

## Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

## Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
JCSP 34 / PCEMI 34

**EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS**  
C/PR500/IRP/RP-1

**AN EXAMINATION OF CANADIAN AND CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN  
THE CARIBBEAN REGION: CONFLICTING AIMS?**

By / par Major D.G. Daly

Syndicate 9 Term 4

*This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfillment of one of the requirements of the course of studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.*

*La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.*

## ABSTRACT

Two very different countries are involved in foreign policy engagement in the Caribbean region. China's involvement is long-term and subtle. Canada, under the leadership of Prime Minister Harper, has just become involved in the region. Both countries are using "soft power" techniques in order to further their objectives.

The foreign policies of the two countries are examined, and the policy objectives and the method by which they are being achieved are analysed to determine whether the countries' policies conflict or are complementary.

This essay argues that the People's Republic of China and Canada's policy objectives are largely complementary, and unlikely to cause conflict.

## INTRODUCTION

The Caribbean is the region consisting of the Caribbean Sea, its islands, and the surrounding coasts.<sup>1</sup> It has the reputation of being a slow corner of the planet, but interesting things are happening in the Caribbean, and the actions of two very different countries in the region bear closer analysis. Chinese interest in the Caribbean has increased greatly in the last thirty years, while Canada's interest is more recent. The first is a civilization thousands of years old, the second, a relative newcomer on the world scene; one is an industrial western middle power, the other a regional power halfway around the globe, perhaps an aspiring hegemon. Why is each interested in the Caribbean?

The method used to conduct this examination will be broad to narrow; to examine each country's foreign policy writ large, then to look more closely at why the Caribbean region is of interest to each in turn. These aims will then be compared to see if Canada and China's aims are likely to conflict or will complement one another. The thesis of this paper is that the aims of the two countries, while not coordinated, are complementary in the Caribbean region.

## CHINA

This section will briefly describe some aspects of China, its international policy goals, and through them the reasons why Chinese interest in the Caribbean is so high.

The People's Republic of China is the most populous country in the world, with 1.3 billion people. It is a one party socialist republic, with the Chinese

---

<sup>1</sup>Definition, Catherine Soanes, ed, *Pocket Oxford English Dictionary*, 9<sup>th</sup> ed., (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 128.

Communist Party (CCP) being that party. Its Gross Domestic Product in 2007 was nearly \$3.5 billion (Canadian Dollars – CAD),<sup>2</sup> the fourth-largest economy in the world.<sup>3</sup>

The prime goal of the Chinese Communist Party is to maintain itself in power.<sup>4</sup> The end of the Cold War in 1990 meant an end to the stable bipolar (West-USSR) system that allowed China to play one superpower off the other, in order to achieve their long-term goals.<sup>5</sup> These goals are to avoid the fate of the USSR and Warsaw Pact, to ensure territorial integrity (including unification), and to maintain internal stability.<sup>6</sup>

In order to achieve the first aim, avoiding the fate of the USSR, China seeks domestic stability. This is a tremendous challenge, for a variety of reasons. First, the economic inequity of the rapid economic growth—10.7% in 2006<sup>7</sup>—between the agrarian majority and the urbanized middle class and elites causes tension, as does corruption at all levels of government, pollution, and demographic problems similar to those faced by western nations (but due to the

---

<sup>2</sup>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Fact Sheet, April 2008, found at: <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/geo/china-fs-en.aspx> ; Internet; accessed 17 December 2007.

<sup>3</sup>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Emerging and growing markets: China's growing importance to Canada and the world*. found at: <http://www.international.gc.ca/commerce/markets-marches/china-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2007.

<sup>4</sup>Russell Ong. *China's Security Interests in the Post-Cold War Era*. (London: Curzon Press, 2002), 178.

<sup>5</sup>Robert Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War*. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2008), 37.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>7</sup>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Fact Sheet, April 2008. found at: <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/geo/china-fs-en.aspx> ; Internet; accessed 17 December 2007.

one-child policy in China's case)<sup>8</sup>. Handling these problems while maintaining growth will be problematic for the Chinese leadership. In order to do so, access to new markets for Chinese products will be necessary, as will energy and raw materials.

