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**FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY:
AN INTEGRATED CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY**

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines Canada's integrated foreign policy. In using Afghanistan as a case study, the paper demonstrates that Canada has failed to achieve the full promise of an integrated foreign policy. Drawing from the case study, other Government of Canada horizontal initiatives and the experience of other countries, the paper recommends that Canada adopt a more rigorous process of determining and communicating strategy, formal coordination of the responsibilities of government departments and a common framework for operational planning and cooperation.

The examination of Canada's international policy also makes it clear that integrated national and international contributions are needed to address the complex challenges of fragile states. Current efforts to achieve a more synergistic Canadian foreign policy are an attempt to meet these challenges and improve upon past successes. Although there is scope for considerable improvement, rejecting an integrated approach to foreign policy would be out of step with Canada's interests, values and historic internationalism.

In 2005, the Liberal-led Government released Canada's International Policy Statement (IPS), the first comprehensive review of foreign policy since Canada in the World was issued in 1995. Introducing the IPS, Prime Minister Paul Martin noted that global transformation was influencing Canada's prosperity and security and that "independent countries like Canada . . . risk being swept aside, their influence diminished, their ability to compete hampered."[1] He stated that Canada wanted "to make a real difference in halting and preventing conflict . . . around the world."[2] Moreover, he made it clear that an integrated approach was the best way to make a difference, in particular one in which the "3Ds" of Diplomacy, Defence and Development are effectively coordinated.[3]

The IPS identifies Afghanistan, which provided Al-Qaeda with a base to prepare for the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, as a state where Canada can make a difference with an integrated approach.[4] Although Canadians elected a new government on 23 January 2006, the April 2006 Throne Speech indicated that the Conservative-led Government would maintain an integrated foreign policy and place a priority on Afghanistan.[5] This theme was retained in the 2007 Throne Speech which stated: "Nowhere is Canada making a difference more clearly than in Afghanistan" and "Canadians understand that . . . without security, there

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[1]Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Overview* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005), i.

[2]*Ibid*.

[3]*Ibid*., iv.

[4]*Ibid*., 11 and 13.

[5]The Speech from the Throne stated "the Government will support a more robust diplomatic role for Canada, a stronger military and a more effective use of Canadian aid dollars . . . [and] stands firmly behind the vital role being played by our troops in Afghanistan today." Office of the Prime Minister, *Turning a New Leaf: Speech from the Throne* (Ottawa: Office of the Prime Minister, 2006) [document on-line]; available from http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1087; Internet; accessed 3 January 2008.

can be no humanitarian aid, no reconstruction and no democratic development."[6]   However, the 2007 Throne Speech acknowledged that, notwithstanding Canada's considerable contributions to Afghanistan, progress had been slow.[7] As such, the Government appointed an independent panel to assess Canada's Afghanistan mission.[8]

The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan reported that the mission is the country's broadest exercise of foreign policy since the Korean War and that "for once, our defence, diplomacy and development assistance are all pointed at the same problem."[9] At the same time, the panel cautioned that many Canadians have reservations about the mission and whether success is achievable.[10]

This paper will examine Canada's integrated foreign policy in Afghanistan. In using Afghanistan as a case study, the paper will demonstrate that Canada has failed to achieve the full promise of an integrated foreign policy. Drawing from the case study, other Government of Canada horizontal initiatives and the experience of other countries, the paper recommends that Canada adopt:

    a.   A more rigorous process of determining and communicating national strategic intent;

    b.   Formal coordination, at the national strategic level, of the responsibilities of government departments; and

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[6]Governor General, *Strong Leadership, A Better Canada: Speech from the Throne* (Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication, 16 October 2007), 5 [document on-line]; available from http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sftddt-e.pdf; Internet; accessed 3 January 2008.

[7]*Ibid.*, 5.

[8]*Ibid.*, 6.

[9]The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2008), 22 and 4.

[10]*Ibid.*, 3.

      c.   A common framework, across departments, for operational planning and cooperation.

An assessment of Canada's foreign policy must be informed by an understanding of the policy's origins. Historically, Canada has to varying degrees adopted an integrated approach to foreign policy. Canada is well known for Lester Pearson's Nobel Prize winning synthesis of diplomacy and defence, which helped bring a resolution to the Suez crisis in 1956.[11] As such, the current emphasis on an integrated or Whole-of-Government Approach (WGA) has been characterized as better coordination of the different elements of Canadian foreign policy rather than an entirely new policy.[12]

The recent impetus for improved integration stemmed from a period of policy review that was triggered by perceptions that Canada's influence was declining at a time when grave threats were emerging. The turn of the century saw many prominent commentators lament the decline of Canada on the international stage. Professor Andrew Cohen of Carleton University bemoaned that Canada's diplomatic, defence and development capabilities had withered and that Canada was "given to a kind of lofty ad hockery [sic], inclined to embrace

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[11]In October 1956, a combined British, French and Israeli force attempted to regain control of the Suez Canal after Egypt had nationalized the Canal during a dispute over its ownership. Canada, under the leadership of External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson, brokered a solution to the conflict, one element of which was the interposition of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) between the adversaries. The UNEF was commanded by Canadian Major General ELM Burns and Canada contributed communications and logistics expertise to the force. Terence Robertson, *Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1964) xi-xvi, 161-167, 269-304 and 335-336.

[12]Professor George MacLean, of the University of Manitoba has suggested that "the idea of 3D is in the tradition of Canadian foreign policy and is not entirely new." Similarly, the 1995 foreign policy statement Canada in the World stated that the world was changing rapidly and that the three key foreign policy objectives of "prosperity and employment; the protection of … security, within a stable global framework; and the protection of Canadian values and culture . . . [would be pursued with] the full span of the Government's instruments, including the programs of international trade, diplomacy, and international assistance." House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, no. 61, Monday, October 31, 2005, 12-13 and 20; and Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World* (Ottawa: Communication Group, 1995), i-iii.

the next fashionable idea . . . as long as it doesn't cost too much."[13] Robert Greenhill's

External Voices Project interviewed foreign policy experts in nineteen countries during 2004

and ascertained that a focus on domestic concerns and fiscal restraint had led to a retreat from

the international arena and the outside view that Canada had played a marginal role in the

world during the preceding fifteen years.[14]

At the same time, a burgeoning number of weak states began to pose increasing

threats to global stability and human security. Weak states have posed security concerns

virtually from the birth of the modern state.[15] In the final decade of the twentieth century,

factors such as the fragmentation of Cold War political structures, ethnic and religious

tensions, economic grievances and weak governance led to an increase in the number fragile

states and associated security challenges.[16] Canada's National Security Policy (NSP),

released in 2004, warned that failed states present a direct security threat to Canada, most

notably when used as bases for terrorist groups.[17] The NSP also emphasized the need for

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[13]Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2003) 26-27 and 162.

