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EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS/EXERCICE NOUVEAUX HORIZONS

**FOOTPRINTS IN THE SNOW – Pursuing a
New Path in the Arctic**

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La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense Nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense Nationale.

ABSTRACT

A number of factors have combined in recent years to heighten public interest in Arctic sovereignty including; pollution and global warming, increasing world-wide demands for mineral resources; and the public spectacle surrounding the August 2007 Russian submarine visit to the North Pole and the ongoing posturing of Canada and Denmark over tiny Hans Island. In response to these security challenges, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has recently announced his intention to enhance and reinforce the Canadian military presence in the Arctic.

While a number of initiatives will be put in place to enforce Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, increasing domestic frictions between the Inuit and various levels of government may actually serve to undermine Arctic sovereignty and could threaten National security. As the Canadian Forces undertakes operations in the Arctic, it will be immersed in an environment where there are deep-seated perceptions of social, economic and cultural separation from the greater Canadian community and increasing dissatisfaction with the government's ability to recognize and address the needs of its northern constituents.

This paper attempts to illustrate the possible risk of latent perceptions of disenfranchisement and of socio-economic isolation becoming the seeds of an insurgency in the Arctic. The use of counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques is suggested as a means to enable CF operations in the Arctic, bolster the legitimacy of northern government and to mitigate the frictions fuelling indigenous unrest. The COIN construct may be a valuable option in advancing the goals of the Canadian Forces (CF), the various levels of government, and perhaps most importantly, the goals and needs of the Inuit people.

In recent years a number of factors have combined to heighten public interest in Arctic sovereignty. Among those factors is global climate change that may improve accessibility to a good portion of Arctic waters that were erstwhile ice locked. In addition, world-wide demands for mineral resources and the increasing predation of the Earth's finite energy sources find speculators hungrily eyeing the Canadian Arctic. Finally, the publicity surrounding the visit of a Russian submarine to the ocean floor at the North Pole in August of 2007, and the continued rhetoric between Canada and Denmark about the ownership of Hans Island have served to bring the issue of northern security to the fore.¹ Nunavut Premier Paul Okalik has voiced his profound concern at the perception that, "Russians, Americans and Danes are all attempting to encroach on our territory."²

In response to these security challenges, in August of 2007 Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced his intention to enhance and reinforce the Canadian military presence in the Arctic by expanding the Canadian Rangers to a force of 5,000 personnel. In addition, a year-round Arctic Training Centre will be established in Resolute and a deep-water docking and refuelling facility will be constructed in Nanisivik, Baffin Island. These measures have been undertaken to underpin his "Canada First" defence policy and they reflect the Prime Minister's conviction that "protecting National sovereignty [and] the integrity of our borders is the first and foremost responsibility of the National

¹ Robert Huebert, "Canadian Arctic Maritime Security: The Return to Canada's Third Ocean" *Canadian Military Journal* 8, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 27.

² Paul Okalik, "Speech to the Northern Transpor

Government.”³ In order to effectively “[guard] the approaches to the Northwest Passage” and “enforce our claim to sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Arctic” and to better establish a visible presence in the Arctic, the Prime Minister also plans the construction of six to eight patrol vessels that will be capable of operating in sea-ice as thick as one metre.⁴ These vessels will help to improve Canada’s ability to conduct monitoring and surveillance in the North, and they will greatly enhance the nation’s enforcement capabilities if the need should arise.⁵

Of particular note, the Prime Minister’s impressive list of initiatives is undertaken with a view of exercising, enforcing and defending Canadian sovereign control in the Arctic, vice establishing it. Some experts such as Canadian author and historian William Morrison offer that there exists a broad international base of acceptance of Canada’s Arctic land claims, based on the traditional proofs of sovereignty such as “discovery, cession, conquest and administration.”⁶ An increased presence by military forces would reinforce the perception that Canada maintains “effective occupation” and security over its land holdings; however, the claim on archipelagic waters such as the Northwest Passage being purely Canadian, internal waterways will remain an issue that will

³ Stephen Harper, “Prime Minister announces expansion of Canadian Forces facilities and operations in the Arctic,” <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&id=1787>; Internet; accessed 4 September 2007.

⁴ Stephen Harper, “Prime Minister Stephen Harper announces new Arctic offshore patrol ships,” <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&id=1741>; Internet; accessed 4 September 2007.

