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Exercise NEW HORIZONS

**ASCENT OF A NATION:
DEFINING CANADA'S MIDDLE-POWER
AND GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY**

By /par

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses Canada's global influence as a growing middle-power and how that translates into international responsibilities. Canada has been a strong proponent of the emerging principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and has played a direct role in its international legitimization, in particular when it commissioned the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty whose guidelines were endorsed at the World Leaders Summit in 2005. A current example of circumstances that R2P is meant to address has been developing for several years in Africa's Darfur province of Sudan, where Canada has maintained a long-time interest on humanitarian grounds. The evidence offered in this paper suggests that the Canadian Forces (CF) must prepare to assume expanded humanitarian leadership responsibly abroad (in places such as Darfur) where values of good governance, rule of law and human rights are recurrently under attack.

"What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow: this is the whole Law; the rest is the explanation; go and learn" – Rabbi Hillel, 1st Century BCE

INTRODUCTION

In December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), led by Canada's former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, tabled a report regarding international legitimization of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept. The report responded to the United Nations (UN) Secretary General's Millennium Report that asked:

"If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?"¹

The irony that "Axworthy, Canada's... lion of the political left, [had] an idea that could appeal to American neo-conservatives and evangelical Christians"² was highlighted in a July 2005 Maclean's Magazine article. It is true that the R2P principle is hardly a polite, international community gesture towards a nation in need of protection: R2P is meant to oblige the international community to take action, including the necessary lethal use of force, to intervene against self-declared sovereign states whose delinquency towards its peoples' wellbeing is gross and systemic.

In 1999 Canada was at the forefront of an intervention characterized by the R2P principle: outside of UN Security Council (SC) sanction, with loaded CF-18 fighter-bombers, Canada led an attack on Yugoslavia in response to that country's gross human

¹Ian Williams, "Annan Has Paid His Dues," *Guardian*, 20 September 2005. available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1573765,00.html>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

²Luiza C.H Savage, "Canada's 'responsibility to protect' Doctrine Gaining Ground at the UN," *Maclean's Magazine*, July 18, 2005, 43.

rights abuses.³ Canada's actions in Kosovo, as a practical application of R2P in the extreme, demonstrated its willingness to assume global leadership outside the UN's often antiquated bureaucracies when intrinsic national values heavily overlapped international interests.

Since these events, the Canadian Government published an updated 2005 International Policy Statement which appears to carry over attributes found in the Duncan & John Gray Memorial Lecture proffered six decades earlier by Louis St. Laurent, then Secretary of State for External Affairs. Most noticeable are Middle-power themes of foreign policy emanating from national values, and willingness to accept global responsibility while acting in peoples' best interests.⁴ These consistencies should be reassuring and probably expected from a nation that is reputable for perpetuating global liberal peace. However, the rest of the world might remain sceptical regarding Canada's burgeoning extroversion for the time being. A few decades earlier, Canada was not 'punching above its weight', but was 'pulling punches', which academic Michael Byers apportions blame to the perpetual dearth of boldness in successive Canadian Governments.⁵ However, hindrances to Canada's progressiveness, such as collective security arrangements with super-powers and a UN Security Council handicapped by vetoes softened after the Cold War, have given way to resurging international growth and

³John Kirton, "Multilateralism, Pluralism, and the United Nations," Ch. 23 in *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), 393.

⁴The Right Honourable Louis St. Laurent, "The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs." Duncan & John Gray Memorial Lecture; *Department of External Affairs in Statements and Speeches*, (January 1947). Transcribed by Russil Wvong. Available from <http://www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/stlaurent.html>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

⁵Michael Byers, *Intent For a Nation: What is Canada For?* (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 2007), 238.

permissiveness.⁶ The unfortunate corollary though has been fresh threats to international stability, increasing with developing states' misappropriated self-determination.⁷

A large number of Canadians may have difficulty reconciling Canada's present mission abroad with their expectations of Canadian international policy, but Canada's goals in Afghanistan should not be viewed as isolated objectives unto themselves. The current crisis in Africa's Darfur province of Sudan is a categorical example of where nations such as Canada will feel compelled to assume a leadership role as intervener on humanitarian grounds in the future. Recent history has demonstrated increasing demand for global peace support operations (PSO) capacity and the conflicts are becoming more complex.⁸

THESIS AND APPROACH

"If you don't know where you are going, you might end up somewhere else" - Yogi Berra

This paper will make a case that Canada and the Canadian Forces (CF) must prepare to assume expanded humanitarian leadership responsibly internationally where

⁶"An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping." *Report of the Secretary-General* (pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council 31 January 1992); available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008. From para 2: "The adversarial decades of the cold war made the original promise of the Organization impossible to fulfill," and from para. 3: "The Organization must never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed."

⁷*Ibid.*, from para. 11. "We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends... At the same time, however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal... strife."