[14]Robert Greenhill, *Making a Difference? External Views on Canada's International Impact* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs Special Report, February 2005), 4-5.

[15]An immature state system began to develop during the Medieval Period in Europe as a means of ordering political and economic life. This early system was codified by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Today's nation-state is the product of the subsequent development this system, which was influenced by the evolution of relations between states and between sovereign authorities and citizens, as well as the growth of commerce. From the nascent stages of state development, state fragility has been at the root of many security challenges (for example, territorial wars and peasant revolts). Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, *After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder* (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994), 3-23.

[16]For example, between 1950 and 2002 the number of recognized states increased from 69 to 192. Many of these 123 new states were embryonic and hence vulnerable to predation and collapse. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, 1-49 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2 and 25 to 30.

[17]Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004), 50.

greater military-civilian capacity to foster and restore peace, order and good government in fragile and failed states and directed greater integration of efforts in this regard.[18]

Building on the NSP, the IPS identified human security as a dilemma linked to fragile states, a dilemma that can produce humanitarian tragedy and a deleterious effect on neighbouring states.[19] Responding to alarms about declining relevance and emerging threats, the IPS sought to assure that Canada would make a difference, and asserted that the country had a responsibility to make a meaningful contribution to global stability and the well-being of the victims of state failure.[20] In this context, the IPS pronounced that "new threats will be met with a forward-looking and integrated approach – across departments and levels of government."[21]

Successive Canadian Governments have identified Afghanistan as a fragile state where Canada can make a difference by applying an integrated approach. And contributions from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Department of National Defence (DND), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Justice, Public Safety Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Correctional Service Canada) and municipal police have made a difference. Since August 2003, Operation ATHENA has provided an infantry battle group and support elements, consisting of approximately 2,500 military personnel, to help the International Stabilization

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[18]*Ibid.*, 51.

[19]Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Overview . . .*, 13.

[20]*Ibid.*, 12-13.

[21]*Ibid.*

Assistance Force (ISAF) establish security in the Kabul and Kandahar regions.[22] Of note,

Canadian Lieutenant General Rick Hillier commanded ISAF from February to August

2004.[23] These contributions were critical to establishing a secure environment in advance of

Afghanistan's first democratic elections.[24]

CIDA also funded more than $33 million in initiatives to support the successful

October 2004 presidential election and September 2005 parliamentary and provincial council

elections.[25] Since September 2005, the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A),

consisting of military personnel and civilian members of DND and CIDA working closely

with the Canadian Ambassador, has helped the Afghan federal and provincial bureaucracy to

prepare strategic governance and development plans.[26] By contributing more than $20

million in funding to organizations such as the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights

Commission and international programs to improve legal capacity (that have trained more

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[22]Operation ATHENA is the Canadian Forces' contribution to ISAF. It nominally consists of a contingent of 2,500 personnel; however, this number fluctuates. The contingent is designated Joint Task Force Afghanistan and consists of: the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team; an infantry battle group; a Health Service Support unit, a National Command Element, National Support Elements located in Kandahar and at intermediary points, and staff at the Headquarters of ISAF and Regional Command South. House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence*, no. 1, June 2007, 39 and 46 to 48.

[23]*Ibid.*, 46.

[24]Wright, Julian, *Canada in Afghanistan: Assessing the 3-D Approach*, Report Prepared by the Institute for Research on Public Policy for the Centre for International Governance Innovation (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, May 2005), 5 [document on-line]; available from http://www.irpp.org/miscpubs/archive/wright_cigi.pdf; Internet; accessed; 18 January 2008.

[25]Government of Canada, *Report to Parliament, Canada's Mission in Afghanistan: Measuring Progress* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, February 2007), 11 [document on-line]; available from http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/docs/260207_Report_E.pdf; Internet; accessed 6 January 2008; and Canadian International Development Agency, "CIDA in Afghanistan – Closed Projects: Support to Parliamentary Elections," http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-1269631-JK5; Internet; accessed 6 March 2008.

[26]House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence . . .*, 44 - 46.

than 100 prosecutors and public defenders, and more than 200 judges), CIDA has helped improve Afghan governance.[27]

Canada has also fostered Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program, which helps rural communities form councils to improve development and governance. As of January 2008, over 500 councils had been established in Kandahar province and nearly 20,000 nation-wide.[28] The wide-spread participation of women on the councils and the fact that as of 2006, less than one percent of council projects had been targeted by insurgents are notable accomplishments.[29]

In the security domain, CIDA has been a key donor to international and Afghan programs that have demobilized more than 63,000 former combatants and decommissioned over 520,000 mines, 100,000 weapons and 320,000 tons of ammunition.[30] DFAIT has provided more than $8.5 million in funding for police training and infrastructure rehabilitation.[31] Soldiers, civilian police officers, and corrections advisors serving with a range of international and Canadian organizations (such as the Canadian Afghan National

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[27]Government of Canada, *Report to Parliament, Canada's Mission in Afghanistan: Measuring Progress . . .*, 12; Canadian International Development Agency, "CIDA in Afghanistan – Closed Projects: Support to Parliamentary Elections," http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-1269631-JK5; Internet; accessed 6 March 2008; and Canadian International Development Agency, "CIDA in Afghanistan – Current Projects," http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-12514940-QGL; Internet; accessed 6 March 2008.

[28]Canadian International Development Agency, "CIDA in Afghanistan – Current Projects: National Solidarity Program - National Program Including Kandahar Province," http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-1267121-GBL; Internet; accessed 6 March 2008.

[29]Government of Canada, *Report to Parliament, Canada's Mission in Afghanistan: Measuring Progress . . .*, 13-14.

[30]Government of Canada, "Rebuilding Afghanistan," http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/pdf/Tableau_WoG_FEB08_eng.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 March 2008; and Canadian International Development Agency, "CIDA in Afghanistan – Current Projects."

[31]Library of Parliament, Publication PRB 07-35E, *Afghanistan: Reconstruction and Development*, (Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, 20 November 2007), 3 [document on-line]; available from http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0735-e.pdf; Internet; accessed 4 March 2008.

