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/mission-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 7 April 2008.

³ In part as a result of negative public opinion and Opposition pressure, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the formation of an Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan in October 2007. The panel was asked to analyse and make recommendations on Canada's engagement in Afghanistan beyond February

mission.⁴ This paper will use key dimensions of command and control within the Competency, Authority and Responsibility (CAR) model to assess the performance of DND, and more specifically, the Canadian Forces (CF). The essay will first describe the model, identify the roles and responsibilities of the CF, and then evaluate the organization. By using the CAR model, this paper will show that the CF's support in Afghanistan requires improvement in key areas to enhance the overall effectiveness of the whole of government mission. The required length of this paper constrains the number of appropriate examples to support the evaluations however, it will conclude with specific recommendations for improving the current mission of the CF in Afghanistan.

Competency, Authority, Responsibility Model

Prior to evaluating the CF's contribution to the rebuilding of Afghanistan, it is important to understand the evaluation tool. In their study *Re-conceptualizing Command and Control*, Canadian researchers Pigeau and McCann introduce new definitions for command and control in addition to presenting a model for analysing the effectiveness of someone's ability to command and control.⁵ Their model to evaluate an individual is based on three dimensions of command capability – competency, authority and responsibility (CAR). Competency is defined as those skills and abilities required to complete missions successfully and can be divided into one of four classes: physical, intellectual, emotional and interpersonal. Authority refers to command's

2009. "Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan," available from <http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/main-eng.html>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2008.

⁴ Several organizations have produced reports and/or discussion papers over the past few years commenting on government actions in Afghanistan. These include the Senlis Council, the Canadian Council for International Co-Operation and the Atlantic Council of the United States.

⁵ Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, "Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control," *Canadian Military Journal* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2003); available from http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol3/no1/pdf/53-64_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 November 2007.

“domain of influence” and is described as the degree to which a commander is empowered to act, including the scope and recourses available to the individual.⁶ It is divided into legal and personal authority. The final factor, responsibility, refers to the extent to which an individual accepts liability (legal and moral) of command. The two components of this dimension are extrinsic and intrinsic responsibility. “Extrinsic responsibility is the degree to which an individual feels accountable both up to superiors and down to followers.”⁷ Intrinsic responsibility is the “degree of self-generated obligation that one feels towards the military mission” and is associated with the concepts of honour, loyalty and duty.⁸

Pigeau and McCann describe the relationship between the three dimensions with a cube model that enables a visual mapping of the entire space of command capability and provides an ability to situate individual members within this space.⁹ Figure 1 illustrates how each of the CAR dimensions is depicted on one of the axes of the cube and the relationship between authority and responsibility when competency is at a fixed level. The desired state is a balanced command which enables an appropriate level of both authority and responsibility. Figure 2 demonstrates this balanced command at various levels of competency. Ideally, the level of authority and responsibility given to an individual is commensurate with the level of competence; the result is termed the Balance Command Envelope (BCE). Compromised

⁶ Ibid., 58.

⁷ Ibid., 59.

⁸ Ibid., 60.

⁹ Ibid., 60.

command capability can arise when a large imbalance exists.¹⁰ Overall, the CAR model provides a good tool to assess an individual's command capability.¹¹




Figure 1 – The relationship between Authority and Responsibility in the CAR structure, when Competency is at a fixed level.

Source: Pigeau, McCann, Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control, 59.




Figure 2 – Three slices of the Authority-Responsibility surface for three different levels of Competency.

Source: Pigeau, McCann, Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control, 60.

¹⁰ Ibid., 61.

¹¹ The Pigeau McCann study began with the “intention to develop an internally consistent set of command and control concepts that would form the framework for a uniquely Canadian research program.” The study uses clarified definitions of command and control as a foundation for the CAR model and while may not yet be a common assessment tool, it does provide a method to consistently and thoroughly evaluate command capabilities for comparison purposes. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control,” *Canadian Military Journal* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 53.