⁸The Henry L. Stimson Center, *Who Should Keep the Peace?* Ed. William J. Durch, Tobias C. Berkman. (Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 2.

values of good governance, rule of law and human rights are recurrently under attack. It will suggest that Canada will continue to ascend as a middle-power nation as the result of the legitimacy of its international policy, and its political will to influence and pursue objectives without directly involving a major-power with diverging interests despite a humanitarian crisis.⁹

Arguments will be presented in three sections: Part I will discuss the principle of R2P and the challenges being faced to convert theory into practice, including the issues regarding UN Security Council (SC) authorization and China's interests. Part II will discuss alternate means of intervention using Regional PSO mechanisms, and why this initiative has been indecisive in Africa. Part III will then discuss Canada's propensity to act in a global capacity to lead humanitarian intervention in the current climate of international political challenges. In general, analysis will be guided by consideration of political will, legitimacy and authority, as well as national capacity for global action.

The CF has recently undergone a significant transformation and has proven its capacity for intense, sustained, expeditionary development and security operations in Afghanistan. But a frequent prompt to Headquarters' Planning Staffs is 'don't fight the last war!' This paper provides evidence that the next major mission for the CF and its development and diplomacy partners is likely to entail humanitarian intervention operations. It will therefore closely consider the persisting crisis in Africa's Darfur province in Sudan, in the context of the principle of responsibility to protect (R2P).

⁹For the purposes of this paper, major-power nations include great-power nations, such as Germany, Great Britain and emerging power China. The USA will be referred to as the lone 'super-power.' Major-powers will be considered as those that have sufficient economic, military and political influence to effect world events. As a rule of thumb, as a minimum, major-powers include the Security council Permanent 5 (P5).

PART I – RESPONSIBILITY

“We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” – Albert Einstein

Public dialogue is certain to continue amongst Canadians regarding the Afghanistan mission and its effect on national image, which is challenging how Canadian's "...have, traditionally, preferred their country to behave."¹⁰ Academics like Michael Byers advocate that PSO, particularly genocide prevention, should be Canada's priority mission versus interventionism with 'search and destroy' overtones.¹¹ Byers' genocide reference strikes a nerve with Canadians. The Rwanda UN peacekeeping mission commanded by Canadian General Romeo Dallaire was hamstrung to prevent the 1994 genocide while crisis after crisis in Bosnia held global attention.¹² A European think-tank in Berlin that promotes dialogue on globalization said:

“Africa has hosted some of the most brutal violent conflicts and civil wars. The continent is currently at a crossroads where policy makers, civil society and the international community all concede that the past atrocities such as in Rwanda, or intra-state wars such as Liberia, Sierra-Leon and Burundi must serve as a learning curve for preventing recurrence in the future.”¹³

Since then, confidence that improved UN diligence will curtail a Rwanda sequel seems to have subdued any previous urgency to strengthen prevention measures that were called for by the Panel on UN Peace Operations.¹⁴ A decade after Rwanda, the UN has only

¹⁰Byers, *Intent for a...*, 52.

¹¹*Ibid.*,

¹²William Shawcross, *Deliver Us From Evil*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 151.

¹³Thelma Ekiyor, “Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine in Africa,” *FES Berlin Briefing Paper* 01 (January 2007). available at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/50404.pdf>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008, 2.

¹⁴The Henry L. Stimson Center, *Who Should Keep...*, 38.

recently succeeded in introducing a UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, which “has yet to yield tangible effect on civil protection.”¹⁵ For example, in Darfur, Sudan, since 2003, “Approximately 300,000 people have been killed... and 1.75 million displaced.”¹⁶ Former U.S. Secretary of State Collin Powell’s personal assessment of the situation was ‘genocide.’¹⁷ The African Union (AU), a dominant influence in the region, stated: “there is consensus that the crisis is shocking to the conscience of humanity.”¹⁸ The UN itself “... considers the Darfur conflict to be one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.”¹⁹

Darfur’s human devastation exemplifies the need for firmer global leadership and unfettered response that citizens like Michael Byers believe should be a Canadian niche.²⁰ The basis of the conflict seems neither extraordinarily complex nor insoluble, yet it has been a trial of international will to intervene effectively. In Sudan, the People’s Liberation Movement/Army has lead uprisings challenging the national government’s status quo distribution of power, resources and the role of state religion. The Janjaweed, allegedly empowered by Khartoum, have at intervals killed en masse and displaced

¹⁵Rebecca J. Hamilton, “The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine – But What of Implementation?” *Harvard Human Rights Journal* Volume 19 (Spring 2006). available at <http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss19/hamilton.pdf>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008, 7.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁷Thelma Ekiyor, “Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine in Africa.” *FES Berlin Briefing Paper* 01 (January 2007). available at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/50404.pdf>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008, 3.

¹⁸*Ibid.*,

¹⁹UNMIS - United Nations Mission In Sudan, <http://www.unmis.org/english/en-main.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

²⁰Byers, *Intent for a Nation...*, 64.

millions of Darfurians in order to suppress anti-government rebellion.²¹ The conflict has chronically reached flashpoint during several decades of simmering civil war. One solution to disarm belligerents has been UN sanctions, which against rogue African leaderships prove counterproductive because these sanctions tend to advance the suffering of those already oppressed, heightening cross-regional sympathies. Consequently, self-policing with an ‘Africa First’ pretext has been half-hearted.²²

“Darfur presents a textbook example of a government that is ‘unable or unwilling’ to protect its citizens, and an international community equally ‘unable or unwilling’ to take on the default sovereign responsibility that the R2P envisages.”²³ The principle of R2P is when “peaceful/diplomatic measures fail, the international community through the Security Council has the responsibility to use ‘collective action’ to protect populations from the atrocities.”²⁴ However, UN Charter has enshrined member-state sovereignty since 1945, which restrains intervention on behalf of a country’s peoples’ wellbeing: the principle of sovereignty has become prescriptive as a rule of law.²⁵ Still, the Charter could be modified; there is impetus to do so and there are precedents to consider here.