Training Centre Detachment and the Canadian-led Khandahar Provincial Reconstruction

Team [KPRT]) have contributed to the training of more than 35,000 Afghan security officials

and mentored several thousand officials in the field.[32]

CIDA has also funded programs to improve economic development, public

infrastructure, health and education throughout Afghanistan and in Kandahar province.[33]

Since the fall of the Taliban, the contributions of Canada and the international community to

Afghanistan have helped set the conditions for a doubling of per-capita incomes, the return of

more than five million refugees, a tripling of school enrolment and a decline in child

mortality rates.[34]

Although Canada has made a difference, the Government of Canada has been

strongly criticized for flawed implementation of an integrated approach in Afghanistan. In

2005 Julian Wright, of the Institute for Research on Public Policy, reported that "3D has not

yet developed into a truly integrated and results-driven approach."[35] By 2007, criticism had

increased. Gordon Smith of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute commented

that "the 3Ds are not . . . effectively working together – the Canadian Forces have a

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[32]Government of Canada, *Report to Parliament, Canada's Mission in Afghanistan: Measuring Progress . . .*, 9-10; House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence . . .*, 43-44; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "International Peace Operations Branch: Canadian Civilian Policing Efforts in Afghanistan," http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/peace_operations/afghanistan_e.htm; Internet; accessed 26 March 2008; and Correctional Service Canada, "International Relations, Peace-Building and Reconstruction Missions: Afghanistan," http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/intlforum/pbrm/afghanistan_e.shtml; Internet; accessed 26 March 2008.

[33]Canadian International Development Agency, "CIDA in Afghanistan – Closed Projects," http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/FRA-32013011-MXN; Internet; accessed 6 March 2008; and Canadian International Development Agency, "CIDA in Afghanistan – Current Projects."

[34]The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report . . .*, 7.

[35]Julian Wright, *Canada in Afghanistan: Assessing the 3-D Approach . . .*, 6.

fundamentally different agenda than CIDA."[36] Many questioned the balance amongst the

contributing departments. The Senlis Council cautioned that "failure of Canada's

development . . . to support the efforts of international troops . . . is compromising the entire

Canadian mission."[37] Retired Commodore Eric Lehre opined that DFAIT and CIDA were

letting DND down and that 3D was largely fiction.[38] Similarly, the Standing Committee on

National Defence (SCOND) noted that some view the mission as too heavily tilted toward

defence.[39]

 This criticism is not surprising. The NPS and IPS may have made pronouncements

about the need for integration, but neither included a strategy to achieve integration.

Successive Canadian Governments have only peripherally addressed important issues such as

strategic direction, coordination leadership and integrated planning.

 Flawed integration begins with a failure to craft and articulate strategic intent. The

Independent Panel identified "an absence of a comprehensive strategy directing all ISAF

forces [as a] . . . serious failure of strategic direction."[40] A similar reproach may be leveled

at Canada. The absence, until very recently, of an overarching framework for Canada's role

in Afghanistan reflects that the mission has unfolded as a series of incremental components.

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[36]Gordon Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?* (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2007), 6.

[37]Senlis Council, *Canada in Afghanistan: Charting a New Course to Complete the Mission* (Ottawa: Security and Development Policy Group, May 2007), 8 [document on-line]; available from http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/Ottawa_Position_Paper; Internet; accessed 23 October 2007.

[38]Eric Lehre, "Is the 3-D Construct at Work in Kandahar Or are we Kidding Ourselves?" *The Dispatch Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute Newsletter* 4, no.3 (Fall 2006) [journal on-line]; available from http://www.cdfai.org/newsletters/newsletterfall2006.htm; Internet; accessed 7 December 2007.

[39]House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence . . .*, 26.

[40]The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report . . .*, 13.

Decisions to initiate or renew components have to a certain extent been reactionary, often in response to external requests, rather than strategic policy.[41]

In Canada, the Prime Minister and cabinet formulate policy.[42] Foreign affairs, international development, and defence policy is the domain of the Foreign Affairs and National Security cabinet committee.[43] The Privy Council Office (PCO) supports cabinet decision-making by coordinating policy development and implementation across departments.[44] In this capacity, PCO has played a role in analyzing and coordinating Canada's efforts in Afghanistan; however, the preparation of a detailed strategic plan exceeds PCO's mandate and capacity.[45] DFAIT is the departmental lead.[46] Within DFAIT, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) was introduced in 2005 and is charged with developing and implementing strategies for integrated crisis and stabilization

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[41]For example, on 7 October 2001 Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, stated that Canada had responded to requests for assistance from the United States in contributing over 2,000 military personnel to military action against the Taliban regime as part of Operation APOLLO. Similarly, on 12 February 2003 John McCallum, Minister of National Defence explained that Canada was responding to a request for assistance from the international community in deciding to contribute approximately 2,000 personnel to ISAF as part of Operation ATHENA. Art Eggleton, "Speaking Notes for the Honourable Art Eggleton Minister of National Defence Press conference: Canadian military contributions - National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario," *National Defence and the Canadian Forces News Room Archives* (8 October 2001) [speaking notes on-line]; available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=518; Internet; accessed 24 August 2007; and House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence . . .*, 39.

[42]Allan Blakeney and Sandford Borins, *Political Management in Canada,* 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 5.

[43]Office of the Prime Minister, "Cabinet Committee Mandates and Membership – February 8, 2008," http://pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/Cab_Committee-comite.pdf; Internet; accessed 26 March 2008.

[44]Gregory J. Inwood, *Understanding Canadian Public Administration: An Introduction to Theory and Practice,* 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pearson Education Canada Inc., 2004), 133-134.

[45]*Ibid.*

[46]*Ibid.*, 129-130.

missions.[47] Although START is backed by a Deputy Minister (DM) level advisory board, it

has found it difficult to secure agreement on integrated strategic objectives and until recently

strategy development for Afghanistan was led by an ad hoc DM level committee.[48]

Consequently, Canada has lacked a cohesive strategy with a clear statement of goals,

objectives, and measures of success for Afghanistan. Consider that a February 2007

Government report to Parliament references the Afghan Compact as the strategic framework

for the mission.[49] The Afghan Compact's pillars of security, governance, and development

can be broadly mapped to DND, DFAIT and CIDA respectively; however, there is

significant overlap between the pillars and the Compact is not a framework specific to

Canada. Critics such as the Senlis Council have charged that the "leadership and policies . . .

necessary to coherently coordinate Canada's . . . efforts [in Afghanistan] are missing."[50] The

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[47]Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Year in Review: Mobilizing Canada's Capacity for International Crisis Response September 2005 – September 2006* (Ottawa: Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force Communications Unit, 1 November 2006), 7 [document on-line]; available from http://www.international.gc.ca/fac/START-GTSR/year-review-revue-annee-0506.aspx; Internet; accessed 24 February 2008.