Although designed to assess an individual's command capability, the CAR model can be adapted to assess an organization. The dimensions of competency, authority and responsibility are extremely relevant to both measuring and comparing the effectiveness of units or organizations. However, some of the components of each dimension must be adapted to fit this type of assessment and a brief description of each competency and subordinate class follows. At an organizational level, physical competency can be interpreted as the capability to conduct mandated operations. Intellectual competency remains similar and could also include organizational experience and knowledge. Emotional competency can be associated with organization willingness to endure under trying circumstances and interpersonal competency as the ability to interact with other organizations as well as within the organization (unit or group cohesion). Within the second dimension, legal authority "formally assigns commanders resources and personnel for accomplishing the mission"¹² and is applicable to both individuals and organizations. Personal authority for an individual is given informally by peers and subordinates and is difficult to translate to an organization. From the final dimension, extrinsic responsibility is the same as for an individual – the willingness to be held responsible for the assigned legal authority. Intrinsic responsibility for an organization is also similar – "the degree of self-generated obligation that one feels toward the ...mission."¹³ These descriptions will be used to assess the performance of the CF in Afghanistan.

Canada's Role in Rebuilding Afghanistan

As delineated in the Afghanistan Compact, the Afghan Government has pledged to create a secure environment "by strengthening Afghan institutions to meet the security needs of the

¹² Ibid., 59.

¹³ Ibid., 60.

country in a fiscally sustainable manner.”¹⁴ At the request of the elected Afghan government, approximately 47,000 ISAF forces from 40 nations are currently deployed throughout the country to help provide a secure environment.¹⁵ This military force is in part responsible to provide security for a significant number of development and governance organizations. ISAF and the international community realized that progress in Afghanistan could only be made if security, governance, and reconstruction and development activities complemented and supported each other.¹⁶ Canada has pledged full support to the Afghanistan Compact and in a speech to Canadian Forces College in 2007, Defence Minister Peter MacKay stated:

...the [Canadian] Government has brought together all relevant federal departments and agencies in a whole-of-government approach. Our collective expertise in areas such as governance, development, health, justice and security is making a difference on the ground in Afghanistan.¹⁷

CF Mandate and Mission in Afghanistan

According to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence, security is clearly the role of the CF in Afghanistan. Its 2007 report on the CF in Afghanistan stated:

The Canadian Forces are in Afghanistan:

- a. To protect the national security interests of Canada by helping to ensure that Afghanistan will not, once again, become a haven for international terrorists;
- b. At the invitation of the democratically elected government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, to help provide a secure environment in which the rule of law, human rights and economic prosperity can grow; and

¹⁴ *The Afghanistan Compact*, 3.

¹⁵ NATO, “Progress in Afghanistan: Bucharest Summit,” (2-4 Apr 2008); available from http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/progress_afghanistan.pdf; Internet; accessed 7 April 2008. As of March 2008.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Peter MacKay, “Speaking Notes for Defence Minister Peter MacKay at the Canadian Forces Defence College - 3 December 2007,” (3 December 2008); available from http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/sp_mnd_031207-en.asp; Internet; accessed 7 April 2008.

c. To support our allies and other international friends in the UN, NATO and the G-8 by providing leadership in one of the most difficult operational areas.¹⁸

This approach in Afghanistan is consistent with Canadian Government policy. As stated in *Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*, the CF land forces can be expected to conduct a three-block war. This could involve simultaneous combat operations, stabilization operations, and humanitarian relief and reconstruction in a single operating environment.¹⁹ How these published defence missions interact with other government departments will be assessed later in this paper.

Background

Shortly after NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in October 2001, then Prime Minister Chrétien announced that Canada would contribute forces to an international coalition to conduct a campaign against terrorism.²⁰ The initial deployment sent a Naval task Group, long-range transport aircraft, and two maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft to the Southwest Asia theatre with a mandate to conduct al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership interdiction operations.²¹ In January 2002, Canada deployed an infantry battle group as part of a US Army task force. In addition to providing security at the Kandahar airfield, the troops engaged in combat operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Beginning in 2003, a deployment of approximately 1700 personnel was sent to Kabul to help establish security in support of ISAF.

¹⁸ House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence, "Canadian Forces in Afghanistan," <http://cmtc.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/391/nddn/reports/rp3034719/nddnrp01/nddnrp01-e.pdf>; Internet; accessed 8 April 2008.