⁵ Huebert, “The Return to Canada’s Third Ocean”..., 11.

⁶ William R. Morrison, “Arctic Sovereignty.” The Canadian Encyclopedia, <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1SEC816209>; Internet, accessed 2 February 2008.

ultimately be resolved by diplomacy and the establishment of international consensus.⁷ It is unclear at this time whether the Canadian Government will pursue formal means of having its claims regarding these waters firmly ensconced in international law. It is likewise unclear how much potential damage to existing diplomatic relationships such actions could cause or whether the Canadian Government is willing to accept such risk; however, Canada's unilateral declaration of ownership and control over key internal navigable waters including the Northwest Passage is not the central theme of this paper.

This paper will focus on Canadian domestic issues with respect to Arctic sovereignty and the impact that an increased military presence in the Arctic might have on ameliorating or compounding those domestic issues. While the Canadian Government seeks to promote the National interest by authoritatively exercising sovereignty over the Arctic, the interests of another cultural nation, specifically the Inuit, may be subordinated and marginalized in the process. As a department and servant of the federal government, the military must provide the Canadian people with a capable and responsive force; however, the careful planning and implementation of military effort in the Arctic could be vital in preventing the fracture of the extant lines of friction between the Inuit and Ottawa. In essence, the military could be navigating dangerously thin ice and this paper will attempt to articulate a different construct for approaching northern operations. Specifically, this paper suggests that approaching the Arctic as a 'counter-insurgency' campaign, may be a valuable option in advancing the goals of the Canadian Forces (CF),

⁷ Morrison, "Arctic Sovereignty"..., Internet.

the various levels of government, and perhaps most importantly, the goals and needs of the Inuit people.

A counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign focuses on the political primacy of the local government.⁸ The role of the military is purely supportive within a COIN and the military strives to illicit and nurture the positive psychological perceptions of the indigenous population.⁹ This paper will demonstrate that the tenets of a COIN campaign should be used while establishing a broader CF presence in the Arctic. In order to establish the case for using a COIN construct, this paper will first define the Arctic environment and identify the key characteristics that parallel that of an insurgency environment. The philosophy of COIN operations will be discussed along with the key COIN principles and recommendations will be offered on specific actions that can successfully support the COIN concept.

Northern Dissidence

The Inuit have been subject to Canadian jurisdiction since the British ceded control of the Arctic territories to the newly formed Dominion of Canada in 1870.¹⁰ Despite their new “Canadian identity,” the northern aboriginal people were denied the

⁸ Department of National Defence, B-GL-323-004/FP-003 *Counter-Insurgency Operations (Final Draft)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007); Chapter 3, Page 4/25.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Chapter 1, Page 12/24.

¹⁰ Guy Killaby, “Great Game in a Cold Climate’: Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty Question” *Canadian Military Journal* 6, no. 4 (Winter 2005-2006): 33.

right to vote like other Canadians until 1970.¹¹ Ironically, as Premier Okalik indicated in November 2005, it is the historic and continuous presence of the aboriginal peoples on the land and on the sea-ice and their self-identification as Canadians, “that gives Canada an unmatched expression of northern sovereignty.”¹² The Inuit are becoming an increasingly literate, globally aware and politically informed and active populace and they are growing in number. Professor Peter Jull of the University of Queensland, a world-renowned expert on indigenous peoples’ politics and public policy, describes increasingly vocal Arctic political leaders as representative of “politics of northern dissidence [that are] founded on an ancient sense of territorial rights among societies which were in place and managing their own affairs” long before a foreign form of modern government was superimposed on the North.¹³ Jull offers that even the earliest Indian treaties, flawed as they may have been, were entered into with some significant level of face to face interaction and consultative process. In the Arctic experience however, “states have simply absorbed lands and waters and assumed governing powers

With the establishment of the Government of Nunavut in 1999 and the settlement of both the Inuvialuit and Nunavut Land Claim Agreements, the groundwork was established for the aboriginal North to once again begin to exercise control over its own destiny. The Land Claims Agreements are intended to preserve cultural identities as well as protect and preserve the Arctic wildlife, environment and biological productivity while ensuring, “equal and meaningful participation in northern and National economy and society.”¹⁵ The agreements seek to provide for “certainty and clarity of rights to ownership and use of lands and resources”, and to establish the rights for Inuit to “participate in decision-making concerning the use, management and conservation of land, water and resources, including the offshore.”¹⁶ It is important to note however, that promises of ‘participation’ articulated in the Land Claims Agreements by no means, equate to ‘autonomy’ or to rapid and decisive political action.