[48]The assertion that strategy development for Afghanistan has been led by an ad hoc DM level Committee is based on observations made by the author while serving with DND's Strategic Joint Staff. Similarly, Patrick and Brown, as well as Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald, note that Canadian foreign and defence policy development is somewhat ad hoc as it tends to be driven by committees and working groups at the DM and Assistant DM level. Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing 'Whole of Government' Approaches to Fragile States* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 65; and W.D. Macnamara and Ann Fitzgerald, "A National Security Strategy Framework for Canada," *The Institute for Research on Public Policy - Policy Matters* 3, no. 10 (2002): 12-13.

[49]The Government of Afghanistan and the international community agreed to the Afghan Compact at the London Conference on Afghanistan in early 2006. The Compact identifies mutual obligations with respect to goals and timelines within the pillars of security, governance and development. Prior to the Afghan Compact, international efforts in Afghanistan were governed by the 2001 Bonn Agreement. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United Nations London Conference on Afghanistan, *The Afghanistan Compact* (London, 2006), 2 [document on-line]; available from http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_londonConf/_docs/06jan30-AfghanistanCompact-Final.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 March 2008; and Government of Canada, *Report to Parliament, Canada's Mission in Afghanistan: Measuring Progress . . .*, 3-6.

[50]Senlis Council, *Canada in Afghanistan: Charting a New Course to Complete the Mission . . .*, 8.

report of the Independent Panel levied similar criticism.[51] Of note, in 2007 the Government

created a special cabinet committee on Afghanistan and an Afghanistan Task Force under the

leadership of an Assistant DM, David Mulroney.[52] The Task Force is to develop a unified

campaign plan, the Afghan Narrative, with common objectives and success metrics.[53]

Canadian efforts to develop and implement a unified strategy have been hampered by

inadequate coordination of departmental responsibilities. In 2005, Julian Wright commented

that great strides toward an integrated approach had been made at the tactical level but this

was not matched in Ottawa.[54] Wright observed that the military and development

communities were on opposing paths at the strategic level.[55] Two years later, in discussing

the benefits of the Afghanistan Task Force, David Mulroney commented on the tendency for

DFAIT, DND and CIDA to have different policies that were not well coordinated.[56]

The Independent Panel referred to the KPRT as a centrepiece of Canada's mission in

Afghanistan.[57] The KPRT has also been described as the best example of a Canadian WGA

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[51]The Panel identified the need for systematic political oversight and more cohesive policy. It recommended the Prime Minister, supported by a special cabinet committee and a full-time task force, lead efforts in this regard. The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report . . .*, 34.

[52]Office of the Prime Minister, "Cabinet Committee Mandates and Membership – February 8, 2008," http://pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/Cab_Committee-comite.pdf; Internet; accessed 26 March 2008; and Robert Parkins and Chris Thatcher, "Common Narrative: Canada's Integrated Approach to Afghanistan," *Vanguard* (July 2007) [journal on-line]; available from http://www.vanguardcanada.com/CommonNarrativeMulroney; Internet; accessed 3 March 2008.

[53]Ibid.

[54]Julian Wright, *Canada in Afghanistan: Assessing the 3-D Approach . . .*, 5.

[55]*Ibid.*, 15.

[56]Robert Parkins and Chris Thatcher, "Common Narrative: Canada's Integrated Approach to Afghanistan."

[57]The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report . . .*, 23.

at the tactical level.[58] However, the Independent Panel also reported that the KPRT would

benefit from the alignment of departmental and national priorities.[59] This observation

reflects recurring criticism that CIDA's priorities are insufficiently aligned with those of the

Government. Specifically, the Independent Panel suggested that increased investment and

civilian participation in the KPRT would be more in keeping with Canada's priorities and

Afghanistan's needs.[60] The Independent Panel found that over fifty percent of CIDA's

contributions were funneled through international organizations and another thirty-five

percent funneled through the Government of Afghanistan (GoA).[61] Consequently, a

relatively small percentage of CIDA funding was available for development projects that can

immediately improve the lives of Afghans or signal that Canadian engagement is a force for

positive change.[62] The Panel's report echoes earlier findings of the Standing Senate

Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD). SCONSAD found that CIDA

was very focused on building the capacity of the Afghan national government.[63] SCONSAD

agreed that building GoA capacity was essential to establishing the legitimacy and viability

of the central government; however, SCONSAD cautioned that improving the lives of

Afghans was critical to communicating that there was a better alternative to insurgency and

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[58]Michael D. Capstick, "The Civil-Military Effort in Afghanistan: A Strategic Perspective," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 10, no. 1 (Fall 2007), 18 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.jmss.org/2007/2007fall/articles/capstick.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 March 2008.

[59]The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report . . .*, 26.

[60]*Ibid.*, 28-29.

[61]*Ibid.*, 25.

[62]*Ibid.*, 25-26.

[63]Senate, An Interim Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Canadian Troops in Afghanistan: Taking a Hard Look at a Hard Mission*, February 2007, 8-9.

that Canada was a positive influence.[64] Correspondingly, the Senlis council argued that

Canada was not able to do enough to help meet the basic needs of the people of Kandahar

because it was insufficiently investing in humanitarian and development assistance and that

this failing was eroding hard-won military gains.[65]

Canada's ability to meet needs on the ground has also been hindered by

administrative constraints. For instance, the Independent Panel found that travel restrictions

imposed by Ottawa greatly reduced contact between development officers and residents of

Kandahar, which in turn limited the effectiveness of development officers.[66] The Panel

understood that travel restrictions were motivated by concern for the well-being of CIDA

personnel, but made the case that greater freedom of movement, and hence effectiveness,

could be afforded if risk was managed by civilian and military leadership, in Afghanistan,

with local knowledge of the security situation.[67] Administrative roadblocks also featured in

a 2007 SCOND assessment. SCOND reported that development projects were frequently

delayed because CIDA funding was subject to administrative controls designed for Canadian

contracting.[68] For example, in 2006 several KPRT projects were stalled awaiting access to

$10 million that CIDA had set aside for development in Kandahar province.[69]

Inadequate coordination has also denied the SAT-A the benefit of the full range of

expertise the Canadian Government could bring to bear. The SAT-A was an initiative

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[64]*Ibid.*

[65]Senlis Council, *Canada in Afghanistan: Charting a New Course to Complete the Mission . . .*, 8.

[66]The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report . . .*, 26.

[67]*Ibid.*

[68]House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence . . .*, 55.