Territorial integrity is important to the People's Republic of China. It is a large country, with diverse make-up, and the leadership of the CCP has not been slow to learn from the lessons of the Soviet Union break-up, which once started, was unable to be stopped. They are determined not to have the process begin. Border issues with the Soviet Union, and Russia and the "stans" after the break-up of the USSR, along with the normalization of relations with India, all in the 1996-7 timeframe,<sup>9</sup> have meant that China's inland borders are secure. The same could not be said for the seaward borders, in particular, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. While the former British and Portuguese colonies were returned to the People's Republic Of China in 1997 and 1999 respectively, the Republic of China (hereafter, Taiwan) remains a thorn in the side of the Beijing government. But, why are their feelings so strong on this issue?

The depth of the People's Republic of China's feelings on the Taiwan issue is based in history. The answer lies in "the hundred years of humiliation" from the start of the first Opium War in 1839 to the People's Republic of China victory over the Kuomintang (KMT) in the Chinese Civil War. China was victim

---

<sup>8</sup>Oded Shenkar, *China's economic rise and the new geopolitics*". International Journal, Vol 61, No 2 (Spring 2006), 314.

<sup>9</sup>Paul H. B. Goodwin, *Force and Diplomacy: China prepares for the Twenty-First Century*, in *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium*. 4<sup>th</sup> ed, edited by Samuel Kim, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 175.

to imperialism (Japanese and western), and lost great power status, territory, and sovereignty. The People's Republic of China is determined that this will not recur.<sup>10</sup> China regards Taiwan as a renegade province<sup>11</sup>, and the People's Republic of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has stated that it is prepared to "...complete...the final phase of the Chinese Civil War".<sup>12</sup>

Taiwanese Ministry of Defence indicates there are six possible situations in which Beijing may invade:

- If and when the island declares itself 'independent';
- If and when an internal upheaval occurs;
- If and when Taiwan's armed forces become comparatively weaker;
- If and when Taiwan protractedly refuses to talk with Beijing about the issue of unification; and
- If and when Taiwan goes nuclear.<sup>13</sup>

Complicating the Taiwan issue is the close relationship with the United States, and the fact that Taiwan is an economic competitor. The history of U.S. support dates back to the Korean War, when it was in the U.S. national interest to prevent the People's Republic of China from gaining control of Taiwan; the 1954 Mutual Security Pact placed "China's Taiwan Province under U.S. protection".<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup>Goodwin, *Force and Diplomacy...*, 171.

<sup>11</sup>Ong, *China's Security Interests...*, 96.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 98.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 98.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, 106.

The People's Republic of China leadership regards this as the U.S. interfering in their internal affairs. They remain concerned, and have built up forces capable of discouraging the U.S. from intervening should Taiwan attempt to break away from the mainland.<sup>15</sup> The official U.S. position, according to the People's Republic of China, is:

All Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The US government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and installations from Taiwan.<sup>16</sup>

The Taiwan issue is one that is clearly important to the People's Republic of China. Events occurring in the Caribbean region that bear on Taiwan recognition would therefore be important to the People's Republic of China. U.S. military intervention in Yugoslavia/Kosovo has fed the People's Republic of China's paranoia about Taiwan and Tibet<sup>17</sup>. While there has been little written on the very recent Kosovar declaration of independence, it doubtless has caused deep angst amongst the People's Republic of China leadership.

In 2001, a series of events in short order also caused relations to sour between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China; the collision of a Chinese fighter and U.S. Navy EP-3, President Bush allowing the President of Taiwan to visit the U.S. twice, hosting the Dalai Lama at the White House, approval of

---

<sup>15</sup>Lampton, David M.. *The Faces of Chinese Power.* Foreign Affairs, Vol 86, No 1 (January/February 2007), 118.

<sup>16</sup>Ong, *China's Security Interests...*,106-7.

<sup>17</sup>Suisheng, Zhao, *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior.* Armonk, New York: "An East Gate Book", 2004, 271.



advanced weapons for Taiwan, and approving the construction of a limited missile defence system (China feared its limited nuclear deterrent would be obsolete), all seemed to be directed at the Chinese.

Later in 2001, the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> brought the two adversaries closer together, since Beijing also fears the rise of Islamic radicalism, particularly in Xinjiang province, which borders Russia to the north, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tjikistan, Afghanistan, and Kasmir to the west.