Professor Jull is critical that the federal government has “not generally extended full public services or political benefits to the North because it is too little populated for the high costs involved, yet it also denies local rights to resources because they are too rich.”¹⁷ It is this dichotomy or “contradiction in how Canada treats Nunavut domestically and internationally” that Premier Okalik feels may ultimately weaken

¹⁵ Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, *The Western Arctic Claim: The Inuvialuit Final Agreement* (Ottawa: Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1985), 1.

¹⁶ Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, *Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty Queen in right of Canada* (Ottawa: Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1993) 1.

¹⁷ Jull, “Arctic Peoples”..., 3.

Canada's sovereignty claims, unless Nunavut is brought under the umbrella of Confederation as a full and equal partner.¹⁸ Paul Kaludjak, President of Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI), the representative body that monitors and protects Nunavut Inuit interests under the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA), agrees with the Premier's assessment. His view is that, "the Government of Canada keeps the Inuit dependent and in a state of financial and emotional despair despite promises made when the NLCA was signed."¹⁹ It is the government's failure to fully implement the NLCA that has persuaded NTI to file a \$1 billion lawsuit for breach of contract.²⁰ It is also this perceived failure to properly address the grievances of the northern populace that serves to marginalize the Inuit and drives a wedge between their 'Inuit' and their 'Canadian' identities. These failures could ultimately sow the seeds of a full insurgency.

Seeds of Insurgency

An "insurgency," as defined in CF doctrine, is a competition involving at least one non-state actor "using means that include violence against an established authority to achieve political change."²¹ The competition is for public opinion, legitimacy of purpose and ultimately power. The 'insurgency' definition also serves to highlight the fact that, insurgencies are primarily political problems and not strictly the purview of the military.

insurrection, nor that they would ever consider such a line of action. It is important to note however, that quite often insurgencies stem from such central narratives or stories of exploitation, the lack of political power or representation, or the perception of inequity or marginalization by another sector of society. These narratives establish both the genesis and motivation of the movement but also tie the movement to a shared history with the local populace. The insurgency is usually based on a set of “legitimate grievances” against a governing power and the shared experience with the general populace lends “legitimacy and justification” to the movement’s means and desired end state.²² To be in a position to address the greater problem of an insurgency, one must first be familiar with the details of the underlying narrative.

Professor Peter Cummings of York University, author and past educator in Nunavut, laments both the history and the process by which northern perceptions of subjugation and occupation have occurred. The Inuit and their ancestors have been “members of an organized society, occupying a specific territory over which they asserted and continue to assert the aboriginal life” for untold generations.²³ The appropriation of northern lands was undertaken “to the exclusion of [these] other organized societies or claimants at the time the Crown asserted sovereignty.”²⁴ In 1953, a number of aboriginal families were forced to relocate from their homes in Northern Quebec to newly government-established communities in Resolute and Grise Fjord. The

²² National Defence, *Counter-Insurgency Operations...*, Chapter 1, Page 3/24.

²³ Peter Cummings, “Canada’s North and Native Rights” in *Aboriginal Peoples and The Law: Indian, Metis and Inuit Rights in Canada*, ed. Bradford W. Morse, 695-744 (Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1989), 712.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 712.

reasoning behind the move was publicly touted as protecting the population from rapidly declining food sources and offering them a chance to move to areas that enjoyed ‘better hunting’. Edgar J. Dosman of the York University Centre for International and Strategic Studies offers that the real reason for the relocation was to add international credibility to Canada’s claims of sovereignty over the numerous islands in the Arctic archipelago.²⁵ Professor David C. Hawkes, Chief Federal Negotiator to the Aboriginal Peoples Roundtable, indicates that the absence of an Inuit equivalent to the Indian Act of 1876, has led to an unclear demarcation of jurisdictions and responsibilities for the delivery of support and services to northern communities by the federal and provincial governments.²⁶ As has been the case under the NLCA, the term ‘jurisdiction’ does not necessarily “oblige governments to act,” but rather it allows for “discretionary performance” pursuant to a particular government’s agenda.²⁷ It is this failure to clearly define the division of responsibilities and accountabilities that has bred stagnation within governmental process and has ultimately led to the failure to address the underlying grievances in the North.