[69]*Ibid.*

launched by the Chief of Defence Staff, General Hillier with guidance from Canada's

Ambassador and Head of Aid for Afghanistan.[70] One CIDA contract employee augments the

15 DND members of the team.[71] Given the SAT-A's role, the team could benefit from

expertise resident in other government departments. SCOND reported military officers agree

that public servants would be more qualified to furnish strategic advice to the Afghan

bureaucracy and envision the SAT-A transitioning to civilian leadership.[72] With greater

strategic coordination, the full range of Canadian expertise could have been added to DND's

valuable initiative to build GoA capacity and plans put in place to transfer it to civilian

leadership.

Canada's Afghanistan mission has shown that when national and departmental

priorities are not synchronized, strategic level coordination is needed to achieve alignment.

The START has lacked the authority needed to harmonize the contributions of departments,

particularly when differences over policy emerge.[73] The Independent Panel concluded that

separate departmental task forces are not an effective means of coordination and suggested

that greater involvement from the Prime Minister, the support of a cabinet committee and a

full time task force were needed to achieve effective interdepartmental coordination.[74]

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[70]National Defence, "Backgrounder: Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan," http://www.mdn.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703; Internet; accessed 3 March 2008; and Christie Blatchford, "Bureaucratic 'Jealousy' Threatens Military Team," *Globe and Mail*, 14 January 2008 [article on-line]; available from http://ago.mobile.globeandmail.com/generated/archive/RTGAM/html/20080114/wblatchford14.html; Internet; accessed 30 March 2008.

[71]Ibid.

[72]House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence . . .*, 45-46.

[73]Patrick and Brown,*Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing 'Whole of Government' Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 68.

[74]The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report . . .*, 28.

Although the Canadian Government has not fully implemented the Panel's recommendations, with the creation of a special cabinet committee and a task force for Afghanistan, there are growing signs of interdepartmental cohesion. In early 2008, the International Development Minister, Bev Oda announced plans to increase civilian staff in Kandahar from ten to thirty-five, to empower officials in Kandahar to expedite development assistance and to launch a "readily identifiable" Canadian project that will make a difference in the lives of Kandaharis.[75] Similarly, the Vice-President of CIDA's Afghanistan Task Force, Stephen Wallace was promoting measures to better coordinate development and military efforts and to evaluate the effectiveness of development projects.[76]

Closely linked to inadequate coordination, rudimentary collaborative planning has been another weakness in Canada's integrated approach to Afghanistan. Typically, personnel from different departments plan and work well together on the ground. Referring to the KPRT, the Commander of the Canadian Forces Expeditionary Command, Lieutenant General Michel Gauthier explained that "it is more difficult to get [synchronization] at the Ottawa end because we operate quite differently, whereas on the ground in Afghanistan, everyone is working side by side in the PRT."[77] Integrated planning has suffered from the lack of a common framework to sequence, prioritize and link initiatives such that departmental contributions mutually reinforce the pursuit of desired effects. In turn, without

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[75]Allan Woods, "Kandahar Aid Gets Overhaul," *The Toronto Star*, 28 February 2008 [article on-line]; available from http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/307723; Internet; accessed 28 February 2008.

[76]Canadian Press, "Canada Learning Hard Lessons in Aid to Afghanistan: Senior Aid Official," 3 March 2008 [article on-line]; available from http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/308313; Internet; accessed 1 March 2008.

[77]Defence News, "Lt. Gen. Michel Gauthier: Commander, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command," 10 December 2007 [article on-line]; available from http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3262059&c=FEA&s=INT; Internet; accessed 21 March 2008.

an integrated plan it has been difficult to identify shortcomings and adverse second and third order effects in advance. Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown of the Center for Global Development report that experience in Afghanistan has revealed a gap between DND's shorter-term focus on security and CIDA's longer-term focus on development.[78] Exercising an integrated plan would have provided an opportunity for early identification of this shortfall. The lack of an integrated plan has also made it difficult to develop meaningful measures of performance and effectiveness for the integrated mission. Not surprisingly, the Independent Panel called for more constructive measurement of results achieved in Afghanistan.[79]

The problems with strategic direction, coordination leadership and integrated planning encountered during Canada's Afghanistan mission are similar to difficulties that have emerged in a range of horizontal government initiatives in Canada and other countries. Systematic changes, based on lessons learned from the accumulated body of experience, are required if similar problems are to be avoided in the future and if the full promise of an integrated foreign policy is to be realized.

To begin with, a more rigorous process of determining and communicating national strategy is required. In examining American conflict termination, William Flavin found that a clear statement of the salient issues, national goals and guidance from the executive level was the first step toward achieving unity of interagency effort and focus on desired

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[78]Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing 'Whole of Government' Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 62.

[79]Current metrics tend to measure activity levels and dollars spent rather than effects or progress attained. The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report . . .*, 36; and Seema Patel and Steven Ross, *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan*, Center for Strategic and International Studies Report (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 29 March 2007), 6 [document on-line]; available from http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070329_breakingpoint.pdf; Internet; accessed 4 March 2008.

outcomes.[80] Flavin's finding is consistent with the Canadian experience in Afghanistan and is amplified by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. The Principles are derived from the experience of OECD countries in fragile states and offer counsel to improve Canada's integrated approach to foreign policy. Specifically, clear political leadership, commitment and guidance are needed.[81] Very early on, political leadership must establish a strategy that delineates expected outcomes, the responsibilities of departments and the scale of commitment.[82] Integrated initiatives can generate uncertainty about mandates, authorities and collective accountability.[83] Thus strategic direction must also define expectations in this regard and reconcile any significant differences in departmental approaches.

The need for greater strategic engagement does not automatically require organizational change at the executive level. A special cabinet committee may not be needed for each engagement. Rather, the basic requirement is for cabinet engagement and leadership as well as consideration of the full range of Ministries (in addition to the traditional 3Ds) that may be able to contribute to a mission.[84] It is also important to ensure that organizational or

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[80]William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 103.

[81]Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2006) 7 and 10 [document on-line] available from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf; Internet; accessed 9 January 2008.

[82]*Ibid.*; and Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for Joined-Up Government," *Policy Matters* 5, no. 5 (July 2004, 2004): 18 and James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane and Beth Cole DeGrasse, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, Monograph Prepared for the Smith Richardson Foundation (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2007), xix.

[83]Herman Bakvis and Luc Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership*, Canada School of Public Service Basic Research Report (Ottawa: Canada School of Public Service Research and University Relations Group, 2004), 56 [document on-line]; available from http://www.ccmd-ccg.gc.ca/Research/publications/pdfs/hc_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 February 2008.