¹⁹ Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005, 8.

²⁰ Jim Cox, "PRB 07-19E Afghanistan: The Canadian Military Mission;" available from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0719-e.htm>; Internet; accessed 1 April 2008.

²¹ Parliamentary Research Branch, "Afghanistan: The Canadian Military Mission," (2007) available from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0719-e.htm>; Internet; accessed 1 April 2008.

Operations included foot patrols, armed raids on weapons caches, and surveillance missions, as well as the facilitation of provincial, national and presidential elections. From mid-2005 until the present, Canadian troops have been conducting operations against the Taliban in the Kandahar region in an effort to establish a secure environment.²² The above missions all further support the mandate stated by the Standing Committee on National Defence.

In pursuing their mandate, the greatest threat to CF personnel in Afghanistan lies in missions that take them “outside the wire” of the main base in Kandahar (KAF). The base is occasionally attacked with mortars but few casualties result from these infrequent attacks. It is when troops depart KAF that they become the target of enemy forces employing small arms fire, mortar attacks or Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Personnel are required to leave the confines of KAF for several reasons including reconnaissance patrols, intelligence gathering missions, direct combat support missions, re-supply patrols for Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) or transit to meetings with Afghan personnel. With this brief explanation of mandate and mission of the CF, it is now possible to assess the effectiveness of the mission.

The CAR Model - Competency

Based on previous discussion, the CAR model provides an appropriate tool to assess the CF’s effectiveness in meeting the security mandate. The competency dimension consists of four skill sets - physical, intellectual, emotional and interpersonal. This author interprets the physical ability of the CF as the capability to conduct operations to meet the stated mandate. Force protection is an essential element of meeting this security mandate. Preservation of both personnel and defence assets is a high priority and must be addressed during all phases of the mission.

²² Ibid.

The CF, specifically the Army, has transformed significantly since 2001. Upon initial deployment to Afghanistan, the CF was operating equipment that was not suitable for the hostile environment. For example, the thinly armoured Iltis jeep provided little protection against an IED and its use resulted in the deaths of Canadian soldiers.²³ The Army realized that it had to modernize to help prevent further losses. “The Canadian Army is quickly transforming into a knowledge-based, medium weight force using technology, information dominance and armoured wheeled-fleets as key weapons on the battlefield.”²⁴ The government has increased the defence budget to ensure that the appropriate equipment is available to the CF.²⁵ “Since the [CF] first joined ISAF in 2003, government, military and public service leadership has joined in a cooperative effort to get Canadian troops the clothing, weapons and equipment to do the job we have sent them to do.”²⁶ With the acquisition of new equipment such as the Leopard tank and the RG-31 Nayala within the last year, the Army is better equipped to meet the stated security mandate and to provide force protection. However, the number one cause of casualties in theatre for the CF is still IEDs.²⁷

²³ CBC News, "Questions Raised about Military Equipment After Soldiers Killed," <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2003/10/03/iltis031003.html>; Internet; accessed 9 April 2008.

²⁴ Canadian Forces, "Backgrounder: Army Equipment for Operation ARCHER," http://www.dnd.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1833#apy; Internet; accessed 7 April 2008.

²⁵ Main estimates (\$B) for fiscal years 01/02 – 11.39, 02/03 – 11.83, 03/04 – 12.26, 04/05 – 13.30, 05/06 – 13.40, 06/07 – 14.80. Department of National Defence, “Defence Budgets 1999-2007,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Reports/budget05/back05_e.asp; Internet; accessed 20 April 2008.

²⁶ House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence, “Canadian Forces in Afghanistan,” available from http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/pdf/scond_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 7 April 2008.

²⁷ Forty-eight of the total of eighty-two fatal casualties were caused by IEDs. Forty-seven of seventy-four occurred since Canada’s redeployment to Kandahar was completed in February 2006. Statistics are not available but the number of non-fatal casualties resulting from IEDs is very high. Department of National Defence, “Fallen Canadians,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/fallen/index_e.asp; Internet; accessed 9 April 2008.