As various levels of government continue to negotiate responsibilities, jurisdictions and the division of powers over fiscal resources, the Inuit continue to bear the social cost of the delays. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation indicates that

²⁵ Frances Abele, “Confronting ‘harsh and inescapable facts’: indigenous peoples and the militarization of the circumpolar region,” in *Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic*, ed. Edgar Dosman, 176-193 (London: Routledge, 1989), 182.

²⁶ David C. Hawkes, *Aboriginal Peoples and Government Responsibility: Exploring Federal and Provincial Roles* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989), 9.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

Arctic communities suffer from a suicide rate that is six times the National norm and that the incidence of tuberculosis is eight times greater than elsewhere in Canada.²⁸ The physical isolation of northern communities drives the cost of living to a level approximately 65% higher than the Canadian average while the average annual income in Nunavut remains 50% lower.²⁹ Even more alarming, Professor Franklyn Griffiths of the University of Toronto has shown that in the year 2000, while the average non-Inuit household income was \$89,841, the average Inuit household income was a paltry \$47,533.³⁰ Mary Simon is the President of the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, the National voice of Canada's Inuit. Despite the Prime Minister Harper's renewed focus on the Arctic, she is quick to remind the government of other promises, some admittedly made by past governments to fund housing projects across the Arctic where "overcrowding and hidden homelessness are rampant."³¹ Notwithstanding \$200 million earmarked for new housing in Nunavut, no funds were made available to improve the housing situation in other regions, and promises of \$1.3 billion for healthcare improvements and another \$1.8 billion for education initiatives "never materialized."³² Simon offers, "rather than training military personnel from southern Canada to drive Ski-Doos up and down Ellesmere Island" the government must do more to invest in the economies of Nunavut,

²⁸ Canadian Broadcast Corporation, "Nunavut: Birth of a Territory" ..., 52.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 52.

³⁰ Franklyn Griffiths, "*Camels in the Arctic? – Climate Change as the Inuit See It: from the inside out*" *The Walrus* 4, no. 9 (November 2007): 53.

³¹ Simon, "Sovereignty From the North"..., 34.

³² *Ibid.*, 34.

Nunavik, Inuvialuit and Nunatsiavut in order to “integrate this vitally important region into mainstream Canada.”³³

It is perhaps the psychological effects of the political marginalization of the Inuit nation, more than the physical isolation, which underpins the perceptions of isolation from mainstream Canada and the lack of promise for the future. The lack of employment opportunities in the North is one of the main reasons why many Inuit choose to leave school at a relatively early age. Only about 38% of students progress to the grade nine level before striking out into a society suffering from alcoholism, crime, suicide, familial violence and a general break-down of traditional roles and ties that bound their social infrastructure together for generations.³⁴ This uniquely Inuit experience or ‘narrative’ is at the heart of the necessity for the CF to undertake operations in the North as if it were seeking to counter an insurgent group. Otherwise, the military presence in the Arctic may serve to reinforce the impression of sovereignty to an external audience but not the internal audience – the Inuit.

Counter-Insurgency Campaigning

The central principles for conducting a COIN campaign are proposed in the latest draft of the new B-GL-323-004/FP-003, Counter-Insurgency Operations Manual. These principles include:

- effecting political primacy in the pursuit of strategic aims;

³³ Simon, “Sovereignty From the North”..., 34.

³⁴ Canadian Broadcast Corporation, “Nunavut: Birth of a Territory” ..., 52.

- promoting unity of purpose in co-ordinating the actions of participating agencies, including all the machinery of government;
- understanding both the complexities of the insurgency and the broader socio-economic/cultural environment; and
- sustaining the commitment to expend capital and resources and extend planning horizons over the long term to ensure the continued stability and capacity of the local indigenous government.³⁵

Within a counter-insurgency campaign, a strong information operations campaign is critical, to correctly frame the posture of CF personnel. Their public profile can be, and should be manipulated to optimize the perception of an approachable and cooperative presence.³⁶ Counter-insurgency doctrine provides in-depth guidance regarding the use of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions to defeat an insurgency. The central goal in defeating an insurgency is in bringing about the “resolution of the root causes of political and socio-economic grievances,” and the CF can be a critical actor as part of a comprehensive approach of both government and non-government entities attempting to counter the underlying tensions.³⁷ The types of operations that would typically be undertaken to re-establish stability after the cessation of hostilities in a classic COIN campaign are most applicable to northern operations. Promoting public faith and trust in a functional and proactive governmental system must be central to CF aims in the North. Other stability and capacity building efforts can then