[84]OECD, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 9.

procedural changes intended to facilitate greater strategic engagement do not simply slow decision making by adding a layer of bureaucracy.[85] Finally, strategic engagement may be needed to align incentives across government with an integrated approach.[86]

In addition to strategic direction, formal coordination from the national strategic level is needed to ensure that contributions from departments reinforce each other.[87] Canadian experience in Afghanistan mirrors the results of other horizontal government initiatives, which indicate that coordination across departmental boundaries will not occur naturally.[88] In assessing WGA to fragile states, Patrick and Brown concluded that effective coordination requires "a strong authoritative coordinating entity," preferably resident within a central agency.[89] The OECD suggests that based on mandate, a Foreign Affairs Ministry is

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[85]OECD, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 39.

[86]Fitz-Gerald observes that the United Kingdom has successfully encouraged departmental integration on two fragile state initiatives, the Africa and Global Conflict Prevention Pools, by allocating a single budget for each initiative. Fitz-Gerald recommends that Canada adopt a similar approach for integrated foreign policy initiatives. Furthermore, the OECD found that integrated resource pools streamline the funding of programs that crossed departmental boundaries. The OECD also found that governments do not provide sufficient incentives to motivate inter-departmental collaboration. Patrick and Brown accurately point out that this finding applies to Canada and recommend that incentives promoting integrated approaches be incorporated in professional development and personnel evaluation systems. Fitz-Gerald, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for Joined-Up Government" . . ., 13-14 and 22; OECD, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 10-11 and 36; and Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing 'Whole of Government' Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 68 and 141.

[87]Further, coordination may be more precisely defined as "the practice of aligning structures and activities to . . . [achieve] horizontal objectives, to reduce overlap and duplication, and at a minimum, to ensure that horizontal objectives are not impeded by the actions of one or more units." Bakvis and Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership . . .*, 8.

[88]*Ibid.*, 19.

[89]In Canada, DFAIT has acted as a central agency for the coordination of foreign policy. This arrangement reflects the fact that PCO's coordination role is relatively limited and that its primary functions are to challenge the views of departments and provide advice to cabinet. David Mulroney, "CIIA Keynote Address 9 May 2007 – Canada in Afghanistan: From Collaboration to Integration," *Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade* [speaking notes on-line]; available from http://www.igloo.org/ciia/download/Branches/national/afghanis/davidmul; Internet; accessed 4 March 2008; and Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing 'Whole of Government' Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 62.

frequently best placed to lead coordination; however, OECD best practices allow that in certain circumstances other Ministries may be better suited to the role.[90] The uppermost point is that responsibility for coordination needs to be assigned to an appropriate agent and that agent must have the authority and resources needed to harmonize efforts across departments.[91]

Improved strategic coordination is a prerequisite for truly integrated planning. Beyond strategic coordination, a common planning framework is needed to synchronize activities and effects. Patrick and Brown suggest using proven military operational planning concepts as a starting point for developing interagency planning doctrine.[92] Noting that planning for post World War II (WW II) commenced three years before the end of the war, Flavin advises that early interagency planning is critical to successful conflict termination operations.[93] This recommendation can be extended to WGA engagement in fragile states and should be captured in interagency doctrine. Since Canada rarely engages in fragile states without partners, Canadian interagency planning doctrine must also facilitate alignment with international planning.[94]

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[90]OECD, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 41.

[91]To foster collaborative coordination, such resources should include personnel from other departments. *Ibid.*

[92]In fact, beginning in July 2000, operational planning processes were used to develop a multi-year, operational-level interagency plan for Bosnia. ISAF also used this approach to facilitate a transition between the Afghanistan Transitional Authority and the current GoA. Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing 'Whole of Government' Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 138; Pierre Lessard, "Campaign Design for Winning the War and the Peace," *Parameters* 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 47; Kerensa Hardy, "Multi-Year Road Map Tracks SFOR Progress," *SFOR Informer* no. 112 (May 2001) [article on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/112/s112p03a/t0105033a.htm; Internet; accessed 19 March 2008; and Howard G. Coombs and Rick Hillier, "Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying Operational Art in Post-Conflict Afghanistan," *Canadian Military Journal* 6, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 8-12.

[93]Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success" . . ., 97 and 110.

[94]Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing 'Whole of Government' Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 143; and OECD, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 41.

Further to the creation of a common framework, personnel must be trained to implement the doctrine. Training should take place in an interagency environment as this would have the secondary benefit of fostering interdepartmental understanding.[95] Canada uses secondments (for example, DND and CIDA personnel serve with the START) to improve interdepartmental linkages.[96] Since effective planning is a collaborative effort, consideration should be given to creating more robust interdepartmental teams as a means of strengthening collaboration and bridging cultural differences.[97]

Some may consider it impractical to expect greater engagement and more precise direction from cabinet. Flavin points out that political leadership tends to prefer broad strategic guidance because senior politicians are often under intense time pressure and because there is significant political risk in being overly specific about foreign policy goals, which are invariably difficult to attain.[98] Admittedly, time constraints will limit the energy that political leadership is able to devote to any single issue. As such, it is imperative that the bureaucracy help focus policy through careful dialogue with political leadership.[99] As well, there is no doubt that a preference for strategic flexibility is a fact of political life. After all, broad goals provide the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances and take advantage of emerging opportunities. However, governments also face electoral scrutiny and if strategic

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[95]Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success" . . ., 108.; and John R. Broulé II, "Operational Planning and Conflict Termination," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 1, no. 29 (Autumn/Winter 2001-2002): 102.

[96]OECD, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 29.

[97]OECD, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 29, 32 and 35.

[98]Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success" . . ., 98.