Mitigation of the IED threat includes avoidance and/or improved detection and de-arming.²⁸ As previously mentioned, re-supply patrols are required for keeping FOBs equipped with essential provisions such as ammunition, equipment, fuel, food, etc. Since these patrols must occur on a regular basis and often on a single available route, enemy combatants are able to plan effective IED attacks or ambushes. The use of medium-lift helicopters would negate the requirement for the majority of these road-based re-supply missions and thus, reduce opportunities for enemy attacks. Canada is in the process of acquiring such an airborne asset but it is unclear if it will be available prior to 2011 when Canada's mission is set to end.²⁹ In February 2008, Poland announced that of the eight helicopters it is sending to Afghanistan, two would be "at the disposal of Canada."³⁰ While this is a step in the right direction, the CF's physical competency in providing force protection against IED attacks will remain degraded until adequate airborne resources are acquired. Including the new equipment acquired over the last year, overall physical competence is assessed as medium.

The second skill set of competency, intellectual, is critical for planning missions, monitoring the situation, assessing risks, making judgments and includes a willingness to learn.³¹ The CF uses the *CF Operational Planning Process (OPP)* as the main guide for mission planning.³² Specifically, and to a much greater extent than the Air Force or Navy, the Army uses

²⁸ To keep the paper at the unclassified level, this paper will not discuss detection and/or de-arming of IEDs.

²⁹ The Canadian Press, "Ottawa Asks Boeing for Proposal for 16 New Chinook Helicopters;" available from <http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5hlHnUE9Q5hfUQFZlApGdESkRKwfQ>; Internet; accessed 11 April 2008.

³⁰ The date for commencement of the helicopter operations has not been promulgated. Michael Petrou, "Warsaw Antes Up," *Macleans*, 4 February 2008; available from http://www.macleans.ca/article.jsp?content=20080204_001906_632; Internet; accessed 12 April 2008.

³¹ Ross Pigeau, Carol McCann, *Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control*, 58.

³² Department of National Defence, *CF Operational Planning Process*, National Defence, (2002), 1-1.

the process to plan missions by developing an understanding of enemy capabilities, evaluating potential enemy and friendly courses of action, and creating a campaign plan using the operational art. Although modifications to the process are often conducted, overall, the OPP has survived the test of time. A high degree of operator confidence in the process demonstrates that it is an effective planning tool. As a complimentary process, over the past few years the Army has revitalized its ability to educate soldiers through the Army Lessons Learned Centre (ALLC). Using information gathered from theatre, the “ALLC will collate, analyze and disseminate Canadian and Allied full spectrum operational experiences in order to support the Army Learning Process.”³³ Linked with the ALLC is the After Action Review website whose purpose is “to enable soldiers, units and formations to LEARN more from their experiences during training and operations.”³⁴ Both staff officers and combat soldiers understand the importance of having timely information to train future rotations. These proven planning practices coupled with timely improvements to applying lessons learned demonstrate a high degree of intellectual competence within the CF.

Emotional competency is the third skill set to be evaluated. For an organization, this skill set is associated with the willingness to endure adversity under trying circumstances and to “keep an overall emotional balance and perspective on the situation.”³⁵ The CF suffered its first personnel losses in April 2002 to a friendly fire incident and to date, a total of 82 men and

³³ Department of National Defence, "Army Lessons Learned Centre," <http://armyapp.dnd.ca/allc/main.asp?language=English>; Internet; accessed 5 April 2008.

³⁴ Department of National Defence, "The After Action Review," <http://armyapp.dnd.ca/allc/aar/main.asp?lng=e>; Internet; accessed 7 April 2008.

³⁵ Ross Pigeau, Carol McCann, *Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control*, 58.

women have paid the ultimate sacrifice in defence of the mission.³⁶ Despite these losses, the CF remains committed to its mandate and after each death, reinforces the message that the soldiers did not die in vain.³⁷ More importantly, this organizational commitment appears to be helped by support for the mission from soldiers and their families.³⁸ Based on the professed commitment from the CF and individual soldiers, emotional competency is assessed as high.