³⁵ National Defence, *Counter-Insurgency Operations...*, Chapter 3 page 3/25.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Chapter 8, Page 21/22.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Chapter 1, Page 4/24.

be initiated in conjunction with other agencies to “maintain, restore or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved.”³⁸ It is paramount however, that the established territorial, community and ethnic leaders figure prominently in all endeavours to reinforce the perception of autonomy and to maintain and enhance the legitimacy of government.³⁹

Regardless of how the CF approaches operations in the Arctic, its personnel will be operating within an environment where the indigenous society is questioning its government’s ability to fulfil its leadership mandate and to address the needs of constituents. More to the point, the fledgling Northern Governments will continue to be under tremendous pressure to fulfil basic functions such as establishing and overseeing health care and education, while taking on the other myriad administrative and legislative responsibilities of territorial government such as environmental and resource management. The CF as part of a comprehensive approach, must foster cooperation and work in concert with civil and community organizations. This function of promoting civil and military cooperation is called “CIMIC,” and it refers to the entire realm of possible “measures taken between CF commanders and any level of government and the civilian population, concerning the relationship between CF elements wherever they are stationed, or plan to be deployed, supported or employed.”⁴⁰ The key principles of CIMIC are deeply intertwined in the COIN concept and promote the establishment of

³⁸ National Defence, *Counter-Insurgency Operations...*, Chapter 1, Page 6/24.

³⁹ Jull, “Arctic Peoples”..., 4.

⁴⁰ Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-023 *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997), Chapter 1, Page 11/21.

trust and confidence between parties, fostering the greatest levels of cooperation possible, while maintaining the total impartiality of the CF as issues between levels of government and constituents are addressed.⁴¹

Leadership and Legitimacy

Territorial and community governments must not simply be consulted, but must be fully engaged and partnered in establishing, supporting and sustaining the military presence in the Arctic. Northern territorial governments were conceived and built on the premise of providing native northern answers to native northern issues and these governing bodies must be seen to truly lead the enhancement of northern security. The military cannot be, or be perceived to be in a position of usurping the power of the territorial governments. Domestically, the military would not normally be in a position where its actions would directly promote ‘political’ outcomes; however, in a cooperative, comprehensive effort, all of the capabilities and resources of the CF should be brought to bear as one of the various instruments of Canadian National power. The use of the CF as an enabler to the overall comprehensive effort bolsters the capability and legitimacy of all levels of government in accordance with COIN principles.⁴²

In addition to promoting a more favourable political and security environment, the natural and social environments must likewise be preserved and safeguarded. Reports

⁴¹ National Defence, *Counter-Insurgency Operations...*, Chapter 1, Page 12/21.

⁴² National Defence, *Counter-Insurgency Operations...*, Chapter 3, Page 4/25.

indicate that Nunavut alone may hold up to 15% of Canada's oil reserves.⁴³ The Arctic in total may hold as much as 100 to 200 billion barrels of recoverable oil and up to 2000 trillion cubic metres of natural gas.⁴⁴ As pressure increases to exploit new oil reserves, the impetus to do so in an environmentally responsible way may tend to decrease.

Professor Jull has noted in his writing that Canada does not “lack activity in the North so much as it lacks purposeful energy and direction.”⁴⁵ The CF will have the ability in the future to be able to monitor activities in the Arctic and to ensure that economic ventures do not endanger the environment. The Inuit incidentally, have no overwhelming desire to see the CF in the Arctic solely as a military force, but they do desire an additional agency for “pollution management in the waters where they harvested their food.”⁴⁶

Understanding the complexities of the natural environment and its importance to the northern psyche is a vitally important principle of the overall COIN campaign. To make the problem more complex and challenging, the management of the Arctic environment and that of the Arctic seas is by definition an international issue and requires close monitoring before the pollution deposited in the Arctic Ocean by both the Gulf Stream and by Russian river systems becomes worse.⁴⁷ The opportunity exists to increase both the territorial governments' legitimacy in the eyes of its constituency and to promote native leadership development. Louis Bruyere the President of the Native Council of Canada, has described the aboriginal community in Canada as the “gate-keepers of success or

⁴³ Okalik, “Speech to the Northern Transportation Conference” ..., Internet.