[99]Ibid., 101.

ambiguity is perceived to be the cause of ineffective or wasteful policy, or worse an

abdication of responsibility, the public will demand greater precision.[100]

Others argue that interdepartmental coordination is doomed to break down in an

insecure environment. Generally, members of the Public Service are neither trained nor

expected to serve in conflict zones, thus there is a tendency for integrated approaches to tilt

heavily toward military contributions when security deteriorates. After diplomat Glyn Berry

was killed near Kandahar in January 2006, security concerns restricted the ability of DFAIT

and CIDA personnel to contribute to reconstruction and development.[101] In addition, many

in the development community view integrated approaches as a means of co-opting

development and humanitarian assistance for security purposes. The Canadian Council for

International Cooperation (CCIC) has expressed concern that the integration espoused by the

IPS compromises humanitarian neutrality and impartiality.[102] Moreover, the CCIC warns

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[100]The application of Canada's integrated international policy in Afghanistan has been the subject of
continuous public discourse. When Canada's efforts shifted from Kabul to Kandahar, the mission became a
lightening rod for public debate and generated a torrent of unfavourable analysis. The critical and well received
final report of the Independent Panel triggered a new round of commentary on the mission, and the strategy and
leadership of Canada's international policy. In early March 2008 the Toronto Star, Canada's highest-circulation
newspaper, took the Government of Canada to task for spending $25 billion per year on defence, diplomacy and
development without an adequate strategy to guide the spending. Janice Stein and Eugene Lang of the
University of Toronto's Munk Centre for International Studies pointed out that criticism that General Rick
Hillier, Canada's Chief of Defence Staff has usurped policy making from elected officials is misplaced and
should be directed at elected officials who have abdicated their foreign and defence policy responsibilities.
Editorial, "$25B Spent, But no Plan," *Toronto Star*, 1 March 2008 [editorial on-line]; available from
http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/308313; Internet; accessed 1 March 2008; and Janice Gross Stein and
Eugene Lang, "Too Few Hilliers," *The Walrus*, April 2008, 37.

[101]Taylor Owen and Patrick Travers, "3D vision: can Canada reconcile its defence, diplomacy and
development objectives in Afghanistan?" *The Walrus*, July/August 2007, 46.

[102]Stephen Cornish of Care Canada provides a summary of similar perspectives in arguing that the
challenges associated with an integrated approach have outweighed the benefits in Afghanistan. Canadian
Council for International Cooperation, "Canada's 3D Approach Presentation to the Standing Committee on
Defence and Veteran Affairs," (Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Cooperation, November 2005), 1-3
[document on-line]; available from http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_policy_2005-11_3ds_stand_cttee_dva.pdf;
Internet; accessed 15 January 2008; and Stephen Cornish, "No Room for Humanitarianism in 3D Policies: Have
Forcible Humanitarian Interventions and Integrated Approaches Lost Their Way," *Journal of Military and
Strategic Studies* 10, no. 1 (Fall 2007), 22-23 [journal on-line]; available from
http://www.jmss.org/2007/2007fall/articles/cornish.pdf; Internet; accessed 5 April 2008.

that "integrating the 3Ds puts civilians at risk by blurring the lines between humanitarian and military . . . operations."[103] This perspective is not uniformly shared within the development and humanitarian communities. Jim Cornelius, the Executive Director of the Canadian Foodgrains Bank has welcomed an integrated international policy "because any effort to address global hunger and poverty requires all aspects of foreign policy. It cannot be reduced to development assistance, as though somehow development assistance by itself is going to deal with it."[104]

That being said, development and humanitarian experts have legitimate concerns. In addition to Glyn Berry, civilians working for the United Nations (UN) and nongovernmental organizations have been killed in Afghanistan.[105] Although security, development and humanitarian contributions intersect, each has its own distinct space that must be respected. Trust is a prerequisite for addressing legitimate concerns and building the relationships needed to work together where contributions overlap. Internationally, UN agencies (for example, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) often lead efforts to bring disparate

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[103]CCIC, "Canada's 3D Approach Presentation to the Standing Committee on Defence and Veteran Affairs" . . ., 2.

[104]Similarly, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade recommended that Canada establish a coherent policy on Africa by integrating "aid, trade, security, and foreign affairs staff" in one office. Much of the input the Committee received from the development community supported an integrated approach. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence . . .*, 13; and Senate, The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Overcoming 40 Years Of Failure: A New Road Map For Sub-Saharan Africa*, February 2007, 86:97.

[105]United Nations Department of Public Information, *Press Release ORG/1489: 2007 'One of Deadliest Years' for United Nations Personnel, Staff Union Says* (New York: UN, 2 January 2008) [article on-line]; available from http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/b657be76c84ac934852573c5004f2cda! OpenDocument; Internet; accessed 5 April 2008; and Medecins Sans Frontieres, "MSF Disappointed by The Verdict in Court Case About the Killing of Five of Its Staff in Afghanistan in 2004," http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=8C339269-5056-AA77-6CEC5B41739DE441&component=toolkit.article&method=full_html; Internet; accessed 5 April 2008.

contributors together.[106] In Canada, organizations such as the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, which provides collective civilian and military training, can be leveraged to foster greater understanding and synergy.[107] Finally, where ideology or insecurity are a barrier to governance and development initiatives, Defence will need to be prepared to assume a broader role while working to quickly establish the conditions for transition to civilian leadership.[108]

Others point out that Canada has little appetite for the commitment needed to implement effective interagency planning. First, creating and maintaining a system of interagency doctrine and training, as well as the more robust task forces needed to foster true interagency planning, will require either additional personnel or setting other initiatives aside. Second, given the complexity of the problems of fragile states, true interagency planning may very well produce plans that demand even more resources, such as a larger cadre of deployable civilians with nation-building expertise.[109] Demands for increased commitment may not sit well with the Canadian public, which has historically been more

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[106]Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success" . . ., 106.

[107]The mission of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is to advance peace operations through research, training, education and capacity building. In this role, it brings civilian and military personnel together for courses, simulations and conferences. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, "Who We Are," http://www.peaceoperations.org/web/la/en/pa/25D32889DA43494098B2BAA8F3D3F4FA/template.asp; Internet; accessed 5 April 2008.

[108]Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success" . . ., 106.

[109]Analysis frequently identifies inadequate resource commitment as a primary reason that WGA initiatives fall short of their objectives. The need for additional resources to be committed to Afghanistan is a common theme in analysis from diverse perspectives. The Independent Panel, Senlis Afghanistan and Barnett Rubin (former advisor to the UN Special Representative in Afghanistan) all call for the international community to contribute more toward security, humanitarian assistance and development, and particularly toward alternatives to opium production. Drawing from twenty four case studies, the RAND Corporation found that a mismatch between resources and desired outcomes was one of the most common reasons that nation-building initiatives failed. The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report* . . ., 15, 19 and 37; Senlis Afghanistan, *Stumbling Into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink*, (London: MF Publishing Ltd, November 2007), 55-58, 96-98; and A Barnett R. Rubin, "Saving Afghanistan" *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 1 (January/February 2007): 66 and 78.

concerned about prosperity than international policy. In reviewing the domestic political landscape at the end of the last century, Murphy concluded that the Canadian public places economic self-interest at the cornerstone of foreign policy and is unwilling to adequately fund humanitarian aspirations or security. [110]

In this context, some may conclude that Canada would be better off focusing on functional contributions to multi-lateral efforts. It is clear that there is a limit to Canada's willingness to devote resources to international policy. In acknowledging this limit, Prime Minister Martin stressed the importance of fostering multi-national cooperation to overcome international challenges.[111] In reality, no nation can solve all of the world's problems. Even the United States, with far greater resources than Canada, generally seeks the cooperation of international partners. The logic for Canada to adopt integrated planning is thus twofold. First, integrated planning will help Canada to make the most of its limited resources by ensuring that activities are not redundant or worse, counterproductive. Second, since experience has shown that integrated approaches are needed to deal with the root causes of fragile states and should be the basis for international efforts, integrated planning will help Canada to synchronize with international partners, even when Canadian contributions are limited to one functional area.[112]

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[110]Captain (N) Dan Murphy, "Planting the Maple Leaf: Domestic Politics and the Cultivation of Canadian Foreign Policy" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College National Securities Studies Course Research Essay, 1999), 3 and 9.