To round out the competency factor, an assessment of interpersonal skills must be completed. At an organizational level, interpersonal competency can be interpreted as an ability to demonstrate effective interaction with subordinate, peer, and superior organizations while representing a high degree of trust and respect. The CF in Afghanistan is an integral part of the ISAF mission and as the fifth largest contributor, Canada holds a respected position within the organization.³⁹ Surrounding the CF's area of responsibility in Regional Command (RC) South are US, UK and Dutch troops. A Canadian currently commands RC South and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar Province is led by Canada. Commenting on Canadian US interoperability, Dr Adam Chapnick stated "We use the same equipment; we have similar approaches; our medical personnel have the same training as theirs. The U.S. likes to work with

³⁶ Department of National Defence, "[Fallen Canadians.](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/fallen/index_e.asp)" http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/fallen/index_e.asp; Internet; accessed 9 April 2008.

³⁷ The CEFCOM press release in part stated "This incident will not deter us from continuing our work with the Government and the people of Afghanistan. Incidents like this one prove that, along with our Afghan National Security Force partners, Canadians need to continue working to bring about peace and security in the region." Similar statements follow each fatality. Department of National Defence, "Canadian Soldier Killed in Afghanistan," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2609; Internet; accessed 9 April 2008.

³⁸ Prior to her death, Capt Nicola Goddard wrote home "The longer that we are in theatre and the more we interact with the Afghan people the more I feel that we are serving a purpose here." Numerous comments can be found from serving members or families reinforcing support for the mission.

³⁹ NATO, "International Security Assistance Force Placemat," available from http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 April 2008.

us, and we like to work with them."⁴⁰ Recently the House of Commons voted to extend the mission in Afghanistan only if certain conditions were met. One condition was that NATO must provide an extra 1,000 troops to support Canadian operations in the south.⁴¹ During the final day of the NATO Summit conference in April 2008, the US pledged to supply "many more" soldiers to support Canada.⁴² This support from a reliable NATO ally indicates that the CF's relationship with international organizations continues to be strong. Canada's historical relationships with major allies have generally been resilient and it appears that this continues today with the respect that Canada has earned during the mission in Afghanistan. In addition to the typical international relationships in which the CF currently participates, a special link to the Afghans is also evident.

An integral part of the CF's mission is training the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) to be more effective and to eventually assume responsibility for Afghanistan's security. The Canadian Operational Mentor Liaison Team (OMLT) advises, mentors and assists the senior leadership of the ANA in capacity building.⁴³ OMLTs also play a particularly important coordinating and de-conflicting role between ANA and ISAF operations. The Manley report stated the importance of the OMLT succinctly. "Critical to the [CF] mission in Afghanistan is

⁴⁰ Daniel Lak and Robert Sheppard, "Joint Operations: The Pros and Cons of Teaming Up with the U.S. in Afghanistan," CBC News; <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/joint-command.html>; Internet; accessed 11 April 2008.

⁴¹ Government of Canada, "News Release - Prime Minister announces decisive action on Afghanistan Panel recommendations;" http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/nr_2008_02_08-en.asp; Internet; accessed 20 April 2008.

⁴² CTV, "U.S. Pledges 'Many More' Soldiers for Afghanistan," http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20080404/putin_NATO_AM_080404/20080404?hub=SEAfghanistan; Internet; accessed 11 April 2008.

⁴³ Department of National Defence, "Operation ATHENA: The Canadian Forces Contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/afghanistan/athena_e.asp; Internet; accessed 18 April 2008.

their contribution to the [ANA].”⁴⁴ As with the historical and current international relationships described previously, the success of this particular partnership reinforces the organizational relationships in which the CF participates. However, not all of the CF’s relationships are as positive as these.

The CF has played the major role in Canadian efforts in Afghanistan. To a lesser extent, DFAIT and CIDA contribute the nation-building efforts. The Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) is commanded by a CF Lieutenant Colonel and consists of 330 personnel including diplomats, development experts, police officers and military personnel. Although the KPRT is designed to be the spearhead for the whole of government approach, because the vast majority of personnel are military, there exists an inadequate representation of civilians to provide advice. Similarly, the Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) is a “team of strategic military planners to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in developing key national strategies and mechanisms for the effective implementation of those strategies.”⁴⁵ The team consists of 16 CF, two DND and two CIDA personnel and does not realistically represent the intended whole of government approach.⁴⁶ After the death of Canadian diplomat Glyn Berry in January 2006, non-military personnel have largely been restricted to the secure bases in Kandahar and have been unable to conduct the reconstruction

⁴⁴ John Manley and others, *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, (2008); available from <http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/reportViewer-eng.asp?selMenu=1>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2008.