The loss of the stable bi-polar world to one in which the United States is a global hegemon is disturbing to the Chinese. They have decided to “focus on ‘comprehensive national power’ essential to achieving the status of a global great power by 2049”.<sup>18</sup> To contain the United States, they have decided to pursue military build-up, multilateralism, and multipolarity.<sup>19</sup>

#### MILITARY BUILD-UP

According to official Chinese sources, China’s military expenditures were 12.7% of total expenditures in 2004.<sup>20</sup> Despite 15 years of double digit increases in military spending, Chinese leaders remain concerned. It appears to many analysts that the goal is to build the strongest military force in Asia.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup>Dr. Mohan Malik, “China’s Growing Involvement in Latin America.” Power and Interest News Report, 12 June 2006, found at [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=508&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=508&language_id=1); Internet; accessed 22 February 2008, 2.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>20</sup>Lampton, *The Faces of Chinese Power...* 119.

<sup>21</sup>Robert Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations...*, 130.

## MULTILATERALISM

China is becoming one of the major trading partners with an increasing number of countries. Using “soft power” to build trade and economic dependencies and mutual security, arms sales, and intelligence cooperation has the potential to make China a force to be reckoned with.

## MULTIPOLARITY

China has embraced multipolarity to attempt to offset the power of the sole remaining superpower. For example, as of November, 2006, China was the 13<sup>th</sup> largest contributor of UN peacekeepers, with nearly 1,700 troops abroad.<sup>22</sup> China had resisted participating in peacekeeping since joining the UN in 1971, and has a permanent seat on the Security Council. The memories of the Korean War, a United Nations action where China was forced to defend itself, left a strong negative feeling in China. Since the country began peacekeeping in 1990, 8 Chinese servicemen have died, the last a People’s Liberation Army Lieutenant Colonel in the Israeli attack on a United Nations observation post in Lebanon, which also killed a Canadian major.

In an effort to leverage financial and economic multipolar power, China has joined the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, International Finance Corporation, International Development Organization, World Trade Organization, and others.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup>Lynch, Colum. “China Filling Void Left by West in UN Peacekeeping.” Washington Post, November 24, 2006. Found at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/23/AR2006112301007.html>; Internet; accessed 27 March 2008, 1-2.

<sup>23</sup>William R. Feeney, *China and the Multilateral Economic Institutions*, in *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium*. 4<sup>th</sup> ed, edited by Samuel Kim, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 239.

In summary, China considers unification of the mainland and Taiwan essential, wishes to control radical Islam, desires a multipolar world where multilateralism is the norm, and needs energy, raw materials, and new markets. In addition, attempting to contain the United States would also be worthwhile. How good a fit is the Caribbean region for these criteria?

#### CHINA IN THE CARRIBEAN

Each of the above factors will be considered in turn, to establish why China is active in the Caribbean.

As of June, 2006, Latin America and the Caribbean region were home to 12 of the 25 countries that officially recognize Taiwan. Four of these are in the Caribbean—Belize, Haiti, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and St. Kitts/Nevis, who receive significant economic help from Taiwan.<sup>24</sup> China is unhappy with this, and continues to press for all Caribbean countries to recognize the PRC, after which a structured regional relationship on trade could be negotiated. For a country with the financial clout that the PRC has, this pressure will be intense.

The PRC is also using “soft power” to achieve aims in the Caribbean. While western countries lecture Caribbean countries on human rights, democracy, and drugs, the PRC does not. It achieves multilateralism as a goal, not as a result, since it does not have to consider profit when establishing strategic footholds.

---

<sup>24</sup> Sir Ronald Sanders, “China and Taiwan divide the Caribbean.” Found at: <http://www.caricomblog.com/index.php?itemid=152>; Internet; accessed 22 February, 2008, 1-2.

The PRC's increasing presence in the Caribbean is seen by some as a "tit for tat" response to the U.S. presence in China's area of influence.<sup>25</sup> In the past, use of countries whose leaders disliked China's adversaries were used by Beijing for "containment through surrogates," which would assist in containing the United States.

A clear sign that China is working towards multilateralism in the Caribbean can be seen by two examples. First, Chinese participation in the United Nations Mission in Haiti in 2004, and in the same year, China taking a role as a permanent observer (and supporter) of the Organization of American States demonstrate this tendency. Apart from generating goodwill, it is difficult to see what interest China would have in supporting Haiti. By supporting the poorest country in the region, China deftly built up its profile, in an area where the Caribbean Community—CARICOM—states were also engaged.