⁴⁴ Killaby, “Great Game in a Cold Climate” ..., 33.

⁴⁵ Jull, “Arctic Peoples” ..., 6.

⁴⁶ Jull, “Arctic Peoples” ..., 2.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

failure to husband our resources.”⁴⁸ Positive measures must be undertaken to address the perception that indigenous people are always the “first to know about changes in the environment, but we are now the last to be asked or consulted.”⁴⁹

The military must be mindful of its own impact on the natural environment. There already exists a military legacy of waste and pollution in the Arctic. Decommissioned Pine Tree and Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line sites, derelict infrastructure, equipment and machinery are scattered across northern Canada. Each of these sites is a potential environmental time-bomb with residual quantities of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), hydro-carbons, petroleum products and chlorinated solvents. The Inuit have been compared to a human “DEW Line.” Mary Simon has likened them to the proverbial “canary in the global coal mine” that gives Canada and the rest of the world strategic warning of climate change.”⁵⁰ The Inuit are not only attuned to environmental change, northern communities have proven to be among the most forward thinking in terms of legislation and environmental planning. Nunavut was the “first jurisdiction in Canada to come up with a climate change strategy” and has included a pollution mitigation strategy that will adapt the current electric power production system in the community of Iqaluit from fossil fuel dependency to a hydro-electric source.⁵¹ The military must therefore seek to establish long-term waste and pollution management

⁴⁸ Gro Harlem Brundtland, *Our Common Future – World Commission on Environment and Development*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 61.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁵⁰ Mary Simon quoted in Griffiths, “*Camels in the Arctic?*” ..., 50.

⁵¹ Griffiths, “*Camels in the Arctic?*” ..., 55.

schemes that are in consonance with, or exceed the goals articulated by northern legislators to maintain a positive public perception and to retain the legitimacy of the CF as a productive member within the overall comprehensive effort.

Resource usage in the Arctic must likewise be in concert with local norms, but to do so will demand a highly developed appreciation of local challenges and perceptions. In creating or maintaining the infrastructure of northern CF establishments, the military must be mindful of exhausting the limited resources that have been brought into local communities at considerable expense. The development of infrastructure demands a carefully balanced approach. On one hand, the stimulation of the local economy through local purchases is helpful; however, causing local or temporary shortages of key material, or causing localized inflation as the demand is driven up, would be detrimental to community relations.⁵² Robert A. Rubenstein, an expert in conflict management and international mediation, offers that organizations that are involved in operations that are directed at reconciliation and development, must conduct themselves “with a self-conscious sense of how their presence distorts local practices.”⁵³ His experiences have shown that the introduction of goods, supplies, technologies, and large amounts of currency that normally accompany foreign aid missions, often “distort local economies” and he cautions that “distinguishing between damaging distortions and appropriate activities may present a challenge” to organizations in the field.⁵⁴ Louis Bruyere has

⁵² National Defence, *Counter-Insurgency Operations...*, Chapter 5, Page 9/11.

⁵³ Robert A. Rubenstein, “In Practice: Cross-Cultural Considerations in Complex Peace Operations” *Negotiation Journal* 19, no. 1 (January 2003): 45-46.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 45-46.

observed that partnership and engagement with the aboriginal community on planning issues can be highly productive; however, most often “we are seldom asked to help avoid the need for compensation by lending our expertise and our consent to development.”⁵⁵ CF efforts in the Arctic must therefore be carefully structured to ensure that local governments and communities are free of any perceptions of dependency or that they lack the freedom or ability to develop their own plans for self-sufficiency.

Efforts to procure a labour force to construct, maintain, sustain and train the CF elements in the North will have to be done with due consideration to the social environment. The Territorial Government of Nunavut as an example has demanded that job opportunities be developed in a manner that allows and promotes aboriginal representation at all levels of the workforce under the NLCA. These job opportunities must be more than transient; they must be sustainable over the long term to enhance economic growth. Care must be taken to ensure that a two or three year boom period during the construction of CF infrastructure in the Arctic should not be followed by massive layoffs and a down-turn in the local job market. An enhanced and enduring relationship between the CF and the Rangers may be a key element.