⁴⁵ SAT Mission Statement: “SAT will, guided by the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan and in accordance with CDS intent, assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRA) in the development of the human capacity and processes needed to design the strategic plans necessary to attain the objectives of the *Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)*.” Department of National Defence, “Backgrounder: Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703; Internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

⁴⁶ “The Canadian Forces Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan (SAT-A)” (Presentation to JCSP 34, 2007).

and development work required.⁴⁷ Each organization has a different priority and the KPRT “displays signs of the fragmentation and uncoordinated effort that prevail throughout the programming of international aid development in Afghanistan.”⁴⁸ A Canadian officer, in speaking of “deep cultural differences” in Afghanistan commented:

...I'm talking about the differences between the military culture, the culture of diplomacy and the culture of development assistance. We don't understand each other, we don't understand each other's languages, we don't understand each other's way of doing business.⁴⁹

The CF's history of working in a multi-national environment during dozens of peacekeeping missions and with various coalitions has left Canada with an expertise in these military organizational relationships. However, the CF's record of conducting effective liaison within Canadian governmental organizations in Afghanistan is viewed with mixed success. At the strategic and operational level, a distinct lack of framework is evident. No doctrine exists for intergovernmental cooperation, thus limiting the CF's ability to contribute to the whole of government mission. Overall, interpersonal skills at an organizational level range from low to high.

For the assessment of DND's overall competency in Afghanistan, the descriptions above illustrate an organization that has, on average, a medium degree of physical and intellectual capability. Despite the new and updated equipment, the modified tactics and a robust lessons learned system, IEDs still cause the majority of CF deaths and thus, detract from a secure

⁴⁷ Taylor Owen and Patrick Travers, "3D Vision," *The Walrus*, no. July August 2007 (2007), 46; available from <http://www.walrusmagazine.ca/articles/2007.07.Afghanistan-and-Canada/>; Internet; accessed 13 Apr 2008.

⁴⁸ *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, 24.

⁴⁹ The article consists of an interview with Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, co-authors of *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*. Lee Berthiaume, "The Three-D Approach is here to Stay," *Embassy* 178 (31 October 2007); available from http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2007/october/31/threedapproach/; Internet; accessed 10 April 2008.

environment. There is future promise to reduce the frequency of this type of attack but for now, the assessment must stand. The emotional and interpersonal skill sets of competency are assessed in a range from low to high; the organization is committed to the mandate and while is extremely effective at working with military multinational elements, in Afghanistan, it is having difficulty at conducting liaison with Canadian OGDs. To continue with the overall assessment of the CF, authority will be evaluated.

The CAR Model - Authority

The second organizational capability, authority, refers to the CF's domain of influence and is the scope of power and resources available to the organization.⁵⁰ Although in the CAR model authority is divided into legal and personal, only legal will be discussed. Personal authority, that authority given informally to an individual by peers and subordinates, does not readily translate to an organizational concept.⁵¹ In the case of the CF, the Government of Canada (GoC) ultimately assigns the legal authority to the organization through the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).⁵² However, under NATO command, ISAF also has a role to play. Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-AFG) is commanded by a Canadian Brigadier General who, on behalf of the CDS, exercises both national and operational command over CF elements in Afghanistan. NATO-ISAF RC South Headquarters direct military operations. Canada has agreed to provide forces, without restrictive caveats, under operational command of NATO-ISAF; thus, the Canadian Brigadier General receives operational orders from the Commander of ISAF RC South. From a command and control (C2) viewpoint, it appears that the CF has a high

⁵⁰ Ross Pigeau, Carol McCann, *Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control*, 58.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁵² *National Defence Act*, (1985): 18; available from <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cs/N-5///en>; Internet; accessed 13 April 2008.

degree of legal authority to conduct the assigned mission. However, one critical aspect of legal authority is that it formally assigns commanders resources and personnel for accomplishing the mission.⁵³

As discussed under physical competency, the greatest threat to personnel and physical resources is from IEDs. The use of airborne assets for transport would mitigate the losses significantly yet these resources have not been provided to the forces in theatre by the GoC or ISAF, thus elevating risk. Despite the arguably preventable losses, those assigning comprehensive C2 for the CF have failed to provide the required resources that must accompany complete legal authority. When all factors are assessed, the legal authority assigned to the CF ranges from low to high. Continuing with the assessment requires a look at responsibility.