Chinese bilateralism is also easy to find in the Caribbean. The recent Cricket World Cup is an excellent example. China gave Antigua a US\$55 million grant to build a cricket stadium, US\$30 million to Jamaica for another, St. Lucia both a cricket and football stadium, and the people of Dominica received aid equivalent to US\$1,600 per person for a cricket grounds.<sup>26</sup> Taiwan built grounds in Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent. When a hurricane destroyed the grounds in Grenada, the PRC rushed in and built another. At the end of the

---

<sup>25</sup>Dr. Mohan Malik, "China's Growing Involvement...", 4.

<sup>26</sup>Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, "China Outplays Taiwan in Cricket Diplomacy," March 26, 2007, found at: <http://abcnews.go.com/International/Story?id=2980988&page=1>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2008, 1.

tournament, Grenada and Dominica de-recognized Taiwan and recognized the PRC.<sup>27</sup> They had won the tournament without playing a game.

Viewing the websites of the embassies of the PRC in each of the countries in the Caribbean is instructive. For example, on the Embassy of the PRC in Barbados website, the description of the relations between the PRC and Barbados since the recognition of the PRC in 1977 shows 44 official visits, 14 cultural and educational exchanges, and 12 important bilateral agreements.<sup>28</sup> In 2005, year-over-year trade volume had increased by 82.7%.<sup>29</sup> The Embassy in Jamaica indicates a 90% increase in trade from 2003 to 2004.<sup>30</sup>

Beijing is taking advantage of a 2002 United States law banning training for countries that refuse to exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Training in Barbados, Costa Rica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and several Latin American countries are affected.<sup>31</sup> “[U.S.] Secretary of State Rice described the result as “the same as shooting ourselves in the foot””.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup>Chaudhuri, “China Outplays Taiwan...”, 1.

<sup>28</sup>Embassy of the PRC in Barbados, *Summary of China-Barbados Bilateral Relations*, 3 July 2006, found at: <http://bb.china-embassy.org/eng/zbgx/t261184.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>30</sup>Embassy of the PRC in Jamaica, *Bilateral Economic and Trade Relations*, <http://jm.china-embassy.org/eng/zygx/jmhzt211230.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

<sup>31</sup>Dr. Mohan Malik, “China’s Growing Involvement...”, 5.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.

Cuba has also been a beneficiary of the Chinese largesse. According to the Power and Interest News Report, Beijing has been operating two intelligence stations in Cuba since 1999.<sup>33</sup>

China needs energy, importing 3.19 million barrels per day (2007 estimate),<sup>34</sup> and the Caribbean region is rich in reserves. China has negotiated large oil contracts with Venezuela, and the Caribbean region will be necessary for shipping of the oil. Since 1996, it has been reported that China has conducting oil drilling operations in the Continental Shelf, in a deal for 4.6 billion barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.<sup>35</sup> United States companies also attempted to bid to do the exploration work, but were denied due to domestic laws preventing support to Cuba.

China has a requirement for raw materials for manufacturing. During a 2004 visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao, 16 economic agreements were signed, including a venture in the nickel industry; Cuba has the third largest nickel reserves in the world.<sup>36</sup> According to Chinese trade statistics, Chinese trade grew 36% in 2004.<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>34</sup>Source: CIA factbook, found at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ch.html>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2008.

<sup>35</sup>CNN Money report May 9, 2006, found at: [http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/09/news/economy/oil\\_cuba/index.htm](http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/09/news/economy/oil_cuba/index.htm); Internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

<sup>36</sup>Mary Murphy, producer, NBC News, *China gives boost to Cuba Economy*, 23 November 2004, found at: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6566988/>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2008.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*

The World Tourism Organization has suggested that by 2020 China will be the fourth-largest source of global leisure travellers; recently, tourists from China have been allowed US\$5000 to travel. Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, and St. Lucia have been given “approved travel destination” status, which gives them a head-start in this enormous new market.<sup>38</sup>

## SUMMARY

Although it is somewhat unexpected that the PRC would be involved in the Caribbean, it has been shown that they are deeply engaged in the Caribbean to match their national objectives, both political (Taiwan issue), and economic.

The next section will cover Canada’s foreign policy, and its interest in the Caribbean region.

## CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

This section will describe Canada’s growth from colony to middle power, its foreign policy interests, and describe the history of Canadian engagement in the Caribbean region.