²¹UNMIS - United Nations Mission In Sudan, <http://www.unmis.org/english/en-main.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008. From the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement.”

²²Ekiyor, *Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’*..., “In all instances, these sanctions have mainly impacted the already poor and oppressed and not their leaders who are usually the targets of the sanctions. Furthermore, experience has shown that sanctions further isolate so-called “pariah” states and are not effective. International sanctions on African states also have the effect of invigorating unity amongst African governments, who see each other as “brothers”. This unity affects the ability of states to embark on punitive collective action.”

²³Hamilton, *The Responsibility to...*, 5.

²⁴Ekiyor, *Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’*..., 2.

²⁵Tom Farer, “A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention,” Chap. 8 in *Enforcing Restraint*. Ed. Lori Fisler Damrosch, 316-347 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 316.

The 1992-93 UN operation in Somalia signalled a shift regarding international humanitarian responses, “[passing] far beyond old-fashioned peacekeeping [or] peace enforcement, to something approaching a de facto trusteeship.”²⁶ Later, operation Desert Storm that liberated Kuwait from Saddam Hussein seemed “no more than the realization of the Charter’s original premise of collective resistance to classical forms of aggression.”²⁷ However, subsequent SC Resolutions imposing a safe area for Kurds in Northern Iraq further indicated the changing paradigm of SC jurisdiction.²⁸

Following the 2005 World Summit involving heads of state and government, R2P was adopted in principle based on recommendations from the ICISS report.²⁹ “Just four years after publication, the... report has gained enough significance that its framing of the issues and the language it employs now infiltrate almost all discussions of humanitarian crises.”³⁰ However, international legitimization of R2P has not conferred clear-cut implementation. In some instances, a pertinent question seems to be: why do many major-powers, apart from the US,³¹ demonstrate reluctance to intervene on humanitarian grounds?³² For example, considering China’s geostrategic interests in Sudan where it cultivates solutions for its energy appetite, it has yet to intervene in any humanitarian

²⁶*Ibid.*, 329. “They were not where they were with the consent of local authorities; they were not lightly armed.”

²⁷*Ibid.*, 322.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹Ekiyor, *Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’...*, 2.

³⁰Hamilton, *The Responsibility to...*, 5.

³¹Tom Farer, *A Paradigm of Enforcing rest...*, 326. It is suggested that, of the power countries, the US demonstrates substantial enthusiasm for unilateral human rights enforcement.

³²*Ibid.*, 326. For example, the hesitation of leading states to intervene in Bosnia even when butchery has unpleasant effects for them and their allies.

capacity. A rationale is that some global-powers that enjoy elevated regional influence also display aversion to political-risk. The Chinese have involved themselves in larger (and less ambiguous) Chapter VI peacekeeping operations,³³ but “One can judicially notice that [humanitarian] intervention is not high among [their] priorities.”³⁴ To illustrate: despite its positive relationship with Kuwait before Iraq occupation, China reiterated its reservations regarding SC sanctioned collective-defence against Iraq in 1990-91, choosing to abstain (not an outright veto), explaining frankly that the UN sponsored Korean War had not been forgotten. China though was rewarded for its behaviour: Tiananmen massacre sanctions were lifted and development aid resumed.³⁵

China has exercised its SC veto power effectively to further its own interest, but not to further international interests.³⁶ At times Beijing abstains from voting when a resolution is of no immediate consequence;³⁷ but it has wilfully vetoed resolutions when its domestic politics regarding Taiwan can be pursued.³⁸ Notably, China has “oppose[d] all attempts to set a precedent that might ... provide a pretext for ... multilateral intervention.”³⁹ As such, China remains somewhat of a ‘wild-card’ where it might affect SC consensus on humanitarian interventionism. Late in 2006, China abstained from the Sudan UN Mission vote on the grounds that “the resolution did not specify ‘with the

³³Rachel E Utley, *Major-powers and Peacekeeping*. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2006), 86. Example, in Cambodia in 1992-3.

³⁴Farer, *A Paradigm of Enforcing rest...*, 326.

³⁵Utley, *Major-powers...*, 85. “Chinese people still clearly remember that the Korean War was launched in the name of the [UN].”

³⁶*Ibid.*, 87.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 85.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 87.