The CAR Model - Responsibility

The final dimension of the CAR model used to assess the CF is responsibility, which addresses “the degree to which an individual accepts the legal and moral liability commensurate with command.”⁵⁴ The first of two elements, extrinsic responsibility, refers to the willingness to be held responsible for the assigned legal authority. Under the definition, this implied contractual agreement requires the CF to willingly accept responsibility for both the power and resources assigned by the GoC (or ISAF) under the previously described legal authority. It is also the degree to which the CF feels accountable up to superiors, the GoC, and down to subordinate elements. Thus, it should be correlated with the amount of legal authority assigned and act as a guarantee that power will be issued responsibly.⁵⁵

⁵³ Ross Pigeau, Carol McCann, *Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control*, 59.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 59.

Extrinsic responsibility is closely linked with legal authority. As discussed, the legal authority for the CF to conduct the mission in Afghanistan is clearly delineated in the C2 structure through both the GoC and ISAF. Corresponding with this authority is the willingness to accept the legal structure and responsibilities. The CF, in agreeing to the command structure, has demonstrated a high degree of extrinsic responsibility.

The second element of this dimension is intrinsic responsibility, the “degree of self-generated obligation that one feels towards the military mission.”⁵⁶ It is a function of the resolve and commitment that the organization has toward the mission and is associated with the concepts of honour, loyalty and duty. Intrinsic responsibility is the most fundamental of all the components of the dimensions of command and is considered the source of all motivation, effort and commitment. From early in the planning phase, the CF demonstrated a clear commitment to the mission in Afghanistan.

Shortly after being appointed CDS in February 2005, General Hillier began a campaign to increase Canada’s commitment in Afghanistan. His five element proposal to the Minister included the KPRT to implement the whole of government approach, special forces, an offer to lead the Kandahar region multinational headquarters, a combat infantry task force, and the SAT.⁵⁷ Despite reluctance from Prime Minister Martin, “[Hillier] argued with great confidence and clarity that the [CF] could meet the challenge, that Ottawa should focus on the opportunity rather than the risk.”⁵⁸ He also believed that Canadians “would be justifiably proud of their

⁵⁶ Ibid., 60.

⁵⁷ Eugene Lang and Janice Gross Stein, "Blame Hillier," *Maclean's* 120, no. 40 (15 October 2007), 24-28; available from <http://www.proquest.com/>; Internet; accessed 15 April 2008.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

government and their military for undertaking a difficult and important assignment.”⁵⁹ Hillier’s vision was based on a strong commitment to provide assistance to Afghanistan while concurrently rebuilding the CF and transforming it into an efficient fighting force. The CDS, as the leader of the institution, was responsible for creating and sustaining a high degree of intrinsic responsibility throughout the CF and to some degree, in the GoC itself. This responsibility was evident from the initial stages of planning and continues today as the CDS, on behalf of the CF, advocates an allegiance to Afghanistan, its people and the mission.

The examples of the numerous skill sets in the CAR model described above are limited and were intended to provide illustrations of various levels of assessment. Averaging these particular assessments yields a medium level of competence, medium level of authority and a high level of responsibility for the CF’s mission in Afghanistan. Continuing with the overall assessment requires examination of how this co

that the authority assigned is appropriate for the level of accepted responsibility to safely and appropriately utilize the military's extreme power. When either authority or responsibility is not commensurate with the other, ineffectual command is the result, which can lead to potential compromise of the mission.




Figure 3 – The Balanced Command Envelope.

Source: Pigeau, McCann, Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control, 61.