Canada is a relatively new country in comparison to the People’s Republic of China. Its foreign policy does not have the consistency that China’s does. A series of five events have shaped foreign policy, and they are described here.

Originally a British colony, Canadian foreign policy was carried out through the British Foreign Office.<sup>39</sup> This was an advantage, since the British Foreign Office was more powerful than the Canadian representative would have

---

<sup>38</sup>Sanders, “China and Taiwan divide...”, 2-3.

<sup>39</sup>Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s*. (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd., 1994), 2.

been, and was economical, since the country did not have to maintain embassies or high commissions around the world (such as it was at the time). As the young colony matured, the British attempted to keep peace with the Americans, causing some discontent, but it was recognized that good Anglo-American relations were a good thing for Canada.<sup>40</sup> Britain tended to settle things in favour of the Americans.

Nothing really changed until the First World War. Canada's significant contributions and sacrifices were recognized when Canada was allowed to sign the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 as the Dominion of Canada, rather than having Britain sign on her behalf. The other shen



destinies.”<sup>43</sup> However, the move from the orbit of Britain to that of the United States had begun.

The lead-up to the Korean War led to changes in Canadian foreign policy. The policy goals were to attempt to moderate United States decisions, particularly those which might lead to nuclear war, and to ensure that the United Nations intervention be effective (“since the strength of the organization... depended on it being used.”).<sup>44</sup> This was also the beginning of the internationalist or multilateral movement in Canada. Canada worked closely with the United States, now its major trading partner, but fought with the Commonwealth Division.

The Suez Crisis in 1956 forced Canada to choose supporting the United States, now Canada’s closest ally, or Israel, France and Britain. A United Nations resolution calling for the disputants to refrain from using force was vetoed by Britain and France. Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson and United Nations Secretary-General Hammarskjold brought a proposal for the creation of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force to the first Emergency Meeting of the General Assembly, and the United Nations Emergency Force was born.<sup>45</sup> This was a triumph for Canadian policy, and won Pearson the Nobel Prize for Peace. Multilateralism worked.

---

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, 229.

<sup>44</sup>Dennis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint*, in Hillmer, Norman, ed., *Partners Nevertheless: Canadian-American Relations in the Twentieth Century*, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1989), 217.

<sup>45</sup>James Eayrs, *Canadian Policy and Opinion During the Suez Crisis*. *International Journal*, Vol 12, No2 (Spring 1957), 97-108.

The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was an opportunity for Canada to reaffirm its close relationship with the United States, but the opposite happened. Canada had brief warning that President Kennedy was going to reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba, and its half-hearted support caused a crisis in the Canadian government. While the details are unimportant to this paper, the poisonous relationship between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Diefenbaker caused a serious rift between the two countries when support to the U.S. in a crisis did not materialize, due to Diefenbaker's inability to make what should have been an easy decision. The decision to increase air defence readiness, in accordance with the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) Agreement for two days in the crisis. Diefenbaker chose the worst possible time to try to demonstrate independence from United States foreign policy. Following the crisis, the President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, John Holmes said, "We are again reminded of the dilemma of middle powers. They must constantly demonstrate their independence without losing the respect of the great powers, particularly those who are their allies".<sup>46</sup> Canada maintained relations with Cuba, and the United States did not. This shows the independence of Canadian foreign policy, and also is the only time that a Caribbean nation figures in the history of Canadian foreign policy.

In 1971, President Nixon unexpectedly redid United States trade policy, reducing or eliminating favoured trading status with Canada, and the rest of the world, to protect internal markets. Canada had three options; first, to maintain the

---

<sup>46</sup>Peyton V. Lyon, *Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 63.

status quo (difficult to impossible), second, to embrace economic collaboration with the United States (rejected since it would accelerate integration with the United States), and the so-called “Third Option”, which stressed the relations with third countries in order to reduce Canada’s vulnerability to the United States policy.<sup>47</sup> The Trudeau government embraced the Third Option, and worked diligently to diversify Canadian trade with Asia and Europe. The problem was that both Asia and Europe, given the choice, preferred to work with the United States, and the Third Option failed due to the blindingly obvious advantages of proximity, fairly free land borders, excellent transportation, and shared history. The relative size of Canada and the United States—Canada has 10% of the population and GDP—make it inevitable that Canada will be economically inferior to the United States. Prime Minister Trudeau observed:

70 per cent of Canada’s foreign policy is predetermined by the Canada-United States relationship; he suggested that the task of Canadian diplomats was to make the most of Canada’s freedom with respect to the remaining 30 per cent.