Robert Huebert is a Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy Studies at the University of Calgary. He is a serving representative to the Arctic Security Working Group, a bi-annual forum where the federal and territorial governments, along with aboriginal groups meet to discuss policy and planning with respect to security

⁵⁵ Brundtland, *Our Common Future*..., 61.

issues. The issues of greatest importance to this Working Group are: the threat of organized crime penetrating Arctic diamond production; the security of oil and pipelines from terrorist attacks; environmental issues including the receding polar icecap; and the ability of the Canadian medical system to effectively field a pandemic response.⁵⁶ An increased CF presence in the Arctic will be augmented by a larger and more robust Canadian Ranger organization. The Rangers have historically provided the boots on the ground for monitoring Arctic security and for providing training and specialist support to Canadian Forces operations in the North. Perhaps the time has past for the Rangers to be used in a supporting role. As the indigenous military force, perhaps they should be expected and empowered to fulfill a leadership role under the COIN construct. Having a deep and profound cultural appreciation for the existing threats, it would seem logical that territorial native representation would be at the vanguard when and where threats to sovereignty and security are confronted. The legitimacy of native leadership and the empowerment of the aboriginal community are central to the effort of preventing the development of any nascent insurgency and will greatly enhance both Arctic security and sovereignty. While it is not in the military's mandate to influence policy or politics, the COIN construct may be of great use in strengthening "the infrastructure of nationhood" and the increased capacity and legitimacy of northern territorial governments "is surely as important a sovereignty issue as defending lines on Arctic maps with fleets and lawyers."⁵⁷ Arnold Wolfers, a renowned political scientist from Yale University once stated that nations must walk the tight rope of "maintaining an acceptable level of

⁵⁶ Robert Huebert, "The Rise and Fall (and Rise?) of Canadian Arctic Security" *SITREP – A Publication of the Royal Canadian Military Institute* 67, no. 4 (July-August 2007): 6.

⁵⁷ Jull, "Arctic Peoples"... , 10.

security” while meeting other desirable commitments such as infrastructure, education, healthcare and welfare programs.⁵⁸ By undertaking operations in the Arctic with due regard to the central principles of a counter-insurgency campaign, the Canadian Government and the CF may be able to strike that perfect balance.

Conclusions

Dr. G.H. Brundtland, former Prime Minister of Norway and past Chair of both the World Commission on Environment and Development and of the World Health Organization, has elucidated the “terrible irony” that the formal development of the world’s most remote and isolated regions usually causes such widespread ecological and social impact that development “tends to destroy the only cultures that have proved able to thrive in these environments.”⁵⁹ Dr. Brundtland has also noted that those communities or societies that are most likely to be effected by the developmental policies of an external agency such as government or big business, are quite often too “poor or lack the power to complain powerfully and effectively at high levels.”⁶⁰ This paper has attempted to illustrate the possible risk of the latent perceptions of disenfranchisement and of socio-economic isolation becoming the seeds of an insurgency in the Arctic. More importantly, this paper has highlighted the possibility of using counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques as means to both enable CF operations in the Arctic and to mitigate the frictions that could exacerbate indigenous unrest.

⁵⁸ Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ As An Ambiguous Symbol,” in *National and International Security*, ed. Michael Sheehan, 3-24 (Burlington: Ashgate, 2000), 10.

⁵⁹ Brundtland, *Our Common Future*..., 114.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 46.

The Canadian Forces is a relatively new, but an increasingly active member in the Arctic community. The North is at the same moment an exceptionally fragile natural and social environment. As the original and continuing land users, indigenous northern communities have a moral and legal claim to both control and benefit from Arctic development. Southern solutions to northern problems have never been popular or productive in Canada's Arctic and COIN creates a structure by which northern interests and leadership are given primacy.⁶¹ By developing and promoting legitimate northern leadership and government, the 'Canadian' identity of the Inuit is strengthened, and so too is Canadian sovereignty. The CF must be adaptable and creative in its approach to Arctic operations if it is to become a responsible northern citizen and if it is to be a productive mechanism in helping the Canadian Government broker a "new relationship between [the] original inhabitants and other Canadians."⁶² In the words of Premier Okalik, "done right, political and economic development in the North will reinforce Canada's Northern sovereignty. Done wrong, we will increase the likelihood of challenges to our Northern security."⁶³

⁶¹ Peter Mansbridge: Canadian Broadcast Corporation. "News in Review – Nunavut: Birth of a Territory." Movie Video, 071 N4 1999 CFC, 2003.

⁶² Jull, "Arctic Peoples"... , 3.

⁶³ Okalik, "Speech to the Northern Transportation Conference"... , Internet.

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