[111]Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Overview* . . ., i.

[112]The OECD emphasizes that successful engagement in fragile states requires "coherent progress across the political, security, economic and administrative domains . . . [which] requires donor countries to adopt a WGA approach." RAND Corporation best practices for nation-building call for integrated planning at both the national and international levels. OECD, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States* . . ., 7; and Dobbins, Jones, Crane and DeGrasse, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* . . ., xix and xxii.

Perhaps most contentiously, others contend that the premise of intervening in a failed state with an integrated approach is doomed because it seeks to recast societies in the mould of norms that the West has deemed to be universal and superior.[113] As well, the approach is viewed as impractical because the know-how required to re-engineer societies is lacking and interveners are not willing to devote the resources that the task requires. This flaw is acute when Western nations intervene in the interest of security and underestimate the complexity of the underlying root causes.[114] There is no shortage of analysis highlighting the fact that the international community has not come to terms with the root causes of Afghanistan's instability. Moreover, since state failure is a part of global political evolution, others recommend letting new political structures emerge from the fragmentation of dysfunctional states or simply containing the associated instability.[115]

Although challenges to the universality and superiority of Western norms and the capacity to transform weak states are warranted, there are many examples of integrated approaches succeeding. The European Recovery Program was part of an integrated approach

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[113]Stairs, Denis, *The Menace of General Ideas in the Making and Conduct of Canadian Foreign Policy*, O.D. Skelton Memorial Lecture (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, October 25, 2006), 7-9.

[114]Such causes include militarized actors with economic and social incentives to perpetuate conflict, illicit regional trade (for example, in drugs, weapons and diamonds), the absence of an economic base to support government and population, corrupt governance, tribal divisions, and regional competition and instability. Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, "Introduction: Making States Work," in *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance*, ed. Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, 1-10 (New York: United Nations University Press, 2005), 3-8; and Susan Willet, "Globalization and the Means of Destruction: Physical Insecurity and the Weapons Industry at the Turn of the Millennium," in *Globalization and Insecurity: Political, Economic and Physical Challenges*, ed. Barbara Harriss-White, 184-202 (New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd., 2002), 191-192.

[115]Jeffrey Herbst, "Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, 302-318 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 311-316 and Steven Metz, "New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency," *Parameters* 37, no. 4 (Winter 2007-08): 31.

that fostered development in post WW II Europe.[116] UN-led integrated missions have

diffused conflict and nurtured governance and development in fragile post-Cold War

environments such as Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique.[117] Although,

many of these were relatively permissive environments, integrated approaches have also been

effective in states beset by insurgencies.[118] Notwithstanding, interveners must temper their

expectations about objectives and timelines for political transformation and economic

development. Contributing nations such as Canada must be careful to cultivate local

ownership of initiatives and support opportunities for political engagement and

reconciliation, and the inclusion of regional stakeholders.[119] Canada must also adapt to the

reality that previously successful strategies may not be directly applicable to current fragile

states and that the complexity of challenge increases significantly when a fragile environment

includes an insurgency or narcotics based economy.[120]

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[116]The European Recovery Program (or Marshall Plan) was a cooperative program between the United States and sixteen European states to accelerate the reconstruction of Western Europe in the aftermath of WW II. Between 1948 and 1952, the United States contributed approximately $13 billion in development assistance to sixteen European countries. At the same time, European countries invested approximately ten times this amount in reconstruction. For participating states, on aggregate the program resulted in a 32 percent increase in Gross National Product, a 40 percent increase in industrial production and an 11 percent increase in agricultural production. United States, Department of State, *The Marshall Plan: Rebuilding Europe* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of State Bureau of International Information Programs, May 2007), 1 and 14 [document on-line]; available from http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/marshallplan/marshallplan.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 April 2008.

[117]James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik and Anga Timilsina, *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, RAND Corporation Monograph (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2005), xvi and xvii.

[118]During the last century, integrated approaches helped resolve insurgencies in Greece (1946 to 1950), Malaya (1946 to 1960), the Phillipines (1946 to 1954) and El Salvador (1981 to 1992). James S Corum, "The Air Campaign of the Present and the Future: Using Airpower Against Insurgents and Terrorists," in *Air Campaigns in the New World Order: Air Symposium 2004,* ed. Alan D. English, 25-42 (Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, 2005), 31-33 and 35.

[119]Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing 'Whole of Government' Approaches to Fragile States . . .*, 136;

[120]For example, Thomas Axworthy, chair of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at Queen's University and former Principle Secretary to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau suggested that it may take 25 to 30

In conclusion, by using the Afghanistan mission to examine Canada's foreign policy, this paper has demonstrated that Canada has not fully integrated its foreign policy. The essay has also shown that a fully integrated approach to international policy will require a more rigorous process of determining and communicating strategy, formal coordination of the responsibilities of government departments and a common framework for operational planning and cooperation.

The examination of Canada's international policy has also made it clear that integrated national and international contributions are needed to address the complex challenges of fragile states. Current efforts to achieve a more synergistic Canadian foreign policy are an attempt to meet these challenges and improve upon past successes. Although there is scope for considerable improvement, rejecting an integrated approach to foreign policy would be out of step with Canada's interests, values and historic internationalism.

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years to bring enduring stability to Afghanistan. In doing so, he noted that foreign aid of approximately US$ 3 bil per year now provides as much as 90 percent of public spending and that this sum is dwarfed by Afghanistan's illegal narcotics economy. Further, Afghanistan's insurgency is complicated by the fact that it is linked to and sustained by unrest in neighbouring Pakistan. Thomas Axworthy, "Making the Mission Work," *The Toronto Star*, 2 March 2008 [article on-line]; available from http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/308300; Internet; accessed 2 March 2008.

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