In summary, the history of Canadian foreign policy is coming of age as a country early in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, gradually moving from the influence of Britain to that of the United States, and trying to maintain a measure of independence from the United States.

#### CANADA’S INTERNATIONAL POLICY STATEMENT

In 2005, the Liberal government of Prime Minister Paul Martin released an International Policy Statement (IPS), titled “A role of Pride and

---

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, 665.

Influence in the world”.<sup>48</sup> In addition to improving relations with the United States, Canada’s goal was to “make a difference globally”, by “building a more secure world (countering terrorism, stabilizing failed and failing states, and combatting proliferation)”, and “increasing global prosperity (strengthening global competitiveness, increasing trade and commerce, and promoting sustainable development)”.<sup>49</sup>

Canada suffered from a broken system of international aid; 155 countries were receiving aid, with 54 receiving less than CAD\$1 million a year. The government indicated that in future Canada would focus on 25 “Development Partners”, with the goal of actually making a difference, rather than having aid programs a mile wide and an inch deep.<sup>50</sup> The IPS put Mexico high on Canada’s list, yet ignored the Caribbean entirely, though Haiti was mentioned in the section on failed and failing states.<sup>51</sup>

#### CANADA IN THE CARIBBEAN

In July, 2007 Prime Minister Stephen Harper made a series of speeches signalling Canada’s renewed engagement in the Americas. Canada’s objectives were:

- To strengthen and promote Canada’s values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

---

<sup>48</sup>Canada. *Canada’s International Policy State: a role of pride and influence in the world*. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005).

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, foreword.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>51</sup>John Graham, *Neglected? Canadian Policy in Latin America*. Vanguard: Canada’s Premier Defence and Security Magazine, July 2007. found at: <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/HemisphericShiftGraham>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008, 1.

- To build strong sustainable economies through increased trade and investment linkages; and
- To meet new security challenges, as well as natural disasters and health pandemics.<sup>52</sup>

The Americas, including the Caribbean, are now arguably third in Canada's foreign policy, after the United States and Afghanistan, where Canada has committed to maintaining troops until 2011. Why should Canada be involved in the Caribbean?

According to Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade statistics, the Americas are Canada's third largest trading partners, after the United States and Asia. Mexico is fourth.<sup>53</sup> Clearly, there are economic opportunities, and the Caribbean is closer than either Europe or Asia. The countries in the Caribbean speak English and French, which makes communication easier than with other trading partners.

In addition to the benefits to the Canadian economy, there are also risks to Canada that can be averted by engagement in the Caribbean. Caribbean countries do not have the resources to deal with the problems of drug, weapon and human trafficking. It has been said that the Caribbean is Canada's most porous border.<sup>54</sup> Canada has experience and the technology to deal with these threats.

---

<sup>52</sup> Canada. Prime Minister of Canada. Address to Chilean and Canadian business and political leaders, Santiago, Chile, 17 July 2007, found at: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&id=1759>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

<sup>53</sup> John Graham *Southward Bound: Harper shifts focus in hemisphere*. Vanguard: Canada's Premier Defence and Security Magazine, June 2006, found at: <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/NeglectedGraham>; Internet; accessed 20 March, 2008, 1.

Health issues also are problematic. Control of communicable disease is difficult in less developed nations; a good example is the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome crisis, which came to Canada from China. Around one in thirteen Canadians travel to the Caribbean annually,<sup>55</sup> and this presents a threat that should not be ignored. Again, Canada has the capacity to help deal with the problems at source.

Some engagement had been occurring in the region, notably in defence. The Military Training Assistance Plan (MTAP) was established in 1964 to provide military training assistance to newly independent Commonwealth nations, and was jointly funded by Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence (DND). It was expanded to include other nations, but in 1991, Foreign Affairs declined to continue funding, and DND assumed full funding. MTAP aims at encouraging long-term, sustainable results, by conducting expert team visits to other countries, providing language training, and peacekeeping training. Suitable candidates also can attend professional development courses at the Land Forces Command and Staff College, Canadian Forces College, and the range of classification (Infantry, Pilot, etc) training. A cooperative venture between Jamaica and Canada supports the Caribbean Junior Command and Staff College.<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>54</sup>John Graham, *Neglected? Canadian Policy in Latin America*. Vanguard: Canada's Premier Defence and Security Magazine, July 2007. found at: <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/HemisphericShiftGraham>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008, 2.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup>Rasiulis, Andrew. *The Military Training Assistance Program: An instrument of military diplomacy*. Canadian Military Journal, Autumn 2001, 63-64.