³⁹*Ibid.*

consent of the Sudanese Government.”⁴⁰ It seems likely that a SC proposal for stronger Darfur intervention could compel China into an outright veto.⁴¹ “China..., on a rising trajectory of national power, can paralyse the [SC] at will.”⁴²

Although China’s veto power could prove to be an issue for consensus on intervention, the lack of political will of other nations is itself a significant impediment to R2P brought on by various influences. Notwithstanding the presumed legitimacy of a particular intervention (just-cause),⁴³ national interest is a requisite variable that underwrites the exigency of intervening (reasonable prospects [for success]).⁴⁴ Oppositely, if a major-power’s heightened national interest compels it to lead a non-UN sanctioned intervention, the motive (right intention)⁴⁵ may still be challenged in the SC. A result is the eventual erosion of the interveners’ political will if international disfavour creates domestic political friction, and ultimately the legitimacy of R2P in general could become jeopardized. A categorical example occurred during the US-led 2003 intervention of Iraq: “[It] brought ‘humanitarian intervention’ into disrepute,” after “the initially stated security rationale for intervention proved illegitimate, [encouraging] post-

⁴⁰“Security Council votes to set up UN peacekeeping force in Darfur.” *UN News Centre* (13 August 2006). available at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19685&Cr=Sudan&Cr1=Darfur&Kw1=china&Kw2=abstain&Kw3=>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008. “UN SC Resolution 1706.”

⁴¹Thelma Ekiyor, *Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’...*, 5. “The subjectivity in assessing extreme situations undermines the importance of implementing this new international norm. The argument that Iraq was an extreme case, while Liberia was not, raises scepticism that interventions under R2P will also be based on the geo-strategic value of countries requiring preventive intervention than on the need to protect civilians.”

⁴²Farer, *A Paradigm of Enforcing rest...*, 330.

⁴³ Hamilton, *The Responsibility to...*, 2, ‘Just cause,’ first principle of R2P.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 3, ‘Reasonable prospects,’ fifth principle of R2P.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 2, ‘Right intention,’ second principle of R2P.

hoc humanitarian-based rationales.”⁴⁶ “Since the invasion, proponents of the R2P have had an increasingly difficult time garnering support, with Europeans in particular stating their reluctance....”⁴⁷ Historically, insensitivities towards R2P are persistent: Hitler’s pretext for invading Czechoslovakia was to free oppressed German minorities in 1939.⁴⁸ One Country’s justification for humanitarian interventionism may “appear to another [country] like old-fashioned aggression,”⁴⁹ so there is no easy solution to ease the concerns of international stakeholders. A former UN Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs highlighted the challenge:

“...the responsibility to protect should be depoliticized and translated into joint action by all Council members and global organizations. It must transcend singular interests and become the core principle of humanity across all civilizations. When the lives and safety ... were at stake regardless of where, neither strategic nor economic or political interests should deter Council members from acting swiftly upon their united responsibility to protect”⁵⁰

So, what prospects might there be for escalating R2P towards ‘last resort’⁵¹ actions in Darfur?⁵² Nations suitable to undertake R2P leadership currently have few armed forces available considering the intensity of missions elsewhere.⁵³ In sharp contrast to the UN’s planned 20,000 African troops, Romeo Dallaire estimated “44,000

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁷ Hamilton, *The Responsibility to...*, 5.

⁴⁸ Farer, *A Paradigm of Enforcing rest...*, 324.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 326.

⁵⁰ Ekiyor, *Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’...*, 6.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 5, Last resort infers that military recourse is the only available option remaining to intervene in the context of R2P, after all preventative measures fail.

⁵² Hamilton, *The Responsibility to...*, “Darfur presents a textbook example of a government that is ‘unable or unwilling’ to protect its citizens, and an international community equally ‘unable or unwilling’ to take on the default sovereign responsibility that the R2P envisages.”

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 6.

‘NATO-quality’ troops would be needed to protect civilians in Darfur.’⁵⁴ The mission capacity dilemma is exacerbated by an overloaded Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),⁵⁵ and various “proposals for multinational standing forces have been discussed for many years without gaining traction.”⁵⁶ The problem naturally reverts back to the great-powers, particularly the US and United Kingdom, who are understandably sensitive about another Muslim state intervention.⁵⁷ In light of previous discussion, a likely alternative to SC sponsored intervention or major-power led intervention is Regional peacekeeping: it is a solution that is being attempted in Darfur, but not with any great successes to record.

PART II – ISSUES WITH INITIATIVE

“If I am not for me, who is?” – Rabbi Hillel, 1st Century BCE

The “Try Africa First” approach gained momentum following the AU’s evolution from the ‘Organisation of African Unity.’ The approach is laudable for initiatives that unburden the UN and international organizations that have attempted to reverse Africa’s legacy of neglect in the post-colonial period.⁵⁸ Regional security burdens are addressed

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 6, see footnote 41.

⁵⁵Henry L. Stimson Center, *Who Should Keep...*, 41.

⁵⁶Hamilton, *The Responsibility to...*, 8.

⁵⁷Ekiyor, *Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’...*, 3.

⁵⁸Utley, *Major-powers...*, 102.

through a framework of PSO capabilities that establish a Common Defence and Security Policy.⁵⁹

According to David J. Francis, “Africa has emerged as the laboratory for the experimentation and deployment of peacekeeping operations.”⁶⁰ The grave corollary is that peacekeeping in Africa remains indecisive, lacking any predictable outcome. Francis is an advocate of Africa’s expanding regional approach to managing economic, security and humanitarian issues. However, the theory has stumbled throughout its implementation. African states have endured the preponderance of civil wars since the 1990s. When African attempts at regional hegemony cannot contain the conflicts, international intercession becomes necessary. A lesson from Sierra Leone was that:

“The relative success of the... peacekeeping operations is attributed mainly to the deployment of the largest UN peacekeeping force with a ‘robust peacekeeping’ mandate, the deployment of preponderant military force by an extra-regional actor, Britain, and the peace enforcement role of ECOMOG.”⁶¹

Francis’ assessment of Africa’s developing conflict management capacity is that its security functions are primarily responsive to crisis situations and are therefore highly reactive, what Francis calls the ‘fire brigade’ mentality. As a consequence, there has been a spontaneous growth of “regional improvisation and ad hoc arrangements, sometimes inadequately thought through in terms of capabilities, resources... and regional political and foreign policy implications.”⁶² ‘Blue print’ solutions for peace and security in Africa have been resisted, although the need for strategic vision on prevention

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 112.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 108.

has not been dismissed altogether.⁶³ To reiterate, normatively the international community has been called upon to prop-up African regional initiatives.