According to Figure 2, the CF's overall assessment of medium competency, medium authority and high responsibility places the organization in the ineffectual command portion of the cube. A high level of responsibility has been taken for all aspects of the mission but the level of competence and authority is not on an equal footing. "Ineffectual command undermines the very purpose of the military."⁶¹ Without the appropriate level of authority, even though the CF feels responsible for the mission, the organization is unable to properly accomplish it. A closer look at those elements that reduce the competency and authority levels is beneficial to understand the overall assessment.

⁶¹ Ibid., 60.

As discussed, the highest number of Canadian casualties is caused by IEDs. One of the best ways to counter these weapons is to reduce the number of convoys on the roads, specifically the re-supply convoys. However, because Canada does not have access to medium lift helicopters, greater risk is encountered. The Manley panel believed that the safety and effectiveness of the CF would be markedly increased by the acquisition of new equipment, specifically a helicopter airlift capacity.⁶² Both physical competency (lack of helicopters) and legal authority (GoC not providing adequate resources) negatively affect the level, thus bringing down what would otherwise be a high score. The eventual acquisition of medium-lift helicopters should reduce the number of IED casualties and improve the force protection measures to contribute to overall security in the region.

A significant negative effect is observed under interpersonal competency because of the CF's lack of adequate liaison with OGDs, specifically DFAIT and CIDA. Earlier, the paper argued that both the KPRT and the SAT consisted of mostly military personnel with very few representatives from the other two organizations. This has led to a focus with a military slant which may not address the overall GoC objectives to support the Compact. The Manley report stated that the "Canadian-led PRT in Kandahar also displays signs of fragmentation and uncoordinated effort" and that "effectiveness would be enhanced by aligning national and departmental priorities and operations more closely – and more collaboratively."⁶³ The Panel also recommended that the PRT be placed under civilian leadership.

It is important to note that the cause for this low assessment is not necessarily the fault of the CF. Given a mandate to create a secure environment, the CF has clearly accepted the

⁶² Manley and others, *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, 27.

⁶³ Ibid.

responsibility and led from the front when no other leadership was evident. Generally, it is understood that security must be in place before significant development and diplomacy can be realized. The lack of clear coordinated direction from the GoC with a single focused committee has been observed; the Manley panel recommended that intergovernmental coordination must be elevated and led by the Prime Minister to strengthen Canada's commitment to the Compact.⁶⁴ Until this strategic level direction and action occurs, the CF should seek to increase OGD representation on the KPRT and SAT with an objective of increasing diplomatic and development actions to support the Compact goals.

Conclusion

Canada's initial contribution to the war on terror consisted of a Naval task group in the Arabian Sea and was shortly followed by an Army battle group in Afghanistan. Throughout the past several years, the Canadian Government has increased support to the country, using the Afghanistan Compact as a guide for a whole of government approach. The Compact provides clear guidance on priorities for improving the lives of the Afghan people via the pillars of security, governance, and economic and social development. The primary mission of the CF is to provide security so that development and diplomacy can contribute to this vision.

Utilizing the CAR model to assess the CF's performance in supporting Canada's whole of government approach has demonstrated that scope for improvement exist. The CF's level of competence is generally high, although some areas require attention. Specifically, there is an immediate requirement for medium-lift helicopters to alleviate the significant threat of IEDs. Without them, force protection will continue to suffer, thus affecting the ability to provide security for the Canadian sector. Another critical competency shortfall is the lack of effective

⁶⁴ Ibid.

liaison with DFAIT and CIDA, leading to an overall government strategy that is not comprehensive and too militarily focused. Further, the GoC has not given the CF adequate resources (helicopters) to contribute to the security mission and therefore, has limited the legal authority required. Despite these problems, the CF continues to accept full responsibility for the mission and endeavours to meet the government's overall commitment. The result of this is ineffectual command – not enough resources or authority to complete the mission, yet the feeling of responsibility to do whatever is possible.

The Government of Canada must act. All required resources must be obtained not only for the CF, but also for DFAIT and CIDA. Most importantly, a clear fully coordinated approach must be promulgated and supported. Without guidance and resources, Canada's whole of government approach will remain a sub-standard plan and significantly detract from mission success.

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