Canada also contributes both Maritime Patrol and Naval ships to the Joint Interagency Task Force-South mission to counter narcotic trafficking in the area.<sup>57 58</sup>

In summary, Canada is a young country, which moved from the British to the American sphere of influence after the Second World War. Since, Canada has attempted to keep the United States close, but not too close. In the Korean War and the Suez Crisis, Canada used the United Nations to attempt to constrain the United States, as an internationalist or multipolarist on the world stage. In the Cuban missile crisis, Canada found that in a crisis, exercising independence was a dangerous thing to do. In exploring the Third Option, Canada found that the limits of geography limited her capacity to diversify her economy.

With the release of the IPS, Canada found her stride in the international community, trying to make a difference, rather than aiding in a piece-meal fashion, and started a return to middle power status. With the new engagement in the Americas, a region once taken for granted is now a focus.

---

<sup>57</sup>Capt Jeff Manney, “Auroras return from equatorial counter-drug patrols”. Maple Leaf, Vol 11, No 12. Found at: [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Community/mapleleaf/article\\_e.asp?id=4255](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Community/mapleleaf/article_e.asp?id=4255); Internet; accessed 21 April 2008.

<sup>58</sup>Master Sergeant Steve Miller, “Canadian Frigate briefly joins JIATF-South in counter drug mission”. Southern Command press release, found at: <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=584>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2008.

## COMPARISON OF CHINA AND CANADA'S OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA

The objectives of each country will now be examined to determine whether, in total, they conflict or complement one another.

What are the similarities between the foreign policies of the two countries? Both prefer to work multilaterally, or in a multipolar fashion, in order to achieve their objectives through the use of "soft power". In each, there is concern that a United States hegemon is not a good thing for the world, and active attempts have been made by through world bodies such as the United Nations, and regional organisations such as the Organization of American States to constrain the United States.

Both countries are looking for export markets. Canada uses economics to attempt to bring democracy and rule of law to less developed nations, while China is less concerned about these, and is more concerned about building long-term relationships, even if they are with nations such as Venezuela. China is not concerned with profit, and can afford to take a loss in order to fulfill long-term goals. Innovative methods of becoming involved such as sponsorship of the Cricket World Cup proved to raise China's profile.

As members of the United Nations, both countries have attempted to help Haiti, as members of United Nations peacekeeping missions. While Canada was in on the ground floor on peacekeeping, the Chinese experience in the Korean War deterred them from considering peacekeeping much later in the century.

Both nations have relations with Cuba. Canada maintained relations after the Cuban revolution, and China only normalized relations after the collapse of



the Soviet Union. China is clearly after resources from Cuba, in particular nickel and energy, while Canada is committed to bringing Cuba to more developed status.

China has a long-term plan for engagement in the Caribbean, while Canada is at the whim of the currently sitting government, and must necessarily think more short-term.

Canada has no overriding higher goal in the region, whereas China's preoccupation with unification and the Taiwan question is a clear national priority—one that the People's Republic of China would go to war for.

## CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper was to discover whether the People's Republic of China and Canada's objectives are in conflict, or complementary. After a review of the evidence, it is concluded that the two countries' objectives are complementary, in the view of the region and the world community. Although there are differences, overall, the objectives are not in conflict. The people in the Caribbean region are in a "win-win" situation.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barry, Major M.J. "China will not be a Superpower." Toronto: Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Course New Horizons Paper, 2006.

Boutillier, James. *The China conundrum: To engage or contain?* Vanguard: Canada's Premier Defence and Security Magazine, July 2007. found at: <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/EngagingAsiaBoutillier>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

Canada. *Canada's International Policy State: a role of pride and influence in the world.* Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005.

Canada. Dept of National Defence. *Strategic Assessment 2006/2007.* Ottawa: Dept of National Defence, 2006.

Canada. Minister of Foreign Affairs. Address by the MFA to the Canadian Foundation for the Americas. "Canada in the Americas." March 13, 2008. Found at: [http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication\\_id=385948&Language=E&docnumber=2008/5](http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=385948&Language=E&docnumber=2008/5); Internet; accessed 18 April 2008.