A lesson might have been taken from the UN itself: even UN peacekeeping has frequently been buttressed by emergent ad hoc arrangements with major-powers and other security organizations. “[N]o one operational model and no single security provider can address every circumstance and meet every operational need with equal aplomb.”⁶⁴ The Darfur situation is no exception. Even though the “[AU is] a more acceptable intervening body to the Khartoum Government than the UN, the experiences of the AU in Darfur have revealed the lack of capacity to embark on large scale interventions.”⁶⁵ The mission started out alone “without the requisite financing or manpower”⁶⁶ and generally insupportable logistics. As such, a hybrid UN–AU Mission in Sudan was lashed together and accepted by Khartoum in July 2007.⁶⁷ Through its strategic mandate under UN Chapter VII to implement the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), “UNAMID will become one of the largest UN peacekeeping missions in history, and larger than the UN peace operation currently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”⁶⁸

UNAMID is ambitious but worrisome for a number of reasons. The Panel on UN Peace Operations has stressed “states’ responsibilities to contribute well-equipped, well-

⁶³*Ibid.*, 109.

⁶⁴Henry L. Stimson Center, *Who Should Keep...*, 3.

⁶⁵Ekiyor, *Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’...*, 4.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 3.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸United Nations – African Union Mission In Darfur, <http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx#>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

trained and well disciplined troops.”⁶⁹ A historical issue for the DPKO has been that states can treat UN missions as “military soup kitchens – where ill-equipped troops could find uniforms, housing, food and reimbursements.”⁷⁰ The troop composition for the hybrid mission to Darfur does not seem to respect this concern:

“DPKO is exerting all possible efforts to ensure that UNAMID will consist of a predominantly African force, and a number of pledges from African troop and police contributing countries have already been made. Pledges for key enabling capabilities in areas such as aviation and ground transport, however, remain outstanding.”⁷¹

It is a reality of modern UN missions that the higher ratio of forces from smaller developed states forming the perennial mission backbone has reversed to developing states which now represent the top fifteen contributors.⁷² Some of the lacking robustness is mitigated through developed states’ provision of training and equipment, but these are easier to fulfil than critical but neglected leadership remits for UN operations.⁷³ The palpable risk regarding UNAMID’s troop quality cannot be dismissed easily which suggests that it is at least in part a consequence of diplomatic concessions with Khartoum.⁷⁴

⁶⁹Henry L. Stimson Center, *Who Should Keep...*, 38.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 38.

⁷¹African Union Mission In Darfur, <http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx#>

⁷²Henry L. Stimson Center, *Who Should Keep...*, 42.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 42.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* “The AU-UN Hybrid operation was finally endorsed on 12 June 2007 by the Government of Sudan after intense diplomatic activity by the Secretary-General and after long, complex technical discussions between the UN, AU and Sudanese Government.”

As a counter point, the advantages presented by regional peace and security theory are still considerable.⁷⁵ It can be anticipated that the national objectives and political constitutions of states so organized would synergize the conflict management mechanisms employed. The technical and doctrinal milieu of operations would be expected to enjoy efficiency of interoperability and legitimacy, and authority for intervention would reach easy consensus eliminating unilateral divisions. However, a Realist's assessment of regional PSO, exemplified by African missions, reveals that "The most common threats to regional peace – internal threats – are exactly those least likely to generate consensus."⁷⁶ States' national interests inevitably sharpen under the threat of conflict.⁷⁷ Regionally more-powerful states, for example Africa's sub-regional hegemon Nigeria,⁷⁸ may not have stabilizing influence if "[its] interests or policy objectives [are not] consonant with the goals of the rest of the region for any number of reasons, not the least because, being largest, they don't have to."⁷⁹

Reservations concerning UNAMIDS' chances for success, as implemented, do not seem inappropriate, nor does scepticism regarding Khartoum's interests towards

⁷⁵ *An Agenda for Peace* Para 64. "What is clear, however, is that regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions covered in this report.... Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs."

⁷⁶ Henry L. Stimson Center, *Who Should Keep...*, 49.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 30, "non-un mandates vulnerable to perceptions of bias...."

⁷⁸ Utley, *Major-powers...*, 111.