Canada. Prime Minister of Canada. Address to Chilean and Canadian business and political leaders, Santiago, Chile, 17 July 2007. Found at: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&id=1759>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

Canada. Prime Minister of Canada. Address to CARICOM leaders, Bridgetown, Barbados, 19 July 2007. Found at: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&id=1770>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

Dobson, Wendy. *China's economic transformation: Global and Canadian implications.* International Journal, Vol 61, No 2 (Spring 2006), 299-312.

Eayrs, James. *Canadian Policy and Opinion During the Suez Crisis.* International Journal, Vol 12, No2 (Spring 1957), 97-108.

Graham, John. *Southward Bound: Harper shifts focus in hemisphere.* Vanguard: Canada's Premier Defence and Security Magazine, June 2006. found at: <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/NeglectedGraham>; Internet; accessed 20 March, 2008.

Graham, John. *Neglected? Canadian Policy in Latin America.* Vanguard: Canada's Premier Defence and Security Magazine, July 2007. found at: <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/HemisphericShiftGraham>; Internet; accessed 20 March, 2008.

Granatstein, J.L., and Robert Bothwell, *A Self-Evident National Duty*, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 3, No 2 (January 1975): 212-233.

Hillmer, Norman, and Granatstein, J.L., *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s*. Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd., 1994.

Karlstad, LtCdr Fridtjof. "China's Power Ambitions." Toronto: Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Course Master's Thesis, 2006.

Jubany, Florencia and Poon, Daniel. "Research report: Recent Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Canadian Perspective." Canadian Foundation for the Americas, March 2006. found at: [http://www.focal.ca/pdf/china\\_latam.pdf](http://www.focal.ca/pdf/china_latam.pdf); Internet; accessed 2 February 2008.

Kim, Samuel, ed, *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium*. 4<sup>th</sup> ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998.

Lampton, David M. *The Faces of Chinese Power*." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 1 (January/February 2007), 115-127.

Lynch, Colum. "China Filling Void Left by West in UN Peacekeeping." *Washington Post*, November 24, 2006. Found at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/23/AR2006112301007.html>; Internet; accessed 27 March 2008.

Lyon, Peyton V. *Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963*. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968, 27-64.

Lyon, Peyton V. *Second Thoughts on the Second Option*. *International Journal*, Vol 30, No 4 (Autumn 1975), 646-670.

Malik, Dr. Mohan. "China's Growing Involvement in Latin America." *Power and Interest News Report*, 12 June 2006. [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=508&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=508&language_id=1); Internet; accessed 22 February 2008.

Manney, Capt Jeff. "Auroras return from equatorial counter-drug patrols". *Maple Leaf*, Vol 11, No 12. Found at: [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Community/mapleleaf/article\\_e.asp?id=4255](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Community/mapleleaf/article_e.asp?id=4255); Internet; accessed 21 April 2008.

Miller, Master Sergeant Steve. "Canadian Frigate briefly joins JIATF-South in counter drug mission". Southern Command press release, found at: <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=584>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2008.

Ong, Russell, *China's Security Interests in the Post-Cold War Era*. London: Curzon Press, 2002.

Rasiulis, Andrew. *The Military Training Assistance Program: An instrument of military diplomacy*. Canadian Military Journal, Autumn 2001, 63-64.

Sanders, Sir Ronald. "China and Taiwan divide the Caribbean." <http://www.caricomblog.com/index.php?itemid=152>; Internet; accessed 22 February, 2008.

Shambaugh, David, ed. *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*. Berkley, California: University of California Press, 2005.

Shenkar, Oded. *China's economic rise and the new geopolitics*". International Journal, Vol 61, No 2 (Spring 2006), 313-319.

Soanes, Catherine, ed. *Pocket Oxford English Dictionary*, 9<sup>th</sup> ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Stairs, Denis, *The Diplomacy of Constraint*, in Hillmer, Norman, ed., *Partners Nevertheless: Canadian-American Relations in the Twentieth Century*, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1989), 214-226.

Suisheng, Zhao, ed. *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*. Armonk, New York: "An East Gate Book", 2004.

Sutter, Robert, *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2008.

Xinhua News Agency, *China Promotes Cooperation with OAS*, June 6, 2005; Found at: <http://beijing2008.german.china.org.cn/english/international/131091.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 February, 2008.