⁷⁹ Henry L. Stimson Center, *Who Should Keep...*, 49.

peace in light of its sporadic political wrangling.⁸⁰ In a recent Government of Canada press release, Minister of Foreign Affairs Maxime Bernier remarked:

“The [Darfur] Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed three years ago, on January 9, 2005, but despite progress in key areas of the Agreement, some of these critical provisions remain to be fully implemented.”⁸¹

Of an incident on January eighth, 2008, the Minister said:

“Canada strongly condemns the January 8 attack of an African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation supply convoy by elements of the Sudanese armed forces in West Darfur, and calls on Sudan to ensure that there will be no recurrence of such incidents in the future. Sudan has an obligation to respect its commitment to the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation, as outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1769.”⁸²

In summary, the multiplicity and increased complexity of PSO in regions of Africa has not responded very favourably to reactive conflict-management methods. The political will to sustain peace-enforcement has been a challenge and studies have indicated no gains in expedience by employing regional PSO over the UN.⁸³ The Sudanese Government has been reticent to concede UN involvement in Darfur; instead it insists on predominantly regionally-weighted intervention missions despite its unduly lethargic progress towards peace.⁸⁴ Parts I and II of this paper have suggested that without a strong international voice assuming a leadership role for Darfur, current

⁸⁰Ekiyor, *Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’...*, 4, The AU committed to prevent atrocities, but members do not abide by ideals or recommendations, e.g. Peace SC asking Sudanese to disarm Janjaweed militia – Khartoum ignored.

⁸¹Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada: News Releases. January 9, 2008 (3:30 p.m. EST) No. 8 “Canada Calls For Full Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan.” http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=385753&language=E&docnumber=8; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

⁸²*Ibid.*

⁸³Henry L. Stimson Center, *Who Should Keep...*, 50.

⁸⁴Nelson Kasfir, “Sudan’s Darfur: Is It Genocide?” *Current History*, Vol104, No 682, May 2005, 195-202, 198.

intervention will not generate sufficient results, nor will the hybrid peacekeeping mission assert itself politically or forcefully enough to prevent continued humanitarian crisis there.

PART III – THE POWER TO CHOOSE

“If I am only for me, what am I?” – Rabbi Hillel, 1st Century BCE

Canada’s most recent 2005 International Policy Statement dismisses the old view that middle-power states are measured solely by their military and international development spending, national economies and gross domestic product. While these are relevant in the context of a state’s resilience in the realm of global instability, the 2005 Policy contemporizes middle-power as a function of national capacity to influence the world and global political structures through plurilateralism reform and bilateral initiative.⁸⁵ It can be deduced that soft-power diplomacy should gather momentum in stride with globalisation. The explosion of communication and information systems shrinking the world is a dramatic enabler: “The ability to share information – and to be believed – becomes an important source of attraction and power.”⁸⁶ The neo-realist school of thought suggests that:

“A rising Canada increasingly shapes global governance by inserting innovative ideas and institutions based on Canada’s interests and values. It argues that a more powerful Canada is no longer just reinforcing or reforming but now replacing

⁸⁵Canada. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. Canada’s International Policy Statement, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2005, 2.

⁸⁶Nye, Joseph S. Jr. “The Benefits of Soft Power.” *Harvard Business School* (8 February 2004). available at <http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html>; Internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

the... multilateral system born in 1944-45 with a world order crafted in Canada's image."⁸⁷

A discussion of Canada's international responsibilities based on the implications of its accumulated middle-power is pertinent. This paper contends that international responsibility is a consequence of a nation's autonomy and power to choose policy direction through its national interests and national values. The international policies that Canada pursues are informed by its treatment of perceived responsibilities. Canada's middle-power is a product of this responsibility demonstrated through national direction of policy. Borrowing from the principles of R2P discussed in Part I, the interrelationship of political will, authority and national capacity provide a useful framework for examining national responsibility.

As a starting point, Britain's declaration of war in August 1914 automatically brought colonial Canada into WWI. A few years hence, Canada's choice to join WWII was determined by Parliament a week after Britain had declared war. It could be argued that Parliamentary dialogue was moot considering Canada's steadfast loyalty to Britain; nonetheless, approval by parliament signified Canada's intent to have a say in its own destiny.⁸⁸ Regarding the lethal use of force, citing credible examples of Canada acting unilaterally beyond its borders is difficult. Oppositely, there have been notable instances where Canada defied external pressure for action, most recently the US' 2003 decision to intervene in Iraq. Such instances arguably lend weight and credibility to Canada's political will when countering international threats to peace (such as the growing

⁸⁷*A Role of Pride and Influence...*, 3.

⁸⁸William G. Watson, *Globalization and the Meaning of Canadian Life*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 156. This is not a definitive source for this argument, but its essence is captured in context well by Watson.

genocide in Kosovo in 1999) do align with its own agenda. Perhaps Canada's strongest expression of political will regarding the use of arms is its choice to employ domestic nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes, while aggressively supporting strategic initiatives to mitigate the threat of 'loose-nucs.'⁸⁹

In a treatise entitled *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, John Kirton draws attention to Canada's leadership at the start of the combined offensive against Yugoslavia in 1999, which he interprets as Canada's 'great transformation' of policy towards the UN. He observes that unlike the Gulf War of 1990-91 and Korea in 1950, "Canada *initiated* an attack against a sovereign state to rearrange its internal affairs. And unlike the Gulf and Korea, Canada attacked without authorization in advance from the [UN]"⁹⁰ Canada demonstrated its shift in UN policy from:

"the old desire for middle-power privileges, universal membership, the diplomacy of constraint against America, and reverence for the [UN] Article 2(7) enshrined constitutional principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states."⁹¹

Kirton's assessment of Canada's evolved middle-power stance vis-à-vis its international policy is notable:

"These were replaced by [Canada's] reliance on principle power concerts, plurilateral coalitions of the willing, and the diplomacy of combat that America adjusted to, in support of the new defining principle of the internal responsibility to protect (R2P)."⁹²

⁸⁹Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Global Partnership Program: Making a Difference." available at [http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/GlobalPartnership_FINAL_e%20\(3\).pdf](http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/GlobalPartnership_FINAL_e%20(3).pdf); Internet; accessed 24 April 2008.

⁹⁰Kirton, *Multilateralism, Pluralism, and...*, 393. Emphasis added by author.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 394.

⁹²*Ibid.*

It can be deduced that Canada's evolving self-determination as a global middle-power (and its sense of responsibility therein) means it will employ multilateral structures to suit its national interests, and construct plurilateral arrangements when the former approach is unsatisfactory. Altogether, Canada has demonstrated quite succinctly its power, in terms political will and national interests, to choose its policy direction autonomously.

Robert Higgs makes the assertion that "in the study of human action, nothing is more fundamental than an appreciation of what the actors believe."⁹³ Perhaps overstated, his observation suggests that legitimized authority for policy begins with the elemental ingredients of state interests and values. The problem however, since 1945, is that the UN Charter defers to sovereign member-state's jurisdiction over its internal interests and values, and according to the 2001 ICISS (R2P) Report, "the task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the council work better."⁹⁴ The countering criticism is that this is merely "... [R2P] legitimization of the status quo through its reliance on the Security Council as the authorizing body of choice."⁹⁵ Canada's actions in Yugoslavia are supported by its international policies that have been historically normative as a democracy propagating global liberal peace. Because Canada pursues its middle-power strategy normatively, encouraged by international respect, and its political will has increasing global influence in recent decades, it is logical that authority to pursue its normative policies can be reassured. At some level in the hierarchy of international governance, recognition of the authority to action international policy becomes inherent as a product of political will and its implied legitimacy.

⁹³Watson, *Globalization and the Meaning...*, 84.

⁹⁴Hamilton, *The Responsibility to...*, 3.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 4.

Were it as simple as that, fewer Canadians would feel compelled to criticize their Governments for inapt imitations of US unilateralism ostensibly as a result of Canada's use of lethal force in South West Asia. Domestic politics play a vital role in policy formation. Although higher national policy changes little, Canadians provide the policy 'check and balance' through their interpretation of good governance. Economist William G. Watson's posits that "[T]he public opinion whose appeasement the Liberal party of Canada calls 'pragmatism' [has to] come from somewhere."⁹⁶ Former Premier of Ontario Bob Rae wrote that politics is a healthy fact of life, extending down to the basic social building-block of the family household.⁹⁷ It follows that good governance emanates from liberalized-politicking because "Politics is about the persuasion required to move people to judgement," and "Judgement is... a matter of choosing between alternatives, none of which may... be desirable."⁹⁸ Rae intimates that good governance through politics enables the safe navigation of difficult alternatives, like Parliament's choice to declare war in 1939 or the CF's planned departure from Afghanistan in 2011.

Authors Watson and Rae alike appeal for fresh domestic politicking, unfettered by old misapprehensions of an overbearing US. Both underscore the phenomena of globalization as the burgeoning challenge surpassing the supposed dilemma of neighbouring with a super-power.⁹⁹ John Kirton claims that:

⁹⁶Watson, *Globalization and the Meaning...*, 84.

⁹⁷Bob Rae, *The Three Questions : Prosperity and the Public Good*, (Toronto: Penguin Books Canada Ltd., 1998), 184.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, 193.

⁹⁹ Watson and Rae go to length in their books (cited in here) to deemphasize the impacts to Canada and Canadians from neighboring with the world's last super-power. Rae counter-argues the idea that bilateralism trade with the US means taxes in Canada cannot be kept sufficiently high enough to support Canadian social systems, therefore Canada is vulnerable to losing its distinction from the US.

“[E]specially [after] 1990, a vanquished and ever more vulnerable America allowed Canada ever more effectively and innovatively to shape world order, both multilaterally through the UN but above all plurilaterally outside.”¹⁰⁰

This leads directly to final discussion regarding global responsibility in terms of national capacity to act, which is shaped by interrelationships with political will, and authority and legitimacy, which naturally converges on the humanitarian crisis in Darfur.¹⁰¹

R2P’s antithesis is the unrealized political will to authorize legitimate action when the capacity to intervene exists: such was the lesson of Rwanda in 1994. Rebecca J.

Hamilton’s *Harvard Human Rights Journal* article posits that a similar scenario is lurking today:

“There is a plausible argument that if [a country] was serious about protecting civilians [there], operational capacity would not be a limiting factor. With current troop deployment levels near capacity, protecting civilians in Darfur would not be costless; there would be risks involved with withdrawing troops from their current placements to redeploy them. But if protecting civilians in Darfur was a sufficiently high political priority this is a risk that would be taken.”¹⁰²

Capacity to intervene is not merely a quantitative estimate but also a qualitative assessment of available troops as discussed previously regarding the AU’s ability to supply capable troops in terms of both training and moral fitness. Hamilton stresses:

“The lesson of the current situation—where an under-resourced and undersized African Union force has been charged with the responsibility to protect Darfuri civilians amidst a genocidal regime is not only that without the requisite operational capacity civilians will remain unprotected, but also that even if operational targets can be met, they will not be met without political commitment.”¹⁰³

Watson counter-argues the idea that Canada’s close economic ties with the US and free-trade will result in Canada’s erosion as distinct from the US.

¹⁰⁰Kirton, *Multilateralism, Pluralism, and...*, 412.

¹⁰¹Hamilton, *The Responsibility to...*, 6.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*

¹⁰³*Ibid.*

Capacity to intervene must also be considered at multilateral levels where political will and legitimacy come under increasing pressure. In the case of the Darfur Crisis, in 2005 Collin Powell labelled the situation as genocide, which signified political and moral obligations particularly because the lone super-power was implying the need to intervene. Africa, however, was apparently “...not central to [US] national interests and Washington would not commit forces there,”¹⁰⁴ in part because the US had its hands full in Iraq. In response, Prime Minister Paul Martin struck upon the higher tenet of Canada’s national capacity to intervene at a meeting with President Bush, paraphrased as follows: ““We [Canadians] can do things you can’t in places like Darfur where we can be the face, we can be the lead, and we can make a difference...””¹⁰⁵ The implication was clear from a political-legitimacy perspective. Martin believed Canada *should* take the lead from the US for Darfur, arguably because Sudan is an almost exclusive Muslim state, the US Global War On Terror (GWOT) was reaching into Africa through US AFRICOM¹⁰⁶ which would not mix well with a humanitarian intervention in Darfur and because China was increasingly engaging in ‘political-warfare’¹⁰⁷ in Africa in order to protect its national interests against US interference.

The key points of this section are that Canada has demonstrated the political will to intervene in contentious situations threatening international security and has

¹⁰⁴Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, (Toronto: Penguin Group (Canada), 2007), 194.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶Robert G. Berschinski, *AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The ‘Global War On Terrorism,’ ‘Capacity Building,’ Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa*. (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 4-5.

¹⁰⁷Donovan C. Chau, *Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: U.S. Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 50.

legitimized its intentions to act, as an influential global middle-power, through innovative plurilateral avenues. This is central to Canada's leadership potential in terms of policy options regarding Darfur. As well, global responsibilities are shared ventures, which for the sake of expedience must rely on the unique competencies of nations having the political will and the earned international respect to take legitimate action.

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

"If not now, when?" – Rabbi Hillel, 1st Century BCE

In the introduction, this paper alleged that Canada's mission in Afghanistan must not be viewed as an end unto itself, it being neither a rehearsal nor the final showing of Canada's political will. Canadian troops and their development partners in Kandahar have had an impact in Afghanistan that has been related to the Canadian Public in depth by the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. Canadians can be proud of their country's impact abroad, but must reflect on the nation's capacity in the world and what its current Afghanistan mission portends for the future. Whatever images Canadians held about their military and its peacekeeping legacy is now moot. As Janice Gross Stein, et al. asks "...[are] we approaching the limits of liberal imagination," in terms of intervention and nation building? The trend suggests that Canada is only just beginning to assert its global leadership and act, which includes the use of lethal force when it is necessary.

Africa's Darfur province of Sudan has been a strong theme of this paper. However, this should not be interpreted as meaning that a more robust intervention led by Canada is the answer to Darfur's problems. As Bob Rae posits in his book *The Three*

Questions, political choice should never be construed as leading to one ethical answer.¹⁰⁸

It should also be noted that in the interim months after Paul Martin succeeded Jean Chrétien as Prime Minister, and the CF fatefully returned to Kandahar in force, Martin's international priorities were higher for Darfur as well as Haiti.¹⁰⁹ One can only assume that based on the evidence presented here that a country with the political will, global legitimacy and capacity, such as Canada, will ultimately feel compelled to step forward. Circumstances being as they were, the CF's capacity peaked in Afghanistan, which invalidated plans for elsewhere, but the point can be seen that a Darfur mission was not eliminated in favour of Afghanistan.

Canada has accumulated considerable middle-power through its record of effective soft-power methods that is now matched by its increased propensity to use force for humanitarian intervention. Canada's global-influence enablers are its willingness to act on its policies which it has legitimized through its demonstrated depth of responsibility. This has resulted in Canada's power to increasingly choose the 'right way' of its own making. The implications for the CF are significant. The CF is creating a new destiny for itself by transforming and better aligning with Canada's policies (instead of Departmental policies). It is legitimizing itself in global terms (not only domestic) and being rewarded with the modernized tools to enhance its war-craft and its potential to bring relief around the globe. Inevitably, the next CF mission on the horizon will be somewhat different than planners can prepare for fully. However, the CF is in a much better position today in terms of its capacity to respond, meaning that it is better prepared to hold up its part of international so that it does not affect Canada's political

¹⁰⁸Rae, *The Three Questions...*, 194.

¹⁰⁹Gross Stein et al., *The Unexpected War...*, 129.

will or its ability to act with legitimacy. The CF needs to showcase its forward thinking and consolidate itself for humanitarian intervention tasks in the future.

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